Urban transport system changes in the UK: In danger of populism?

Abstract

Many cities seek to change their transport systems to reduce negative outcomes. This generally involves measures supporting active and public transport, restricting vehicle use. Infrastructure modification and legislative developments are often perceived as ‘attacks’, and lead to resistance by specific groups. This paper uses critical discourse analysis to evaluate a convenience sample of 185 social media threads opposing Ultra-Low Emission Zones (ULEZ), Clean Air Zones (CAZ), and Low Traffic Neighbourhoods (LTN) in four cities in the UK, Oxford, London, Birmingham, and Bradford. Themes are identified through MaxQDA to determine the range of discursive strategies used, as well as to understand their interrelationships. Findings highlight intersections of populist politics and (sustainable) transport policymaking and planning in UK cities. The understanding of the mechanisms at work can facilitate the development of less divisive strategies for transforming urban transport systems.

Full text

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
Available online 18 July 2024
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Urban transport system changes in the UK: In danger of populism?
S. G¨
ossling
a,b,*
, N. Schweiggart
c
, M. Nieuwenhuijsen
d,e,f
, R.R.C. McEachan
g
, H. Khreis
h
a
School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, 391 82 Kalmar, Sweden
b
Western Norway Research Institute, PO Box 163, 6851 Sogndal, Norway
c
Department of Socioeconomics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
d
ISGlobal Barcelona Institute for Global Health, Barcelona, Spain
e
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), Barcelona, Spain
f
CIBER Epidemiología y Salud Pública (CIBERESP), Madrid, Spain
g
Bradford Institute for Health Research, Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Bradford, UK
h
MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge School of Clinical Medicine, Cambridge, UK
ARTICLE INFO
Keywords:
Air pollution
Clean Air Zones
Discourse analysis
Low trafc neighbourhood
Populism
Ultra-low emission zones
ABSTRACT
Many cities seek to change their transport systems to reduce negative outcomes. This generally involves measures
supporting active and public transport, restricting vehicle use. Infrastructure modication and legislative de-
velopments are often perceived as ‘attacks’, and lead to resistance by specic groups. This paper uses critical
discourse analysis to evaluate a convenience sample of 185 social media threads opposing Ultra-Low Emission
Zones (ULEZ), Clean Air Zones (CAZ), and Low Trafc Neighbourhoods (LTN) in four cities in the UK, Oxford,
London, Birmingham, and Bradford. Themes are identied through MaxQDA to determine the range of discursive
strategies used, as well as to understand their interrelationships. Findings highlight intersections of populist
politics and (sustainable) transport policymaking and planning in UK cities. The understanding of the mecha-
nisms at work can facilitate the development of less divisive strategies for transforming urban transport systems.
1. Introduction
Transport systems remain a barrier to climate change mitigation and
clean air (de Blas et al., 2020;Mueller et al., 2020;Nieuwenhuijsen,
2021). Cities are often at the forefront of efforts to reduce emissions and
pollutants. Strategies include the promotion of active transportation and
public transport, sometimes in tandem with limitations on private
vehicle use. For example, cities have implemented play streets, speed
limits, cycling infrastructure, and ultra-low emission zones. However,
any infrastructure change may be seen as ‘disadvantaging’vehicle use
and can become an arena for heated political debate (Griggs &Howarth,
2008) that ultimately pertains to the spatiality of the city and ideas of
spatial justice (Soja, 2013).
Transport politics are an easy target for populists because of their
largely technical, abstract, and ‘elite-driven’nature (Huber, 2020). In
recent years, populist parties have gained support in Europe and else-
where (Müller et al., 2017;Waisbord, 2013). Populist views increasingly
lead to social divide (Ginsburgh et al., 2021), in which climate policies
feature prominently as a theme (Huber et al., 2020). This has polarized
society at local, national and international levels, fueling populist
discourse across Europe, North America and in other regions (Fraune &
Knodt, 2018;Lockwood, 2018).
Environmental debates are often highly polarized (Wanvik &Haar-
stad, 2021). Differences become obvious between liberal, left-leaning
urbanities and more conservative, right-leaning suburban dwellers
(Wanvik &Haarstad, 2021). Typically, populist movements have
framed green policies as a conict between ‘the people’and ‘the elite’,
thereby challenging their validity (Wanvik &Haarstad, 2021), as well as
the science behind these policies. Supporting this framing is the poten-
tial increased cost or inconvenience for vehicle users. In the context of
urban transport planning, populist movements, often fueled by disap-
pointment with the current political system (Huber, 2020), have
emerged in opposition to measures such as road tolls, congestion
charging, car-free zones, or fuel subsidy removal (Wanvik &Haarstad,
2021). There is thus evidence that urban contexts increasingly serve as
arenas in which populist politics are playing out through sustainable
transport policies.
Populist conservative movements have often been successful in
dismantling environmental laws and regulation (Mostafavi et al., 2022;
see also Henderson &Gulsrud, 2019). For instance, the “Yellow Vest”
* Corresponding author at: School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, 391 82 Kalmar, Sweden.
E-mail address: stefan.gossling@lnu.se (S. G¨
ossling).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Cities
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cities
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2024.105273
Received 27 January 2024; Received in revised form 27 April 2024; Accepted 5 July 2024

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
2
movement in France and Belgium was triggered by a fuel tax hike that
subsequently turned into opposition to Emmanuel Macron’s climate
agenda (Kinniburgh, 2019). In Norway, the populist “Enough is Enough”
(“Nok er Nok”) movement, prominent in the lead-up to the 2019
municipal elections in the city of Bergen, successfully advocated for the
removal of toll road stations. It framed green governance as an agenda of
‘elite’politicians “out of touch with ‘the people’” (Wanvik &Haarstad,
2021, p. 2097). In January 2024, Farmers in Germany blocked roads
throughout the country to protest reductions in fossil fuel subsidies; this
caused the government to change its planned policies (Monbiot, 2023).
The examples illustrate that ‘resistance’can be successful in overturning
policies, showing that populism can be a driver of opposition, but also
represent a practice of opposition.
The understanding of the workings and effects of populism, as well as
the associated phenomenon of societal polarization, is arguably vital for
the continuation of urban transport system change (UTSC) initiatives.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze debates of
UTSC related to improvements in air quality and active travel, and to
describe and evaluate the discursive strategies used. Focus is on the UK,
where recent introductions of transportation demand management
(TDM) policies (CAZ, ULEZ and LTN) have caused conicts. Based on a
critical analysis of social media accounts, the paper investigates the
discourses created by opponents to UTSC, their character, as well as
their discursive relations, addressing the following research question:
“Which discursive strategies are used to oppose UTSC initiatives, and
which relevance do they have for transport demand management pol-
icies and planning?”Findings are used to discuss the importance of
measures and communicative strategies that seek to understand oppo-
sition, also as a populism practice, and thus help reducing UTSC
resistance.
2. Literature review
2.1. Urban transport system change
Transport planners in cities of various size and form have introduced
measures to support active forms of transport or to restrict vehicle-based
transport (Ward et al., 2021), with a view to desirable social, environ-
mental and public health outcomes. Policies have the purpose of
addressing external costs, or to increase well-being. Changes usually
disadvantage vehicles, and in particular the private car, as space is
reallocated to accommodate cycle tracks, play streets, or car-free zones,
while speed limits are lowered to mitigate air pollution, noise, and
injury risks. Restrictions can be imposed for different reasons, to reduce
vehicle numbers, or to increase pressure on polluting, loud, or large
vehicles; and take various forms, such as bonus/malus systems,
congestion charges, or ultra-low emission zones (Habibi et al., 2019;Ma
et al., 2021;West &B¨
orjesson, 2020). In some countries, it is also
common to charge vehicle users for infrastructure use (highway charges,
bridge, or tunnel fees) (Duncan et al., 2020).
Cities are characterized by specic structures that determine how
UTSC measures affect different transport mode users. This is captured in
the spatiality of cities, a multifaceted concept that involves an under-
standing as to how physical layout, social structures, and economic
systems within urban environments interact and inuence each other.
For instance, Robinson (2011: 1) distinguishes “wealthier and poorer,
capitalist and socialist”cities. Central to urban spatiality is the idea of
spatial justice, i.e., the equitable distribution of resources and oppor-
tunities across different urban areas (Soja, 2013). The conguration of
urban space directly impacts social interactions and accessibility of
services, which may increase (or decrease) social inequalities (Lefebre,
1991).
UTSC is usually framed as a response to pressures, such as growing
congestion or high levels of air pollution. Cities strive to enhance quality
of life and well-being, supported by substantial evidence indicating that
urban green spaces and active mobility contribute positively to physical
and mental health (Mueller et al., 2020;Nieuwenhuijsen, 2021).
Furthermore, urban planning initiatives aim to mitigate climate change
and adapt to the challenges posed by it. For instance, the rising fre-
quency and intensity of heat waves can be mitigated, in part, by an
augmentation of urban green spaces (Wong et al., 2021). There are also
issues of congestion and safety, all related to welfare and well-being.
In general terms, this represents a situation in which pressures lead
to the conclusion, grounded in rational argument, that reductions in
urban vehicle trafc are desirable, necessary, or even unavoidable. In
world cities such as Barcelona, Madrid, Copenhagen, London, or Paris,
this has seen initiatives restricting vehicles, specically the private car
(Lebrus´
an &Toutouh, 2021;Mueller et al., 2020). UTSC designs have
usually been successful in reducing negative externalities, though ben-
ets of specic policies may be small (Ma et al., 2021) and nuanced,
depending on measurement instrument and the externality’s proxy
(Glazener et al., 2022).
Scientic perspectives on the transformation of urban transport
systems are nevertheless often met with resistance from groups
perceiving themselves to be disadvantaged. Opposition can take very
different forms, from social media campaigns to vandalized infrastruc-
ture, and political leaders on UTSC have found themselves to be at the
center of efforts to oust them from ofce. These efforts often seem to be
personal attacks, embedded in emotional claims. In Paris, Mayor Anne
Hildago quit the social media platform X over onslaughts on her urban
policies, arguing that the site manipulated and disinformed: “Twitter
[…] has in recent years become an impressive tool for destroying our
democracies”(Reuters, 2023, no page). In London, mayor Sadiq Khan
defended ultra-low emission zones over scientic evidence of 4000
premature deaths per year in the city, blaming criticism on oppositional
party ideology: “That’s why they are desperate to confect a bogus war on
the motorist. Division is both their strategy and overriding priority”
(Badshah, 2023, no page). The examples illustrate how populist
discourse is interacting with sustainable transport policies within the
spatiality of cities.
2.2. Populism and polarization
Many European liberal democracies have seen a recent rise in
populism and growing political polarization. Mudde (2004, p. 543)
dened populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure
people’versus ‘the corrupt elite’”. By implication, ‘elite politics’do not
represent majority views or interests (Wirth et al., 2016), and hence
allow for the moral distinction of ‘good people’pitched against an ‘evil
elite’(Hawkins &Kaltwasser, 2018). The ‘elite’are characterized by
higher academic education or socioeconomic status, and, as a group, use
political power and public resources to their advantage (Remme et al.,
2022).
Populist discourse uses forms of dispositional blame attribution
(Busby et al., 2019) that can be based on highly emotional and simplistic
arguments (Mudde, 2004, p. 542), polemics of victimization, and
moralization over rational discourse (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Populist
debates can invoke “nefarious minorities”(Ostiguy &Casullo, 2017),
viewed as the source of corruption of elites and drawing away their
attention from the “deserving”but neglected people. Populism offers
simplied worldviews, specically regarding the structures of power in
society. ‘The people’are seen as the rightful authority (Mudde, 2004),
and populist discourse is invariably in the name of ‘the people’, ‘the
nation’or ‘the local community’ – discursively seeking to unite around
shared values and beliefs (Griggs &Howarth, 2008). Strong preferences
for ‘law and order’are also associated with populism, while institutions
are distrusted (Ginsburgh et al., 2021). The media has been important to
communicate ideas (Engesser et al., 2017;Prior, 2013;Schulze et al.,
2020), though social media platforms have more recently taken over the
role of echo chambers (Urbinati, 2019).
While populism and polarization are two distinct concepts, they can
S. G¨
ossling et al.

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
3
be mutually self-reinforcing and share similar characteristics (e.g.,
extreme positions, lack of middle ground, emotional appeals). Polari-
zation is related to populist attitudes (Ginsburgh et al., 2021), and refers
to the process by which opinions, beliefs, or groups become divided into
extreme or opposing positions. In political contexts, polarization often
involves distinct and contrasting views, leading to a sharp divide be-
tween different political camps that again is the basis for populist “them
vs. us”narratives. Root causes for societal division are seen in the
increasing cost of living, job insecurity, and income disparities
(Ginsburgh et al., 2021). Populism and polarization affect democratic
stability (Inglehart &Norris, 2017;McCoy &Somer, 2019), with some
scholars highlighting signs of democratic regression (Lührmann et al.,
2019) that also undermines progress on environmental goals (Mostafavi
et al., 2022;Wanvik &Haarstad, 2021).
Even though the focus is here on populism, it is important to
acknowledge that populism is not in itself an all-encompassing expla-
nation of opposition to UTSC. As the literature on congestion pricing
shows, reasons for opposition vary, depend on values and beliefs, and
change over time; addressing issues of fairness, dedication of revenues to
specic purposes, incentives, or beliefs in benets will increase accep-
tance (B¨
orjesson et al., 2016;Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2023;Eliasson,
2014;Harrington et al., 2001;Hårsman &Quigley, 2010;Selmoune
et al., 2020). The discussion for this returns to underlying factors, such
as symbolic and affective vehicle values (Steg, 2005), to provide a
deeper analytical foundation for interventions.
3. Materials and methods
The aim of a critical discourse analysis (CDA) is to study “text in
context”(Van Dijk, 1993, p. 96) and to provide a “systematic theoretical
and descriptive account of the structures and strategies, at various
levels, of written and spoken discourse”. This also includes relationships
between texts and their interactions with “the relevant structures of
their cognitive, social, cultural, and historical contexts”(ibid.). In doing
so, the analysis moves beyond language and also investigates the social
and political contexts and roles at play, depicting the attitudes and be-
haviors of key actors (Hickman &Hannigan, 2023). Through discourse
analysis, multiple and competing narratives can be uncovered (Sharp &
Richardson, 2001) and reveal how language is used to pursue political
objectives and how policies are interpreted by their intended audience
(Jacobs, 2006).
Discourse analysis has importance for transport and urban planning
(Hickman &Hannigan, 2023; for examples see Haikola &Anshelm,
2023;Jensen et al., 2020;Mown &Bailey, 2022; and Smith, 2016),
because diverse interest groups seek to establish specic narratives to
achieve political goals (Jacobs, 2006). The understanding of discourses
and their subjectivities can help the analysis of differences in viewpoints
and interests (Hickman &Hannigan, 2023). These can include those of
policymakers, other political actors, media and public, or residents.
Focus of this paper is on the views expressed by individuals on social
media with the goal of opposing UTSC.
Studies of TDM policies such as ULEZ, CAZ and LTN must be local, as
these policies are not implemented nationwide. The UK is currently at
the forefront of UTSC efforts, as different TDM policies are implemented
in its cities. For this explorative paper, focus is on Ultra Low Emission
Zones (ULEZ; Greater London), Clean Air Zones (CAZ; Bradford, Bir-
mingham), and Low Trafc Neighbourhoods (LTN; London, Oxford), i.e.
cities that vary in size, population, and structure. For details on ULEZ,
CAZ and LTN see also Ding et al. (2023),Ma et al. (2021),McEachan
et al. (2022).
TDM policies in these cities have in common that they are unpopular
because they change the transport system status quo and restrict
behavior (e.g. Lattarulo et al., 2019). The analysis is however not limited
to these efforts, it also touches upon other approaches to UTSC, such as
the 15-minute-city, which is mentioned in several of the threads
included in this study.
To analyze a diverse sample of current communications (text iden-
tication), the decision was made to focus on social media, including
Reddit and X. A sample of threads was collected and assembled in
September 2023, in a deliberate attempt to gather a diverse material.
This also included keywords and hashtags (#waroncars, #ULEZ, #LTNs,
#BradfordCAZ), as well as a screening of the “Top Tweets”panel on X. It
remains unclear if any of the tweets were posted by bots; however, both
real and bot accounts contribute to populism. The material is not
exhaustive, as the study had no goal of theoretical saturation (Glaser &
Strauss, 2017), and thus needs to be considered explorative. For anal-
ysis, 185 threads were combined in one Word document, comprising 75
pages of text with 46 photographs. For purposes of denition, a thread
consists of individual comments or viewpoints on a specic aspect of
UTSC. Threads have been mostly posted by individuals (>90 % of the
material), rather than institutions or agencies. Of the usernames reap-
pearing in the material (n=10, with three or more posts), six reach out
to >1000 followers. Consequently, the analysis does not allow for con-
clusions regarding the users of social media platforms or the recipients of
information.
MaxQDA (Kuckartz &R¨
adiker, 2019;Oswald, 2019) is an estab-
lished tool for conducting discourse analyses (Leimbigler, 2021) and was
used to derive themes that represent exposing, framing, or discursive
strategies. Comments were coded based on an inductive approach, i.e.
an in vivo development of codes (themes). Codes were assigned both to
whole entities (i.e., posts), text passages and single words. Memos and
comments were added where necessary for the interpretation of the text.
The analysis uses Fairclough’s (2013) three-dimensional framework for
discourse analysis, including (1) text analysis –the structure of text,
vocabulary and grammar cohesion, (2) discursive practice –the analysis
of the processes in which statements are made and feed into other de-
bates, and (3) social practice –a study of discourse in relation to wider
power structures and ideology.
The unit of analysis is consequently a specic type of discourse, or a
repeated theme, rather than the author or organization behind the
comments (Guiver, 2007). It is assumed that authors are “competent
language users”who deliberately select language which supports and
justies their own actions and beliefs. The aim of the discourse analysis
is to identify prevalent discourses and examine their implication. Quotes
are included for illustration. Since these quotes are extracted from
spoken language, they may contain disjointed language, can be gram-
matically incorrect or contain explicit language and swearing.
The analysis of the threads leads to the identication of 12 themes, i.
e. the content around which discourses are organized. These are pre-
sented in the following under specic labels that reect on content
(thematic summaries; see Kuckartz &R¨
adiker, 2019). Themes are often
interrelated, and the quotes will thus often substantiate more than one
theme. Cross references between themes have for this reason been
included. Linkages between themes are illustrated through a co-
occurrence analysis that measures overlap and distance of the coded
elements (Leimbigler, 2021). In the Results section, themes are orga-
nized in ‘hierarchical’order, following escalation stages from factually
argued viewpoints to emotional calls for violence. It is acknowledged
that there are other ways of organizing the themes; here, escalation
stages are considered suitable given the paper’s focus on populism and
societal polarization outcomes. The presentation of the themes outlines
linkages and includes a theoretical embedding where appropriate.
4. Results
Findings suggest that various discursive strategies are used to create,
maintain, or enhance opposition to UTSC and TDM policies. These
strategies are interlinked and can be organized as escalation stages
(Table 1). The following sections provide thematic summaries that
illustrate the content around which discourses are organized.
A prominent strategy encountered in threads and texts is to negate
rational or scientic ndings and arguments, i.e. to establish alternative
S. G¨
ossling et al.

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
4
facts (theme 1). Facts are dismissed, and alternative interpretations
presented, here in regard to (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) disrup-
tiveness, (3) health hazards, and (4) welfare losses. Claims (1) can be
broad: “It is clear to see for all that they [LNTs] do not work”, and involve
“substantiation”by “experts”:“[Name, title]stressed that there is not
enough data about pedestrian trafc deaths to understand the causes…”.
Challenges to the policies’disruptive character (2) insinuates that
motorized trafc is displaced and public transport slowed down: “Oxford
low trafc neighbourhoods make bus journeys slower than walking”. The
disrupted transport system thus causes health hazards (3): “Lewisham is
gridlocked, asthma rates up.”Welfare losses (4) are invoked: “I bet the City
loses more $ in lost property valuation taxes than it’s worth”,“[c]ycling
infrastructure is usually a waste of money”. The theme is linked to reversed
causalities (see theme 2), and can be accompanied by calls for “evi-
dence” – a meme that has its own X-hashtag (“#DemandEvidence”) -, or
demands for “truth”:“@BBCLondonNews @BBCNews @LBC @cristo_r-
adio…@thetimes @guardian - Isn’t it time that media outlets &papers told
the truth?”
A related theme is the reversal of causalities (theme 2), “We all know
that it is #cyclists, and cyclists alone, who cause congestion.”, and that
drivers will be exposed to pollution if using other transport modes: “[…]
if displacement of motorists to the underground occurs, those people are at
risk from poor air quality on that form of transport”. Cycling is dismissed,
because it imposes risks on others: “[…]pavement cycling is so common
now that many elderly folk walk less as it is so dangerous”. Another claim is
that motorists are overcharged in ULEZ, an argument that is also found
in the context of fuel taxation or parking: “PER DAY…#ULEZ £12.50
CONgestion Charge £15.00 …”.
Another discourse seeks to sideline UTSC (theme 3), i.e. to establish
that other societal challenges should have higher priority, a mechanism
also described as “whataboutism”(Dykstra, 2020). Sidelining is usually
based on comparison. For example, “Poor people paying CAZ charges when
all this rework pollution […]”suggests that Clean Air Zones (CAZ) are
established at the expense of low-income earners (see also theme 4),
while addressing other sources of pollutants should have priority.
Comparison can involve literally any issue, as Ultra-Low Emission Zone
(ULEZ) discussions in London illustrate: “More money invested in #ULEZ
than policing”, and even invoke personal responsibility for pollution:
“[…]whilst his busses are major polluters”in reference to London’s mayor.
Drivers often present themselves as victims of transport policies (theme
4) who are treated unfairly. This can also involve generic reference to
“the poor”. Many of these discourses are linked to “big government”
“robbing”the “working man”, who “[…]put the people […]out of business
and into poverty”. Views also invoke unfairness: “Over 400,000 foreign
drivers avoid #ULEZ nes”;“It will force us onto one of the already busiest
roads in the UK and means hours more in the car every week”.
Various threads use a strategy of deep value construction (theme 5),
linking UTSC to threats against family, older citizens, disabled citizens,
education, health, access, and (small) businesses: “I heard about busi-
nesses closing and family life being devastated”, (see also theme 6,
constructive language). Numerous other quotes invoke family values:
“[…]is a disaster for our young family…”;“#ULEZ is isolating the most
vulnerable in our society and disconnecting our families.”. The theme is
powerful, because it touches upon the central human value, i.e. bio-
logical family. In some cases, such as “[…]declared War on Family Visits”,
this is discursively reinforced. Notably, a declaration of war justies the
staging of a defense, and potentially even violence directed at an
aggressor. Freedom is another deep value in Western society. Here,
comments distort. For example, the 15-minute city, designed to be
accessible for everybody without access to a private car, is framed as:
“15 min city =prison ‘cell’=ghetto”. Again, language (theme 6) is of
importance, as the term ‘ghetto’is associated with German atrocities
during WWII. More common is the word ‘prison’:“It starts as a walkable
city. Then slowly they turn into zones that you aren’t allowed to leave. Then it
becomes prison”. Claims can have the character of conspiracy theories:
“Cities that are being converted into 15-minute Smart Cities (prison)run by
A.I. You better check to see if your city is listed. If not, it will be. This is going
worldwide”;“This is what China’s 15 minute cities looks like. A place where
you have to scan your QR code COVID passport and your face recognition to
get in or out. Dystopian hell.”Deep value discourses also involve statistics
of unknown origin: “[…]monitoring shows we’ve had 8–13 % MORE most
polluting HGV’s[heavy good vehicles]past since CAZ. LTN’s will push more
pollution here. Past homes, multiple schools, hospitals, elder homes, shops,
businesses &where kids walk &get buses”.
Language (theme 6) refers to the form in which opinion is expressed.
Comments can be emotional, accusing, aggressive, violent, even
invoking death: “Bradford my home town is dead to me”;“You’ve destroyed
our city”. In other contexts, the tone is insulting, describing policymakers
as “robbing twats”,“rest of the scum labour MPs [members of parliament]”,
“scumbags”,or “lobbyist puppetmasters”(see also theme 11). Language
can also incur oppression: “They love creating these GHETTOs”(as dis-
cussed in theme 5), and there is a hashtag “war on cars”, described as “an
all-out war against the motorist is in full swing”. Such “despotic decision […]
to force the hated #LTNs [into society]”can lead to calls for insurgence:
“The ghtback and backlash from this despotic decision […]has only started.
There will be full force opposition until there is absolute local authority
capitulation”. Language can also be about textual form (see also theme
7), i.e. the use of capital letters and exclamation marks to add emphasis,
or to reect on the emotional state of the writer; for instance, to convey
anger: “Your CAZ charge is a bloody scam !!”.
Mock indignation (theme 7) is another strategy that is related to
language (theme 6), though here with the purpose of dismissing UTSC as
altogether unworthy of rational consideration. Comments express
disbelief and incredulity, often in capital letters to underline the
emotional character of the post: “#RIDICULOUS POLICY!!”There can be
ridicule and sarcasm: “[…]love this piece of ‘reasoning’[…] [laughing
emoji]”, also by posting photographs in which setbacks to UTSC are
celebrated. An example is a burning electric bus, drawing ridicule for
causing “bad air”.
Comments infer that restrictions serve the goal of earning money to
government, ripping off taxpayers (theme 9): “Don’t wanna give my money
to a council with a stupid get rich quick scheme.”;“cash cow opportunity”.
This can lead to the conclusion that policymakers are corrupt: “These
new taxes in the poorest drivers are morally corrupt.”;“@lambeth_council =
where corruption never sleeps”.
The evil state (theme 9) is underfed by the idea of “hardworking peo-
ple”battling “the system”. This discourse paints a morally just struggle
aimed at re-establishing democracy (“#DemandDemocracy”). No his-
torical comparison is too grand to serve as a metaphor for the scale of
Table 1
Themes and main message quotes.
Theme Main message quotes
1. Alternative facts “Bradford doesn’t have an air pollution problem.”
2. Reversal of causalities “LTNs […]have proven time and time again to
increase congestion/pollution”.
3. Sidelining UTSC “What about stopping child grooming gangs.”
4. Self-victimization “Absolutely shameful. The true face of @UKLabour
making the poor poorer…#labourhypocrisy
#ulezexapansion.”
5. Deep values “We’ll now have schools without teachers and roads
without shops”
6. Language “ANOTHER VANITY PROJECT.”
7. Mock indignation “The AUDACITY!!!!!”
8. Ripping off taxpayers “[…]a money making scheme by introducing CAZ”.
9. The evil state “We live in a #Stasi state […]”
10. Resistance “When is it acceptable for people to rebel against
government overreach? When is it allowable for
citizens to tear down the symbols of an authoritarian
state?”
11. Shame-labelling “you are shameful.”(addressed at a member of the
County Council)
12. Endorsement and
encouragement of violence
“RIP THEM ALL DOWN.”
S. G¨
ossling et al.

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
5
this struggle: “But it’s all for your own safety they keep telling us as they take
away our freedom of speech freedom of movement and all the other freedoms
our grandparents and great grandparents fought so hard for in 2 World
Wars”;“People were cheered for tearing down the Berlin Wall - but touch an
#ULEZ camera, and you’ll end up in the clink”. In this view, government is
evil, and policymakers criminal or worse:: “Still think #WEF TERRORIST
@Sadiq Khan is working for Londoner’s instead of his @C40Cities +WEF
TERRORIST MATES?”.
Various themes motivate resistance to UTSC (theme 10). Comments
portray a common enemy –the evil state and its representatives –
against whom opposition needs to be built. Strategies can involve the
sharing of injustices online, as well as donations for the common cause:
“Share how the #ULEZExpansion has impacted your family and loved ones”,
“[Go-fund-me link]If you can afford it donate a day’s charge or an hour pay.
Whatever you can afford!”. Readers are encouraged to follow specic
hashtags (“Keep ghting #CAZ and #ULEZ”). Resistance in this line of
argument sometimes supports democratic form as potential majorities
can reverse policies: “There is only one solution now. In May he has to go”;
“#Ulezexpansion will end as long as you make the right choice. ANY other
vote is a vote for sadiq khan”. Statements can also be ominous: “There’s
going to be a backlash.”;“The ghtback and backlash from this despotic
decision […]has only started. There will be full force opposition until there is
absolute local authority capitulation”.
A common strategy to reduce an opponent’s credibility is to shame-
label the person (theme 11). In the threads analyzed, shame-labelling is
evident in the nouns and attributes used (“hypocrite”;“cretinous”), as
well as in specic form (“This man needs to be put on the spot for ruining
#Oxford”) (followed by photo of a member of County Council). Shame-
labeling also dehumanizes “[…]the scum labour mps”, as it infers that a
person has a lower value to society because of specic character traits.
This lowers moral barriers to attack the person and to justify violence.
The last escalation step endorses violence (theme 12). Technical
infrastructure, such as surveillance cameras in ULEZ zones, are the most
prominent feature against which violence is encouraged. For example,
“Blade Runners”,
1
are a loose movement of vigilantes vandalizing or
stealing surveillance cameras. In November 2023, the London Metro-
politan Police reported 987 ULEZ cameras as stolen or damaged (Met,
2023). YouTube clips showing Blade Runners in action are widely
available on the Internet, and are described as “heroes”and “Robin
Hoods”. Organized through social media groups, Blade Runners have
crowdsourced maps of camera locations. Comments read: “If only a
#bladerunner were here”;“Every #ULEZ camera […]is there to make you a
better marksman. How good are you […]?”A specic aspect of ULEZ
vandalism is that the resistance to the scheme morally normalizes
violence and that ULEZ cameras need to be destroyed: “Anti-ULEZ ac-
tivists are planning to destroy 8 out of 10 cameras in the next four weeks.
They have exciting plans that will bring the pollution charge scheme to its
knees. NO TO #ULEZExpansion NO TO #RoadUserCharging”. Verbal ex-
pressions of support are often interlinked with visualizations, such as
pictograms endorsing camera damage: “795 #ULEZ cameras were
damaged or stolen in #London between April and September”(followed by
exed-biceps emoji), as well as images, in which predominantly male
individuals are photographed or lmed during “raids”. Perpetrators al-
ways wear ski masks to render impossible face-recognition, creating the
impression of an insurgence: “We must ght the power and crush the
imposition of hated, unwanted and unwarranted #LTNs”.
Further MaxQDA co-occurrence analysis shows that alternative facts
(theme 1) and deep values (theme 5) represent central nodes in the
discourse, branching out to ripping of taxpayers (theme 8), resistance
(theme 10), and language (theme 6) (Fig. 1). The most problematic
theme, endorsement of violence, is most closely linked to evil state
(theme 9) and language (6).
Even though the work presented in this paper is based on four cities
and a limited number of posts, data suggests that some themes appear
more frequently than others (Table 2). Posts questioning facts (theme 1)
as well as presenting UTSC measures as designs to rip off vehicle owners
(theme 8) dominate, followed by posts addressing deep values and fears
(theme 5). These also appear frequently in tandem, as shown in the
overlap of themes. For example, themes 5 and 8 are often used in the
context of alternative facts, and theme 8 also coexists with victimization
and language. While it needs to be conrmed that the pattern is robust,
this may indicate that these themes reverberate particularly well with
followers.
5. Discussion
The case study of four different cities in the UK has sought to address
the question of discursive strategies used to oppose UTSC initiatives.
Twelve different themes were identied in posts and comments that
provide content for discourses positing that TDM policies are misguided
and further disadvantage already vulnerable population groups. Politi-
cal linguistic research conrms that these themes are regularly
employed in populist discourse, including an amalgam of emotions,
fears, self-victimization, reversal of causalities, anti-elite sentiments,
shaming, and humor (Kelly, 2019;Ott &Dickinson, 2019;Al-Ghazzi,
2021;Sakki &Martikainen, 2021).
Discourses serve different functions. Emotionally charged discourse
exploits fears and is a catalyst for populism (Ott &Dickinson, 2019).
Affective exaggerations as well as the dismissal of ‘adversary’arguments
represent a departure from the political norm (Stuckey, 2017), and are a
means of establishing ‘virtue-based’justications for views and actions
that are founded in moral superiority over rival parties (Vahter &
Jakobson, 2023). Self-victimization plays a crucial role in achieving this,
as noted by Al-Ghazzi (2021), while the reversal of logic undermines the
identication of common ground in scientic facts (Blassnig et al.,
2019).
In tandem with notion of an evil state, populist discourse creates a
notion of structural oppression, fostering a sense of vulnerability
(Johnson, 2019). This sentiment is reinforced by a vilication of elites
and attribution of societal problems to their inuence (P´
erez-Curiel,
2021). ‘Hardships’resulting out of ‘elite’policies absolve of culpability
(Kelly, 2019;Neerdaels et al., 2023), and justify opposition and
resistance.
Shaming has a critical role in public humiliation and critique of
adversaries (Jacobs et al., 2020), and shame-labelling, as well as lan-
guage that dismisses ‘elites’(transport planners, politicians) is system-
delegitimizing, contributing to perceptions of democracy decit
(McCoy &Somer, 2019;Tworzecki, 2019). Public humiliation also
represents a departure from established policy norms, again compli-
cating the nding of a consensus based on collaboration and dialogue
(Homolar &L¨
ofmann, 2023). Humor –in this study also involving
ridicule –is a means of cultivating anger and polarization, while rein-
forcing a sense of moral superiority and divisiveness (Sakki &Marti-
kainen, 2021).
Findings suggest that UTSC has become an arena where populism, as
a driver of opposition and as a practice, play out through sustainable
transport policies. While these ndings pertain to the cities studied, and
their specic spatialities, they may nevertheless have relevance for other
urban contexts (Robinson, 2011). Populism, i.e. the expression of
opinion in aggressive form that delegitimizes opponents, is a threat for
democracy, specically when these are dismissive or question demo-
cratically legitimized policies with established social welfare gains
(McCoy &Somer, 2019). Hence, notions that populism should be
“considered inherent to the transformation process”(Wanvik &Haar-
stad, 2021, p. 2096) are problematic if considering ndings that the
urban-rural divide is growing (Jennings &Stoker, 2018;Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018) and that TDM policies can also lead to division in the
1
The movement is named after the 1982 sci-, dystopian lm “Blade Run-
ner”where “Blade Runners”are special agents assigned to hunt down escaped
(illegal) “replicants”.
S. G¨
ossling et al.

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
6
communities where they are implemented. To limit polarization of
opinion should thus be a priority in transport planning and politics;
specically since this study indicates that UTSC can have such relevance
that they eclipse other political matters.
Here, spatial justice can serve as a starting point (Soja, 2013). Rea-
sons for resistance to UTSC are usually considered social justice and
equity related (Remme et al., 2022;Wågsæther et al., 2022; see also
Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2023). The car is a transport mode on which
people depend in the absence of alternatives, also as a result of car-
centric transport policies (Hrelja &Rye, 2023). The car also has sym-
bolic and affective values (Steg, 2005) that may, depending on context
and situation, outweigh its instrumental functions (G¨
ossling, 2017).
Drivers also develop co-identities with their vehicles, and TDM policies
may be perceived identity threats (Murtagh et al., 2012). Opposition to
UTSC may consequently be multi-dimensional, as evident from the
complex, multifaceted discourses identied in this research.
Findings have relevance for the future of UTSC. A starting point is to
acknowledge that UTSC measures have potentially grave nancial im-
plications for low-income groups, and may disproportionally affect rural
and sub-urban populations (Wanvik &Haarstad, 2021). There is some
support for notions that green policies often benet the more afuent
and educated population in urban centers (Annsen, 2021;Remme
et al., 2022;Wanvik &Haarstad, 2021), while disadvantaging those who
may have been forced out of cities because of rising housing costs
(Mattioli, 2014; see also Currie &Delbosc, 2011).
This suggests that resistance to UTSC should not be dismissed as a
mere nuisance to public order, that transport alternatives need to be
offered, and that emotions may reect on instrumental, symbolic and
affective vehicle values endangered by TDM policies. In reection of the
escalation stages identied in this research, policies should be designed
with a view to accommodating disadvantaged populations, and with a
framing in appropriate communication strategies (van Wee, 2023). For
example, it has been suggested that geographically differentiated pric-
ing models can shield vulnerable groups (Creutzig et al., 2020). Even
more successful may be strategies that engage with change from the top
by targeting those social groups contributing disproportionally to a
problem. For example, charges for SUV, based on the argument that
these reduce visibility in trafc, require greater shares of scarce parking,
or cause more severe injuries, will reverberate with broader populations.
Likewise, measures designed to make ways to school safer for children or
for elderly people using sidewalks will be perceived as supportive of
vulnerable groups.
This underlines the important role of communication strategies in
UTSC (Meeks, 2023). Where vocal anti-policy voices spread negative
views and misinformation on TDM policies, this can drown out majority
views in favour of such policies. Participatory planning approaches that
engage opposing voices into the co-design of less divisive policies may
help addressing such concerns. Communication strategies may also
focus on direct benets for residents, such as more accessible, afford-
able, healthy, and quiet neighbourhoods, where costly automobility is
Fig. 1. Discursive strategy connections*.
*Line thickness indicates the frequency of shared discourses. Colours signify clusters. MaxQDA distinguishes three theme clusters based on their geodesic distance.
Table 2
Frequency of themes.
Theme Frequency
(1) Alternative facts 34
(2) Reversal of causalities 7
(3) Sidelining UTSC 13
(4) Victimization 17
(5) Deep values 31
(6) Language 21
(7) Mock indignation 8
(8) Ripping off 33
(9) The evil state 18
(10) Resistance 12
(11) Shame-labeling 10
(12) Endorsement of violence 12
S. G¨
ossling et al.

Cities 153 (2024) 105273
7
an option, but not needed. Further research is needed to better under-
stand these interrelationships, including the design of interventions and
communication strategies.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates discursive strategies used to oppose urban
transport system change in the specic context of ULEZ, CAZ, and LTN
implemented in four cities in the UK. Findings show that multiple,
interlinked social media discourses drive opposition, but also represent a
practice of opposition. The analysis suggests that some of these dis-
courses are particularly important, including alternative facts, ripping
off drivers, and deep values, the latter addressing fears related to family,
older citizens, education, health, or access. Analysis also sees these
discourses as hierarchical, with evidence that social media posts
encourage violence.
To prevent conicts related to UTSC, it is crucial to not only analyze
the outcomes of TDM policies, rather than to understand the instru-
mental, symbolic, and affective values of cars that are at risk in the
perception of vehicle owners and drivers. This allows for a deeper
analytical understanding of resistance to UTSC and the design of
communication strategies and transport policies that can minimize
conict.
Findings in this paper are limited by the non-exhaustive nature of
searches and identication of text from selected social media platforms
and focus on a few cities in just one country. The analysis is therefore
exploratory in nature but paves the way for further in-depth and
expanded inquiries. It is recommended that future research include
representative or exhaustive sampling, an assessment of recurrent social
media actors, the legitimacy of their claims, their inuence, the
authenticity of social media accounts (e.g., by quantitative big data
mining), and data from interventions in other countries and regions.
Finally, it would be meaningful to study discourses from proponents of
UTSC and identify their strategies and whether these increase or bridge
the gap with opponents.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
S. G¨
ossling: Writing –review &editing, Writing –original draft,
Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis,
Conceptualization. N. Schweiggart: Writing –original draft, Visuali-
zation, Formal analysis, Data curation. M. Nieuwenhuijsen: Writing –
review &editing, Funding acquisition. R.R.C. McEachan: Data cura-
tion, Writing –review &editing. H. Khreis: Writing –review &editing,
Conceptualization.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing nancial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to inuence
the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
Acknowledgements
This project has received funding from the European Union’s, Ho-
rizon Europe Framework Programme (HORIZON) under GA No
101094639 - THE URBAN BURDEN OF DISEASE ESTIMATION FOR
POLICY MAKING (UBDPolicy).
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