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Discourses of Moral and Ecological Crisis in the Czech Post-Socialist Transformation*

Authors:

Abstract

This chapter analyses the discourses of moral and ecological crisis in the first years of Czech postsocialist transformation and their relation to the late socialist period. The chapter investigates how liberal ecologists came to understand what they diagnosed as ecological crisis as a moral crisis and a failure of state socialism. It explores how Josef Vavroušek and Bedřich Moldan, former state-socialist experts who became environment ministers after 1989, came to see state socialism as anti-ecological, aligned themselves to varying degrees with market liberalism and put their hopes into legal mechanisms and environmental ethics that would regulate the markets. It also suggests that the two ministers’ discourse of ecological-cum-moral crisis as at once a specific historical experience and a part of global crisis was another way to signal a ‘return’ to Europe and participate in global politics. The first part of the chapter discusses how Vavroušek used the language of cybernetics to describe ecological crisis as a failure of state socialism and propose a new global environmental programme, while emphasising the values of humanism and sustainability as a corrective to the market economy. The second part examines the way Moldan used the figure of the tragedy of commons, presenting ecological crisis as a case against state socialism and for the market, and his belief in Christian values as neoliberalism’s moral compass.
Discourses of Moral and Ecological Crisis in the Czech
Post-Socialist Transformation
Martin Babička
Institute of Contemporary History, Czech Academy of Sciences
Author accepted manuscript
Babička, Martin. "Discourses of Moral and Ecological Crisis in the Czech Post-Socialist
Transformation." In East Central European Crisis Discourses in the Twentieth Century,
pp. 368-391. Routledge, 2024.
Published version available at:
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003438298-18/discourses-
moral-ecological-crisis-czech-post-socialist-transformation-martin-babi%C4%8Dka
Abstract
This chapter analyses the discourses of moral and ecological crisis in the first years of Czech
postsocialist transformation and their relation to the late socialist period. The chapter
investigates how liberal ecologists came to understand what they diagnosed as ecological crisis
as a moral crisis and a failure of state socialism. It explores how Josef Vavroušek and Bedřich
Moldan, former state-socialist experts who became environment ministers after 1989, came to
see state socialism as anti-ecological, aligned themselves to varying degrees with market
liberalism and put their hopes into legal mechanisms and environmental ethics that would
regulate the markets. It also suggests that the two ministers’ discourse of ecological-cum-moral
crisis as at once a specific historical experience and a part of global crisis was another way to
signal a ‘return’ to Europe and participate in global politics. The first part of the chapter
discusses how Vavroušek used the language of cybernetics to describe ecological crisis as a
failure of state socialism and propose a new global environmental programme, while
emphasising the values of humanism and sustainability as a corrective to the market economy.
The second part examines the way Moldan used the figure of the tragedy of commons,
presenting ecological crisis as a case against state socialism and for the market, and his belief
in Christian values as neoliberalism’s moral compass.
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Discourses of Moral and Ecological Crisis in the Czech
Post-Socialist Transforma;on*
I would never agree with any sort of environmental fundamentalism, just as I don’t agree
with any economic or other one- sided view.1
—Josef Vavroušek (1994), Czechoslovak (federal)
Minister of the Environment (1990–1992)
We have come a long way since 1990, we have acquired many modern, more efficient
technologies; to say that we have moved away from the goal is communist propaganda, I
believe, nothing else. But some environmental activists say exactly that, and I
fundamentally disagree with them.2
—Bedřich Moldan (2000), Czech Minister of the
Environment (1990–1991)
The Second Congress of the Czech Union for Nature Conservation took place on November
20, 1989, just three days after the police supressed a student demonstration near the Czech
National Theatre in Prague, an event that came to symbolize the 1989 regime change. The
Union for Nature Conservation condemned the “disproportionate” police force used against
the students and joined calls for a society-wide “democratic dialogue.”3 The Union’s statement
also emphasized the need to respect and strengthen socialist legality when it came to
environmental crime and demanded the constitutional right to live in a healthy environment
and a right to information about the state of the environment.4 It also condemned the lack of
“qualitative changes in the whole system.” Influenced by systems theory, ecologists accented
the mutual links and complexities, including those between politics and the environment. In
the following days, the link between “moral,” “ecological,” “economic,” and “political”
“crises” was articulated in speeches and open letters written in the wake of the events of
November 17 by scholars, students, workers, and other groups.5
At the Congress, ecologist Pavel Trpák asserted that the “ecological crisis” in
Czechoslovakia had been worsened by a “deep moral crisis.”6 His speech may have not been
original, but it neatly encapsulated key ideas circulating in contemporary ecological
discourse—from Marxism and systems theory to Christianity and phenomenology—using
language that would only in the following days and months become associated with the fall of
state socialism. According to Trpák, people had lost the notions of love, compassion, and
reverence for life. Trpák’s charges were not new: in the past two decades, many Czechoslovak
ecologists, just like their colleagues elsewhere in the world, had grown skeptical of the ability
to solve environmental damage using the same technocratic approach that had caused it.7 Trpák
attacked the Cartesian logic behind contemporary anthropocentrism, which saw the world in
mechanistic terms and nature solely as an object of research and material resources. Even
Marx’s original idea of the interaction of production with the forces of nature was allegedly
overshadowed by an economizing view of nature seen as a mere passive object of human labor.
Trpák believed that the subjugation of nature created a technocratic myth of conquest, resulting
in ecological crisis. According to Trpák, such utilitarianism obscured the fact that humans were
a part of the natural world. He welcomed the way that the concept of “ecosystems,” with its
emphasis on wholeness and interconnections, brought that idea back to science; but a
paradigmatic shift in science alone would not be enough. Trpák hoped that returning to “love,
morality, ethics, and humility” would put an end to alienation from nature. The notion of
disharmony of ecosystems was, for Trpák, inextricably linked with a crisis within human
society. Although one could make an argument about what does or does not constitute a “true”
crisis, I wish to refrain from these debates by focusing on the ways in which discourses of
crisis were used at the time. As such, a crucial task of this chapter will be to understand how
the notion of different crises became entangled and what, according to the political actors,
linked them.
Social scientists, who were the first to tackle the relationship between ecology and post-
socialist politics in Eastern Europe, have given various explanations as to why interest in
environmental issues weakened in the 1990s. As environmental criticism gained traction in the
1980s, culminating in several protests in 1989, the subsequent sharp decline of political interest
in ecology across East Central Europe has left some scholars to consider that environmental
problems were suppressed by market reforms.8 Another explanation is that environmentalists
who had been active in the late socialist movement were deradicalized and became employed
by the state, or alternatively turned their expertise into a political career, while others joined
Western- style nongovernmental organizations.9 Some pointed to continuities with late
socialism, namely a technocratic, “apolitical” approach to environmental problems.10
Ecological modernization, an approach prevalent in Western Europe, also appeared
compatible, in Czechia, with both the continuity of technocratic decisions and the arrival of
the market economy.11 Yet, as others have noted, a more radical, grassroots movement that
opposed the state’s technocratic approach to environmental problems developed alongside
attempts to establish a green political party.12 Notably, historian Matěj Spurný has asserted that
a “normative” form of ecology, which called for a profound value change, was marginalized
after 1989 and a less radical, “instrumental” form of ecology, compatible with capitalism’s
economizing view of nature, prevailed.13 Although this chapter does not wish to challenge the
notion that there was a (not always clear- cut) divide between radicals and conformists,
Spurný’s definition obscures the fact that “instrumental ecology” was also heavily normative
and founded on an assumption of deep moral change, much like the whole post- socialist
transformation.
In this chapter, I investigate how liberal ecologists came to understand what they diagnosed
as ecological crisis as a moral crisis and a failure of state socialism. I explore how former state-
socialist experts who became ministers after 1989 came to see state socialism as anti-
ecological, aligned themselves to varying degrees with market liberalism, and put their hopes
into legal mechanisms and environmental ethics that would regulate the markets. As
neoliberals presented their reforms as a chance for a moral transformation of society, so did
market- friendly ecologists believe in the possibility of a moral change. Although
neoliberalism is often conflated with the idea of unregulated markets, it was not only
neoliberals who needed the state to protect the market legally: many neoliberals, in fact, also
advocated some sort of moral regulation.14 In a similar vein, in the early 1990s, Czech
neoliberals in charge of state reform legitimized privatization as a moral transformation of a
socialist society into market- oriented, liberal citizens.15 Because the ecologists I explore here
believed environmental damage was caused by how people thought and behaved under state
socialism, they hoped to create a system in which people would acquire liberal values and
choose to be environmentally responsible.
As this chapter will show, the liberal ecologists who came to power after 1989 supported
marketization, but they endeavored to supplant market logic with law and ethics, rooted in
Christianity and humanism, to alleviate what they saw as intertwined crises. I focus here on
Josef Vavroušek (1944–1995) and Bedřich Moldan (b. 1935), the first Czechoslovak and
Czech environment ministers, respectively. Moldan was a neoliberal environmentalist and
ecological modernizer who was ready to defend the state and the markets from ecological
protesters. A strong supporter of global institutions, Vavroušek, by contrast, believed in a third
way between socialism and neoliberalism. With a focus on ethics and shared responsibility, he
held communitarian views, which would soon bring him into conflict with radical pro- market
politicians. Both ministers saw a moral deficit in the crude economism of radical neoliberals,
but they also considered markets an indispensable part of democracy, without which they
thought no environmental reform would be possible. Building a new society upon the rubble
of communism, these ecologists agreed with neoliberals on a less technocratic and paternalistic
state, which they saw as a major cause of environmental problems. According to that view, a
one- party political system, central economic planning, and exploitation of nature were all
symptoms of the same flawed logic of modern rationalism in the hands of a single elite. For
that reason, once they succeeded in creating a liberal playing field in the political and economic
realms, their struggle for the ecological cause became a matter of legal reform and moral
change, while the crisis discourse largely lost traction.
Czech liberals thought of ecological and moral crisis in Czechoslovakia in relation to the
global environmental and spiritual crisis at the end of the twentieth century. Calls for a global
awakening of spirit and culture came in reaction to ecological crisis in the post-socialist region
from politicians such as Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, and Václav
Havel, the first president of post- socialist Czechoslovakia.16 In a similar vein, Al Gore, a US
vice president (1993–2001), advocated “sustainable growth,” postulating that greater
individual responsibility could provide a way out of what was chiefly a crisis of spirit.17 Gore’s
market environmentalism was close to that of Vavroušek, who wrote an afterword to his Earth
in the Balance, as they both proposed a spiritual renewal and strong global institutions as the
solution to environmental crisis.18 That convergence of ideas was no coincidence, as their
thought derived from a transnational exchange between ecologists. Havel, Gorbachev, Gore,
and Vavroušek referred to various holistic conceptions of the world, such as Gaia and
noosphere, and associated them with the notion of ecosystems.19 They also advocated for the
principles of “balance,” “humility,” “responsibility,” “modesty,” and “sensitivity,” and against
an omnipotent state that had allegedly been destroying both nature and people.
Therefore, rather than just a regional oddity or a one-way transfer of the Western agenda, I
suggest that the two ministers’ discourse of ecological- cum- moral crisis was at once a specific
historical experience and a part of global crisis, while also providing another way to signal a
“return” to Europe and participate in global politics. Their attempt was parallel to neoliberals’
efforts to integrate into a global economy, which the ecologists wished to regulate with a new
global morality.20 Indeed, in the last third of the twentieth century, the environment became a
matter of legal and moral regulation on a global scale. In particular, the idea of sustainable
development emerged from within global institutions as an attempt to square the circle of
limiting growth and the theory of growth.21 It is no coincidence that Limits to Growth, the 1972
Club of Rome report, was translated into Czech by Vavroušek and Moldan.22 Already an
accepted concept by the World Bank in the mid- 1980s, following the publication of Our
Common Future (also known as the Brundtland Report, named after the former prime minister
Gro Brundtland of Norway) by the United Nations in 1987, “sustainable development” became
a new global environmental ethic in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.23 This rather
vague term encompassed both supporters of economic growth and those who preferred to talk
about economic limits and quality of life.24 While Vavroušek never abandoned the mentality
of limits, Moldan fully adopted the optimistic vision of “green” growth in the Brundtland
Report. What Vavroušek and Moldan, then, brought to the table—for example, when they went
to Rio—was the historical experience of state socialism, which they criticized on moral and
economic grounds.
Lastly, understanding expertise as a social construction and a particular kind of intervention,
this chapter elucidates the ways in which Moldan and Vavroušek made expert claims in times
when technocratic socialism had lost its legitimacy.25 As they had themselves been technocrats,
it may initially appear paradoxical that they criticized the notion of socialist technocracy. Yet
their refusal of technocratic control was a part of a broader shift by late socialist experts toward
ideas of liberal governance.26 Cybernetics, for one, evolved from being a tool for socialist
progress to a tool for analyzing systemic issues of state socialism and outlining a liberal model
of society.27 The post- Stalinist era of the 1960s saw a major debate between technocratic and
humanist strands of Marxism. In their book Civilizace na rozcestí (Civilization at the
crossroads, 1967), technocratically oriented Czechoslovak Marxists around Radovan Richta
offered a socialist vision of postindustrial society, governed by technocratic means and the
latest science.28 They believed that cybernetics would help overcome the modern mechanistic
paradigm of top- down control. Meanwhile, in the intellectual hit Dialectics of the Concrete
(1963), Czech philosopher Karel Kosík sought to combine Marxism with phenomenology.29
On the one hand, the consolidation regime that took power after the Warsaw Pact invasion in
1968 stripped Richta’s technocratic socialist project of its emancipatory potential, while
turning it into an authoritative legitimation narrative.30 On the other hand, various alternative
political discussions of the 1960s continued to have their place, especially among young
technocrats and dissident intellectuals.31 However, the late 1980s debates differed from the
Marxist dilemma between humanizing and alienating effects of technical civilization in
seeking a different epistemological and, ultimately, political order. By the late 1980s, socialism
no longer appeared to pave the way forward from industrial modernity, but instead represented
its worst symptom. The ecologists’ anti- technocratic turn toward ethics is inseparable from
this process. In what follows, I focus, successively, on Vavroušek’s and Moldan’s use of
“crisis” discourse, alongside the ways in which they combined their ecological expertise and
moral language.
Cyberne'cs, Humanism, and Sustainability
At a demonstration on Wenceslas Square in Prague on November 23, 1989, the ecologist Josef
Vavroušek, who in July 1990 would become the first Czechoslovak Minister of the
Environment, took the microphone to talk about politics and nature, which at that moment
seemed to be linked more closely than ever.32 The country’s environmental destruction was,
for Vavroušek, the “fundamental characteristic of the current crisis.” According to Vavroušek,
people were losing their “instinct for self- preservation,” their ability “to respond to a life-
threatening danger.” The society was, as Vavroušek put it, “losing its ability to govern itself”
as it lacked “effective feedback loops.” A cybernetician by profession, Vavroušek employed
the metaphor of feedback to describe the exchange of communication between different
entities. In this case, Vavroušek wished to highlight a dysfunctional political system, which
responded neither to citizens’ problems nor to environmental damage, because it did not have
appropriate mechanisms in place. The crowd chanted a rhetorical question: “Who is to blame?”
The answer was obvious, as Vavroušek concluded that the only way out of “ecological crisis”
was a change of political system. During those days, both on Wenceslas Square and elsewhere,
thus far abstract, theoretical language was acquiring new political meaning.
Vavroušek developed his criticism as an expert within the socialist state apparatus, but he
was also in contact with the dissident movement. In early 1989, he published a short article in
the samizdat magazine Sociologický obzor (Sociological horizon), lamenting the opposition’s
lack of a political program.33 Unlike in the 1960s, he claimed, there was no vision upon which
to build political opposition, along with greater disillusionment, environmental damage, and a
worse economic situation than in those times. Vavroušek remembered those times well. An
engineering student in Prague in the mid- 1960s, he was on the editorial board of the student
magazine Buchar (Hammer), which was later banned for its political openness.34 In the 1960s,
Vavroušek belonged to the younger generation, which was not so much involved in debates
about communist reform, initiated by party members, but rather aspired to some sort of
political and social liberation.35 In 1989, he was one of the founding members of the Civic
Forum, a broad political platform established during the period of regime change. Taking part
in writing its manifesto, Vavroušek’s phrasing is apparent from the cybernetic language used
to describe the situation: “The ecological crisis requires an urgent solution. We see it in social
self- regulation with functioning feedback loops, democratic mechanisms, effective state
inspection and regulation, and above all, unrestricted public information.”36 Originally
cybernetic concepts, such as “feedback,” were through systems theory adopted by ecology;
now Vavroušek used them to analyze a political situation.
Earlier that year, Vavroušek had written a book called Životní prostředí a sebeřízení
společnosti (The environment and self-regulation of society), where he laid out a systemic,
ecological theory of social organization. He theorized a systemic model with three layers,
showing how the destruction of the environment impacted individuals, the economy, and
politics. The primary layer involved immediate phenomena like air quality; the secondary layer
related to more complex ones like climate or hydrology; and the third layer described “deep
links”—biosphere, stability, and aesthetics.37 Vavroušek argued that the third layer was what
explained the current state of the environment and society, pointing to social values and norms.
This included a low level of “ecological consciousness,” mass consumption and waste, the
pursuit of individual interests, and the disappearance of shared responsibility.38 According to
Vavroušek, the socialist price system could account neither for nature’s inability to reproduce
as fast as the economic plan envisioned nor for destruction of the environment or depletion of
unrenewable sources.39 Moreover, what Vavroušek called the “information system” did not
allow people to access enough information and even concealed it, thereby hindering or
preventing “corrective feedback.” His argument was that access to information would improve
people’s moral and political choices regarding the environment. This would include both the
authorities receiving information from citizens and well-informed citizens actively adjusting
their behavior or taking political initiative. He suggested that it was necessary to find a system
that would enable a “harmonious development of humans and a simultaneous restoration of
dynamic equilibrium between society and its environment.”40 An ecological notion of balance
was mapped onto society. Other prerequisites of harmonic development included respect for
human rights and social justice. Vavroušek also criticized the growing alienation between the
individual and political representation.41 He thus used the language of cybernetics to articulate
not only general links between nature and society, but also specific failures of the state socialist
system.
In doing so, Vavroušek aligned cybernetics with liberal environmentalism. He saw in
systems theory a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense, as he put it, following the reception of
cybernetics by Czech Marxists in the 1960s. He took inspiration from philosopher Miroslav
Král, who in 1968 interpreted systems theory as a pinnacle of the history of science, in which
a “substantialist” approach was gradually replaced by a “relational” approach.42 Whereas
modern physics always accounted only for a handful of variables, systems theory operated
with complex interconnections. When it came to governance, cybernetics proved to Král that
the center could never hold “unrestricted power to intervene in a directive manner,” but should
allow for self-regulation of the system’s parts. 43 Nevertheless, Král concluded with a vision
of technocratic governance informed by democratic decision-making in which society would
choose among various paths laid out by experts.44 Taking this a step further, Vavroušek asserted
that the self- regulating system should consist of various parts that controlled themselves and
each other. He drew an analogy between the human body and society: the brain is at the top of
the hierarchy only in terms of the organism’s self- regulation, but otherwise is equal with other
vital parts of the body. Analogously, “the most effective hierarchical system of control of a
company or a state is not able to ensure long- term qualitative growth if, at the same time, there
is not enough room for the free decision- making of each individual.”45 From that perspective,
the liberal separation of powers was a version of a political structure with several “power
subsystems” that would keep each other in balance, supported by feedback mechanisms of
participatory citizenship. Broadly speaking, Vavroušek drew political consequences from
statements that came from an existing scientific theory. In this sense, his political project
remained technocratic, although his political vision did not give center stage to experts alone.
Ultimately, cybernetics was—at least in Vavroušek’s eyes—merely an analytical tool that
uncovered the role of moral values in tackling ecological crisis. Indeed, Vavroušek derived
inspiration from the 1960s intellectual boom around cybernetics. However, Král’s 1968
cybernetic vision of democracy still relied exclusively on scientific rationality; he argued that
metaphysical ideas had to accommodate to technological progress as the only way to achieve
humanity’s salvation.46 Vavroušek, on the other hand, associated the belief in technocratic
control with a disapproving image of paternalistic experts in power, seeing it as one of the
causes of environmental problems. Instead, he stressed modesty and humility, values that he
felt had been suppressed under state socialism.47 He believed that aesthetic and ethical
principles should regulate human behavior.
Given his skepticism toward omniscient planners, Vavroušek welcomed abandoning the
centrally planned economy for the market, but he warned that this alone would not be enough
to solve moral and environmental problems.48 It is apparent from Vavroušek’s political
engagement—first in the Liberal Club, a faction of the Civic Forum, which was a political
movement established during the 1989 regime change, and later in the Civic Movement, a
liberal political party with social- democratic and ecological leanings—that he was looking for
pro- market alternatives to market radicalism.49 While the Liberal Club declared that the
market economy was a means to a better life, including environmental factors, rather than a
goal in itself, the Civic Movement provided a political alternative to the more strictly
neoliberal program of the Civic Democrats.50 In September 1992, Vavroušek founded the
Society for Sustainable Life (STUŽ), promoting the idea of sustainable development in the
Czech Republic. The platform was critical of “monetarists,” represented by radical neoliberal
reformers uninterested in environmental issues, and included more radical voices than
Vavroušek’s.51 The sustainability advocates believed in the fight for “human values,” which
those “monetarists” allegedly lacked. For example, at their 1994 symposium, philosopher
Milan Valach asserted that a “value change” in fact ought to mean a “systemic change,”
advocating for employee ownership and direct democracy.52 In turn, “sustainable
development” became an umbrella term for alternatives to the neoliberal obsession with
“growth.”53 In 1990s Czechia, the two terms were often set against each other, although the
former in fact was not a proposition to put an end to growth, but only to restrain it. Vavroušek
himself would therefore sometimes talk about a “sustainable way of life” instead of
“development” to highlight the primacy of moral values over “economistic” views of society.54
So, while criticizing the socialist system for a lack of responsibility, Vavroušek warned
about the danger of a “one-sided orientation toward short- term economic profit and a
concurrent reduction of freedom to the freedom to make money.”55 Although Vavroušek’s
political goals, such as democratic elections, were being realized, he believed that linkage
between humans and nature largely remained broken.56 When it came to neoliberal reforms,
he criticized concrete policy measures or the lack thereof, such as the fact that liberalized
energy prices did not sufficiently reflect the environmental impact of energy production.57 He
thought it possible to introduce economic measures within the market system that would lead
to a more ecological mode of production, but he also believed that most economists ignored
the noneconomic aspects of society, including people’s attitudes toward nature. They allegedly
failed to see the environment as an inseparable part of life, rendering it an externality. His
argument was also ethical, as he believed that money was mistakenly becoming the axiom of
the new society, rather than a means to democratic governance. Vavroušek thus shared the
neoliberals’ opposition to an omniscient leader, but he also believed that markets alone were
oblivious to the environment.58
Ecological and economic criticism of the socialist past found common ground in criticism
developed in the dissident movement. Like Vavroušek, Havel saw environmental damage and
economic problems as two sides of the same coin: “incompetent” and “authoritarian” rulers
supressed critical views and subordinated to the Soviet Union an economy oriented only
toward growth and lacking market mechanisms.59 In Havel’s view, central planning ruined
competition, thereby creating bureaucratic demands that were followed only on paper and
lacked “natural” market regulation. Havel questioned the communist reliance on scientific
rationality, which was based on the idea that humans could master nature because of their
access to truth about the world, epitomized by the figure of a central planner.60 However,
Havel’s argument went beyond the basic difference between centralized and diffused
knowledge. He also asserted that the communists prioritized immediate benefits over future
risks: environmentally, underestimating energy savings and investment in better technologies,
and fiscally, “giv[ing] people decent wages [and decent social benefits] for the time being so
that they d[id] not rebel.”61 Havel’s post-socialist views were rooted in a dissident critique of
crude materialism as the cause of a moral failure evident in the social and environmental
decline.62 According to that view, communist engineering had destroyed “natural” values;
here, nature implied authenticity, rootedness, and a connection between landscape and
culture.63 This understanding of natural values informed post- dissident liberalism, based on a
notion of a political community connected to its surroundings.64
This ecological understanding of the world also informed Vavroušek’s political imagination
of global integration as a liberal- communitarian endeavor. As Czechoslovak Minister of the
Environment, Vavroušek initiated the first pan- European conference of environmental
ministers, held in June 1991 in Dobříš, near Prague. The conference was opened by Havel.
First, echoing the Heideggerian philosophy developed in the dissident movement, Havel
stressed that the environmental damage was due to “something deeper and more substantial,
namely a particular relation to the world, to nature, to man, to existence.”65 He proposed that
communism was an ideology that believed in the power of the human brain as the “most perfect
organization of matter,” overlooking the “much more complicated and more ingenious
organization” evading human comprehension: “the order of being, the order of nature, the
order of the universe.”66 Havel thus suggested that there was a natural order that eluded the
rationalistic comprehension of the world proposed by the Marxists.
Vavroušek was the first ecologist Havel had met, at an underground seminar at Havel’s
brother’s flat, and Vavroušek’s ideas had helped inform Havel’s philosophy.67 Ecological
thought met with a search for a new kind of universalism in politics, which emerged in
phenomenological criticism of technocratic governance and a view of nature as a complex set
of intertwined entities. As Havel put it in Dobříš, an ecological view of nature as a system
represented a principle of integration that was, with some imagination, applicable to political
institutions. In fact, an “organic incorporation” of the country into larger political organizations
was, for Havel, just “another dimension” of ecology seeking an “optimal” structure.68 Havel
therefore associated the cybernetic principles of ecology with the notion of a political
community, which he saw as authentic since it was based on natural order. In that way,
cybernetics, once a rationalist theory in the hands of the Marxists wishing to explain every
element of the matter, became a vehicle to veil the world’s complexity in the mystery of nature.
Understanding “systems” as an organizing principle of the world, Vavroušek applied
ecological principles to international politics. Vavroušek’s speech in Dobříš emphasized the
legacy of communism and the historic opportunity to establish a pan-European environmental
initia tive, alongside the political and economic transformation of East Central Europe into
democracies with social market economies.69 Vavroušek suggested creating a “system” with a
“flat” network structure.”70 The relational, systemic approach thus also meant a turn from top-
down to supposedly less hierarchical and more flexible structures.71 Such an interconnected,
planetary action, Vavroušek hoped, would coordinate often isolated efforts to tackle
environmental problems. Criticizing the lack of global coordination, Vavroušek proposed to
form a “UN World Environment Organization” consisting of continental units. The United
Nations as a whole would thus be responsible for four “systems,” which would be mirrored in
their institutions: environmental, security, economic, and social. He presented his proposal at
the 1992 conference in Rio de Janeiro, but it received little support. On the other hand, the
Environment for Europe initiative, started in Dobříš, resulted in continued international
cooperation among European countries.72
As posited already in his earlier works, Vavroušek stressed in Dobříš the change in human
values as the single most important and, at the same time, most difficult goal.73 Vavroušek
therefore combined a Cold War idea of the world order as a system and a phenomenological
notion that humans as active agents with values comprised a system.74 Alongside new
institutions, “new, less selfish ways of life” had to be found, not just to preserve human life
but also the “immense intrinsic value” of nature. Specifically, Vavroušek wished to
“rediscover” Albert Schweitzer’s “respect for life,” a moral corrective to optimism rooted
solely in science.75 Schweitzer was a Protestant missionary born in Alsace who practiced his
Christian humanist ethic in a hospital in Lambaréné, Gabon, a French territory at that time. In
1968, when he was still an engineering student, Vavroušek took part in the Lambaréné
Expedition, the goal of which was to bring drugs to Schweitzer’s hospital, a performance of
assistance to the “developing world” by Czechoslovak youth. As with shifting understandings
of cybernetics, Schweitzer’s reverence for life flexibly transitioned between the socialist and
post- socialist eras. Schweitzer’s laments about the modern world also appeared as epigraphs
to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, broadcast on Czechoslovak Radio in 1966: “Man has lost the
capacity to foresee and to forestall. He will end by destroying the earth. Man can hardly
ever recognize the devils of his own creation.”76
The potential negative aspects of progress resonated well with Marxist considerations of the
changing relations between humanity and nature in the age of scientific-technological
revolution. In fact, Schweitzer’s version of Christian humanism, which was optimistic about
life and science backed by ethics, also matched well with the kind of ecology preached under
late socialism, which used the idea of “respect for life” to define itself against existentialist
resignation.77 Schweitzer’s Teaching of Reverence for Life was published twice in Czech, in
1974 and 1993. As the afterword to the 1974 edition explains, Schweitzer’s belief in human
progress and love of living beings were also socialist values.78 In addition, Schweitzer’s ideas
were drawn upon by the Czechoslovak nature protection organization TIS (Association for the
Protection of Nature, Landscape, and People).79 And in Vavroušek’s Životní prostředí a
sebeřízení společnosti (Environment and self- regulation of society), Schweitzer’s teaching
served as a theoretical framing of the need to respect ecological processes.80 Finally, both
Schweitzerian humanism and the Lambaréné expedition were reference points in Vavroušek’s
post- socialist endorsement of a global environmental ethic. This discursive shift perfectly
illustrates how it was possible to use the language developed under late socialism to endorse
liberal values.
On a global level, Vavroušek continued to theorize ethical principles that would guide
humanity toward an ecological future. For example, at the general meeting of the International
Union for Conservation of Nature in Buenos Aires in January 1994, Vavroušek described what
he saw as current values and charted an alternative for each one.81 He suggested replacing a
“predatory” relation to nature with “awareness of belonging,” “quantitative growth” with
“qualitative development,” “hedonistic” consumption with “conscious modesty,” individual
freedom with “mutual responsibility,” “pride of reason” with “cautious intervention” in nature
and society, “alienation” and “lack of negative feedback” with “instinct for self- preservation,”
“short- term interests” with acknowledging “long- term consequences,” “intolerance” of
different opinions and other civilizations with “mutual tolerance,” and finally lack of shared
decision-making with participatory democracy.82 Perhaps most interestingly, he wished to
surpass both socialist collectivism and economic individualism, the former represented by
“actually existing socialism” and the latter by “Smith’s invisible hand,” with a balance between
individual and collective.
The end of state socialism, then, was for Vavroušek an opportunity to establish a morally
sound global cooperation.83 The historical experience of state socialism meant that the West
was an object not just of criticism but also of aspiration. On the one hand, Vavroušek contrasted
“an enormous economic and social leap forward in some parts of the planet” with “severe
global environmental problems” and the destruction of non- Western cultures.84 But when he
talked more concretely about policy and values in practice, he saw the West, where “every
businessman knows they must behave well towards the environment,” as much more advanced
than post- socialist countries.85 He also believed that overpopulation was a cause of
environmental problems, a controversial opinion at that time, and one that anti- environmental
neoliberals like Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus used to their advantage in arguing against
ecological measures.86 In contrast, Vavroušek took issue with the post- socialist reforms led by
Klaus, whose only goal was allegedly to lead the country to a state that Western Europe was
trying to escape.87 Instead, he believed that the region should join the world in looking for
global solutions to the crisis.
Tragedy of the Commons, Markets, and Chris'anity
As Bedřich Moldan wrote in 1992,
We are still behaving as we did under the communist regime, when it was all about
“grabbing” whatever we could, knowing very well that the share we got had hardly
anything to do with either real needs or expected benefits.88
As the first Czech environment minister (1990–1991), Moldan had for three decades worked
as an expert of the socialist state, monitoring the condition of the environment. He thus came
to see the continued exploitation of nature as a sign of a communist mentality, ruthless and
technocratic. As he said on Czechoslovak Radio in February 1990, the best everyone could do
was direct the revolution “against ourselves,” meaning to become responsible and change
one’s behavior according to environmental principles.89 Considering pressing debates about
privatization, Moldan argued that ecological transformation had to be done concurrently with
economic reforms.90 He served as vice president (1993–1994) and president (2000–2001) of
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, and between 1998 and 2001, he was
negotiating the harmonization of environmental law with the European Union. He believed
that the market economy was not just compatible with environmentalism, but in fact the only
guarantee of sustainable development.91 This was partly motivated by international
commitments, but Moldan believed that care for the environment was implicated in the given
economic model.92 One example he gave was the state- socialist management of land:
There used to be a long tradition of careful economy of space in our country, but like many
other good traditions, it has been completely lost. The technocratic arrogance of the past
regime, strengthened by the ideologically justified denial of property rights, and,
consequently, the value and price of land, has resulted in countless absurdities, such as huge
areas devasted by warehouses full of junk and building yards overgrown with weeds for
decades. At the same time, however, we have witnessed the reprehensible “densification”
of high-rise buildings on housing estates based on nonsensical norms. The restitution of
land and land ownership and the introduction of a normal property market will undoubtedly
bring about change.93
It appeared to Moldan that the socialist economy denied scarcity and weakened responsibility,
whereas the market supposedly operated with scarcity and had a moral core. Moldan thus
juxtaposed a supposedly forgotten, authentic economy on the one hand with technocratic
mismanagement on the other. He combined the notion of economizing natural resources with
an image of an ideal pre-communist past, which together justified marketization. The right to
property, for Moldan, guaranteed a more ecological management that stood against
bureaucratic “non- sense.” He suggested that, unlike the socialist economy, markets fostered
frugality and allowed for moral behavior in place of the careless materialist exploitation of
nature.
Thus, Moldan drew on the historical experience of state socialism to advocate for a moral
ecological transformation through marketization. In 1990, Moldan and his colleagues at the
Ministry of the Environment published an official report on the current state of the
environment in Czechoslovakia, building on expertise developed under state socialism. In the
1980s, as Moldan saw it, ecologists did have enough information about the state of the
environment, though he criticized the insufficient publicity and political action of the decade.94
However, the report criticized the communist past in an unprecedented manner:
The root of the deep ecological crisis we are in is the political development of the past
forty- two years. Relationships among humans as well as between humans and nature have
been distorted. The Earth’s biosphere has been seen exclusively in exploitative terms; it has
ceased to be living nature, a structure to which we ourselves belong. The relationship to
nature as a mere reservoir of raw materials and energy, as a mere object of exploitation,
clearly prevailed.95
The report assumed that a “totalitarian” attitude toward individuals sat parallel with an
exploitative view of nature. The modern divide between humans and nature, from which
environmental problems allegedly grew, was thus in the report ascribed specifically to state
socialism.
By extension, combating ecological crisis now also required rejecting that past. Presenting
the report on television, Deputy Minister of the Environment Václav Mezřický stressed that
his primary goal was to show that the totalitarian notion of omnipotence aggravated
environmental destruction.96 Indeed, before assessing scientific data, the 1990 report begins
with an analysis of the “totalitarian system.”97 According to Moldan, imprudent use of violence
was the other side of misguided belief in rationality.98 The totalitarian system was blamed for
a “deep moral crisis”: the failures of science, deformation of values, and lack of individual
responsibility led to the ruthless exploitation of nature, seen only as a resource for a materialist
lifestyle. The three “pillars” of the communist system as described by Moldan—lies, collective
responsibility, and departmentalism—all manifested in the ecological crisis as lack of
information, irresponsibility, and inability to cooperate and see beyond limited interests.99 In
that view, not only were elites blamed for the crisis, but the whole society was seen as
pervasively broken, not fostering or even allowing individuals to be responsible; hence the
calls for a moral awakening.
Moldan saw the legacy of communism as the worst symptom of the failures of Western
civilization and an argument for market- based sustainable development. Communism was
characteristic of an “ideological struggle with nature,” subjugated solely to human needs,
exploiting its resources and transforming it at the will of technocrats.100 According to Moldan,
communist ideology was “perhaps the worst outgrowth” of Western civilization.101 Under late
socialism, ecological crisis had also been seen as the flip side of technological progress. But
here, a more general criticism of “civilization” was updated as a condemnation of the
communist past, with a transformational agenda for the future. Importantly, Moldan believed
that the negative traits of Western civilization were surmountable, channeling his optimism
into the market. Moldan was more optimistic in this regard than Vavroušek: this was also
apparent during the first post- socialist debate at Ekofilm, a film festival that in its fifteen years
of existence under state socialism had been a major meeting ground for Czechoslovak
ecologists. While Vavroušek talked mainly about modesty, not just in terms of frugality but
also in terms of human knowledge, Moldan highlighted the shift from a 1970s limits-to-
growth position to the contemporary idea of sustainable development as professed in the
Brundtland Report, which hoped to accelerate economic growth under ecological principles.102
Moldan believed that the markets were not just compatible with but indispensable for an
ecological future. In his 1992 book Ekologie, demokracie, trh (Ecology, democracy, market),
Moldan drew upon the work of major American ecologists, namely Herman Daly, Donella
Meadows, and Garrett Hardin.103 Daly’s “ecological economics,” Meadows’s “limits to
growth,” and Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” were part of Moldan’s criticism of Western
civilization, along with his skepticism toward rationalism and objectification of nature.104 The
close connection between ecology and economics was not new, as it framed the environment
as a governable problem for socialist technocracy.105 But now ecologists, propelled also by
perestroika-era debates about economic reforms, even considered the benefits of a market
mechanism for the environment. Indeed, the concept of sustainable development, popularized
in the late 1980s, which promised a qualitatively different economic growth, influenced
socialist debates about the relations between economy and ecology.106 This was reflected in
the theme of the 1989 Ekofilm festival: “ecological economics—economical ecology.”107
There, experts discussed, for instance, “ecological economic growth” and “reduction of energy
and material inputs in industrial technology.”108 The urbanist Václav Kasalický even criticized
the fact that the current economic system did not reflect the cost of natural resources:
“regulated prices can never replace the market,” he believed, including markets for housing,
land, and natural resources.109 Effectively reiterating Hardin’s argument, the free use of such
resources allegedly led to their degradation, since common property equaled “nobody’s
property.”
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” resonated exceptionally well with the view that state
socialism had caused environmental damage due to its wastefulness, economic inefficiency,
and resignation on individual responsibility. Moldan agreed that individuals overused the
commons, as their only motivation was to exploit resources that did not belong to them,
whereas if they were owners, they would use available resources more carefully.110 Hardin
believed that it was therefore necessary to “explicitly exorcize the spirit of Adam Smith in the
field of practical demography.”111 Hardin offers a thought experiment: when a herdsman is
deciding whether to add more cattle to their pasture, benefitting from increased production and
with the negative impact of overgrazing shared by all other herdsmen, one rationally decides
to breed more animals. What did that thought experiment imply for the transformation of a
state- socialist economy? There were individual companies that also benefitted from free
access to land and other natural resources and were also often free to pollute their surroundings.
Therefore, it was necessary to put a price tag on natural resources and create laws to regulate
pollution. But instead of coercion, Hardin proposed to create a society that would encourage
responsibility and redefine coercion from the “arbitrary decisions of distant and irresponsible
bureaucrats” to rules created from a mutual agreement of free individuals. In this rendering,
the scarcity of resources as an environmental issue became an argument for neoliberalism. In
the 1990s, Moldan was not as pessimistic as Hardin when it came to sustainable development,
which the latter saw just as another growth trap.112 However, like Hardin, Moldan posited that
in contrast to the state-socialist past, the role of the state in the transformation had to be
temporary and avoid the “paternalism” of central authorities.113 He assumed that the market
would create conditions under which a moral change could happen.
Moldan believed in the importance of ecological education, consumer choice, and the role
of nonstate actors in protecting the environment.114 Ecologically educated citizens would act
as responsible consumers, replacing dysfunctional regulation by socialist bureaucrats.115 Like
Vavroušek, he believed in the power of information in fostering value change, but he was more
confident in the ability of individuals, guided by ethics, on the market. Moldan thus countered
those who were skeptical of the market economy’s ability to solve environmental problems of
planetary scale, driven by the power of technology.116 For instance, he also hoped that market
forces would stop the expansion of nuclear power, viable only with the generous support of
the state; yet this was one of the few cases where neoliberals like Klaus (a fellow Civic
Democrat) did not mind giving a state guarantee.117 Addressing anti- capitalist criticism,
Moldan considered selfishness—an indispensable part of how markets work—a “morally
neutral” economic behavior and an anthropological constant.118 However, he also thought that
people were free to cooperate and would often find cooperation economically beneficial; their
free will, informed by a dose of moral values, would take care of the rest. As a Civic Democrat,
he remained a stern supporter of the markets, individual responsibility, and freedom of choice
in tackling ecological problems.119
Moldan suggested that the morality needed to overcome the utilitarian view of nature could
be found in the Christian notion of human responsibility for God’s creation.120 And whereas
some, such as the philosopher Václav Bělohradský, saw Christianity as the origin of the human
sense of superiority over nature, Moldan argued that the Christian subjugation of nature was
in fact a positive call for stewardship.121 For Moldan, the Christian nature was not a mere
object of exploitation, but a habitable and fertile land given to humans by God to take care of.
Referring to Pope John Paul II’s 1991 encyclical Centesimus annus, Moldan found in
Christianity a morality that would encase the markets in ecological values, while allowing for
private property and free enterprise.122 John Paul II suggested that markets should be regulated
by a morality based on human dignity, making a case against too much state intervention and
bureaucratic control. Like ecologists, the Pope also criticized a mechanistic view of the world,
associated with the rationalism of the Enlightenment and atheistic state socialism as its
offspring. Christian ethics thus appealed to Moldan as a defense of the market economy that
overcame free- market materialism with Christian metaphysics.
Conclusion
The changing relationship between the discourses of ecology and morality was part of the long
process that saw state socialism transform into neoliberalism. When a political transformation
came, various discourses of crisis were mobilized to fill it with meaning and promote a certain
interpretation of events. Much of the criticism under the banner of ecological crisis had already
formed during state socialism, and it was only the political change that fully turned that
discourse against socialism itself. Theoretically equipped to observe the connections between
the categories of the natural and the social, ecologists formed a causal link between moral and
ecological crisis.
After 1989, laments about ecological crisis became explicitly associated with state socialism
as an economic and political system. Environmental issues were related to manifold other
crises, mainly that of modern rationalism and its use by socialist technocrats. Josef Vavroušek
and Bedřich Moldan saw the ecological crisis in Czechoslovakia and the concurrent moral
crisis of communism as part of a global ecological crisis and a moral crisis of the West,
although they deemed the local situation worse than elsewhere. They believed that a profound
moral transformation, not just of their country but of “Western civilization” and the whole
world, was essential for the continuation of human life on Earth. Although they saw Western
civilization critically, they believed in its reform through the rediscovery of forgotten values.
Vavroušek, however, through his application of cybernetics and humanist ethics, analyzed the
failures of technocratic socialism as a political system within a wider ecosystem. Moldan, on
the other hand, was inspired by Western market-oriented environmentalists and an idea of the
Christian stewardship of nature, meaning that he saw state socialism mainly as a dysfunctional
and irresponsible economy. Liberal environmentalists shared with neoliberals a skepticism
toward a big, interventionist state that based its rationality on the perfectibility of human
knowledge and control of nature. At the same time, environmentalism was, for them, a way to
return the country to Europe and influence global politics. Vavroušek and Moldan hoped a set
of laws and moral values, which they felt were lacking in state socialism, would be enough to
govern the markets by the principles of sustainable development. Indisputably, the proponents
of sustainable development opposed, to varying degrees, the neoliberal mainstream, but the
question remains whether their very focus on value change made it neoliberalism’s conscience
rather than a rival idea.
Notes
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