ArticlePDF Available

The Wilson government, the rise of nationalism and the road to the royal commission on the constitution, 1966-1968

July 2024
Contemporary British History 39(1):1-23

DOI:10.1080/13619462.2024.2382116

Authors:

Adam Evans

Cardiff University

Content uploaded by Adam Evans

Content may be subject to copyright.

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fcbh20

Contemporary British History

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fcbh20

The Wilson government, the rise of nationalism

and the road to the royal commission on the

constitution, 1966-1968

Adam Evans

To cite this article: Adam Evans (22 Jul 2024): The Wilson government, the rise of nationalism

and the road to the royal commission on the constitution, 1966-1968, Contemporary British

History, DOI: 10.1080/13619462.2024.2382116

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2024.2382116

Published online: 22 Jul 2024.

Submit your article to this journal

View related articles

View Crossmark data

The Wilson government, the rise of nationalism and the road

to the royal commission on the constitution, 1966-1968

Adam Evans

Wales Governance Centre, Cardiﬀ University, Cardiﬀ, UK

ABSTRACT

The Royal Commission on the Constitution was a rare moment

when the UK’s territorial governance was considered as a whole.

Established as a response to the rise in electoral support for the SNP

and Plaid Cymru in the mid to the late 1960s, the Commission was

seen by some at the time and others since of being a cynical

attempt to kick the constitutional ‘can down the road’. This article

is not an analysis of the Royal Commission’s ndings, rather it oers

an examination of why it came to be established. Drawing on an

extensive range of primary and secondary source materials, includ-

ing Cabinet papers and ministerial correspondence, this paper

provides a detailed assessment of the months of debates and

deliberations, which preceded the decision to establish a Royal

Commission on the Constitution. The by-election successes and

unnerving near-misses for Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties

at by elections between 1966 and 1968 created a sense within the

Cabinet that the Government needed to have a clear response to

the electorate. That this response was a Commission only followed

an intense process of debate and deliberation within Government

that failed to produce a broadly acceptable alternative.

KEYWORDS

Devolution; British history;

Welsh politics; UK

constitutional political

history; Scottish politics

Introduction

The Royal Commission on the Constitution was the most recent example, and one of only

two episodes, in which the UK’s territorial governance was considered as a whole.

The

Commission was tasked with an expansive and ambitious (or perhaps unrealistic) terms of

reference which spanned not just the relationships between the constituent nations of

the UK with the central government, but also the relationship between the Channel

Islands and the Isle of Man with the UK. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Commission spent

years deliberating, during the course of which its rst chairman (Lord Crowther) died.

When the Commission nally concluded in 1973, it was marked by considerable divisions

of opinion among the Commissioners. Indeed, the Commission concluded its work with

two publications: an ocial report signed by the bulk of the Commissioners (although

they were internally divided on key aspects of the ocial report’s proposals) and

a memorandum of dissent signed by two commissioners.

However, this article is not an examination of the Royal Commission on the

Constitution, rather it aims to provide a detailed account of the debates within Wilson’s

CONTACT Adam Evans evansab@parliament.uk Wales Governance Centre, Cardiﬀ University

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY

https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2024.2382116

Government which led to the establishment of the Commission in 1969. The role that the

electoral rise of the SNP and Plaid Cymru at by-elections in the mid to late 1960s had in

driving devolution onto the political agenda is well known.

However, by drawing on an

extensive range of primary and secondary source materials, including Cabinet papers and

ministerial correspondence, this article further enhances our understanding of how this

nationalist challenge resulted in the Wilson Government eventually settling upon a Royal

Commission as its response.

As this paper demonstrates, it was a response that emerged

only after an intense process of debate and deliberation within Government that sought

to divine a clear package of proposals that could be oered to voters in Scotland and

Wales. It was only after this process failed to produce a unanimous way forward, and in

the context of continuing electoral pressure from the nationalist parties, the Government

reached for the option of a Royal Commission.

Background

Questions about the UK’s territorial governance (i.e. how the various constituent parts of

the United Kingdom should be governed and what their relationships should be with the

central UK state) have a long history. While the Irish Question dominated parliamentary

and public debates on the future of the Union at the turn of the century, there were also

powerful voices in favour of Home Rule for Scotland and for Wales. In 1919, after

a successful vote in the House of Commons, a Speaker’s Conference on Devolution was

established to consider devolution for Scotland, Wales and England, however it con-

cluded in stalemate. Yet while devolution (in the sense of directly elected parliaments or

assemblies for Scotland and Wales) gradually disappeared from the political agenda, this

did not bring an end to the debate about the UK’s territorial constitution.

Administrative devolution for Scotland began in the late nineteenth century with the

establishment in 1885 of a Scottish Oce and Secretary for Scotland (later to be given

Secretary of State status in the 1920s). Within Parliament, a Scottish Grand Committee

was, after a brief experiment between 1894 and 1895, re-established in 1906, providing

a forum for Scottish MPs to debate Scottish-only legislation. In the 1950s, the Conservative

Party had committed itself to strengthening ‘Scottish control of Scottish aairs’. A Royal

Commission on Scottish Aairs was established in 1952 and reported in 1954, resulting in

an extension in the responsibilities of the Scottish Oce and the Secretary of State.

In Wales, the road to institutional distinctiveness was a longer one than in Scotland.

There was a trickle of decentralisation in the early Twentieth Century with the establish-

ment of a Welsh Department in the Board of Education and a Welsh Board of Health and

Council of Agriculture for Wales. However, there was no equivalent to the Scottish Oce

or Scottish Secretary. In 1949, the then Labour UK Government, having rejected further

calls for a Welsh Oce and Secretary of State for Wales, established an advisory body, the

Council for Wales and Monmouthshire. A further modest step forward was taken by the

Conservative Government in 1951 with the creation of a Minister for Welsh Aairs—

although this was a role bolted-on to existing Cabinet responsibilities (rst held by the

Home Secretary and then moved in 1957 to be held by the Minister of Housing and Local

Government). Labour would commit itself in 1959 to the creation of a Secretary of State

for Wales, a pledge which the party re-armed in its 1964 manifesto.

After 13 years in

opposition, Labour had returned to power at the 1964 General Election by the slimmest of

2A. EVANS

margins—with Harold Wilson entering 10 Downing Street with a wafer thin majority of

only four seats. A Secretary of State for Wales was established that year, followed a year

later by the formation of the Welsh Oce.

After just under 18 months in oce, and in a bid to win a more secure parliamentary

majority, Harold Wilson called a snap General Election for the spring of 1966. Wilson’s

reward for this gamble was a 98 seat majority. In Wales, Labour swept the board winning

32 out of 36 seats and polling 60.7% of the vote. In Scotland, Labour polled just under 50%

of the vote and returned 46 out of 71 seats. As for the nationalist parties in Wales and

Scotland, Plaid Cymru (which had never returned an MP to Westminster) polled only 4.3%

of the vote, while the SNP (whose sole electoral success at Westminster was in the 1945

Motherwell by-election) polled 5% of the vote.

1966/68: by-elections, buoyant nationalism and a need to act

The results of the 1966 General Election seemed to have guaranteed a comfortable

parliamentary majority for Labour and to have conrmed that nationalism in Scotland

and Wales was electorally peripheral. Labour’s honeymoon would not last for long,

however, in either nation.

In May 1966, shortly after having won re-election as the Labour MP for Carmarthen,

Lady Megan Lloyd-George died. At the subsequent by-election, held in July 1966, Plaid

Cymru won a historic victory, defeating the Labour candidate (Gwilym Prys Davies) by

39% to 33%.

The following year saw a near-miss for Plaid Cymru in the Rhondda West by-election

(where Plaid polled 39.9% of the vote) and the SNP poll nearly 30% of the vote in Glasgow

Pollock (resulting in Labour losing the seat to the Conservatives). Finally, in

November 1967, the SNP and their candidate, Winnie Ewing, secured a famous victory

in the Hamilton by-election, securing 46% of the vote.

According to the political scientist and historian of devolution, James Mitchell,

Hamilton ‘moved the SNP and the case for a Scottish Parliament from the fringe of

politics’.

Certainly, the SNP’s victory prompted some discussion within Wilson’s govern-

ment of how, if at all, it should respond. On 13 November 1967, Richard Crossman, the

then Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, wrote to the

Prime Minister, ‘prompted by further reection on the Hamilton by-election’.

According

to Crossman, whatever their views on the nationalist parties themselves, ‘it would be

unwise to disregard the growing feeling that Wales and Scotland are not getting a fair

deal from Whitehall’. Referring to a previous discussion between the two of them,

Crossman suggested that Wilson had, at least in passing, oated the idea of a ‘Stormont

model’ for Scotland and Wales. Expressing his attraction to the idea of constitutional

reform, Crossman went on to press for the issue of devolution to be explored, arguing that

‘recent events have given added urgency and importance’ to discussing the topic.

Eleven days later The Times ran an editorial, titled ‘A Celtic Dawn’ responding to the

recent by-election successes and near-wins for the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties.

These parties, the editorial exclaimed, were no longer ‘regarded as the lunatic element on

the Celtic fringe’. Noting the existing and extensive administrative devolution which

Scotland enjoyed via the Scottish Oce, the paper stated that there were ‘strong argu-

ments why this should be accompanied by a comparable degree of political devolution’.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 3

The editorial strongly echoed the arguments that Crossman had put forward in his letter

to Wilson, urging that the ‘next step should be to set up a commission of inquiry into the

possibility of a Stormont solution for Scotland and Wales’.

This would not be the last

time that the press appeared to publicly air views which aligned with those of

Crossman.

On 4 December 1967, the Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend wrote to the Prime Minister

to discuss the Crossman memo. Noting the potential opposition which devolution could

provoke within Government, Trend suggested the Prime Minister should ‘approach the

subject [. . .] with some circumspection’. He advised that the ‘simplest’ way to look at the

issue would be for a general discussion to be held in Cabinet which might then ‘result in

the appointment of a group of Ministers to examine the implications of further devolution

for Scotland and Wales before the Government accept any formal or public

commitment’.

After this memorandum, Trend spoke to Crossman directly. In a follow-up letter to the

Prime Minister, Trend reported that Crossman would be content with his suggestion of

a Committee to examine the issue, ‘but he would very much like to take the chair of this

committee himself’. Furthermore, and to the evident surprise of Trend, Crossman ‘would

also prefer it to consist of junior Ministers!’.

Crossman proposed a Committee including

Dick Taverne (Home Oce), Dickson Mabon (Scottish Oce), either Edmund Dell or Alun

Williams (Department of Economic Aairs), Niall MacDermot (Housing and Local

Government), Eirene White (Welsh Oce) and Harold Lever (Treasury).

Reporting this

to the Prime Minister, Sir Burke Trend exclaimed that he was ‘not quite sure what might

come out of a body of this kind’. However, he acknowledged, this was a subject ‘which

might benet from a fresh and perhaps rather unconventional approach’. Indeed, he told

the Prime Minister that, if he agreed, he ‘would rather like to go ahead [. . .] and see what

happens’. However, he also argued that if the Committee did get the go ahead, then its

terms of reference should clearly state that it would report to a more conventional body—

namely, the Cabinet’s Home Aairs sub-committee (HAC). The Prime Minister agreed,

writing in the margins that Crossman’s committee could ‘go ahead’ provided that it is

clear that it reports to HAC ‘or whatever other Ministerial body the Prime Minister may

direct when the Committee has completed its work or wishes to seek further

instructions’.

Spring 1968: the ministerial committee on devolution

In March 1968, the Ministerial Committee on Devolution began its work. The rst week of

the Committee’s deliberations would prove inuential in moving Crossman away from his

previously expressed enthusiasm for a ‘Stormont solution’ for Scotland and Wales and

towards a more modest set of reform. On 20 March 1968, the Committee met for the rst

time and heard from the then Welsh Secretary, Cledwyn Hughes, on the Welsh dimension.

Crossman claimed that Hughes had put forward a paper on ‘what he thinks Home Rule for

Wales would mean based on the Stormont parallel. But he does not want anything like the

power of Stormont. He wants to leave social security, judiciary, civil service and central

government all at Westminster. I wasn’t at all clear what the devil the Welsh Parliament

would do’. Indeed, Crossman was so nonplussed by Hughes’ presentation that he argued

he was wondering whether Wales was ready for full national devolution or whether they

4A. EVANS

wanted a regional structure which might ‘parallel the English regional structure we will

have in the local government reorganisation’.

Later that week, on 26 March, the Committee met again to hear from the Scottish

Oce. Dickson Mabon, a junior Scottish Oce Minister and member of the Committee,

put forward proposals agreed by the Secretary of State (Willie Ross). These proposals were

rmly focussed on reforming how Westminster worked, rather than creating new institu-

tions. According to Crossman, what Ross wanted was a ‘regional select committee, a UK

one with English Members as well, but sitting in Edinburgh [. . .] he is also willing to

consider the expansion of the work of the Scottish Grand Committee, possibly meeting in

Edinburgh as well as in London’.

The following day, Crossman’s diaries record a conversation he had with Freddie

Warren, the Principal Private Secretary to the Chief Whip on the topic of devolution.

According to Crossman’s diary, after just a week of the Committee’s work, it was ‘clear that

neither the Welsh nor the Scottish are ready for full self-government’. Instead, he now felt

that ‘what they would like and what would go down well is devolution (by which he

meant administrative devolution) plus the visible signs of MPs being interested in regional

aairs’. Crossman therefore put Warren, and by extension the Chief Whip, on notice that

he wished to look at ‘special Scottish and Welsh select committees sitting in Cardi and

Edinburgh’, as well as a ‘host of other devices which would present the image of

Parliament in the regions’.

Crossman’s attention was now rmly xed on intra-

Westminster and Whitehall reforms as a response to national sentiment in Scotland and

Wales.

In early April 1968, Crossman put forward his own thoughts to the Ministerial

Committee on Devolution. In his diary entry for 3 April, Crossman reported that he had

told colleagues that there was a ‘sharp choice between moving on to genuine self-

government or devolving a certain number of obvious regional activities while strength-

ening the oce of the regional Secretaries of State’. According to Crossman, the ‘only

eective answer’ the Government could make to the nationalists, if political devolution

was not on the agenda, ‘was to make our present regional system work innitely better’.

As had been trailed in his discussions with Freddie Warren, Crossman’s mind was now

focussed on intra-Whitehall and Westminster reforms, such as moving grand committees

to Cardi and Edinburgh, or new territorial select committees. However, Crossman

warned that an obstacle to this agenda was that ‘the Welsh want the best of both worlds

by trying to have both a Secretary of State and an eective regional council’.

As we will go on to discuss, the Welsh focus on the powers of the Welsh Oce and

a regional council would become an impediment to progress. However, it was not, at this

point, an obviously insurmountable one. A bigger barrier to the Committee being able to

conclude successfully came instead a few days later when Wilson reshued his

Government. The reshue would have signicant implications for Crossman’s committee.

At Secretary of State level, the reshue saw Cledwyn Hughes replaced with George

Thomas at the Welsh Oce. Hughes, the MP for Anglesey, had been a longstanding

supporter of Welsh devolution, having been a supporter of the Parliament for Wales

campaign in the 1950s.

By contrast, George Thomas was deeply hostile to the idea of

devolution. While Crossman’s claim that Thomas regarded his predecessor’s views on this

issue as ‘sheer treason’ was an exaggeration, it nonetheless hit upon a fundamental

truth.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 5

At junior ministerial level, Lord Stonham came in as the Home Oce’s representative

on the Committee (in place of Dick Taverne who had been moved in the reshue to the

Treasury). The loss of Taverne, described by Crossman as having had an ‘open mind’ on

these issues and his replacement with the ‘anti-devolution’ Stonham was clearly bitterly

resented by Crossman. In his diaries, Crossman mused that personnel changes on minis-

terial committees were ‘often a nuisance’ but generally do not ‘matter much more than

that’. However, in this case, he lamented that he had ‘handpicked the Committee to get

a fair balance and to get people of independent mind who wouldn’t work to

a departmental brief’. After a meeting of the reshued committee earlier that day had

descended into an ‘atmosphere of complete chaos’, Crossman gloomily noted in his entry

for 10 April 1968 that while he did not ‘suppose that Harold meant to wreck the

committee [. . .] he certainly has’.

While the Committee continued its deliberations, by June it was clear that a consensus

on the way forward was not on the horizon. On 21 June 1968, Sir Burke Trend wrote to the

Prime Minister advising him that the Ministerial Committee on Devolution ‘has been

unable to reach agreement’. According to Trend, ‘they agree only in rejecting

a separatist solution, i.e. a greater degree of devolution than the Stormont arrangements’.

Below that, there were dierent constellations of opinion about the way forward. Trend

noted that some (principally the Lord Privy Seal) favoured no further change but to

instead wage ‘an energetic campaign to explain how much devolution has already

occurred, particularly in Scotland, and what the disadvantages of a separatist solution

would be’.

The Secretary of State for Wales, on the other hand, had thrown his support behind

a ‘strong Council for Wales,

with executive functions, operating between the spheres

normally occupied by local government and by central government’, accompanied by

a bolstering of the nascent Welsh Oce via a transfer of responsibilities to it from the

education, health and agriculture ministries.

As for the rest, there appeared to be agreement that there should be ‘maintenance of

the unitary system, but with more self-government’. This conception of self-government

was, crucially, focussed around reform at Whitehall and Westminster. Trend told the Prime

Minister, that for this group, the implications for Scotland would be ‘further administrative

devolution accompanied by some dispersal of central government departments to

Scotland and further Parliamentary devolution by arranging for the Scottish Grand

Committee to sit occasionally in Scotland and for a Scottish Select Committee’. For

Wales, there would be greater administrative devolution in relation to health and sharing

responsibilities for agriculture, but not extending to transferring education functions.

There would also be dispersal of central government departments in Wales, as well as

a more active role for the Welsh Grand Committee—including the right to sit in Wales.

However, crucially, Trend noted that this latter proposition was opposed by the Secretary

of State for Wales ‘as being likely to reveal to the Welsh the ineectiveness of the Grand

Committee, which has no legislative functions comparable to the Scottish Grand

Committee’.

As we shall see, the Secretary of State for Wales’s opposition would

prove a major obstacle to any proposals for parliamentary reform.

Even at this stage, however, there were signs that reforms which might attract the

support of most ministers, were not going to prove a suciently attractive response to

the public. Trend warned Wilson that Crossman intended to speak to him to counsel that

6A. EVANS

while the ‘consensus proposals might have been adequate a year or two ago, they do not

now match the mood of Scotland and Wales, which has been moving towards the

nationalist position while the Committee has been sitting’.

Local elections in

May 1968 had yielded strong gains for the SNP (they won over 100 local council seats

on around 30% of the vote),

and in a further important development that month the

Leader of the Opposition (Edward Heath) came out in favour of a policy of Scottish

devolution during his speech to the Conservative Party’s spring conference in Perth.

Having summed up the state of the Committee’s work, Trend put a series of questions

for the Prime Minister to consider and discuss with his colleagues. First, Trend queried

whether the ‘consensus proposals, which are admittedly the lowest common denomi-

nator between people with widely divergent views, oer any likelihood of matching the

mood of the public’. Further, if they were not a ‘permanently satisfactory solution’, would

those proposals at least oer ‘something which could be done in earnest as a sign of the

Government’s good intentions, to be followed (for Scotland at least) by an enquiry into

the possibility and consequences of a more radical solution?’ This distinction between

a short term reform package followed by a promise of a longer-term look at the wider

issue, would become a recurring theme.

In terms of immediate action, Trend suggested that as the Parliament was already two

years old (and would have only a maximum of three further years before a dissolution) any

response in the current Parliament would ‘have to be of an administrative character’.

Raising the concerns which several Whitehall departments had already expressed about

administrative devolution resulting in less ecient services (Health and Education were

particularly reluctant to cede responsibilities to the Welsh Oce

), Trend asked whether

a less ecient service might be the price to pay for ‘a service which is visibly under

Scottish or Welsh control’. According to Trend, this trade-o was perhaps greatest in

Wales where ‘it may be necessary to accept greater administration than considerations of

economy and eciency would support, largely for presentational reasons’.

Trend went on to address the big stumbling block on a Welsh response—the dier-

ence between the Secretary of State for Wales and other government ministers about the

Welsh Oce’s proposal for a rebooted and more powerful Council for Wales. Trend noted

the scepticism which some felt about the likelihood of the Council satisfying national

sentiment, suggesting that arguably it might instead act as a ‘focus for dissatisfaction with

central government policy’ and become a ‘pressure group for more expenditure in Wales’.

He also noted the concerns that other colleagues had about such a body acting as

a precedent when it came to addressing regional policies elsewhere in the UK (indeed,

Willie Ross would become a vocal opponent of an enhanced Welsh Council for fear of

what it might imply for Scotland).

In terms of the longer-term, Trend questioned whether the Government would con-

sider a body of inquiry, perhaps but not necessarily a Royal Commission, to look at the

issue. If such a body was to be considered, then Trend urged that the proposals ‘be

examined in detail by ocials in order that Ministers might determine whether their

administrative and other consequences would be acceptable’. Even if a Commission were

to be established, Trend noted that the Government would need to be alert to criticisms

of ‘delaying tactics’ and of repeating the prior Royal Commission on Scotland, which had

‘failed to produce substantial proposals’ beyond a modest enhancement of the Scottish

Oce.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 7

And what of Wales? Trend suggested that the lack of institutional capacity and history

in Wales (Wales had been assimilated into England in the sixteenth century and absorbed

into the English administrative and legal systems) meant there was ‘so little institutional

basis for further devolution’. But, if the Welsh Oce’s Council for Wales proposals were to

be rejected, then, Trend suggested, there didn’t seem to be ‘any real alternative’ to further

administrative devolution. Furthermore, if an inquiry was to look at Scotland’s governance

then would a Welsh inquiry also be necessary?

Summer 1968: one last push for a government policy on devolution?

On 24 June, the Cabinet’s Parliamentary Committee

met to discuss, among other things, the

Committee on Devolution’s work. According to a subsequent despatch from the Cabinet

Secretary, the Parliamentary Committee was divided between ‘those who thought no conces-

sion should made to the Nationalists and those who thought there should be some movement

towards greater devolution within the unitary framework of the United Kingdom’.

Nonetheless, the committee ultimately agreed with the Prime Minister’s suggestion that

Crossman, following discussion with the two territorial Secretaries of State, should bring

forward proposals based on the Committee on Devolution’s work.

The next day, Crossman wrote to the Prime Minister.

While Crossman suggested that

he could work in a ‘reasonable’ manner with both of those colleagues, the overall result,

based on his experience chairing the Ministerial Committee on Devolution, was that the

outcome would be ‘the lowest common denominator’. He therefore had decided to set

out his own views in the hope that they could be the basis of a discussion which could

‘swing large numbers of voters in Scotland and Wales’.

Agreeing with a prior suggestion from Willie Ross that there should be a focus on

‘bashing the nationalists’, Crossman called upon the Treasury to ‘marshal the latest and

most convincing economic arguments showing the eect on Scotland and Wales of

economic separation from England’. Crossman noted that should this aggressive

approach to nationalism be adopted, the Government might also wish to ensure the

dispersal of a major Whitehall departments to Scotland, which he argued ‘would do more

good than a lot of propaganda’, and the extension of administrative devolution. He also

believed that the ability of the Scottish Grand Committee to meet in Edinburgh and the

creation of a Scottish Aairs Select Committee had ‘a great deal to commend it’ and

argued that a 'decision on the Grand Committee and the Select Committee should be

announced at the beginning of the next Session [of Parliament]’.

As for Wales, Crossman claimed that he appreciated ‘the diculties of the Secretary of

State’ and his preference of a Council for Wales vis-à-vis the Welsh Grand Committee

sitting in Cardi. Indeed, he noted that should Scotland not consider a Welsh Council as

a ‘dangerous precedent’ then he would himself ‘consider that the political advantages

[. . .] greatly outweigh the administrative drawbacks’.

Crossman’s letter then turned to longer-term issues, principally whether region-

alism was the way forward. Noting that there were two Royal Commissions under-

way examining local government in England and Scotland, Crossman mused about

a regionalisation of the UK which would resemble the federal split between the

German Lander and the German federal government. Although he felt that such an

approach might not entirely ‘satisfy the aspirations of Scots nationalism’, he was

8A. EVANS

‘not so certain that it wouldn’t appeal to the Welsh’. Should this idea nd favour in

the Cabinet then Crossman suggested that the proposals should be sketched out

for the UK as a whole, i.e. treating Scotland and Wales on a par with English

regions. He also suggested that the Government, when publishing such

a blueprint, ‘should make it clear that if either the Scots or the Welsh clearly

and demonstrably showed that they were discontented with a Federal solution

which gave the British regions as much self-government as the Scots and the

Welsh, then our government would be prepared seriously to consider their

demand for a greater degree of self-government’.

On 28 June, the Secretary of State for Wales wrote to the Prime Minister to put forward the

Welsh Oce’s perspective. Thomas began by welcoming Crossman’s emphasis on taking the

ght to separatism, stating that it was ‘of the rst importance that the Treasury and the

Economic Departments should provide us with as much information as possible’. However,

Thomas implored the Prime Minister to ensure that the Government attacked nationalism ‘in

a way that appeals to those (in Wales the great majority) who want to see local national

traditions and identities cherished [and] who do not want to weaken in any way the position

of the United Kingdom in the world as an economic and political unit’.

In this vein, Thomas once more emphasised his department’s proposal for a partly elected-

partly nominated Welsh Council. The council, ‘with functions taken over form the eld of

nominated bodies who were now operating in the twilight zone between central and local

government’, would not ‘involve any separatism which would weaken the essential unity of

the United Kingdom’. Indeed, Thomas argued that, to the contrary, a revamped and empow-

ered Welsh Council ‘would bind Wales more surely into this entity’.

Conscious of the Scottish Oce’s concerns, Thomas urged the Prime Minister to not let

the inappropriateness of this proposal for Scotland ‘be a decisive consideration’ in terms

of it being applied to Wales. Furthermore, and noting the Royal Commission which was

looking at local government in England and the Government’s interest in regional reform

in England, Thomas suggested that ‘a Welsh Council [. . .] [might] be of some experimental

interest in relation the problem of the English regions’. Finally, and pursuing another

familiar Welsh Oce theme, Thomas urged the Prime Minister, in a spirit of attacking

nationalism ‘with some constructive proposals’, to ‘make a positive statement about

strengthening the Welsh Oce in accord with our election promise’.

On 8 July, it was the turn of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Willie Ross. Ross also

expressed support for the greater provision of data from the Treasury with which to make

‘convincing economic arguments on the folly of economic separation’. He went on to

support the political benet that would arise if there was the dispersal to Scotland of

a major central government department (he suggested, for example, the relocation of the

Civil Aviation Department of the Board of Trade to Prestwick). Ross was also in favour of

a Scottish Aairs Committee, although he noted the ‘practical diculties about meetings

of the Scottish Grand Committee in Edinburgh’.

However, while he could broadly support some parliamentary and administrative reforms,

there was, he suggested, one issue ‘that worries me’: the proposal for a ‘Welsh Council, with

executive functions and a considerable—perhaps even dominant—elected element’. Such

a body, in Scotland, would, he feared, provide a rival caucus of elected national representa-

tives to Scotland’s MPs and would be ‘a dangerous concession to separatism’.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 9

While the Welsh Oce had previously pointed to the parallel of the Greater London

Council (GLC), Ross dismissed this comparison—arguing that the GLC was ‘quite clearly an

organ of local government’ and had a more dened terms of reference and responsibil-

ities. Having a council operating in the ‘same functional eld and overall the same

geographical area as an organ of central government’ [i.e. the Scottish or Welsh oces]

would risk, he argued, a power struggle between the two. Ross feared that such a power

struggle could yield only one winner, warning that ‘in democratic terms it is very hard to

see how a department of central government—i.e. the Welsh Oce or the Scottish Oce

—could retain eective control over a body deriving authority more directly from the

electorate in the area’.

Ross, similarly, opposed Crossman’s idea of elected regional

councils for Scotland and Wales alongside those for parts of England.

Following the urry of correspondence between the principal protagonists on the

Ministerial Committee on Devolution (and, in the case of the two territorial Secretaries of

State, two of the key veto players on any eventual devolution policy), Sir Burke Trend wrote to

the Prime Minister on 17 July in an attempt to summarise the position and discuss a way

forward.

Trend noted that Crossman, in his paper, had split his proposals between short-term

actions and matters for the longer term. Regarding the ‘short term’ approach (‘bash the

nationalists’ and ‘sweeten’ the constitutional status quo via dispersal and administrative

devolution and parliamentary reform), it seemed that only the bashing of nationalists com-

manded unanimous support.

In terms of dispersal, Trend noted that the current government policy was to give ‘priority to

Scotland and the North’. However, the Scottish Secretary had made clear his views that this

had failed to ‘ensure enough dispersal to Scotland’. Trend suggested that the Prime Minister

would want to ‘consider whether the political advantages to be obtained by greater dispersal

to Scotland (and Wales) are such that considerations of economy, eciency and the require-

ments of other regions should be given less weight than at present’. Trend reminded the Prime

Minister that of the current 50,000 government jobs which are either to be created or

dispersed from London to other regions, 10,000 a piece were destined for Scotland and

Wales. However, he noted that this seemed to be less of a numbers game for the Scottish

Secretary ‘as of a single dramatic move, such as the move of the Civil Aviation Department of

the Board of Trade to Prestwick’. It was this sort of major move which attracted the disagree-

ment of other colleagues, with Trend noting that the President of the Board of Trade was

resisting this particular suggestion from the Scottish Secretary.

As for Parliamentary reform, Trend argued that this was ‘probably the thorniest issue in

the short term’. While the Scottish Secretary was prepared, albeit “without much con-

dence in its ecacy, for the Scottish Grand Committee to meet on occasion in Edinburgh

and a New Scottish Aairs Select Committee to also sit in Edinburgh and report to the

Grand Committee, the Welsh Secretary saw ‘no advantage and some disadvantage, in the

Welsh Grand Committee, which has no legislative functions, sitting in Cardi’. The Welsh

Secretary’s own proposal, of a stronger Council for Wales ‘with some executive functions

and some elected membership’, was, in turn, opposed by the Scottish Secretary.

On this point, Trend invited the Prime Minister to reect on ‘the repercussions on Scotland

of what is done in Wales’. Highlighting the asymmetric histories and institutions of both

nations, Trend noted that ‘it will be dicult to t them into the same pattern’. He therefore

suggested that the Prime Minister might wish to ponder whether it was ‘really impossible to

10 A. EVANS

distinguish them and to give each a pattern of devolution appropriate to its own

circumstances’.

In Wales, Trend suggested, it was possible to conceive of a Council for Wales

acting as a ‘top tier of local government or, in a special area between local and

central government, in a manner which does not call into question the unitary

system of central government’. However, and depending on what the Royal

Commission on local government in Scotland decides, such a body may not be

appropriate for Scotland and would ‘come much nearer to the Scottish Assembly’

that had been proposed by the Leader of the Opposition (Ted Heath) in Perth on

18 May 1968. An Assembly style body would, Trend argued, come nearer to

a Scottish Parliament ‘and some form of federal system’. In contrast, an enhanced

Scottish Grand Committee and a Scottish Aairs Select Committee ‘might well be

more appropriate as a form of further devolution for Scotland within a unitary

system’. This model would not be so readily applicable to Wales because it lacked

the legal and political distinctiveness of Scotland, and had a much less powerful

territorial department than the Scottish Oce.

While Trend acknowledged that the longer term approach (regional governments in

a federal system as had been suggested by Crossman) may not be pursued very far until

the Scottish and English Royal Commissions had reported), he suggested that the Prime

Minister ‘may like to consider at this stage whether they are suciently acceptable to be

worth further study’. Trend reected that federalism would raise questions about the

symmetry (or not) of the powers to be enjoyed by the sub-state administrations), as well

as of whether England was to be one unit or many.

“It could have been useful if launched eight months ago”: Crossman produces his

proposals

On 15 July 1968, a by-election in the Welsh Labour stronghold of Caerphilly saw Labour’s

majority collapse from over 21,000 to just under 2,000 votes, with Plaid Cymru polling

40% of the vote. Three days later on 18 July, the Prime Minister convened a meeting of

Ministers to discuss devolution. At this meeting, it was agreed that the Government

should undertake further analysis on ‘parliamentary devolution’ (reform of Westminster)

to be led by Crossman in conjunction with the Lord Privy Seal and the Chief Whip, and for

the Head of the Civil Service to produce a study on administrative devolution.

The next

week, Crossman circulated a paper to his ministerial colleagues for discussion. According

to Crossman, the discussion a week before had focussed on the need for a two stage

response to the ‘problems of Scotland and Wales’:

Plan A, which could be implemented in the lifetime of the present Parliament;

Plan B, which would be implemented in the next Parliament, but possibly announced in

a White Paper before the Dissolution but after we had an opportunity to consider our

proposals in the light of the recommendations of the Royal Commissions on Local

Government in England and in Scotland (the Redclie-Maud and Wheatley Commissions).

Crossman proposed that ‘Plan A’ should consist of three elements. The rst was ‘the

education of public opinion’, demonstrating to voters (particularly in Scotland and

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 11

Wales) of the benets of the constitutional status quo, the extent of existing devolu-

tion, and the potential consequences for voters ‘of the separatist policies advocated by

the nationalist parties’. The second element would be an extension of the existing

system of administrative devolution—with the Scottish Oce given new responsibil-

ities over ancient monuments and historic buildings and tourism and the Welsh Oce

given further powers over health, tourism, ancient monuments and historic buildings

and agriculture.

The third element of ‘Plan A’ was ‘Parliamentary devolution’ by which, as we have seen

already, Crossman was referring to reforms of Westminster’s parliamentary machinery and

procedures. Crossman proposed that the Scottish Grand Committee should meet in

Edinburgh and the Welsh Grand Committee in Cardi for the rst two days of the debate

after a Queen’s Speech (with Scottish and Welsh MPs returning to Westminster for the

remaining two days of debate). According to Crossman, those days ‘should be devoted to

a general debate on the “state of the nation” in Scotland and Wales respectively’. The two

Grand Committees should also meet in their respective nations on other occasions, ‘either on

a series of Fridays immediately after the publication of the Estimates (when Government

Departments publish their spending plans for approval by Parliament) in the spring, or during

a recess’. There should also, Crossman proposed, be Scottish and Welsh Select Committees.

These Committees would sit in their respective capital cities and report directly to their

respective grand committees.

Crossman’s memorandum also included the controversial subject of a Council for Wales.

He started with a reminder that the Government had already pledged, in its 1967 Local

Government in Wales White Paper, to establish a Welsh Council ‘with advisory and promo-

tional functions’ and that the Government would consider, after the Redclie-Maud and

Wheatley Commissions, ‘the possibility of a further strengthening of the Council’s respon-

sibility and membership’. Crossman suggested that once those two Commissions had

reported, the Government should ‘consider what room there is for an elected, or partly

elected, council which [. . .] would not add a third tier to Welsh local government or absorb

deliberative functions, which we may nd more suitably discharged within the existing

unitary system by the Welsh Grand Committee’. A Welsh Council formed part of Plan A,

although Crossman conceded that “it might not reach its nal form until the early ‘70s”.

If Plan A was to help, in Crossman’s words, establish ‘our bona des’, there would be

a need to ‘say before the end of the present Parliament what further measures we intend

to take in the next’. Crossman accepted that there was limited scope for ‘thinking much

further’ on this while the Government awaited the reports of the English and Scottish

Royal Commissions, but it could ‘give some preliminary thought to the two suggestions

put forward at our meeting [on 18 July] namely for a National Assembly for Scotland and

a Royal Commission on Scottish Government with a wide terms of reference’. Crossman

noted that an Assembly might look ‘like a rst step towards a federal system’ and could be

a rival to Westminster and its organs such as the Scottish Grand Committee. However, he

also pondered whether, if it were ‘oated’, it could become the subject of a study by Royal

Commission.

While the various elements that might come together to form Plan A had

been debated for several months, what came next (i.e. Plan B) was far less well developed.

However, even at this highly tentative stage, and while focussed around Scotland, the

spectre of kicking the substantive issue of devolution to a Royal Commission was hover-

ing in the background.

12 A. EVANS

Rather predicably, Crossman’s memorandum (which was circulated to other Ministers

on 31 July) drew an immediate response from the Welsh Oce. On 9 August 1968, George

Thomas wrote to the Lord Privy Seal making clear that, in his and his Welsh Oce

colleagues opinion, the Crossman proposals would not ‘be of net political benet to

Wales’.- While Thomas agreed with Crossman’s stance so far as it related to educating

public opinion (the ‘bash the nationalists’ bit of the approach) and was ‘glad to see the

proposals for strengthening the Welsh Oce’ - although he rather acidly noted that ‘no

great praise can be expected for implementing election promises’ – he felt that any

benet in this eld would be ‘more than oset’ by the harm which he felt the Government

would ‘inict on ourselves’ through Crossman’s parliamentary proposals.

The Welsh Grand Committee meeting in Cardi would, Thomas conceded, ‘well arouse

some interest in Wales’, however he argued that this might not be to the Government’s

benet. Essentially, Thomas expressed concern at the fact that even if the Welsh Grand

Committee’s remit was to be extended to include debates on the Estimates, ‘it will not be

possible to show that the Committee is taking real decisions of importance’. Further, Thomas

feared that opposition members would hijack the Committee’s meetings to ‘draw attention to

the limited powers and responsibilities of the Committee’ and of the Welsh Oce.

Thomas had no more enthusiasm for a Welsh Select Committee. He noted that a recent

meeting of the Welsh Labour group of MPs had shown ‘an overwhelming feeling against the

proposal’ and argued that a Select Committee would clash, and overlap, with a newly

enhanced Welsh Council and absorb the Welsh Oce’s resources at the expense of the

Council.

Thomas had long thrown his weight behind a Welsh Council and his letter marked yet

another missive in the Welsh Oce’s campaign for a new Council for Wales. Thomas

objected to the language in Crossman’s memorandum about the Welsh Council not

adding an extra tier of government or potentially clashing in its deliberative role to

a Welsh Grand Committee. Thomas urged ‘less negative’ language to be employed if

the possibility of a Welsh Council ‘is really to be kept open’ and expressed his regret that

the proposals of successive Welsh Secretaries on this topic had been ‘set aside’.

Finally, Thomas noted that Crossman’s Plan B made no mention of Wales. Expressing

his view that the next Labour manifesto needed ‘a clear and carefully thought out

programme for Wales and Scotland’ if it was to ‘carry any weight’ in those areas,

Thomas made clear (again) his view that a ‘partly elected, partly nominated’ Welsh

Council ‘taking over non-parliamentary functions from the multiplicity of nominated

bodies now operating in the eld between central and local government’ should be at

the heart of Labour’s oer to Wales.

On 27 August 1968, there would be a further attempt to resolve the Welsh question

when Crossman and the Lord Privy Seal met the Welsh Secretary. However, George

Thomas used the meeting to reinforce his claims that the proposals would not be of

‘net political benet to Wales’, that the parliamentary proposals would in fact cause

‘positive harm’, and that an empowered Welsh Council was ‘a much more satisfactory

way of meeting Welsh requirements and wishes’.

Crossman drew the meeting to a close

by reminding Thomas that the Prime Minister had invited the territorial secretaries and

the Lord Privy Seal and Chief Whip to explore the practical and technical problems and

issues which might arise from the Scottish and Welsh grand committees meeting in their

localities, alongside new select committees.' Accordingly, ‘whether or not the proposals

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 13

[. . .] were rmly rejected on their merits’ they would continue with exploring the practi-

calities in the hope that, if the Government did decide to go ahead, the proposals could

be implemented in the next parliamentary session.

Notwithstanding this ‘show must go on’ approach, it was abundantly clear that, with-

out unanimity from the territorial secretaries of State, the Crossman plan was doomed.

And so in September, after nearly nine months of intensive discussion, Crossman wrote to

the Prime Minister. It was clear that Plan A lacked sucient political support, with

Crossman noting that George Thomas ‘had suddenly felt compunction’ with all of the

plan while there was ‘no great enthusiasm in Scotland’. Having discussed the matter with

the Chief Whip and Lord Privy Seal, Crossman now reported that the three of them were

‘in entire agreement that though it could have been useful if launched eight months ago,

Plan A might well be counter-productive if we suddenly announced our conversion to it

a few weeks before the new session starts’.

With Plan A looking doomed, by September it was clear that the idea of a Royal

Commission was not just in the background but picking up steam. However, while

Crossman had been clear that Plan A was no longer viable, he expressed reluctance at

the idea of a Commission. Mentioning a rumour that he had heard of a Royal Commission

on Home Rule being oated at Labour conference, Crossman stressed that he would not

like to adopt this expedient unless it was really clear that we had nothing better to

propound”.

Of course, however, as the various meetings which Crossman had either chaired or

attended and the correspondence he had engaged in with other ministers since the

beginning of 1968 attested, the Government could not agree anything better to pro-

pound as an answer to the nationalist parties.

Embracing the expedient: the adoption of a commission on the constitution

as government policy

By the close of September 1968, while Plan A’s doom seemed certain, those who had been

tasked with exploring the potential implications were still diligently pursuing their task to

completion.

This culminated in a rather curious letter from the Lord Privy Seal to the

Prime Minister on 27 September. Opening by noting that ‘it was generally felt that the

time is not appropriate for pursuing “Plan A”’, he nonetheless felt that the Prime Minister

might like a summary of where Ministers had got to in scoping out this now dead-rubber

idea. According to the Lord Privy Seal, the idea of sending the Grand Committees to meet

in their respective capitals was considered to have ‘very considerable practical diculties

for Ministers, Members, and sta of the House’. However, these diculties were not fatal

and ‘could be overcome if the proposal were otherwise thought suciently desirable’.

Select Committees, it was judged, would pose fewer practical diculties and could be

feasible if stang was assured. Despite noting that this was now an ‘academic’ exercise,

the Lord Privy Seal told the Prime Minister that he would still seek the views of the Clerk of

the House of Commons on the provision of Clerks.

Certainly, it seemed that the time had come for a decision to be made on the way

forward. On 3 October 1968, JJ Nunn, a Civil Servant in No.10 Downing Street, wrote to the

Prime Minister, noting that ‘there are some questions now outstanding on devolution’.

Nunn therefore suggested that the Prime Minister might wish to reconvene the group of

14 A. EVANS

Ministers which had met in July to address these issues.

Such a meeting would be an

opportunity to formally decide whether to agree with the Lord President’s view that Plan

A was dead, it would also be an appropriate forum for deciding another proposal. Namely,

a ‘suggestion made to him [Wilson] orally by the Home Secretary (James Callaghan) [. . .]

for a Royal Commission’. Crucially, this would not just be a sequel to the 1950s Royal

Commission on Scotland, but would ‘consider the whole issue of unitary government and

federalism, including the arrangements in Northern Ireland’.

The key meeting was scheduled for 23 October. It would be a meeting ‘concerned

mainly with the broad issues of the timing and tactics of the Government’s approach to

the problems of nationalism and devolution during the next two or three years’. In

determining that approach, Ministers would discuss proposals which had been put

forward by the Home Secretary (James Callaghan) and Richard Crossman. Both agreed

that Crossman’s original Plan A proposals ‘would now by themselves be too little and too

late’, but diered on an alternative approach to the issue. In one last attempt to frame the

Government’s devolution policy, Crossman suggested that they should wait to see what

the Redclie-Maud Commission concluded about the top tier of local government in

England, ‘should themselves work out proposals for regional government in England and

some form of Home Rule in Wales and Scotland’. Previous ideas about reforming parlia-

ment and extending administrative devolution could then be slotted into this work. It was

only if Redclie-Maud did not provide the basis for a system of regional government in

England which could accompany devolved government in Scotland and Wales, that

Crossman thought a Royal Commission could be desirable.

Callaghan, on the other hand, felt that the government should act immediately to

‘appoint a Royal or Constitutional Commission’. Such a Commission would have a wide

ranging terms of reference which encompassed the entire system of government as it

related to the constituent parts of the UK and the Channel Islands and Isle of Man and

‘consider if any changes are expedient’. Importantly, and in a marked contrast with the

Ministerial Committee on Devolution and subsequent debates within government,

Callaghan was able to command the support of both the Scottish and Welsh Secretaries

of State.

Callaghan argued that a new Commission would not impede the currently

established Royal Commissions on Scottish and English local government nor prevent the

adoption of further administrative devolution or parliamentary reform if they were so

desired.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the considerable time already spent attempting to

address these issues within the government, Ministers opted for Callaghan’s approach

over Crossman’s. It was agreed that they should report to Cabinet that a Constitutional

Commission should be established and that it should be mentioned in the forthcoming

Queen’s Speech.

The following day, 24 October, the Cabinet formally discussed the proposed

Constitutional Commission. Having once rejected a Royal Commission (on industrial

relations) on the grounds that ‘they take minutes and last years’,

Wilson conceded

that he was alive to the prospect of the Commission being criticised as a ‘means of

delaying action’. In response, he proposed that the Commission’s terms of reference

should include a ‘dynamic element’ to enable them to ‘take account of developments

which occurred while it was sitting’ (such as the publication of Redclie-Maud and

Wheatley and events in Northern Ireland). While, during discussion, there was some

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 15

suggestion that the Government should take more time before committing itself to

a Royal Commission, other voices argued that there was already an expectation that

a Commission would be announced in the Queen’s Speech and that there was no

reason why the Government would be precluded from taking action, if desired, while

the Commission was in progress. It was clear that the decision to proceed with

a Commission had already been eectively taken, all that remained to be determined

was the Commission’s terms of reference and the text to be included in the Queen’s

Speech.

On 29 October, the Cabinet resumed its deliberations and were presented with an

additional memorandum from Callaghan, including revised proposed terms of reference.

The Cabinet was informed that the text in the Queen’s Speech would be framed as

beginning consultations on a Royal Commission as the Government would need to

hold talks with other parties and governments (the Northern Irish government and the

governments of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands). As a sign of his sensitivity on the

issue, Wilson once again mentioned the potential charge of ‘avoiding decisions’, arguing

that he would make it clear during the Queen’s Speech that the Commission would not

preclude action in the areas covered within its remit.

Furthermore, Wilson argued that

by appointing a Commission, it would be necessary for the Government to take ‘a view on

the problems before the Commission’.

During the Cabinet’s discussion it was suggested that in an ideal world, the

Government would have devolution policies in place before establishing a Commission

‘so as to rebut the suggestion that the appointment of a Commission was no more than

a delaying device’, however it was accepted to be ‘unrealistic’ for the government to

produce ‘satisfactory policies within a matter of months’. A rueful reference perhaps to the

attempts since the start of 1968 to produce a government policy on devolution. At the

end of the discussion, the Cabinet agreed that an announcement of consultations on

a commission should be included in the Queen’s Speech and that a Ministerial committee

should be established to consider the questions arising from the creation of a Commission

on the Constitution.

A day later, on 30 October 1968, saw the State Opening of Parliament and the Queen’s

Speech.

The Queen’s Speech included the following section:

My Government will begin consultations on the appointment of a Commission on the

Constitution. The Commission would consider what changes may be needed in the central

institutions of Government in relation to the several countries, nations and regions of the

United Kingdom. It would also examine relationships with the Channel Islands and the Isle of

Man.

As Wilson had anticipated, it did not take long for the Government to be accused of using

a Commission as a means of kicking the devolution can down the road. In his contribution

to the Queen’s Speech debate, the leader of the Opposition (Edward Heath) claimed that

the Government hoped that a Commission would ‘see them out for the rest of this

Parliament’.

In reply, Wilson argued that the negotiations on establishing the Commission would

conclude swiftly and, although noting that the Commission would itself ‘take some time

to report’, Parliament would ‘be free to act’ where needed while the Commission was

underway.

To demonstrate his bona des, Wilson said that the Government would take

16 A. EVANS

action to extend administrative devolution, stating that the Secretary of State for Wales

would get powers over health and shared responsibility over agriculture.

Nonetheless, claims of dodging the issue continued to arise during the Queen’s Speech

debate. Alick Buchanan-Smith, a Conservative MP (who would resign due to his pro-

devolution stance from Margaret Thatcher’s Shadow Cabinet in the late 1970s), lambasted

the consultations on a Commission as a mark of ‘the barrenness of Government thinking’

and accused the Government of displaying ‘genuine complacency and a lack of

urgency’.

Gwynfor Evans, the winner of the 1966 Carmarthen by-election and Leader

of Plaid Cymru, warned that ‘no one seems convinced that [. . .] (the Government) will take

any action as a result of any report (of the Commission)’ and told the Commons that the

idea was ‘thought to be a gimmick to “take the steam” out of Welsh and Scottish

nationalism’. Indeed, he challenged the Government to disprove this cynicism and

show that it was ‘something more than a time wasting gimmick’ by requiring that the

Commission produce a report in 18 months.

Critics were not conned to the opposition benches. JP Mackintosh, a Scottish Labour

MP who would long be a forceful proponent of devolution, had no qualms in expressing

his unhappiness with the idea of a Commission. Telling MPs he was ‘aghast at the thought

of sitting here for 3 or 4 years waiting for a group of people to produce some proposals’,

Mackintosh suggested that he could only ‘assume that that the reason the Government

have chosen to set up the Commission is because of a fundamental diculty in their ranks

in deciding on the matter’.

On 5 November, the Prime Minister and Home Secretary met at 10 Downing Street

(alongside senior Civil Servants, including Sir Burke Trend) to discuss the steps that

needed to be taken for the Commission to be established. Those present agreed that

the Commission should have members from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well

as a number of politicians and individuals drawn from professions such as the judiciary,

economics, academia, as well as representatives from local government, business and the

trades unions. It was further agreed that there should be at least one female member. In

terms of who the Chairman should be, it was agreed that the person ‘should be a major

national gure’. A wide and eclectic variety of names were thrown into the mix at this

stage including Lord (Rab) Butler, the Duke of Edinburgh, Jo Grimond MP, and Lord

Carrington. However, those were all ‘rejected for various reasons’. Instead, they decided

to approach the Lord Chancellor (Lord Gardiner) to see if he would accept the post.

The ”most promising” alternatives at this point appeared to be Sir Alec Douglas-Home or

Mr Justice Scarman. It was agreed that the Prime Minister, Home Secretary and Lord

President (Richard Crossman) should hold a follow-up meeting with the Lord Chancellor

to discuss the Commission’s chairmanship.

The meeting with the Lord Chancellor took place on 18 November. Unfortunately, and

despite the Prime Minister opening the meeting by oering him the job, the Lord

Chancellor declined praying in aid his existing commitments. After some discussion,

Lord Crowther (a former editor of The Economist) emerged as ‘the best candidate’ for

the role. Crowther had experience of chairing an ocial committee (he had been

Chairman of the Central Advisory Council for Education, a body established by the 1944

Education Act), and ‘so far as was known he had no xed ideas on devolution’.

Having been turned down by the Lord Chancellor, the Prime Minister and Home

Secretary seemed keen to secure the services of Lord Crowther. That very afternoon

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 17

they invited him to 10 Downing Street to ‘ask whether he would be willing to take on the

chairmanship’. After being told by the Prime Minister that he was their ‘rst choice for the

job’, Lord Crowther replied that it was a ‘great honour to be asked to serve’. While he

wondered whether “he was a big enough man for the job, he conceded that this ‘was the

sort of oer which ought to be accepted’ and asked for a few days to reect on the oer.

Shortly afterwards, and despite continuing concerns about his suitability for the role.

Crowther accepted the post.

Conclusion

The remaining membership of the Royal Commission was formally announced on

3 April 1969 and it held its rst meeting later that month (29 April).

The Commission

was faced a daunting task in seeking to address terms of reference that were wide-

ranging and ambiguous that encompassed the entirety of the UK’s territorial constitution

and the relationships between the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands and the Isle

of Man.

In 1973, four years, two chairs (Lord Crowther died in 1972, his successor was Lord

Kilbrandon), a general election., and a change of governing party later (the Conservatives

defeated Labour at the 1970 General Election), the Commission nally reported.

The Commission failed to produce a unanimous report. Indeed, the ocial report was

accompanied by a Memorandum of Dissent penned by two commission members (Lord

Crowther-Hunt and Professor A.T. Peacock).

Division was rife even among the signa-

tories of the ocial report, with some members favouring legislative devolution for

Scotland and Wales, some advocating advisory or deliberative bodies for Scotland and

Wales, and some insisting on a pan-UK scheme of regional government.

As Bogdanor

has concluded, “it is not surprising that, faced with so wide a range of diering views [. . .]

most MPs greeted its publication with baement and even mirth

The report made minimal immediate impact and indeed seemed on all accounts to

have been overtaken by events. At least that was until the February 1974 General Election

which not only resulted in Labour returning to power but also saw the SNP secure seven

seats—and thus led to devolution becoming a prominent part of the Wilson and then

Callaghan governments policy programme.

The length of time it took for the Commission to report and its incredibly broad terms

of reference might give the impression that the decision to establish Royal Commission

was a cynical reex response to the challenge Wilson’s 1966–70 Government faced from

the SNP and Plaid Cymru. As one pair of academic experts on devolution have put it, the

Commission and its “vague terms of reference were ‘surely an attempt to drag the sting

from the issue [of devolution] whilst waiting for the nationalist tide to ebb”.

Indeed, Lord

Crowther told Edward Heath, at a meeting to discuss whether the Commission should

continue after the 1970 election, that ‘he had no illusions about the reasons for setting up

the [. . .] Commission or about the likely value of its ndings’.

In its leading article on

1 November 1973 (when the Royal Commission’s report was published), The Times

suggested that ‘it is sometimes said that a royal commission is a device for the avoidance

of action. If that is so, this is a royal commission par excellence’.

While expediency undoubtedly played an important role in Wilson’s considerations,

the story behind the establishment of the Royal Commission was far more nuanced in

18 A. EVANS

reality. Originally discussed, in vague terms, as a potential ‘Plan B’ or long-term response

to the challenge posed by nationalism, the Royal Commission was embraced in the

Autumn of 1968 because of the failure within the Government to align on a clear

programme of immediate steps (what Crossman would call Plan A) that could be taken

to respond to the challenge posed by the SNP and Plaid Cymru. By the summer of 1968,

despite several meetings of successive ministerial committees and working groups, it was

obvious that Cabinet Ministers, particularly the Secretaries of State for Wales and

Scotland, were unable or unwilling to compromise on a modest package of reforms. As

this article has demonstrated, it was only after this thorough examination, and exhaustion,

of alternative responses that opinion within the Cabinet coalesced behind a Royal

Commission as the least dicult option for showing that the Government had

a plausible response to the nationalist challenge.

Notes

1. The other being the Speaker’s Conference on Devolution 1919–20. For more on the Speaker’s

Conference, see: Evans, A. “A Lingering Diminuendo? The Conference on Devolution, 1919–20,”

Parliamentary History, 35 no. 3, (2016): 315–35; Evans, A. “An Interlude of Agreement?

A Reassessment of the Conference on Devolution’s ‘Consensus’ on Powers,” Contemporary

British History, 29 no. 4, (2015): 421–40

2. Bogdanor, V. Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford: OUP, 1999); Rawlings, R. “Riders on

the Storm: Wales, the Union, and Territorial Constitutional Crisis,” The Journal of Law and

Society, 42 no. 4, (2015): 471–2; Pentland, G. Edward “Heath, the Declaration of Perth and the

Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, 1966–70,” Twentieth Century British History, 26 no. 2,

(2015): 251–8; Mclean, I. and A. McMillan, State of the Union: Unionism and the alternatives in

the United Kingdom since 1707, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 158–70.

3. For a previous analysis which situates this discussions within a wider debate about reform of

the machinery of Government, see: Tanner, D. Richard Crossman, “Harold Wilson and devolu-

tion, 1966–70: the making of government policy,” Twentieth Century British History, 17 no. 4,

(2006): 545–78.

4. Mitchell, J. The Scottish Question, (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 74–86.

5. For more, on the historical context behind the debate on administrative and political

devolution for Scotland and Wales, see: Mitchell, J. Devolution in the UK, (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 2009), 16–39 and 40–66; Wyn Jones, R. and R. Scully, Wales

Says Yes Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum, (Cardi: University of Wales Press, 2012),

28–39; Evans, J. G., Devolution in Wales: claims and responses 1937–1979, (Cardi: University of

Wales Press, 2006); Mitchell, The Scottish Question, 38–155; McLean and McMillan, State of the

Union, 113–34 and 155–80; Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 110–65.

6. Mitchell, Devolution in the UK, 42–44; Evans, A. “‘This Welsh Problem’ Churchill and the

Creation of a Minister for Welsh Aairs,” Finest Hour: The Journal of Winston Churchill and

his times, 193 (2021): 35–36.

7. For a detailed account of the Hamilton by-election and its historical signicance, see: Mitchell,

J. Hamilton 1967: The by-election that transformed Scotland, (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2017).

8. Mitchell, The Scottish Question, 114

9. TNA. “PREM 13/2151. Memorandum from R. Crossman to H. Wilson,” dated

13 November 1967.

10. ”A Celtic Dawn,” (London: The Times, 24 November 1967): 11.

11. Crossman’s diaries are littered with references to regular lunches at the Garrick Club between

Crossman and journalists (see, for example: Crossman, R. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister,

(London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape), 1976, 610 and 731).

12. TNA. “PREM 13/2151”. Letter from B. Trend to H. Wilson, dated 4 December 1967.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 19

13. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from B. Trend to H. Wilson [attached to memorandum from WHQ

to H. Wilson, dated 9 February 1968].

14. At Crossman’s request, Shirley Williams and the Attorney General were also added as

Members (TNA. PREM 13/2151: Memorandum from WHQ to H. Wilson, dated

9 February 1968).

15. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from B. Trend to H. Wilson [attached to memorandum from WHQ

to H. Wilson, dated 9 February 1968].

16. Crossman, “The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister,” 724.

17. Ibid., 739.

18. Ibid., 742.

19. Ibid., 759.

20. Jones, D.L. Hughes Cledwyn, “Baron Cledwyn of Penrhos (1916–2001), politician,” Dictionary

of Welsh Biography, (2011) https://biography.wales/article/s8-HUGH-CLE-1916#?c=0&m=

0&s=0&cv=6&manifest=https%3A%2F%2Fdamsssl.llgc.org.uk%2Fiiif%2F2.0%2F1490010%

2Fmanifest.json&xywh=1204%2C1545%2C3340%2C2749.

21. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, p.771.

22. Ibid.

23. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from B. Trend to H. Wilson, dated 21 June 1968.

24. As briey mentioned earlier, a Council for Wales and Monmouthshire had been established

by the Attlee Government (who strongly resisted calls for a Welsh Secretary and Welsh Oce)

in 1949. By 1967/68, this forum had ceased to exist after several years of a moribund

existence. In its 1967 White Paper, Local Government in Wales, the Welsh Oce had proposed

the creation of a new advisory and promotional ‘Council for Wales’ to advise the Welsh Oce

on economic, cultural, tourism and transport policies and to review and promote the work of

various existing nominated bodies (e.g. the Tourist Board) (Welsh Oce, Local Government in

Wales, Cardi: HMSO, 1967, Cmnd 3340, pp.46–60

25. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from B. Trend to H. Wilson, dated 21 June 1968.

26. Ibid.

27. Wilson, G. SNP: The Turbulent Years 1960–1990, Edinburgh: Scots Independent (Newsletters),

2009, p.58.

28. See: Pentland, “Edward Heath, the Declaration of Perth and the Scottish Conservative and

Unionist Party,” 1966–70, 249–73.

29. The leadership of the Civil Service was particularly concerned about the prospect of devolu-

tion. Most notably, the newly appointed Head of the Home Civil Service, William Armstrong

wrote in July that while he understood that ‘some further measure of devolution may well be

politically desirable [. . .] nearly all the proposals which are now in mind would be at the cost

of some administrative eciency’. He therefore proposed that, should the Prime Minister

agree, that he be permitted to undertake a review of the stang and administrative

implications of devolution (TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from W. Armstrong to M. Halls,

dated 8 July 1968).

30. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from B. Trend to H. Wilson, dated 21 June 1968.

31. This was an inner cabinet of senior Ministers formed by Wilson at the time of the 1968 April

reshue. As Hennessy explains, it was tasked with steering the Government’s political

strategy and agenda (Hennessy, P. The Prime Minister, The Oce and its holders since 1945,

London: Allen Lane, 2000, p. 320

32. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Memorandum from B. Trend to H. Wilson, dated 17 July 1968.

33. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from R. Crossman to H. Wilson, dated 25 June 1968.

34. Ibid.

35. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from G. Thomas to H. Wilson, dated 28 June 1968.

36. Ibid.

37. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from W. Ross to H. Wilson, dated 8 July 1968.

38. Although regional councils might just work in England ‘where the central government

would be operating on a dierent geographical level’, Ross feared that in Scotland and

Wales they could only operate on a ‘basis of virtual scal and therefore economic

20 A. EVANS

separation, or else in a way that left central government with little power while still

having to carry the main nancial burden’. This was not a proposition that Ross was

willing to entertain.

39. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Memorandum from B. Trend to H. Wilson, dated 17 July 1968.

40. Ibid.

41. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from PL Gregson to H. Wilson, dated 6 September 1968.

42. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Memorandum from R. Crossman, dated 24 July 1968.

43. Ibid.

44. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from G. Thomas to Lord Longford, dated 9 August 1968.

45. Ibid.

46. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Note of a meeting in the Lord President’s room on Tuesday

27 August 1968.

47. Ibid.

48. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from R. Crossman to H. Wilson, dated 23 September 1968.

49. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Note of a meeting held in the Lord Privy Seal’s room, Thursday

26 September 1968.

50. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from F. Peart to H. Wilson, dated 27 September 1968.

51. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from J.J. Nunn to H. Wilson, dated 3 October 1968.

52. TNA. PREM 13/2151. Letter from P.L. Gregson to G. Jones, dated 7 October 1968.

53. While JJ Nunn queried the strength of the case for including the Channel Islands and the Isle

of Man, there seemed to be little other challenge to their inclusion (TNA. PREM 13/3259.

Memorandum on devolution from J.J. Nunn to H. Wilson, dated 22 October 1968).

54. TNA. PREM 13/3259. Memorandum on devolution from J.J. Nunn to H. Wilson, dated

22 October 1968.

55. TNA. PREM 13/3259. Memorandum from WHG to H Wilson, dated 23 October 1968.

56. H. Wilson quoted in: Byrne, C. N. Randall and K. Theakston, Disjunctive Prime Ministerial

Leadership in British Politics: from Baldwin to Brexit, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020,

p.125.

57. TNA. CAB 128/43. Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, Thursday 24 October.

58. Indeed, early in 1969 a Select Committee on Scottish Aairs was established by the House of

Commons as part of Crossman’s wider programme of specialist select committees (see:

Aylett, P. “Crossman and Beyond: House of Commons Select Committees in the 1960s,”

Parliamentary History, 38 no. (3) (2019): 425–6

59. TNA. CAB 128/43. Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, Tuesday 29 October.

60. The tight timeframe between the MISC 215 group and Cabinet discussions on the proposed

Commission and the Queen’s Speech was drawn repeatedly to the Prime Minister’s attention

(TNA. PREM 215/3259. Memorandum from J.J. Nunn to H. Wilson, dated 28 October; and

Memorandum from J.J. Nunn to H. Wilson, dated 29 October 1968) and prompted an urgent

note from Downing Street to the Palace to advise the Queen that the text of the speech

would now include additional text relating to a Commission on the Constitution and to

secure her approval for a Royal Warrant to be issued establishing such a body (TNA. PREM

215/3259. Letter from M. Halls to M. Adeane, dated 29 October 1968; and Letter from

M. Adeane to M. Halls, dated 29 October 1968).

61. HL Debates (Hansard) 30 October 1968, Vol. 772, c.4.

62. Ibid., c.28.

63. Ibid., cc.35–36

64. Ibid., c.38.

65. Ibid., cc.121–2

66. Ibid., cc.524–5

67. Ibid., cc.553–6

68. TNA. PREM 13/3259. Record of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday

5 November 1968 to discuss the setting up of the Commission on the Constitution. The

other action point from the meeting was the establishment of a Ministerial Committee,

chaired by the Home Secretary, to ‘examine matters relating to the Commission on the

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 21

Constitution’, including the coordination of evidence from Government departments to the

Commission.

69. TNA. PREM 13/3259. Record of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Monday

18 November 1968 to discuss the Chairmanship of the Commission on the Constitution.

70. TNA. PREM 13/3259. Letter from P.L. Gregson to B.C. Cubbon, dated 18 November 1968.

71. TNA. PREM 13/3259. Letter from B. Cubbon to P. Gregson, dated 26 November 1968.

72. HC Deb (Hansard) 3 April 1969, Vol. 781, c.176w; HC Deb (Hansard) 1 May 1969, Vol. 782,

c.1590.

73. Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 171–2.

74. Royal Commission on the Constitution, Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969–1973,

Volume I, Report, London: HMSO, 1973, Cmnd. 5460; Royal Commission on the Constitution,

Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969–1973, Volume II: Memorandum of Dissent London:

HMSO, 1973, Cmnd. 5460—I.

75. Evans, A. “Back to the Future? Warnings from History for a Future UK Constitutional

Convention,” The Political Quarterly, 86 no. (1), (2015): 26–30.

76. Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 172–5.

77. Wyn Jones and Scully, Wales Says Yes Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum, 31.

78. TNA. PREM 15/74. Future of the Royal Commission on the Constitution: note on meeting

between the Prime Minister and Lord Crowther, dated 28 July 1970.

79. Away from the Centre: Who Wants Devolution?, London: The Times, 1 November 1973, p.19.

80. Tanner Richard Crossman, “Harold Wilson and devolution, 1966–70: the making of govern-

ment policy,” 576–7.

Disclosure statement

No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID

Adam Evans http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4150-1517

Bibliography

Aylett, P. “Crossman and Beyond: House of Commons Select Committees in the 1960s.”

Parliamentary History 38, no. 3 (2019): 408–430. doi:10.1111/1750-0206.12467 .

Bogdanor, V. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford: OUP, 1999.

Byrne, C., N. Randall, and K. Theakston Disjunctive Prime Ministerial Leadership in British Politics: From

Baldwin to Brexit. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

Crossman, R. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1976.

Evans, A. “Back to the Future? Warnings from History for a Future UK Constitutional Convention.” The

Political Quarterly 86, no. 1 (2015a): 24–32. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12135 .

Evans, A. “An Interlude of Agreement? A Reassessment of the Conference on Devolution’s

‘Consensus’ on Powers.” Contemporary British History 29, no. 4 (2015b): 421–440. doi:10.1080/

13619462.2015.1015421 .

Evans, A. “A Lingering Diminuendo? The Conference on Devolution, 1919–20.” Parliamentary History

35, no. 3 (2016): 315–335. doi:10.1111/1750-0206.12238 .

Evans, A. “This Welsh Problem” Churchill and the Creation of a Minister for Welsh Aairs.” Finest

Hour: The Journal of Winston Churchill and His Times 193 (2021): 35–36.

Evans, J. G. Devolution in Wales: Claims and Responses 1937-1979. Cardi: University of Wales Press,

2006.

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons Ocial Report. Fifth Series. 772 vols.

London: House of Commons, November 4, 1968a.

22 A. EVANS

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons Ocial Report. Fifth Series. 772 vols.

London: House of Commons, October 30, 1968b.

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons Ocial Report. Fifth Series. 782 vols.

London: House of Commons, May 1, 1969a.

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons Ocial Report. Fifth Series. 781 vols.

London: House of Commons, April 3, 1969b.

Hennessy, P. The Prime Minister, the Oce and Its Holders Since 1945. London: Allen Lane, 2000.

Jones, D. L. H. C. “Baron Cledwyn of Penrhos (1916-2001), Politician.” Dictionary of Welsh Biography

(2011). https://biography.wales/article/s8-HUGH-CLE-1916#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=6&manifest=

https%3A%2F%2Fdamsssl.llgc.org.uk%2Fiiif%2F2.0%2F1490010%2Fmanifest.json&xywh=

1204%2C1545%2C3340%2C2749 .

Mclean, I., and A. McMillan State of the Union: Unionism and the Alternatives in the United Kingdom

Since 1707. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Mitchell, J. Devolution in the UK. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009.

Mitchell, J. The Scottish Question. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Mitchell, J. Hamilton 1967: The By-Election That Transformed Scotland. Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2017.

Oce, Wales. Local Government in Wales, Cmnd 3340: Cardi: HMSO, 1967.

Pentland, G. E. H. “Edward Heath, the Declaration of Perth and the Scottish Conservative and

Unionist Party, 1966-70.” Twentieth Century British History 26, no. 2 (2015): 249–273. doi:10.

1093/tcbh/hwu064 .

Rawlings, R. “Riders on the Storm: Wales, the Union, and Territorial Constitutional Crisis.” Journal of

Law & Society 42, no. 4 (2015): 471–498. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6478.2015.00722.x .

Royal Commission on the Constitution. Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969-1973, Volume II:

Memorandum of Dissent, Cmnd. 5460—I London: HMSO, 1973a.

Royal Commission on the Constitution. Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969-1973Volume I,

Report. London: HMSO, 1973b, Cmnd. 5460.

Tanner, D. R. C. “Richard Crossman, Harold Wilson and Devolution, 1966-70: The Making of

Government Policy.” Twentieth Century British History 17, no. 4 (2006): 545–578. doi:10.1093/

tcbh/hwl026 .

The Times, A Celtic Dawn, p.11, Accessed November 24, 1967, London: The Times.

The Times, Away from the Centre: Who Wants Devolution?, p.19, Accessed November 1, 1973,

London: The Times.

Wilson, G. SNP: The Turbulent Years 1960-1990, 2009, Edinburgh: Scots Independent (Newsletters).

Wyn Jones, R., and R. Scully Wales Says Yes Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum. Cardi:

University of Wales Press, 2012.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 23

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.

"This Welsh Problem": Churchill and the Creation of a Minister for Welsh Affairs

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2021

Adam Evans

This article explores the background to, and development of, the office of the Minister for Welsh Affairs, established by Churchill's Government in October 1951.

A Lingering Diminuendo? The Conference on Devolution, 1919-20

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2016

Adam Evans

This article looks at one of the more obscure moments in British constitutional history, the rise of federal devolution in the United Kingdom in the early 20th century and, in particular, the context to the Conference on Devolution that sat between October 1919 and April 1920. The conference, as this article will briefly discuss, has been relegated to footnote status in the historiography on federal devolution and British politics. However, while the conference has not been the subject of detailed academic attention, the claim that devolution and constitutional reform in this period was a by-product of the crisis in Ireland pre-partition has gathered considerable traction among political historians. This article will redress both the paltry analysis of the Conference on Devolution within the academic literature and the Irish-centric historiography on federal devolution in the early 20th century. On the latter front, this article will demonstrate that the conference was the product of forces that extended beyond the Irish crisis, in particular parliamentary congestion. As for the conference itself, this article will use a wide range of archival sources to examine critically the conference's deliberations and in doing so will challenge prevailing assumptions regarding the supposedly one firm source of agreement during the conference: the powers that the devolved bodies should enjoy.

An Interlude of Agreement? A Reassessment of the Conference on Devolution's ‘Consensus’ on Powers

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2015

Adam Evans

In the decades since the Conference on Devolution's proceedings concluded in stalemate in April 1920, the Conference has been consigned to the margins of political and constitutional history. However, within this limited literature, one interpretation of the Conference's proceedings has been universally held: that the subject of the powers the devolved legislatures should enjoy was a rare source of consensus. This article challenges this orthodoxy, using archival evidence from the Conference to demonstrate that while a consensus on powers may have existed on paper, such agreement certainly did not exist in practice.

Back to the Future? Warnings from History for a Future UK Constitutional Convention

Article

Full-text available

Mar 2015
POLIT QUART

Adam Evans

Amid the fallout from the Scottish independence referendum, a UK constitutional convention has been proposed as a mechanism to take stock not only of the referendum, but also of the past fifteen years of devolution. However, despite longstanding conceptions of British constitutional development, a constitutional convention would not herald a brave new world for the UK's constitution. As the article highlights, in the past hundred years there have been two attempts to treat the territorial constitution in the round: the Speaker's Conference on Devolution, 1919–1920 and the Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969–1973. This article examines both of these forums, arguing that they provide clear warnings for a future UK constitutional convention, in particular the threat of internal division that any such forum risks facing. A danger that this article highlights is heightened by the associated difficulty of reaching agreement across the UK's ‘state of unions’.

Devolution in the UK

Book

Jun 2009

James Mitchell

This book explains devolution today in terms of the evolution of past structures of government in the component parts of the United Kingdom. It highlights the importance of the English dimension and the role that England's territorial politics played in constitutional debates. Similarities and differences between how the components of the UK were governed are described. The book argues that the UK should be understood now, even more than pre-devolution, as a state of distinct unions, each with its own deeply rooted past and trajectory. Using previously unpublished primary material, as well as a wealth of secondary work, it offers a comprehensive account of the territorial constitution of the UK from the early twentieth century through to the operation of the new devolved system of government.

The Scottish Question

Book

Jun 2014

James Mitchell

Disjunctive Prime Ministerial Leadership in British Politics: From Baldwin to Brexit

Book

Jan 2020

‘The extent to which prime ministers make the political weather or succumb to it has always puzzled political leadership scholars. Confronting such a question, this book presents meaningful comparisons of the circumstances and challenges of prime ministerial leadership, within a framework of disjunctive leadership. Byrne, Randall and Theakston expertly utilise Skowronek’s classic political time approach during three critical junctures in modern British politics. Crucially they argue for a deeper understanding of the role of prime ministerial agency within this “rhythm of time”. A fascinating, comparative evaluation of the exercise of prime ministerial power.’ –Mark Bennister, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Lincoln, UK ‘This book could hardly be more timely or judicious in its attempt to help us understand how effective prime ministerial leadership can be practiced during times of crisis. The authors deserve enormous praise for presenting us with an alternative and highly distinctive take on contemporary British political history which focusses on the successes and failures of disjunctive prime ministers. Through applying the concept of political time to a detailed and scholarly analysis of prime ministerial performance, the authors present us with a range of exciting new insights into the character of successful leadership and the dynamics that have helped shape the evolution of British politics. This is a must-read for students and scholars with a broad interest in UK politics.’ –Peter Kerr, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Birmingham, UK This book illustrates the cyclical pattern in the kinds of dilemmas that confront political leaders and, in particular, disjunctive political leaders affiliated with vulnerable political regimes. The volume covers three major episodes in disjunction: the interwar crisis between 1923 and 1940, afflicting Stanley Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald and Neville Chamberlain; the collapse of Keynesian welfarism between 1970 and 1979, dealt with by Edward Heath, Harold Wilson and James Callaghan; and the ongoing crisis of neoliberalism beginning in 2008, affecting Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. Based on this series of case studies of disjunctive prime ministers, the authors conclude that effective disjunctive leadership is premised on judicious use of the prime ministerial toolkit in terms of deciding whether, when and where to act, effective diagnostic and choice framing, and the ability to manage both crises and regimes. Christopher Byrne is Lecturer in Politics in the School of Social Sciences at Leeds Beckett University, UK. Nick Randall is Senior Lecturer in British Politics at Newcastle University, UK. Kevin Theakston is Professor of British Government in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Leeds, UK.

Crossman and Beyond: House of Commons Select Committees in the 1960s

Article

Oct 2019

Philip Aylett

Assessments of the work and impact of house of commons investigatory select committees during the 1960s usually centre on the success or otherwise of the new ‘specialist’ committees established in the second half of the decade. This article uses both quantitative and qualitative evidence to give a more rounded picture, including both new and existing committees. It concludes that 1960s select committees were more popular, active and influential than has previously been appreciated. It also argues that there has been an overvaluation of the role of the Labour cabinet minister, Richard Crossman, in promoting and establishing these committees, and that support for committee work on both front benches and back benches was rather more widespread and substantial than has been assumed. In particular, the article contends that Harold Wilson's role in advancing the work of select committees has been underestimated.

State of the Union

Article

Jan 2006

This is the first survey of Unionism, the ideology of most of the rulers of the United Kingdom for the past 300 years. Because it was taken so much for granted, it has never been properly studied. In the twilight of Unionism, it is possible to see its long shadow over British and imperial history since 1707. The book studies the crucial time points at which the Union was built up and partly taken down: 1707, 1800, 1886, 1921, 1974, and 1997 to date. Primordial Unionism (the belief that the union is good in and for itself) now survives only in Northern Ireland. Instrumental Unionism supported the Union as a means to other ends, such as the Empire and the Welfare State; but the first is gone and the second is now evolving differently in the four territories of the UK. Representation and finance are the unsolved, and arguably insoluble problems of the post-1997 devolution settlement.

Riders on the Storm: Wales, the Union, and Territorial Constitutional Crisis

Article

Dec 2015
J LAW SOC

Richard Rawlings

The United Kingdom continues to undergo a rapid process of constitutional change, with an ongoing redistribution of law-making and governmental powers to different parts of the Union under an expanded rubric of ‘devolution'. This article illuminates a pervasive sense of territorial constitutional crisis and opportunity in the most recent period, familiarly associated with, but not confined to, Scotland. Constructive and flexible federal-type responses inside a famously uncodified constitution are championed. Wales, commonly treated as a junior partner in the United Kingdom, presents special challenges for constitutional and legal analysis and distinctive perspectives on the Union which have not received the attention they deserve. In tackling this deficiency, the article elaborates a ‘new Union’ concept of a looser and less hierarchical set of constitutional arrangements in which several systems of parliamentary government are grounded in popular sovereignty and cooperate for mutual benefit.

The Wilson government, the rise of nationalism and the road to the royal commission on the constitution, 1966-1968

Recommended publications

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STATUS REPORT OF SRI LANKA -2016

Responding to the Calls to Action of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Exploring the...

JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: A BALANCE BETWEEN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

European Union: aiming to preserve variety of port capacities