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Master Thesis
COMPULSORY HIJAB IN
IRAN
Functions and impacts on Iranians’ daily life during 44
years of Islamic State
Author: Fatemeh Shirazizadeh
Supervisor: Barzoo Eliassi
Examiner: Jonas Sjölander
Term: Spring 2024
Subject: Colonial and Postcolonial
Studies
Level: Master Level
Abstract
The thesis examines the concept of mandatory hijab as a tool for governing
female bodies by providing them with different roles, values, and positions in
society, based on hierarchical classification.
While the number of educated and working women has increased in Iran,
gender-based violence has increased. Moreover, the government has increased
efforts to limit and contain the social activities of women in accordance with
the Islamic Republic's mandatory hijab. The goal of this dissertation is to argue
about compulsory hijab which is more than compulsory veiling in Iran. It
pushes women to be isolated and affects people’s everyday life. For this
reason, meaning and functions of compulsory hijab in men and women’s daily
life are examined by the analyses of conducted qualitative interviews.
The importance of this research is about women’s resistance. It demonstrates
how limitation and containment contribute to violence against women and
push women and men to accept unequal roles, values and positions. When we
have a better insight of compulsory hijab’s dimensions, then we can
understand its structure and we will find better ways to resist.
Key words
Hijab, compulsory hijab, femininity, feminine sexual attraction, sexual
objectification, chastity, virginity, stay-at-home woman, laws, leaders’
speeches, leaders’ letters.
Acknowledgments
I express my gratitude to those individuals who graciously accepted the
invitation to accompany me during the interview process and generously
shared their experiences, thoughts, and emotions. It is important to note that
these interviews were conducted over a year prior to the popular movement of
‘Women, Life, Freedom’ in Iran. As an Iranian woman, and in alignment with
the desires of the majority of the interviewees, I sincerely hope that this
dissertation can contribute, even if only in a small way, to the realization of
freedom for Iranians. I must emphasize that this achievement would not have
been possible without the presence and support of the interviewees, for which
I am immensely thankful.
I would also like to extend my special appreciation to my esteemed lecturer,
Rebecca Duncan, whose invaluable assistance greatly aided in the structuring
of my thesis. Additionally, I am grateful to Eleonor Marcussen for her
unwavering support throughout this journey. Furthermore, I would like to
express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Barzoo Eliassi, for his guidance
and insightful ideas that greatly contributed to the writing of this thesis.
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my family, including my beloved husband
and children, who have stood by me with patience and compassion throughout
this entire process.
Contents
COMPULSORY HIJAB IN IRAN .............................................................. 1
Functions and impacts on Iranians’ daily life during 44_years of Islamic
State ............................................................................................................. 1
Abstract .......................................................................................................... 3
Key words ...................................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................... 4
Contents ......................................................................................................... 5
Appendices ..................................................................................................... 7
Abbreviations ................................................................................................ 7
1 Introduction............................................................................................ 1
1.1 Context ............................................................................................. 1
1.2 Research purpose .............................................................................. 3
1.3 Research questions ........................................................................... 3
2 Previous research ................................................................................... 5
2.1 Political context ................................................................................ 5
2.2 Religious and cultural contexts ........................................................ 7
3 Method and Methodology ................................................................... 10
3.1 Methodology .................................................................................. 10
3.2 Data collection, Limitations and Possibilities ................................ 11
3.3 Interviews ....................................................................................... 13
3.3.1 Construction of interview ........................................................ 13
3.3.2 Questionnaire .......................................................................... 14
3.3.3 Interview’s conduction ............................................................ 14
4 Theory ................................................................................................... 16
4.1 Discursive formations of power ..................................................... 16
4.1.1 The discourse of Compulsory Hijab ....................................... 17
4.1.2 Intersectionality of power discourse and compulsory hijab
discourse ................................................................................................ 20
4.2 Feminist theory of compulsory hijab ............................................. 21
4.2.1 Oppression .............................................................................. 21
4.2.1.1 Segregation ...................................................................... 22
4.2.1.2 Seclusion .......................................................................... 23
4.2.1.3 Obedience ........................................................................ 23
4.2.2 Discrimination and Polarization .............................................. 25
4.2.3 Sexual objectification .............................................................. 26
5 Discussion and analysis ....................................................................... 29
5.1 Religious perspective ..................................................................... 30
5.2 Leaders’ points of view .................................................................. 32
5.3 Legislations and the compulsory hijab ........................................... 38
5.4 Analysis .......................................................................................... 42
5.4.1 Institutionalization of obedience to perpetuate power discourse
within a patriarchal framework .............................................................. 44
5.4.2 The sexualization of the body, the objectification of femininity
and Female resistance within a patriarchal context. .............................. 48
5.4.3 The ‘Us’ and ‘Others’, fostering a sense of ‘Otherness’ ......... 55
5.4.4 The subordination of women through the gender roles
definitions .............................................................................................. 59
5.4.5 Imposing contradictory responsibilities on men ..................... 60
6 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 63
7 References ............................................................................................. 65
Appendix ...................................................................................................... 70
Appendices
• The questionnaire of interview
• Khomeini’s letter to Mohammadreza Shah in 1962
• The poster of Khamenei’s speech amongst Khuzestan’s women in
1997
• The table of interviewees’ number by gender and age
• The table of the date and length of interviews
• The list of legislation and speeches webpages
Abbreviations
IRR: Islamic Republic Regime
IRRC: Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution
IRPC: Islamic Republic Penal Code
IRCC: Islamic Republic Civil Code
AH: After hijrah. This is the calendar that used by Muslims started
from 662 CE the time which Prophet Muhammad migrated from Mecca
to Medina
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1 Introduction
This thesis is about compulsory hijab as a tool to promote the isolation and
obedience of Iranian women. I will examine how compulsory hijab is
understood by Iranian women and men, and the way it shapes and impinges
on people’s everyday life. This examination is important because compulsory
hijab is a complex issue with consequences for both women and men. Looking
at how compulsory hijab is perceived and experience in day-to-day life sheds
light on how this institution is practiced, negotiated and even resisted.
In this thesis, ‘Compulsory hijab’ is understood as much more than the veil
itself. Rather, the term refers to a complex of legislations, culture and theology
which stereotypes women and pushes them into specific gender roles, which
isolate them and force them to be obedient and faithful to the Islamic State
(Afshar, 1998; Bagheri, 2017; Basiri, 2018; Basmechi, 2018; Sedghi, 2007).
As I will outline in the theory section below, compulsory hijab can be
understood as what Michel Foucault calls a “discursive formation of power”:
a power relation that takes shape through a social discourse and specific rules.
Syntax and semantics are not enough for comprehending a discourse, and as
Foucault argued; there are sets of rules beside syntax and semantics that can
show and define discursive formation (Foucault 1969).
The thesis commences with a contextual exploration of mandatory hijab,
providing a succinct overview of the governing regime. Subsequent sections
articulate the purpose, research questions, and delve into an extensive review
of existing scholarship on hijab and compulsory hijab. The methodology is
then elucidated, employing a qualitative research approach rooted in
Epistemological Constructivism Realism, with a specific focus on conducting
in-depth interviews to unravel women’s nuanced perspectives on mandatory
hijab and its intricate impacts on daily life in Iran. The theory section of the
dissertation explores postcolonial theory and feminist theory, analyzing the
framework of mandatory hijab and its connection to power dynamics using the
perspective of 'Discursive Formations of Power'. The feminist theory segment
specifically highlights the oppression and objectification that are linked to
mandatory hijab. The concluding chapter wraps up the discussion and analysis
of the research findings.
1.1 Context
To understand the context of compulsory hijab in Iran, we should regard two
aspects: compulsory veiling and restrictive laws which limit women’s
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presence in social activities. In 1983, five years after the Islamic Republic
Regime (IRR) came to power in Iran, veiling became mandatory for Iranian
women regardless of their religion or status. This is one of the most important
features of the IRR’s rule. The idea of veiling and staying at home for women
were promoted as a social issue, and based on traditional religious concepts by
IRR. The gender roles and stereotypes which defined women were also
strengthened by the idea of stay-at-home women. Women who appear in
public without Islamic headscarves are fined 74 lashes under the 1983 Islamic
Republic Penal Code (IRPC), and all Iranian women are required to wear the
Islamic hijab
1
. The ‘Moral Security Police’ known as guidance patrol or
‘Gasht-e-Ershaad’, was created in this regard (Sedghi, 2007; Zahedi, 2007).
It instructs women to observe appropriate clothing, prevents the presence of
uncovered women and punishes women who wear inappropriate clothing.
Limits of appropriate coverage are usually determined by the police officers
and not by any guidelines.
On the other hand, the IRR established restrictive laws for women to decrease
their presence in social activities and push them to stay at home. This was done
to control women's power and bodies (Afshar, 1998; Mernissi, 2011; Sedghi,
2007). Women’s right to vote, hold political positions and participate in social
activities were the most important issues that sparked the Ayatollah Khomeini
protests to Mohammad Reza Shah in 1962 (Khomeini, 2010)
2
. Seventeen
years after those protests, the Pahlavi regime was changed to IRR by Khomeini
in 1979. Many people followed and supported Khomeini’s protest since their
traditional and religious beliefs about hijab and women issues.
Hijab has different forms among Iranians. It is not limited to covering
women's heads and bodies. As well as wearing a headscarf, manteau or chador,
it also extends to the following modesty and chastity, paying attention to
honor, reputation and prejudice, virginity, staying at home and not going out
unless it is necessary, being under the care of the father, brother, husband or
other men, having restrictions on travel, career and sports, restrictions on
therapeutic and beauty activities and finally the doctrine of “obedience”. These
are all examples of hijab for women (Afshar, 1998; Bagheri, 2017; Basiri,
2018; Sedghi, 2007; Zahedi, 2007). All these forms have been shaped during
a long time by religious and cultural definitions of femininity in Iran.
Culture and religion have deep and inseparable connections. The hijab
definition which is used by Iranians is exactly the synonym of hijab in Arabic
1
Article 638 - Anyone who publicly pretends to commit a prohibited act in public or in public places
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for ten days to two months or to 74 lashes in addition to his or her
punishment for the act. A person who commits a crime that does not carry a punishment, but which
injures public decency, will only be sentenced to ten days to two months of imprisonment or to 74 lashes.
Note: Women who appear in public without a religious veil will be sentenced to imprisonment for ten
days to two months or to a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 rials. (IRPC, Book of Punishments, approved in
1375 and revised in 1399), translated from Farsi by me.
2
vol 1, p. 78; pp 80-81; p 118; p 161; p 191-192; p 209-214; vol 2, p123.
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which is “segregator”
3
. There are two different beliefs about women’s
covering in religion. One of them is the chastity and a specific cover that is
stipulated in the Quran (An-Noor 30-31; Al-Ahzab 59). Another belief is more
conservative relates to practices of secluding women, hiding them in home and
limiting them to specific gender roles. Concepts such as virginity, chastity,
honor, prejudice and reputation are cultural concepts which represent hijab for
Iranian women and they are derived from limiting and segregating beliefs.
There are some narratives quoted from prophet Mohammad that regard
women’s bodies as “Aurah”
4
(Aurah is a word in Arabic that means sexual
organs) and for this reason women are pushed to stay at home. Although these
kinds of narratives are rejected by some clerics and scholars, conservative
groups prefer to limit women by promoting these narratives.
1.2 Research purpose
This thesis aims to explore the understanding and lived experiences of
compulsory hijab in the everyday lives of Iranian women and men, with a
particular focus on the narratives of Iranian women. It emphasizes the
examination of the discursive formation of power in the Islamic Republic of
Iran (IRI) to illustrate how compulsory hijab functions to reproduce gender-
based inequalities in Iran. Additionally, the thesis will delve into the Iranian
and Muslim feminists’ theories of oppression, resistance, and sexual control,
in relation to hijab and veiling.
1.3 Research questions
To achieve the outlined research objectives, the study will address three central
inquiries:
1. What does compulsory hijab mean to Iranian women and men?
2. How have the IRR's attitudes toward compulsory hijab been shaped?
3. How have these attitudes in turn reinforced dominant power
structures that perpetuate othering, gender stereotypes, and
patriarchy in Iranian society?
Informed by these research questions, the dissertation initially explores the
interpretations of hijab within the approaches and laws of IRI, examining how
the IRI has instituted and advocated for compulsory hijab. By drawing upon
3
The word hijab is used in the Qur'an in 7 verses (Al-A'raf 46, Al-Esra 45, Maryam 17, Al-Ahzab 53,
Saad 32, Fosselat 5, Shura 51) and it means things for segregation.
4
"
..."
women are Aurah thus lock them up in the house. It is said that this hadith is from the Prophet of Islam
and has been mentioned in the books of the hadith of Ayoun Akhbar al-Reza (Vol. 4, p. 365), Mustadrak
al-Wasa'il, Mustanbat al-Wasa'il (Vol. 14, p. 182). (Translated by me) in this dissertation I don’t focus
on the truth or falsity of hadiths but I just want to concentrate on the effect of them on women’s lives.
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the theoretical work of Michel Foucault on Discursive Formation of Power, I
will analysis the power discourse of IRI in relation to compulsory hijab and
constitution of gendered identities. The second question analyses the impacts
of compulsory hijab on women’s daily life. For this question, I have discussed
the views of Iranian and Muslim feminists about the oppression and
objectification of women, especially the sexual objectification of women, as
well as the sexualization of women's bodies.
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2 Previous research
This section engages with previous research on compulsory hijab. Hijab
research is not new in social sciences, and it has been discussed for many
years; Even though hijab has been mentioned as a sign of Muslim women all
over the world (Mohammadi, 2016; Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2007;
Derayeh, 2011; Safitri, 2010), this issue has become more political than
cultural or religious in Iran due to the fusion of politics and religion (Safitri,
2010; Sedghi, 2007; Afshar, 2008; Gould, 2014; Mir-Hosseini, 2007). Texts
with post-colonial and feminist approaches are chosen to review previous
research. Previous books and articles have dealt with mandatory hijab in Iran
in three main fields: politics, history and the study of religions.
The point I need to mention here, is that political context of research does not
refer to the political science, rather it examines the policies and attitudes of
IRR toward femininity, gender and women’s rights. Also, historical fields are
those researchers which look historically at cultural issues of compulsory hijab
and other paradigms than veil in Iranian culture. Religious fields, as well, point
out religious approaches toward compulsory hijab. They are categorized in
two sectors: proponents and opponents of compulsory hijab.
The most famous and functional paradigm of hijab is the veil, which refers to
the shape of covering and clothing of women. For this reason, most of previous
research have been about veil, while the importance of addressing other
paradigms is not less than the veil, but more than that. As mentioned, three
main approaches of political, religious and cultural contexts have been
investigated. The definition of the body has the fundamental importance. What
I focus on during the dissertation is the sexual objectification of femininity and
feminine body, which has been less paid attention in previous research. By
investigating the IRR leaders’ perspectives, legislations and through the
interviews, I point out the importance of sexual objectifying approaches which
have made the compulsory hijab discourse.
2.1 Political context
In this section, I examine the political context addressed by the previous
research. Some articles specifically consider this issue. More than a religious
or social concept, the compulsory hijab is a political issue imposed on women
by the IRR, but at the same time it is a complex tool with multiple uses
(Bagheri,2017; Bilge,2010; Mir-Hosseini,2007; Sedghi,2007).
The political context of previous research can be divided into four categories:
1. Arguments which show the multifunctionality of veiling.
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2. Arguments which point to the ‘Segregation’
3. Arguments based on discursive formations of power and power
relation
4. Arguments which examine the links between political and religious
approaches of IRR toward compulsory hijab by feministic views.
What is said about the hijab in the West is that the hijab is a restrictive tool for
women that deprives them of their social freedoms. At the same time, it is also
seen as a mean of resistance for women to stand against sexual and gender
discrimination introduced by the IRR and society (Afary, 2009; Ahmadi, 2006;
Bagheri, 2017; Bilge, 2010; Derayeh, 2011; Mir-Hosseini, 2007; Safitri,
2010). Sedghi (2007), in her book ‘Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling,
Unveiling, and Reveiling’ said:
“The state uses women and their portrayal as Westernized or Islamized,
unveiled or veiled, in order to depict a distinct political identity and
message abroad. Women become an instrument of national and foreign
policies.” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 4).
Taking a different view, Amer (2014), points at veiling as women’s resistance
against compulsory unveiling of Pahlavi’s before the 1979s revolution, and
Western lifestyle after the 1979s revolution. Some researches note the anti-
imperialist and anti-colonial approaches of IRR. They pointed the IRR claims
about unveiling which is a symbol of imperialist and colonial powers
dominating women's bodies. Thus, Iranian women’s bodies were also used as
a weapon of colonization and after the foundation of the Islamic Republic as a
weapon of anticolonial and anti-imperialist movements of clerics (Basiri,2018;
Bilge,2010; Sedghi,2007). Afary (2005) in ‘The Iranian Constitutional
Revolution’, argued that IRR makes a situation that women are forced,
unwillingly, to wear veil to protect themselves and their safety, while they are
aware of the necessity of the resistance against compulsory hijab.
There are some arguments which indicate segregation as one of compulsory
hijab signs that is a political attitude. These arguments focused on gender
issues, femininity and violation of women’s rights. Segregation sent the
message to men and women that women would be safe only if women are
invisible, and that men are free to have no control over their own bodies in
mixed situations. In fact, segregation indicates the permission and possibility
of assaulting women by men, not necessarily protecting women
(Bagheri,2017). Sedghi, also, talks about gender issues and sexuality as well
as their relationship with politics. She said: “From the beginning of the
twentieth-century to the present, sexuality and veiling practices have been the
two sides of the same coin in Iranian politics.” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 220). She
regards segregation as a patriarchal tool that IRR uses for its domination.
Some of the most important functions of compulsory hijab are domination,
reproduction of power and using women’s bodies by the IRR. The majority of
previous research regarded them by examining through the concept of
Discursive Formations of Power and power relations. Michel Foucault has
detailed arguments about power and its construction. I will discuss these two
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theories later. Limiting the body and sexuality, objectification, defining
stereotypes and sexual and gender duties, and redefining moral and religious
concepts in order to control the body and sexuality are methods of creating and
maintaining power by the IRR (Ahmadi,2006; Foucault, 1978; Gould,2014).
However, Gould believes that the IRR's action in the direction of mandatory
hijab is automatically a kind of commodification of women. She has paid
attention to how the state regulations about veiling incorporate female body
into the political economy of the commodity form (Gould,2014). She argued
that European and Iranian societies incorporate the veil into the capitalist
world system and use it to suppress women’s agency. Gould quoted Marx:
“As Marx elaborated: as soon as an object steps forth as a commodity, it
becomes transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but,
in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head (1906: 82)”
(Gould, 2014, p. 3).
According to Gould, the Iranian government considers women's bodies as
commodities, valuing them in this way through mandatory hijab usage.
However, the government claims that the hijab is an Islamic rule and must be
followed. Gould argues that what is done in Iran has no religious basis, and it
is a double standard. She draws on Louis Althusser to suggest that the IRR
system is a political ideological system that relies predominantly on
persuasion, to achieve its hegemony, and the hijab fulfills this role (ibid,
p226). According to her, the Islamic State has implemented secular laws based
on Sharia (religion) and has positioned itself as a government that implements
ideology. Therefore, imposing the hijab shows that religious concepts are
manipulated in the regime’s interests (ibid, p228). Here women's agency can
become significant. By making the hijab mandatory, the IRR has presented
women's bodies as a valuable commodity that must be made unavailable if
they want to remain chaste. In this case and in the case of women wearing the
hijab to avoid staying at home in order to participate in social activities, their
agency has been ignored.
2.2 Religious and cultural contexts
Religious arguments about compulsory hijab are mostly examined by Muslim
feminist and progressive Muslims. Sahar Amer, Leila Ahmed and Fatema
Mernissi are scholars who have illustrative views about religious sides of hijab
and compulsory hijab. However, I also found other valuable and clarifying
works about this issue.
For example, Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s works examines the relationship between
political and religious approaches of compulsory hijab in Iran and argues that
the hijab in Iran has changed its position from a religious to a political one
(Mir-Hosseini, 2007). Mir-Hosseini’s article, The Politics and Hermeneutics
of Hijab in Iran: From Confinement to Choice, examined this change of
position. In the article, the author divides hijab as a religious perception into
two categories, traditional and classical. In the traditional view, a woman's
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whole body is Aurah (private) and must be completely enclosed so as not to
cause sedition. In the classical view, the hijab protects women from society
dangers, and women can protect themselves by choosing it. But when the
religious views turn into political views, in cases both of compulsory unveiling
and compulsory hijab, a resistance was created in society, which in the first
case showed its resistance against the unveiling in the form of a protesting veil,
and in the second case resistance to the compulsory hijab led to the creation of
new interpretations of religious scriptures. In light of these three points of
view, it can be concluded that Iranian women face a variety of cultural and
political issues that are forced upon them by the IRR.
Stay-at-home woman and obedience are also regarded as two more relevant
concepts to compulsory hijab in some articles, because they have religious
roots and at the same time IRR uses them as a political way for domination.
As Foroutan (2021) and Saper (2018) mentioned IRR's wish is that women
stay at home and do not engage in social activities, and at the same time they
are obedient to the regime and have a social presence whenever needed. The
IRR has defined certain frameworks for women's social presence and has
introduced leaving those frameworks as immorality and unchastity.
Consequently, men are allowed to abuse and oppress unchaste women, and
women are blamed and accused when this happens (Foroutan, 2021; Saper,
2018). Obviously, in such a situation, women's resistance is not only for more
serious participation in social activities, but also for healthy and pressure-free
participation. Therefore, the formation of Islamic feminism in Iran was not due
to the original return to Islam. Instead, it was simply a way to secure the
context for women's social activity. It also taught men to respect women's
rights according to religious rules.
Amer, in her book, ‘What is Veiling?’ (2014), argued about veiling religiously,
politically and socially. She has stated that hijab, more than anything, is made
popular by adapting the native and cultural traditions of each region, and it
does not necessarily have a religious dimension, but over time, it is mixed with
religious traditions and fulfilled as a corresponding concept with each
community. In communities with a Muslim majority or an Islamic
government, there are strict rules for observing the hijab. Ahmed, in ‘Women
and gender in Islam’ (1992), mentioned to the political use of vague
understanding of Islamic ideas. She said:
“[…] the political uses of the idea that Islam oppressed women and
noting that what patriarchal colonialists identified as the sources and
main forms of women’s oppression in Islamic societies was based on a
vague and inaccurate understanding of Muslim societies.” (Ahmed,
1992, p. 166).
In this case, Ahmed refers to Cromer's orders in Egypt, how he prevented the
medical education of women in order to force the acceptance of the desired
concept, that is, the scientific and cultural improvement of the Egyptian
society, because in his opinion, the presence of male doctors in the world is a
legal and routine matter. Two other examples that have been mentioned in this
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context are the deprivation of social and government services as well as gender
quotas in universities and jobs during the Pahlavi and IRR periods, in the
former to promote modern western culture and in the latter to fight against
western modern culture (Afshar, 1998; Basiri, 2018; Foroutan, 2020; Zahedi,
2007).
More than others, Mernissi, in ‘The Veil and the Male elite’ (1991), has
focused on the relationship between religious foundations and Islamic
governments. She quoted Jaberi as saying that the politicians of the Islamic
world can take over some matters by sanctification of history. She has
explained that in Muslim societies, there is generally no belief in individual
choice and individual identity, and all existing laws are for all Muslim nations.
For this reason, people grow up obedience, and individuality is considered as
rebellion and disobedience (Mernissi, 1991). She says that hiding women's
hair reveals more about the fear of men towards sexuality than it does about
the allure of women. (Mernissi, 2011). She sees gender and femininity as a
religious challenge among Muslims and mentioned that “sexual power
attributed to women has caused Islamic states to contain and control their
sexuality through such social institutions as the veil, the family, the marriage
system, and the legal system.” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 12).
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3 Method and Methodology
In this section, I discuss method and methodological considerations.
According to the research questions, my hypothesis is that the compulsory
hijab is a different concept and more than the compulsory veiling. Compulsory
veiling, which is fulfilled since the first years of Islamic revolution in 1979, is
one of compulsory hijab’s paradigms. Thus, I start with the discussion about
the compulsory hijab’s meaning and its role in the Iranian women’s everyday
life. Then I discuss the method of collecting materials of research and the
reason of choosing that method.
3.1 Methodology
The methodology of this dissertation is qualitative research. Qualitative
researchers investigate phenomena within their authentic environments,
striving to comprehend and interpret them based on the significance
individuals attribute to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). As I want to
investigate the meaning of compulsory hijab in Iranian men and women’s
everyday life, I found that qualitative research is the way that shows the people
understanding of various events during their life (Flick, 2018). The idea of
investigating the compulsory hijab came to my mind when I saw some
contradictory signs and behaviors about veiling from the IRR. I understood
that the meaning of Islamic veil in Iran is different from other Islamic societies
(Ahmed, 2011; Gould, 2014) and the veil introducing in Iran by IRR refers to
the segregation of men and women (Afshar, 1998; Sedghi, 2007). Thus, I am
encouraged to find other paradigms of compulsory hijab and their effects in
Iranian’s everyday life. This also helps me to understand the formation of the
IRR attitudes toward compulsory hijab, as well as how to reinforce power
structures based on gender stereotypes and patriarchy.
Considering that different people's understanding of compulsory hijab was
considered, the collection and analysis of materials was done with the method
of epistemic constructivist realism. Epistemological constructivism means
“our understanding of the world is inevitably our own construction there can
be no perception or understanding of reality that is not mediated by our
conceptual lens” (Bhaskar, 1989, pp. 12–25; Campbell, 1988, p. 447;
Maxwell, 2018). Realism is often known by quantitative research but actually
a realist ontology “is compatible with many qualitative methods and is the
position of choice of many qualitative researchers” (Madill, 2008, p. 731).
Using realism in an epistemological constructive way is important because it
is a common instance in qualitative research and it is a prevalent feature of
how we deal with the world in our daily lives (Maxwell, 2018). As I mentioned
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above, the meaning of Islamic veil for women in Iran is different from other
Islamic societies, and the mandatory hijab that is implemented in Iran is a
unique issue (Afshar, 1998; Ahmadi, 2006). Therefore, in order to investigate
its effects on people's daily lives, I had to use a method that provides specific
results just for Iranians. Qualitative research has this feature. Due to the
significance of context, the outcomes of qualitative studies are limited to
specific locations and lack inherent applicability or transferability. By
meticulously addressing sampling concerns, the internal generalizability of the
findings can be supported within the specific environment, scenario, or group
under investigation. However, extending generalization or transferability
beyond these boundaries necessitates the utilization of diverse arguments and
evidence (Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014).
The qualitative interview serves as a crucial and primary instrument in
qualitative research. It proves to be a valuable and reliable approach in
comprehending the perspectives of interviewees or the target community
(Roulston & Choi, 2018). During a qualitative interview, participants express
their views and provide descriptions related to the research topic. However, it
is important to note that the interviewee's statements do not offer a complete
and direct understanding of the subject matter (Maxwell, 2018). Nevertheless,
this method allows researchers to gather data in a conventional manner, where
they engage in conversations with individuals or groups to explore a specific
topic. This serves as the initial step for researchers to investigate and analyze
social phenomena (Flick, 2018). Given the significance of qualitative
interviews, I carried out interviews centred around comprehending the concept
of hijab and the obligatory hijab in Iran. The subsequent section will delve
into the specifics of these interviews.
3.2 Data collection, Limitations and Possibilities
Data collection is based on two sorts of information, the archival research and
the interviews. Research in archives includes historical, social, religious, and
political topics from books, articles, speeches, and headlines in newspapers
and reports. According to the research questions, I had to find a meaningful
relationship between IRR leaders' definition of femininity and the female
body, laws related to the mandatory hijab, and women's and men's beliefs
about hijab and femininity. Having access to this link can show the effect of
compulsory hijab in people's everyday life. This type of search requires
examining data, social phenomena and events, legislations and governmental
views, and finally putting them together and finding a connection between
them. I did not need statistics here because my aim was to interpretively and
epistemically examine the narratives and individual experiences of women and
men based on the laws and beliefs related to the compulsory hijab.
Since a lot of research has been done in Iran on the hijab, choosing the sources
was difficult. This topic has been discussed by three groups: Islamists and
compulsory hijab supporters, feminists, and Islamic feminists. As I intended
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to find the opinions of the IRR and the people regarding mandatory hijab, as
well as investigating the impact of mandatory hijab on people's everyday life,
I had to look at the sources that investigated common beliefs about hijab.
Therefore, two sides are considered in collecting resources. First, historical,
cultural, political and religious written sources, and second, interviews.
Collecting written sources was an easy task on the one hand because I was able
to provide many sources in English and Farsi by searching for keywords. The
majority of them are PDF files and published on news agencies' websites. IRR
leaders' speeches and letters are also available on their specific websites that I
used. It was necessary to examine many Persian sources since this is
qualitative research on how the hijab affects Iranian women and men's lives.
Because I have excellent Persian skills, I was able to easily read the Persian
sources and conduct the interview in Persian. Also, access to resources was
one of the most helpful possibilities in the first months of starting work.
However, this possibility was limited in the second half of my research
because of internet bans in Iran and Iranian webpages.
One of the limitations is about Persian sources. The written sources used in
my thesis include Persian and English sources. English sources are easy to use,
but they are mostly used for data analysis. It was possible to investigate the
events from Persian sources. The first limitation was that there was no English
translation of the books or websites utilized. Since I did not have access to a
reliable and fast translator, I translated the required material myself. I was not
sure that the translator could reflect exactly the material I needed in the same
way in his translation. Several Persian websites provided English content as
well. However, upon further investigation, I realized that the trustworthiness
of their English translation was not preserved. There were intentionally
missing parts of the English content. Speeches and letters by regime leaders
have this problem. So, I used the same Persian part and the translations are all
my own. Each link mentioned in the references or footnotes is from the same
Persian section.
As to the interviews, my limitation was that I only wanted to speak to Iranians
living in Iran. Because I wanted to get a true sense of those who are in the
situation at that time, I didn't talk to any Iranians who live out of Iran in this
section. We conducted the conversations through audio and video calls. They
were recorded by a voice recorder, and the audio files were stored in external
memory. One more constraint encountered during the interview pertained to
conversing with adolescent girls below the age of 18. The insights gained from
teenage and school-going girls hold immense value in comprehending the
notion of mandatory hijab. I had the opportunity to engage in discussions with
girls aged 13 to 17, with the consent of their parents and their physical presence
during the interview. However, ethical considerations prevent me from
disclosing their responses publicly.
Iran is a multi-ethnical country and provides multicultural and multilinguistic
research atmosphere. Speaking to women from different ethnicities is crucial
to understanding and investigating body and femininity definitions. Speaking
and being heard, as well as the dominance of languages, are part of power
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relations (Spivak, 1988). “One benefit of multilingual research is to make
diverse – and often vulnerable – groups and their perceptions, experiences and
needs visible and to include their experiences into the discourse.” (Resch &
Enzenhofer, 2018). The language of the conversation was Farsi, even though
I talked with women and men of different ethnicities. I was deprived of
understanding ethnic feelings because I didn't know the accents of other
Iranian ethnicities. Having knowledge of different languages can help the
researcher gain a deeper understanding of the research subjects. Languages
and dialects contain special and unique expressions and terms to express
various concepts and phenomena. Cultural context can be portrayed very well
by these expressions (Ibid).
There were also restrictions on the use of all parts of conversations. There were
long conversations, some lasting over two hours. After the conversation, I
wrote them in text form, and I only translated the parts used in the thesis. This
was my responsibility because privacy had to be protected and the desired
concepts were expressed comprehensively. During the interview, I remained
neutral and did not introduce my own opinions or beliefs. However, religious,
cultural, and traditional beliefs differed sometimes during the interview. For
example, sometimes the interviewees used the expressions such as, ‘you are
outside Iran and maybe you don't know..., you are outside Iran and maybe you
don't understand..., you are outside Iran and maybe you don't be as religious
as me and don't understand that...’. It is probably understandable for both
parties to extend the conversation in certain directions, but at the same time I
will not receive ethnic and minority perspectives. As a last limitation, due to
the audio nature of most calls, I was deprived of receiving the feeling and
observing the interviewee's body language during the conversation, and only
through hearing voices, silences and pauses, sighs, sad and disappointing
words, I could partially grasp sadness, pressure and oppression. But in video
calls that were generally made in the Google Meet environment, it was
possible to understand the emotions of the audience to a broader extent. At all
times during the interview, I tried to remain completely detached from the
interview process and not to elicit any feelings from the interviewee.
3.3 Interviews
The following part will cover the interview structure, the types of questions
asked, methods for finding interviewees, participant characteristics, and
guidelines for conducting the interview.
3.3.1 Construction of interview
Qualitative interviews serve as an effective means to capture the perspectives
of marginalized individuals. These interviews are conducted in a qualitative
and semi-structured or open format. Prior to the interview, participants are
provided with an explanation of the topic and engage in individual interviews.
The focus of the interviews revolves around the belief in hijab, which presents
challenges from both religious and cultural standpoints for the interviewees. I
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attempted to concentrate on the sections of the interviews that aligned with the
theories discussed in the Theory chapter. They determine women’s
comprehension and experiences about the compulsory hijab discourse.
Furthermore, the discussions delve into the relationship between laws
pertaining to mandatory hijab, women's rights, and the impact of these laws
on their daily lives. To ensure familiarity with the topic, participants are given
general questions in advance.
3.3.2 Questionnaire
The interview questions are entirely theoretical and exploratory. As
previously stated, the intention behind formulating these questions was to
gather individual accounts regarding mandatory hijab. There exist two
variations of the questions. The version presented towards the conclusion of
the thesis includes clarifications for each question within parentheses,
elucidating the objective of each interrogator (see the Appendix). However,
these explanations were withheld from the participants to allow them to solely
reflect upon their own personal experiences.
3.3.3 Interview’s conduction
I recorded interviews in forms of audio and video in summer and autumn 2021.
A total of 25 individuals, consisting of 20 women and 5 men, hailing from
various regions and circumstances in Iran, attended the interviews. The age
range of the interviewees spanned from 13 to 70 years old. Among them, there
were both literate and illiterate individuals. The literacy levels varied greatly,
encompassing primary, secondary, diploma, bachelor, master, and PhD
qualifications. The participants expressed their interest in participating in the
interviews after a public invitation was extended through Facebook and
Instagram pages. This invitation, in the form of both text and video, was
disseminated for a duration of one month. Initially, the interview commenced
with a larger number of participants, but some later withdrew, resulting in a
final count of 25 individuals who actively took part in the interviews. Prior to,
during, and after the interviews, all participants were adequately informed
about the interview process and the nature of the questions. Their consent was
obtained at each stage of the interview. Throughout the interview, only the first
names of the participants were used, as consent had been obtained from each
interviewee.
The purpose of conducting the interview was not to catch the participants off
guard with unexpected questions. Instead, I wanted them to carefully consider
the information and be challenged as they connected it to their everyday
experiences. To gain a deeper understanding of events and laws, I sought more
personal insights into their daily lives and emotions. This is why I created a
comfortable and intimate environment where the interviewees could freely
express their feelings and opinions. It was crucial for me to assess the
participants' comprehension of the subject matter and the questions, as well as
their concerns and knowledge related to the topic being discussed. Therefore,
I refrained from confirming or rejecting their statements and avoided
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providing explanations for the questions. Prior to the scheduled conversation,
I shared a list of questions (see the Appendix) with the participants,
emphasizing that it would be a casual conversation and we would not strictly
adhere to the questions. However, the questions were provided to help them
familiarize themselves with the subject. Some participants had taken the
initiative to inquire and research about the topic, enabling them to contribute
more examples from their daily lives during the interview. They discovered
that they had previously overlooked these aspects.
The discussions were divided between individuals who supported and opposed
the hijab. Within the group of opponents, two individuals completely rejected
the concept of the hijab, advocating for complete freedom for women. On the
other hand, 23 others believed in the hijab, with the only difference being their
perspectives on the paradigms associated with it. However, despite the
majority of interviewees considering the Chador as a superior form of hijab,
they believed that it alone could not fulfil other aspects of hijab such as
modesty and chastity. Furthermore, they believed that a woman could conceal
the attractions of her body without necessarily wearing a Chador. Among the
women who wore manteau and scarf as hijab, 10 of them believed that the
purpose of veiling should be to conceal the attractions of women's bodies and
did not feel the need to cover their hair. They believed that women's hair was
not as alluring as to require covering. However, others believed that covering
the hair was necessary, just like covering the other attractions of a woman's
body, and they had no issue wearing a scarf. The men who participated in the
conversation agreed that veiling was a form of hijab, but two of them did not
believe in covering the hair and instead advocated for concealing women's
attractions as hijab.
Various reasons were cited by those who agreed with the hijab, including
women's security, maintaining women's sexual attraction as a secret, showing
respect towards women, self-respect, and preventing societal depravity caused
by women. However, a small number of individuals also viewed the hijab as
a symbol of government control. On the other hand, opponents of the hijab,
consisting of only two individuals, argued against it based on individual
freedom and the influence of hijab culture brought into Iran by Muslim Arabs.
Supporters of the hijab believed that covering women's sexual attraction
symbolized modesty and considered it a positive aspect for society. However,
significant differences in opinions arose when discussing other topics such as
honor, reputation, extremism, and various women's issues including
employment, education, and travel. Many of the women involved in the
discussion were unaware of women's rights legislation, and very few had
knowledge about the existing laws and penalties related to not wearing the
veil.
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4 Theory
In the following section I will present the theoretical frameworks that have
been used to analyze the functions of compulsory hijab among Iranian women
and men. The concept of power as a discursive formation of power which has
been used in postcolonial studies will be addressed. Additionally, the empirical
material will be analyzed by drawing on feminist accounts of oppression and
resistance. The experience of resistance will be addressed as ways of women’s
encounter with cultural and religious labeling, and surviving from
discriminating legislations in their everyday life. In this case, I looked at
Iranian feminists and Muslim feminists because of the association of
compulsory hijab and the Islamic beliefs.
4.1 Discursive formations of power
The work of Michel Foucault concentrates extensively on the concept of
power. Since Foucault proposed that nothing is outside of ‘discourse’, he
argues that power works through discourse, and that we can understand
cultural and social facts as produced by this function (Foucault, 1969;
Miller,1990). Foucault asserts that discourse and history have an inseparable
union and every specific period of history has its specific discourse (ibid).
Thus, ‘Discourse’ originated from Foucault's work which combines history,
historiography, and cultural studies (Miller,1990).
Foucault’s concept of discourse is put forward in his book ‘Archaeology of
Knowledge’ (1969) which is study of systems of thought (epistemes) and
knowledge (discursive formations) that are shaped by rules that operate below
the conscious level of the subject individual. These rules establish a conceptual
system of possibilities for the use of language and thought at a given time and
place (Foucault, 1969; Lessa, 2006). As Foucault suggests, there are some
subjects in society that are more able to create and disseminate discourse than
others, including political institutions, the media, and academics (Foucault,
2008; Melis & Chambers, 2012) and this inequality is essential to his
understand of power.
According to Foucault, power is not a fixed quantity of physical force, but
rather a flow of energy flowing through all aspects of society. Power is based
on knowledge; it utilizes knowledge, and it reproduces knowledge by shaping
it in accordance with its own intentions. This means that, for Foucault, power
is productive and not just repressive; it produces reality and truth. By
establishing order, power affects people's actions and beliefs. Foucault’s
analyses of power are simultaneously articulated at two levels, the empirical
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and the theoretical. The first level is constituted by a detailed examination of
historically specific modes of power and how these modes emerged out of
earlier forms. Hence, he identifies modern forms of power, such as the closely
related modes he termed ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘biopower’, and earlier,
premodern forms such as ‘sovereign power’ (Foucault, 1981; Foucault &
Deleuze, 1980; Tylor, 2014). The power which is defined by Foucault does
not exactly and totally mean the domination, although it is a part of
domination.
4.1.1 The discourse of Compulsory Hijab
The notion of power as discursive formations helps to conceptualize both sides
of compulsory hijab. The origins of the discourse of compulsory hijab are
founded before the 1979 revolution. Although the protests in 1962 started
because of women's social presence and voting, the main protester who took
over the leadership of the IRR after the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, hid
his true approach to women's freedom and presence during the struggle against
Pahlavi. Khomeini personally urged women to march with men in the Islamic
Revolution, even at the cost of imprisonment, torture, and death, and the first
change in women's presence occurred when popular movements were formed
towards the Islamic Revolution. Unlike his desire for presence of women, but
alongside with the freedom of women and equality of men and women’s rights,
he praised the presence of women in revolutionary activities. Khomeini stated
in all interviews of 1978 that "women's rights are the same as men's rights, and
we will act in accordance with Islamic law within the Islamic State"
(Khomeini, 2010, vol 5, p. 224, p. 322-328, p. 469). But what did Khomeini
really mean by the Islamic State? Throughout the 15 years since protesting
against women's rights to vote, election, and employment, he had changed his
mind to the point where he invited women and their counterparts to fight for a
new government with him. Although he said in his interviews that in Islam,
men and women have equal rights, he stated: “if there is a limit for women, it
is in their best interest and there are also restrictions for men” (ibid, vol 6, p.
436). At first glance, he used simple, abstract phrases to introduce the Islamic
State he wanted, but in the end, his purpose is not entirely clear. His speech in
March 1979 to women in Qom, shortly after the revolution, stated that the
hijab was meant to preserve women's high values, and Islam wanted to
preserve women's high values because a woman who didn't wear the hijab
would be a toy for randy men (ibid, p. 299-302). It seems important to
Khomeini what women are up to and for what purpose. It is quite clear that
there are contradictions in Khomeini's words from 1962 to the last day of his
life, as the leader of the Iranian Revolution, about the presence of women and
the hijab. This contradiction can only be understood by knowing the doctrine
of ‘obedience’ and the principle of ‘Velayat-e-Faghih’.
Veiling became compulsory officially in 1984, and punishments were
determined for unveiling (Sedghi,2007; Zahedi, 2007). Hijab is one of
essential basements of IRR. Principles of IRR are formed by the doctrine of
‘Obedience’ which is one of origins of ‘Velayat-e-Faghih’ or ‘Guardianship
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of Clerics’. ‘Velayat-e-Faghih’ is a theological theory that IRR claims it based
on Islamic and Shiite ideas. According to this idea, the leader of Islamic
society is an alternative of Shiite Imams and actually the twelfth Imam of Shia,
and his commands are based on Islam and mandatory
5
. Therefore, one of the
constitutive parts of the Compulsory hijab discourse is related to religious
beliefs, which has a long history in Iran. Doctrine of ‘Obedience’ is promoted
by institutions, organizations, media and all propaganda tools, universities, etc.
that areunder the domination of IRR.
Another constituent of the Compulsory hijab discourse is the language used
by the regime to create this discourse. As mentioned previously, in
‘Archaeology of Knowledge’, Foucault argued that, by discursive formation
we can define a conceptual system of possibility that determines the
boundaries of language and thought used in a given time and domain
(Foucault, 1969). Dominance in the field of languages, are part of power
relations (Spivak, 1988). In this regard, the IRR uses specific words or
concepts that define the boundaries of the Compulsory hijab discourse. This
language limits women and forces them to stay at home and accept gender
roles that confirm their obedience. IRR uses both language and ideology in
combination to form the concept of compulsory hijab (Afshar, 1998). She and
Minoo Derayeh (2011) named it as the Islamification of symbols. Derayeh said
that IRR defines women’s chastity by compulsory hijab and stay-at-home
woman, (Derayeh, 2011). She believed that the Islamification of symbols and
the use of Islamic language by women were further indications of the regime's
appropriation of women's agency.
By examining the concepts related to the mandatory hijab, we realize that a
wide redefinition of political, cultural, moral and religious concepts has taken
place by the IRR, which started at the very beginning of the Islamic Movement
in the 60s. Language was confiscated by the IRR, introduces new concepts to
the lower classes in Iran. The confiscation of language in Iran does not mean
that the regime has introduced a new language, but rather that religious,
cultural and moral concepts that already exist have been given a new meaning
to form the power discourse. For example, femininity is defined by
motherhood, wifehood, and girlhood. The female body is completely
sexualized in all of these. Chastity and modesty have been introduced as
specific concepts for women, which have a direct relation to shame, and a
chaste woman is shown as shameful. The more chaste a woman is, the more
she will try to cover and hide herself as a basis for shame (Afshar, 1998;
Sedghi, 2007).
The relationship between sexual control and power discourse and
constructions is one of Michel Foucault's themes. He published the book
‘History of Sexuality’ (1978) and explained about sexuality and its role on
social relations and power. According to him, sexual desires are rooted in
people's identity, and sexuality is a point for power transfer, therefore it can be
a tool for dominance. He analyzed how power operates through sexuality by
5
References of Velayat-e-Faghih definition are in Farsi and I mentioned them in the reference part.
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creating norms, categories, and practices that regulate and define human
behavior. He argues that power and discourse create the techniques of
sexuality, through social practices such as confession, examination,
surveillance, and discipline. These, that enable individuals to monitor,
regulate, and express their sexual desires and behaviours (Foucault,1990).
The IRR uses women's sexuality and their labor to legitimize its political and
cultural position and consolidate its power by intervening in their lives for
internal and external policy objectives (Afshar, 19; Sedghi, 2007; Zahedi).
Also, women are used in order to depict a distinct political identity and
message abroad (ibid). Culture and religion are both good reasons and tools
for forming the idea of sexual control by the IRR. According Deniz Kandiyoti,
(1987) “These are vested in the culturally defined modes of control of female
sexuality, especially insofar as they influence subjective experiences of
womanhood and femininity.” (Kandiyoti, 1987, p. 319). But it must be seen
within the broader context. Sedghi believed that “sexuality and veiling
practices have been the two sides of the same coin in Iranian politics.” (Sedghi,
2007, p. 12). She gives the example of both Pahlavi and IRR practices of
controlling women’s bodies and their sexuality as strategically vital to state
consolidation of power.
As previously mentioned, according Foucault, power defines people’s
behaviors through norms, categories and practices that are stereotyped by
sexuality. In fact, power discourse works in two ways about sexuality. On the
one hand it determines the definition and functions of sexuality, and on the
other hand it defines the normal and abnormal behaviors which are relevant to
sexuality. According to Foucault, power and discourse is a conceptual system
which is flowing through all aspects of society (Foucault, 1969, 2008; Lynch,
2010), thus, language, culture and ideology influence it a lot. Based on this
theory, femininity and masculinity are sexualized by IRR (Afshar, 1998, 2008;
Bagheri, 2017; Sedghi, 2007; Zahedi, 2007). Women’s bodies sexualization
by IRR clarifies the reason of Khomeini’s point of view about women’s assault
by randy men. Sexualization of body regards in both religious and cultural
ideas of Muslim Iranian (ibid). IRR’s Sexual stereotyping of women is also
seen in the second leader’s speeches. Khamenei said: “The most important of
all women's work is raising children and strengthening the spirit of husbands
to enter the big fields”
6
. He also added that the woman's most important task
is having children and said that women should not avoid having children
because of working outside the home, because bringing up the children and
raising them for the woman is more important than working outside the home,
and not wanting a child is against human nature. Women can also be
employed; however, if family members are affected by women's employment,
it is the woman's duty to make the home and family chores and not be
employed.
Defining the sexuality and its functions by power discourse is not only limited
to women. IRR has declared definitions and stereotypes for masculinity and
6
Khuzestan speech for women’s day 1997\3\2 https://khl.ink/f/7284
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masculine sexuality. The first definition presented in the first supreme leader’s
speech in Qom in March 1979. Khomeini said that “a woman who didn't wear
the hijab would be a toy for randy men” (Khomeini, vol 6, p.299-302). His
audience seems to be women in that speech, but actually one of masculine
sexuality definitions, which is Khomeini’s idea, has been pointed out here. He
used the word ‘randy men’ that in the first glance seems not to be included all
men. But if all men were not the target, why hijab mandated for all women?!
IRR believes that mandating hijab supports women from assault and abuse. If
there are certain numbers of randy men in the society that probably able to
abuse women, why there is no clear rule for limiting or arresting them? Indeed,
it is understood by Khomeini’s speech that randy men are allowed to assault
women if they see an unveiled woman, because she herself wants to, and by
leaving the hijab, she signals that I am ready to use. The IRR is not going to
stop these men because it basically believes the man is superior and more
powerful than the woman, so he covers the woman with his power. In fact, the
randy men are not considered unusual, but the unveiled women are unusual
and causes them to be harassed.
4.1.2 Intersectionality of power discourse and compulsory hijab
discourse
IRR emphasizes on the sexualization of body. Sexualization of the body has
strong roots in culture, religion and laws. Therefore, as Foucault said, it can be
used to create and consolidate a power discourse as well as creation of a
patriarchal system (Foucault, 1978). For example, we can mention one of
Khomeini's speeches before the 1979 revolution, which was in protest against
unveiled women and their presence and work in public offices. He said:
“[…] It's about twenty years passed from the abandon of hijab; see
what did you do you bring women in the offices; You see, in every office
they entered, that office was ruined. It is currently limited; clerics says
don't develop it; Don't send women to the provinces. If a woman enters
a device, she will ruin the situation; Do you want women to provide
independence?”. (Khomeini, 2010, p.118).
[…] The issue of women's right to participate in elections is not an
obstacle; But their right to be elected creates depravity. The issue of
women's right to vote, etc., is at the end of the list and not the case[…]”
(ibid, p.191).
The IRR's emphasis on stay-at-home women is promoted by reasons such as
the job crisis for men, the supporting role of men in the family, encouraging
women to have children, and the men’s lack of concentration in the workplaces
due to the presence of women. Women are introduced as sexual bodies and
stimuli, and men are taught that the presence of women in society causes men
to be sexually aroused and also causes men to lose focus in the work
environment. On the other hand, men's sexual function is defined in such a
way that they neither need to control themselves against sexual stimuli, nor
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they should even resist against sexual stimuli, because the standard man
according to IRR is a man who has high sexual ability and can have more
children for serving the IRR. Just like the bourgeoisie who promoted economic
growth in the 17th century by defining sexual activities for more children
(Foucault, 1978).
4.2 Feminist theory of compulsory hijab
Feminism basically focuses on the inequality of people's social rights and
wants equal rights for all (Walby, 1990). Therefore, feminist theory often
focuses on the analysis of gender inequality (Nussbaum, 1995). In this thesis,
I have paid attention to the discrimination, oppression and sexual
objectification as themes which are regarded by feminist theory. I have
addressed Islamic feminist theory in this section, since Iranians face an
ideological totalitarian regime (Afshar, 1998; Mir-Hosseini, 2007; Sedghi,
2007), and feminist activities in Iran are mostly based on IRR’s claims about
‘Norm Woman’. Furthermore, the Western feminist theories take up different
in issues. This difference is based on the lifestyle, and the resistance of Iranian
women against oppression.
Feminist scholars argue that the compulsory veiling is a tool of oppression that
reinforces gender inequality and restricts women’s freedom of expression and
movement (Afshar, 19889; Basiri, 2018; Basmechi, 2018; Sedghi, 2007;
Zahedi, 2007). They also assert that the hijab is a symbol of patriarchal power
and control over women’s bodies (ibid). During the second decade of the IRR
establishment, Iranian women became more active and creative because of
Islamic feminist activities. People who want to promote women's rights or
human rights in Iran were being accused of collaborating with the West and
imperialism. Thus, feminist activists should first demonstrate faithfulness to
their religious origins (Ahmadi, 2006). On the other hand, women's rights
activists' struggles against the regime's radical policies about women were
portrayed as a confrontation of the radical and traditional interpretations of
Islamic ideas. Islamic feminists have challenged the clergy's monolithic
power, launching a new trend in Islamic theological and legal sources
(Ahmadi,2006; Soroush, 2000). They believe that we should interpret the
Quran in accordance with the historical and traditional context of the Arab
community (ibid). They also criticize the Qur'an as the main religious text of
Islam and believe that misogynistic and patriarchal interpretations of the
verses of the Qur'an should be corrected because early Islam was more
egalitarian than today's Islam (Badran, 2009; Mojab, 2001).
4.2.1 Oppression
The following section presents feminist accounts of oppression. This section
will examine Iranian feminist views as well as Muslim feminist views
regarding the hijab and the social and cultural conditions of women. I will
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examine how oppression works through mechanisms of segregation, seclusion
and obedience.
Oppression can happen in different dimensions between two people or two
groups. Different branches of feminism examine oppression in different
political, economic, class, sexual and gender dimensions, etc., but in principle,
they see it as a result of the patriarchal effort to control social production and
reproduction (’Asta & Hall, 2021; Musingafi et.al, 2021; Walby, 1990).
Gender oppression is a situation in which men have a fundamental and tangible
interest in controlling, using and oppressing women. Domination happens in a
kind of power discourse where one party succeeds in making the other party
(the subordinate) an instrument of the dominant’s will, and refuses to
recognize the subordinate’s independence (Lengermann & Niebrugge, 2000).
In a more general definition, Pohlhaus Jr. in ‘The Oxford Handbook of
Feminist Philosophy’ (2021) categorizes the main methods of oppression as
follows: deprivation of possibilities, limitation of possibilities, confinement in
ignorance (meaning lack of knowledge), rejection and marginalize, ignore and
invalidate.
4.2.1.1 Segregation
IRR performed the segregation between men and women in public places as
its first revolutionary actions after establishment (Basiri, 2018; Basmechi,
2018; Sedghi, 2007; Zahedi, 2007). Both Iranian feminists and Muslim
feminists argue for segregation and regard it as manipulation of sexuality.
Although some of 1979 revolution’s theoreticians and leaders such as
Mottahari, Khomeini and Khamenei, presented veil as a good way for
women’s hybridity and thought that it prevents women’s segregation (Afshar,
1998; Mottahari, 1980), but Iranian feminists and Muslim feminists, by
pointing at manipulation of women’s sexuality and gender roles and
stereotypes for men and women, regard veiling as a kind of segregation and
compulsory hijab as well as forcing women to stay home (Afshar, 1998,
Ahmed, 1992; Amer, 2014; Helie &Hoodfar, 2012; Mernisi, 1987;
Sedghi,2007; Shirazi, 2001; Zahedi, 2007).
Afshar(1998) introduced the compulsory hijab as the most immediate and
obvious means of separating and removing women from public spheres. She
has explained how women were forced to stay home with Islamic rules
promoted by IRR. Feminine sexuality is one of reasons that IRR focuses on
and segregates women by it, as Fatima Mernissi noted that “the sexual power
attributed to women has caused Islamic states to contain and control their
sexuality through such social institutions as the veil, the family, the marriage
system, and the legal system” (Mernissi, 2011; Sedghi, 2007, p. 12). She also
said: “concealing female hair says more about men’s sexual anxiety than it
does about the seductive power of women.” (Mernissi, 2011, p.31). In fact,
Men's efforts to control women's sexuality may be symbolized by their efforts
to control their hair, which is a highly charged symbol of female power
23 (74)
(Delaney, 1995). In the other word, A device that can protect men against the
power of female sexual attraction has been justified by the fear of female
sexual attraction over men. As stated earlier, Hamideh Sedghi, as an Iranian
Feminist scholar, also believes that IRR manipulates women’s sexuality by
compulsory hijab to legitimize its political and cultural position and
consolidate its power (Sedghi, 2007) and one of compulsory hijab paradigms
is segregation between women and men in public places.
4.2.1.2 Seclusion
Seclusion of women is the result of pressure on women to fit into a certain
pattern defined by the regime. There are two different and contradicted
arguments about seclusion of women among Iranian feminism and Islamic
feminism which both conclusions are relevant to the power relation
appropriation of women’s sexuality.
Women’s sexual attraction, in Iranian feminism views, is a factor that
appropriated by IRR for consolidating power. As mentioned previously in
Foucault’s ideas about the relationship of sexuality and power discourse, he
believed that when sexuality defines in specific ways by governments, they
can appropriate it for consolidating power in power relation (Foucault, 1978,
1990). Iranian feminism insists on this view and knows women’s sexual
attraction as one of important factors in power discourse (Afshar, 1998; Helie
&Hoodfar, 2012; Sedghi,2007; Shirazi, 2001; Zahedi, 2007). For instance,
IRR, in every period of its governing, defines women’s sexuality in a specific
way to have the most benefit for consolidating its power. The definition of
‘Standard Revolutionary Woman’ on the war period by Khomeini, and ‘The
Third Female Pattern’ in recent years by Khamenei are in line with IRR goals
7
.
Limitation of women’s sexuality attraction, in Muslim feminists’ views, is
argued in a different way. As Muslim clerics regard women, essentially, as a
sexual concept, they see women as a danger for men in the society and try to
stop the danger (Mernisi, 1987, 2011). Although Mernisi believed that sexual
attraction is a feminine power that men can’t stand it and they are in danger
because of their fear of it as well as struggling for suppress it (Mernisi, 1987),
but Amer pointed at clerics view of women which is mentioned during recent
centuries. She showed that Muslim clerics regard women as a sexual concept
and social disorder or ‘Fitnah’ and for this reason they want to limit women
(Amer, 2014). Most of Muslim feminist scholars believe that these views are
contradicted with what progressive Muslims discovered from early history of
Islamic ideas (Bilge, 2010; Mernisi, 1987, 2011, Mir-Hosseini, 2007).
4.2.1.3 Obedience
The concept of obedience is seen both in Iranian culture and in Islamic rituals.
In Iranian culture, a man is the head of the family, and a good woman is a
7
https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/10428
24 (74)
woman who obeys men _ father, brother, husband and son_ and accepts them
as her guardian. Also in religious beliefs, from the past to the present, women
have been introduced as an obedient member of the family. Both in old Iran
when Zoroastrian religion was prevalent in the society
8
, and after the arrival
of Islam in Iran in the 7th century and even until now
9
, the concept of women's
obedience to men has been discussed. The main doctrine of Shia, which is the
principle of Velayat, is based on absolute obedience to the Vali (guardian). The
concept of obedience in Shia is generally for everyone and specifically for
women.
In ‘The Veil and The Male Elite’ (1991), Mernissi has talked about the concept
of obedience in the Muslim communities. Mernissi believes that, generally,
there is a lack of individuality in Muslim communities. She points out the issue
of leaders’ dominance and asserts that Muslim communities encourage
Muslims to the obedience by leaving individual choice and identity. Pointing
at this issue by Mernissi shows that the leaders’ dominance is the issue of all
Muslim communities not just Shia Muslims; but in Shia it calls ‘Velayat’.
Mernissi regards the obedience as a concept which is based on both culture
and conservative comprehension from Prophet Mohammad narratives
(Mernissi, 2011). Finally, she and other Muslim feminists who present
themselves as progressive Muslims, believe that culture and mores of a region
effect on people’s comprehension from Prophet’s narratives and Quran, and
what Islamic State wants is the dominance and power (Ahmed,1992; Amer,
2014; Mernissi, 2011; Mir-Hosseini, 2007, Soroush, 2000).
For example, the concept of obedience is seen in speeches or in Fatwa
(religious commands) of IRR leaders Almost all conservative clerics believe
that women do not have the right to leave the house without the permission of
their husbands. Khomeini, in Tahrir al-Wasila (1989), which is about religious
commands, argued the right of women to leave the house. Analyzing this book,
it is found that Khomeini does not allow women to leave the house without
their husband's permission, under no circumstances. Khamenei, the second
leader of the regime, has a similar opinion. In his speech on March 10, 1997
in Khuzestan, Khamenei said that said that a woman is obliged to obey her
husband in several cases. For example, a man can prohibit his wife from
leaving the house. He called the woman's most important task having children
and said that women should not avoid having children because of working
outside, because bringing the child and raising him for the woman is more
important than working outside the home, and not wanting a child is against
human nature, but women can also be employed. However, if family members
are affected by women's employment, it is the woman's job to make the home
8
For example, Minog-i-khrad which is a religious commands’ book of Zoroastrianism, patriarchal ideas
are obviously seen.
9
There are too many narratives quoted from prophet Mohammad about the obedience to wife. For
example: ‘None of woman’s prayers will be accepted, if a woman does not obey her husband’ (Noori
Hossein, 1987, Mostadrak-al-Vasayil, vol 2, p. 552). Here I don’t discuss the trustworthy of narratives,
even though most of them are fake, because IRR uses these kinds of narratives to form the discourse of
compulsory hijab.
25 (74)
and family chores and not be employed
10
. Khamenei also introduces the third
female pattern in the third decade of the establishment of the regime. Civil
code, passport code, work and employment rules, etc. also emphasize the
concept of obedience.
The articles about obedience in IRCC are coming below:
Article 1105: in the couple life, the head of family is the husband.
Article 1108: Whenever a woman without a legitimate barrier refuses
duties of the couple life, will not eligible for alimony.
Article 1114: woman has to live in a place which is prepared by her
husband despite she has deputized the right of place by her husband.
Article 1117: Husband can prevent his wife from working in a job which
is not suitable for her or weaken her dignity.
11
IRR Passport Code is another example. In the article 18 of passport code, an
under 18 single girls get a passport with the permission of her father, and
married women can only have a passport with the permission of spouse.
Article 19 states that a person who receives a passport is subject to his
permission if he regrets his permission, he may prevent the passport holder
from traveling.
12
4.2.2 Discrimination and Polarization
Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (2000) mention positions that show the
discrimination between men and women in a society. They note that most
women experience situations differently than men, as they are located
differently and experience those situations differently. Additionally, women
are less privileged than or equal to men in most situations because their
location is not only different from men, but also less privileged. Women’s
situation also has to be understood in terms of a direct power relationship
between men and women. It is also important to point out that women's
experiences of discrimination, inequality, and oppression differ from one
another (Lengermann & Niebrugge, 2000; Musingafi et. al, 2021).
Hamideh Sedghi, in her book ‘Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling,
and Reveiling’ (2007) discusses sexual and gender segregation and
discrimination of IRR’s politics. She notes that a female official in a
managerial position in one of the ministries indicated: “women run into all
kinds of sexual discrimination in high level positions. We are systematically
at war with male colleagues who will somehow try to humiliate us if they sense
10
https://khl.ink/f/7284 and https://khl.ink/f/26155 and https://khl.ink/f/39136
11
https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/97937 (translated to English by me)
12
https://iran5050.com/?p=576passport laws, Judiciary Organ official website. (Translated by me)
26 (74)
we are dedicated and ambitious.” (Sedghi, 2007, p. 237). Fatemeh Moghadam
regards the IRR focus on the sexual and gender role of women as a reproducer,
because of that, IRR encourages women to stay home and be a wife and
mother. Haideh Moghissi, in ‘Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism Limits
of Postmodern Analysis’ (1999), notes that Islamization project, by
indoctrinating the Shia’s rites, forms the working atmosphere for women in
such a way that they are simultaneously predominated and powerless. In fact,
she regards the compulsory veil as a subdivision of Islamization project and
introduces the women’s disempowerment as sexual and gender discrimination.
A sample survey of 250 educated married women, ages 20 to 50 conducted in
Tehran in 2002 noted in Sedghi’s book said that women prefer the household
than the marketplace (Keshavarz, 2003; Sedghi, 2007). Moghissi believes that
these statistics and surveys shows the indoctrination of Shia’s rites and culture
(1999).
Islamization and Shia’s rites indoctrination sexualize women’s bodies by
compulsory veiling, and in the other hand, push women to the consent of
sexual and gender roles which are defines by IRR. Thus, the discrimination
and polarization are established not only between men and women, but also
among women who accept the condition and women who don’t accept it.
Women who consent sexual and gender roles as well as compulsory veiling,
introduced as normal and standard women. In contrast, women who do not
accept the conditions, are deprived from IRR facilities and services. Afsaneh
Najmabadi, in a chapter of ‘Women, Islam and the State’ (1991), mentions
about sexual and gender discrimination of IRR to women for employment. She
argues that women who believe in wearing the chador or manteau and scarf is
provided the opportunity to claim social, political, and economic spaces
(Najmabadi, 1991). There are many works on discriminatory employment
laws based on mandatory hijab. Despite the IRR clear manipulation of
women’s employment process and adopting several strategies to reduce
women’s employment, women from the lower class have suffered from
discriminatory laws more than women from the wealthy and privileged class
(Basiri, 2018; Basmechi, 2018; Hoodfar, 1994; Moghadam, 1988, 2009).
Sexual and gender quotas in educational system, quotas for veiled women and
women who covered by Chador in employment law, stereotyped definitions
such as breadwinner men or housewife and the facilities which are regarded
for them by the government, and the specific limited concepts which are
defined as normal men and women by the IRR, are some examples of
discrimination and polarization in Iran.
4.2.3 Sexual objectification
Objectification is a term used to humiliate and which is related to
dehumanization. This is a set of beliefs, words and behaviors that mostly uses
for sexual objectification (Nussbaum, 1995). Nussbaum, in her article
Objectification (1995), notes seven notions which are the ways of
objectification:
27 (74)
Instrumentality: the objectifier treats the object as a tool of his/her
purposes.
Denial of autonomy: the objectifier treats the object as lacking in
autonomy and self-determination.
Inertness: the objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and
perhaps also in activity.
Fungibility: the objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with
other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other types.
Violability: the objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary-
integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, break
into.
Ownership: the objectifier treats the object as something that is owned
by another can be bought or sold, etc.
Denial of subjectivity: the objectifier treats the object as something
whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account
(Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257)
Mernessi considers female sexual power as a frightening factor for men and
introduces it as the reason of men's desire to impose hijab on women
(Mernissi, 1991, 2011). But Sedghi believes that the regime seeks to legitimize
and reproduce power by manipulating the concepts of sex and gender. She
notes that IRR takes the control of female body’s power by sexualization and
objectification the female body, as well as mandating the hijab (Sedghi, 2007).
However, Mernessi in ‘The Veil and The Male Elite’ (2011) shows that the
promotion of the concept of obedience as a positive religious and moral
characteristic as well as a feminine stereotype by religious governments, along
with the sexualization and objectification of the female body, creates the
concept of compulsory hijab.
Based on Marx's view of the transcendental value of commodification,
Rebecca Gould introduces the compulsory hijab in Iran as a type of capitalist
commodification that is implemented through male authority (Gould, 2014;
Marx, 1906). She considers the IRR as a capitalist system in which the female
body is owned and controlled by men as a consumer item through hijab. This
view is consistent with the seven points Nussbaum says about the object’s
attributes (Gould, 2014). According Gould, hijab erases women from the field
of the male gaze, which causes women to be given a permanent position in the
male hierarchy and placed them as an object. In this case, the man must be
responsible for all the women's affairs. She notes an interview she had with a
man about his girlfriend. The man said to her that when a woman is stopped
and interrogated by the moral police because of inappropriate veiling or
unveiling, a man who is with her or a man of her family is also blamed and
28 (74)
punished. This shows that IRR insists on the objectivity of women and the
ownership of women by men (Ibid).
More than a capitalistic view, women’s objectification, especially women’s
sexual objectification, is a religious belief of IRR. According Islamic Shiite
beliefs women’s body is Aurah which literally means genital organ of women,
and metaphorically means a private concept. This definition origins from a
narrative of prophet Mohammad that says: “
...”
(An-nesaao Aurah Fahbesoohonna fil boyoot) means women are Aurah thus
lock them up in the house. It is said that this hadith is from the Prophet of
Islam and has been mentioned in the books of the hadith of Ayoun Akhbar al-
Reza (Vol. 4, p. 365) and Mustadrak al-Wasa'il, Mustanbat al-Wasa'il (Vol.
14, p. 182). The authenticity of this narrative will not be investigated here.
Despite the fact that the reliability of a religious narrative is important so that
we can conclude a religious order from it, in this thesis I will not deal with
religious orders about hijab and how they are formed. The hypothesis in this
dissertation is that the IRR considers the interpretation of the verses and
narratives through which it implements the mandatory hijab. Thus, this is one
of narratives which is insisted on by IRR. It clarifies the women’s position in
the male hierarchy which is inferior and objective of men. Emphasizing
women as Aurah in Shia religious beliefs is not only sexualizing women's
bodies, but also is the sexual objectification. By more investigating of Shia
jurisprudence, we will find that the most of religious commands about women
have sexual points and functions. They also focus on the inferiority of women
and the necessity of women’s obedience to men. One of instances is about the
contract of marriage. According to the Sharia's view, marriage is a contract in
which a man is able to use the woman's Bodha' by paying dowry and alimony
(Ibn-al Manzour,1955, vol 2, p 626. Tabarsi, 1993, vol 3, p 45. Mostafavi,
1981, vol 12, p 235). The word ‘Bodha'’ in Arabic means female sexual
organs(Ibn-al Manzour,1955, vol 8, p 14). According to this definition, in
marriage, woman has right to receive dowry and alimony and she is obliged to
provide her sexual body to her husband, in contrast, the man has the right to
use the female's sexual organs and is obliged to pay dowry and alimony for the
use of the sexual organs.
29 (74)
5 Discussion and analysis
Muslims have various forms and understandings of the hijab. When we think
of the term 'hijab', it typically evokes images of modestly covering the body
and hair with a range of garments such as scarves, shawls, chadors, burqas,
yashmaks, mantles, and long dresses. Additionally, the term 'purdah' is used
to describe women who choose to stay at home (Ahmed, 2011; Amer, 2014;
Mahmood, 2011; Mernisi, 1992, 2011). Muslim men typically do not possess
any discernible indicators for identification, whereas the Hijab serves as a
prominent symbol for Muslim women (Mahmood, 2011). A closer
examination of hijab in Iran reveals the presence of two intertwined issues: the
hijab and the compulsory hijab. In Iran, the concept of hijab encompasses
various paradigms and instances, extending beyond the mere act of covering
women's heads and bodies. The practice of hijab in Iran is multifaceted and
encompasses a range of political, cultural, social, and religious dimensions.
The hijab for women in Iran contains various aspects that reflect their
commitment to modesty and chastity. This includes wearing a headscarf,
manteau or chador, which symbolizes their dedication to observing these
values. It also regards the honor, the reputation, the prejudice, and the
virginity. These concepts are intertwined within the Persian language and
culture. While honor typically refers to a respectful act or behavior that
conveys pride and satisfaction, in Persian, this term takes the form of
‘Namoos’ and encompasses a range of meanings including hidden secrets,
dignity, law, valuable possessions, and women. Virginity is similarly defined
in the same manner. Virginity refers to abstaining from sexual intercourse
prior to marriage or before engaging in a sexual relationship with a partner.
Therefore, it is not regarded as a characteristic specific to any gender. But this
attribute, in Iran, is deemed proper for women and is discernible through
physical indications within the female body. Hence, these terms and concepts
have taken on a gendered semantics, and this semantic rotation can play a
crucial role in the formation of compulsory hijab discourse. Later I will discuss
them more on the analysis section.
Women in Iran often encouraged to stay at home unless it is necessary to go
out of home, and they push to rely on the guidance and support of their male
family members. However, women face restrictions on travel, career
opportunities, and participation in sports. They also have limitations on certain
therapeutic and beauty activities. Lastly, the doctrine of ‘obedience’ plays a
significant role in shaping the concept of compulsory hijab for women in Iran.
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the mandatory hijab
discourse, I will categorize the discussion into four distinct sections. Moving
30 (74)
forward, I will delve into religious perspectives, viewpoints of leaders, legal
aspects, and cultural dimensions to further explore this topic.
5.1 Religious perspective
During the reign of the Pahlavis, the Shia clerics initiated their initial protests
primarily due to religious concerns. Throughout both the first and second
Pahlavi eras, the Shia clerics encountered numerous religious obstacles with
the government. Their objective during these protests was to compel the
regime to adhere more closely to the principles of Shia Islamic faith
Following the triumph of the revolution in 1979, Khomeini, who was the first
leader of the revolution, pursued the Islamization of all governmental
institutions. Since 16th century, every governing body in Iran has adopted Shia
Islam as its official religion. However, what sets the IRR apart from its
predecessors is the direct involvement of clerics in policy implementation and
governance. Consequently, in the subsequent discussion, I will delve into the
perspectives of Shiite Islam regarding hijab and the compulsory hijab.
The term hijab is mentioned in the Qur'an across seven verses (Al-A'raf 46, Al-
Esra 45, Maryam 17, Al-Ahzab 53, Saad 32, Fosselat 5, Shura 51). In verse
53 of Al-Ahzab, the concept of hijab is specifically mentioned as a means to
cover the wives of the Prophet of Islam. However, in the other relevant verses,
hijab is referred to as a tool for segregation with a broader application. Taking
this into consideration, it becomes evident that the term ‘hijab’ in the Qur'an
signifies a form of segregation rather than the specific cover we seek.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to employ this keyword when analyzing
women's attire in the Qur'an. However, as anticipated, the term ‘hijab’ which
is employed as a covering, is in conjunction with two broader concepts: firstly,
the covering of the body, and secondly, the adherence to moral principles.
When examining the aspect of body covering, it is referenced in 10 verses. The
verses that specifically address the type of covering can be found in Surah An-
Noor, specifically verses 30, 31, and 60. Additionally, Surah Al-Ahzab, verse
59, will also be regarded in this regard.
Surah An-Noor's verses 30 and 31 discuss the topics of chastity, ornaments,
and clothing styles for women
13
. On the other hand, verse 60 of the same Surah
touches upon the dressing style of menopausal women
14
, which can be linked
13
30. Tell the believing men to restrain their looks, and to guard their privates. That is purer for them.
God is cognizant of what they do. 31. And tell the believing women to restrain their looks, and to guard
their privates, and not display their beauty except what is apparent thereof, and to draw their coverings
over their breasts, and not expose their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands'
fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers, their brothers' sons, their sisters' sons their women,
what their right hands possess, their male attendants who have no sexual desires, or children who are not
yet aware of the nakedness of women. And they should not strike their feet to draw attention to their
hidden beauty. And repent to God, all of you believers, so that you may succeed. (30&31 AL-Noor,
p180-181, Translated by Talal Itani, 2012, The Quran, Clear Quran, USA)
14
60. Women past the age of childbearing, who have no desire for marriage, commit no wrong by taking
off their outer clothing, provided they do not flaunt their finery. But to maintain modesty is better for
31 (74)
semantically to verses 30 and 31. commentators argue that the portrayal of
menopausal women as undesirable for marriage in verse 60 is attributed to the
reduced sexual attractiveness that women experience during menopause (Ibn
Atiyah,2001). Consequently, it can be inferred that both the commentators and
possibly the Qur'an itself view women's bodies through a sexual lens, with
sexualization being intertwined with social categorization within the cultural
norms of early Arab society during the time of Islam's inception.
The terms jalbab and khmer are mentioned in the Qur'an as garments for
women. Jalabib is the plural form of jalbab. According to Ibn Atiyah, jalbab
refers to any type of covering, while Ibn al-Sakit defines it as a cloth that
covers a woman. On the other hand, Ibn Manzur suggests that jalbab has two
meanings: a shirt and a wider garment or covering compared to khmer. In
Arabic, khmer means the method or means of covering something. Ibn
Manzoor interprets this word as a way to hide and cover (Ibn Atiyah, 2015).
As previously stated, it was a prevalent practice among the Arabs to utilize a
headscarf as a means of differentiating between slave women and free women,
known as Khmer. A comparable tradition existed in Iran, referred to as the
Iranian caste.
The interpretation of hijab verses by Shiite clerics differs slightly. Unlike
others, Shia clerics take into account additional verses. According to them,
hijab primarily focuses on segregating and concealing women from men,
rather than solely emphasizing the manner of covering their bodies. This is
because Shia clerics view a woman's entire body as Aurah. Consequently, they
perceive femininity through a lens of sexualization. Hence, the preservation of
virginity holds great significance for women, as it is regarded as an indicator
of their piety and modesty. In order to comprehend the perspectives of Shiite
clerics on the topic of hijab, I sought insights from various commentaries and
their interpretations of the verses related to hijab. These commentaries hold
significant importance as they are the oldest Shiite commentaries and are
widely acknowledged by the IRR as reliable texts on jurisprudence.
The earliest books of Shia commentary, penned in the 2nd century AH, have
not delved into the topic of hijab or verses pertaining to women's attire. It was
not until the 4th century AH that the first discussions emerged regarding the
interpretation of these verses. During these debates, the focus shifted towards
narratives surrounding the style of women's clothing and the importance of
concealing ornaments as symbols of modesty. However, as time progressed
and commentary books were written after the 8th century AH, commentators
began incorporating the notion of concealing female sexual attractiveness and
virginity into the concept of women's chastity.
15
them. God is Hearing and Knowing. (60 AL-Noor, p 183, Translated by Talal Itani, 2012, The Quran,
Clear Quran, USA)
15
In this regard, I have relied on several significant Shiite commentary books. These include Tafsir al-
Ayyashi by Muhammad ibn Mas'ud Ayyashi (4th AH), Tafsir al-Safi by Mullah Mohsen Faiz Kashani
(11th AH), Tafsir al-Mizan by Mohammad Hussein Tabatabai (14th AH), Tafsir Ibn Atiyyah written by
Ibn Atiyyah Andalusian (6th AH), Tafsir Abu al-Jarud written by Ziad Ibn Al-manzar known as Abu al-
Jarud (2nd AH), and Tafsir al-Qomi written by Abu Ibrahim Qomi (4th AH). All of these books are in
32 (74)
5.2 Leaders’ points of view
In the following section, the focus is on the comments, letters, and speeches
made by the two leaders of the IRR. For this purpose, I have referred to the
‘Sahifa Imam’ and the official website of Ayatollah Khamenei. The ‘Sahifa
Imam’ is an extensive collection consisting of 22 volumes, encompassing all
of Ayatollah Khomeini's letters and speeches from 1961 until his demise. This
collection was published by the ‘Imam Khomeini Publishing and Arranging
Works Institute’, under the supervision of his family. This collection is in Farsi
language and the translation of the materials used in this thesis was done by
myself. The official website of Ayatollah Khamenei, www.Khamenei.ir ,
includes his biography, all speeches in text and video form, photos and
relevant materials. This website is available in multiple languages (8
languages), but as I have already mentioned, the content in the Persian
language section is more complete and I have referred to this section. The
significance of scrutinizing the perspectives of the IRR leaders lies in their
utilization as the fundamental principles for legislation
16
.
In 1962, Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his opposition to women's suffrage
and their ability to hold political positions (Khomeini, 2010, vol 1, p. 78).
Prime Minister Asadullah Alam took the initiative to propose a bill in the
cabinet that would amend the provincial and state associations law. This law,
which was enacted during the first session of the National Assembly in 1907,
consisted of 122 clauses that addressed the establishment of city and village
associations for direct decision-making. The law allowed certain individuals
to participate in elections, either as voters or candidates, while explicitly
excluding those who were not eligible to participate. The Cabinet of Ministers
under Alam's leadership decided to pass a bill in accordance with this law. The
new bill introduced two significant changes. Firstly, it abolished the exclusion
of women from voting, granting them the same voting rights as everyone else
and allowing them to be elected as representatives. Secondly, upon being
elected, deputies were required to take an oath before the holy book, pledging
their loyalty to the country, the king, and their constituents. The previous law
did not specify the requirement of taking an oath in front of the holy book or
the Quran. These changes, particularly women's suffrage and the use of the
holy book instead of the Quran, sparked strong protests from Ayatollah
Khomeini. He asserted that the Shah and the government were undermining
the Islamic foundation in the nation, while the original legislation enacted in
Arabic, and I have taken great care to provide accurate English translations that adhere to the rules and
complexities of the Arabic language. These few commentary books were chosen for their exceptional
authenticity, as they have been widely referenced and quoted by other commentaries as well. (AH: After
hijrah. This is the calendar that used by Muslims started from 662 CE the time which Prophet
Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina.)
16
Article 176 of the Islamic Republic Regime Constitution (IRRC) pertains to the ‘Supreme National
Security Council.’ This council bears the responsibility of shaping the fundamental policies of the
governing system, and its decisions necessitate the leader's endorsement for implementation.
Consequently, for any legislation to be enforceable, it must receive implicit approval from the leader,
whose perspectives hold significant sway in the process of formulating and authorizing laws.
https://www.shora-gc.ir/0001Dv The full text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran along with the interpretative comments of the Guardian Council, updated on 2024/01/11.
33 (74)
1907 displayed no indication of a requirement for Muslim deputies and
election participants to take an oath on the Qur'an. Interestingly, Khomeini
lacked faith in the electoral process, yet he refrained from directly protesting
against it. However, his protest was evident in two specific instances. The
demonstrations against oaths were considered deviant in nature, with the focus
being on women's participation in elections rather than the oath itself.
Khomeini's correspondence with Asadullah Alam (Khomeini, ibid, pp 80-81)
elucidates this point. It is worth considering Khomeini's initial letter to the king
regarding the provincial and state associations bill (see Fig. 1). In this letter,
he addresses both of these cases:
“To his majesty, Mohammad Reza
After praying for the health of the king, as published in the newspapers,
the government in state and provincial associations did not condition
‘Islam’ on voters and elected officials; And it gives women the right to
vote. And this is a matter of concern to the clergy men and other classes
of Muslims. It is clear to your majesty that the country's authority is to
keep the rules of the religion of Islam and peace for people. It is
obligatory to remove material that opposes the sacred religion and the
official religion of the country from government and party programs in
order to pray for the Muslim nation.” (Khomeini, 2010).
Following the initial correspondence, Khomeini penned a second letter to the
prime minister, expressing his belief that both cases were in violation of Islam
and the parliamentary law. Notably, the law referenced by Khomeini, derived
from the perspectives of both religious and non-religious individuals, indicates
that during that period, the majority of society concurred with the exclusion of
women from public life.
“Tehran - Mr. Asadullah Alam, Prime Minister of Iran
During the long parliamentary holiday, it is seen that the government is
taking steps that are contrary to the law of Islam, and the explicit basis
of the constitution. Rest assured that the transgress of the laws of Islam
and the Constitution and the laws of parliament will create a strong
responsibility for you yourself and the government in front of the holy
God Almighty and the Muslim nation and the law. The entry of women
into parliament and state and provincial associations and the
municipality is contrary to the strong laws of Islam, the recognition of
which, in the end of the constitution, is entrusted to the clergy men and
the authorities of the fatwa as well as Quran, and does not entitle others
to interference. And the jurists of Islam and the authorities of the
Muslims have given and are honoring it. In this case, the right to vote
for women and to choose them together is contrary to the second article
of the Constitution. And the law of the Parliament, approved by Rabi al-
Thani in 1325(1907), has deprived women of the right to be elected and
elected in state and provincial associations and municipalities. See
34 (74)
Articles Seven and Nine of the Law on State and Provincial
Associations, and the Fifteen and Seventeen Laws of the Association of
Baladiyah (Municipality). In this case, giving them such a right is a
transgression of the law. And the abolition of the condition of ‘Islam’ in
the electorate and the elect, which is stated in the law, and the conversion
of the oath from Qur'an into a ‘holly book’ is a transgression of the said
law; And it poses great dangers to Islam and the independence of the
country, which either the negligence or the God did not want
intentionally This has been done. Now that His Majesty has referred
the request of the proclamation clerics to the government and is
responsible for your government, it is expected that you will follow the
strong laws of Islam and the laws of the country, and make sure that the
comments are not repeated. And if there is an ambiguity in the opinion
of the ministers, let me ask you to do so, so that any ambiguity will be
resolved, and the material that is in the interest of the country and not
written will be reminded”. (Khomeini, 2010, p.80-81)
From October to December 1962, Khomeini extensively corresponded with
clerics and individuals across Iran through written letters. Simultaneously, he
delivered speeches in diverse locations, all of which revolved around the topic
of women's involvement in society. Khomeini's primary focus during these
speeches was to dispel the Prime Minister's misconceptions regarding the
Quranic verses and clarify that his interpretation was in line with the teachings
of the Qur'an. For example, his speech in December 1962 contained these
statements about the presence of women in society:
“[…] it's about twenty years passed from the abandon of hijab; See What
did you do You bring women in the offices; You see, in every office they
entered, that office was ruined. It is currently limited; clerics says don't
develop it; Don't send women to the provinces. If a woman enters a
device, she will ruin the situation; Do you want women to provide
independence?” (ibid, p.118)
Also, on May 1963 in one of his speeches he said:
“[…] The issue of women's right to participate in elections is not an
obstacle; But their right to be elected creates depravity. The issue of
women's right to vote, etc., is at the end of the list and not the case…”
(ibid, p.191)
Khomeini raised another concern that sparked protests, this time regarding the
equality of men's and women's rights and the inclusion of women as judges.
He denounced this as a plot orchestrated by Iran's enemies and a direct insult
to the country's official religion. Khomeini believed that such actions would
undermine the teachings of the Qur'an and weaken the foundations of Islam,
thus posing a threat to the religious beliefs of the people. Interestingly,
Khomeini not only voiced his opposition to the Shah and the government but
also rallied public support, delivering successive speeches and inciting public
outcry against the government:
35 (74)
“[…] they believe men and women are equal in their rights. the equality
of men and women's rights, is the violation of Qur'an; That is,
abandoning the religion of Shiite; That is, to make the Qur'an out of date
and replace it with perversities, that is, to drag the girls into the barracks
and other things that threaten Islam and Muslims […]” (Ibid, p. 161, pp.
209-214)
Throughout the years, Ayatollah Khomeini's perspectives on women's rights
and presence underwent significant changes. The shift in his stance becomes
more evident as we transition from 1962 to 1978. For instance, in 1967,
Khomeini expressed his opposition to the Shah by protesting against female
military service and religious orders to Prime Minister Hoveida. However, the
availability of letters exchanged between the Shah and Alam revealed that his
protest solely revolved around women's voting rights (ibid, vol 2, p. 123). The
Shiraz celebration serves as another example of Khomeini's protests against
women's issues. He addressed this matter in a speech (ibid, vol 3, p. 239),
which was so critical that even the British ambassador objected (Parsons,
1984). Shortly after the speech, Khomeini referred to this type of freedom as
‘forced freedom’ in another address. According to him, Mohammad Reza
Shah aimed to diminish the human status of women, using them as mere tools
(Khomeini, 2010, vol 5, p. 239).
Since 1978, Khomeini has consistently expressed his desire to replace the
Pahlavi government with an Islamic system. He actively encouraged women
to participate alongside men in the Islamic Revolution, even if it meant facing
imprisonment, torture, or death. The initial progress in women's involvement
occurred when various popular movements emerged in support of the Islamic
Revolution. Khomeini commended their presence during this transformative
period, recognizing it as a contributing factor to women's growing popularity
and freedom. In all interviews conducted in 1978, Khomeini emphasized that
women's rights should be equal to men's rights, and that the Islamic State
would uphold these rights in accordance with Islamic law (ibid, vol 5, p.224,
p.322-328, p.469). His speech in March 1979 to women in Qom, shortly after
the revolution, stated that the hijab was meant to preserve women's high
values, and Islam wanted to preserve women's high values because a woman
who didn't wear the hijab would be a toy for randy men (Khomeini, vol 6,
p299-302). The phrase ‘women's high values’ is an abstract expression that
does not specify exactly what women do that is valuable.
The second leader’s view, Ayatollah Khamenei, have been made clearer and
more detailed in this regard. Ayatollah Khamenei has been the supreme leader
since 1989 with the approval of members of Assembly of Experts of the
Leadership. In a quick review, his point of views on women's issues are much
clearer than those of Khomeini. He has made very clear definitions of hijab,
femininity, women's responsibilities and women's duties in the family and
society. For example, on one of his speeches he said:
“One of women’s responsibilities at home and family is raising children.
Women who are reluctant to have children because of activities outside
36 (74)
the family are acting against their human and feminine nature. God is
not pleased with this. Those who abandon raising children, breastfeeding
and giving them love and mercy for actions that do not depend much on
their existence, have made a mistake […] The most important of all
women's work is raising children and strengthening the spirit of
husbands to enter the big fields”
17
.
Khamenei's first speech on hijab and femininity was accomplished on January
16, 1990, on the occasion of Women's Day and among women physicians
18
.
The important points that can be extracted from this speech are summarized in
three cases. The first point is the position of women in Islamic society, which
has been announced that men and women have the same place in Islamic
society, and both should have the same capability and opportunity to progress
and grow in different fields. The second point of the plan is the issue of hijab.
He stated that the hijab is to prevent the unconditional mixing of men and
women in society, and if this mixture happens, it is to the detriment of society
and, moreover, to the detriment of women. But he goes on to say that the hijab
of women will not prevent them from being present in any way, and women
have to enter different fields with hijab and be diligent in the progress of
society. But the third point is the most interesting, women must have a
university degree and be able to enter all fields of medicine, so that female
patients do not have to visited by male doctors and be able to visited by female
doctors. If we can create a gap between men and women in society, women
will not have to meet men for their work.
Another Khamenei's most important speech was March 10, 1997 in Khuzestan.
When I found this speech on Ayatollah Khamenei's website, the first thing that
caught my eye was the poster designed for this page (see Fig. 2) This poster
shows women sewing at home and children playing beside them. They wear
headscarves even though they are in the house. Once again, this poster can be
another sign of the ‘Norm Woman’ in IR leaders' view, the woman who stays
at home, giving birth to children, raising them, doing household chores and
wearing a scarf as a hijab. Eventually, all these signs are defined as hijabs for
women. The name chosen for this poster is ‘The Revolutionary Aware
Women’
19
. Regarding Islam's approach to women's issues, he said that Islam
accepts women's presence in three areas: first, individual growth, there is no
difference between men and women in this regard; Second, social contexts,
there is no difference here, but there are limitations for women, such as the
physical and mental strength of women, which makes some jobs not suitable
for women, and the third, family is the best place for a woman. he said that
Islam emphasizes not mixing men and women in society, and that the hijab is
to maintain women's security and society. In the second part of the speech,
17
Khuzestan speech for women’s day 1997\3\2 https://khl.ink/f/7284 updated on 2024/01/11
18
The speech exists in the website www.Khamenei.ir and the direct link is https://khl.ink/f/2250 updated
on 2024/01/11 (the speech in Farsi) Excerpts from statements made in meeting with a large group of
women - Khamenei.ir (the speech in English) unfortunately there are several differences in the main
translation which is given by the website and I recommend to use the Farsi speech.
19
https://farsi.khamenei.ir/ndata/news/39367/smpl.jpg
37 (74)
when Khamenei's personal approaches to women's issues were mentioned, we
see that he is very focused on the family and considers the woman as the home
manager. Although he considers some traditional ideas to be ignorant and
contrary to Islamic standards, he has said that a woman is obliged to obey her
husband in several cases. For example, a man can prohibit his wife from
leaving the house. He called the woman's most important task having children
and said that women should not avoid having children because of working
outside, because bringing the child and raising him for the woman is more
important than working outside, and not wanting a child is against human
nature, but women can also be employed. However, if family members are
affected by women's employment, it is the woman's job to make the home and
family chores and not be employed. According to the routine of all his
speeches He described the western societies, and especially feminism, as the
destroyer of the family's foundation, and said that contrary to feminist theories,
men and women are not the same and that women's employment is not the
main issue, also, educational contents which are related to men's jobs should
be banned for women
20
.
In another speech in 1991, Khamenei made the remarks. There, again, he
referred to the hijab as a valuable concept and considered the existence of hijab
to separate men and women in society and prevent sexual freedoms. In
addition to presenting the hijab, he has determined the position of the woman
at house. "No matter how specialized women are, they are important and
valuable when they are skilled in housekeeping," he said in the speech
21
. In
recent years, there has been a general dissatisfaction with the compulsory hijab
in society and movements to protest the compulsion of hijab In a speech in
2017 and 2018, Khamenei pointed to the inequality of men's and women's
rights in Islam, citing the unequal needs and physical and mental attributes of
women and Men have also considered it perfectly reasonable to make the hijab
compulsory, because in his view, the duty of the Islamic State is to prevent
people from sinning, and hijab is a social matter that keeps people far from
sin
22
.
20
https://khl.ink/f/7284 and https://khl.ink/f/26155 and https://khl.ink/f/39136 updated on 2024/01/11
21
https://khl.ink/f/2536 updated on 2024/01/11
22
https://khl.ink/f/36053 and https://khl.ink/f/39136 updated on 2024/01/11
38 (74)
5.3 Legislations and the compulsory hijab
The initial mention of women in the legal field can be found in the preamble
of the constitution
Women will have more rights due to the more oppression they have
endured so far from the last oppressing system. The family is the
fundamental unit of society and the main centre of human growth and
paramountcy, and the ideological and ideal agreement in the formation
of the family, which is the main basis for the evolutionary movement
and growth of human beings, has been the basic principle of loyalty;
Achievement To this end is one of the duties of the Islamic State. In such
a perception of the family unit, the woman comes out the form of (object
being) or (tool) in which shows as a consumer and exploited person
and,
while recycling the duty of a mother who is a role model in nurturing
scout and faithful individuals, be active in every stage beside men.
finally, then they will have essential responsibility, and in Islamic view,
are more valuable and paramount.
23
Legislation places significant emphasis on the family as the primary and most
fundamental unit of society, rather than on the individual. Within this
framework, women are defined solely within the context of their familial roles,
disregarding their unique individuality. Lawmakers perceive women merely
as young girls, sisters, or mothers, failing to recognize the significance of
femininity in their lives. This perspective may stem from the assumption that
women require a male guardian for their well-being and decision-making.
Despite the attention given by both the legislature and the leaders of the IRR
to the family, the laws enacted to protect the family, particularly women, have
proven to be discouraging and problematic, hindering women's personal
development. These laws were all implemented in line with the mandatory
hijab, which signifies the significance of the IRR's compulsory hijab. When
we discuss compulsory hijabs, we are not solely referring to the covering of
certain body parts, but also to the ideologies that segregate women from
society, ultimately shaping the concept of Iranian femininity. Notably, the
IRCC includes articles 1102 to 1128 that outline the rights and responsibilities
of men and women within a couple's life. Here are a few examples:
Article 1105: in the couple life, the head of family is the husband.
Article 1108: Whenever a woman without a legitimate barrier refuses
duties of the couple life, will not eligible for alimony.
Article 1114: woman has to live in a place which is prepared by her
husband despite she has deputized the right of place by her husband.
23
https://www.shora-gc.ir/0001Dv The full text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
along with the interpretative comments of the Guardian Council, accessed 2024/11/01
39 (74)
Article 1117: Husband can prevent his wife from working in a job which
is not suitable for her or weaken her dignity.
24
The default intention behind these regulations is to outline the authority of a
man over a woman, as stated in verse 34 of the surah Nessa. According to
Shiite clerics, this verse emphasizes the responsibility of a man to provide for
a woman and cover her financial needs. It is worth noting that certain expenses
are outlined in Article 1707 of the IRCC:
Article 1707: Alimony is one of all the common needs and appropriate
for the situation of women such as housing, alimony, food, home,
furniture and medical and health expenses and servants in case of habit
or need due to loss or illness.
25
Article 1118 of the Civil Code stipulates that spousal support is not applicable
to a woman who neglects her responsibilities as a wife to her husband. As per
the legal provisions, a woman is expected to seek her husband's consent before
leaving the household and be prepared for intimate relations whenever he
desires. The requirement of not leaving the house also serves the purpose of
satisfying the man's sexual needs, ensuring that they are met at any time and
place chosen by the husband.
Passport law Article 18 permits single girls under 18 to obtain a passport with
the permission of their father, and married women can only obtain a passport
with the permission of their spouse. Article 19 states that a person who
receives a passport is subject to his permission if he regrets his permission, he
may prevent the passport holder from traveling.
26
Apart from the restrictive
laws that enable men to prevent women from attending society, for women
who have managed to cross the dam, there are rules such as gender quotas for
entering universities and jobs, coverage rules and job selection rules. For
example, since 2004, the fields of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy have
been subject to lower quotas for women, and fewer women could study in
these fields. Since 2007, the lower quota has been secretly for other disciplines,
and in 2009 it was officially announced that fewer women are allowed to study
at universities
27
There are selection rules for working, and a committee is set
up to select individuals according to their moral competencies. Another
example is a law for women’s selecting for a job, which is set in 1998 by the
parliament. Women's choice for a job should be made by a women's kit
(women committee), and the need for that job should be considered for the
number of women needed (the quota that decided before by employers and this
quota mostly set by parliament legislators) or if several persons are in the
priority of employment, the priority is with the woman who uses the chador
24
https://islamic-law.ir/isl-law/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-
%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%DB%8C/ Iranian Civil Code approved in 1314 (1935) with subsequent
additions and amendments (translated to English by me), accessed 2022/12/07
25
Ibid
26
https://iran5050.com/?p=576 Passport Code approved in 1351 (1972) and subsequent amendments
(Translated by me) Accessed 2022/12/07
27
https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f1_girls_universities/436671.html , accessed 2022/07/11
40 (74)
as a cover. (Article 2, Note 2, Law on the selection of teachers and education
staff, approved on 1995)
28
.
Virginity is another concept that the government introduces as chasteness.
Here I examine the rules about virginity. Which woman is a virgin woman?
This attribute has two important points. One is that a woman does not have sex
with anyone and the other is that she has a hymen. It is interesting to note that
the religious definition of virginity is not having sexual intercourse. The
definition is the same for men and women. Religious definitions say virginity
is proved by a person's own claim. However, legally, being a virgin is only for
women, and it is necessary to prove it, and the person's own claim is not
enough. Since in religious definitions, virginity means not having sex, if a
woman does not have hymen, she is not allowed to have hymenoplasty
surgery, because it is a deception of the man in marriage. But today, some
clerics have allowed surgery to solve a problem created by law. The
legislature's premise for a woman who intends to marry is that she must be a
virgin and must be notified if she is not a virgin. According to article 439 and
article 1128 of the Civil Code and article 647 of the Fifth Book of the IPC, a
man who finds out after marriage that his wife was not a virgin can cancel the
marriage and according to This law does not apply to a woman with the
cancellation of a dowry marriage. Also, a man can get all the gifts and expenses
the woman has received during their time together.
Article 1128: whenever a specific feature determined for each one of
man and woman in the process of marriage, and after marriage they
understand the lack of that feature, both of them have the right to cancel
the marriage, whether the feature said clearly in the process of marriage
or the marriage based on that feature.
29
Basically, this law is related to transactions that if the seller gives the product
to the buyer that is defective, the buyer can cancel the transaction and, in some
cases, can even cancel the seller Also receive compensation
30
. When the
legislature generalizes this law to marriage and only sets such a condition for
one party, it becomes clear that his presumption was that the woman was a
virgin, and if She was not a virgin, she had to be informed in advance. It may
be said that the law does not say that a man or a woman, it has only been said
that any party who has deceived another in marriage has the right to cancel the
marriage. But in fact, the issue of virginity can only be problematic on the part
of women, because only women have been introduced to prove that they are
virgins, and in no way can a man be a virgin Proved. Now let's see why the
law cares about being a virgin. Is it a crime to lose virginity? According to the
28
(ravabetkar.ir) (Translated
by me) updated on 2022/11/15
29
https://islamic-law.ir/isl-law/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-
%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%DB%8C/ Iranian Civil Code approved in 1314 (1935) with subsequent
additions and amendments (translated to English by me), accessed 2022/12/07
30
Article 439, IRCC, says: “If the events are planned, the customer will have the right to terminate the
bill”
41 (74)
law, a woman is no more than two states, she is a virgin or not a virgin. if a
woman loses her virginity during marriage process there is no problem, but no
woman has the right to lose her virginity outside of marriage because of The
IRR's view that believes it is contrary to religious law. According to the law,
if a woman has sex with a man without marriage, she will commit a crime and
be punished
31
. If she has been raped and she is satisfied with the rape, she will
be punished, and if she is not satisfied with the rape and has been forcibly
raped, only the rapist will be punished If the woman is a virgin, she will receive
compensation:
Article 231: In cases of forcible rape and in its sentence,
If the woman
is a virgin, the perpetrator will be sentenced in addition to the prescribed
punishment for paying Arsh-al-Bakareh (compensation) and Mahr-al-
Methl (common dowry), and if she is not a virgin,
it only applies to the
punishment and payment of the sentence
32
.
The aforementioned laws primarily aim to make women passive and align with
the IRR's compulsory hijab policy, which seeks to establish women's reliance
on men. These laws often go unnoticed by the majority of the population.
However, the laws pertaining to veiling and segregation are the most
prominent and widely acknowledged regulations concerning compulsory
hijab. The most important law is the punishment for not wearing Islamic veil
in public, which is in the fifth book of the Islamic Penal Code:
Article 638 - Anyone who publicly pretends to commit a prohibited act
in public or in public places shall be sentenced to imprisonment for ten
days to two months or to 74 lashes in addition to his or her punishment
for the act. A person who commits a crime that does not carry a
punishment, but which injures public decency, will only be sentenced to
ten days to two months of imprisonment or to 74 lashes.
Note: Women who appear in public without a religious veil will be
sentenced to imprisonment for ten days to two months or to a fine of
50,000 to 500,000 rials. (IRPC, Book of Punishments, approved in 1375
and revised in 1399)
33
Gender segregation laws were enacted shortly after the 1997 revolution to
apply to various public spaces, including stadiums, schools, and beaches.
However, as time went on, these laws expanded to encompass a wider range
of areas. The gradual implementation of segregation measures can be observed
in the separation of men and women in public transportation systems like buses
and subways, the establishment of women's parks, and the division of certain
textbooks for boys and girls in schools. In 2011, the Ministry of Education
issued an instruction that exemplifies segregation - the separation of
31
(dadrah.ir) Islamic Penal Code - approved in 1392
(2013)Article 221, IRPC (translated to English by me), accessed 2022/08/08
32
Ibid, article 231(translated to English by me)
33
Ibid, article 638 of the fifth book (translated to English y me)
42 (74)
classrooms for 5- and 6-year-old boys and girls in preschools.
34
As per the
guidelines outlined in the ‘Preservation of Boundaries and Islamic Traditions
in Higher Education Institutions’ regulation, formulated by the Supreme
Council of Cultural Revolution, students are obligated to adhere to the
principles of gender segregation within universities. The regulation
emphasizes the need for separation between men and women in various areas
such as classrooms, student lounges, laboratories, research teams,
administrative offices, dormitories, libraries, prayer areas, dining facilities,
and university-organized recreational trips.
35
In the IRR’s view, women are required to maintain their modesty by not being
seen by any man who is not their Mahram (their family). However, this rule
allows for exceptions in cases of necessity, which are determined and defined
by the clerics and the government. The parliament officially endorsed this
viewpoint on November 1, 1998, through the enactment of the ‘Gender
Adaptation Act’. Subsequently, all medical centers were promptly notified of
this legislation. These regulations not only pertain to the gender compatibility
between doctors and patients but also extend to other aspects. For instance,
Article 17 stipulates that individuals present in the operating room, including
non-medical staff like cleaners, must be of the same gender as the patient and
the medical team. It appears that some hospitals had already implemented
these rules prior to their parliamentary approval, but their endorsement
eventually compelled everyone to comply. While gender alignment is
essential, women in similar circumstances are provided with specific
instructions regarding the type of attire they must observe, even if it surpasses
the requirements of gender adaptation. This includes the obligation to wear a
full hijab. These guidelines can be found in Articles 5, 7, 17, and 21 of the
Law on the Adaptation of Administrative and Technical Affairs of Medical
Institutions to the Rules of the Holy Sharia, pages 14-16.
36
5.4 Analysis
In this section, the Iranian’s narratives of compulsory hijab are analyzed based
on the theoretical discussions about the formation of power discourse and
compulsory hijab discourse, as well as various forms of gender oppression.
These narratives are Iranians’ understanding and lived experiences of
compulsory hijab through which we can observe the impact of compulsory
hijab on Iranians’ everyday life. In the subsequent part, I shall undertake a
comprehensive examination of the ongoing discussion encompassing six key
subjects. This scrutiny has been derived from a meticulous comparative
34
https://p.dw.com/p/12LOQ , accessed 2023/11/09
35
https://new.qut.ac.ir/fa/studentsdepartment/disciplinary-committee/maintain-about-islamic-customs-
in-universities , accessed 2024/01/12
36
https://w.wiki/9AzH The Law on Compliance of Administrative and Technical Affairs of Medical
Institutions with the Standards of the Holy Sharia, approved in 1364 (1985), accessed 2022/08/15
43 (74)
analysis of the information presented and the empirical evidence gathered via
interviews. The titles encompassed are as follows:
1. Institutionalization of obedience to perpetuate power discourse
within a patriarchal framework.
2. The sexualization of the body, the objectification of femininity
and Female resistance within a patriarchal context.
3. The ‘Us’ and ‘them’, fostering a sense of ‘otherness’.
4. The subordination of women through the gender roles
definitions.
5. Imposing contradictory responsibilities on men.
44 (74)
5.4.1 Institutionalization of obedience to perpetuate power
discourse within a patriarchal framework
Among Ayatollah Khomeini's letters and speeches, there was one particular
letter that grabbed my attention - the consent letter he wrote for his wife's visit
to Iraq. This letter was officially registered at a notary office in Qom on
January 17, 1961.The letter's footnote makes reference to the fact that married
women are bound by travel regulations that necessitate permission from their
spouse. The date of this letter corresponds to a period when the concept of
gender equality had not yet been broached by the legislators of Pahlavi
government. Nevertheless, the introduction of equal rights has not brought
about any changes to this particular law. The existence of this legislation
indicates that women were fully aware, both legally and culturally, that they
were unable to travel without the consent of their husband or father, while men
were considered their supporters.
37
Upon careful examination of the ‘Family
Protection’ bill that gained approval in 1967, it became apparent that it failed
to address the issue of granting women the freedom to leave their homes and
travel unrestrictedly. Hence, despite the existence of the family protection law,
women were still compelled to submit to patriarchal dominance throughout
the Pahlavi era.
The concept of obedience holds great significance in both Iranian culture and
Islamic rituals. As highlighted in the leaders' perspectives (see 5.2), they
perceive women's obedience to men as a religious decree, and any deviation
from it is seen as a violation of religious mandates, undermining the essence
of faith, and destabilizing the fundamental structure of the family. It seems that
this is solely a religious command, however, Mernessi (2011) has discusses
this matter. She argues that Muslims expand their convictions regarding
obedience to the Prophet and God to the governance of the Islamic community.
Mernissi, Amer and other Muslim feminists, as well as progressive Muslims
argue that conservative and traditional narratives of Islam focused on Islamic
community as a group of Muslims who have no individual identity and choice.
They believe in the collective identity that is guided under the leadership of
the Islamic rule (Ahmed,1992; Amer, 2014; Mernissi, 2011; Mir-Hosseini,
2007, Soroush, 2000).
The power discourse, as Foucault (1969) argues, is based on the using of
historical, cultural and ideological elements. According to Foucault, certain
mechanisms can automize and deindividualize power, and a material or
ideological structure can be used to create and sustain a power relation
independent of the person exercising it (Avelino, 2021; Foucault,2002). Based
on this concept, I perceive the regime's focus on Islamization as a process that
diminishes the individual's autonomy in favor of the Islamic State. The
37
The family protection law approved in 1967 and 1974 does not contain any provisions or clauses
addressing women's freedom of travel or their ability to obtain passports without restrictions.
wikisource.org https://fa.wikisource.org/wiki/ (bing.com)
wikisource.org https://fa.wikisource.org/wiki/ (bing.com), Accessed 2024/01/10
45 (74)
regime's approach in this domain involves disregarding personal identities and
prioritizing collective identities. This is evident through the expectation of
obedience towards the male head of the family, as well as the broader societal
expectation of compliance with the leader and Islamic laws. As highlighted by
Mernessi (1991), this matter aligns with the objective of the Islamic State to
establish a dominant narrative by eradicating personal identities and
diminishing individuals' authority in the presence of the leader of the Islamic
State.
The concept of obedience was extensively discussed during the interviews.
Religious women emphasized the necessity for a woman to be obedient to her
husband or father, stressing that she should refrain from taking any action
without their permission or consent. They underscored the husband's support
in strengthening the family's core and introduced hijab, home management,
and raising children as key paradigms of support.
Taybeh pointed to the concept of obedience in a part of her word. She is 43
years old and a high school teacher. She points to the husband’s permission
and highlights the regulations concerning women's passport acquisition and
their employment as an illustrative example:
I've been informed that in certain cases, a woman may require her
husband's permission to obtain a passport. Similarly, in certain
situations, a woman may need to provide a permission letter from her
husband or father to secure a job, as requested by the employer.
Taybeh has never applied for passport, but she asserts that there is a document
of spouse’s consent for women’s employment as requirements. It is important
to acknowledge the obedience towards both the family head and the Islamic
State. By broadening the understanding of obedience, the legislator extends
the patriarchal power discourse from the family to the hierarchical power
structure of the State. Consequently, women are compelled to comply with
their husbands' authority within the confines of their homes, as it is considered
a religious obligation, just as they are compelled to obey the ruler of the
Islamic State.
Zahra, who is 35 years old and a housewife, also, points to the dignity of
hijab in religious ideas that are essential for her and religious people:
I think it's really necessary to regard hijab and it's not promoted enough.
These days, when people don't wear enough hijab, betrayal and divorce
have increased among families. The lack of hijab has led to chaos. in the
past, when women were more chaste than now, divorce and betrayal
were less, and families were more fixed than they are now [...] Our
family is very obsessed with wearing chador, but I don't think the hijab
is just chador. It's important that the body is covered in front of men and
the woman is modest herself and show chastity. I myself accept the hijab
because God has asked us, and God has given us such an order for our
peace and calmness.
46 (74)
According to Zahra, faithfulness of men in the family relates directly to the
women’s veiling and chastity. Zahra considers hijab to cover women’s bodies
from men’s eyes and know it as an essential factor of a stable family. In her
view, chaos and infidelity happen by unveiling. However, the point is where
she linked the obedience of God’s commands to the hijab and family. She
extends the obedience of God to the obedience of husband by regarding the
hijab. Zahra believes that the IRR effectively serves as a reminder to women
about the importance of religious order. As She said:
During the onset of the revolution, we were informed that the hijab held
religious significance. It was emphasized that wearing the hijab was a
means to preserve the well-being of society, safeguard women's dignity,
and maintain their esteemed position.
Somayeh is 42 years old and is a teacher at a primary school for girls in Tehran.
She agrees the compulsory hijab and regards religious, political, and social
beliefs as interconnected and as she said:
I support the requirement of women wearing the hijab due to the
presence of an Islamic government. It is crucial for the government to
ensure that its people remain connected to Islam and their religious
values. Additionally, if the government fails to address any deviant
behavior within society, it may lead to chaos. Allowing women to freely
express themselves and behave in any manner they desire without any
restrictions would have detrimental effects on families and society as a
whole, potentially resulting in increased instances of rape. Therefore, it
is imperative for the government to establish laws regarding this matter,
while also implementing strict punishments for criminals. This will
serve as a limitation and make others aware that engaging in
inappropriate behavior is unacceptable.
Two other examples are Masoumeh and Fatemeh, who are siblings, with
Fatemeh being ten years older than Masoumeh. They were raised in a
traditional religious family in a bustling city. Fatemeh, who is now 69 years
old, has been academically educated and is retired. She pursued her education
during the Pahlavi era and appears to have a more open-minded perspective
compared to her sister. Fatemeh believes that women should be employed and
contribute to the family's financial well-being. However, she does not support
complete independence for women. According to her, if a woman is employed,
her earnings should be handed over to her husband or father and utilized for
the benefit of the family. She is another example of ignoring the feminine
independent identity and relying on a man as a head of the family.
On the other hand, Masoumeh, who is 59 years old, holds a contrasting
viewpoint. She believes that women should not work and that men should bear
all the living expenses. Both sisters share the belief in wearing hijab and do
not view the existing hijab laws as obligatory. However, they consider these
laws to be in line with Islamic principles due to the country's Islamic
governance. Fatemeh expressed her opinion by stating:
47 (74)
I believe that the hijab is unrelated to the governments. Wearing the
hijab existed before the Islamic revolution, and it continues to be
observed today. Our current government follows Islamic principles, and
its laws are derived from Islam. As a Muslim, I feel obligated to abide
by these laws. However, individuals who are not Muslims should
naturally adhere to the laws of their own country, as it is reasonable to
follow the law. If we criticize mandatory hijab, it can be seen as a protest
against religious rulings. Therefore, I completely reject that notion and
find no logical basis for mandatory hijab.
She continues about the laws that keep women inferior to men:
Personally, I hold no objections towards the existing laws pertaining to
women. Take, for instance, the argument that questions why women
have fewer rights than men or why they require the permission of their
father or husband to leave their homes. In my opinion, these laws are
rooted in the principles of Islam, and I find them to be quite valid.
Women are vulnerable, and deserve the support and protection of men.
A man who genuinely loves his wife and daughter assumes the
responsibility of caring for them and providing for their needs. In a
society where women are at risk of assault, a loving husband and father
ensure their safety by not allowing them to venture out of the house, thus
shielding them from potential abuse.
Masoumeh also agrees the compulsory hijab because she knows the IRR as an
Islamic State. She said:
I agree the obligatory hijab and firmly believe that the Islamic State has
the authority to enforce mandatory regulations, as these laws are rooted
in religion and everything dictated by religion is inherently righteous.
Our support for the Islamic revolution stemmed from our desire for
religious governance to prevail over us.
The primary aspect revolves around women's perception of hijab as a religious
obligation. Interestingly, it was not just conservative women who held this
viewpoint; even other women acknowledged hijab as a religious practice. The
disparity between conservative women and others lay in their belief regarding
the authority and control of the regime in enforcing it within society. Among
these individuals, only three advocated for mandatory hijab as a governmental
decree in accordance with Islamic principles. The rest accepted hijab as a
religious obligation but believed that the IRR should not impose it. All these
women referred to hijab as a means of covering the head and body,
emphasizing that women inherently require the support of men, not because of
the laws that make them weak, but rather from the recognition of women's
inherent physical vulnerability compared to men.
Fatemeh points to this issue that they are veiled women even before the
establishment of IRR. It can be accounted that the concept of obedience has
48 (74)
been accepted by religious masses for a long time and IRR has promoted the
compulsory hijab relied on it. As mentioned in theory section (see 4.1), in
Foucault’s point of view, the knowledge plays a pivotal role in the formation
of power. Power, conversely, forms knowledge in accordance with its
objectives. Within this process, power and knowledge are perpetuated in
parallel (Foucault, 1981; Foucault & Deleuze, 1980; Tylor, 2014). In the
comparison between Foucault's argument and the viewpoints expressed by
Fatemeh, Masoumeh, and Somayeh on the acceptance of compulsory hijab
and the concept of obedience, it is worth noting that all these women shared a
belief in obedience as an accepted religious principle. The regime utilized this
belief to construct a power discourse and enforce the practice of compulsory
hijab.
The compulsory hijab’s discourse is often centered around ideas of obedience,
segregation, discrimination, and polarization. These concepts also serve to
reinforce the power discourse. Each of these concepts within the power
discourse is interconnected and mutually dependent. Power relations, for
instance, establish the notion of obedience by defining concepts like
compulsory hijab. However, it is important to note that the reverse can also be
true; the power discourse can shape the idea of mandatory hijab by defining
and expanding the concept of obedience. Similarly, segregation,
discrimination, and polarization also share a symbiotic relationship with
obedience, as each concept reinforces and strengthens the others. This
interplay of concepts is instrumental in consolidating and perpetuating power
for dominant groups within society.
5.4.2 The sexualization of the body, the objectification of femininity
and Female resistance within a patriarchal context.
According to Foucault's perspective on the discursive formations of power
(Foucault, 2008; Melis & Chambers, 2012), compulsory hijab, which acts as
a form of power discourse, has emerged through the efforts of political and
cultural organizations. Political organizations, including leaders, theoreticians,
and legislators play an active role in shaping this discourse. Additionally,
cultural and academic organizations operate within the framework of
legislative organizations, further contributing to the formation of the discourse
on compulsory hijab. This discourse not only helps establish power dynamics
but also leads to the creation and institutionalization of a hierarchical structure
within Iranian society, particularly evident in the relationships between men
and women in families and society. One concrete illustration of establishing a
hierarchy within the family is by instilling the notion of women's vulnerability
and their constant reliance on men. Consequently, this perpetuates the
institutionalization of the hijab, portraying it as a protective measure for
women against potential harm.
One of issues that women often bring up during the interviews is the
significance of the family unit and how it is strengthened through the practice
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of hijab. During the interviews, all the women emphasized the issue of men's
infidelity and connected it to the act of unveiling.
For example, Masoumeh said:
The hijab is a rule mentioned in the Quran for both men and women.
However, it is emphasized more for women due to their perceived
attractiveness. The purpose of the hijab is to prevent rape and infidelity
within families. Unfortunately, the observance of the hijab among
women has decreased significantly. This lack of adherence has led to
men becoming disheartened with their wives and seeking attention from
other women they encounter on the streets or at work. The presence of
these colorful women distracts most men, making it difficult for them to
focus on their work and maintain concentration. Consequently, when a
man becomes infatuated with another woman and neglects his wife, the
wife may feel compelled to seek another man’s attention. This
destructive cycle ultimately leads to the breakdown of the family unit.
Zahra told me about a television show that asserted on hijab:
I remember a television interview where the interviewer presented two
photographs to various women and inquired about their preference for
their husband's colleague. One photo depicted a woman wearing a hijab,
while the other showed a woman without one. Surprisingly, all the
interviewees chose the woman in hijab, expressing their desire to
prevent any potential distractions for their husbands at work. This
incident made me realize that both covered and non-covered women
have a significant impact on men. When a man interacts with vibrant and
non-covered women in his professional environment, it becomes
challenging for him to concentrate on his work. If the man happens to be
single, his focus tends to shift towards sexual matters rather than his
professional responsibilities. Even if he is married, his wife may no
longer be his priority, as the allure of other women can tempt him. It is
evident that women possess a greater level of attractiveness compared to
men, which is why it is crucial for women to maintain a more modest
appearance.
Zahra's remarks reminded Khomeini's speech for women in Qom (Khomeini,
vol 6, p299-302). Masoumeh and Zahra discuss the significance of loyalty
within the family and the need to fortify the foundation of the family unit.
However, the points they raise serve as reminders of how the female body is
often objectified in a sexual manner.The IRR's media heavily promotes these
concepts, which are also widely disseminated throughout society via various
organizations and educational institutions. Masoumeh and Zahra implicitly
portray women as sexual objects, while simultaneously endorsing the
objectification of women as a religious belief. They argue that Islam requires
women to be modest, but they associate women's modesty with the hijab,
asserting that it serves to deter sexual provocation. Consequently, the female
50 (74)
body is inherently viewed as a sexual object, and the hijab is intended to
safeguard it from objectification.
Throughout the interview, it became evident that the sexualization of the
human body is a phenomenon that affects both genders, albeit in distinct ways.
Men are often perceived as active individuals, while women are frequently
seen as sexual objects. Notably, the religious perspectives upheld by Shia
clerics significantly contribute to the sexualization of the body. These
viewpoints often lead to the presentation of sexualized interpretations and
analyses of the Qur'an and hadiths (narratives). Religious views hold
significant importance due to their profound influence on popular culture.
Moreover, the legislation within the Islamic State is founded upon the religious
perspectives advocated by the Shia clerics.
The conservative perspectives on women are commonly perceived as Aurah
(Aurah is a word in Arabic that means sexual organs). This encompasses not
only the physical form of women, but also the entirety of femininity and all
characteristics associated with women.
38
Consequently, in the viewpoint of
conservative clerics and jurists, women's voices should not be audible to men
outside of their family, and women should be confined to their homes. They
support this stance by citing a narrative attributed to the Prophet Muhammad,
although historical evidence contradicts this assertion. For instance, there is no
record of any women from the Prophet Muhammad's family being secluded at
home, nor is there any indication that Muhammad himself referred to the
women in his family as Aurah.
However, by the IRR point of view, when ‘Aurah’ applied to women and
femininity, encompasses two distinct meanings, with one being of greater
significance. Firstly, it implies that femininity is totally a negative issue.
Secondly, it suggests that the function of femininity is primarily reduced to the
female sexual organ. It appears that the latter perspective is more common in
Iranian society, as evidenced by the majority of women interviewed who
associated hijab with the absence of head covering and the wearing of
attracting attire, thereby emphasizing the sexual attractions of unveiled
women. Furthermore, these women regarded men as vulnerable and powerless
in the face of female sexual attractiveness. Based on the statements of these
interviewees, it can be inferred that not only are women objectified as sexual
beings, but men are also portrayed as uncontrollable sexual subjects, eagerly
awaiting a signal to engage in sexual activities. This belief, which equates
bodily functions solely with sexual activities, has been institutionalized in
people by religious authorities and the Islamic State, enabling them to
construct the discourse of mandatory hijab.
Nussbaum posits that objectification is intertwined with dehumanization and
views it as a means of humiliation (Nussbaum, 1995). This issue aligns with
38
“
...” (An-nesaao Aurah Fahbesoohonna fil boyoot) means women are
Aurah thus lock them up in the house. It is said that this hadith is from the Prophet of Islam and has
been mentioned in the books of the hadith of Ayoun Akhbar al-Reza (Vol. 4, p. 365), Mustadrak al-
Wasa'il, Mustanbat al-Wasa'il (Vol. 14, p. 182). (Translated by me) in this dissertation I don’t focus on
the truth or falsity of hadiths but I just want to concentrate on the effect of them on women’s lives.
51 (74)
Mernissi's perspective on men's apprehension of women's sexual authority
(Mernissi, 1991, 2011). It is crucial to highlight that humiliation plays a pivotal
role in the power discourse of IRR, as the regime's power discourse is
constructed on the foundation of 'Obedience'. Furthermore, the sexual
objectification of femininity is integrated into the framework of the regime's
power discourse, where female sexuality is shaped by the principles of
objectification. By means of humiliation, dehumanization, and seclusion of
women, a hierarchy is established in which women are subordinated, and IRR
institutionalizes 'Obedience'. This process mirrors the manipulation and
redefinition of concepts that Foucault alludes to in the formation of power
discourse (Foucault, 1976, 1980, 1991).
The majority of the women who took part in the interview highlighted the
inequality between women and men about hijab. Some of them point to the
freedom of men in Iranian culture, while others attribute it to the
objectification of women and the resulting inequality. However, one crucial
aspect that stands out amidst these discussions is the detrimental impact of the
sexualized perception of women. Many female participants emphasize that this
perception renders them vulnerable to potential assault, leading to their
suffering. Maryam who is 50 years old and an employed woman considers
herself interested in veiling but not the compulsory hijab, said:
In this society, where men eagerly await the sight of a few strands of
hair to gaze upon, and where the prevalence of rape has increased due to
the lack of modest hijab and the freedom of women, it is believed that
by covering themselves, women can protect themselves from abuse. A
virtuous and honorable woman is one who maintains proper modesty
and refrains from flaunting herself.
Maryam asserts that men have a tendency to assault unveiled. She explains
that she personally has chosen the hijab as a means to enhance her bodily
protection, as she believes that the more a woman conceals herself, the lower
the likelihood of assault. This notion aligns with the ideology frequently
advocated by Khomeini during the 1979 revolution. Maryam holds the belief
that the objective attitudes toward women in our culture is rooted in patriarchal
approaches, aiming to exert control over women. She perceives the hijab as a
means of resistance against the sexual objectification of women's bodies.
Michel Foucault explores the intricate connection between sexual control and
the construction of power in his work. In his renowned book ‘History of
Sexuality’ (1978), Foucault delves into the role of sexuality in shaping social
relations and power dynamics. He argues that sexual desires are deeply
embedded in individuals' identities, and as such, sexuality becomes a pivotal
point for the transfer of power. Consequently, it can be utilized as a means of
asserting dominance. According to Sedghi (2007), states manipulate gender
for legitimacy and power consolidation. Maryam's words provide a clear
illustration of how the regime appropriates and manipulates sexual concepts.
Sexualizing femininity, patriarchal ideas and sexual controls can be used to
isolate women and bind them in a passive position. It is crystal clear in
52 (74)
Somayeh’s words that the sexual issues manipulated by the IRR to subordinate
and seclude women, not to fortify them. Somayeh mentions that men cannot
control their sexual desires confronting women’s sexual attractions. She
believes, women’s body is totally sexually attractive for men. She said:
As women who choose not to wear hijab can be a source of temptation
for our husbands outside the home, it becomes necessary for me to
constantly strive to maintain my husband's satisfaction and prevent him
from seeking relationships with other women, despite the presence of
unveiled women around us.
Zahra compares unveiled women and veiled woman and simulates them to the
dishes ready for feeding. She said:
It is important to know that men have natural desires, just like hunger.
However, there is nothing wrong with enjoying a simple meal. In fact,
simplicity can be quite satisfying. Nevertheless, when presented with a
variety of colorful dishes, it is understandable that most people would
opt for the vibrant and diverse options. Similarly, promoting hijab is not
solely for the sake of men who may be tempted, but also for women who
seek a more stable and fulfilling married life.
Masoumeh points out about men’s essential desires and the harm that women
feel because of their weakness. She said:
In our culture, men are granted freedom without any restrictions on their
attire, unlike women who are advised in the Quran to cover themselves.
Men are only required to cover their sexual organs, while the rest of their
bodies can remain uncovered. This is because men are generally
considered less attractive than women and are more susceptible to being
provoked by women's allure […] It is believed that men lack the ability
to control their impulses, hence it is suggested that women should refrain
from leaving their homes. If a woman values her safety and wishes to
avoid any potential assault, it is advisable for her to stay indoors. Despite
a woman's adherence to hijab, men may still be provoked and inclined
towards assault, making it safer for women to remain at home.
The IRR likes to keep up the agency and subjectivity of men in sexual acts to
save the hierarchy. Taybeh implicitly points to the non-punishment of men
causing disturbances:
I am dissatisfied with the operations of our ethics security police, known
as Gasht-e-Ershaad, due to their tendency to humiliate individuals,
particularly women. It is disheartening to observe that they rarely
address issues of harassment and bothersome conduct when it comes to
men.
Taybeh highlights the moral security police and reflects on their role as the
enforcers of societal norms for women. The existence of the guidance patrol
and the oppression of women further exemplify the regime's perspective on
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objectifying women sexually. Despite Article 619 of the IRPC stating that
individuals who disrupt women and children in public spaces should face
consequences, the moral police's disregard for this law and simultaneous
suppression of women indicate a tacit acceptance of men's authority and the
objectification of women.
As per Article 619 of the IRPC, individuals who engage in physical assault or
cause disturbance to women and children in public areas or on the streets, or
subject them to verbal insults and inappropriate behavior, can face
imprisonment ranging from two to six months along with 74 lashes. However,
it is unfortunate that this legal provision is often disregarded, and when a
victim of rape or assault dares to voice their protest, they are advised to confine
themselves to their homes in order to avoid further harm. The propagation of
this ideology has instilled a sense of psychological vulnerability among
women, leading them to believe that they must safeguard themselves as the
legal system fails to provide adequate protection. Even if they manage to attain
legal recourse, they stigmatize by others, mostly other women, and labelled as
unchaste women. Also, they see their position in the family as an unfair and
unequal competitor, fearing losing it.
Pegah is 40 years old. She is a software engineer and working for a non-
governmental company. She does not regard herself as a veiled woman and
she believes that she is far from the ‘Norm Woman’ that is introduces by the
IRR. However, she is worried about women who may hurt because of
unveiling. She said:
Removing the compulsory hijab could potentially lead to a surge in
selfish behavior within our society. After years of confining both men
and women to certain behaviors, it is likely that there is a build-up of
internal anger, anxiety, and greed. The removal of the forced veil may
result in internal conflicts, potentially causing harm to many women
amidst the resulting chaos. While this may not personally affect me, it is
important to consider the impact on individuals who have not received
proper education on sex and gender. Unfortunately, our society often
perpetuates the notion that if a woman presents herself attractively, it is
acceptable for a man to invade her privacy. Instead of holding the man
accountable for his actions, the blame is shifted onto the woman,
suggesting that she should have covered herself more to avoid being
attacked. However, the question remains: to what extent should this
cover be? In my opinion, men may prefer women who stay at home in
order to exert control over themselves and avoid invading women's
privacy. For someone who lacks self-control, even the mere presence of
a woman can be a trigger for losing control.
Pegah implicitly points at the definition established for women who do not
wear veils or dress in a manner considered abnormal. She raises two important
points. Firstly, she highlights the potential risk of men assaulting women if
they perceive their clothing as inappropriate or if they are unveiled. Secondly,
she emphasizes the importance for women to take care of themselves in any
54 (74)
situation. Pegah asks about the appropriate level of covering that women
should adhere to in order to avoid assault. Interestingly, she answers her own
question by stating that there is no limit, as even the mere presence of a woman
can be arousing to a man lacking self-control. The influence of leaders'
speeches and religious beliefs can be observed in Pegah's statements, as well
as in the views expressed by other women.
Thus far, our understanding suggests that veiling serves as a means of women's
resistance against being objectified sexually. As previously mentioned, the
IRR has actively promoted veiling as a form of resistance against the Western
colonial and imperialist approaches since the establishment of the IRR
(Basiri,2018; Bilge,2010; Sedghi,2007). By perceiving femininity solely as a
sexual object, the IRR acknowledges and adopts the very approaches it
criticizes the West for, and through the same means of objectifying women's
bodies, the IRR aims to reinforce its power discourse. Consequently, it
promotes the sexual objectification of women in order to compel them to resist
it, while simultaneously bolstering the compulsory hijab discourse based on
women's resistance against sexual objectification. In fact, veiled women
challenge other paradigms of compulsory hijab through their veiling, yet
contribute to the reinforcement of the IRR’s compulsory hijab discourse
(Afary, 2009; Ahmadi, 2006; Bagheri, 2017; Bilge, 2010; Derayeh, 2011; Mir-
Hosseini, 2007; Safitri, 2010).
In the legislation section (see 5.3), I have made a note of article 836 of IRPC,
which mentions the term ‘Prohibited Act’. Adjacent to it, there is a notation
that pertains to non-religious covering and the corresponding punishment for
this act. However, there is no explicit explanation elsewhere in the laws, such
as the IRRC (Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution), IRCC (Islamic
Republic Civil Code), or IRPC (Islamic Republic Penal Code), regarding the
exact definition and purpose of religious covering. The only aspect highlighted
in this particular article is that if this act undermines public modesty, the
offender will face consequences. Consequently, unveiling is considered an act
that compromises public modesty. Nevertheless, what does public chastity
truly entail and which actions undermine it? If we turn to the speeches of the
leaders on this matter, we will discover that they also equate unveiling with
immodesty. The IRR's power discourse and compulsory hijab’s discourse has
utilized various means to reinforce this notion, aiming to establish a
connection between unveiling, immodesty, sexual objectification of women,
and assault. The speeches delivered by leaders, proponents of mandatory hijab,
and organizations advocating against unveiling, along with the legal
framework surrounding hijab, women, and family, are designed to reinforce
the connection between unveiling and the objectification of women's bodies.
These narratives perpetuate the notion that women are inherently provocative,
and that their choice of clothing, particularly specific styles or colors of veils
and cloths, implies consent to assault.
During the interviews, several men also highlighted the notion that one's
behavior and appearance reflect their personality and inclinations.
Consequently, they believed that individuals should refrain from protesting if
55 (74)
they are treated in a particular manner based on these factors. Qhasim, 45 years
old, who is an accountant said:
I personally believe that not all women need to cover their hair.
However, I do think it is crucial for women to cover their bodies. It has
been ingrained in us that women's bodies are provocative and men
cannot control themselves. In order for a woman to protect herself from
harm and prevent any potential assault, she should ensure her body is
fully covered. Additionally, women's behavior is also significant. While
a woman may have sufficient coverage, she should avoid behaving in a
manner that provokes or attracts men.
Javad who is 48 years old and an engineer, has grown up in a religious family.
according to his words, his father and maternal grandfather were both clergy
men, but they left the clergy because they did not want to get involved in
political affairs. Javad is married and they have three daughters. He says that
his wife and daughters cover their heads and bodies, and if they decide to
unveil today, although he inwardly doesn’t like it, but he respects their
decision. He also thinks that veiling is a protective way for women to avoid
assault.
I have faith in the significance of hijab and firmly believe that women
should prioritize coverage due to their inherently more attractive
appearance compared to men. The hijab serves as a means to preserve
women's modesty and purity, while also diverting men's attention from
solely focusing on their physical appearance. In essence, the hijab acts
as a safeguard for women, ensuring their safety and security in various
settings.
Mustafa, 48 years old, a G.P. who lives in Tehran, disagrees the compulsory
hijab. He points at traditions for forming the concept of hijab and its
relationship with sexualization of women’s bodies in his view. He said:
There are some individuals choose to dress in a manner that aims to
attract the attention of the opposite gender. However, I believe that it is
not necessarily provocative if someone does not wish to draw attention
to themselves. The definition of what is considered provocative in terms
of clothing varies across different societies, as it is influenced by their
respective traditions. This is why I believe that the concept of hijab is
not a rigid form of body covering, but rather, it is shaped by the traditions
of each society. Nevertheless, I firmly oppose the idea of enforcing hijab
on individuals.
5.4.3 The ‘Us’ and ‘Others’, fostering a sense of ‘Otherness’
The methods of oppression that are evident in the IRR’s power discourse, have
been mentioned in Feminist Theory section (see 4.2). Oppression is enforced
through segregation, seclusion, and obedience. Additionally, obedience plays
a crucial role in establishing and strengthening the power discourse of IRR.
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The concept of obedience fosters a hierarchical society in which individuals
are classified based on their compliance with the dominant authority. The
distinction lies between ‘Us’ and ‘Others’. ‘Us’ constitute the power circle,
while the remaining individuals fall into the category of ‘Others’ who may
gain proximity to the power circle based on their obedience.
During the interviews, I noticed that the interviewees had varying degrees of
comprehension regarding these concepts, with many of their experiences being
rooted in their childhood. Childhood experiences have the potential to
internalize these concepts within individuals' thoughts and actions, ultimately
influencing their behaviors and beliefs in adulthood, thus contributing to the
compulsory hijab’s discourse. Mohadetheh, a 25-year-old woman, was born
in one of the cities in Isfahan but has been residing in Tehran for her studies
and professional pursuits. She proudly identifies herself as a women's rights
activist. During our extensive conversation, we delved into various women's
issues prevalent in Iran.
Mohadetheh shared that she was raised in a conservative religious family,
which aimed to maintain a religious environment around her. However, she
acknowledges that the IRR imposition of compulsory hijab is not genuinely
aimed at preserving women's chastity and values. Instead, she firmly believes
that the objectification of women's bodies is the primary reason why Iranian
women feel compelled to adhere to veiling. She said:
I do not consider the chador as a suitable form of hijab, and I am
confident that one day I will discontinue wearing it. The chador holds a
significant value for my family, and I prefer not to engage in any
disagreements or disappoint them. However, it is clear that my personal
choice does not align with wearing the chador.
She acknowledges her reluctance to engage in a debate with her family
regarding wearing the veil, as she fears being ostracized and damaging her
familial bond. Another instance of rejection and isolation was witnessed in
Mahdieh’s childhood memories. After dedicating three years of her career to
working as an English-language translator for a private company, Mahdieh, a
36-year-old professional translator, made the difficult decision to resign from
her position in order to prioritize the care of her child. She said:
The female members of our family insisted that we all wear chador,
emphasizing that it was mandatory for us to wear it. They made it clear
that if we chose not to wear the chador, we would be excluded from any
form of contact with them. During my childhood, there were times when
my mother would show sympathy and let me to ride my bike in the
backyard, as long as I wore a manteau and scarf. However, she was
cautious not to let my aunts discover this secret privilege […] My mother
and aunt strongly believe that my daughter should wear a chador, but I
don’t want my daughter to feel the hardships I experienced. My priority
is to ensure my baby's happiness and freedom from worries. I take great
care of her, but I don't want her to constantly fear harassment from men.
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Sometimes, when we go to the park or the mountains for leisure, my
daughter and I choose not to wear a chador because it allows us to be
more comfortable. However, I am aware that if my family see us
suddenly, I will face criticism. At times, I feel sorry for my daughter, but
I make an effort to have conversations with her and explain that wearing
a hijab in our society can actually benefit women themselves.
Foucault argues that power can be intertwined with violence, but he also
emphasizes the significance of obtaining consent (Foucault, 1991). On the
memories of Mahdieh, the Otherness is established by a violent dichotomy
which was made by female members of her family. In fact, “non-religious
women’s bodies are identified as not wearing enough to be a ‘complete
Muslim woman,’ compared to religious women’s bodies that are modest,
covered, and ideal from an Islamicist viewpoint” (Mir-Miri, 2022).
The occurrence of discrimination, segregation, and polarization within the IRR
encompasses various approaches, all of which can be influenced by gender.
As an illustration, Sedghi (2007) recounts the story of a woman employed in
a governmental role who endured humiliation from her male coworkers.
Nussbaum (1995) has previously argued that humiliation serves as a means of
objectification. In situations characterized by discrimination and hierarchy, an
individual or a collective determines the actions of the ‘others’ and dictates
who has the privilege to voice their opinions (Foucault, 1981; Mills, 2003).
To not observing the agency over the body is a crucial aspect of childhood
experiences with compulsory hijab. This is achieved through various means.
As evidenced by Mahdieh's statements, instilling fear in a child by threatening
them with rejection from their family and community is a commonly employed
method. It is often perplexing how legislators can pass legislation that
mandates individuals to relinquish their autonomy. However, this is actually a
cyclical process within the community and family. During early childhood, the
fear of rejection and the actual act of rejection become ingrained. A child who
grows up under the threat of familial rejection develops a fear of being rejected
themselves and passes this fear onto the next generation. Simultaneously, they
possess empathy for their own child and do not wish to subject them to similar
hardships. Consequently, they induce feelings of shame, acceptance of
inferiority, and a lack of agency over one's body in the next generation,
perpetuating this cycle.
Another example is Zeinab, a 41-year-old mother. Zainab, a resident of the
rural region in northern Iran (Mazandaran), has grown up in this serene
environment. Despite holding a Diploma in design and sewing of clothes,
Zainab currently remains unemployed. Although she is the mother of three
boys, she finds herself discontented with her marriage. Unfortunately, her lack
of financial independence has hindered her ability to pursue a divorce from her
husband. Despite coming from a traditional family with a veiled mother, she
acknowledges that she was never coerced into wearing the hijab. Her family's
main concern was her virginity, and Zainab recalls how her mother always
emphasized the significance of maintaining dignity. However, she said that
societal pressure compels her to observe the veil, as not adhering to it could
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result in being excluded from social opportunities or rejected by various
groups. Zainab also discussed her marital life, emphasizing the importance of
women having financial autonomy. However, she expressed concern over
existing laws that allow men to hinder women from pursuing employment and
achieving financial independence. Zainab revealed her desire to initiate
divorce proceedings on several times, but cited insufficient funds and lack of
familial and social backing as obstacles preventing her from doing so.
Moghissi highlights the detrimental effects of gender segregation and
discrimination on women, resulting in their continued subordination and
powerlessness (Moghissi, 1999). Gender segregation serves as a mechanism
for establishing a hierarchical structure and perpetuating discrimination.
Segregated groups enjoy certain privileges through access to distinct facilities.
Zainab, in her own words, reveals that her mother's emphasis on virginity as a
defining characteristic led her to view it as a symbol of female chastity.
However, she also acknowledges that societal norms impose the veil upon her.
She concedes that wearing the veil can lead to improved job prospects.
Some interviewees brought up the topic of gender quotas in work and
education. Mohadetheh and Mahdieh both mentioned that they had lost job
opportunities due to these quotas. Mustafa, among the male interviewees,
specifically discussed gender quotas in education. He mentioned certain fields
in the specialized medical assistant courses that are off-limits for men. Mustafa
also noted that in certain surgical fields, women tend to avoid participation
because the regulations are designed in a way that prevents female graduates
from being employed in those areas. Mohadetheh also highlighted gender
quotas in engineering fields, stating that the selection applications of the
universities clearly reserve acceptance capacity for men in some engineering
disciplines. Otherness is institutionalized in such a way that people voluntarily
become interested in discrimination and segregation (Moghissi, 1999; Sedghi,
2007).
Many women were unaware of the legal limitations imposed on them. For
instance, Taybeh holds the belief that women are capable of working like men.
She advocates for women to pursue employment in an environment that
embraces femininity and gender segregation. Unbeknownst to both Mahdieh
and Taybeh, there is a law that allows men to prohibit their wives from
working. Mohadetheh believes that this law provides an advantage to men.
Both Pegah and Mohadetheh highlighted the pressures women face regarding
dress codes in the workplace. Pegah shared her experience of receiving serious
warnings and fines from his boss for using scented creams or deodorants at
work. Additionally, women are required to wear long manteaus and scarves,
and their boss has implemented separate working areas for males and females,
resulting in minimal interaction between male and female employees, even
during lunch breaks.
Upon analyzing the statements and perspectives of the interviewees, the
speeches and viewpoints of the leaders, and the legal framework, it becomes
evident that the regime's leadership, who hold the authority to shape the
regime's core policies, maintain the belief that gender equality is not a
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fundamental principle. They assert that the notion of equal rights for both men
and women is a concept originating from the Western world and is
incompatible with Islamic principles. Khomeini argues that the inclusion of
women in work settings results in the corruption of men within society,
contradicting religious directives and undermining the dignity of women.
Khomeini, being a conservative cleric, advocates for the seclusion and
restriction of women, whereas Khamenei takes a different stance. Khamenei
recognizes women as integral to both the workforce and the reproductive
foundation of the regime's power discourse. He believes that harnessing the
power and creativity of women can fortify the pillars of the IRR. Additionally,
he seeks to imbue his policies with religious legitimacy by incorporating a
religious context. Hence, it is evident that Khamenei's approach towards
women aims to establish and enhance the concept of obedience through the
definition of the ‘The Third Female Pattern’.
In the first glance, it appears that the promotion and advancement of the notion
of women's submission to men is primarily intended to empower men within
the household, while its consequences do not prove detrimental solely to
women. The legislators do not acknowledge women as autonomous
individuals with the ability to make their own decisions. Legislators have
established a framework where women are defined within the confines of the
family and reliant on men. The underlying assumption made by legislators is
that men must afford the family. Consequently, this has resulted in a disparity
of privileges granted to men under the legal system. A woman who is unable
to receive alimony may eventually seek a divorce after the court orders the
man to provide her with alimony through a series of legal steps. Women are
left with no alternative but to take legal action against their husbands, and in
their legal complaint, they must demonstrate that their husbands have failed to
fulfill their alimony obligations as promised. Filing a complaint in court entails
exorbitant fees. Unfortunately, the legislature fails to consider how a woman,
whose basic living expenses are not covered by her husband, will manage to
cope with these financial burdens. Even if we assume that women are capable
of leaving home to file a complaint, there are some women who are not literate
enough to comprehend the intricacies of complex regulations, and are not able
to submit an accurate complaint.
5.4.4 The subordination of women through the gender roles definitions
The absence of women's autonomy in decision-making regarding travel,
custody of their children, medical work, education, and even leaving their
homes without permission from their spouse or father has resulted in a lack of
independent identity for women. They are constantly confined to two roles:
being under the guardianship of their father or the supervision of their spouse.
In fact, Iranian women are reliant on men for support.
Foucault argues that people's actions are determined by power structures that
enforce norms, categories, and practices associated with sexuality (Foucault,
1978). Mahdieh faced a difficult decision between her career and caring for
her child, ultimately choosing to leave her job because she was told that being
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a mother takes precedence over being an employee. The significance of
childbirth and child-rearing has been reiterated numerous times by the leaders
of the IRR (see 5.2). Gender roles are underscored by the IRR in order to
reinforce the power discourse through the obedient women. Furthermore, it is
evident that gender roles extend beyond just women to encompass men as well.
Public job vacancies often prioritize the recruitment of male candidates due to
the prevailing notion that men are the primary earners in a family, as stipulated
by the law (see 5.3). Legislators, however, perceive the employment of women
as more of a leisure activity rather than a necessity. Mohadetheh shared stories
of her friends who were terminated due to pregnancy, as their employers did
not want to provide additional benefits such as maternity leave. Pegah also
discussed the issue of women's employment. She believes that many
employers hire women to pay them less, despite women working the same
hours as men. Pegah argues that private businesses often disregard government
laws and neglect the rights of their employees, particularly affecting women.
Mohadetheh highlighted certain businesses that do not employ single
individuals, whether they are women or men. Additionally, these businesses
offer bonuses exclusively to married men. These practices indicate that the
IRR aims to redefine gender roles within the context of familial
responsibilities, aligning with its preconceived notions about women. The
presence of regulations such as travel permissions for married women, which
are subject to the husband's discretion, further emphasizes the regime's
perception of wifehood as a pivotal role, akin to motherhood. Conversely,
single women above the age of 18 are not required to obtain their guardian's
consent for travel. The emphasis on encouraging women to marry and bear
children suggests that the IRR leans towards subjugating and subordinating
women rather than promoting their independence.
5.4.5 Imposing contradictory responsibilities on men
The male interviewees perceived the compulsory hijab primarily as a
requirement for women to cover their heads and bodies. While a few discussed
gender roles, gender quotas, and gender segregation, they failed to grasp that
these were all part of the broader mandatory hijab discourse and the
marginalization of women. Every male participant expressed their primary
concern by highlighting a specific issue. Mustafa, for instance, raised the
matter of educational and job quotas. He mentioned the practice of universities
designating certain fields of study exclusively for women. Mustafa said:
It is said that fields like clothing design, gynecology, midwifery,
nursing, and kindergarten teaching are meant for women. Conversely,
there are courses that are perceived as male-dominated, and universities
restrict women from pursuing them. My question is that who categorize
the majors as feminine or masculine?
Issues such as dowry and living expenses were also mentioned. All the men
interviewed mentioned economic problems and said that they would like their
wives to help them with living expenses.Men bear a heavy burden of
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responsibility in this particular circumstance. Being a guardian encompasses
more than just having control over things; it entails a lasting obligation to
shoulder family expenses and payments.
Although some men may be open to sharing this responsibility with their
wives, societal norms often perceive such behavior as a sign of weakness,
diminishing the man's authority. The introduction of concepts like honor,
reputation, prejudice, and prejudice as moral obligations for men has either
falsely instilled confidence in them, leading to acts of bullying and violence
being considered normal, or has instilled a fear of inadequacy in fulfilling this
duty, causing men to feel insufficient in their personal, familial, and social
lives. The gender roles extend beyond mere social categorization or a
hierarchical structure; it encompasses the establishment of a system that
emphasizes Obedience. Women are assigned the roles of wife and mother,
while men are assigned the role of breadwinner.
Another gender role that imposed on males, is the opposite role of women’s
sexual objectivity. Within the leader’s perspectives section (see 5.2), I
previously discussed the speech of Khomeini in 1979 in Qom. He portrayed
men as 'randy' in order to justify the necessity for women to wear hijab. In
opposition to the sextual objectification of women, men are depicted as
proactive sexual subjects. As Foucault argues sexuality is effective on the
power discourse and governments construct the power discourse by
manipulating and redefining sexuality (Foucault, 1978). The IRRinstructs
men that women serve as sexual triggers and that they lack the ability to
manage their impulses when faced with such triggers. This causes an
assumption that says firstly, men are reliant on sexual gratification, and
secondly, their potency and competence are often linked to sexual encounters,
thus emphasizing the positive aspect of relying on such acts. Consequently, a
higher level of sexual activity equates to greater power. The prevalence of
exaggerated sexual encounters and sexuality has become apparent.
It is evident that our community is engaging in an excessive manner with
sexual jokes, language, behavior, anger, and various situations that revolve
around sexual perspectives. Additionally, since there is no legal concept of
virginity for men, they feel conflicted by societal expectations of modesty. The
existence of rules regarding virginity for women and the association between
virginity and chastity in public culture leads society to equate virginity with
chastity. However, there are no such rules for men, implying that legislators
do not prioritize male chastity. From a religious perspective, chastity applies
to both men and women, and while it is equally desirable and positive for men,
the prevailing notion of exerting power through sexual behaviours has also had
a positive impact on men. In other words, a man is considered virtuous for
controlling his sexual desires and maintaining his chastity, but he also has the
right to indulge in his sexual desires to appear powerful. Consequently,
teenagers and young men find themselves confused and concerned about
sexual matters, struggling to decide whether or not to engage in sexual activity.
If they choose abstinence, they are seen as chaste but lacking power in social
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interactions, whereas if they engage in sex, they are perceived as skilled but
immoral.
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6 Conclusion
This dissertation examined the compulsory hijab as a limitation to women's
attractiveness in Iran and the functions of the compulsory hijab in Iranian men
and women's daily lives. As shown in this thesis, the mandatory hijab
established by the government is not only for veils and covering the body, but
is also a set of restrictive laws that prevent women's presence in society.
Ayatollah Khomeini, the main leader of Iran's revolutionary movements, made
a number of promises to women in 1979, including freedom to choose
coverage, equal treatment for men and women in Islamic society, and the
preservation of high values for women. As Islamic State laws were enacted, it
became clear that women were subject to men. Compulsory hijab is one of
those women’s subjectivities. The political religion proclaimed by IRR was
founded on the erasure of women as not a legitimate constituent of society but
as a marked group whose rights were originally rendered inferior. The effects
of these rules show themselves as wearing a headscarf, manteau or chador,
observing modesty and chastity, paying attention to honor, reputation and
prejudice, virginity, staying at home and not going out unless it is necessary,
being under the care of the father, brother, husband or other men, having
restrictions on travel, career and sports, restrictions on therapeutic and beauty
activities and finally the doctrine of ‘obedience’ in the context of society. To
better understand and examine examples of mandatory hijab in Iranian society,
I conducted an investigation in two parts. In one section, the government's
attitude and definition of femininity, women's issues and women's position in
society were discussed. In this case, I have examined the historical views of
the first and second leaders of the IRR, as well as various laws on women's
issues, to find the definition of the government about femininity, women's
issues and women's position in society.
The theoretical section of this thesis delves into the analysis of the discursive
formation of power and the mandatory hijab discourse from a postcolonial
perspective. Additionally, feminist theory explores the oppression based on
gender segregation, seclusion, and obedience, as well as the discrimination and
polarization based on the sexualization and objectification of women's bodies.
In the theory section, it has been illustrated the influence of compulsory hijab’s
discourse on formation of power discourse, which is rooted in oppression,
discrimination, and polarization, ultimately consolidating and reproducing the
power. The IRR's approach toward women and femininity focuses on body
sexualization and gender stereotypes like motherhood and wifehood. By
promoting these stereotypes and linking them to religious ideals, the IRR
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establishes the concept of obedience, thus shaping the compulsory hijab
discourse.
The second part of the study is about the impact of compulsory hijab on
people's daily lives. In this section, I interviewed 25 men and women for more
than a hundred hours. I have tried to share their views on hijab, compulsory
hijabExamine the existing rules and the impact of these rules on their routine
living conditions. Even though most of them agreed with the hijab, they did
not accept it as mandatory by the government. Hijab supporters originally cited
society's conditions as the most relevant reason. They believed that there was
a situation in society where people's mental security was not provided without
hijab, either individually and in family or at the community level. To protect
ourselves against injuries, it is better to wear veil. Most participants in
interviews defined hijab as head and body cover, and often in relation to
existing laws regarding mandatory hijab and barriers to women's presence in
society. However, all participants in the interviews knew the concepts
associated with compulsory hijab and mostly disagreed with them. By the end
of this section, I have examined how restrictive laws and relevant concepts
regarding compulsory hijab affect women and men. As a result, women are
passive and men are forced to perform tasks beyond their capability, and there
is general dissatisfaction among Iranians.
Since 1997, social activism in Iran has become very open due to the reformist
government and Khatami's presidentship. Feminist movements operated more
openly than before. Feminist activists and women's rights activists have made
many efforts in the past 20 years to create more independence and agency for
women. However, there are no legal ways for women to become independent,
and the government pushes them to stay home. The recent government
pressures on women are encouraging more women to have children and
preventing them from uasing contraceptives to keep women at home, putting
more gender quotas for women for less entrance to universities and jobs,
separating parks for men and women, separating academic spaces for men and
women, and new dress codes and limitations for public offices and
organizations.
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Appendix
Questionnaire of interview:
1. Do you believe in wearing hijab?
2. What do you think hijab means? What does it mean to be in hijab?
(Examining the definition and limits of hijab from the point of view of
the interviewee)
3. Do you think hijab is only for women or also for men? (The answer to
this question determines the amount of information a person has and
the extent to which a person is concerned about this issue. It also
determines a person's view of gender equality and whether or not he or
she is aware of gender issues.)
4. When did you start wearing hijab?
5. What is your family's attitude towards hijab? (The answer to this
question determines the impact of family upbringing on the individual
definitions of the interviewee and also shows the cultural elements).
6. Do you consider it obligatory to wear hijab? (Study of religious,
cultural and governmental compulsions)
7. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of having a
hijab?
8. Why do you think hijab is mandatory in Iran? (Examining the general
cultural and moral reasons of the people from the point of view of the
interviewee and also examining the reasons of the government for
forcing the hijab)
9. What do you think is the position of women in IRR? How does the
government think about women and what does it expect from women?
(Examining the government's views on sex and the female body, as
well as their position in society)
10. How would you behave if hijab was not mandatory?
11. Does it affect men whether women are veiled or not? (Examining the
definitions of gender in the thinking of the interviewee and finding the
roots of those definitions)
12. Has the hijab ever been good or bad for you? Has it benefited or harmed
you?
13. Do you think that women's rights are considered in Iran? If yes, which
rights are given importance? If not, what rights do not matter?
(Examining the interviewee's knowledge of women's rights)
71 (74)
14. What rights do you think having a hijab has deprived you of or what
rights have you been entitled to? Why?
Figure 1: Khomeini’s letter to Mohammadreza Shah in 1962
72 (74)
Figure 2: ‘The Revolutionary Aware Women’, the picture chosen for
Khamenei’s speech amongst Khuzestan’s women in 1997
Interviewees
Female
Male
total
20
5
13–18-year-old
3
0
19-30-year-old
1
1
30–40-year-old
6
1
40–50-year-old
6
3
50–60-year-old
3
0
60–70-year-old
1
0
Figure 3: Table of interviewees’ number by gender and age.
73 (74)
Interviewees
Date
The length of the interview
Taybeh
2021/11/29
26 min (phone call)
Mahdieh
2021/11/29
32 min (phone call)
Zeinab
2021/12/03
42 min (phone call), 50 min (video call)
Mohadetheh
2021/12/03
1 h, 3 min (phone call)
Shirin
2021/12/04
30 min (phone call)
Ghasem
2021/12/04
20 min (phone call)
Raheleh
2021/12/05
25 min (phone call)
Javad
2021/12/09
26 min (phone call)
Pegah
2021/12/10
2 h (video call)
Mustafa
2021/12/15
2 h (phone call), 30 min (video call)
Hanna
2021/12/15
1 h (video call) with her parents’
presence
Sara
2021/12/15
30 min (video call) with her parents’
presence
Fatemeh
2022/01/06
1 h (video call)
Masoumeh
2022/01/06
2 h (video call)
Somayeh
2022/01/07
2 h (phone call)
Maryam
2022/01/07
30 min (phone call)
Omid
2022/01/08
3 h (phone call)
Ati
2022/01/08
2 h (video call) with her parents’
presence
Nader
2022/01/09
1 h (phone call)
Zahra
2022/01/09
55 min (phone call)
Narges
2022/01/09
27 min (phone call)
Leila
2022/01/09
45 min (phone call)
Mansooreh
2022/01/09
50 min (phone call)
Mina
2022/01/09
1h, 50 min (phone call)
Marzieh
2022/01/09
3 h (phone call)
Figure 4
Table of the date and length of interviews.
74 (74)
The list of legislation and speeches webpages:
• https://www.khamenei.ir/ The Official Website of the Office for the
Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Grand Ayatollah
Sayyid Ali Khamenei, Accessed 2024/01/11
• https://iran5050.com/?p=576 Passport Code, approved in 1351 (1972)
and subsequent amendments, Accessed 2022/12/07
• https://www.shora-gc.ir/0001Dv The full text of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran along with the interpretative comments of the
Guardian Council, Accessed 2024/01/11
• https://islamic-law.ir/isl-
law/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-
%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%DB%8C/Iranian Civil Code approved
in 1314 (1935) with subsequent additions and amendments, Accessed
2022/12/07
• (dadrah.ir) Islamic Penal Code
- approved in 1392 (2013), Accessed 2022/08/08
• https://w.wiki/9AzH The Law on Compliance of Administrative and
Technical Affairs of Medical Institutions with the Standards of the
Holy Sharia, approved in 1364 (1985), Accessed 2022/08/15
•
(ravabetkar.ir) Law on the selection of teachers and education
staff, approved in 1374 (1995), 2023/09/12
• https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f1_girls_universities/436671.html
Accessed 2022/07/11
• https://p.dw.com/p/12LOQ Gender segregation of preschool children
in Iran, approved on 2011\08\22, Accessed 2023/11/09
• https://new.qut.ac.ir/fa/studentsdepartment/disciplinary-
committee/maintain-about-islamic-customs-in-universities
Regulations for maintaining the limits of Islamic etiquette in
universities and institutions of higher education, approved by
Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution 1987, 2024/01/12
• wikisource.org https://fa.wikisource.org/wiki/
(bing.com) The family protection law, approved in 1967, Accessed
2024/01/10
• wikisource.org https://fa.wikisource.org/wiki/
(bing.com) The family protection law, approved in 1974, accessed
2024/01/10
