Article

The unnecessary ‘more’—compared to ROPA: a reply to Mangione

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Abstract

In her recent paper, Emanuele Mangione proposes combining maternal spindle transfer (MST) and reciprocal effortless in vitro fertilisation (ReIVF) to enable both females to have genetic and gestational ties with the same child, which can particularly benefit lesbian couples. This response rejects Mangione’s proposal for the reason that the additional biological ties created by MST+ReIVF, compared with the reception of oocytes from partner (ROPA), are unnecessary. ROPA is currently the most effective method for redistributing biological ties within lesbian couples, allowing one member to provide the egg and the other to carry the fetus. The additional biological ties created by MST+ReIVF are quantitatively too small to significantly enhance parental bonding or couple relationships, and their potential harms to both prospective parents and children outweigh any minor benefits. Furthermore, like ROPA, MST+ReIVF fails to address deeper feminist concerns. Therefore, I propose a new idea: combining in vitro gametogenesis with ectogenesis, which can offer far more reproductive choices and greater potential to address deeper feminist concerns than MST+ReIVF.

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