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What Effect does Ideological Extremism have on Mass Shootings? An Assessment of Motivational Inconsistencies, Risk Profiles, and Attack Behaviors
Terrorism and Political Violence
Abstract
Much like other violent extremists, some mass shooters embrace inconsistent, mixed, or customized beliefs and attack for a combination of personal and ideological reasons. This makes it difficult to understand what effects ideology has on their behavior. To obtain empirical answers, we studied (1) the frequency of extreme ideological interests and motives among public
mass shooters, (2) differences between perpetrators with and without extreme ideological interests, and (3) the degree of consistency between their ideologies and attack outcomes. Findings suggest that from 1966–2023, approximately one-quarter of public mass shooters in the United States had extreme ideological interests and roughly 70 percent of them were partially motivated by those extreme beliefs. Mass shooters with and without extremist
interests showed similar rates of childhood trauma, mental health
problems, suicidality, crisis, substance abuse, and criminal records, but ideological shooters were more likely to create legacy tokens, use semi-automatic or automatic rifles, kill strangers and non-white victims, and be copycats or role models. It appears extremism was sometimes a correlate and sometimes a cause of their behavior, with a clear effect on shaping some attacks. Nevertheless, inconsistencies were common, and many attackers did not target locations or victims that fit their ideological enemies.
... For each case where a specific woman was targeted, we then coded whether the shooter intended to harm her before, during, or after the main attack. 5 Finally, we also supplemented TVP's data with findings from other research on perpetrators' sexual frustration problems, fame-seeking motives, and ideological motives (Lankford, 2016;Lankford & Silva, 2024a, 2024bSilva, 2023;Silva & Greene-Colozzi, 2019;Silva & Lankford, 2024). 6 Overall, continuous variables were coded as numbers and binary variables were coded as 1 = yes, 0 = no/no evidence. ...
... Researchers have coded mass shooters as having fame-seeking motives if they overtly admitted it, made statements for widespread dissemination, or followed the path to fame of previous high-profile individuals (Lankford, 2016;Silva & Greene-Colozzi, 2019;Silva & Lankford, 2024). Finally, shooters have been coded as having ideological motives based on their expression of extremist ideologies that were directly associated with the reason for their attack (Lankford & Silva, 2024b;Silva, 2023). ...
For this study, we closely examined public mass shooters who targeted specific women and quantitatively compared them to other shooters. Results indicate that nearly one-quarter (24%) of public mass shooters in the United States have targeted specific women, the target–offender relationship was usually romantic/sexual or familial, and 80% of the targeted women were ultimately killed. Compared to other mass shooters, perpetrators who targeted specific women more often (1) had a history of sex offending and domestic abuse, (2) were divorced/separated, (3) had experienced a recent breakup, and (4) had several other key characteristics. Implications for violence prevention and future research are discussed.
Law enforcement and security services are facing a rising number of referrals involving concerns about an adolescent’s potential for extremist violence. Assessing and managing their risks requires a somewhat different approach than doing so with adults. While some risk and protective factors overlap, their significance varies at different stages, as do their mechanisms of action. Risk must be understood in its developmental context. The challenge is amplified because adolescents are concurrently undergoing significant biological, social/emotional, and cognitive changes. This article describes a developmentally informed approach to these assessments to help professionals better understand the complexities of adolescent behavior and to plan and provide more effective interventions. It introduces the general challenge of assessing risks related to violent extremism and the emergence of the Structured Professional Judgment model as a best practice approach. It goes on to define the contours of “developmentally informed assessment,” explaining why that perspective is necessary for a competent evaluation of an adolescent’s risk for extremist violence. The ensuing sections outline some of the key developmental constructs such as identity and psychosocial maturity and developmentally specific risk and protective factors to consider in those evaluations and conclude with a brief description and example of the risk formulation process.
On May 6, 2023, Mauricio Garcia, a man with longstanding neo-Nazi views, murdered eight people in a mass shooting at the Allen Premium Outlets mall in Allen, Texas. He was shot dead by police. Though investigators are still probing the deceased gunman’s motivations, this article examines all the available information regarding Garcia’s modus operandi, the nexus between extreme far-right ideas and misogyny prevalent in Garcia’s writings, and the complex roles of race and mental health in the attack. Garcia had an ideologically fuzzy tapestry of extreme thoughts tied to rampant violence. He appeared to view neo-Nazis and other members of the extreme far-right as living the “real” masculine ideal in its fullest form by their commitment to generating dominance through violent, radical, racial, and cultural action. This interaction between race and gender is an increasingly present aspect of far-right violence and needs to be better understood.
This article explores the motivations of ideological killers by investigating their justifications for violence. These justifications are divided into three categories: those that are grounded in actual social/political realities that are present in the lives of the perpetrators; those that utilize geographically and/or temporally distant vicarious victimisations; and those that are fictional, i.e., they have no basis in reality. These concepts are illustrated through discussions of a range of perpetrators of ideological violence. The implications of vicarious and fictional motivations are discussed in terms of our understanding of the psychology of perpetrators, the process of radicalisation, and counterterrorism efforts.
This study compared public mass shooters (n = 171) and active shooters (n = 63) in the United States to the general population, homicide offenders, and people who die by suicide. Comparisons with the general population are the foundation of epidemiological research, and comparisons with homicide offenders and people who die by suicide are helpful because public mass shooters and active shooters always intend to kill and often take their own lives. Findings indicate that public mass shooters were more often male, unmarried, and unemployed than the average American. Active shooters were not significantly different from the general population based on prior felony convictions or preexisting firearm ownership. Public mass shooters and active shooters appeared more like people who die by suicide than homicide offenders, given their high frequency of premeditation, acting alone, suicidal ideation, and unnatural death. Overall, this suggests that felony histories and firearm ownership may have limited utility for threat assessment, but several suicide prevention strategies might help reduce the prevalence of these attacks.
Progress in understanding and responding to terrorism and violent extremism has continued to stall in part because we often fail to adequately conceptualize the problem. Perhaps most notably, much of our terminology (for instance, “radicalization”) and many variants of our existing models and analogies (including conveyor belts, staircases and pyramids) conflate sympathy for this violence with involvement in its creation. As its name suggests, the Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) model seeks to overcome this issue by placing this key disconnect between attitudes and behaviors at its core. In this paper, we first present the key elements of our model, which include a graphic representation of this disconnect and a classification system of the drivers of violent extremism. The former enables us to track the trajectories of individuals in relation to both their attitudes and behaviors, while the latter helps ensure that we consider all potential explanations for these movements. We then adapt these elements to focus on exit from violence, applying the dual concepts of disengagement and deradicalization. Finally, we conclude with a section that aims to provide the research community and those tasked with preventing and countering violent extremism with practical benefits from the ABC model.
The field of terrorism has long suffered from a data deficit, particularly when it comes to primary data derived from interviews with violent extremists. This deficit reflects more than the difficulties of securing such data. For a variety of more subtle and complex reasons, researchers have been reluctant to interview terrorists and suspicious of the information derived from such interviews. As part of a larger study, this article explores the nature and foundations of this situation by systematically examining the limited discussion of the problem in terrorism studies and delineating three underlying interpretive concerns that appear to have interfered with securing more such interviews and trusting the data acquired through them.
Violent extremists and terrorists often abandon their associates to join like‐minded groups (i.e., with the same ideology or cause) or leave violent activism altogether (i.e., disengage or deradicalize). Sometimes, however, militants might switch between groups with mutually exclusive and hostile ideologies (e.g., from left‐wing to right‐wing extremism or from right‐wing extremism to Salafi‐jihadism). To explain intergroup migration, social identity theory (SIT) stipulates individual mobility as a strategy for status enhancement. However, SIT's applicability to this highly specific scenario of intergroup migration across hostile ideologies has not previously been explored. Several theoretical caveats could limit SIT's explanatory value here, such as potential group impermeability, lack of realistic status enhancement, and high social identity salience with the original ingroup. To assess SIT's applicability, this article uses four well‐documented individual case studies of violent extremist intergroup migration across hostile ideologies in Germany. The article shows that SIT's individual mobility strategy largely applies to this scenario, at least in the presented case studies.
‘Hate stereotyping’ occurs when researchers foreground negative emotions, especially hate, as motivating right-wing social movements, epitomized by labels like ‘hate group’. This convention contradicts empirical evidence showing that hateful feelings and ideological prejudices are mostly insignificant for attracting and retaining members in such movements. Using contemporary theories of hate, this article demonstrates the concept’s limits and misuse in studying and theorizing the political Right. For instance, hate’s theoretical and methodological ambiguity sometimes leads scholars to confuse hatred with right-wing ideology and prejudice, which can obfuscate findings and spur dubious generalizations across political groups. Moreover, some researchers accept post-structuralist theories of hate as a substitute for vital data on emotions, motivations and meaning-making among right-wing actors. Hate explanations persist because they appeal to ‘common sense’ about intolerance, not because of their methodological integrity for studying right-wing movements. By foregrounding intolerance, hate stereotyping risks sustaining the dominant narrative that prejudices such as racism are deviant, and that racism is a problem of bad attitudes and fringe ideologies, rather than larger issues of systemic and structural inequality.
This study article focuses on American far-right (FR) extremists who committed ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes in the United States. We examine three research questions. First, are certain types of FR ideological beliefs associated with different types of criminal behavior? Second, can the various indicators of FR ideology be used to create a scalar measure of commitment to FR ideology? Third, which typology of the FR movement provides the most reliable measure of FR extremism? We use data from the United States Extremist Crime Database to measure indicators of FR ideology in a sample of 305 FRs who committed a financial crime or homicide between 2006 and 2010 in the United States. Conspiratorial, antigovernment, and antitax beliefs were positively associated with risk of financial crimes, while xenophobic, survivalist, and anti–gun control beliefs were positively associated with risk of violent crimes. A factor analysis created a commitment to FR ideology scale and identified four sub-types of FRs: Conspiracy Theorist, Survivalist, Movement Participant, and Proud far-rightist. The factor analysis did not support the prevailing typologies. Importantly though, these typologies were useful in predicting criminal behavior patterns of far rightists. We outline a number of other measurement issues for future research to address.
Active shooter events involve individuals entering a public space and opening fire with the intent to kill as many people as possible. In recent years this topic has received extensive media coverage, followed by an increase in academic attention. Much research focuses on high-profile active shooter events, labeled as mass homicide events or mass shootings. The present study examined active shooter events through the rational choice perspective and crime script analysis, with emphasis placed on finding similarities between the motivation for an offense and event-level characteristics. Once events were organized into three general scripts (that is, autogenic, victim-specific and ideological), variables pertaining to the commission of the offenses were examined. While event characteristics overlapped between scripts, key differences in the planning, execution and conclusion stages were observed. This new typology may be a useful analytic tool, not only to empirically study active shooter events, but also for the development of policies to help reduce the occurrence and/or lethality of these events.
This study explores the threat of ideological active shooter attacks in the United States. In particular, to understand if these events constitute a new brand of “lone wolf terrorism” or if they are simply “deranged shooters” that happen to be ideological. The results show that ideological and non-ideological active shooters share very similar profiles. Despite the similarities, ideological extremism seems to influence the way these offenders prepare, execute, and conclude their attacks. Most ideological active shooters are “loners” whose attacks tend to be motivated by ideology. Given their sophistication and lethality, ideological active shooters represent a serious threat to national security.
This note describes a new and unique, open source, relational database called the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). We first explain how the ECDB was created and outline its distinguishing features in terms of inclusion criteria and assessment of ideological commitment. Second, the article discusses issues related to the evaluation of the ECDB, such as reliability and selectivity. Third, descriptive results are provided to illustrate the contributions that the ECDB can make to research on terrorism and criminology.
Compared to most types of criminal violence, terrorism poses special data collection challenges. In response, there has been growing interest in open source terrorist event data bases. One of the major problems with these data bases in the past is that they have been limited to international events—those involving a national or group of nationals from one country attacking targets physically located in another country. Past research shows that domestic incidents greatly outnumber international incidents. In this paper we describe a previously unavailable open source data base that includes some 70,000 domestic and international incidents since 1970. We began the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by computerizing data originally collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS). Following computerization, our research team has been working for the past two years to validate and extend the data to real time. In this paper, we describe our data collection efforts, the strengths and weaknesses of open source data in general and the GTD in particular, and provide descriptive statistics on the contents of this new resource.
2 This is an independent advisory paper prepared during the week following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It was submitted to the Behavioral Analysis Program of the National Security Division, FBI, on Sept. 21, 2001. The paper was subsequently circulated to other intelligence agencies, both in the U.S. and abroad. The purpose of the advisory paper was to marshal as quickly as possible psychological knowledge concerning "the violent true believer" and his homicidal-suicidal state of mind. It concludes with behavioral and psychological characteristics that, when combined with factual evidence, could be used to guide the investigation of one or several individuals suspected of terrorist activities. It was not prepared as a scholarly submission, therefore no references are cited.
Scholars and counterterrorism practitioners have expressed increasing concern over violent extremists who display an amalgamation of disparate beliefs, interests, and grievances. Despite a proliferation of labels like “salad bar extremism,” consensus on the nature of the problem is lacking and current understandings risk conflating what are in fact distinct types of extremism. Building on current literature and a detailed dataset, this article presents a new conceptual framework for understanding this phenomenon, consisting of an overarching concept of composite violent extremism (CoVE) and underlying typologies of ambiguous, mixed, fused, and convergent violent extremism. The article then proposes explanations for the apparent increase in these radicalization patterns.
The study found little to distinguish these two violent offender types in their socio-demographic profiles. Their behaviors, on the other hand, differed significantly in the degree to which they had interacted with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they lacked information prior to their attack. Unlike lone terrorists, mass murderers' violence was spontaneous due to unplanned physical or emotional conflicts. Lone terrorists, on the other hand, were motivated to commit violence due to ideologically based conflicts or differences with potential target victims. Regarding threat or risk, there are a number of overlapping questions that must be considered, including what type of action is most likely, under what conditions is a particular mass violence attack likely to be perpetrated, and what interventions are likely to be effective in preventing or mitigating the perpetration of violence. Lack of predetermined intent and strategy distinguishes mass murderers and lone terrorists. The lone terrorist tends to engage in more observable behaviors and planning than the mass murderer, which presents more of an opportunity to observe and assess preparatory actions and intervene to prevent the planned violence from occurring. 3 figures and approximately 100 references
Although several mass killings by incels have received much attention, the overall phenomenon of sexually frustrated offenders seems even larger. This study drew from a recently developed sexual frustration theory to closely examine public mass shooters in the United States from 1966 to 2021 (n = 178). Results showed that some sexually frustrated perpetrators just wanted sex, while others lusted after unavailable partners or had illegal urges that were difficult to satisfy. Quantitative analyses indicated that compared to other mass shooters, sexually frustrated perpetrators were more frequently young, male, unmarried, childless, and unemployed. They were also more likely to be misogynistic, sex offenders, and fame-seekers, and their attacks killed significantly more female victims. Concerted efforts to reduce toxic masculinity and provide better guidance to young men could help reduce this threat.
This article argues for recognition of fringe fluidity as a distinct radicalization pathway. Most studies on individual-level radicalization examine how relatively normal people come to accept violent extremist beliefs. But some people who come to accept and act on an extremist ideology transition from the embrace of one form of violent extremism to another—and understanding their prior extremism is essential to appreciating their ultimate beliefs and actions. The article demonstrates the existence of fringe fluidity by detailing the pathway between neo-Nazism and militant Islamism. Factors allowing fringe fluidity between these ideologies include recent cases of individuals who transitioned from one to the other or simultaneously embraced both; some ideological overlap, particularly in shared out-groups; and historical precedent that allows some adherents to reconcile inconsistent aspects of the two ideologies. Despite this article’s focus on neo-Nazism and militant Islamism, fringe fluidity is likely more widely applicable beyond the context of these two ideologies.
The current study examines mass public shooters who target government agents and institutions in the United States. This research uses a rational choice perspective to examine the incidence, motivations, and target selection. Additionally, this work provides an in-depth investigation of ideological attacks, as well as a comparison against general mass public shooting perpetrator, planning, and incident characteristics. Results indicate non-ideological attacks against government targets occur more than ideologically motivated shootings. Importantly, the majority of ideologically motivated mass public shooters do not attack government targets. These findings provide implications for security, policy, and prevention strategies that have historically focused on ideologically motivated mass public shootings against government targets.
Growing racial, ideological, and cultural polarization within the American electorate contributed to the shocking victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Using data from American National Election Studies surveys, we show that Trump’s unusually explicit appeals to racial and ethnic resentment attracted strong support from white working-class voters while repelling many college-educated whites along with the overwhelming majority of nonwhite voters. However, Trump’s campaign exploited divisions that have been growing within the electorate for decades because of demographic and cultural changes in American society. The 2016 presidential campaign also reinforced another longstanding trend in American electoral politics: the rise of negative partisanship, that is voting based on hostility toward the opposing party and its leaders. We conclude with a discussion of the consequences of deepening partisan and affective polarization for American democracy and the perceptions by both experts and the public of an erosion in its quality. © 2019 by The American Academy of Political and Social Science.
This study provides a comparative analysis of news media coverage across four types of mass public shootings: rampage, disgruntled employee, school, and lone-wolf terrorist. This research analyzes the agenda-setting function of the media and identifies differences in coverage and the salience of coverage, proportionality of coverage, changes in coverage over time, and factors influencing levels of coverage. Findings indicate school shootings and lone-wolf terrorist shootings receive disproportionate amounts of news media coverage. This suggests media coverage may be contributing to setting the public and policy agenda concerning the phenomenon. These findings have important implications for public perceptions of risk, conceptualizations of potential perpetrators, and the implementation of security measures.
Why and how do individuals residing in relatively peaceful and affluent Western societies come to embrace extremist ideologies that emanate from distant places? We summarize the most recent empirical literature on the causes and dynamics of radicalization, and evaluate the state of the art in the study of Islamist homegrown extremism in the West. We propose a theoretical synthesis based on four factors that come together to produce violent radicalization: personal and collective grievances, networks and interpersonal ties, political and religious ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures. We propose adopting a “puzzle” metaphor that represents a multifactor and contextualized approach to understanding how ordinary individuals transform into violent extremists. We concluded with three recommendations to strengthen the empirical foundations of radicalization studies.
For years, scholars have claimed that suicide terrorists are not suicidal, but rather psychologically normal individuals inspired to sacrifice their lives for an ideological cause, due to a range of social and situational factors. I agree that suicide terrorists are shaped by their contexts, as we all are. However, I argue that these scholars went too far. In The Myth of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Other Self-Destructive Killers, I take the opposing view, based on my in-depth analyses of suicide attackers from Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and North America; attackers who were male, female, young, old, Islamic, and Christian; attackers who carried out the most deadly and the least deadly strikes. I present evidence that in terms of their behavior and psychology, suicide terrorists are much like others who commit conventional suicides, murder-suicides, or unconventional suicides where mental health problems, personal crises, coercion, fear of an approaching enemy, or hidden self-destructive urges play a major role. I also identify critical differences between suicide terrorists and those who have genuinely sacrificed their lives for a greater good. By better understanding suicide terrorists, experts in the brain and behavioral sciences may be able to pioneer exciting new breakthroughs in security countermeasures and suicide prevention. And even more ambitiously, by examining these profound extremes of the human condition, perhaps we can more accurately grasp the power of the human survival instinct among those who are actually psychologically healthy.
Though widely used by academics and policy-makers in the context of the 'war on terror', the concept of radicalization lacks clarity. This article shows that while radicalization is not a myth, its meaning is ambiguous and the major controversies and debates that have sprung from it are linked to the same inherent ambiguity. The principal conceptual fault-line is between notions of radicalization that emphasize extremist beliefs ('cognitive radicalization') and those that focus on extremist behavior ('behavioural radicalization'). This ambiguity explains the differences between definitions of radicalization; it has driven the scholarly debate, which has revolved around the relationship between cognition and behavior; and it provides the backdrop for strikingly different policy approaches—loosely labeled 'European' and 'Anglo-Saxon'—which the article delineates and discusses in depth. Rather than denying its validity, the article calls on scholars and policy-makers to work harder to understand and embrace a concept which, though ambiguous, is likely to dominate research and policy agendas for years to come.
This study presents results from the first combined quantitative assessment and comparative analysis of suicide terrorists and rampage, workplace, and school shooters who attempt suicide. Findings suggest that in the United States from 1990 to 2010, the differences between these offenders (N = 81) were largely superficial. Prior to their attacks, they struggled with many of the same personal problems, including social marginalization, family problems, work or school problems, and precipitating crisis events. Ultimately, patterns among all four types of offenders can assist those developing security policy, conducting threat assessments, and attempting to intervene in the lives of at-risk individuals.
Previous research comparing rampage shooters in the U.S. and volunteer suicide bombers in the Middle East appears to be virtually non-existent. When these two types of suicidal killers have been mentioned in the same context, it has primarily been to dismiss any possible connections. Rampage shooters are generally assumed to be mentally unbalanced, while suicide bombers are seen as extreme, but rational, political actors. However, this review explores the possibility that the primary differences between the two types of killers are cultural, not individual, and that in terms of their underlying psychology and motivation, they are actually quite similar. In both cases, substantial evidence indicates that these perpetrators of murder–suicide share many of the following characteristics: (1) they had troubled childhoods, (2) they lived in oppressive social environments, (3) they suffered from low self-esteem, (4) they were triggered by a personal crisis, (5) they were seeking revenge, and (6) they were seeking fame and glory.
FBI Director Christopher Wray Testifies on January 6 Capitol Attack
- Wray
Wray, "FBI Director
Christopher Wray Testifies on January 6 Capitol Attack";
Statement by Director Christopher Wray Before the U.S. House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on Global Threats
- Wray
Wray, "Statement by Director Christopher Wray
Before the U.S. House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on Global Threats."
For critiques of this logic, see: Donald Holbrook and John Horgan
For critiques of this logic, see: Donald Holbrook and John Horgan, "Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking the Nut,"
Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 6 (2019): 2-15;
The Myth of Martyrdom"; Post
- Lankford
Lankford, "The Myth of Martyrdom"; Post, "Current Understanding of
Terrorist Motivation and Psychology";
Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism
- Pew Research
- Center
Pew Research Center, "Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism,"
August 30, 2011, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-inalienation-or-support-for-extremism/.
Disaggregating Mass Public Shootings
- Capellan
Capellan et al., "Disaggregating Mass Public Shootings."
Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter
- Capellan
Capellan, "Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter?";
Current Understanding of Terrorist Motivation and Psychology
- Lankford
Lankford, "The
Myth of Martyrdom"; Neumann, "The Trouble with Radicalization"; Post, "Current Understanding of Terrorist
Motivation and Psychology."
Mixing Ideologies Requires Multipronged Terrorism Prevention Efforts (The National Counter Terrorism Center
Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Mixing Ideologies Requires Multipronged Terrorism Prevention
Efforts (The National Counter Terrorism Center, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2023);
The Age of Incoherence? Understanding Mixed and Unclear Ideology Extremism (National Counterterrorism Innovation
- Alexander Meleagrou
- Hitchens
- Moustafa Ayad
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Moustafa Ayad, The Age of Incoherence? Understanding Mixed and Unclear Ideology Extremism
(National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, 2023);
The Bitter Life and Sudden Death of A.C
- Rick Anderson
Rick Anderson, "The Bitter Life and Sudden Death of A.C.," Seattle Weekly, April 20, 2017, https://www.
seattleweekly.com/news/the-bitter-life-and-sudden-death-of-arcan-cetin/; Adam Taylor, "O. M. May Not Have
Understood the Difference Between ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah," The Washington Post, June 13, 2016, https://
tinyurl.com/yxf9p5vh.
Where Do 'Mixed, Unclear, and Unstable' Ideologies Come From
- Baele Brace
Brace, Baele, and Ging, "Where Do 'Mixed, Unclear, and Unstable' Ideologies Come From?";
This seems credible given the "admissions against interest" standard, we found no evidence of extreme ideological interests
- Ross Gartenstein
- Blackman
Gartenstein-Ross
and Blackman, "Fluidity of the Fringes"; Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Mixing Ideologies Requires
www.cnn.com/2021/03/17/us/robert-aaron-long-suspected-shooter/index.html. This seems credible given the
"admissions against interest" standard, we found no evidence of extreme ideological interests, and at that
point he had little to hide.
The Globalization of American Mass Shootings
- Lankford Silva
Silva and Lankford, "The Globalization of American Mass Shootings?";
59. Based on the recommendations from the "No Notoriety" campaign and Lankford and Madfis's proposal to deny offenders the attention they often seek, we are not publishing mass shooters' names. Adam Lankford and Eric Madfis
- Wray
Wray, "Statement by Director
Christopher Wray Before the U.S. House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on Global Threats."
59. Based on the recommendations from the "No Notoriety" campaign and Lankford and Madfis's proposal to deny
offenders the attention they often seek, we are not publishing mass shooters' names. Adam Lankford and Eric
Madfis, "Don't Name Them, Don't Show Them, but Report Everything Else: A Pragmatic Proposal for Denying
Mass Killers the Attention they Seek and Deterring Future Offenders," American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 2
(2018): 260-79.
A Case Study in Lone-Actor Terrorism
- N H Poppe
Poppe, N. H.: A Case Study in Lone-Actor Terrorism.
Manifesto of the Charleston Church Shooter, Copy obtained by the authors
- D R Hansi Lo
- Wang
D. R., Manifesto of the Charleston Church Shooter, Copy obtained by the authors, 2015; Hansi Lo Wang, "Alleged
Shooter Visited Slave Plantations Before Church Shooting," NPR, June 23, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/cz9jvtyf.
has at Least One Black Friend who Denies Alleged Shooter is Racist
- Daniel Politi
Daniel Politi, "D.R. has at Least One Black Friend who Denies Alleged Shooter is Racist," Slate, June 2015, https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/06/dylann-roof-has-at-least-one-black-friend-who-denies-alleged-shooter-isracist.html.
Almost Didn't Go Through' with Charleston Church Shooting
- Erik Ortiz
- Daniel Arkin
Erik Ortiz and Daniel Arkin, "D. R. 'Almost Didn't Go Through' with Charleston Church Shooting," NBC News,
June 19, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/charleston-church-shooting/dylann-roof-almost-didnt-gothrough-charleston-church-shooting-n378341.
Composite Violent Extremism"; Hafez and Mullins
- Gartenstein-Ross
Gartenstein-Ross et al., "Composite Violent Extremism"; Hafez and Mullins,
"The Radicalization Puzzle"; Holbrook and Horgan, "Terrorism and Ideology";
Influences on the Ideology of E.H. (version 1.3)," School Shooters Info
- Peter Langman
Peter Langman, "Influences on the Ideology of E.H. (version 1.3)," School Shooters Info, 2016.