The Pandemic and Counterurbanization: A Comparison of Sweden and Slovenia

Abstract

Based on the concept of teleworkability, its sluggish determinants of industry structure and workplace culture, and the change in people’s valuation of rural amenities that happened during the pandemic, this paper analyzes their possible influence on counterurbanization during the pandemic in Sweden and Slovenia. We found signs of open (migration) as well as “hidden” counterurbanization (unregistered rural living) in both countries, stronger in Sweden than in Slovenia, and we found indications that industrial structure and national workplace cultures contributed to differences in the strength of the counterurbanization. In both countries, we found indications that the pandemic contributed to a shift in people’s relative valuation of rural vs. urban amenities. Thus, while the sluggish factors contributed to differences in teleworkability between Sweden and Slovenia, the chock implied similar reactions in the shift of the valuation of amenities. Ever since the counterurbanization of the 1970s, studies of the phenomenon have almost solely been completed within countries, and the few international comparisons that have been completed have been based on comparing the results of the national studies. This study is one of the very first ones that compares counterurbanization and its driving forces in two countries within the same analytical framework.

Full text

Citation: Westlund, H.; Gorišek, M.;
Podmenik, D.; Rebernik, M. The
Pandemic and Counterurbanization:
A Comparison of Sweden and
Slovenia. Sustainability 2024,16, 6904.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su16166904
Academic Editors: Jianming Cai and
Stephan Weiler
Received: 9 July 2024
Revised: 2 August 2024
Accepted: 8 August 2024
Published: 12 August 2024
Copyright: © 2024 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
sustainability
Article
The Pandemic and Counterurbanization: A Comparison of
Sweden and Slovenia
Hans Westlund 1,2,* , Maruša Gorišek 2, Darka Podmenik 2and Maša Rebernik 2
1Department of Urban Planning and Environment, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH),
SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
2Institute for Developmental and Strategic Analysis, Dunajska 113, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
*Correspondence: hans.westlund@abe.kth.se
Abstract: Based on the concept of teleworkability, its sluggish determinants of industry structure and
workplace culture, and the change in people’s valuation of rural amenities that happened during the
pandemic, this paper analyzes their possible influence on counterurbanization during the pandemic
in Sweden and Slovenia. We found signs of open (migration) as well as “hidden” counterurbanization
(unregistered rural living) in both countries, stronger in Sweden than in Slovenia, and we found
indications that industrial structure and national workplace cultures contributed to differences in
the strength of the counterurbanization. In both countries, we found indications that the pandemic
contributed to a shift in people’s relative valuation of rural vs. urban amenities. Thus, while the
sluggish factors contributed to differences in teleworkability between Sweden and Slovenia, the chock
implied similar reactions in the shift of the valuation of amenities. Ever since the counterurbanization
of the 1970s, studies of the phenomenon have almost solely been completed within countries, and the
few international comparisons that have been completed have been based on comparing the results
of the national studies. This study is one of the very first ones that compares counterurbanization
and its driving forces in two countries within the same analytical framework.
Keywords: counterurbanization; teleworking; teleworkability; COVID-19 pandemic; Sweden;
Slovenia
1. Introduction
Fifty years ago, in the middle of the 1970s, American geographers noticed a “popula-
tion turnaround”. Many metropolitan areas stagnated or even lost population, while many
smaller urban places and rural areas grew [
1
]. Berry [
2
] defined the change in migration
patterns as “a process of population deconcentration; it implies a movement from a state of
more concentration to a state of less concentration” (p. 17) and gave it the name “counterur-
banization”. Similar trends were also found in many European countries (for overviews
see [
3
,
4
]). In retrospect, it can be stated that this “green wave” (as it was called in Sweden)
coincided with the oil crisis and the crisis of the manufacturing industry but also with a
general questioning of the Western way of life among many young people. From the 1980s
and onwards followed a long period of reurbanization, probably driven by the growth of
the knowledge economy and its concentration in metropolitan regions.
During the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2022, similar phenomena as in the 1970s
were observed in many countries. At the end of 2020, a British and an Australian scholar
warned that the pandemic could turn cities into doughnuts, with empty centers but vibrant
suburbs. London was presented as the most obvious example. During the UK lockdown
that started on 5 November 2020, retail and tourism visitor numbers fell to 90–92% below
the pre-pandemic levels [
5
]. Regarding domestic migration, Japanese research states that
“.. .there is evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic is driving, for the first time in years,
more out-migration than in-migration in Tokyo” [
6
] (p. 7). For Australia, Borsellino et al.
state that “The observed net migration rates broadly conform to the common narrative of
gains in regional areas and corresponding losses in the largest capital cities” [
7
] (p. 411). In
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Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 2 of 17
Germany, “The pandemic was (.. .) associated with an upsurge in net migration losses for
the largest cities” [
8
] (p. 1). For Spain, “Results (.. .) reveal unusually large net migration
losses in core cities and net migration gains in rural areas” [9] (p. 1).
This article empirically observes the processes of counterurbanization through the
comparative analysis of two EU member states—Sweden and Slovenia. Through the analy-
sis of the strength of counterurbanizaton and by explaining the main differences between
these two countries, we aim to identify some of the mechanisms that drive such “population
turnaround”. We primarily focus on the role of teleworking and hypothesize that the in-
creasing possibility of working from home is one of the drivers of counterurbanization. We
frame this analysis in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and try to answer the question
of whether the pandemic had an effect as a driver of counterurbanization. The analysis
is based on a comparison of two very different countries, which largely differ regarding
their developmental plan, economic structure, and level of urbanization. Comparing an
urbanized (Sweden) and a de-urbanized country (Slovenia) will enable us to test the model
of possible factors of counterurbanization in different contexts and find other factors that
can influence the process of counterurbanization that are not yet included in the model.
The analysis is based on the model of causes for counterurbanization that is presented
in Section 2, together with the scientific background of the paper. Section 3presents the
methods and data used. The results are presented in Section 4and discussed in Section 5.
2. Background
The counterurbanization of the 1970s coincided with a reaction against modern indus-
trialized society and a wish to go “back to nature” and away from the industrial way of
life and work. There are undoubtedly such features in the migration shifts of today (see
the above references from several countries), but the renaissance of the countryside and
small places of today is based on doing modern work with the use of modern technology
and on doing this work part-time or full-time at a place that is not the regular workplace.
Teleworking is a key to the current counterurbanization.
Telework could be simply defined as any work performed outside of the employer’s
premises, by means of information and communication technologies (ICT). Different fre-
quencies of teleworking are known, such as full-time teleworking, teleworking on an
occasional basis (for example, during the COVID-19 pandemic seasonal activity peaks), and
hybrid working. Not all jobs are teleworkable. Dingel and Neiman [
10
] presented a binary
teleworkability index based on American data, according to which 37% of the workforce
had teleworkable occupations. For the EU, Sostero et al. [11] produced a similar index.
The Eurofund developed these binary divisions into three groups [
12
]. The first
group consists of information processing tasks, which are completely teleworkable (white
collar jobs—company management, lawyers, accountants, financial and insurance jobs,
consultants, and computer programmers). The second group comprises social interaction
tasks that are fairly teleworkable (teachers, researchers, .. . ), while the last group includes
physical/handling tasks, which are completely non-teleworkable (manufacturing, onsite
service jobs, etc.). Thus, teleworkable jobs could be divided into completely teleworkable
jobs and quite teleworkable jobs. This means that a country’s industrial structure has a
decisive influence on the share of teleworkable jobs. Roughly speaking, the more developed
the knowledge economy is in a country, the more teleworkable jobs there are.
Figure 1shows the occurrence of teleworking in the countries of the European Union
in 2009 and 2019 (i.e., before the pandemic). The differences are striking. Sweden and
the Netherlands were in the top with 37% of total employment teleworking usually or
sometimes in 2019, while the corresponding figure for Bulgaria and Romania was 2%. As
we can see, there was a considerable difference in the prevalence of teleworking between
Slovenia and Sweden before the pandemic.

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 3 of 17
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 18
Figure 1 shows the occurrence of teleworking in the countries of the European Union
in 2009 and 2019 (i.e., before the pandemic). The differences are striking. Sweden and the
Netherlands were in the top with 37% of total employment teleworking usually or some-
times in 2019, while the corresponding figure for Bulgaria and Romania was 2%. As we
can see, there was a considerable difference in the prevalence of teleworking between Slo-
venia and Sweden before the pandemic.
Figure 1. Prevalence of teleworking across EU member states in 2019 and 2009. Source: European
Commission [13].
Even if there are substantial differences in industrial structure between the EU coun-
tries, it does not seem reasonable that they should explain all the differences in the share
of teleworking. Cultural differences probably play an important role here since many
workplaces in East and Southern Europe are set up in a more traditional way than they
are in the Nordic countries.
The outburst of the pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns of workplaces and/or
“recommendations” to work from home meant new incentives (and compulsions) to per-
form telework. However, increased teleworking per se does not necessarily need to have
any connection to an “urban exodus”. Even if the current counterurbanization probably
would not take place without the possibility of teleworking, teleworking can only be con-
sidered a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite for counterurbanization.
What is of importance here is that the pandemic not only forced an increase in tele-
working but that it also made urban life less aractive. The lockdowns meant, on the one
hand, a forced social isolation in people’s apartments and houses; on the other hand, it
meant that all the usual urban amenities ceased to exist: cafés, restaurants, theaters, sports
arena arrangements, and street life in general. This loss of amenities did not happen to
non-urban areas, as their amenities usually are of another kind: landscapes, nature, and
possibilities for outdoor life, including many outdoor sports. The result was an equaliza-
tion of aractiveness factors between country and city, which promoted counterurbaniza-
tion, in particular among groups that have preferences for rural amenities.
Even if counterurbanization was (and is) vaguely defined (see above), the classic
measure of counterurbanization, which was used in the 1970s, was migration from urban
to rural areas. Using such a measure today is not unproblematic. The reason is that aver-
age income and wealth have increased and that a large share of the households in devel-
oped countries have second homes in the countryside, although they still are registered
as city dwellers. This circumstance tends to hide the counterurbanization that is “part-
time” or “hybrid” and expressed in the form that people work part-time from their second
Figure 1. Prevalence of teleworking across EU member states in 2019 and 2009. Source: European
Commission [13].
Even if there are substantial differences in industrial structure between the EU coun-
tries, it does not seem reasonable that they should explain all the differences in the share
of teleworking. Cultural differences probably play an important role here since many
workplaces in East and Southern Europe are set up in a more traditional way than they are
in the Nordic countries.
The outburst of the pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns of workplaces and/or
“recommendations” to work from home meant new incentives (and compulsions) to per-
form telework. However, increased teleworking per se does not necessarily need to have
any connection to an “urban exodus”. Even if the current counterurbanization probably
would not take place without the possibility of teleworking, teleworking can only be
considered a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite for counterurbanization.
What is of importance here is that the pandemic not only forced an increase in tele-
working but that it also made urban life less attractive. The lockdowns meant, on the one
hand, a forced social isolation in people’s apartments and houses; on the other hand, it
meant that all the usual urban amenities ceased to exist: cafés, restaurants, theaters, sports
arena arrangements, and street life in general. This loss of amenities did not happen to
non-urban areas, as their amenities usually are of another kind: landscapes, nature, and
possibilities for outdoor life, including many outdoor sports. The result was an equalization
of attractiveness factors between country and city, which promoted counterurbanization,
in particular among groups that have preferences for rural amenities.
Even if counterurbanization was (and is) vaguely defined (see above), the classic
measure of counterurbanization, which was used in the 1970s, was migration from urban
to rural areas. Using such a measure today is not unproblematic. The reason is that average
income and wealth have increased and that a large share of the households in developed
countries have second homes in the countryside, although they still are registered as city
dwellers. This circumstance tends to hide the counterurbanization that is “part-time” or
“hybrid” and expressed in the form that people work part-time from their second homes and
part-time at their regular workplace, while still being registered as city dwellers. This means
that existing migration statistics underestimate these new forms of counterurbanization
today. In spite of that, internal migration should normally be a possible measure for
determining whether counterurbanization takes place.
Another way to estimate possible counterurbanization could be completed by studying
the real estate market. If prices of second homes (that most often are situated in rural areas)

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 4 of 17
increase more than prices of one-family houses (that most often are situated in urban areas),
it can be interpreted as an expression of counterurbanization.
We base our study on the following hypothesis: For a large part of the labor market,
working outside the traditional workplace has become a possibility that has been used in
various places across Europe due to the industrial structure, geographical conditions, and
other circumstances. The pandemic boosted this development and triggered a tendency
of open (migration) or hidden (working outside the workplace, in second homes, or other
rural areas) counterurbanization. The possible continuation of this trend is dependent on
a number of factors, e.g., workplace culture and its changes, the change in the industrial
structure, the extension of the transportation infrastructure, commuting costs, etc.
The above-described hypothesis is summarized in Figure 2. The teleworkability is on
the one hand determined by the industrial structure and the national workplace culture.
On the other hand, during the pandemic, the closedowns of workplaces forced people
into telework. Moreover, the social isolation that was a result of the closedowns, caused
a change in the relative importance of urban vs. rural amenities. These changes in the
relative weights benefitted rural areas. This, and the existing teleworkability, contributed
to the (open or hidden) counterurbanization during the pandemic.
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 18
homes and part-time at their regular workplace, while still being registered as city dwell-
ers. This means that existing migration statistics underestimate these new forms of coun-
terurbanization today. In spite of that, internal migration should normally be a possible
measure for determining whether counterurbanization takes place.
Another way to estimate possible counterurbanization could be completed by stud-
ying the real estate market. If prices of second homes (that most often are situated in rural
areas) increase more than prices of one-family houses (that most often are situated in ur-
ban areas), it can be interpreted as an expression of counterurbanization.
We base our study on the following hypothesis: For a large part of the labor market,
working outside the traditional workplace has become a possibility that has been used in
various places across Europe due to the industrial structure, geographical conditions, and
other circumstances. The pandemic boosted this development and triggered a tendency
of open (migration) or hidden (working outside the workplace, in second homes, or other
rural areas) counterurbanization. The possible continuation of this trend is dependent on
a number of factors, e.g., workplace culture and its changes, the change in the industrial
structure, the extension of the transportation infrastructure, commuting costs, etc.
The above-described hypothesis is summarized in Figure 2. The teleworkability is on
the one hand determined by the industrial structure and the national workplace culture.
On the other hand, during the pandemic, the closedowns of workplaces forced people into
telework. Moreover, the social isolation that was a result of the closedowns, caused a
change in the relative importance of urban vs. rural amenities. These changes in the rela-
tive weights benefied rural areas. This, and the existing teleworkability, contributed to
the (open or hidden) counterurbanization during the pandemic.
We analyze the industrial structure and workplace culture as determinants of tele-
workability, and we present possible empirical evidence of the counterurbanization in
Sweden and Slovenia. The relative changes in amenity weights, as effects of the
closedowns, are measured by the relative changes in second-home prices vs. first-home
prices during the pandemic.
Figure 2. A model of the causes of counterurbanization during the pandemic.
3. Materials and Methods
This article uses the method of a comparative case study of Slovenia and Sweden
based on the model described above.
Both countries are currently developed democratic members of the European Union,
but they are in many aspects each other’s opposites. Sweden has a long history of democ-
racy with a strong influence of social and democratic ideas on the development of the
nation during the last century. Slovenia, on the other hand, is a former socialist country
that became independent and democratic as late as 1991. Sweden is located in the north-
ernmost parts of the EU (only Finland being more northerly), while Slovenia is a Mediter-
ranean country. Sweden is one of the largest countries in the EU, while Slovenia is one of
Figure 2. A model of the causes of counterurbanization during the pandemic.
We analyze the industrial structure and workplace culture as determinants of telework-
ability, and we present possible empirical evidence of the counterurbanization in Sweden
and Slovenia. The relative changes in amenity weights, as effects of the closedowns, are
measured by the relative changes in second-home prices vs. first-home prices during
the pandemic.
3. Materials and Methods
This article uses the method of a comparative case study of Slovenia and Sweden
based on the model described above.
Both countries are currently developed democratic members of the European Union,
but they are in many aspects each other’s opposites. Sweden has a long history of democ-
racy with a strong influence of social and democratic ideas on the development of the
nation during the last century. Slovenia, on the other hand, is a former socialist country that
became independent and democratic as late as 1991. Sweden is located in the northernmost
parts of the EU (only Finland being more northerly), while Slovenia is a Mediterranean
country. Sweden is one of the largest countries in the EU, while Slovenia is one of the
smallest, with an area that is only 4.4% of Sweden. However, Slovenia’s population density
is 4 times higher than Sweden’s (which has the second lowest population density in the
EU). Slovenia has the highest GDP per capita among the former socialist countries, but
it is still only about half of Sweden’s. These circumstances enable us to test the model in
different contexts, which will bring insights into its validity.
The comparative case study is conducted with the use of the following data sources:
1. Industrial structure

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 5 of 17
This indicator uses data from Eurostat, Statistics Sweden, and the Slovenian Statis-
tical Office (SURS) to determine the possible structural opportunities and limitations to
teleworkability in both countries.
2. National workplace culture
The tradition and scope of organizational culture studies are very extensive, including
models and indicators used for comparative research. In the context of this study, those that
have been used for stable and dynamic organizational conditions come into consideration.
Data are collected from the European Values Survey (2017–2020) and Eurobarometer (2018).
3. Pandemic management measures and teleworking during the pandemic
This section presents a comparison of the key measures adopted during the pan-
demic in Slovenia and Sweden that could influence teleworkability and the process of
counterurbanization. We focus especially on measures dealing with workplace closures,
work-from-home mandates, and social distancing. The comparison is based on earlier
research and secondary data analysis. Furthermore, statistical data on teleworking before,
during, and after the pandemic are used. The data are collected from Eurostat, Statistics
Sweden, and Valicon (2023).
4. Indicators of counterurbanization
Indicators of counterurbanization include data about population development in
urban and rural municipalities in Slovenia and Sweden (data from national databases
Statistics Sweden and SURS, Slovenia) and data on the real estate markets that can serve as
indicators of counterurbanization.
There are certain limitations to the conducted comparative case study analysis, espe-
cially regarding the availability and comparability of data. Some of the data available for
Sweden (the second-home price development and percentage of workforce in each sector
working from home during the pandemic) were not available in Slovenia. Furthermore,
there are some important differences in definitions that could influence the comparison.
These are discussed below.
4. Results
4.1. Industrial Structure
In recent decades, we have witnessed considerable changes in industry. Fast tech-
nological development is used to improve efficiency and productivity and address some
of the most pressing challenges, such as energy efficiency and societal needs [
14
]. This
so-called transition to industry 4.0 influenced the industrial structure. The OECD [
15
]
shows a significant increase in polarization of employment structures, with occupations
classified into low-skill, middle-skill, and high-skill categories. In Western Europe, low-skill
jobs increased by 2.7%, while high-skill jobs increased by 7.6%. The Digital Revolution has
led to a decrease in middle-skill jobs by 9.8%. The study suggests that digitalization is the
primary factor behind this shift.
Furthermore, industry 4.0 also includes new social infrastructure in the workplace
and a more human-centric approach. This includes redirecting workers from routine
tasks to more creative work and flexible work organization [
14
]. Therefore, we expect
that countries with higher levels of digitalization and use of technology in industry have
better prerequisites for teleworking. The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) shows
significant differences between Slovenia and Sweden in this regard. While the level of
connectivity is similar in both countries, Sweden is performing much better in human
capital and in the integration of digital technology into the economy. For example, while
more than 65% of internet users in Sweden have above basic or basic digital skills, the share
in Slovenia is 50%. Furthermore, more than 85% of small- and medium-sized enterprises
in Sweden have at least a basic level of digital intensity, while in Slovenia, the share is
around 55% [
16
]. Similarly, Sweden ranks 7th and Slovenia 37th in the World Digital
Competitiveness Ranking [
17
]. Similarly, based on Eurostat data, Sweden has the second

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 6 of 17
highest share of total employment working in knowledge-intensive service sectors (57.1%),
while Slovenia (37.2%) is below the EU average (41.3%).
Manufacturing was among the economic sectors most impacted by the pandemic
crisis. Other strongly affected sectors were wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles, accommodation and food services, retail estate and business, and
administrative activities. Those industries are also the ones for which working from home
is the least common or possible [
18
]. Before the pandemic, 30.6% of Swedish and 48% of
Slovenian employees worked in the most impacted sectors [13].
The industrial structure and the number of employees in different industries, therefore,
represent important indicators of teleworkability. Data show some important differences
between Slovenia and Sweden. Slovenia’s share in manufacturing, construction, energy,
water, and waste is almost twice as high as that of Sweden. The disaggregation of the
figure shows that the big difference is in manufacturing; Slovenia’s manufacturing share
is 27%, while Sweden’s is only 10%. The other notable difference is found in public and
private services, where Slovenia’s share is only two-thirds of Sweden’s. A closer look at
the figures shows that the difference mainly is explained by three subsectors. In Sweden,
9% of the workforce is employed in professional, scientific, and technical activities, while
the corresponding figure for Slovenia is 5%. Education’s share in Sweden is 12% and 9%
in Slovenia. The subsector with the biggest difference is human health and social work
activities, which in Sweden gathers 15%, but in Slovenia, it is merely 7% of the workforce.
As seen in Tables 1and 2, manufacturing still plays a big role in the Slovenian economy.
The share of the population older than 15 and who have worked in manufacturing for a
long time is almost twice as big as in Sweden. Furthermore, long-term manufacturing work
has been gradually decreasing in Sweden but increasing in Slovenia in the last few years.
Table 1. Share of employment (percentage) in main sectors in Slovenia and Sweden in 2019.
Source: ILO.
Slovenia Sweden
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 3% 1%
Manufacturing, construction, energy, water, waste 35% 19%
Trade, transport, hotels, restaurants 21% 19%
Public and private services 41% 61%
Table 2. Long-term manufacturing employment in Slovenia vs. Sweden (for population over the age
of 15, in percentage of total employment). Source: ILO.
Year Sweden Slovenia
2022 9.4% 21.9%
2021 9.8% 22.1%
2020 9.9% 25.3%
2019 10% 25.6%
2018 10.1% 24.9%
2014 10.7% 22.6%
There are big differences between countries in how many jobs can be completed from
home [
19
]. In developed countries, the share is one in five, but in some developing countries,
only one in 26 jobs can be completed from home. Data from the US show that employees
from sectors such as information, finance and insurance, professional, and business services
are much more likely to work from home than, for example, manufacturing, transportation,
and warehousing [
20
]. Since manufacturing jobs are more likely to demand an in-person
presence at the workplace, and knowledge-intensive service sector jobs are more likely
to be able to be performed from home, this could be an indicator that the potential for
teleworking is bigger in the Swedish labor market than in the Slovenian. However, other
indicators need to be taken into account as well.

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 7 of 17
4.2. National Workplace Culture
Work culture, experienced practices, beliefs, rituals among employees, as well as
between them and the leaders/staff, attitudes toward work, and other organizational and
cultural dimensions can be changed only in the long term. According to Eurobarometer
data (2017–2022), Slovenian managers (from medium and small companies) prioritize
lower and more materialistic measures to address employee deficit: 27% of Slovenian
managers believe that suitable working conditions and increasing wages are effective
measures, whereas only 17% of Swedish managers share this perspective. Additionally,
7% of Slovenian companies (the lowest in the EU) attribute the lack of employees to
the competition’s inability in terms of wages, benefits, and flexibility, whereas 18% of
Swedish hold this view. This is in spite of the fact that, compared to Sweden, the wages
in Slovenia are significantly lower, the organizations are less flexible (see Table 4), and
Slovenian companies score below average in competitiveness. In terms of innovativeness,
responsibility, and profitability, Sweden ranks 3rd globally, while Slovenia ranks 39th. In
terms of competitiveness, Sweden ranks 6th globally, while Slovenia ranks 35th [21].
That employers and managers have no problem introducing flexible working hours
confirms 77% of employed (under 65 years of age) Slovenians and 83% of Swedes. When
it comes to support provided by employers and managers for employees to make use of
flexible work options, 67% of Slovenians and 84% of Swedes acknowledge their positive
role, while 29% of Slovenians and 14% of Swedes indicate that managers usually discourage
employees. (Tables 3and 4).
Table 3. The prevalence of different forms of flexible work (calculated as the sum of “Very widespread”
and “Fairly widespread” responses) in Slovenia and Sweden, % (adults under 65). Source: Euro-
barometer 2018.
Slovenia Sweden
Flexitime 62% 71%
Part-time work 31% 39%
Working from home 24% 25%
Table 4. Perceived difficulty of flexible work arrangements and the impact of such arrangements on
individuals’ careers (percentage of respondents answering “totally agree” and “agree”, measured
among adults under 65). Source: Eurobarometer 2018.
% of People Agreeing with the Statement by Country Slovenia Sweden EU average
It is easy to make use of flexible work arrangements 77% 83% 76%
Flexible work arrangements have a negative impact on one’s career 22% 14% 31%
While general attitudes toward work among Swedes and Slovenians are rather similar,
the differences are larger when considering the impact of work on lifestyle; 47% of Sloveni-
ans and 33% of Swedes agree that work should take precedence over free time. Moreover,
there is a notable contrast in how individuals assess those who are not employed, with
80% of Slovenians believing that non-working individuals tend to become lazy, compared
to only 32% of Swedes who share this view. Expectations about work in the future also
differ significantly: one of the preferred future changes—less importance placed on work is
considered “good” by merely 16% of Slovenians and 40% of Swedes; alternatively, 69% of
Slovenians and 40% of Swedes see it as “bad”.
According to the “classic” model, which distinguishes between three types of organi-
zational culture: traditional hierarchy; synergistic with the social system; and dynamically
adaptable to the environment; the presented data indicate that Slovenia predominantly
exhibits a more traditional organizational culture, while Sweden leans toward a more
modern and dynamic culture. The Slovenian work culture appears to be influenced more
by existential and developmental challenges.

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 8 of 17
The Slovenian tendency toward traditionalism in both work culture and work values
can be partially attributed to environmental conditions but more so to the industrial
traditions and work culture characteristics inherited from the previous socialist regime.
Another challenge in Slovenian work culture is communication, which is hindered by
exceptionally high levels of bureaucratization and constantly changing rules and norms [
22
].
These shortcomings certainly impede teleworkability, as partially indicated by the data
presented in Table 4above.
4.3. Pandemic Management Measures and Teleworking during the Pandemic
As shown in Figure 1, the possibility of working from home, or from some other distant
place, did not emerge with the pandemic. While the share of the population teleworking
was very small, since the 1960s, the prevalence of working from home has been gradually
increasing in the US [
20
]. In the late 1990s, discussions on work–life balance became more
common, and the possibility of working from home was one of its central ideas [23].
In 2020, when the pandemic hit the whole world, working from home became one
of the central measures aimed at minimizing social contact in order to stop the spread of
the virus. The pandemic started a global social experiment in working arrangements [
20
].
However, not all countries experienced the same types and severity of pandemic measures,
including mandates for teleworking.
Sweden became rather famous during the pandemic for a different approach toward
pandemic management. It was one of the few countries that did not enforce strict lockdown
measures, and instead of restrictions (except for a ban on large gatherings), their govern-
ment relied on recommendations [
24
]. Those included social distancing and gathering
restrictions, only using public transport if urgently needed, and working/studying from
home. These recommendations were based on the framework of Swedish democracy, which
is based on the individual and their responsibilities [
25
]. Sweden, therefore, never made
working from home obligatory and left the decision to employers. This means that people
were recommended to work from home, but it was not an employee’s right to work from
home [26].
The situation in Slovenia was different, as the government imposed strict lockdown
measures already in the first wave of the pandemic. This included school closures, a ban
on gatherings, movement restrictions outside of one’s municipality, curfews, and business
closures. While the measures during the first wave were strict, timely, and followed by the
majority of the population, future waves showed a different picture. Measures were often
adopted late [
27
] and had many exceptions, which made them less effective. Although
many businesses were closed in times of strict measures, which means that many people
were not working at that time, working from home was never a requirement but mainly a
recommendation. There were even some systematic barriers to working from home that
were not addressed by the government. Nevertheless, data show that many people worked
from home in times of strict pandemic measures.
Slovenia’s pre-pandemic share of teleworking in Figure 1(2019) is supported by
The Valicon panel survey [
28
], which showed that 17% of working respondents reported
working from home for at least a portion of their work time directly before the start of the
pandemic in February 2020. This is comparable to the numbers from the Statistical Office
of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS), which recorded 17.8% of the working population as
working from home for at least some of the time in 2019. According to Figure 3, this share
had increased to 50% at the end of 2020. Thereafter, the share dropped to about 25% in the
middle of 2021, and with some fluctuations, it remained at that level until the end of 2022.
In summary, while remote work in Slovenia saw an initial surge at the start of the
pandemic, it gradually declined toward its end. However, the number of employees doing
remote work was slightly higher in 2022 compared to pre-pandemic times. This suggests a
partial integration of teleworking into the labor system, although future trends have yet to
be seen.

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 9 of 17
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 18
Slovenia’s pre-pandemic share of teleworking in Figure 1 (2019) is supported by The
Valicon panel survey [28], which showed that 17% of working respondents reported work-
ing from home for at least a portion of their work time directly before the start of the
pandemic in February 2020. This is comparable to the numbers from the Statistical Office
of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS), which recorded 17.8% of the working population as
working from home for at least some of the time in 2019. According to Figure 3, this share
had increased to 50% at the end of 2020. Thereafter, the share dropped to about 25% in the
middle of 2021, and with some fluctuations, it remained at that level until the end of 2022.
Figure 3. Prevalence of working from home at least partly during the pandemic in Slovenia and
Sweden. Source: Statistics Sweden and NIJZ-PANDA survey (Slovenia) [29]. (“月” in figure means
“month”).
In summary, while remote work in Slovenia saw an initial surge at the start of the
pandemic, it gradually declined toward its end. However, the number of employees doing
remote work was slightly higher in 2022 compared to pre-pandemic times. This suggests
a partial integration of teleworking into the labor system, although future trends have yet
to be seen.
It is important to acknowledge that the sudden shift to remote work during the pan-
demic in Slovenia lacked a thorough assessment of factors that would make it a sustaina-
ble form of work, as its purpose was primarily to limit the spread of COVID-19. As noted
by the Labour Inspectorate, due to the rapid implementation of this form of work, the
employers may not have been able to complete the otherwise required procedures (such
as assessing the suitability of the employees’ home environment) to determine the suita-
bility for a remote work setup [30]. Additionally, it was possible for the employer to uni-
laterally assign remote work without the consent of the employee, which would not have
been the case if not for the pandemic [30]. Therefore, the unique circumstances of the pan-
demic induced remote work situations.
4.4. Indicators of Counterurbanization
4.4.1. Population Development in Urban and Rural Municipalities
As pointed out in the introduction, official population statistics are unable to show
new forms of counterurbanization, e.g., when people are teleworking from their second
homes during parts of their working time but remain registered as city dwellers. In spite
of that, it is still important to study the official statistics to see if they show any signs of
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
12月-20
1月-21
2月-21
3月-21
4月-21
5月-21
6月-21
7月-21
8月-21
9月-21
10月-21
11月-21
12月-21
1月-22
2月-22
3月-22
4月-22
5月-22
Working from home during the pandemic
Slovenia Sweden
Figure 3. Prevalence of working from home at least partly during the pandemic in Slovenia and
Sweden. Source: Statistics Sweden and NIJZ-PANDA survey (Slovenia) [
29
]. (“
月
” in figure
means “month”).
It is important to acknowledge that the sudden shift to remote work during the pan-
demic in Slovenia lacked a thorough assessment of factors that would make it a sustainable
form of work, as its purpose was primarily to limit the spread of COVID-19. As noted
by the Labour Inspectorate, due to the rapid implementation of this form of work, the
employers may not have been able to complete the otherwise required procedures (such as
assessing the suitability of the employees’ home environment) to determine the suitability
for a remote work setup [
30
]. Additionally, it was possible for the employer to unilaterally
assign remote work without the consent of the employee, which would not have been the
case if not for the pandemic [
30
]. Therefore, the unique circumstances of the pandemic
induced remote work situations.
4.4. Indicators of Counterurbanization
4.4.1. Population Development in Urban and Rural Municipalities
As pointed out in the introduction, official population statistics are unable to show
new forms of counterurbanization, e.g., when people are teleworking from their second
homes during parts of their working time but remain registered as city dwellers. In spite
of that, it is still important to study the official statistics to see if they show any signs
of counterurbanization during the pandemic. Population changes are a result of two
components, on the one hand, natural population changes (births minus deaths) and, on
the other, net migration (in-migration minus out-migration). The component of interest for
determining counterurbanization is the latter. Table 5shows sums of net migration for all
the municipalities of Sweden and for the municipalities divided into four groups, by size
and density. The table shows the sums of net migration for the pandemic years 2020–2022
and for the three years before, 2017–2019.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that the net migration decreased
considerably during the pandemic. With all municipalities included, the total net migration
during 2020–2022 was only 50% of the net migration during 2017–2019. However, the
change in the net migration shows big differences between the four municipality types.
While the metropolitan municipalities had a net migration decrease of 62%, the rural
municipalities’ decrease was only 30%, and the sparse rural municipalities increased
their net migration from negative to positive. Even if the absolute numbers are very

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 10 of 17
small for the sparse rural municipalities, the change is in line with the general trend
that the municipalities in the metropolitan regions experienced the greatest decrease in
net migration, and the rural municipalities had the smallest decrease. It should also be
added that the biggest municipality of Sweden, Stockholm, which had a positive net
migration of almost +18,000 for the period 2017–2019, had a negative net migration of
almost
−
10,000 during 2020–2022. Most of the out-migration from Stockholm went to the
suburban municipalities but also to the other types.
Table 5. The sum of net migration in Sweden’s municipalities, 2017–2019 and 2020–2022, in the whole
country and divided into four municipality types. Source: Statistics Sweden.
All Municipalities
Metropolitan Regional Centers Rural Sparse Rural
Net migration 2017–2019 251,522 113,641 87,246 47,797 −726
Net migration 2020–2022 126,873 43,647 44,874 33,360 1505
Net migration reduction −50% −62% −49% −30% Increase
The fact that the sparse rural municipalities as a group had a positive change in net
migration and that the metropolitan ones had the greatest decrease can be interpreted as an
indication of counterurbanization during the pandemic.
Due to differences in area size, population density, and municipality distribution, a
direct comparison with Slovenia is not possible. The Slovenian Statistical Office (SURS)
defines rural municipalities as municipalities with fewer than 150 inhabitants per square
kilometer. This means there are 79 urban municipalities and 143 rural municipalities.
Around 75% of the population lives in urban municipalities. However, we can use different
national statistics and projections completed to assess whether we can observe similar
processes in Slovenia as well.
In 2018, the project entitled “A comprehensive demographic analysis with projections
for urban and rural areas” was conducted [
31
]. Table 6shows the shares of rural and urban
municipalities in Slovenia that have experienced either increasing or decreasing numbers of
inhabitants. We can see that, among urban municipalities, there is no big difference between
the number of those that are gaining and those that are losing inhabitants; however, among
rural municipalities, there are more of those that are losing inhabitants.
Table 6. Migration in Slovenian municipalities in 2018. Source: Nared et al. [30].
Urban Municipalities
with an Increasing
Number of Inhabitants
Urban Municipalities
with a Decreasing
Number of Inhabitants
Rural Municipalities
with an Increasing
Number of Inhabitants
Rural Municipalities
with a Decreasing
Number of Inhabitants
Share of municipalities 16.0% 16.5% 28.8% 38.7%
In Table 7, the difference between the number of people migrating into or out of
each statistical region in Slovenia during 2017–2022 is shown. The regions shaded in
green are classified as predominantly rural, while those shaded in blue are classified as
intermediate regions by the Eurostat urban–rural typology. The data in this table show
considerable changes in inter-regional mobility during the pandemic. During the pandemic,
considerably more people moved out of Central Slovenia, where the capital Ljubljana is
located. Similarly, we see a surge in the number of new inhabitants in Coastal Karst and
Upper Carniola compared to other years. However, this cannot be interpreted only as
a sign of counterurbanization. Each citizen of Slovenia can, administratively speaking,
have one permanent and one temporary residential address. During the pandemic, strict
movement restriction measures were accepted, and people, with few exceptions, were not
allowed to leave the region or municipality where they lived. If stopped by the authorities,
they had to present proof of either permanent or temporary residence in that municipality.
This resulted in a surge in administrative applications for temporary residence. In many

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 11 of 17
cases, they were people who already lived in that area but had never officially registered
there. In other cases, it was people temporarily moving out of the cities during the time
of strict measures. Those numbers can, at least partially, speak to the argument that the
pandemic made life in bigger cities less appealing. However, in the case of Slovenia, we
cannot speak of any long-term changes in terms of counterurbanization.
Table 7. Net migration for the statistical regions of Slovenia. Source: SURS, own calculation.
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Mura −3−112 351 354 220 254
Drava 70 539 100 669 397 519
Carinthia −180 −358 −232 −295 −74 −64
Savinja 60 −378 −366 −571 −19 −155
Central Sava −77 −146 −29 −201 −183 148
Lower Sava −74 −176 −49 −18 154 80
Southeast Slovenia −80 −168 −124 67 225 3
Central Slovenia (incl. Ljubljana) 896 1297 540 −3781 −1151 2204
Upper Carniola −258 −411 −68 2575 283 −2426
Littoral-Inner Carniola −181 −31 −41 56 92 23
Gorizia −346 −320 −200 −14 −74 −212
Coastal Karst 173 264 118 1159 130 −374
4.4.2. Real Estate Markets during the Pandemic
Did the pandemic cause any changes in people’s relative weighting of various ameni-
ties? Did the restrictions in mobility, orders to work from home, etc. mean that nature and
other rural amenities were weighted higher than before the pandemic? As a crude measure
of the valuation of rural amenities, we use the price development of second homes (here
estimated as the selling price divided by the taxation value) from March 2020 to February
2023. Figure 4shows an increase in prices until October 2020 but 3–4 months of stagnation
thereafter. However, from the beginning of 2021 until October of the same year, the prices
rose again. Then the prices follow a period of stagnation and even a slight decrease during
the second half of 2022. When the restrictions of the pandemic were over in spring 2022,
the demand for second homes stagnated, but prices remained at a level considerably higher
than before the pandemic.
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 18
Figure 4. Second-home price development (house price divided by taxation value) in Sweden per
month, March 2020–February 2023. Source: hps://www.maklarstatistik.se/ (accessed on 22 March
2024).
Figure 5 illustrates the same process by comparing house prices (divided by taxation
values) for second homes in relation to first homes (one-family houses) from September
2019 to February 2022. While the prices of second homes had very small divergences from
the prices of first homes during the whole of 2020, the relative prices for second homes
increased steadily during 2021. They reached a peak in December 2021 and started to de-
crease at the beginning of 2022. A reasonable interpretation of Figure 5 is that, during 2020,
the first scant year of the pandemic, no shifts in relative amenity weights occurred but
that, when the pandemic showed itself to be a long-term phenomenon, rural amenities
increased in value. Then, when restrictions were abolished, prices of second and first
homes converged again.
The same comparison for Slovenia cannot be made directly, as there are no data re-
garding second-home vs. first-home ownership or the price development available. Nev-
ertheless, in the following, we expand on some of the trends in Slovenian real estate trans-
actions (sales) and prices in the years of the pandemic and the years preceding it. The data
are based on the official registry of residential property prices and sales from SURS, as
well as on the reports on the Slovenian real estate market for 2020, 2021, and 2022, pre-
pared by the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia [32].
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Second homes/One-family houses
Sept-19 - Feb-22
Figure 4. Second-home price development (house price divided by taxation value) in Sweden
per month, March 2020–February 2023. Source: https://www.maklarstatistik.se/ (accessed on
22 March 2024).
Figure 5illustrates the same process by comparing house prices (divided by taxation
values) for second homes in relation to first homes (one-family houses) from September
2019 to February 2022. While the prices of second homes had very small divergences from
the prices of first homes during the whole of 2020, the relative prices for second homes
increased steadily during 2021. They reached a peak in December 2021 and started to
decrease at the beginning of 2022. A reasonable interpretation of Figure 5is that, during

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 12 of 17
2020, the first scant year of the pandemic, no shifts in relative amenity weights occurred
but that, when the pandemic showed itself to be a long-term phenomenon, rural amenities
increased in value. Then, when restrictions were abolished, prices of second and first homes
converged again.
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 18
Figure 4. Second-home price development (house price divided by taxation value) in Sweden per
month, March 2020–February 2023. Source: hps://www.maklarstatistik.se/ (accessed on 22 March
2024).
Figure 5 illustrates the same process by comparing house prices (divided by taxation
values) for second homes in relation to first homes (one-family houses) from September
2019 to February 2022. While the prices of second homes had very small divergences from
the prices of first homes during the whole of 2020, the relative prices for second homes
increased steadily during 2021. They reached a peak in December 2021 and started to de-
crease at the beginning of 2022. A reasonable interpretation of Figure 5 is that, during 2020,
the first scant year of the pandemic, no shifts in relative amenity weights occurred but
that, when the pandemic showed itself to be a long-term phenomenon, rural amenities
increased in value. Then, when restrictions were abolished, prices of second and first
homes converged again.
The same comparison for Slovenia cannot be made directly, as there are no data re-
garding second-home vs. first-home ownership or the price development available. Nev-
ertheless, in the following, we expand on some of the trends in Slovenian real estate trans-
actions (sales) and prices in the years of the pandemic and the years preceding it. The data
are based on the official registry of residential property prices and sales from SURS, as
well as on the reports on the Slovenian real estate market for 2020, 2021, and 2022, pre-
pared by the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia [32].
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Second homes/One-family houses
Sept-19 - Feb-22
Figure 5. The relationship between house price/taxation value for second homes and first homes
(
one-family
houses) in Sweden per month, September 2019 (1)–February 2022 (30). Source: https://www.
maklarstatistik.se/ (accessed on 22 March 2024).
The same comparison for Slovenia cannot be made directly, as there are no data
regarding second-home vs. first-home ownership or the price development available.
Nevertheless, in the following, we expand on some of the trends in Slovenian real estate
transactions (sales) and prices in the years of the pandemic and the years preceding it. The
data are based on the official registry of residential property prices and sales from SURS, as
well as on the reports on the Slovenian real estate market for 2020, 2021, and 2022, prepared
by the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia [32].
The year 2020 (as shown in Figure 6) saw a significant decrease in residential transac-
tions, especially in the second quarter of 2020, and in real estate transactions as a whole,
with a 17% decrease nationwide compared to 2019. This decline was largely attributed
to the measures implemented to stop the spread of the virus [
31
]. However, amidst this
decrease, there was a notable 4% increase in purchases of building land. This surge in
demand for land, particularly for the construction of family homes, at least partly reflects a
trend of individuals seeking residence in the outskirts and surrounding areas of cities due
to increasing apartment prices, notably in more urbanized areas such as Ljubljana.
It is worth noting that, in 2020, the growth in house prices was highest in areas more
developed in tourism. Gurs [
32
] attributes to high demand and increasing investments in
holiday homes (analogous to second homes in Sweden) in tourist areas. For instance, house
prices in 2020 in the Upper Carniola region (the home of the Alpine tourist area) were as
much as 49% higher compared to 2015, and the price increase was also above average in
the coastal area (32% higher in the coastal town of Koper).
The year 2021 witnessed a rebound in the real estate market. Despite the economic
uncertainties induced by the pandemic, there was a large surge in property prices (Figure 2)
across all real estate categories. The residential real estate sector experienced a notable
rise, with a 20% increase in transactions compared to 2020. This surge was driven by a
heightened demand for homes located further away from urbanized areas, fueled by both
escalating urban property and apartment prices and shifting buyer preferences toward

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 13 of 17
areas with more greenery or forested areas [
33
]. Along with the resurgence in residential
property transactions, there was an increase in demand for land intended for residential
construction, rising by 45% compared to 2020, marking the highest level since the pre-crisis
period of 2008 [32].
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 18
Figure 5. The relationship between house price/taxation value for second homes and first homes
(one-family houses) in Sweden per month, September 2019 (1)-February 2022 (30). Source:
hps://www.maklarstatistik.se/ (accessed on 22 March 2024).
The year 2020 (as shown in Figure 6) saw a significant decrease in residential trans-
actions, especially in the second quarter of 2020, and in real estate transactions as a whole,
with a 17% decrease nationwide compared to 2019. This decline was largely aributed to
the measures implemented to stop the spread of the virus [31]. However, amidst this de-
crease, there was a notable 4% increase in purchases of building land. This surge in de-
mand for land, particularly for the construction of family homes, at least partly reflects a
trend of individuals seeking residence in the outskirts and surrounding areas of cities due
to increasing apartment prices, notably in more urbanized areas such as Ljubljana.
It is worth noting that, in 2020, the growth in house prices was highest in areas more
developed in tourism. Gurs [32] aributes to high demand and increasing investments in
holiday homes (analogous to second homes in Sweden) in tourist areas. For instance,
house prices in 2020 in the Upper Carniola region (the home of the Alpine tourist area)
were as much as 49% higher compared to 2015, and the price increase was also above
average in the coastal area (32% higher in the coastal town of Koper).
The year 2021 witnessed a rebound in the real estate market. Despite the economic
uncertainties induced by the pandemic, there was a large surge in property prices (Figure
2) across all real estate categories. The residential real estate sector experienced a notable
rise, with a 20% increase in transactions compared to 2020. This surge was driven by a
heightened demand for homes located further away from urbanized areas, fueled by both
escalating urban property and apartment prices and shifting buyer preferences toward
areas with more greenery or forested areas [33]. Along with the resurgence in residential
property transactions, there was an increase in demand for land intended for residential
construction, rising by 45% compared to 2020, marking the highest level since the pre-
crisis period of 2008 [32].
Figure 6. Number of residential transactions in Slovenia per year quarters, 2018–2023. Source: SURS.
The surge witnessed in 2021 (notably in its second quarter) began to wane in 2022
(Figure 6). Transactions for land intended for construction saw a decline of approximately
15% compared to the previous year, signaling a potential cooling of the real estate market
[32]. Residential property transactions, especially apartment sales, also experienced a dip,
with a nearly 10% decrease compared to 2021. This trend continued into 2023.
Figure 6. Number of residential transactions in Slovenia per year quarters, 2018–2023. Source: SURS.
The surge witnessed in 2021 (notably in its second quarter) began to wane in 2022
(
Figure 6
). Transactions for land intended for construction saw a decline of approximately
15% compared to the previous year, signaling a potential cooling of the real estate mar-
ket [
32
]. Residential property transactions, especially apartment sales, also experienced a
dip, with a nearly 10% decrease compared to 2021. This trend continued into 2023.
Based on the real estate data provided for Slovenia, it appears that there are some
gentle trends indicating a higher evaluation of rural amenities, which in turn, promoted
(especially hidden) counterurbanization. (See Figure 7). This seems to be motivated by
several factors including high apartment prices in more urbanized areas (especially Ljubljana)
and changing residential preferences favoring less urbanized areas, offering increased space
and access to green areas. Nevertheless, we cannot draw any concrete conclusions, as the real
estate market provides only partial information with respect to the whole picture.
Sustainability 2024, 16, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 18
Based on the real estate data provided for Slovenia, it appears that there are some
gentle trends indicating a higher evaluation of rural amenities, which in turn, promoted
(especially hidden) counterurbanization. (See Figure 7). This seems to be motivated by
several factors including high apartment prices in more urbanized areas (especially
Ljubljana) and changing residential preferences favoring less urbanized areas, offering
increased space and access to green areas. Nevertheless, we cannot draw any concrete
conclusions, as the real estate market provides only partial information with respect to the
whole picture.
Figure 7. Index of residential property prices in Slovenia per year quarters, 2018–2023. (Index calcu-
lated as year quarter sales/averaged 2015 sales). Source: SURS [33].
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The concept of teleworkability was set in the center of this analysis, as a function of
sluggish factors such as the industrial structure and national workplace culture plus the
“chock” in the form of the closedowns and social isolation caused by the pandemic. An
additional assumption was that the chock caused relative changes in amenity weights in
favor of rural amenities. Together, these factors were supposed to contribute to open or
“hidden” counterurbanization—a population deconcentration from a state of more con-
centration to a state of less concentration.
We found signs of open (migration) as well as “hidden” counterurbanization (unreg-
istered rural living) in both countries, stronger in Sweden than in Slovenia, and we found
indications that the industrial structure and national workplace cultures contributed to
differences in the strength of the counterurbanization. In both countries, we found indi-
cations that the pandemic contributed to a shift in people’s relative valuation of rural vs.
urban amenities. In Sweden, this was expressed in rising prices on second homes in rela-
tion to prices of “first homes”. Increased demand for housing outside the capital could
also be noticed in Slovenia. Thus, while the sluggish factors contributed to differences in
teleworkability between Sweden and Slovenia, the chock implied similar reactions in the
shift of valuation of amenities. Even if there are no statistics on how much teleworking
took place in second homes, the increased demand for second homes can be interpreted
as a sign of higher evaluation of rural amenities that contributed to (primarily hidden)
counterurbanization.
Going more into detail, we noticed indications of direct counterurbanization in Swe-
den when comparing migration paerns before and during the pandemic. Net migration
saw its most significant decrease in metropolitan municipalities, with Stockholm experi-
encing a shift to negative net migration. Conversely, rural municipalities exhibited the
lowest decrease, and in sparsely populated rural municipalities, the net migration even
turned from negative to positive.
Figure 7. Index of residential property prices in Slovenia per year quarters, 2018–2023. (Index
calculated as year quarter sales/averaged 2015 sales). Source: SURS [33].

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 14 of 17
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The concept of teleworkability was set in the center of this analysis, as a function
of sluggish factors such as the industrial structure and national workplace culture plus
the “chock” in the form of the closedowns and social isolation caused by the pandemic.
An additional assumption was that the chock caused relative changes in amenity weights
in favor of rural amenities. Together, these factors were supposed to contribute to open
or “hidden” counterurbanization—a population deconcentration from a state of more
concentration to a state of less concentration.
We found signs of open (migration) as well as “hidden” counterurbanization (un-
registered rural living) in both countries, stronger in Sweden than in Slovenia, and we
found indications that the industrial structure and national workplace cultures contributed
to differences in the strength of the counterurbanization. In both countries, we found
indications that the pandemic contributed to a shift in people’s relative valuation of rural
vs. urban amenities. In Sweden, this was expressed in rising prices on second homes
in relation to prices of “first homes”. Increased demand for housing outside the capital
could also be noticed in Slovenia. Thus, while the sluggish factors contributed to differ-
ences in teleworkability between Sweden and Slovenia, the chock implied similar reactions
in the shift of valuation of amenities. Even if there are no statistics on how much tele-
working took place in second homes, the increased demand for second homes can be
interpreted as a sign of higher evaluation of rural amenities that contributed to (primarily
hidden) counterurbanization.
Going more into detail, we noticed indications of direct counterurbanization in Sweden
when comparing migration patterns before and during the pandemic. Net migration saw
its most significant decrease in metropolitan municipalities, with Stockholm experiencing
a shift to negative net migration. Conversely, rural municipalities exhibited the lowest
decrease, and in sparsely populated rural municipalities, the net migration even turned
from negative to positive.
During the first year of the pandemic, 2020, the prices of second homes in Sweden
increased but so did the prices of first homes as well. However, during 2021, prices of
second homes rose considerably more than those of first homes. We interpret this as an
expression of an increase in the value of natural amenities in relation to urban amenities.
This can also be interpreted as a sign of increased demand to spend time in rural second
homes when lockdowns and teleworking made it possible. Thus, even if there are no
statistics on how much teleworking took place in second homes, the increased demand for
second homes can be interpreted as an expression of hidden counterurbanization.
Interestingly, we could not find the same indications of counterurbanization in Slove-
nia. Most of the differences can be explained by the geographical and structural differences.
Slovenia is a country with a much smaller area and a much larger population density
compared to Sweden. This means that the definitions of urban and rural areas differ, as
well as people’s habits. The capital is located in the middle of the country and the furthest
municipalities are less than a two-hour drive away. Short distances enable many people to
drive to work daily, which is further encouraged by the national labor laws that envision
obligatory non-taxed travel expenses for each employee.
As in other countries, Slovenia is experiencing a sharp rise in real estate prices in its
largest cities, which motivates people to buy houses and apartments in more rural areas.
However, as our analysis shows, it is not rural areas that are experiencing a rise in number
of inhabitants but suburban areas close to the capital.
Furthermore, the countries differ in some other structural indicators that limit the
influence the pandemic and working from home had on people’s habits. Looking at data
on the industrial and employment structure and workplace culture, we can see that the
potential for teleworkability is much larger in Sweden than in Slovenia.
In addition, it is important to mention the differences in national regulations regarding
teleworking. In Sweden, while telework is governed by certain laws and sectoral collective
bargaining agreements, it is, as in other Nordic countries, to a large extent self-regulated

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 15 of 17
and based on mutual trust between employers and employees [
19
]. On the other hand,
Slovenia has a more stringent regulatory framework, with teleworking integrated into
statutory labor legislation [
34
]. Despite Slovenia’s adoption of sectoral-level bargaining
after the pandemic [
35
], the overall process, excluding the exceptions that allowed for
a temporary easing of regulations during the pandemic, remains an arduous process
entailing numerous steps. For example, it involves an evaluation of working conditions by
the Labor Inspectorate, which must also authorize companies before they can implement
teleworking. Additionally, a new employment contract must be drafted before an employee
can start teleworking.
This disparity in the regulatory approach and administrative process with regard
to teleworking, with Slovenia employing a more stringent compared to Sweden’s more
flexible approach, likely contributes to the differing post-pandemic telework adoption
rates between the two countries. Sweden’s readiness to embrace telework, evident in
sustained post-pandemic levels, contrasts with Slovenia’s adherence to strict regulatory
requirements, which may have contributed to teleworking levels returning to almost pre-
pandemic levels. By extension, it seems that teleworkability may not be as strong a driver
for counterurbanization in Slovenia compared to Sweden.
Thus, the analysis shows that the differences between Sweden and Slovenia are
not only restricted to the general socioeconomic and geographic differences mentioned
in Section 3but also consist of differences in commuting possibilities, legislation, and
administrative rules that affect the process of counterurbanization and the impact of
teleworking during the pandemic.
From a more general perspective, it can hardly be a fortuity that the counterurban-
ization of the 1970s coincided with the manufacturing and industrial crisis and that the
counterurbanization of the early 2020s coincided with the crisis that the
COVID-19
pan-
demic caused for the “urban density” paradigm. However, the latter wave of coun-
terurbanization was also favored by innovations in information and communication
technologies (ICT)—innovations
that no doubt will make teleworking even easier for large
groups on the labor market. During four decades, ICT contributed to the strengthening
of the agglomeration and concentration of resources in the big cities, but today it is obvi-
ous that it has created counterforces to agglomeration as well. Our study indicated that
industrial structure, public and private transportation, and various types of institutions
influence the potential for counterurbanization. This means that not only technology devel-
opment but also planning and political decisions play a decisive role in the concentration
or deconcentration of human resources in the future.
Of course, a study like this has a number of obvious limitations. Counterurbanization
is in itself a concept with vague definitions, and the lack of statistics on the usage of
second homes makes it necessary to use indirect measures of the “hidden” forms of it
(i.e., someone who is part-time living in the countryside but is registered in the city). The
indirect measures that we used in this study, prices on various types of houses, differ as
well between the two countries. Further, there is no common European standard for how
working from home should be measured, and we have found very contradicting figures,
depending on the measures being used. The comparisons completed in this study are
based on the measures that we found most similar for the two countries. These and other
limitations in finding similar data in the two countries make it impossible to perform more
rigorous statistical analyses of the extension and driving forces of counterurbanization
during the pandemic.
Ever since the counterurbanization of the 1970s, studies of the phenomenon have
almost solely been completed within countries, and the few international comparisons that
have been completed have been based on comparing the results of national studies. Thus,
with all its limitations, this study is one of the very first ones that compares counterur-
banization and its driving forces in two countries within the same analytical framework.
Needless to say, there is much that can be improved in further international comparative
studies—if coordinated data can be made available.

Sustainability 2024,16, 6904 16 of 17
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, H.W. and D.P.; methodology, H.W.; validation, H.W.
and D.P.; formal analysis, H.W.; investigation, H.W., M.G. and M.R.; resources, H.W. and D.P.;
data curation, H.W., M.G. and M.R.; writing—original draft preparation, H.W.; writing—review
and editing, H.W., M.G., D.P. and M.R.; visualization, H.W.; supervision, H.W. and D.P.; project
administration, H.W. and M.G.; funding acquisition, H.W. and D.P. All authors have read and agreed
to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council Formas under Grant number
FR-2021/0004. The research is part of the research program Socio-cultural and Organisational
Aspects of Knowledge and Technology Transfer—P5-0342, funded by the Slovenian Research and
Innovation Agency.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Official statistics for Sweden were collected from Statistics Sweden
www.scb.se. Official statistics for Slovenia were collected from the Slovenian Statistical Office
(SURS) https://www.stat.si/statweb. Labor statistics were collected from the International Labour
Organization (ILO). Data on national workplace culture were collected from the European Values
Survey (2017–2020) and Eurobarometer (2018). Statistics on house sales in Sweden were collected
from https://www.maklarstatistik.se/. Statistical data on teleworking before, during, and after
the pandemic were collected from Eurostat, Statistics Sweden, Valicon (2023), and the Slovenian
NIJZ-PANDA survey.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to acknowledge Anja Pogladiˇc for her assistance with
data collection and other important contributions during this research.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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