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Article https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51152-9
Climate impacts of critical mineral supply
chain bottlenecks for electric vehicle
deployment
Lucas Woodley
1
, Chung Yi See
2
, Peter Cook
3
,MeganYeo
2
,DanielS.Palmer
4
,
Laurena Huh
5
,SeaverWang
3
&AshleyNunes
2,3,6
New tailpipe emissions standards aim to increase electric vehicle (EV) sales in
the United States. Here, we analyze the associated critical mineral supply chain
constraints and enumerate the climate consequences of these constraints. Our
work yields five findings. First, the proposed standard necessitates replacing at
least 10.21 million new internal combustion engine vehicles with EVs between
2027 and 2032. Second, based on economically viable and geologically avail-
able mineral reserves, manufacturing sufficient EVs is plausible and reduces up
to 457.3 million tons of CO
2
e. Third, mineral production capacities in the
United States and amongst allies support the deployment of 5.09 million
vehicles between 2027 and 2032, well short of compliance target. Fourth, this
shortfall produces at least 59.54 million tons of CO
2
e in lost lifecycle emissions
benefits. Fifth, limited production of battery-grade graphite and cobalt may
represent particularly profound constraints. Pathways that afford comparable
emission reductions are subsequently explored.
Acceleration of the energy transition and realization of both national
and regional climate commitments require urgent action on a global
scale1. These goals depend upon adoption of technologies that facil-
itate emissions reductions. However, energy systems powered by low-
carbon technologies differ profoundly from current systems of fossil
fuel trade and infrastructure. The manufacturing of solar photovoltaic
plants,wind farms, and electric vehicles (EVs) –technologies crucial to
lowering emissions –generally requires considerable volumes of spe-
cialty minerals, with mineral intensity varying greatly across different
technologies2–4.
Meeting the mineral demands associated with electrifying the
light-duty vehicle fleet warrants particular attention given the trans-
portation sector’s contribution to CO
2
emissions. Owing to an existing
internal combustion engine vehicles’(ICEVs) dependence on fossil
fuels, cars, vans, and sport utility vehicles produce nearly half of all
transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions, making these vehi-
cles significant contributors to climate change5,6.Electrification offers
–by virtue of reduced dependence on fossil fuels –alowerwell-to-
wheels emissions profile, which can reduce overall emissions relative
to the status quo7–12.
However, raw material supply chain bottlenecks present potential
obstacles for an efficient transition to EVs13–16. Compared to ICEVs, five
minerals- cobalt, graphite, lithium,nickel, and rare earths are used toa
significantly higher degree in the manufacturing of EVs. An EV also
requires twice the weight of copper and manganese –two additional
key minerals, relative to ICEVs2. Higher mineral demands imposed by
EVs and the envisioned prospect of widespread electrification as a
pathwaytowards emissions reductionraise the important question: do
mineral demands associated with electrifying the light-duty vehicle
fleet exceed available supply? If so, by how much? And what are the
emissions consequences of disequilibrium in critical minerals market?
Answers to these questions are timely, particularly for the United
States where emissions from the largely ICE-powered light-duty vehi-
cle fleet constitute a significant share of overall emissions. This share
has grown over time and appears likely to continue as household
motorization rates rise17.TheU.S.federalgovernmenthas–since 2008
Received: 24 November 2023
Accepted: 30 July 2024
Check for updates
1
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
2
Department of Economics, Harvard College, Cambridge, MA, USA.
3
Breakthrough
Institute, Berkeley, CA, USA.
4
Groton School, Groton, MA, U SA .
5
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
6
Center for Labor and a Just Economy, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, USA. e-mail: anunes@law.harvard.edu
Nature Communications | (2024) 15:6813 1
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–sought to temper the emissions impact of ICEVs by incentivizing EV
adoption18. The most ambitious of these efforts –introduced by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2023 –envisions a 14.41%
reduction in US transportation-related emissions (the equivalentof 7.2
billion metric tons of CO
2
e through 2055) by regulating tailpipe
emissions for the new light duty vehicles19,20. The standards necessitate
–for vehicles sold after 2026 –realization of an industry-wide average
target for the light-duty fleet of 82 grams/mile (g/mile) of CO
2
by 2032.
Given current market conditions and the thermal inefficiency of ICEVs,
achieving this target necessitates significantly increasing EV sales
volume21. How achievable are increases like these given constraints in
EV mineral supply chains?
Our work addresses this question. To do so, we estimate a model
that, (1) explores requisite EV sales volume scenarios that conform to
the U.S. light-duty vehicle electrification targets set by the EPA22–24,(2)
assesses whether existing U.S. mineral supply chains can accom-
modate EV manufacturing levels needed to achieve the sales targets
associated with these scenarios, and (3) quantifies the emissions
impact of potential disequilibrium between mineral supply and EV-
associated mineral demand for each scenario. Our model accom-
modates envisioned improvements in the emissions profile of alter-
native powertrains owing to technological and legislative efforts, most
notably, recently proposed Corporate Average Fuel Economy stan-
dards (CAFE) for light duty vehicles between 2027 and 203225–27.We
furtherconsiderEVs’potential to operate as substitutes rather than
complements28,29 due to increased range30–33, as well as envisioned
reductions in the carbon intensity of the electrical grid that may –
owing tolegislationlike the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act –improve the
emissions profile of EVs34.
Three key characteristics define our approach.
First, in estimating potential mineral disequilibrium, we recognize
that the US is ill-suited to pursue full self-sufficiency in several key
minerals –most notably cobalt, graphite, and manganese15 –that are
necessary to produce lithium-ion batteries used in EVs34.Wecon-
currently acknowledge political concerns that some countries levy
disproportional influence over key aspects of the automotive supply
chain and may use raw material and manufacturing market power not
only to limit supplies, but also to further attract and concentrate for-
eign investment and advanced manufacturing2,35,36. Following the
Inflation Reduction Act’s passage, US policies require the total value
added from mining and processing of critical minerals for an EV’s
battery by the US and partner countries to exceed certain thresholds
for the EV to fully qualify for tax credit incentives. This is a difficult
criterion for researchers to model without access to considerable
trade and proprietary information37. As the critical minerals value
within EV batteries is considered as an ensemble of all minerals, this
creates many possible combination-based pathways to both credit
eligibility and credit ineligibility.
Consequently, consistent with the general intent of mineral
sourcing provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act to promote secure
sourcing and more diverse supply chains, our estimates more narrowly
consider minerals that are mined either domestically or in countries
with which the US has free trade and/or mutual defense agreements.
We also consider patterns of US and partner country mineral proces-
sing. Furthermore, our analysis assesses both potential limits in the
size of US and partner countries’total geologic mineral reserves
(hereafter referred to as reserves) and their associated limits in the
annual total rate of upstream mineral production (hereafter referred
to as production) (see “Methods”section for details). We also consider
the impact of downstream mineral processing constraints, processing
referring to the treatment of minerals into a usable form for manu-
facturing purposes. Exact processing methods vary depending on the
mineralcommodity, but often entail smelting or chemical refining into
solid metal, for example. Notably, processing facilities often utilize
mineralfeedstocksourced from multiple mines and, unlike mines, are
not geographically constrained to where the minerals themselves are
extracted.
Second, our efforts consider heterogeneity in the adoption of
specific battery chemistries and the emissions intensity associated
with these chemistries38–40.Electrification policies do not –to our
knowledge –prioritize one battery chemistry over another but rather
emphasize specific EV penetration rates. Yet, consideration of the
emissions intensity associated with extracting minerals specifictoa
particular battery chemistry is timely because it influences the mag-
nitude of total emissions reductions EVs ultimately deliver. Put simply,
EVs utilizing relatively carbon-intense battery chemistries likely offer a
smaller emissions benefit–ceteris paribus - than chemistries with
lower manufacturing-related emissions. To account for such factors,
we leverage the 2022 Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and
Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model to estimate emissions
associated with adopting specific battery chemistries41.
Third, we assess whether specific emissions reduction targets
envisioned by the EPA can –given potential constraints in mineral
supplies - be realized by deploying a wider combination of vehicle
powertrains in the national fleet, namely hybrid electric vehicles (HEV).
The manufacturing of HEV batteries requires fewer specialty raw
materials, alleviating mineral supply constraints42,43.Moreover,HEVs
offer substantially lower emissions relative to ICEVs for a similar
vehicle price (thereby offering greater affordability to consumers
relative to current EVs)44 while also enjoying relative market popularity
compared to EVs (thereby affording more rapid widespread
deployment)45.HEVs’popularity has persisted despite the gradual
withdrawal of HEV-specific procurement incentives first enacted in
200846,47. Consequently, we also explore whether complementary
deployment of HEVs can help drive near-term transportation sector
emissions reductions while alleviating immediate raw material supply
chain constraints confronting EVs.
Our efforts can help better inform public policies that target
transportation-related emissions reductions in the face of potential
mineral supply constraints on EV battery pack manufacturing. Fur-
thermore, by scrutinizing geographic patterns associated with mineral
supply constraints, our work can inform efforts to address economic
and national security concerns related to possible mineral shortfalls.
As countries like the United States accelerate their efforts to reduce
emissions and deploy new low-carbon technologies, policymakers
must create the underlying conditions for a new generation of tech-
nologies to achieve widespread adoption while maintaining reliable
and affordable energy and mobility systems amidst real-world
constraints3. In the long term, EVs appear poised to dominate the
future of clean transportation. In the medium term, however, the
tension between ambitious policy targets with fixed timetables and the
inertia facing supply chain expansion poses complex challenges. A
better understanding of the linkages between raw material availability,
battery pack chemistries, and the advantages and drawbacks of dif-
ferent low-emissions vehicle types improves assessments of different
policy options’impacts, thereby promoting more effective public
policy.
Results and discussion
Electrification of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet carries the potential to
reduce CO2 emissions, public health harm from air pollution, and
national dependence on fossil fuels. These societal benefits have
prompted the EPA to propose stringent emissions standards that de
facto necessitate EV adoption. How achievable are the proposed
standards given constraints in mineral supply chains?
We address this question by, (1) specifying requisite EV sales
volume targets across three sales scenarios (low, medium, and high)
that each conform to the electrification targets set by the EPA, (2)
enumerating the extent to which these targets can be met by using a
single battery chemistry (referred to as ‘optimal chemistry’)or
Article https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51152-9
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combination thereof (referred to as ‘market mix’), and (3) quantify the
emissions impact of disequilibrium between mineral supply and
demand. Our sales scenarios encompass the full range of possible
pathways for vehicle manufacturers to meet current adoption goals
and accommodate the range of EV sales estimates projected thus far in
preexisting literature22–24.Specifically, in our low sales scenario, EV
sales persist at current levels until 2032, at which point sales increase
to the requisite amount implied by the EPA’stargets.Inthemedium
sales scenario, EV sales gradually rise over timebeginning in 2027 and
achieve the requisite volume in 2032. In the high sales scenario, EV
sales increase to the requisite volume in 2027 and remain stable
through 2032, reflecting possible rapid compliance from vehicle
manufacturers.
Realization of EPA prescribed sales volume targets are estimated
using both mineral reserve and mineral production estimates (see
“Methods”section for details). Unless otherwise specified, estimates
presented assume new light duty vehicle sales comprise solely of (and
replace) four-door sedans. The robustness of this parameter as it
relates to requisite EV sales and mineral demands is subsequently
tested under the Heavier Fleet Assumption (see Methods for details).
Where our model produces different estimates for each sales scenario,
we present results for the medium sales scenario followed by the range
across the low and high scenarios in parentheses.
Our key findings are as follows.
First, we find that by the year 2032 - given projected emission
profiles of ICEVs and HEVs, - at least 37.82% of new vehicle sales must
be EVs for auto manufacturers to ensure compliance with the EPA’s
tailpipe emissions proposal (Fig. 1a). This finding –which is lower than
other projected estimates regarding requisite EV market share21 –
reflects the impact that improved fuel economy of non EVs (necessi-
tated by the most recent CAFE standards update), have on requisite EV
penetration rates. Given the interdependencies between fuel economy
and tailpipe emissions, a fossil fuel powered light duty vehicle fleet
with higher fuel economy is less polluting, which in turn requires lower
requisite EV market share to comply with the EPA’s tailpipe emissions
standard. Nevertheless, requiring that 37.82% of new light-duty vehicle
sales be EVs requires –consistent with the envisioned intent of the EPA
proposal - a significant increase in EV sales relative to the present-day
rate of 6%48. Assuming the overall size of the light duty vehicle fleet
remains consistent with government projections, our model estimates
that new EVs must displace 28.05 million new ICEVs between 2027 and
2032 (10.21 and 34.62 million in the low and high sales scenarios,
respectively) to comply with the proposed rule (Table 1).
Second, we find that from the vantage point of mineral reserves
alone, supporting the requisite number of vehicles required for EPA
compliance is plausible across all scenarios for five of the six battery
chemistries investigated. That is, the total quantities of economically
extractable minerals contained in the US and partner countries are
theoretically sufficient to meet the required magnitude of EV deploy-
ment. Specifically, we find that for the deployment of EVs using solely
NMC 523, NMC 622, NMC 811, NCA, or LFP batteries, leveraging
mineralreserves can support between 81.66 million and 989.27 million
EVs. Thiswell exceeds the 34.62 million EVs estimated for compliance
in our high penetration scenario, reducing lifecycle emissions by up to
457.3 million tons of CO
2
e, which is equivalent to 76.2 million tons of
CO
2
e per year.
Reliance on LFP battery chemistry maximizes the number of EVs
supported (989.27 million), followed by NCA (400.37 million), NMC
811 (201.80 million), NMC 523 (90.21 million), and NMC 622 (81.66
million). Moreover, leveraging a combination of LFP and NCA che-
mistries affords additional EV batteries to be manufactured; namely,
available reserves can simultaneously produce 735.19 million LFP bat-
teries and 400.37 million NCA batteries, thereby supporting a total of
1.14 billion EVs. Reliance on NMC 111 exclusively affords the fewest
number of vehicles supported (47.71 million), though we recognize
that such a scenario may be unrealistic given recent shifts away from
NMC 111 chemistries49,50.
Although these results imply that vehicle manufacturers can fully
satisfy EV demand using numerous potential major chemistries51,
access to geological mineral reserves depends in practice upon
mineral production capacity. Whereas reserves refer to long term,
cumulative economically viable supply, production rates reflect
existing extraction capacity. Consequently, in addition to solely con-
sidering geological reserves, planners must assess whether available
mineral production capacity can enable realization of the EPA’selec-
trification targets.
Third, we find that based on current mineral production from the
US and its allies between 2027 and 2032, a maximum of 5.09 million EV
batteries can be produced cumulatively, a figure that falls well b elow of
the requisite number of EV batteries in even our lowest sales scenario
(10.2 million; Table 1). This implies that a minimum of 50.13% of overall
EV demand required by the proposed EPA policy cannot be met, owing
to mineral production constraints. Graphite is the key limiting mineral
driving battery chemistry choice that maximizes potential EV deploy-
ment, as exclusive manufacturing of NMC 811 EV batteries supports no
more than 5.09 million vehicles (Fig. 2). This effect is sensitive to our
input battery mineral intensity data, whic h assume 56.6 kg of graphite
for a 75 kWhNMC 811 batterypack, with alternative chemistries such as
NCA or LFP requiring even higher amounts of graphite (Fig. 3). Spe-
cifically, we find limits of 4.70 and 2.98 million NCA and LFP batteries,
respectively, which correspond to at least 53.96% and 70.78% of unmet
EV demand. Under these assumptions, graphite might potentially pose
a challenge to envisioned market shifts towards NCA and LFP EVs by
2032. Were LFP battery packs to be increasingly favored within the EV
fleet owing to their cost advantage13, an outcome we consider in our
market-mix scenario,we find that production capacity from the US and
its allies’alone may currently support manufacturing of only 3.51 mil-
lion EV battery packs from 2027 to 2032. Such an outcome is analo-
gous to 65.61% of unmet EV demand.
What are the emissions consequences of being unable to fully
meet the EPA’s implied EV sales targets? Our fourth finding is that,
assuming manufacturers maximize the quantity of available EVs in
each given year by utilizing NMC 811 chemistries exclusively, the US
light-duty vehicle fleet will contain 22.96 million (5.12 to 29.53 million)
fewer EVs than the EPA targets. This shortfall is equivalent to 284.12
million tons CO
2
e (59.54 million to 369.05 million tons CO
2
e) in lost
lifecycle emissions benefits. Put differently, projected mineral con-
straints reduce potential emissions benefits by 62.1% (13.0–80.7%).
Meanwhile, if the EV fleet evolves using a mix of battery chemistries,
the light-duty vehicle fleet may contain 24.54 million (6.70–31.11 mil-
lion) fewer EVs than the EPA targets, which is analogous to 310.56
million tons CO
2
e (81.11 million to 397.23 million tons CO
2
e) in lost
lifecycle emissions benefits, or 67.9% (17.7–86.9%) of potential emis-
sions benefits.
Resolution pathways
Given the potential formineral constraints to impede the effectiveness
of the EPA’s proposed rule, how can policymakers respond? We
investigate two potential pathways.
The first entails increasing mineral production capacity to better
meet the mineral demand requirements imposed by the EPA’semis-
sions proposal. Given that this approach is currently the focus of
ongoing discussions, most notably through domestic mine permitting
reform52–57,weenumeratespecific production thresholds that warrant
consideration to fully realize the EPA’selectrification goals. Graphite is
the primary constraining battery material, while cobalt would also
pose an obstacle to the required magnitude of EV deployment in
scenarios that rely more heavily on NMC and NCA chemistries. Con-
versely, increased production of other key minerals (i.e., aluminum,
copper, lithium, manganese, nickel, and phosphate) –absent increases
Article https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51152-9
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in graphite and cobalt –does not increase the number of EV battery
packs that can be manufactured. We therefore direct scrutiny towards
the requisite increases to graphite and cobalt production.
Based on existing industry announcements for new natural gra-
phite mines and synthetic graphite plants in the US, production of
graphite by the US and partner countries could increase to 173,000
tons per year by 2026, while from 2027 to 2032, graphite production
would further increase to 255,000 tons per year52–56. However,
achieving the required annual US EV sales of 5.71 million in 2032 –
assuming the leveraging of the optimal chemistry, namely NMC 811 -
would require up to 331,000 tons per year of available battery-grade
graphite. This constitutes a 590% increase in graphite relative to the
present day and exceeds the projected increases based on existing
announcements. Cobalt production by the US and eligible partners
would need to meet demand of up to 37,000 tons per year, or up to
69% more than current collective annual production rates, to support
US light-duty vehicle electrification. In a market mix case, requisite
increases in graphite and cobalt production are 880 and 42% respec-
tively, relative to present day production.
Beyond graphite and cobalt, mineral constraints become less
acute. Between the US and partner countries, present-day mineral
production for aluminum, copper, lithium, manganese, nickel, and
Fig. 1 | Overview of EV sales scenarios and impact of mineral supply constraints. a estimates for sedan only fleet. bestimates for SUV + sedan fleet.
Article https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51152-9
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phosphate would theoretically suffice to meet US vehicle electrifica-
tion goals under all sales scenarios. However, other non-battery sec-
tors often dominate total demand for and US imports of these minerals
—dynamics which could externally impose additional constraints on EV
mineral supply chains in practice. Whereas this work considers all
mineral supply as available for light-duty EV production, in reality, EV
sector demands comprise a fraction of broader economy-wide needs.
For example, we note that lithium and nickel –which are the next most
limiting raw materials –could pose potential challenges owing to their
use outside of the electric light-duty vehicle sector (e.g., heavy trucks,
consumer electronics, utility-scale batteries, other electric mobility
technologies for lithium, and stainless steel, specialty steel, and non-
ferrous metal alloys for nickel)58, as well as their use in satisfying other
countries’EV demand. Indeed, recent work has projected near-term
global lithium supply shortfalls owing to a rapid increase in electric
vehicle demand and lagging upstream production growth, thereby
posing supply constraints not identified in the current study based on
source country eligibility alone59–63.
To what degree would a universal increase in mineral production
support additional EV deployment? To assess the sensitivity of battery
pack manufacturing limits to changes in mineral availability, we
incorporate an Added Supply Assumption in our model. Here, we
assume that for each mineral, an additional amount of eligible mineral
production becomes available for US EV manufacturing, with that
amount equivalent to 20% of the national annual production of the
world’s leading supplier of each mineral. We find that the Added
Supply Assumption dramatically alleviates graphite constraints,
enabling cumulative 2027–2032 deployment of 23.13 million EVs if
exclusively manufacturing NMC811 battery packs, or 15.95 million EVs
for a market mix of battery chemistries. Relative to current mineral
production, this represents a significant increase in deployable EVs
using both an optimal chemistry (initially 5.09 million from 2027 to
Table 1 | Model results for EV sales scenarios (optimal chemistry –NMC 811)
2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
All sales scenarios Projected light-duty vehicle sales 15,478,700 15,330,200 15,268,900 15,210,400 15,144,000 15,102,000
Low sales scenario # of EVs desired 911,257 902,515 898,906 895,462 891,553 5,711,810
# of EVs possible (Production) 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804
Emissions shortfall from lack of EVs (tons CO
2
e) 838,865 701,400 634,080 574,939 509,334 56,281,611
Emissions shortfall (% of potential CO
2
e savings) 93.15 94.05 94.43 94.79 95.21 14.86
Medium sales scenario # of EVs desired 3,645,234 4,047,671 4,467,348 4,884,425 5,295,399 5,711,810
# of EVs possible (Production) 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804
Emissions shortfall from lack of EVs (tons CO
2
e) 37,561,279 41,773,389 45,795,416 49,728,490 52,979,047 56,281,611
Emissions shortfall (% of potential CO
2
e savings) 23.29 20.97 19.00 17.38 16.03 14.86
High sales scenario # of EVs desired 5,854,284 5,798,119 5,774,935 5,752,809 5,727,696 5,711,810
# of EVs possible (Production) 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804 848,804
Emissions shortfall from lack of EVs (tons CO
2
e) 67,232,948 64,632,153 62,343,920 60,429,055 58,129,658 56,281,611
Emissions shortfall (% of potential CO
2
e savings) 14.50 14.64 14.70 14.75 14.82 14.86
Fig. 2 | Estimates reflect production constraints, trends in consumption patterns, and import patterns. Overview of mineral demands versus available supply
(Optimal chemistry –NMC 811).
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2032 when using NMC 811 batteries) and a market mix (initially 3.51
million from 2027 to 2032). However, leveraging the Added Supply
Assumption still produces an EV sales shortfall in the medium and high
sales scenario (that require 28.05 million and 34.62 million EV sales
respectively).
Additionally, automobile manufacturers could conceivably con-
sider smaller EV battery packs to stretch mineral supplies further.
Meeting EPA emissions standards requires implied nationwide
deployment of at least 5.71 million EVs in the year 2032. At present-day
rates of production (48,000 tons per year), graphite remains –we find
–a constraining factor, allowing for just 8.4 kg of graphite per battery
pack. This corresponds to a graphite intensity ~56% that of a typical
20 kWh NMC811 battery like those used in plug-in hybrids, therefore
yielding a battery capacity of 11 kWh. Under the Added Supply
Assumption, an added 170,000 tons per year of graphite (20% of
China’s annual production) is made available, allowing for up to
38.17kg per vehicle or 80% of the requirement of a 60 kWh NMC811
battery. This corresponds to a 48-kWh battery pack. Given perfor-
mance characteristics associated with smaller battery packs (i.e.,
reduced range, acceleration, and payload capacity), and consumer
aversion to these characteristics64,65, our results suggest that efforts to
meet electrification targets by reducing battery size to this degree may
impede EV adoption efforts.
Moreover, we note that our analysis optimistically assumes
battery packs that are scaled for sedan-sized electric vehicles. How-
ever, the U.S. vehicle market is currently skewed towards heavier
SUVs and light trucks (71%) versus sedans (29%). Accounting for this
fleet profile - which more accurately reflects the composition of the
fleet at large –affects our sales and mineral estimates in two ways.
First, it increases the number of EV sales required to ensure com-
pliance with the EPA’s proposal, this owing to the lower requisite and
realized fuel economy of SUVs (relative to sedans) (Fig. 1b). Second,
it increases aggregate mineral demands of the EV fleet as heavier
electrified SUVs/light trucks require –ceteris paribus - a larger bat-
tery (and consequently more mineral) to achieve the same range as
lighter electrified sedans.
Assuming a heavier fleet, achieving the required annual US EV
sales in 2032 –assuming the leveraging of the optimal chemistry,
namely NMC 811 –requires, we estimate, up to 339,000 tons per year
of available battery-grade graphite. This constitutes a 732% increase in
graphite relative to the present day and exceeds the projected
increases based on existing announcements. Cobalt production by the
US and eligible partners would need to meet demand of up to 44,000
tons per year, or up to 104% more than current collective production
rates, to support US light-duty vehicle electrification. In a market mix
case, requisite increases in graphite and cobalt production are 1120
and 77% respectively.
We find that at current mineral production rates, accommodating
a heavier fleet profile limits EV deployment from 2027 to 2032 to 4.12
million EVs for the optimal chemistry (NMC 811-only) case and 2.84
million EVs for the market mix case. Incorporating the Added Supply
Assumption increases these figures to 18.70 million and 12.90 million
EVs respectively, figures that like in the case of considering a sedan-
only fleet, still produces an EV sales shortfall in the medium and high
sales scenario (which require 31.40 million and 41.30 million EV sales
respectively). Consequently, an EV fleetthatfavorsheavierSUVsand
pickup trucks will increase the tension between emissions reductions
goals envisioned by EV deployment and the limited mineral produc-
tion available from the US and partner countries.
A second pathway we investigate that realizes the emissions
reductions envisioned by the EPA involves HEVs. Could HEVs offer an
equivalent emissions benefit envisioned by the EPA proposal? Our
model estimates that if policy were to facilitate the exclusive adoption
of HEVs rather than NMC 811 EVs, meeting the EPA’s emissions
reduction goals necessitates at least 189.90 million (93.70 to 219.46
million) HEVs sold between 2027–2032. But year-on-year from 2028
onwards (2032 and 2027 onwards in the low and high sales scenarios,
respectively), the requisite rate of HEV sales exceeds the total pro-
jected light-duty vehicle sales in the US. For example, in the medium
sales scenario, we estimate that meeting the EPA’s envisioned emis-
sions benefit requires at least 27.72 million HEVs sold in 2030,
exceeding the year’s estimated light-duty vehicle sales of 15.21 million.
Fig. 3 | Estimates reflect production constraints, trends in consumption patterns, and import patterns. Overview of mineral demands versus available supply
(Market mix).
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Thus, although early HEV sales can achieve rates consistent with rea-
lization of the EPA’s envisioned emissions benefits, the requisite
volume of HEV sales becomes implausibly high in later years.
Nevertheless, we find that HEVs can –under specificsalessce-
narios –effectively supplement EVs without reducing the potential
emissions benefits. In our medium sales scenario, selling at least 2.68
million EVs in 2030 and replacing the remaining year’sICEVsaleswith
HEVs offers a total lifecycle emissions benefit of 60.19 million tons
CO
2
e, whichis equivalentto the emissions benefits realized by meeting
the EPA’sfleet electrification goals using solely EVs. In the high sales
scenario, realizing such an emissions benefit requires more stringent
thresholds, with at least 2.49 million EVs sold as early as 2027. Across
all sales scenarios, our model suggests a minimum of 4.91 million EVs
in 2032 are required to enable HEVs to supplement EVs without
reducing potential lifecycle emissions benefits. To the extent that
increases in mineral production progress at a pace slower than
required to realize the EPA’s envisioned emissions reduction targets
using EVs alone, our results suggest that leveraging a combination of
HEVs andEVs may help relaxthe requisite mineral production required
while offering equivalent emissions benefits.
Limitations
Given the rapidly evolving nature of the EV market, our approach
prioritizes the improving value proposition of EVs relative to ICEVs.
These assumptions include (1) improvements in battery longevity
that obviate the need for battery replacement, (2) grid dec-
arbonization driven by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (which
improves the emissions proposition of EVs over non-electrified
counterparts), (3) battery chemistry market mixes weighted towards
cobalt-free LFP batteries, (4) full mineral supply allocation for light-
duty EV production absent considering competing use by other
electric vehicles (e.g., heavy trucks, two-wheelers, off-road utility
vehicles) or in other sectors, (5) increased domestic production of
limiting critical minerals owing to permitting reform, and (6) mineral
requirements that –unlike the current US light-duty vehicle fleet –
assume a smaller, lighter vehicle that has lower mineral demands.
This approach –we argue –provides reassurance that our findings
do not exaggerate the challenges facing future EV mass adoption.
However, opportunities to further build upon our efforts warrant
discussion.
Firstly, our model assumes an EV range of 300 miles, a figure that,
while exceeding the median mileage offered by EVs today,falls short of
median mileage offered by current ICEVs66–68. This shortfall has raised
concerns that range anxiety –the perception (real or imagined) that an
EV lacks sufficient charge to reach its intended destination –may
impede widespread EV adoption69. To the extent that this phenom-
enon remains pervasive among consumers, particularly in North
America9,30,70–72 –the focus of our analysis and a market characterized
by longer distance commutes (compared to Europe and China)73,74,we
note thatthe accommodation of higher range EVs would, all else being
equal, increase the mineral demands associated with widespread
electrification. This may exacerbate the magnitude of disequilibrium
enumerated by our model.
Moreover, we note that while increased mineral demands asso-
ciated with higher range EVs can certainly be tempered by further
improvements in EV fuel economy, the EPA’s emissions proposal
specifically prioritizes tailpipe emissions and remains agnostic to EV
fuel economy. Put another way, the EPA proposal does not explicitly
incentivize automakers to improve fuel economy for EVs. Were EV fuel
economy to improve over time, current mineral production would –
holding range constant –support additional EVs. Moreover, increased
EV fuel economy could raise the lifecycleemissions benefits associated
with the EPA’s policy through reductions in electricity demand. Alter-
natively, policies incentivizing fast and accessible charging stations
along lengthy routes70–72 may reduce range anxiety, thereby increasing
individuals’willingness to utilize EVs with smaller batteries and
less range.
Additionally, were grid decarbonization to proceed at a more
aggressive rate than is assumed by our model75, the lifecycle emissions
benefits associated with the EPA proposal would increase. Conversely,
the emissions consequences of non-compliance would be more pro-
found. For example, if the carbon intensity of the electrical grid were
90% lower by 2030 relative to 2005 (compared to 50% assumed by our
model), the shortfall in meeting requisite sales targets in the low sales
scenario alone would produce the equivalent of 561.39 million tons
CO
2
e in lost lifecycle emissions benefits. This shortfall is much higher
than the 284.12 million tons CO
2
e estimated by our model, which
assumes a less aggressive grid decarbonization rate (though one that is
within existing estimates).
Secondly, we recognize that real-world trade, market, and policy
dynamics may challenge the mineral access assumptions underlying
our model. In estimating critical mineral disequilibrium, we assume
that (a) the totality of minerals produced by allies is made available to
the US, and (b) the totality of minerals produced within the United
States and among allies are directed solely towards realizing elec-
trification targets envisioned by the EPA. Each of these assumptions
warrants discussion.
Regarding unfettered access to minerals produced by allies, we
recognize this is unnecessary for every mineral. Assuming the manu-
facture of NMC811 batteries alone, domestic production of aluminum,
copper, and nickel is sufficient to support battery production without
relying on imports (Figs. 2and 3)76. Similarly, current import volumes
of cobalt and manganese from pa rtner countries suffice to produce the
848,804 EV batteries per year supported by existing graphite supply.
However, current import levels of graphite and lithium from allies
constitute only 25 and 31% of the total import supply needed to sustain
this level of battery production, suggesting significant import growth
is required. Moreover, beyond recognizing that the challenge of pro-
curing sufficient battery mineral supplies is as profound for many US
allies as it is for the US77, we demonstrate that even if accessing the
totality of graphite produced by allies were possible, it would still be
insufficient to realize the EPA’s envisioned electrification targets.
These results are consistent with previous work that –in comparing
total eligible supply to current import levels –find that graphite is
constrained in either scenario, whereas lithium supply is sufficient in
totality yet constrained by current trade realities40.
We further note that leveraging the totality of critical mineral
supply solely for the purposes of EV battery production is an unlikely
prospect. Currently, nearly 60% of lithium, 40% of graphite, 30% of
cobalt, and 10% of nickel produced annually is used for manufacturing
EV batteries58,78,79. Meeting climate goals necessitates the manu-
facturing and deployment of other mineral intensive technologies like
solar photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, grid-scale energy storage
systems, hydrogen electrolyzers, and hydrogen fuel cells —some of
which require the same critical minerals as EV batteries. We demon-
strate that were EV battery production to be prioritized, the prospect
of meeting the EPA’selectrification targets is onerous at best. Relaxing
our assumptions would make realization of these targets even less
likely. Put simply, even though global investment in mineral produc-
tion is accelerating, our results suggest that critical mineral constraints
are significant and persistent80.
Thirdly, our model adopts a mining-only interpretation of nation-
of-origin sourcing rules. Under this interpretation, minerals must be
mined in eligible countries to qualify as domestic content, regardless
of where these minerals are processed. Depending on value-added
calculations, IRA’s nation-of-origin sourcing rules might conceivably
allow minerals mined from ineligible countries to qualify as domestic
content if they were processed in eligible countries (e.g., nickel
hypothetically mined in Brazil (currently an ineligible country) but
processed in Canada (an eligible country))81–83. To accommodate this
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possibility, we further examine the mineral supply implications of this
policy interpretation, focusing on graphite, cobalt, and nickel—the
three most-limiting minerals in our analysis. We generously assume
that the additional eligible mineral output equals the full processing
capacity operating in the US, free trade partners, and allies (see Sup-
plementary Information, Section IV, Part D for details).
This represents a significant but necessary simplification of cur-
rent IRA sourcing criteria, in which U.S. Department of the Treasury
regulations currently require documentation of all procurement
chainssupplying critical minerals for an EV battery, along with a Traced
Qualifying Value Test calculating whether theadded value from mining
and processing of those minerals in eligible countries surpasses the
threshold for the domestic content credit. Such detailed supply chain
information is both publicly unavailable and prohibitively extensive.
Related requirements even pose difficulties for industry, with current
Treasury regulations allowing a temporary exemption for “impractic-
able-to-trace”minerals, including graphite37. Given their complexity,
regulators may also revise sourcing rules further should future ineffi-
ciencies or ambiguity materialize.
In our more simplified approach, we first consider the case
wherein the total eligible supply is defined as the sum of all processing
in eligible countries, regardless of its source, and all mining in eligible
countries, regardless of where the mined minerals are processed (i.e.,
the most lenient possible interpretation of extracted ‘or’processed).
Doing so likely overestimates eligible supply, given that much of this
processing capacity handles locally mined materials that were already
eligible on a mine production basis. Yet even under this assumption,
graphite remains the key limiting factor identified for EV battery pro-
duction, yielding 1,266,840 EVs annually, 77.8% less than the 5,711,810
required by 2032, the target compliance year.
Constraints become even more acute when only considering
materials processed in eligible countries (i.e., without additionally
counting eligible mining supply). Again, considering graphite alone,
our model estimates that the number of EVs supported solely via
processing may not exceed 418,036 annually, 50% less than the figure
achieved in our original production scenarios based on mining pro-
duction. Furthermore, processing constraints are not solely limited to
graphite. For example, lithium mined in Australia constitutes roughly
two-thirds of the lithium supply considered in the present study. Were
eligibility based on processing alone, this amount would be largely
ineligible given the significant proportion of Australian lithium pro-
cessed in China84. In theory, policies could alleviate supply constraints
stemming from processing bottlenecks by defining processing elig-
ibility based on further downstream steps, such as battery-specific
processing that South Korea leads84, instead of primary treatment of
raw materials. However, such an interpretation may only nominally
increase eligible minerals while doing little to meaningfully create a
reliable supply.
Lastly, the most extreme interpretation of domestic sourcing
possible—arguably well exceeding the current spirit of stated IRA
policies—would require all minerals to fully undergo both mining and
processing in eligible countries. This would doubtlessly impose even
greater constraints on possible EV deployment while also necessitating
far more extensive supply chain tracking to verify mineral eligibility, as
supply linkages between mines and midstream processing facilities are
often flexible, blended, and changing over time. Again, due to the lack
of detailed data on trade flows from specific mines to specificmid-
stream facilities, we are unable to quantitatively investigate this most
stringent case.
Collectively, our results provide compelling evidence that
whereas the EV sales targets envisioned by the EPA can deliver sig-
nificant emissions reductions, constraints in mineral production may
impede the extent to which these reductions are realized. Mineral
reserves in the US and partners abroad more than suffice to meet the
full range of EV sales scenarios, but mineral production rates do not.
Specifically, we find that even in the least aggressive sales scenario,
existing mineral production supports a maximum of 5.09 million total
EVs from 2027–2032, a figure that falls well below the minimum 10.21
million EV sales required for compliance with the EPA’s proposal. Our
model estimates the emissions impact of this shortfall to be 59.54
million tons CO
2
e. We identify graphite, and to a lesser extent, cobalt
as the key limiting minerals for which increased production pro-
portionally expands the number of EV batteries that can be
manufactured.
Finally, we recognize that future policies could alleviate the cri-
tical mineral constraints documented here by imposing less stringent
electrification thresholds. In March 2024, the EPA took such action,
implying that new EV sold in 2032 would –for regulatory compliance
purposes - comprise at least 35% of new light duty vehicles sales for
that year, this figure being substantially lower than EV penetration
rates previously envisioned by the agency and made possible by
greater emphasis on PHEV sales20. However, our analysis demonstrates
that realizing even these less stringent EV sales thresholds would -
given mineral production constraints within the US and among allies –
remain challenging. We estimate that at current mineral production
rates, no more than 848,804 EVs can be supported annually, the
equivalent of 5.6% of new light-duty vehicle sales in 2032. Under our
added supply assumption, this disequilibrium is ameliorated but not
eliminated. These findings warrant careful consideration by policy-
makers as efforts to decarbonize the light-duty vehicle sector
accelerate.
Methods
We assess the viability of the EPA’s tailpipe emissions standards in
three steps. Further details on our method, underlying assumptions,
and model parameters are specified in the Supplementary Information
section.
Step 1: sales volume estimation/scenario construction
Estimating the requisite sales volume necessary for EPA compliance
necessitates consideration of the performance profile of all new non-
EVs sold each year, given the interdependencies between these per-
formance attributes (the most notable being fuel economy) and tail-
pipe emissions, which subsequently impacts requisite EV sales.
Consequently, as an initial step, we assume that all new non-EV sales for
a given year are four-door sedans and that these sedans, (1) have a fuel
economy consistent with relevant CAFÉ standards proposed for that
year, and (2) offer a range of at least 300 miles. Electrified replace-
ments for these vehicles are assumed to also be four-door sedans with
a similar range profile. We note that the higher fuel economy of EVs in
our model reflect superior thermal efficiency of electrified powertrains
compared to their fossil-fuel powered counterparts (Table 2).
Accommodation of this consideration does not impact requisite EV
sales as –for the purposes of compliance with the proposed EPA rule –
all EVs are considered zero emissions regardless of fuel economy.
With these vehicle profiles in mind, we estimate requisite number
of EV sales that would satisfy the EPA’sstandard
19. The standard –
which is applicable to new vehicles sold between 2027 and 2032 –
necessitates that during, or by the end of this period, the light-duty
vehicle fleet achieve an average tailpipe emissions target of 82 grams/
mile (g/mile) of CO
2
across new vehicle sales
.
Our model estimates that
compliance necessitates EVs constitute no less than 37.82% of light-
duty- vehicle sales in 2032. Given the proposed standard applies to
vehicle sales beginning in 2027, we construct three sales volume sce-
narios (low, medium, and high sales) that each meet the 37.82% sales
target between 2027 and 2032.
In the low sales scenario, EVs represent 6% of annual light-duty
vehicle sales (analogous to 2022) until 2032, at which time sales
increase to 37.82%48. This represents a lower-bound case wherein EV
sales volume does not increase until the year of the compliance
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deadline (2032). In the medium sales scenario, EV sales steadily
increase from 6% in 2023 to 23.55% in 2027 to 37.82% in 2032, which is
analogous to EVs’market share gradually increasing to satisfy the EPA’s
adoption targets (see Supplementary Information, Section I for
details). In the high sales scenario, EV sales increase to and remain at
37.82% between 2027 and 2032, replicating an upper-bound scenario
wherein manufacturers engage in proactive rapid compliance within
years. Collectively, the low and high sales scenarios encompass the full
range of possible pathways for vehicle manufacturers to meet current
adoption goals, while the medium sales scenario enumerates a more
moderate pathway.
Step 2: mineral demand/supply estimation
Having enumerated the requisite number of EV sales required for EPA
compliance, we subsequently quantify (in metric tons) the associated
mineraldemand associated with the batteries required to power these
EVs and assess whether these demands can be met using existing
supply. We focus on eight minerals used in large quantities in EV bat-
teries, namely aluminum, cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, manga-
nese, nickel, and phosphate.
In scrutinizing mineral demands, we assess the mineral demands
of a singular battery chemistry (or a combination thereof, using linear
optimization) that would best accommodate the sales volume targets
in each sales scenario. We refer to the maximum achievable sales
volume using this approach as our result under the optimal chemistry
case. We note that these demands vary based on the specific battery
chemistry considered (e.g., nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) 811
necessitates more reliance on nickel and less reliance on manganese
and cobalt compared to NMC 111)85. Consequently, we consider the
mineraldemands associated with six chemistries that overwhelmingly
account for the EV battery market. These are NMC 111, NMC 523, NMC
622, NMC 811, NCA, and LFP. Moreover, because the quantity of
minerals required also varies –regardless of chemistry –based on
vehicle range, we assumeequivalent range (i.e., 300 miles) is afforded
across all battery chemistries. This range figure, we note, is consistent
with longstanding assessments of EVs’viability as a decarbonization
pathway and exceeds the current median range of EVs sold today
(thereby accommodating potential future improvements in fuel
economy65,86.Inaddition,weconsideracasewherethechemical
composition of EV batteries sold each year increasingly shifts away
from NMC and NCA chemistries towards LFP, with LFP batteries
installed in 60% of EVs sold in 2030 and thereafter, relative to
36% today.
In assessing mineral supplies, we consider two separate cate-
gories: reserves and production. Reserves refer to the estimated total
amount of a mineral geologically occurring within a country that could
reasonably be economically extracted. Production refers to the
amount of a mineral produced from mining on an average annual
basis. Put another way, reserves refer to long-term, total supply, while
production refers to short-term, annual supply. Furthermore, our
production estimates additionallyinclude minerals recovered through
recycling in the US, but do not include recycled production in other
countries due to lack of data.
In scrutinizing mineral availability overseas, consistent with the
intent of the provision of the Inflation Reduction Act, both reserve
and production estimates consider minerals that can be sourced
domestically and/or from US allies. We define an ally as being a free
trade and/or mutual defense partner of the United States. These
countries include Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jor-
dan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, Singapore,
S. Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and all members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition to these
countries, we also include Austria –a member of the European Union
(EU) that, 1) is not included under the other criteria, and 2), has
mineral production relevant to EV battery manufacturing. Inclusion
of Austria reflects potential realization of an impending minerals-
focused free trade agreement between the EU and the United
States87.
Finally, we enumerate how many EV batteries can be manu-
factured based on (a) annual mineral production limits and (b)
mineral reserves, and compare these figures to the requisite number
of EVs sales necessitated by the EPA proposal under our low, med-
ium, and high scenario. Mismatches between demand and supply in
each scenario are quantified annually (i.e., for each year between
2026 and 2033), and in aggregate (2027 through 2032 combined).To
ensure EVs are given the maximal advantage, we assume a one-to-one
relationship between battery production and EVs (every battery pack
is deployed in a vehicle, with none held in inventory or used for
repair or replacement) and further assume that mineral supplies are
available in their entirety to EV battery production (versus for the
manufacture of competing technologies). Furthermore, we presume
that no non-battery mineral requirements are constraining for EV
deployment.
We additionally consider several sensitivity tests:
•An Added Supply Assumption where available production of each
mineral increases by an amount equal to 20% of the annual pro-
duction from the top producing country for that respective
mineral. In the context of U.S. policies that incentivize ‘friend
shoring’, such an increase could be interpreted in various ways:
new production from free trade partners and domestic mine
operators, loosened domestic content policies, establishment of
Table 2 | Lifecycle emissions by powertrain and chemistry
2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ICEV Fuel Economy (MPGe) 60.00 61.20 62.50 63.70 65.10 66.40
HEV Fuel Economy (MPGe) 73.39 75 75 75 75 75
EV Fuel Economy (MPGe) 114 114 114 114 114 114
Electric Grid Emissions Rate (g CO
2
e/kWh) 309.78 304.12 298.56 293.10 287.74 282.48
Lifecycl e emissions –ICEV (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 40.21 39.58 38.92 38.34 37.69 37.11
Lifecycl e emissions –HEV (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 36.73 36.16 36.16 36.16 36.16 36.16
Lifecycl e emissions –EV NMC 111 (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 26.34 26.08 25.83 25.58 25.34 25.09
Lifecycl e emissions –EV NMC 523 (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 27.12 26.86 26.61 26.36 26.11 25.87
Lifecycl e emissions –EV NMC 622 (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 27.22 26.97 26.71 26.46 26.22 25.98
Lifecycl e emissions –EV NMC 811 (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 26.77 26.52 26.26 26.01 25.77 25.53
Lifecycl e emissions –EV NCA (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 27.10 26.85 26.59 26.34 26.10 25.86
Lifecycl e emissions –EV LFP (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 26.06 25.81 25.55 25.30 25.06 24.82
Lifecycl e emissions –EV weighted average (tons CO
2
e/vehicle) 26.54 26.26 25.95 25.75 25.52 25.28
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free trade agreements with new international partners, boosted
secondary production from recycling, or technological advances
that increase the productivity of existing mines.
•A Battery Pack Downsizing Assumption where EV battery packs
are downsized in capacity to hit the desired level of EV deploy-
ment in 2032 (5.71 million new EVs sold in the year 2032) under
both current mineral production and the Added Supply
Assumption.
•A Heavier Fleet Assumption in which true EV deployment is
skewed towards a mix of 71% light trucks / SUVs and 29% sedans,
as opposed to our default case,which considers a fleet comprising
of 100% sedans. We assume that light trucks and SUVs require a
larger battery of ~100 kWh to achieve the target range of 300
miles, with correspondingly higher per-pack mineral require-
ments. We evaluate the potential ceiling to nationwide EV
deployment under current and Added Supply mineralconstraints
for this heavier vehicle fleet.
Step 3: emissions impact of disequilibrium
Here, we determine –as applicable –the emissions impact of being
unable to meet each EV sales volume target necessitated by the EPA
proposal. To do so, we leverage the GREET model, which is commonly
used in vehicle lifecycle emissions analyses88,tocalculatetheemis-
sions associated with manufacturing EVs powered by different battery
chemistries based on the requisite minerals used for each chemistry.
Building on previous literature2, we subsequently estimate the lifecycle
emissions benefit of HEVs and EVs relative to ICEVs year-on-year from
2023 to 2032, accountingfor heterogeneity in battery chemistry, rising
ICEV and HEV fuel economy, and improvements to the electric grid
(Table 2). Based on the US’target of a 50% emissions reduction (rela-
tive to 2005) by 203089 –a goal further supported via the enactment of
the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)90 –, we assume emissions associated
with the electric grid decline linearlysuch that a 50% reduction relative
to 2005 is achieved in 2030. Regarding HEV fuel economy, we assume
an annual improvement rate of 8% through 2025 and 10% from 2026 to
2032, which is consistent with existing CAFE standards91. However,
owing to diminishing returns on further technical innovation, we
impose a capped maximum fuel economy 75 miles per gallon for HEVs.
We note that we exclude PHEVs from our model given (1) they offer
fuel economy that is –on average –less advantageous than HEVs, (2)
are more mineral intensive than HEVs to manufacture, and (3) con-
sistently constitute less than one% of light duty vehicle sales. We note
that this approach is consistent with longstanding mineral supply
analysis92.
Data availability
This work uses publicly available data.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Jessica Dunn, Richard Freeman, Colin Langan, Edward Nei-
dermeyer, and John Trumpbour for helpful discussions regarding this
work. The authors declare no funding sources.
Author contributions
A.N., S.W., and L.W. designed research. L.W., C.Y.S., P.C., M.Y., D.S.P,
and L.H. performed research and analyzed the data. L.W., C.Y.S., P.C,
M.Y., S.W., and A.N. wrote the paper.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
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