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Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy hps://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i1.3204
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MURDERERS ON THE BALLOT PAPER
, ,
Richard Beadon Williams
argue that the legitimacy of democratic authority
partially depends on the ability of democratic states to make the correct
decisionsthe decisions that beer promote the common goodmore
eectively than antidemocratic alternatives. In this paper I argue that epi stemic
democrats typically overlook the centrality of party politicians to representa-
tive democracies. e democratic choice of policy is mediated through the
democratic choice of politician.
is paper will defend two core contributions. In a critical direction, the rst
core contribution is to put the democratic process of politicians competing for
votes in elections at the center of political theorizing. Epistemic democrats risk
forcing this central characteristic of representative democracy to have an ad hoc
t with their preconceived models of direct democracy. In particular, epistemic
democrats overlook the active possibility that a competent public could still
yield bad outcomes because of how bad apples behave in the legislature and
how conscientious politicians should react. is paper shows that conscien-
tious politicians should compromise with each other in order to gain the politi-
cal alliances and electoral support necessary to stop the murderers on the ballot
paper from winning and wielding political power with killer consequences. So
the active possibility of the worst politicians on the ballot paper winning and
wielding political power as they wish potentially spoils the epistemic benets
of widespread public competence for the rest of us. Rather than promote the
truth, a conscientious politician should compromise the epistemic benets of
widespread public competence with whatever rhetoric, lies, and bullshit will
gain the alliances and votes necessary to resist the bad apples, whether the bad
apples are inside or outside her political party.
As a moral agent, a party politician with personal integrity may feel com-
pelled to promote her moral convictions, and compromising on those moral
convictions may compromise her personal integrity. However, to see only that
E
moral compromises compromise personal integrity is to overlook whether
compromises may cultivate a dierent type of integrity. A politician, as an
elected representative, should cultivate her “democratic integrity” and take
responsibility for protecting the material interests of those she represents. An
uncompromising politician who prioritizes her personal integrity as a moral
agent neglects her democratic integrity as an elected representative.
e bad apples in the legislature provide a powerful reason to construct a
less idealized and more realistic model of deliberation. If a model of delibera-
tion is to help show how democracy outperforms antidemocratic alternatives,
it must become much more sensitive to the weighty profession-specic obli-
gations of politicians in representative democracies to resist the bad apples.
In a constructive direction, the second core contribution is that deliber-
ation is potentially useful for discovering how to resist the bad apples. is
paper will show that a potential epistemic value of public deliberation in rep-
resentative democracies is that it can empower politicians to discover what I
call “deliberated compromises.” It allows politicians to persistently know what
moral compromises to advocate for in order to resist the bad apples. Deliber-
ation can empower politicians to know which moral compromises will gain
the alliances and votes necessary to resist bad apples in light of the constantly
changing range and intensity of political sentiments among the public. e
bad apples problem provides a powerful reason for more realistic models of
deliberation to redirect themselves away from the public promoting truth and
toward politicians promoting compromise.
.
1.1. Politician Incompetence
Epistemic democrats argue that the legitimacy of democratic authority partially
depends on the ability of democratic states to produce the correct decisions
more eectively than antidemocratic alternatives. Broad ly speak ing, they argue
that aggregating competent votes in elections and voicing diverse views in public
deliberations can empower democratic states to discover the correct decisions.
As aggregative epistemic democrats, Robert Goodin and Kai Spiekermann have
defended the Condorcet Jury theorem, showing that if only competent people
Cohen, “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy”; Coleman and Ferejohn, “Democracy
and Social Choice”; Anderson, “e Epistemology of Democracy”; Estlund, Democratic
Authority; Landemore, Democratic Reason; Schwartzberg, “Epistemic Democracy and Its
Challenges”; Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic eory of Democracy; and Cerovac,
Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy.
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
vote, and they vote independently, the competent majority is exponentially
more likely to choose the correct decision than a competent minority. As a
deliberative epistemic democrat, Hélène L andemore has defended the Diversity
Trumps Ab ility theorem, show ing that if a cognitively diverse public spreads the
eective problem-solving heuristics scaered among its members during delib-
erations, the diverse public is more likely to choose the correct decision than a
more cognitively able but less cognitively diverse group of experts. Whatever
the particular mechanism might be, epistemic democrats provide an aractive
ideal that enables them to evaluate the political competence of the public and to
aspire toward institutional reforms that should promote their political compe-
tence more fully. A gainst epistemic democracy, epi stocrats (those who advocate
for expert rule) argue that the public is too politically incompetent to make epis-
temic democracy a realistic ideal. In defense of epistemic democracy, epistemic
democrats argue that the public can and should become politically competent
enough to make epistemic democracy a realistic ideal.
In a dierent direction, I am primarily concerned with a more neglected set
of assumptions. e rst core contribution of this paper is that epistemic dem-
ocrats typically overlook the centrality of elected politicians in representative
democracies. I will therefore explore whether the assumptions about politi-
cian competence rather than public competence are realistic. Even if epistemic
democrats were to assume a fully realistic model of the public, they would still
risk a utopian ideal if they assumed a hopelessly optimistic model of elected
politicians. e incompetent politicians in the legislature potentially spoil the
epistemic benets of widespread public competence during elections.
In practice, representative democracy rather than direct democracy is typ-
ical. Representative democracies typically contain political parties as useful
instruments for elected politicians to win elections and govern eectively. Polit-
ical parties typically unite around common political agendas during elections,
but they contain persistent internal divisions with divergent political traditions,
policy preferences, and political aspirations among their members. Represen-
tative democracy fundamentally changes the type of choices that competent
voters must make. ey cannot directly choose a policy: they directly choose a
politician and indirectly choose a policy. In other words, the democratic choice
of policy is mediated through a democratic choice of politician. e political
Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic eory of Democracy, –.
Landemore, Democratic Reason, –.
Caplan, e Myth of the Rational Voter; Lopez -Guerra, Democracy and Disenanchisement;
and Brennan, Against Democracy.
Even with referendums, the contributions of party politicians seeking to win the next
election typically still inuence the referendum result.
competence of the public risks pushing against the political incompetence of
politicians. Competent voters are less capable of choosing good policies if it is
mediated through a choice of bad politicians.
Epistemic democrats typically assume that representative democracy is not
fundamentally dierent from direct democracy. Perhaps epistemic democrats
can argue that if a large legislature is constituted correctly, many if not most of
the epistemic benets of public deliberation spill into or are cultivated within
the legislature itself.
Epistemic democrats might argue that the epistemic benets of wide-
spread public competence in representative democracies will probably elect
competent politicians. In particular, Goodin and Spiekermann have argued
that the dierence between representative democracy and direct democracy
partially depends on how politicians conceive of their role as elected represen-
tatives. First, they argue that competent voters should elect a delegate-style
politician who votes in light of the judgements of those she represents rather
than a trustee-style politician who votes in light of her personal judgements. In
the spirit of Condorcetian democracy, a delegate-style politician is probably a
competent politician because the majority judgement of those she represents
is exponentially more likely to be the correct judgement than the minority
judgement or her personal judgement.
Second, Goodin and Spiekermann have argued that the epistemic benets
of deliberation in the legislature will probably improve the competence of pol-
iticians. Even if elections do not always elect competent delegates, deliberation
in the legislature will induce competence in otherwise incompetent politicians.
Once enough politicians are competent, the aggregation of votes in the legis-
lature probably produces the correct policies, as a competent majority in the
legislature is exponentially more likely to be correct than a competent minority.
Landemore has rejected that representative democracy is merely a feasible
second best to the unfeasible ideal of direct democracy, arguing that it has par-
ticular epistemic advantages. However, Landemore rejects that representative
democracy has the elitist epistemic advantage of electing the more capable
and competent people to political oce. Following political scientist Nadia
Urbinati, Landemore has argued that representative democracy has the more
egalitarian epistemic advantage of constructing a feedback loop between the
Estlund, Democratic Authority, –; Landemore, Democratic Reason, ; and Goodin
and Spiekermann, An Epistemic eory of Democracy, –.
Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic eory of Democracy, –.
Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic eory of Democracy, –.
Landemore, Democratic Reason, , –.
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
people’s inputs and the proposals of the representative assembly. is pro-
cess provides the time necessary for the public and the politicians to revise
and rene their judgements, cultivating a reective type of wisdom regarding
the policy preferences of the public and the policy decisions of the politicians.
Contrary to these epistemic democratic expectations, I argue that a criti-
cal mass of party politicians in the legislature potentially spoil the epistemic
benets of widespread public competence for the rest of us. Political philoso-
pher Patrick Tomlin has argued that otherwise able groups can become unable
to perform collective actions if a critical mass of their membership remains
unwilling to contribute enough. He has provided a hypothetical case of
one hundred soldiers who need everybody to follow their orders if they are
to cross a river. However, there are always three or more soldiers who are able
but unwilling to follow their orders. So the few able but unwilling soldiers
translate into a willing but unable unit. Similarly, a representative democracy
needs enough competent voters and enough competent politicians if they are
to produce the correct decisions. However, as explored next, there are poten-
tially more than enough politicians who are able but unwilling to promote
the correct decisions. First, the worst politicians on the ballot paperthe bad
applesare typically unwilling to promote the correct decisions. Second, a
conscientious politician is not always willing to make the correct decision if it
may cost her the next election. ird, a conscientious politician should become
willing to compromise on promoting the correct decisions in order to gain the
political alliances and electoral support necessary to resist the bad apples. So a
critical mass of incompetent politicians in the legislature (including both the
bad apples and the conscientious politicians seeking to win the next election
and resist the bad apples) potentially translates into an incompetent represen-
tative democracy despite widespread public competence.
1.2. e Primacy of Electoral Competence
e ordinary incentives of party politicians competing for votes in representative
democracies can signicantly blunt the eects of widespread public competence
for practical reasons. It is not infeasible for bad politicians to win votes during
elections. Good campaigns can elect bad politicians. In order to distinguish
between the complex virtues and vices of politicians, it is helpful to distinguish
between ethical, epistemic, and electoral competence. Ethically competent pol-
iticians are principled and pragmatic enough to do good and avoid harm reliably.
Epistemically competent politicians are empir ically informed and epistemically
Urbinati, Representative Democracy.
Tomlin, “Should We Be Utopophobes about Democracy in Particular?”
rational enough to know the truth reliably. Electorally competent politicians gain
the political alliances and electoral support necessary to win the next election
reliably. e circumstances of politics give electorally competent but epistemi-
cally or ethically incompetent politicians a competitive advantage over ethically
and epistemically competent but electorally incompetent politicians. In par-
ticular, hypocrisy oen gives politicians a competitive advantage. Politicians
frequently do not practice what they preach. First, partisan politicians are prone
not to practice what they preach consistently, especially if consistency would dis -
advantage their political party and inconsistency would advantage their political
party. Partisanship has many moral virtues and socially good consequences.
Nevertheless, partisanship does risk some moral vices, and hypocrisy is one of
them. Second, careerist politicians are disposed to preach the party line and
practice whatever they expect to progress their professional careers. ird,
Machiavellian politicians are willing to preach virtuous principles and practice
whatever they expect to give themselves more polit ical power and personal glory,
however ugly. Whatever their motivations might be, electorally competent
politicians oen preach whatever rhetoric, lies, and bullshit they expect to win
critical votes during elections and then practice whatever advances their narrow
group or personal interests when in oce.
Epistemically incompetent politicians are bad, but ethically incompetent
politicians are typically among the worst. An ethically competent but epis-
temically incompetent politician is typically willing to do good, but she is fre-
quently unable to know how to do good. She oen fails to do good, but she is
well intentioned. In contrast, an ethically incompetent politician is typically
unwilling to do good and willing to do harm. She is wil ling to promote her own
personal good, whatever harm she may do in the process. Ethically incompe-
tent politicians are typically among the worst politicians on the ballot paper.
When the infamous bank robber Willie Suon was asked why he robbed the
bank, he is rumored to have answered “because that’s where the money is.” Sim-
ilarly, some ethically incompetent politicians are on the ballot paper because
political oce is where the power is. Lacking any signicant principled con-
victions, cult leaders typically advocate for whatever populist policies help to
cultivate a personally pleasurable cult of personality. Alternatively, corporatists
publicly advocate for whatever populist policies allow them to prot from a
kleptocracy or a chumocracy behind closed doors. ey redirect signicant
public resources toward themselves, their family, close friends, or political allies
Muirhead and Rosenblum, “e Ethics of Partisanship.”
Weber, “e Profession and Vocation of Politics.”
Machiavelli, e Prince.
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
to the signicant disadvantage of the public. Whatever ethically incompetent
politicians might do, they are badly intentioned, and they frequently advocate
for harmful policies in cynical campaigns.
It is not always very easy for conscientious politicians to win votes during
elections. Good politicians can lose with bad campaigns. Representative
democracy has selection eects. In other words, elections select party poli-
ticians who are able to gain the alliances and votes necessary to win the next
election. ose able to do whatever is necessary to win gain a competitive
advantage over those who are unable. Representative democracy also has treat
-
ment eects. In other words, elections induce a willingness in politicians to
win the next election by any means necessary. ey must become willing to
cultivate the fragile electoral support and internal alliances within their divided
political parties and the fragile electoral support and external alliances with
sympathetic voters and politicians across party lines. ose willing to win by
any means necessary gain a competitive advantage over the unwilling. e
circumstances of politics shape the behavior of conscientious politicians. As
explored next, a conscientious politician must cultivate a pragmatic type of
sensibility toward how to win the next election.
In order to win critical votes, a conscientious politician must become sen-
sitive to the opinions of a critical mass of her political alliances and electoral
support, however ignorant, misinformed, or irrational they might be. In prac-
tice, a generally competent public will stil l contain many ignorant, misinformed,
irrational, and otherwise incompetent people, and generally competent people
will still have particular knowledge gaps, particular false and irrational beliefs,
and other particular incompetencies. So a conscientious politician oen does
not need to promote empirically informed and epistemically rational judge-
ments about how to do good in order to win the next election. She needs
only to conrm whichever ignorant, misinformed, and irrational opinions a
critical mass of her political alliances and electoral support accept. Worse, a
conscientious politician must occasionally avoid empirically informed and
epistemically rational judgements about how to do good in order to win the
next election. If she constantly contradicts the incompetent opinions of a crit-
ical mass of her political alliances and electoral support, she risks losing the
next election. Whatever electoral strategies may w in, a conscientious politician
cannot consistently prioritize the truth over vote accumulation if she wishes
to remain a politician.
It is implausible to presume that there are no conscientious politicians
in the legislature and that the bad apples comprise a majority. However, the
I assume politicians should continue to obey the law.
legislature potentially lacks a critical mass of conscientious politicians and
potentially has a critical mass of bad apples. Too few politicians are Goodin/
Spiekermann-style delegates or are willing to participate in Landemore’s wis-
dom-inducing feedback loop. So there are potentially too few conscientious
politicians in the legislature and too many bad apples for the epistemic benets
of widespread public competence to spill into the legislature.
.
With the pragmatic sensibilities of party politicians who are focused on win-
ning the next election in the background, I will defend the profession-specic
obligation of politicians to protect innocent people from the bad apples in the
legislature. Politicians are not purely self-interested vote grabbers. As fellow
humans, politicians contain a similarly complex bundle of self-interested and
public-spirited motivations as everybody else. However, despite their similar
motivations, it has been long recognized that the will of the voters and the will
of the politicians frequently dier. Rather than judge the dierent wills of
politicians harshly, I will argue that their wills should dier. Politicians should
become sensitive to their profession-specic obligations, even if they might
be signicantly dierent from the ethical obligations of voters. As an elected
representative, a politician can and should cultivate a professional type of sen-
sibility toward how she can protect innocent people from the bad apples in
the legislature.
What should conscientious politicians do about the bad apples? I will argue
that the active possibility of the bad apples winning and wielding political
power as they wish has ripple eects across how all politicians should behave.
e circumstances of politics should shape the ethical obligations of politicians.
So politicians competing for votes also should signicantly blunt the eects of
widespread public competence for principled reasons. Perhaps enough con-
scientious politicians win elections for the epistemic benets of widespread
public competence to potentially spill into the legislature. Nevertheless, poli-
ticians are ethically obliged to make it harder for the bad apples in the legisla-
ture to signicantly harm innocent people. As a consequence, a conscientious
politician should prioritize electoral competence over ethical and epistemic
competence. Whoever she believes the bad apples are, she should typically pri-
oritize whatever it takes to gain the internal and external political alliances and
the electoral support necessary to resist them, even if she must compromise
Rousseau, e Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, .
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
the ability of the epistemic benets of widespread public competence to spill
into the legislature to do it.
Epistemic democrats wish representative democracies to promote the truth.
Indeed, the truth is a highly valuable good. Nevertheless, politicians have many
weighty ethical obligations, and some of them might conict with their ethical
obligation to promote the truth. No politician is ethically obliged to promote
the truth regardless of the consequences. Following political philosopher Wil-
liam Galston, the rst priority of politics is to avoid the worst. e public does
not need to gain the best outcomes in order to live lives they consider good, but
they must avoid the worst outcomes to l ive lives they consider good. ey must
avoid civil war, famine, economic collapse, and comparable catastrophes to live
good lives. In order to avoid the worst outcomes, party politicians are ethically
obliged to resist the bad apples, whether the bad apples are inside or outside
their political parties. So, epistemic democrats risk being too insensitive to the
conicting obligations of politicians. A persistent ethical obligation of politi-
cians is to promote whatever moral compromises are necessary to make the bad
apples signicantly less powerful and to avoid whatever uncompromising truths
might fail to gain critical alliances and votes. Among the many weighty reasons
to promote moral compromises in politics, the ethical obligation to resist the
bad apples is a particularly powerful reason. e ethical obligation to resist the
bad apples provides a particularly powerful reason to prioritize whichever com-
promises will gain the alliances and votes necessary to resist the bad apples and
avoid whichever compromises may compromise those compromises.
2.1. ou Shalt Not Lie!
Politicians oen lieand frequently out of moral vice rather than for some
greater good. However, epistocrat Jason Brennan has shown that it is not always
wrong for politicians to lie. It is plausible to presume that lying is generally
wrong, but an absolute prohibition against lying is highly implausible. In par-
ticular circumstances, it is not wrong to lie. If there i s a know n murderer at your
door, and she asks if you are hiding your neighbor in your house, it is morally
permissible to lie to the murderer in order to protect your hidden neighbor. It i s
not wrong to lie to murderers at the door. In his characteristically colorful style,
Brennan has argued by analogy that if there are murderers at the ballot box and
they will knowingly vote for badly intentioned policies that will directly kill
Whether conscientious politicians should break the law to resist the bad apples exceeds
the scope of this paper.
Galston, “Realism in Political eory,” .
Brennan, “Murderers at the Ballot Box.”
many innocent people, it is morally permissible for politicians to lie to them.
In order to save innocent lives, it is morally permissible for politicians to lie
about their support for the killer policies in order to win the election and then
to oppose the killer policies when in oce.
Similarly, Brennan has argued by analogy that if there are ignorant voters at
the ballot box and they will unknowingly vote for well-intentioned policies that
will nevertheless signicantly harm many innocent people, it is still morally
permissible for politicians to lie to them. If a conscientious politician honestly
and openly opposes the harmful policies during elections, she may risk losing
the election to an honest supporter of the harmful policies. In this scenario,
her honest choice is a bad choice. e honest choice passively contributes to
the harm of many innocent people: the conscientious politician can avoid that
harm if she lies during the election. e dishonest choice is the beer choice
in this case: it actively contributes to avoiding signicant harm. e conscien-
tious politician should lie about her support for harmful policies during the
election in order to win the votes and then should oppose the policies when
in oce in order to avoid the harm. She could even lie about her opposition to
the harmful policies when in oce and preach that circumstances have made
her support for the harmful policies ineective or infeasible. is shows that it
is not always wrong for a politician to lie to ignorant voters at the ballot box. If
anything, politicians are ethically obliged to lie to ignorant voters at the ballot
box if lying is likely to avoid signicant harm.
In a dierent direction, there are other ethical reasons for politicians to
compromise the truth in politics. Rather than politicians merely reecting or
reacting to the moral and epistemic vices of the voters, politicians themselves
have particular moral and epistemic vices to which the more conscientious
among them should react. Suppose there are murderers on the ballot paper,
and they knowingly advocate for badly intentioned policies that will directly
kill many innocent people. In that case, it is morally permissible for a conscien-
tious politician to preach whatever compromised truths will gain the political
alliances and electoral support necessary to resist the murderers on the ballot
paper and to save innocent lives.
Similarly, suppose there are ideological politicians on the ballot paper, and
they unknowingly advocate for well-intentioned policies that will nevertheless
signicantly harm many innocent people. e ideologues put the lives, liber ties,
and happiness of hundreds, thousands, and millions of people at risk with their
irresponsible misuse of state power in wars, policing, the courts, prisons, and
elsewhere. e ideologues could intensely support wars of aggression with
violent blowback, militarized policing, harsh sentences for nonviolent crimes,
and do lile about prison violence. Alternatively, the ideologues may intensely
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
oppose defensive wars, defund policing, support so sentences for violent
crimes, and wish to abolish prisons. Whatever the ideologues might wish to
do with political power, it is morally permissible for a conscientious politician
to preach whatever compromised truths will gain the political alliances and
electoral support necessary to resist the ideologues and thereby avoid signif-
icant harm.
If a conscientious politician were to honestly and openly support the
uncompromised truth during elections, she may risk losing the alliances and
votes necessary to resist the ideologues. In other words, the uncompromised
truth is a bad choice: choosing the uncompromised truth passively contributes
to the empowerment of the ideologues that the conscientious politician may
avoid if only she compromises on the truth to gain critical alliances and votes.
e conscientious politician should compromise on the truth in order to gain
the alliances and votes necessary to resist the ideologues. So it is not always
wrong for a politician to compromise on the truth when ideologues are on the
ballot paper. Compromising on the truth is the beer choice if it actively con-
tributes to resisting the ideologues. If any thing, politicians are ethically obliged
to compromise on the truth when ideologues are on the ballot paper in order
to gain the alliances and votes necessary to resist the ideologues.
Whatever the epistemic democratic analysis of representative democracy
might be, epistemic democrats should become much more sensitive to the
fact that party politicians have many more ethical obligations beyond the eth-
ical obligation to promote the truth. Even if diverse deliberations and vote
aggregation during elections do lter out many of the bad apples from the leg-
islature, not all of the bad apples are ltered out. ere are potentially enough
partisans, careerists, Machiavellians, cult leaders, corporatists, and ideologues
on the ballot paper to allow very harmful policies to succeed, whichever polit-
ical party might be in government. So a politician should prioritize her ethical
obligation to protect innocent people from the bad apples even if she must
compromise the epistemic benets of widespread public competence in order
to gain critical alliances and votes.
If and when the ethical obligation to resist the bad apples overpowers the
ethical obligation to promote the truth, many if not most of the epistemic
benets of widespread public competence will not spill into the legislature. To
Patrick Grim et al. have provided an extensive empirical analysis of epistemic democ-
racy that shows that the epistemic benets of widespread public competence can survive
in representative democracies (“Representation in Models of Epistemic Democracy”).
Whatever the plausibility of their analysis might be, it simply does not consider whether
profession-specic obligations do or should signicantly compromise the ethical and
epistemic competence of politicians.
compromise the epistemic benets of widespread public competence is bad,
but to allow the bad apples to do signicant harm to many innocent people is
worse. So the active possibility of the bad apples winning and wielding politi-
cal power as they wish is enough to ethically oblige conscientious politicians
to compromise the epistemic benets of widespread public competence in
order to gain the alliances and votes necessary to resist the bad apples. As
a consequence, epistemic democrats risk an unrealistic model of politicians
since the active possibility of bad apples in the legislature should motivate
conscientious politicians to spoil the epistemic benets of widespread public
competence for the rest of us.
2.2. Won’t Somebody Please ink of the Common Good?
e avoidance of the worst is not the only consideration in political decision
making. e promotion of the common good is also a central consideration
in political decision making. Brennan has argued that the political power of
democratic citizens voting in elections should become conditional on political
competence and that political competence depends on the ability to promote
the common good. In other words, the right to vote should depend on the
ability to promote the common good. Similarly, perhaps the political power
of party politicians in oce should also become conditional on the ability to
promote the common good. So, if a politician compromises on promoting the
common good in order to resist the bad apples, she may become too politi-
cally incompetent to hold political oce. In the opposite direction, I will argue
that if a politician compromises on the obligation to resist the bad apples in
order to promote the common good instead, she might become too politically
incompetent to hold political oce. As explored next, the ethical obligations
of the average voter and of the average politician should dier in light of the
dierent stakes involved in their political decisions. e terms and conditions
for political competence should become sensitive to the dierent obligations
of the dierent participants within the democratic process.
e average voter is typically only one out of millions in the electorate. For
example, if y or so voters out of the y million or so voters in an electorate
voted for controversial public spending or tax cuts that they judge necessary to
Brennan, Against Democracy, –.
It is generally recognized that the stakes of political decisions aect political behavior.
Lomasky and Brennan, “Is ere a Duty to Vote?”; Pincione and Tesón, Rational Choice
and Democratic Deliberation; Hamlin and Jennings, “Expressive Political Behaviour”;
Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance; and Brennan, Against Democracy. In a similar
spirit, the dierent stakes should aect the ethical obligations of the dierent participants
in the political process.
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
promote the common good, whatever the unintended political consequences
might be, they would not make much if any dierence to who wins, how they
win, or how they govern. ey are only . percent of the electorate. Even
if ve hundred, ve thousand, or y thousand voters voted for the divisive
policies necessary to promote the common good, they would still remain only
. percent, . percent, or . percent of the electorate. So perhaps
it is not unreasonable to expect competent voters to prioritize the controversial
policies necessary to promote the common good, despite the active possibility
of bad apples in the legislature, because the average voter has very limited polit-
ical power in the political process. As a consequence, the ability to know how
to promote the common good may remain central to the political competence
of the average voter.
Conversely, the average politician is typically one out of only hundreds
in a legislature. For example, if y or so politicians out of the ve hundred
or so politicians in a legislature advocated for the divisive public spending or
tax cuts they judge are necessary to promote the common good, whatever the
unintended political consequences might be, they risk failing to gain the polit-
ical alliances and electoral support necessary to resist the bad apples. ey are
approximately percent of the legislature. Even if only ve politicians uncom-
promisingly advocated for the common good, they still remain a potentially
critical percent of the legislature. So the particular type of political power the
average politician has in the political process makes it unreasonable to expect
party politicians to prioritize the common good. e average politician is much
more able to resist the bad apples than the average voter. With that profes-
sion-specic power comes the profession-specic responsibility to resist the
bad apples. Consequently, epistemic democrats in particular and political phi-
losophers more generally should become much more sensitive to the fact that
politicians bear a profession-specic obligation to resist the bad apples even if
they must compromise on the correct but controversial policy decisions nec-
essary to promote the common good in the process.
Independently of how well democracy can promote the common good
compared to antidemocratic alternatives, political theorizing should also focus
on how well democracy can resist the bad apples compared to antidemocratic
alternatives. e moral compromises fundamental to the fragile alliances and
support of conscientious politicians can empower them to limit signicantly
how much harm the bad apples inside or outside their political parties can
do. If conscientious politicians gain critical alliances and votes through moral
compromise, they can take signicant alliances and votes away from the bad
apples. So a potential democratic tradeo is that moral compromises may
limit the advocacy of conscientious politicians for the divisive decisions
necessary to promote the common good, but those compromises can also
empower them to limit signicantly the advocacy of the bad apples for the
worst policies available.
2.3. Democratic Integrity
e external consequences of an action are not the only considerations in
political decision making. Following political philosopher Bernard Williams,
consequentialist calculuses neglect the moral value of personal integrity. e
internal commitments of the agent are also central considerations in political
decision making. A minimum-integrity politics is unaractive. If a party poli-
tician does whatever she expects to promote beer consequences regardless of
her principled commitments, she puts the public at risk of very unprincipled
behavior in order to gain slightly greater goods, which she is not certain of
gaining in return. However, a maximum-integrity politics is also unaractive.
If a politician protects her personal integrity regardless of the external con-
sequences, she puts the public at risk of great wrongs in order to avoid the
signicantly lesser wrong of compromising her personal integrity. Williams
therefore defended a medium-integrity politics: integrity must not be valued
too lile nor be valued too much. When a conscientious politician judges that
circumstances compel her to compromise on her principled commitments, she
should express a sincere sense of guilt aerward in order to reassure the public
that she recognizes the wrong she has done and that she did not and will not
compromise her principled commitments unless she is condent it will avoid
a signicantly greater wrong in return.
As explored next, a conscientious politician should compromise her princi-
pled commitments to avoid the signicantly greater wrong of allowing the bad
apples to win and wield political power as they wish. Political ethicist Edward
Hall has argued that party politicians typically acquire competing ethical obli-
gations as moral agents and as political advocates for the interests and values
of those they represent. When these competing ethical obligations conict,
politicians are forced to get dirty hands. When the circumstances of politics
force a conscientious politician to choose between two wrongs, she should do
the signicantly lesser wrong to avoid the signicantly greater wrong. Never-
theless, the politician does get dirty hands: she is still morally guilty of doing
wrong even if it is the beer choice all things considered. However, the politi-
cian would not have remained morally innocent if she had not done the signi-
cantly lesser wrong. She still would have goen dirty hands but for a dierent
Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism.”
Hall, “Political Compromise and Dirty Hands,” .
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
reason. In that case, the politician would have been guilty of failing to avoid the
signicantly greater wrong. Inaction is not always morally on par with action,
but inaction is not always morally innocent, especially if an action would have
avoided a signicantly greater wrong.
Following Hall, it is useful to recall sociologist Max Weber’s distinction
between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility. A conviction
politician does not accept a high level of responsibility for the unintended but
foreseeably bad consequences of acting on her good conv ictions. A conviction
politician, as a moral agent, prioritizes her personal integrity and promotes her
moral convictions. She may therefore be willing to act on her good convictions
even when she risks unintended but foreseeably bad consequences. Similarly,
a “values advocate” typically prioritizes the moral values that she judges or
that those she represents judge are correct, even if she must neglect her ethical
obligation to advocate for the material interests of those she represents as a
consequence.
In a dierent direction, a responsible politician accepts a high level of
responsibility for the unintended but foreseeably bad consequences of acting
on her good convictions. A responsible politician, as an elected representative,
prioritizes a dierent type of integrityher democratic integrityand takes
responsibility for protecting the material interests of those she represents. Inde-
pendently of whatever unacquired ethical obligations people as moral agents
might have, politicians as elected representatives acquire a professional obli-
gation to protect those they represent. So a responsible politician is willing
to act against her good convictions to avoid unintended but foreseeably bad
consequences. Similarly, an “interests advocate” typically prioritizes her profes-
sional obligation to advocate for the material interests of those she represents
even if she must compromise the moral values she or those she represents judge
are correct in the process.
Unfortunately, moral compromises oen do compromise personal integri-
ty. However, to see only that moral compromises compromise personal integ-
rity is to overlook whether moral compromises may cultivate a dierent type of
integrity. In particular, an interests advocate cultivates her democratic integrity as
an elected representative. An interests advocate protects those she represents
from the bad apples, even if she must compromise her personal integrity as a
moral agent in the process of gaining critical political alliances and electoral
Weber, “e Profession and Vocation of Politics.”
A similar type of view is expressed in Mark Philp’s Report for the Commiee on
Standards in Public Life (“Public Ethics and Political Judgment”).
Leopra, “On Compromise and Being Compromised”; and Lepora and Goodin, On Com-
plicity and Compromise.
support. e moral good of cultivating democratic integrity potentially com-
pensates for the moral bad of compromising personal integrity. Conversely, a
values advocate compromises her democratic integrity to conserve her personal
integrity. A values advocate promotes those values she judges or those she rep-
resents judge are correct, even if she must compromise her democratic integrity
as an elected representative and fails to protect those she represents from the
bad apples as a consequence. e moral bad of compromising democratic
integrity potentially taints the moral good of conserving personal integrity.
Hall has argued that a conscientious politician primarily aims to promote
her principled commitments as eectively as her circumstances permit. I will
argue that the active possibility of the bad apples winning and wielding political
power as they wish unfortunately means that circumstances rarely permit a con-
scientious politician to promote her principled commitments very eectively.
To not resist the bad apples is grossly negligent. If the bad apples win and wield
political power as they wish, the risk is that the material interests of the innocent
people conscientious politicians represent will be harmed by some of the worst
policies available. So a conscientious politician should compromise the moral
values that she judges or that those she represents judge are correct and deploy
whatever rhetoric, lies, and bullshit will gain the political alliances and electoral
support necessary to resist the bad apples. Rather than become Goodin and
Spiekermann’s competent delegate or some type of uncompromising values
advocate, the conscientious politician should become a compromising interests
advocate. As an interests advocate, a conscientious politician is guilty of com-
promising the moral values that she judges or that those she represents judge
are correct. However, she would not have remained morally innocent as a values
advocate. If she does not compromise those moral values to resist the bad apples,
she is guilty of failing to advocate for the material interests of those she represents.
Epistemic democrats might argue that the decision to do the signicantly
lesser wrong is the correct decision. To compromise the otherwise correct
decision in order to resist the bad apples is itself the correct decision in those
circumstances. However, in a dirty-hands choice between two wrongs, there
is no right. As dirty-hands theorists argue, there is something morally good
about avoiding the signicantly greater wrong, but there remains something
morally bad about doing the lesser wrong. In a dirty-hands choice, decisions
Dovi, e Good Representative, ; Philp, “What Is to Be Done?” ; and Hall, “Political
Compromise and Dirty Hands,” .
Hall, “Integrity in Democratic Politics.”
Estlund, Democratic Authority, . is type of view is also extensively defended in Niel-
son, “ere Is No Dilemma of Dirty Hands.”
Hall, “Political Compromise and Dirty Hands,” .
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
that could count as correct are not feasible. e only feasible decisions are
two wrong decisions. To see doing the lesser wrong as the correct decision is
to overlook the deep residual moral bad still fully present in the lesser wrong.
Epistemic democrats should expect that more than enough party politi-
cians potentially spoil the epistemic benets of widespread public competence.
Because of the circumstances of politics, competent voters are prone to vote for
electorally competent but ethically and epistemically incompetent politicians.
First, competent voters may vote for bad apples. ey mistake electoral com-
petence for ethical and epistemic competence. Bad apples may appear princi-
pled and knowledgeable during campaigns; the circumstances of politics thus
reward the electoral competence of bad apples.
Second, competent voters might vote for a conscientious politician. e
conscientious politician is principled and knowledgeable. However, a consci-
entious politician should prioritize her electoral competence even if she must
compromise her ethical and epistemic competence in the process. She should
compromise the moral values that she judges or that those she represents judge
are correct in order to gain the alliances and votes necessary to protect the
material interests of those she represents from the bad apples. In order to resist
the bad apples, the conscientious politician may become guilty of failing to
respect particular truths, failing to do particular goods, and failing to avoid
particular harms. e circumstances of politics force her to do the signicantly
lesser wrong of compromising her ethical and epistemic competence in order
to avoid the signicantly greater wrong of allowing the bad apples to win and
to wield political power as they wish.
ird, competent voters could vote for a conscientious politician who is
unwilling to prioritize electoral competencein other words, a politician who
is uncompromisingly principled. However, the uncompromising politician
simply risks losing the next election. e circumstances of politics thus punish
the electoral incompetence of a conscientious politician. So she would there-
fore be guilty of the signicantly greater wrong of failing to gain the political
alliances and electoral support necessary to resist the bad apples.
It is plausible to presume that there are some uncompromising politicians
in the legislature. However, the legislature potentially contains a critical mass
of compromising politicians willing to resist the bad apples. So there are poten-
tially too many compromising politicians in the legislature for the epistemic
benets of widespread public competence to spill into the legislature. What-
ever the composition of large legislatures might be, the bad apples problem
shows that current epistemic democratic aspirations are potentially defec-
tive. As elected representatives, party politicians should not primarily aspire
to reap the epistemic benets of widespread public competence. As elected
representatives, politicians should primarily aspire to resist the bad apples,
whatever the consequences for the correct decisions might be.
.
As explored above, the principled reasons for compromise extend beyond the
typical reasons of reciprocity, inclusion, and mutual respect. As elected rep-
resentatives, party politicians have a profession-specic obligation to protect
the material interests of those they represent. So a politician can and should
compromise the moral values that she judges or that those she represents judge
are correct in order to resist the bad apples. However, politicians need a mecha-
nism that would inform them of which moral compromises will help them gain
the political alliances and electoral support necessary to resist the bad apples.
In a dierent direction from epistemic democracy, the next core contribution
of this paper is to show that a potential epistemic value of public delibera-
tion in representative democracies is that politicians may use deliberation to
inform themselves about which moral compromises to advocate for. Rather
than participate in Goodin and Spiekermann’s competence-inducing delibera-
tion or Landemore’s wisdom-inducing feedback loop, conscientious politicians
can and should participate in a compromise-discovering type of deliberation.
e epistemic value of public deliberation in representative democracies with
incompetent politicians may look very dierent from that of direct democra-
cies with competent voters.
In between the political ideal of public consensus and the political reality of
state coercion is moral compromi se. A consensus typically discovers common
ground that two parties share. It contains principles both parties already accept
whatever else they accept. Following political philosopher John Rawls, an over-
lapping consensus contains moral principles all reasonable people accept for
moral reasons. In contrast, a compromise typically discovers a middle ground
that is close enough to the two parties and not too distant from either political
party. It contains principles neither party already accepts but that both parties
will accept. A modus vivendi conception of compromise contains moral prin-
ciples that a critical mass of people (reasonable or otherwise) will accept for
Gutmann and ompson, e Spirit of Compromise; Weinstock, “On the Possibility of
Principled Moral Compromise”; and Wendt, Compromise, Peace and Public Justication.
Bellamy, Kornprobst, and Reh, “Introduction”; and Spang, “Compromise in Political
eory.”
Rawls, Political Liberalism, –.
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
pragmatic reasons. A Rawlsian overlapping consensus and a modus vivendi
compromise are second-best agreements but for dierent reasons. Nobody
accepts them as the correct conception of justice. A R awlsian overlapping con-
sensus is a second-best agreement because it contains only those moral prin-
ciples all reasonable people accept for moral reasons. So a consensus second
best can look quite similar to the correct rst best. Conversely, a modus vivendi
compromise is a second-best agreement because it primarily contains those
moral principles a critical mass of people will accept for pragmatic reasons. So
a compromise second best can look very dierent from the correct rst best.
Nobody accepts moral compromises because they judge that they provide
the correct decision. Everybody accepts moral compromises because they rec-
ognize that people disagree over which decisions are correct. Nobody accepts
moral compromises because they are coerced. Everybody accepts moral com-
promises as second-best or third-rate agreements that forgo the correct deci-
sion to avoid an even worse outcome. In private life, people typically commit
to conicting values that must compete against and compromise with each
other: internal moral compromise is a common characteristic of private life.
Similarly, in public life, radically diverse people typically commit to conict-
ing values that must compete against and compromise with each other. In
other words, interpersonal moral compromise is a familiar feature of public life.
Modus vivendi compromises do not righteously aim to promote the correct reli-
gious, moral, or political values since all of those values are deeply controversial.
Modus vivendi compromises realistically aim to promote those few common
interests most if not all members of a radically diverse political community
share. ey aim to avoid violent conict, preserve a peaceful coexistence, and
cultivate productive cooperation in a political community with radically diver-
gent religious, moral, and political values.
Political philosophers typically see deliberation as aiming at consensus and
see compromise as the product of negotiation. In a dierent direction, the
next core contribution of this paper is to show that deliberation is potentially
a compromise-discovery process.
Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism; Hor ton, “Realism, Liberal Moralism and a Political eory
of Modus Vivendi”; and McCabe, Modus Vivendi Liberalism.
Vallier, “On Distinguishing Publicly Justied Polities from Modus Vivendi Regimes,” –.
Hall, Value, Conict, and Order, –.
Van Parijs, “What Makes a Good Compromise?”; and May, “Compromise in Negotiation.”
Jones and O’Flynn, “Can a Compromise Be Fair?”; Warren and Mansbridge, “Deliberative
Negotiation”; Weinstock, “Compromise, Pluralism, and Deliberation”; and Spang, “W hy
a Fair Compromise Requires Deliberation.”
It is helpful to distinguish between what political theorist Richard Bellamy
has called “bargained compromises” and what I call “deliberated compromis-
es.” A bargained compromise is primarily self-interested: two parties promote
a middle ground to advance their narrow individual and group interests as
eectively as possible given their opposing interests. Conversely, a deliberated
compromise is primarily public-spirited: two parties promote a middle ground
to promote their political, moral, or religious values as eectively as possible
given their opposing values. A deliberated compromise foregrounds oppos-
ing values rather than opposing interests.
Rather than participate in Landemore’s wisdom-inducing feedback loop,
conscientious politicians can and should exploit the feedback loop between
the public’s policy preferences and the politicians’ policy decisions to discover
which deliberated compromises will empower them to resist the bad apples.
Deliberation allows a politician to revise and rene which values she is willing
to compromise on in light of what the voters are willing to compromise on. In
return, deliberation allows the voters to revise and rene which values they are
willing to compromise on in light of what politicians are willing to compro-
mise on. A politician must follow public opinion when judging which deliber-
ated compromises are electorally feasible. However, a politician can also lead
public opinion on which deliberated compromises she judges are necessary
to resist the bad apples. is shows that the dynamic between public opinion
and the policy decisions of politicians is much more interactive and complex
than that of vote-hungry politicians blindly following an ignorant public. Par ty
politicians blunt not only the epistemic benets of widespread public compe-
tence but also the epistemic signicance of widespread public ignorance. If
a politician is less sensitive to public opinion and more sensitive to her pro-
fession-specic obligations, public ignorance becomes less of a problem. As
explored above, politicians are ethically obligated to protect those they repre-
sent. Even if the voters are too ignorant to know how to promote the common
good by themselves, they may remain competent enough to help politicians
protect their material interests from the bad apples.
Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism. Bellamy has also explored “trimmed” and “segregated”
types of compromise, which exceed the scope of this paper.
Bellamy prefers what he has called a “negotiated compromise”: they aim to acquire the
reciprocal accommodation of opposing interests and values. Presumably, reciprocal
accommodation aims to promote the negotiators’ values rather than advance their inter-
ests. So negotiated compromises are a special type of deliberated compromise.
Bendi, “Compromising Interests and Principles.”
Political scientist Gerry Mackie has argued that voters are competent enough to contribute
to the mandates of party politicians. Mackie, “Rational Ignorance and Beyond.”
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
As explored next, informative public deliberation allows party politicians to
know which moral compromises to advocate for in order to win critical votes
during elections and to gain critical alliances when in oce. First, elections
incentivize politicians to become willing to seek the vote of the median voter in
order to maximize their share of the vote. e median voter provides imper-
fect protection against polarized political sentiments. e median voter prefers
mildly good policies that most do not judge are the best but most do not judge
are the worst. However, a politician still needs a mechanism that would inform
her of the policy preferences of the median voter. I will show that politicians
are able to know the policy preferences of the median voter with informative
public deliberation. Deliberation reveals the political judgements of the voters.
It makes political judgements publicly known and encourages voters to justify
their political judgements to each other in light of opposing judgements. So
deliberation can empower politicians to persistently discover the diverse and
dynamic political judgements among the voters and to infer the policy pref-
erences of the median voter; without it, politicians are le mostly in the dark
about the complex and constantly changing political judgements of the voters.
Deliberation can empower politicians to persistently infer which mildly good
policies most do not judge are the best nor the worst in order to gain the polit-
ical alliances and electoral support necessary to resist the bad apples.
For example, deliberation can empower party politicians to persistently
infer a level of income redistribution that neither progressive liberals nor market
liberals judge is the best nor the worst. Economist Dan Usher has argued that
the median voter supports some level of income redistribution: “self-interest
can be relied upon in voting about the redistribution of income, narrowing
the gap between rich and poor, without removing the gap completely, altering
people’s ordering on the scale of rich and poor or destroying incentives to work
and save.” However, politicians still need a mechanism to know the level of
income redistribution the median voter supports. As explored next, politicians
are able to know the level of income redistribution the median voter supports
with informative public deliberation.
Politicians can also use deliberation for a variety of other purposes. In particular, it remains
possible that bad apples will use deliberation more eectively than conscientious politi-
cians and that deliberation will reveal moral compromises that empower bad apples rather
than help conscientious politicians resist them. is possibility exceeds the scope of this
paper.
Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision Making”; and Downs, An Economic eory
of Democracy.
Elster, “Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies.”
Usher, e Economics of Voting, i.
Deliberation makes the acceptable levels of income redistribution among
progressive liberals and market liberals known. Progressive liberals typically
hold that income redistribution is imperfect: it does not eliminate social
inequality. It does not permanently liberate the working class from working
under exploitative terms; it only temporarily reduces the exploitation of the
working class as the logic of capital accumulation forces the capitalist class to
increase the exploitation of the working class over time. Nevertheless, progres-
sive liberals can reveal through deliberation the lowest level of income redistri-
bution they reectively judge necessary to signicantly reduce the economic
power of the capitalist class over the working class and consequently reduce
the capacity of capital to exploit labor.
Conversely, market liberals typically hold that income redistribution is less
than perfect for a dierent reason: it reduces economic freedom. It is not the
case that the working class has nothing to lose from income redistribution: they
risk losing the social benets of economic freedom. In particular, redistribu-
tion diminishes the prot incentive that encourages entrepreneurs to invest in
productive, technological, and scientic innovations. Redistribution forces the
working class to forgo the beer and cheaper consumer goods and services that
entrepreneurial innovations produce over time. Nevertheless, market liberals
can reveal through deliberation the highest level of income redistribution they
reectively judge possible to still signicantly preserve the prot incentive and
consequently preserve the capacity of entrepreneurial innovation to produce
beer consumer goods for the working class over time.
Deliberation is a dynamic discovery process that persistently allows party
politicians to know the complex and changing levels of income redistribution
acceptable among progressive liberals and market liberals. Deliberation can
empower politicians to persistently infer an acceptable level of income redistri-
bution that progressive liberals reectively judge will prevent the worst conse-
quences of social inequality and market liberals reectively judge will preserve
the best consequences of economic freedom. More generally, deliberation
allows politicians to discover which mildly good compromises to advocate for
in order to gain the political alliances and electoral support necessary to resist
the bad apples.
Second, vote trading can empower party politicians to avoid policies that a
majority of voters mildly support but a minority of voters intensely oppose.
Vote trading provides imperfect protection against the tyranny of the major-
ity. Electoral minorities can vote for minority parties or minority members
Coleman, “e Possibility of a Social Welfare Function”; and Tullock, “Problems of Major-
ity Voting,” –.
Murderers on the Ballot Paper
within majority parties to advocate for them within or outside of government.
Politicians representing electoral minorities can agree to vote for policies that
those electoral minorities mildly oppose (or against policies that they mildly
support) in return for geing more votes against a policy that those electoral
minorities strongly oppose (or for a policy that they strongly support). So
vote trading provides imperfect protection against policies that electoral
minorities judge are the worst. However, a politician still needs a mechanism
that would inform her of the intensity of political sentiments among electoral
minorities. As explored above, deliberation is a compromise-discovery pro-
cess. Deliberation can empower politicians to persistently discover the diverse
and dynamic intensities of political sentiments among electoral minorities
and to infer which votes to trade; without it, politicians are le mostly in the
dark about the complex and constantly changing intensities of political senti-
ments among electoral minorities. Deliberation can empower politicians to
persistently infer which popular policies to oppose in light of mild majority
support and intense minority opposition. By persistently discovering what the
majority mildly supports and what electoral minorities intensely oppose, delib-
eration can empower politicians to persistently discover which moral compro-
mises to advocate for to win critical votes during elections and to gain critical
alliances when in oce in order to resist the bad apples.
.
Epistemic democrats typically provide an idealized model of deliberation for
direct democracies. However, they provide a potentially unrealistic model of
deliberation for representative democracies. Widespread public competence
can still yield bad policy outcomes because the choice of good policies is medi-
ated through a choice of bad politicians. Politician incompetence blunts the
epistemic benets of widespread public competence. Epistemic democracy
should therefore become much more sensitive to the ordinary incentives of
party politicians competing for votes in representative democracies and how
they shape the ethical obligations of politicians. A politician has many more
ethical obligations than an ethical obligation to promote the truth. In particu-
lar, she has a profession-specic obligation to resist the bad apples even if she
must compromise on promoting the truth to gain the necessary alliances and
votes to do it. A politician should become an interests advocate rather than a
values advocate. She should cultivate her democratic integrity as an elected
Political philosopher Stuart Hampshire observed that compromise frequently involves both
sides of a divide dropping their more minor commitments (Innocence and Experience, ).
representative with a moral responsibility to protect those she represents even
if she must compromise her personal integrity as a moral agent with moral
convictions in the process. As a consequence, politicians potentially spoil the
epistemic benets of widespread public competence for the rest of us because
of the circumstances of politics.
In a dierent direction, public deliberation may bring other epistemic bene-
ts to representat ive democrac ies. Public deliberation provides party politicians
with an eective mechanism to know which moral compromises will gain the
alliances and votes necessary to resist the bad apples. In light of the constantly
changing range and intensity of political sentiments among voters, public delib-
eration can empower politicians to persistently discover which mildly good
compromises a majority mildly supports and most electoral minorities do not
intensely oppose. Once party politicians and their obligations are put at the
center of political theorizing, epistemic democrats in particular and political
philosophers more generally might gain a powerful reason to start modelling
public deliberation in representative democracies as a compromise-discovery
process that can help conscientious politicians resist the bad apples.
University of Sheeld
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