Global misinformation trends: Commonalities and differences in topics, sources of falsehoods, and deception strategies across eight countries

Abstract

In a quantitative content analysis of 3,154 debunking articles from 23 fact-checking organizations, this study examines global misinformation trends and regional nuances across eight countries in Europe and Latin America (UK, DE, PT, SP, AR, BR, CL, and VZ). It strives to elucidate commonalities and differences based on political and media system indicators. Notably, countries with a substantial online presence of far-right parties avoid disclosing (fake) ordinary accounts to evade engaging in inauthentic coordinated actions. While entirely fabricated stories are infrequent, they stand out in Brazil and Spain, the two countries with higher political polarization. Despite variations, aggregated forms of fabrication (invented, manipulated, imposter, or decontextualized content) are more prominent in Latin America due to high social media use for news and low reliance on public media. Conversely, in Europe, countries are more impacted by misleading (cherry-picked, exaggerated, and twisted) information.

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https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448241268896
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Global misinformation trends:
Commonalities and differences
in topics, sources of falsehoods,
and deception strategies across
eight countries
Regina Cazzamatta
University of Erfurt, Germany
Abstract
In a quantitative content analysis of 3,154 debunking articles from 23 fact-checking
organizations, this study examines global misinformation trends and regional nuances
across eight countries in Europe and Latin America (UK, DE, PT, SP, AR, BR, CL,
and VZ). It strives to elucidate commonalities and differences based on political and
media system indicators. Notably, countries with a substantial online presence of far-
right parties avoid disclosing (fake) ordinary accounts to evade engaging in inauthentic
coordinated actions. While entirely fabricated stories are infrequent, they stand out in
Brazil and Spain, the two countries with higher political polarization. Despite variations,
aggregated forms of fabrication (invented, manipulated, imposter, or decontextualized
content) are more prominent in Latin America due to high social media use for news
and low reliance on public media. Conversely, in Europe, countries are more impacted
by misleading (cherry-picked, exaggerated, and twisted) information.
Keywords
Comparative studies, Europe, Latin America, media systems, misinformation, public
arenas, right-wing populism
Corresponding author:
Regina Cazzamatta, Media and Communication Studies, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, 99089
Erfurt, Germany.
Email: regina.cazzamatta@uni-erfurt.de; cazzamatta.regina@gmail.com
1268896NMS0010.1177/14614448241268896new media & societyCazzamatta
research-article2024
Article

2 new media & society 00(0)
Introduction
In recent years, misinformation research has gained prominence in communication stud-
ies due to its substantial impact on democracy and potential to disrupt public discourse
(Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Bimber and Gil de Zúñiga, 2020; Culloty and Suiter,
2021; Waisbord, 2018b), challenging trust in democratic institutions and authoritative
knowledge sources (Carro, 2022; Neuberger et al., 2023; Strömbäck et al., 2020).
However, despite its global significance, research predominantly focuses on the Global
North, leaving gaps in understanding how political and media structures (Hallin, 2020;
Humprecht et al., 2020; Rodríguez-Pérez and García-Vargas, 2021; Wasserman and
Madrid-Morales, 2021) influence false information dissemination. There has been scant
discussion of the different types of false information that circulate in the Global South
and the Global North (Schiffrin and Cunliffe-Jones, 2021).
Thus, this study outlines a comparative content analysis (N = 3154) of falsehoods
debunked by fact-checkers, investigating commonalities and differences in misinforma-
tion across eight countries—Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Portugal, Spain,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. We expanded the scope of research beyond the
United Kingdom and the United States liberal systems by incorporating Latin American
democracies and countries classified under the Mediterranean and Corporatist models in
Europe (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Beginning with the premise that contexts play a
pivotal role in information disorder (Hameleers, 2023) and that misinformation reflects
the emphasis placed on the national political news agenda, we aim to assess similarities
and variations in topics, origins of misinformation, strategies of deception and general
types of falsehoods. We will commence by delineating essential terms in the literature,
elucidating contextual factors that propel misinformation, and presenting deception
strategies and techniques employed by bad actors.
Defining key terms: fake news, disinformation, and
misinformation
Media digitalization and structural transformations of public arenas, that is, reconfigura-
tions of “communicative spaces through digital media, their uses, and associated effects”
(Jungherr and Schroeder, 2021: 3), have placed traditional epistemic authorities like sci-
ence and professional journalism in competition with alternative reality approaches
(Bimber and Gil de Zúñiga, 2020; Neuberger et al., 2023). Since 2016, concerns over
information disorder (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017) have prompted an avalanche of
studies discussing causes and effects of false information (Adams et al., 2023; Madrid-
Morales and Wasserman, 2021). Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) describe “information
disorder” as a phenomenon encompassing problems associated with misinformation
(falsehoods spread unintentionally), disinformation (deliberate employment of false-
hoods to achieve political or economic goals), and mal-information (misuse of genuine
information). The authors also highlighted the importance of separately observing the
“elements” (agents, messages, and interpreters) and phases (creation, [re]production, and
distribution) of the so-called information disorder.

Cazzamatta 3
Tandoc et al. (2018) reviewed studies operationalizing the term “fake news” and pre-
sented a typology based on levels of message facticity and deception—satire, parody,
fabrication, manipulation, advertising, and propaganda. Other scholars (Egelhofer and
Lecheler, 2019) classified the problem as a two-dimensional phenomenon, namely fake
news as a genre (intentional pseudo-journalism) and a label (political instrumentalization
to delegitimize established media). Due to its political instrumentalization, the use of the
term “fake news” has been criticized, and many scholars abstain from employing it
(House of Commons, 2019). This distinction based on intentionality is commonly
accepted among experts (Armitage and Vaccari, 2021), although some scholars claim
that such definitional discussions can be distracting (Weeks and Gil De Zúñiga, 2021). In
this article, since we will approach the comparative data without previous knowledge of
intentional behaviors of agents—especially in the case of ordinary social media users—
we adopt the term “misinformation” as a broader category encompassing false or inac-
curate information, while “disinformation” is used to denote an extreme or politically
motivated form of misinformation, specifically with the intent to deceive (Hameleers
et al., 2022).
Fertile soils for misinformation—populism, polarization,
and social media
Studies have attributed the above discussed information disorder to the fragmentation
and disruption of public spheres due to the erosion of trust in democratic press and politi-
cal institutions (Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Mancini, 2013). Although it is a global
phenomenon, several authors reinforce the cruciality of taking into account the social
and political environments and local circumstances when addressing misinformation
(Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Hameleers, 2023; Humprecht, 2019).
Humprecht et al. (2020) identified seven factors influencing a nation’s disinformation
resilience: societal polarization, populist political communication, diminished trust in
news sources, underdeveloped Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), fragmented media
audiences, the scale of the digital advertising market, and widespread social media use.
Rodríguez-Pérez and García-Vargas (2021) extended this research to Latin American
countries, finding that they exhibit lower resilience compared to their Global North
counterparts. In addition, a state’s resilience to misinformation is influenced by citizens’
preferred social media platforms (Armitage and Vaccari, 2021). The 2018 Brazilian pres-
idential election serves as a notable example of false information dissemination through
WhatsApp (Santini et al., 2021).
Analyses (Bennett and Livingston, 2018; Hameleers, 2020; Marwick and Lewis,
2018; Recuero et al., 2022; Waisbord, 2018a) link the rise of right-wing populism to
disinformation and specific political agendas. From the audience perspective, studies
have demonstrated a positive correlation between misinformation and the support of
right-wing populist parties (Van Kessel et al., 2021). Populism, viewed as a political
communication strategy, exploits societal polarization and binary worldviews, particu-
larly in blame attribution toward the established order and media institutions1 (Hameleers
and Minihold, 2022). Llorca-Abad et al. (2021) highlight parallels between the
approaches of Santiago Abascal, the Spanish political party Vox, and Trump in the United

4 new media & society 00(0)
States, along with proximity to Steve Bannon’s strategies. Other studies note political
similarities in communication methods and strategies among right-wing populists in
Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding (un)truthfulness (Hameleers and
Minihold, 2022). Scholars assert that misinformation boosted support for Nigel Farage’s
Brexit Party in the 2019 European Parliament election (Van Kessel et al., 2021).
In the midst of a global autocratic resurgence, right-wing populism has reached Latin
America with notable figures like Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Javier Milei (Argentina),
Antonio Kast (Chile), and Guido Rios (Uruguay). Despite sharing discursive traits with
far-right movements in Europe (e.g., AfD in Germany, Chega in Portugal, or Vox in
Spain), regional distinctions include presidentialism systems, two decades of left-ori-
ented regimes, and the legacy of military dictatorship (for political specificities, see
Kestler, 2022; Sanahuja et al., 2023; Siles et al., 2021). Bolsonaro, the most radical fig-
ure in Latin America, utilizes YouTube and Telegram to disseminate messages against
the press, the Supreme Court, and the opposition, manipulating public opinion with dis-
information (Di Nubila et al., 2023).
Despite the predominant association of misinformation with far-right ideologies, it
extends beyond right-wing populism. Left-wing movements, exemplified by “Chavismo”
in Venezuela, also employ falsehoods, positioning themselves as champions of the peo-
ple against entrenched elites (Waisbord, 2018a). Similarly, in the United States and the
Netherlands, left-wing populists utilize narratives of people-centricity and attribute
falsehoods to their adversaries, albeit without directly targeting established media and
political figures (Hameleers, 2020). Research indicates that adherents of right-wing ide-
ologies display higher susceptibility to false information and demonstrate greater resist-
ance to corrective measures (Van Kessel et al., 2021).
Agents, topics, and types of falsehoods
Various actors contribute to creating and spreading falsehoods, including social media
users, political figures, foreign governments, hyper-partisan media, established media,
and those driven by economic motives (Tucker et al., 2018). Detecting disinformation is
challenging due to its unknown origins (Bimber and Gil de Zúñiga, 2020) and its covert
nature, as it aims to deceive (Hameleers, 2023). Inauthentic behaviors (Keller et al.,
2020) such as creating fake accounts, using bots to artificially boost engagement metrics
(Chan, 2024; Tucker et al., 2018), or manipulating online discussions through coordi-
nated efforts obscure the origins of falsehoods and worsen misinformation by fabricating
fake audiences (Delwiche, 2019).
Comparative studies across Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, analyzing online disinformation topics and sources identified by fact-checkers,
reveal a significant correlation between misinformation topics and national news agen-
das (Humprecht, 2019). In the United States, for instance, commonly fact-checked mis-
information topics encompass terrorism, national security, healthcare, and the economy
(Yousuf, 2023).
Regarding the types of misinformation or deception techniques, spreaders of false-
hoods often refrain from fabricating entirely implausible stories. Instead, they manipu-
late information through alteration or tampering, constructing deceptive narratives that

Cazzamatta 5
maintain some connection to reality (Hameleers, 2023). Deception is more effective
when it establishes tangible connections to factual information. Misinformation encom-
passes a spectrum, from entirely fabricated content (e.g., alleged 5G brain insertions
after vaccination) to the decontextualization of material, where content is extracted from
its original context and repurposed to alter its meaning (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017;
House of Commons, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). An
example of the latter involves using images from the Kosovo war, misleadingly pre-
sented as events in the Ukraine war. Genuine information can be digitally altered through
manipulation, adding non-existing elements via techniques like photoshopping, crop-
ping, deepfakes, fake subtitles, and other visual manipulations. Manipulated or decon-
textualized visual information is often (mis)used to create a false impression of credibility
and proof, exerting high persuasive impact (Dan et al., 2021). Another technique involves
creating or spreading imposter content that mimics genuine sources, like established
media companies or business organizations (Hameleers, 2023; House of Commons,
2018; Tandoc et al., 2018; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). The literature also encom-
passes misleading information, including distortions, omissions, exaggerations, cherry-
picking facts, or misrepresentations of scientific, and statistical methods (Hameleers,
2023; House of Commons, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017).
Research question
Proceeding from the assumption that contexts are decisive for information disorder and
that misinformation mirrors the priorities set by the national political agenda, we ask:
RQ: What commonalities and differences exist regarding (a) topics, (b) sources of
falsehoods, and (c) deception strategies across the eight countries analyzed—Portugal,
Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela?
Methods
Countries sample
Following media systems theories (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Echeverria et al., 2022;
Flew and Waisbord, 2015), we selected four European countries based on Hallin and
Mancini’s (2004) typology, considering its four main traits: press development, political
parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state. Portugal and Spain
represent the polarized pluralist model, Germany represents the democratic corporatist,
and the United Kingdom represents the liberal model. Portugal and Spain were preferred
over France or Italy within the Mediterranean model due to their historical and colonial
connections with Latin America. To expand the research scope beyond Western democ-
racies, we chose to include four additional Latin American countries. Scholars have
attempted to model Latin American media systems oriented by the Hallin and Mancini
framework, classifying them as “liberal captured” (Guerrero, 2014). However, this char-
acterization was seen as overly generalized, as constructing models for Latin American

6 new media & society 00(0)
media systems presents challenges due to varying levels of journalistic professionalism
within the same country, internal differences resembling liberal and polarized pluralist
models, and greater instability marked by frequent shifts between media and political
systems compared to Europe or the United States (Echeverria et al., 2022; Hallin, 2020).
Thus, for Latin America, our selection was guided by indicators proposed by Humprecht
et al. (2020) and variations in democratic levels based on the “most different” system
design (Rössler, 2011), leading us to choose Chile (full democracy), Brazil, Argentina
(flawed democracies), and Venezuela (autocracy). These additional indicators, as shown
in Table 1, facilitate transnational comparisons. For instance, Chile’s indicators closely
align with those of EU countries, unlike Brazil or Venezuela. Latin American nations
show higher social media usage for news, exacerbating the misinformation phenomenon
compared to their European counterparts. Despite both Argentina and Brazil being clas-
sified as “flawed democracies,” they display distinct indicators, particularly concerning
government involvement in misinformation campaigns.
Table 1. Countries traits in 2022.
Deliberative
Democracy
(0–1)
Political
polarization
(Scale 0–4)a
Trust in the
media/news
(% pop)b
PSB:
Audience
Share
Social Media
as a source of
news (% pop)
Government
Dissemination of
False Information
(Domestic)
(Scale 0–4)c
Argentina 0.64 3.65 35.0 5.4 69 3.44
Brazil 0.45 3.81 48.0 0.5 64 0.54
Chile 0.76 2.62 38.0 8.2 70 3.25
Venezuela 0.04 3.29 51.7 1.8 / 0.34
Germany 0.82 1.62 50.0 42.0 32 3.81
Portugal 0.74 1.27 61.0 34.0 57 3.83
Spain 0.77 2.40 32.0 33.0 56 3.52
The United
Kingdom
0.73 2.38 34.0 39.0 38 2.88
Source: Edelman (2022), European Audiovisual Observatory (2019), Fletcher etal. (2022), Hagan (2019),
Mier-Sanmartín etal. (2019) and University of Gothenburg (2022).
a“Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly
interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces”
(University of Gothenburg, 2022). Measured from “0” (not at all) to “4” (to a large extent). Despite the
existence of far-right and far-left parties in Germany, the country’s strong Public Service Broadcasting and
low social media usage for news (as shown in Table 1) may foster a comparatively more integrated and
less fragmented public sphere. These factors could potentially contribute to a stabilizing effect on people’s
interactions in a less polarized manner when compared to other contexts.
bIn the United Kingdom, trust in news has decreased by 16 percentage points since the Brexit referendum
in 2016, according to the Digital News Report. This decline occurs amid heightened polarization in political
and cultural debates, with political polarization in the United Kingdom among the highest in the EU. In
Spain, diminishing trust is linked to pandemic fatigue and exacerbated by political and media polarization,
amplified by three significant regional elections held at short notice.
cQuestion posed by the survey “How often do the government and its agents use social media to dissemi-
nate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?.” Scale from “0” (extremely
often) to “4” (almost never) (University of Gothenburg, 2022).

Cazzamatta 7
Unit of analysis. Rather than actively seeking false information across platforms, we rely
on established fact-checking organizations. In this context, the results below reflect fact-
checking decisions concerning what to verify, rather than covering all falsehoods within
the national online ecosystems. We chose organizations operating within (a) established
media outlets, (b) global news agencies, and (c) independent initiatives to encompass all
types of organizations, considering their differences in selection processes (Table 2).
Three organizations were selected per country, except for Argentina, which has only two.
Their work involves identifying, verifying, and distributing (mis)information.
Collaborations with tech companies and platforms have provided these organizations
with technological infrastructure, databases, advanced search tools, and training for
monitoring the online environment (Bélair-Gagnon et al., 2023; Westlund et al., 2022).
Due to varying capacities and resources, we adopt a representative approach by selecting
25% of articles from each organization. The sampling size is statistically more than suf-
ficient to represent the main population of articles (Krippendorff, 2018; Rössler, 2011).
The links were gathered from the website of each organization using the Feeder exten-
sion, a web-based tool that allows users to monitor and subscribe to website updates
(Krippendorff, 2018; Rössler, 2011). From the entire pool of links, we selected every
fourth one based on publication date. Our dataset consists of 3,154 verification pieces
published between 1 January and 31 December 2022, the period when the study com-
menced. In 2022, the verification landscape no longer focused solely on the global pan-
demic, providing us with a broader perspective on topics.
Analyzed categories and reliability
Eight native-speaking research assistants coded the data over 5 months. Before assess-
ing reliability, they underwent 40 hours of training. An additional 20 hours post-relia-
bility tests were spent discussing common mistakes to ensure acceptable reliability
levels. Tests were conducted within language-specific groups to eliminate codebook
Table 2. Sampling of fact-checking organizations across countries.
Countries Editorial fact-checking Independents News agencies' units
of fact-checking
Germany Faktenfinder (Tagesschau) Correctiv! DPA Faktenchecks
The United Kingdom BBC Reality Check Full Fact Reuters Fact Check
Portugal Fact Checks do
Observador and Prova
dos Factos (Publico)
Polígrafo X
Spain x Maldita.es, Newtral EFE Verifica
Brazil Estadão Verifica Agência Lupa AFP Checamos
Argentina X Chequeado AFP Factual
Venezuela X Efecto Cocuyo / Es
Paja and Cotejo
X
Chile La Tercera Fact-Checking FastCheckCL AFP Chile

8 new media & society 00(0)
flaws rather than language comprehension issues (Krippendorff’s alpha coefficients in
Table 3). A detailed codebook with comprehensive category descriptions is available
in the Supplementary Material.
Although there are overlaps between deception strategies and falsehood types, our
final variable aggregates all types of fabrication, including entirely invented, manipu-
lated, imposter, and decontextualized content. We also examine their combination with
conspiracy theories or hate speech.
Data analysis
To examine patterns of misinformation across countries, we employed correspondence
analysis (CA), a statistical technique for analyzing relationships between categorical
variables. Especially beneficial for large contingency tables like those in this study, CA
transforms data into a lower-dimensional space, facilitating visualization of patterns and
identification of significant associations. The method emphasizes the representation of
points in a scatter plot, with proximity indicating association strength. This technique
offers insights into relationships between categorical variables, enhancing interpretabil-
ity of complex datasets (Beh and Lombardo, 2014; Greenacre, 2017).
Table 3. Overarching categories for analysis.
Overarching categories Short summarized description Krippendorff’s alpha
Topics (1) Domestic Politics, (2) Economic-Political,
(3) Society, Cultural Wars and Zeitgeist, (4)
Science, Technology and Environment, (5)
Health, (6) International Affairs, (7) Human
Interest.
0.93–0.97
Sources (1) Unknown or Ordinary Social Media
Profiles, (2) Media Actors, (3) Political Actors,
(4) Civil Society Groups and Individuals, (5)
Business Elites, (6) Individual Celebrities,
Digital Influencers and Opinion Leaders
0.70–0.90
Deception Strategies (1) Fabrication, (2) Manipulation, (3) Imposter,
(4) Decontextualization, (5) Misleading, (6)
False Connections/Bad Journalism, (7) Satire
and Parodiesa, (8) Branding and Advertising.
0.77–0.95
General Type of
Falsehoods
(1) Satires; (2) All Types of Fabrication
(3) Sensationalism and Bad Journalism,
(4) Misleading and Cherry-Picking, (5)
Fabrication + Conspiracy Theories (6)
Fabrication + Hate Speech, (7) Genuine
Mistakes, (8) Online Scams
0.9–1.00
aWhile satire and parodies are not intended as deception strategies, we include them in the empirical analy-
sis because they can deceive when misunderstood or unidentified by the audience.

Cazzamatta 9
Findings
Topics of falsehoods across countries verified by fact-checkers
Zooming in on falsehoods, transnational misinformation flows are evident, especially
amid global events. Examples include misinformation about the Russia–Ukraine war,
COVID, and vaccine skepticism, significantly impacting all countries. Other global
event-related falsehoods, like the Qatar World Cup or Queen Elizabeth’s health and
funeral, also appeared across all countries, albeit less prominently. To discern country-
specific similarities and differences, a correspondence analysis based on a cross-sec-
tional table of countries and misinformation topics was conducted (Figure 1). The
Chi-square test indicates a statistically significant connection (p < .001), and Cramer’s V
shows a 19% association between the variables (see Table 1 of Supplementary Material).
In the top-left quadrant of Figure 1, Brazil and Chile show distinct patterns, with the
majority of their falsehoods (52% and 44%, respectively) related to domestic politics.
Examining the standardized residuals in the cross table reveals both countries have more
falsehoods related to domestic politics than expected (sr = 13.5 and sr = 6.0 respectively).
This can be attributed to the highly polarized presidential election in Brazil and the
Chilean constitutional referendum in 2022 (Bell, 2022; Doctor, 2022; Osborn, 2023;
Ozawa et al., 2023; Santini et al., 2021). Focusing solely on misinformation related to
domestic politics in these countries, falsehoods about elections and plebiscites ranged
Dimension 1 (63 % of cases variance)
1.00.50.0-0.5-1.0-1.5
Dimension 2 (21 % of cases variance)
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
Science-Environment
Society-Zeitgeist
Venezuela Spain
Brazil Argentina
Human Interest
International Affair
Health
Economy
Domestic Politics
The UK
Portugal
Germany
Chile
Correspondence Analysis of Countries and Topics of Misinformation
Symmetrical Normalization
V22.Thematic Area
Countries
Figure 1. Correspondence analysis of countries and topics of falsehoods.

10 new media & society 00(0)
from 20% to 39%, while those involving slander, defamation, and smear campaigns
increased from 13% to 30%, constituting the bulk of domestic politics mis-disinforma-
tion. In Brazil, despite intense disinformation campaigns, the right-wing candidate lost
the election (Cazzamatta and Santos, 2023). In Chile, voters rejected the progressive new
constitution amid a campaign tainted by disinformation (Bell, 2022; Nolte, 2022; Osborn,
2023). Notably, a narrative spread by far-right figure Felipe Kast, defeated by Boric in
the 2021 election, claimed the new constitution would allow abortions up to nine months
into pregnancy. Kast, later retracting the statement, also asserted that Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro supported the proposed constitution, suggesting property
expropriation, the inability to inherit insurance funds, and the abolition of uniformed
police (Bell, 2022; Nolte, 2022; Osborn, 2023).
Excluding Brazil and Chile, the predominant theme affecting all other countries was
“international affairs & politics,” ranging from 23% in Venezuela to 38% in the United
Kingdom. Falsehoods related to the “Russian-Ukrainian war” and “slander & defama-
tion of international politicians” emerged as prominent subtopics across nations. In addi-
tion, Chile, Portugal, and the UK faced significant impacts from falsehoods associated
with international elections. In Chile, misinformation primarily revolved around the
2022 Brazilian and Colombian presidential elections. Portugal, owing to colonial ties
and a substantial Brazilian immigrant population, experienced prevalent falsehoods
related to the Brazilian election. In the United Kingdom, misinformation concerning the
2022 US midterm elections and other global ballots, such as those in Kenya and Angola,
circulated more intensively.
Despite misinformation generally dominating international affairs in six countries,
Germany (sr = 2.1) and the United Kingdom (sr = 5.6) exhibit higher circulation. In the
upper right quadrant (Figure 1), the distinctiveness of both countries is evident, particu-
larly in the prevalence of falsehoods concerning foreign affairs. Germany (sr = 1.9) and
the United Kingdom (sr = 5.9) also stand out for health misinformation, with the United
Kingdom having more than expected (sr = 5.9). Distrust in government, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, or scientists renders individuals vulnerable to misinformation. A report from
the British fact-checking organization Full Fact revealed that the ease of harmful misin-
formation spread was attributed to the public’s limited understanding of scientific aspects
related to viruses and vaccines. Research papers gained unusual media focus, and con-
veying intricate scientific ideas accessible to the public proved challenging, leading to
inaccurate reporting in major UK newspapers (Full Fact, 2023), a landscape marked by
tabloid culture (Lefkowitz, 2018). In Germany, the high association with health misin-
formation is linked to the “querdenken” movement, comprising disgruntled citizens,
individuals from the far-right spectrum, conspiracy theorists, and those with esoteric
beliefs, all exhibiting a general mistrust toward the government, media, and conventional
medical practices (Heinke, 2022).
Portugal stands out for its economic misinformation compared to other countries
(sr = 8.7). This pattern is explained by the political-economic context during data gather-
ing when a general election was called in January 2022 following the defeat of the minor-
ity socialist government of Antonio Costa in a pivotal budget vote determining the
allocation of EU aids for pandemic recovery. Coupled with rising energy prices in the
Russia–Ukraine war context, falsehoods related to “taxation, tolls, imposts, and tariffs”

Cazzamatta 11
(21%), “energy consumption, prices rates & variations” (21%), and “the labor market”
(17%) predominated within the landscape of speculations in Portugal.
Spain, Argentina, and Venezuela, situated in the low-right quadrant, show less distinc-
tiveness in proximity to the null point of the graphic, serving as a reference for no asso-
ciation. Despite this, an analysis of standard residuals in Spanish topic distribution
reveals that misinformation associated with “society, cultural wars, and zeitgeist”
(sr = 2.7) and “human interests” (sr = 5.6) occurred more frequently than expected.
Discussions on gender equality, feminism, and identity politics (constituting 40% within
the Zeitgeist category) dominated, followed by racism (19%). This pattern aligns with
the primary focus of Pedro Sanchez’s leftist government, particularly emphasizing an
ambitious agenda for women’s and LGBTQ+ rights alongside the energy revolution. In
the realm of human interest, akin to Venezuela, online scams, phishing, and smishing
attempts (i.e. a form of phishing where perpetrators use text messages [SMS] to trick
individuals into divulging personal information) account for 40% of misinformation top-
ics. This underscores the creation of falsehoods based on discourses circulating within a
specific society.
Sources of falsehoods scrutinized by fact-checkers
Tracing disinformation is challenging due to its unknown origins, as its purpose is to
deceive “behind the scenes.” Consequently, the vast majority of identified falsehoods
across countries, ranging from 61% in Venezuela to 85% in Brazil, originate from uni-
dentified or ordinary social media users, as illustrated in Figure 2. The first case involves
instances where organizations do not disclose the names of social media users or
accounts, instead using general terms like “a profile on Twitter” or obscuring the name
with a black target when presenting a screenshot of the message. In the second case, the
information is visible, but the accounts or profiles belong to publicly unknown, ordinary
social media users.
Accessing the quantity of concealed AstroTurf,2 bots, or human trolls behind seem-
ingly “ordinary” social media accounts is challenging. Flourishing on metrics such as
likes and views, click farms are a consequence of social media logic. In Brazil, Germany,
Portugal, and Spain, where far-right parties are highly articulated, fact-checking organi-
zations typically refrain from disclosing (fake) account names (Figure 3). Instead, iden-
tification is obscured by a black stripe in the false information screenshot.
Given the current political polarization, one might assume that protecting the iden-
tity of disinformed social media users is crucial to prevent online harassment. However,
even more critical is the imperative to refrain from amplifying the profiles of those
spreading falsehoods and to avoid interactions with trolls and bots. Troll farms instruct
their employees to minimize the risk of being blocked by implementing specific strate-
gies for creating fictitious accounts, such as using a human profile picture, maintaining
an active presence with previous posts, publishing at regular intervals, engaging with
others, and ensuring high levels of activity. Understanding this, fact-checking organiza-
tions steer clear of promoting these accounts and refrain from identifying their names.
In this context, it seems reasonable to assume that these countries may exhibit a more
pronounced prevalence of coordinated inauthentic behaviors, leading to a reluctance to

12 new media & society 00(0)
publicize these seemingly “ordinary” accounts and inadvertently assist them in evading
platform controls. In Argentina, Venezuela, and the United Kingdom, the ratio between
identified and unidentified profiles is more balanced, while in Chile, the majority of
social media users are identified.
Despite the obscure online identities of false information, political actors in various
countries also contribute to its dissemination. Fact-checkers, to a lesser extent, verify
statements by local politicians, ranging from 2.2% in Germany to 20% in Portugal. To
evaluate the accuracy of politicians’ statements across countries, we filtered all claims by
national governments’ and opposition parties’ politicians classified as false or partially
false (Table 4).
In Argentina in 2022, the “Frente de Todos” (Front of All) coalition, a union of
Kirchnerism3 forces and non-Kirchnerist territorial Peronism, generated around 20%
69.50%
85.50%
75.80%
62.80%
70.70%73.90% 74.70%72.90%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Argentina BrazilChile VenezuelaGermany Portugal SpainThe UK
Unidentified or ordinary social media profiles
Figure 2. Percentage of unidentified or ordinary social media profiles as a source of
falsehoods.
39.8%
29.4%
79.9%
5.3%
66.8%
9.1%
32.0% 29.0%
62.5%
7.2%
68.9%
4.6%
67.1%
6.9%
37.5% 35.3%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
Ordinary-Unkown
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
Unidentified
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
Unidentified
Ordinary-Unkown
ArgentinaBrazil ChileVenezuela GermanyPortugal SpainThe UK
Relation of unindentified and ordinary sources of misinformation across countries
Figure 3. Ratio between identified and unidentified social media profiles.

Cazzamatta 13
Table 4. Partially false and false statements by government and opposition politicians.
Government’s statements Argentina Brazil Chile Venezuela Germany Portugal Spain The United Kingdom Total
Partially False N5 0 0 3 1 4 14 4 31
% 16.1 0.0 0.0 9.7 3.2 12.9 45. 12.9 100
False N2 13 3 9 1 8 14 7 57
% 3.5 22.8 5.3 15.8 1.8 14.0 24.6 12.3 100
Total in % 19.6 22.8 5.3 25.5 5.0 26.9 69.8 25.2
Opposition’s statements Argentina Brazil Chile Venezuela Germany Portugal Spain The United Kingdom Total
Partially False n1 4 1 0 1 7 15 4 33
% 3.0 12.1 3.0 0.0 3.0 21.2 45.5 12.1 100
False n2 9 2 2 3 28 18 4 68
% 2.9 13.2 2.9 2.9 4.4 41.2 26.5 5.9 100
Total in % 5.9 25.3 5.9 2.9 7.4 62.4 72.0 18.0

14 new media & society 00(0)
of the (partially) false statements in the sample. In contrast, the opposition, led by the
center-right “Juntos por el Cambio” (Together for Change) coalition, accounted for
5.9%. Despite its left-oriented perspective, populist movements in Argentina seemed
more actively involved in spreading falsehoods. In Brazil’s highly polarized 2022
election, false claims from the far-right government of Jair Bolsonaro and his liberal
party (22.8%) were comparable to those from the opposition (25.3%), primarily led
by the Workers’ Party. Similar trends are observed in Chile, where politicians from
the left-oriented government of Gabriel Boric (5.3%) and the opposition (5.9%) show
comparable levels of inaccuracies in their statements. The relatively low percentage
of politicians directly involved in spreading falsehoods can be attributed to Chile’s
distinctive traits—the lowest political polarization, the highest PSB audience share,
and a lower probability of government involvement in disinformation campaigns
(Table 1). In Venezuela, under Maduro’s left-oriented populist administration, the
government exhibits the highest percentage of (partially) false claims (25.5%), con-
trasting with the opposition (2.9%). This aligns with expectations based on the
VDEM-Project’s assessment of governmental dissemination of false information.
In Germany, the coalition comprising the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and
Free Democratic Party had slightly less involvement in disseminating false informa-
tion (5.0%) compared to the opposition (7.4%), which includes the far-right Alternative
for Germany (AfD). In Portugal, the disparities between government and opposition
involvement in spreading imprecise information are more pronounced. The socialist
government, led by Antonio Costa (by the time a majority since the January 2022 gen-
eral election), was responsible for 26.9% of (partially) false information, while the
opposition stated 62.4% of false claims. Notably, since the 2022 general election, the
far-right opposition party Chega significantly increased its results compared to 2019,
winning 12 seats.
In Spain, the socialist coalition government (The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
(PSOE) and Podemos) and the conservative opposition (Partido Popular (PP)) share a
similar proportion of false information spread, with rates of 70% and 72%, respec-
tively. Spain’s highly decentralized structure saw the far-right party Vox entering the
regional government in 2022, forming an alliance with the conservative PP in Castilla
y León. Unlike the traditional right in Germany and Portugal, which seeks to isolate
the far-right, in Spain, Vox has played a crucial role in supporting the Popular Party
(PP) administration or facilitating the passage of conservative legislation. The con-
servatives also triumphed in the June 2022 regional elections in Andalusia, where the
relationship between the government and opposition had to consider administrative
dynamics. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party government, somewhat
influenced by the former far-right UK Independence Party agenda, has 25% of its
claims in the sample labeled as partially false or false by fact-checkers, compared to
18% for the opposition. A notable disparity in government-opposition involvement in
spreading falsehoods was found primarily in Argentina (by the Peronist government),
Venezuela (under the Maduro administration), and Portugal (involving the non-social-
ist opposition). However, in other countries, falsehoods seem to be disseminated by
various political factions across the spectrum.

Cazzamatta 15
Deception strategies identified in the dataset of fact-checking articles
As expected, disinformation strategies generally avoid fabricating entirely implausible
narratives. Instead, they tend to modify or manipulate information, creating deceptive
narratives that maintain connections to elements of truth. This approach aims to prevent
triggering suspicion among recipients who lack the resources to thoroughly scrutinize
every argument (Hameleers, 2023). Completely fabricated stories are less common
(Table 5), varying from 6.1% in Argentinian verified stories to 15% in Spain. Such con-
tent is most prevalent in Brazil (sr = 2.1) and Spain (sr = 2.9), the two countries with the
highest political polarization in their respective continents (Table 1).
However, overall, decontextualization stands out as the primary deception strategy
identified by fact-checkers, claiming the highest proportion in all states, though in vary-
ing degrees, ranging from 50% in Argentina to 27% in the United Kingdom and Portugal.
Despite being the prevailing trend, this strategy is more frequently employed than antici-
pated within the four Latin American countries (see standardized residuals in Table 3,
within supplementary material).
Germany (sr = 4.4) and Spain (sr = 2.1) exhibit a notable prevalence of verified
imposter content (Table 5), where genuine sources are impersonated, often using the
branding of established media organizations, companies, or entities. Private companies
are the primary targets, constituting 37.3% in Germany and 27% in Spain. This is
closely associated with the prevalence of online scams in both countries. Impersonation
of media outlets is the second most common, with nationally established media brands
accounting for 15% in Germany and international media for 4.5%, reflecting higher
levels of trust in domestic media (Table 1). In Spain, the imitation of international
media brands (13%) slightly surpasses that of national brands (10%). Despite accusa-
tions of media bias and “fake news,” imitating media sources persists as a strategy to
create the illusion of information credibility.
Finally, falsehoods due to false connections (discrepancies between texts and head-
lines) and instances of bad journalism are less frequent but more prevalent in Portugal
(sr = 0.2), Spain (sr = 0.4), and the United Kingdom (sr = 0.5). The strong association with
the United Kingdom can be attributed to the prevalent tabloid culture in the country
(Lefkowitz, 2018). In addition, the United Kingdom tops the ranking in misunderstood
satires and parodies (sr = 5.5). It is important to note that fact-checkers classify informa-
tion as satire when individuals misunderstand jokes and mistake them for reality. Unlike
other categories, satire is not a deceptive strategy, as its creators do not intend harm.
General types of falsehoods targeted by fact-checkers
The correspondence analysis between countries and general falsehood types identified
by fact-checkers indicates a more significant impact of aggregated fabrication types
(entire inventions, manipulation and adulterations, imposter, and decontextualization) on
Latin American countries, situated in the upper left quadrant (Figure 4). This corresponds
to their extensive use of social media for news and a limited audience reliance on PSB.
Brazil, particularly affected (sr = 5.6), is followed by Chile (sr = 2.0), Argentina, and
Venezuela (sr = 1.3). It is plausible to assume that events like elections and referendums
prompt more attempts at deception.

16 new media & society 00(0)
Table 5. Cross table countries and deception strategies.
Argentina Brazil Chile Venezuela Germany Portugal Spain The United Kingdom Total
100% Fabrication N11 78 12 23 33 49 81 53 340
% 6.1 13.7 5.5 11.00 10.5 7.9 14.9 10.6 10.8
sr −1.9 2.1 −2.4 0.1 −0.2 −2.1 2.9 −0.1
Manipulation N15 50 19 17 20 25 62 51 259
% 8.3 8.8 8.7 8.1 6.3 4.1 11.4 10.2 8.2
sr 0.1 0.5 0.2 −0.1 −1.2 −3.6 2.6 1.6
Imposter N7 44 27 13 51 31 62 42 277
% 3.9 7.7 12.3 6.2 16.2 5.00 11.4 8.4 8.8
sr −2.2 −0.8 1.8 −1.3 4.4 −3.2 2.1 −0.3
Decontextualization N91 266 98 86 98 166 183 139 1127
% 50.6 46.7 44.7 41.00 31.1 26.9 33.6 27.8 35.7
sr 3.3 4.4 2.2 1.3 −1.4 −3.7 −0.8 −3
Misleading N17 69 39 17 63 94 69 70 438
% 9.4 12.1 17.8 8.1 20.00 15.2 12.7 14.00 13.9
sr −1.6 −1.1 1.6 −2.3 2.9 0.9 −0.8 0.1
False Connection N0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
% 0.0 0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
sr −0.5 0.3 −0.5 −0.5 −0.6 0.2 0.4 0.5
Satire N6 7 4 1 10 7 10 31 76
% 3.3 1.2 1.8 0.5 3.2 1.1 1.8 6.2 2.4
sr 0.8 −1.8 −0.6 −1.8 0.9 −2 −0.9 5.5
Branding N0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
% 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.2 0.2 0.00 0.1
sr −0.3 −0.6 −0.4 −0.4 −0.4 1 1.1 −0.6
Not Applicable N33 54 20 53 40 243 75 113 630
% 18.3 9.5 9.1 25.2 12.7 39.4 13.8 22.6 20.00
sr −0.5 −5.6 −3.6 1.7 −2.9 10.7 −3.2 1.3
n180 569 219 210 315 617 544 500 3154
Total % 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Chi-square = 412.581. Cramers’ V = 0.137.

Cazzamatta 17
European countries, notably the United Kingdom (sr = 3.5) and Germany (sr = 1.8),
experience higher instances of misleading information, with Portugal and Spain follow-
ing (sr = 0.5 each). Misleading information is not entirely false; instead, it often includes
accurate data that is exaggerated or distorted to support a specific argument and align
with a particular narrative. Actors may present information with crucial facts omitted or
offer interpretations based on selectively chosen data (cherry-picking).
Portugal appears less distinctive, close to the null point, while the United Kingdom,
in the lower-left quadrant, stands out for misunderstood satires (sr = 6.1) and genuine
mistakes by media or government agencies (sr = 4.2). In the upper right quadrant,
Germany and Spain share noticeable amounts of online scams (sr = 6.4 and 5.6, respec-
tively), as discussed earlier, and hate speech (sr = 7.4 and 4.7). Hate speech fabrications
include offensive language, violent threats, expressions of hatred, and discriminatory
content targeting individuals based on ethnic or national origin, religious affiliation, gen-
der, sexual orientation, and political beliefs. The primary target of hate speech fabrica-
tions is immigrants and foreigners (32.3% in Germany and 43.5% in Spain). In Spain,
73% of identified hate speech cases relate to “social issues, cultural wars, and zeitgeist,”
while in Germany, hate speech is distributed as 36% within domestic politics (specifi-
cally immigration policies), 27% related to foreign affairs (especially the Russian-
Ukrainian war), and 18% within “social issues, cultural wars, and zeitgeist.”
Dimension 1 (59 % cases variance)
3210-1-2
Dimension 2 (24 % cases variance)
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
Fabrications
Satire & Jokes
Venezuela
The UK
Portugal
Brazil
Online Scams
Mistake
Hate Speech
Conspiracy Theory
Misleading
Sensationalism
Spain
Germany
Chile Argentina
Correspondence Analysis of Countries and Types of Falsehoods
Symmetrical Normalization
V27.General Types of Falsehoods
Countries
Figure 4. Correspondence analysis—countries and falsehood types.

18 new media & society 00(0)
Germany, a destination for numerous immigrants, is poised to receive the highest
number of asylum seekers since the 2015 surge in migration, prompted by the Syrian
civil war. Currently, amid the Ukrainian war, the country has witnessed prolonged
digital media usage by the far and extreme right. The refugee rise of 2015–2016 led to
a widespread alternative digital information environment within the political right,
extending beyond the limited circle of supporters (Jungherr and Schroeder, 2022).
Spain, experiencing increased immigration from North Africa and Latin America,
associates perceived “threats” with media and political discourse, irrespective of unem-
ployment rates or immigrant proportions (Igartua et al., 2005). Falsehoods and hate
speech align with Vox’s nationalist rhetoric, entering Spanish politics in 2018. Vox,
known for assertive language, particularly toward Muslim immigrants, secured seats in
the 2019 national parliament and formed regional alliances in 2022, entering Castilla y
León. This highlights how falsehoods mirror national issues and the news agenda.
Concluding remarks
This study offers a comparative analysis of similarities and differences in topics, decep-
tion strategies, and types of misinformation across eight countries in Europe and Latin
America, as examined by various fact-checking organizations (n = 23). It addresses a gap
in systematic comparative analysis in the field (Matassi and Boczkowski, 2023) and
broadens the geographical scope of disinformation literature, responding to calls from
scholars (Broda and Strömbäck, 2024). The contributions of this analysis to the disinfor-
mation literature are multifaceted. First, it provides empirical evidence that misinforma-
tion is strongly context-dependent (Hameleers, 2023), shaped by regional political
contexts despite global trends like the Russia-Ukraine war, COVID-19, or vaccine skep-
ticism. Second, it empirically supports the concept of “elective affinity” (Gerbaudo,
2018; Hameleers, 2020; Waisbord, 2018a) between information disorder (Bennett and
Livingston, 2018; Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017) and (right-wing) populism. The study
finds that a significant portion of false information originates from unidentified or seem-
ingly ordinary social media users, suggesting potential coordinated behavior behind
these accounts. In countries with a notable far-right online presence, such as Brazil,
Germany, Portugal, and Spain, fact-checking organizations often avoid disclosing the
names linked to fake accounts to prevent aiding these profiles in evading platform con-
trols through continuous engagement and views.
The involvement of government and opposition in spreading falsehoods reveals signi-
ficant disparities, particularly in Argentina (Peronist-Kirchnerist government), Venezuela
(Maduro’s administration), and Portugal (non-socialist opposition). This also corroborates
the disruptive nature of populist communication. Beyond these nations, falsehoods seem to
emanate from diverse political factions. In Chile, a smaller proportion of politicians directly
engaging in disseminating falsehoods (despite no variations between opposition and gov-
ernment) can be attributed to Chile’s unique characteristics within the Latin American
sample. It exhibits the lowest political polarization, the highest viewership of PSB, and a
diminished likelihood of government involvement in disinformation campaigns. Here
resides the third contribution of this study, i.e. the attempt to connect disinformation studies
with media systems analysis and digital indicators, a linkage still relatively rare in the

Cazzamatta 19
literature (Hardy, 2021) with some exceptions (Humprecht, 2019; Humprecht et al., 2020).
In the same vein, as Matassi and Boczkowski (2023) argue regarding social media studies,
analyses of disinformation primarily focus on a single country without connecting the phe-
nomena to other forces impacting media systems and technologies.
Completely fabricated narratives, though present to a small extent, vary in prevalence
across countries, with a higher incidence in Brazil and Spain, notable for their high polit-
ical polarization. Various forms of fabrication, including complete inventions, manipula-
tion, imposter content, and decontextualization, have a more significant impact on Latin
American countries. This trend corresponds to the high use of social media for news and
lower awareness of PSB among their audiences. In contrast, European countries, to vary-
ing degrees, are more influenced by misleading information characterized by cherry-
picked, exaggerated, and twisted content. Specifically, Germany and Spain stand out due
to the distinctiveness of their fabrications, which are intertwined with hate speech.
Despite global similarities in topics, deception strategies, and types of misinformation,
falsehoods are profoundly adapted to local contexts. They can be explained mainly by
the characteristics of their general media systems and informational environments.
A notable limitation of our study is that it relies on the selection criteria of fact-checking
organizations from 2022, which may not accurately depict the current state of misinforma-
tion in the analyzed states. To prevent unnecessary dissemination of false information, fact-
checkers primarily verify stories that have already gained significant traction on social
media in terms of engagement and comments. In addition, they prioritize verifying informa-
tion requested by their audience through WhatsApp channels, taking into account the types
of misinformation that matter to their users (Graves, 2016; Humprecht, 2019; Moreno-Gil
et al., 2021). Some organizations collaborate with tech companies, particularly through pro-
grams like the Meta Third-Party Fact-Checking Program, to verify content circulating on
their platforms. These partnerships not only provide financial support but also automated
tools for monitoring the online environment (Bélair-Gagnon et al., 2023; Graves et al., 2023;
Cazzamatta, 2024). Nonetheless, we believe that despite using the perspective of fact-
checkers to assess misinformation trends in the studied countries, our research still offers
valuable regional insights. Fact-checkers continuously monitor various platforms simulta-
neously, unlike studies that have often focused on trends associated with one platform at a
time, typically Facebook or Twitter (Matassi and Boczkowski, 2023). Recent studies have
even noted a shift in fact-checking practices toward more extensive monitoring of social
media rather than direct verification of statements made by public figures and politicians
(Matassi and Boczkowski, 2023). Future studies may explore disparities by comparing mis-
information circulating across various social networks with that selected by fact-checkers to
advance methodological discussions. In addition, future research could further explore the
motivations of misinformation spreaders and the actors behind coordinated unauthentic
behaviors among seemingly ordinary social media users.
Our findings carry implications for both fact-checkers and policymakers, particu-
larly regarding pre-emptive intervention strategies (pre-bunking) and media literacy
efforts (Amazeen and Krishna, 2024). In nations with a prevalent online presence of
far-right entities, organizations could educate on the potential involvement of these
actors behind seemingly ordinary social media accounts or how to identify automated

20 new media & society 00(0)
bots. In addition, recognizing variations in deception strategies or types of misinfor-
mation across countries allows fact-checkers and policymakers to tailor their responses
and get ahead of misinformation spreaders. For instance, they can elucidate to their
audiences how tactics like decontextualization or cherry-picking information typically
operate to serve specific narratives. As misinformation often aligns with political agen-
das and current events, local stakeholders can be better equipped to address misinfor-
mation waves on social networks. Hence, there remains a necessity for additional
comparative and longitudinal transnational analyses of misinformation trends within
the community.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/
or publication of this article: The author is grateful for the financial support of the German Research
Council (DFG CA 2840/1-1).
ORCID iD
Regina Cazzamatta https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7162-3219
Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. For other facets of the concept, see Kaltwasser et al. (2017).
2. A coordinated disinformation campaign involves participants posing as ordinary citizens to
promote an agenda while concealing the true message source (Keller et al., 2020).
3. Kirchnerism, headed by Néstor Kirchner (President from 2003 to 2007) and his wife Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015), is a political ideology that emerged within the context
of Argentine Peronism. It is characterized by a blend of left-wing populism, nationalism, and
social democracy (Padoan, 2021).
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Author biography
Regina Cazzamatta earned her PhD in media and communication studies from the University of Erfurt,
where she also instructs in the English-language master’s program, “MA Global Communication:
Politics & Society.” She boasts an international background steeped in academic and journalistic expe-
rience. In Sao Paulo, Brazil, she completed her undergraduate degree in Communication Studies and
pursued postgraduate studies in International Journalism at the Pontifical Catholic University of Sao
Paulo. As the author of books such as “Brasilien-Berichterstattung in der deutschen Presse” and
“Lateinamerikaberichterstattung der deutschen Presse: Struktur und Entstehungsbedingungen,” her
research pursuits encompass a wide range of topics, including comparative media systems, news value
approaches, international news coverage, disinformation, fact-checking agencies, and media discourse.
She is currently engaged in research on misinformation and fact-checking institutions in Europe and
Latin America, with funding support from the German Science Foundation (DFG).