Does the Offence- Defence Theory Explain War Onset Between Small States? Causes and Consequences of the 2020-2023 Armenia- Azerbaijan War Introduction: A Shaky Ceasefire Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Abstract

The article explores the causes and consequences of the 2020-2023 Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan reclaimed large parts of territories within 44 days of the war in 2020, the country lost control in the early 1990s and was only hindered from full control by a Russian-brokered ceasefire. Over the subsequent three years, Azerbaijan gradually asserted dominance, reclaiming all lost territories by 2023. The study probes the war's causes and Azerbaijan's military success. It focuses on power imbalances and strategic dynamics between the two countries that led to the war. By applying the offence-defence theory, it argues that shifting economic and military strengths rendered war inevitable due to deadlock in negotiations. Azerbaijan's military investment, modernisation and purchase of advanced technological armament changed the balance between the two states and increased its offensive advantage. The article also examines underlying regional power competition, shaping postwar dynamics in the South Caucasus.

Full text

Research Article
Does the Offence–
Defence Theory Explain
War Onset Between
Small States? Causes
and Consequences of
the 2020–2023 Armenia–
Azerbaijan War
Javadbay Khalilzada1
Abstract
The article explores the causes and consequences of the 2020–2023 Karabakh War
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan reclaimed large parts of territories
within 44 days of the war in 2020, the country lost control in the early 1990s
and was only hindered from full control by a Russian-brokered ceasefire. Over
the subsequent three years, Azerbaijan gradually asserted dominance, reclaiming
all lost territories by 2023. The study probes the war’s causes and Azerbaijan’s
military success. It focuses on power imbalances and strategic dynamics between
the two countries that led to the war. By applying the offence–defence theory,
it argues that shifting economic and military strengths rendered war inevitable
due to deadlock in negotiations. Azerbaijan’s military investment, modernisation
and purchase of advanced technological armament changed the balance between
the two states and increased its offensive advantage. The article also examines
underlying regional power competition, shaping post-war dynamics in the South
Caucasus.
Keywords
The Karabakh War, causes and consequences of the Karabakh War, offence–
defence theory, Azerbaijan, Armenia
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
11(2) 190–213, 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/23477970241250099
journals.sagepub.com/home/aia
1 Department of Political Science, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, USA
Corresponding author:
Javadbay Khalilzada, Department of Political Science, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44240, USA.
E-mail: jkhalilz@kent.edu

Khalilzada 191
Introduction: A Shaky Ceasefire Between Armenia
and Azerbaijan
Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was under the jurisdiction of
the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (AzSSR) since it was established by
the Bolsheviks in 1923 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December
1991. The Armenian majority of the region and the Armenian Soviet Socialist
Republic (ArSSR) disputed its status and demanded the transfer of the region
to ArSSR. However, until the glasnost and perestroika reforms by Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev, it did not transform into a public movement. During the last
years before the Soviet dissolution, Armenians started the public demand for
the unification of the NKAO with ArSSR. The Soviet Union did not last long
in solving the problem, and newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan found
themselves at odds over the region. The dispute eventually transformed into a
full-scale war in 1991 and continued until the Bishkek ceasefire in May 1994.
Armenia has taken control of NKAO and seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan,
more than it was objected to.
There have been ongoing negotiations between the two sides since the 1990s,
mediated by the Minsk Group co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States;
but it was ineffective in resolving the conflict (Abilov, 2018; Gasparyan, 2019).
Both Azerbaijan and Armenia resisted any compromise. Azerbaijani side never
accepted its defeat and the consequences of the war and only promised autonomy to
the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh under the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Victorious
Armenia resisted autonomy under Azerbaijan and demanded recognition of the
consequences of the war (De Waal, 2013). Even the narratives of seven occupied
adjacent regions started to change as Armenians recognised these territories as
homeland rather than occupied territories (Kucera, 2018; Toal & O’loughlin, 2013).
It is noteworthy to highlight that despite the overthrow and change of
governments, both Armenia and Azerbaijan were not free and democratic.
Azerbaijan has been ruled by Aliyevs since 1993, first by Heydar Aliyev and since
2003 by his son Ilham Aliyev and recognised as a non-democratic country
(Altstadt, 2017; Hale, 2014; Khalilzada 2019; LaPorte, 2015; Radnitz, 2012).
Armenia’s victorious elite, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan ruled Armenia
from the mid-1990s until the Velvet Revolution, the latter overthrown by Nikol
Pashinyan in 2018. Since then, Pashinyan consolidated his power and conducted
several reforms declaring his adherence to democracy and transparency (Ohanyan
& Broers, 2020). Although it is too early to assess whether the Pashinyan
government will democratise Armenia, the change of the regime in Armenia
brought new approaches to the negotiations as a new government represented
Armenia.
Over the years, the two states have followed different foreign-security strategies
to achieve objectives in international politics. Armenia’s priorities were to achieve
political recognition of the de facto control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite
Nagorno-Karabakh being an independent entity established on the NKAO and
seven occupied adjacent regions (the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and later the
Republic of Artsakh), even some scholars defined it as a ‘phantom state’ (Byman

192 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
& King, 2012), it was a temporary justification to consolidate Armenian arguments
during the diplomatic negotiations. Armenia and Karabakh Armenians’ main
objective was the miatsum/transfer of Karabakh to Armenia when the movement
started and as was confirmed by Nikol Pashinyan (Prime Minister of Armenia),
‘Karabakh is Armenia’s’ slogan (De Waal, 2013; Kucera, 2019a). Armenia and the
Armenian diaspora supported Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians economically and
politically (Koinova, 2021) and diplomatically at international venues.
To protect its gains, Armenia aligned with Russia as a member of the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union, unlike its
aspiration for independence in the last years of the Soviet Union. Armenia’s
alliance with Russia constrained its foreign relations, and it was seen as a Russian
ally in the West-Russia confrontations. The deployment of small units into Syria
at Russia’s request strengthened these arguments (Kucera, 2019c). Armenia
developed its ties with Russia and received military support and weapons from
Russia to build up its army to deter Azerbaijan from liberating territories
(Danielyan, 2015). Through this Armenia objected to deterring and balancing
Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey.
Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan followed a multi-vector foreign policy to achieve
its objective of returning occupied territories and Nagorno Karabakh to its control.
Azerbaijan detached itself from the West-Russian confrontation and deepened its
relations with both. It aimed to achieve the neutrality of Russia in its relations
with Armenia and recognition of its territorial integrity by the West. Azerbaijan
prioritised territorial integrity, and according to international law, the territories
were recognised as part of Azerbaijan. There are four adopted United Nations
Security Council resolutions in 1993 (822, 853, 874, 884) (Unites Nations, 2008)
and the UN General Assembly resolution 62/243 in 2008 that calls for respecting
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and demanding the withdrawal of Armenian
forces from all occupied territories (De Waal 2013; Walter et al., 2014). This
allowed Azerbaijan to get the international community’s support at the political
and global levels. Azerbaijan joined the Non-Aligned Movement to receive the
support of the Global South in the international community. Simultaneously,
Azerbaijan deepened its security relations and modernisation of its army with
Turkey and increased its technical capacity and modernisation of armament by
developing ties with Israel. In the last decade, Azerbaijan spent more than $5
billion to purchase advanced military technologies and the modernisation of its
army’s fighting capacity conducted in partnership with Turkey (Khalilzada,
2022a).
The conflict has been examined from various scholarly perspectives in the
literature. The conflict has been described as frozen due to the absence of active
military operations (Ambrosio 2011; Bláhová, 2019; Cornell, 2016; Gahramanova,
2010). However, as the ceasefire was occasionally breached, some opposed this
definition (De Waal, 2010). Others defined it as an ‘intractable conflict’ (Eliasson,
2002; Hopmann, 2015; Torosyan, 2013). Radnitz (2019) focuses on geopolitical
and psychological factors in the persistence of the conflict. Broers (2015, 2019)
highlights the inadequacies of these definitions and re-conceptualises the
Nagorno–Karabakh conflict in a broader perspective as ‘enduring rivalry’. In a

Khalilzada 193
detailed examination of the relations between the two nations over Nagorno
Karabakh, Broers (2015, p. 571) infers that rivalry between the two transformed
into the post-soviet phase, and ‘the underlying sources of intractability are to be
found in the interactions at the interstate, domestic and decision-maker levels of
the rivalry, rather than in external/systemic factors’.
Following the 2020 war experts focused on understanding and explaining the
causes of the war. Some focused on social and discursive reasons over material
factors (Gamaghelyan & Rumyantsev, 2021). Gamaghelyan and Rumyantsev
(2021) argue that in the last 30 years, political and intellectual elites in both
societies constructed their own myths and conflict narratives that steadily led to
the war. While the authors have valid reasons, they fail to explain why the 2016
April clashes did not transform into a full-scale war, but 2020 did. Others explain
in the context of securitisation theory and argue that ‘the failure of the negotiation
process (de-securitisation) is considered to pave the way for military confrontation
(securitisation)’ (Kurt & Tüysüzoğlu, 2022, p. 153). Indeed, it is true that the
failure to resolve conflict by peaceful means created the potential for war, but the
failure of negotiations occurred in the first decade of the 2000s. The negotiations
deadlocked in the second decade of the 2000s and the 2016 April War itself could
not mobilise parties to negotiate. Davtyan (2024) on the other hand examines
external factors and concludes that the unresponsiveness of the international
community, particularly Russia, CSTO and the created a permissive environment
for Azerbaijan. Though this article also highlights that external power did not
intervene in the fighting, the author misses that without material capacity
Azerbaijan would not be able to win the war and achieve military technological
superiority.
This article explores these neglected factors that are among the major causes of
the eruption of the war in 2020 and the eventual Azerbaijani control of all
Karabakh. The article employs the offence–defence theory to explain why the
Karabakh war started and what allowed Azerbaijan to pursue its assertive policies
that eventually led to the full control of the former secessionist region. I argue that
the change in the economic-military capacity of Azerbaijan allowed it to achieve
its objectives militarily. I employ the offence–defence theory to explain this
vantage point. Well-established theory of international relations, the offence–
defence theory used to explain the causes of war, the origin of the First World War,
Soviet-American relations, the arms race, alliance formation and ethnic conflicts
(Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Hopf, 1992; Powell, 1993; Snyder, 1985; Van Evera,
1984, 1998). Van Evera (1997, p. 30) argues that ‘most theories of war are best
tested by case-study methods because the international historical record of pre-war
politics and diplomacy, which serves as our data, usually lends itself better to deep
study of a few cases than to exploration of many cases’. Employing offence–
defence theory for cases of the 2020 Karabakh war will illustrate how strong the
explanatory power of the theory is and allow us to better understand the causes of
the war and the likelihood of its occurrences in other geographies.
While there is significant literature that uses offence–defence theory to explain
the war onset (Lynn-Jones, 1995) the literature mostly focuses on relations
between great powers empirically. There is a gap in the literature that the theory

194 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
was used to explain the causes of war between small states. Some experts focus
ethnic dimension of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Abushov,
2019; Broers, 2015; Gamaghelyan & Rumyantsev, 2021) and they have valid
points. However, the 2020 war outbreak shows that inter-state relations played a
more important factor in explaining the onset of the war in 2020 as the ethnic
dimension permanently exists between states. In this study, I explore these factors
using offence–defence theory to contribute exploratory strength of the theory and
explain how technology improves the offensive capacity of the states in offence–
defence dilemmas. While the offence–defence theory highlights the importance of
technological factors, there is a gap in the literature that explains how armed
drones could make a difference and change the balance between states.
To do this, I use the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
countries’ Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer Database and the Global
Militarisation Index from Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies.
Additionally, I use Armenia, Azerbaijan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to compare the state’s military
spending and economic factors of the War. While data is available in open-
source figures and tables are created and analysed by the author. In the next
sections, the article presents a brief overview of the Armenia–Azerbaijan
conflict and the offence–defence theory. Following that economic and military
data explain the change in the balance between the two states and demonstrate
how economic and military balance changed. In addition to the change in the
military balance between the two countries, political relations between the two
states were briefly examined. This is followed by an examination of how the
war changed regional great power competition in the region. In conclusion,
I overview the findings and prospective research topics and the applicability of
offence–defence war onset between small states.
Armenia and Azerbaijani Conflict: Karabakh Wars
In the twentieth century, Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought several times over
Karabakh. As both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, they fought over control of Nagorno-
Karabakh, and the war lasted from 1991 to 12 May 1994 Bishkek Ceasefire
that ended hostilities without resolving the conflict. Since then, there have been
ongoing negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired
by France, Russia and the US) to solve the conflict by peaceful means, which
was unsuccessful. As a result of the war, Armenia took control of the NKAO
and surrounding regions and expelled populations of the region. The war ended
with the victory of Armenia which controlled more territory than it objected to as
Map 1 shows.
Armenia tried to dictate its conditions in negotiations demanding recognition
of the de facto status. Azerbaijan promised to grant the highest degree of autonomy
to the region only under Azerbaijan’s sovereignty (Jafarova, 2015). Moreover,
over the period while Armenia asserted its robustness on its demands, Azerbaijan

Khalilzada 195
increased its assertiveness in negotiations and announced that if Armenia would
not withdraw from the territories peacefully, then it would liberate territories by
force (Khalilzada, 2022a).
As mentioned above, the conflict was studied from various perspectives, and
some experts defined the Armenia–Azerbaijan Karabakh conflict as frozen.
However, the war never ended between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The breaches of
ceasefire regularly occurred between the parties along the line of contact. Severe
ceasefire eruptions occurred in 2008, 2010, 2014 and 2016, known as the April War.
While both countries lacked professional armies in the 1991–1994 war, they
modernised and built up their militaries over the years. Although Armenia was
victorious in the 1991–1994 war, the closure of its borders with Azerbaijan and
Turkey negatively affected its economy and indirectly its military. In contrast, with
the flow of petrodollars from the mid-2000s, Azerbaijan’s GDP and expenditure on
its military increased significantly which made a new war inevitable.
Offence–Defence Theory
The offence–defence theory is based on realist assumptions of international
relations. It argues that states maximise their security in a self-help system
to minimise the probability that they will be conquered and destroyed by
other states (Glaser, 1996; Lynn-Jones, 1995; Van Evera, 1999). In his study,
Map 1. The Map Shows the Regions That Were Under Armenian Control Before the
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Source: The Economist Newspaper (2020, October 3).

196 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
Biddle (2001, p. 744) presents two causal outcomes of the offence–defence
theory balance, ‘the relationship between the offence–defence balance and
political events such as war or alliance formation (the balance as cause); and
the relationship between the military circumstances of a confrontation and the
offence–defence balance (the balance as effect)’. Building its assumptions on
realist foundations, the major assumption of the offence–defence theory is that
as the advantage of offence increases, war becomes more likely (Jervis, 1978).
Glaser and Kaufman (1998) state that the offence–defence theory could explain
a state’s ability to perform the military missions that are required to attack,
deter and defend successfully. The authors highlight two additional variables
that would help understand how states achieve their offensive or defensive
objectives; ‘with states’ relative resources-power, and a country’s ability to
effectively employ military technology, including designing military strategy
and assessing adversaries’ forces and strategy’ (Glaser & Kaufman, 1998, p. 48).
The theory argues that ‘offence advantage makes war more likely for a variety
of reasons: war will be quick and decisive and therefore profitable, states will be
more insecure, making expansion more valuable; and the advantage of striking
first grows with offence advantage’ (Van Evera, 1998, p. 48).
The offence–defence theory assumes that the war is likely to occur when a
state invests in offence to offset an adversary’s investment in defence. As Lynn-
Jones (1995, p. 665) states ‘the offence–defence balance is the number of resources
that a state must invest in offence to offset an adversary’s investment in defence’.
Particularly three major factors were examined in the literature to be decisive in
the change of balance in offence–defence theory: geography, resources and
technology (Blagden, 2021; Glaser & Kaufman, 1998). All these three important
factors depend on conditions and how are these factors strategically utilised.
Geography is important and it is widely discussed how geography mostly favours
defensive forces (Glaser & Kaufman, 1998; Jervis, 1978). Resources allow a state
to invest either in its defence or increase offensive power this includes manpower
and economic sources that the state can overcome its adversary. As Beckley
(2010) finds economic development and resources are major contributing factors
in military victories rather than non-material factors. Lastly, advanced technology
changes the balance in offence–defence. Experts argue that while tanks shifted
offence–defence balance in favour of offence, nuclear technologies shifted
towards defence (Lynn-Jones, 1995). So, technologies could change the balance
depending on their purpose and functions.
The Armenia–Azerbaijani war case will support these arguments as we will
explore them in the next sections. The empirical case will also contribute to the
understanding of how military technologies change offence–defence balance.
There are significant studies that assume that emerging technologies favour
offence. Lynn-Jones (1995, p. 667) explains any new technology on existing
rivalry shifts balance and yield and offensive advantage, ‘the existing pool of
technology determines the relative costs of offensive and defensive strategies, a
new type of weapon that makes it possible to pursue a given type of strategy at
lower cost’. Technology was another game-changer in the Armenia–Azerbaijan
balance. The combat drones, Harop and TB2, were game changers and enabled

Khalilzada 197
Azerbaijan to reduce the cost of the war and time to liberate territories. Comparing
losses and captured armaments, Azerbaijan, an offensive country, lost fewer
combatants and weapons than Armenia (Khalilzada, 2022a).
In addition to advanced military technology, the battleground fighting capacity
of Azerbaijani units was another factor that made a difference. While it is hard
to measure how the servicemen’s military capacity could make a difference,
Azerbaijani special forces played an important role in Azerbaijan’s victory. To
acquire modern battle and effective command skills and increase the performance
of its army the Azerbaijani army has held regular training and drills with Turkey,
a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member, (Yalçınkaya, 2021). As the
experts examined closely, the battle of Shusha in early November showed the
fighting capacity of the Azerbaijani army and its special forces eventually led to
the surrender of Armenia (Spencer & Ghoorhoo, 2021).
Hoag (1961) explains that the development and purchase of weapons by one
country to its military will force another to make a larger addition to restore its
ability to defend. The arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan shows that
Azerbaijan aimed to increase its military capacity and offensive power to liberate
the territories that are occupied by Armenia. In response, Armenia purchased
weapons and allied with Russia to prevent Azerbaijan’s ambitions. Russia
prevented Georgia from taking control of South Ossetia in the 2008 August War
(Khalilzada, 2022c) and defended its ally; therefore, it was a threatening example
for Azerbaijan and assuring case for Armenia that Russia would not allow Armenia
to lose the war. As it was in the 2016 April War, Russia warned Azerbaijan to stop
fighting, as Zakir Hasanov, Azerbaijan’s defence Minister, told in an interview
(Khalilzada, 2022a). Indeed, Russia did intervene in the war in 2020 and prevented
Azerbaijan from taking full control of the Karabakh region, but Azerbaijan took
control of the Shusha and Hadrut cities of the former NKAO and liberated seven
adjacent regions eventually.
Power Matters: How Has the Balance of Power Changed
Between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
Economic Factors of the War
Both countries suffered economically from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
the 1990s, and their economies began to recover starting in the 2000s. However,
the flow of petrodollars to Azerbaijan starting from the mid-2000s advantaged
it over Armenia. According to the IMF data, as Figure 1 shows, Azerbaijan’s
GDP increased significantly from $10 billion in 2006 to over $75 billion in 2014.
Despite the fluctuation of oil prices in the second half of the 2010s, Azerbaijan’s
GDP changed between $40 and $50 billion, which still was more than three times
higher than Armenia’s GDP. These economic resources allowed Azerbaijan to
invest and build its military. However, Armenia lacked natural resources, and the
closure of the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan due to the occupation of the
territories negatively affected its economy as it has borders open with Georgia in

198 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
the North and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the South. Armenia’s GDP reached
slightly above $10 billion only in 2008. In the last decade, its GDP was between
$10 and $15 billion which was around one-third of Azerbaijan’s GDP.
Change in GDP proportionally affected states’ spending on their military.
According to the data on the Global Militarisation Index, Armenia positioned
third, and Azerbaijan positioned tenth among the most militarised countries in the
world (Mutschler & Bales, 2019). Both countries spent a significant portion of
their annual budget on their security. While data available for Armenia in SIPRI
since 2005, its annual government spending for the military changed between
15% and 20%, as Figure 2 shows. However, Azerbaijan’s spending was between
Figure 1. Change in Gross Domestic Product in Armenia and Azerbaijan (GDP).
Figure 2. Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Government Spending.

Khalilzada 199
10% and 15% for the same period. Considering that the NATO member states’
military spending was under 2% between 2014 and 2021, only the US’ share was
around 3.5% of its GDP (NATO, 2022), both Armenia and Azerbaijan spent a
significant portion of their GDP on security. Thus, both states raced on
militarisation and economic investment in their security and to balance each other.
Military Factors of the War
Although the portion of Azerbaijan’s government spending is smaller compared to
Armenia’s, as Azerbaijan’s GDP increased significantly in the past two decades,
its military expenditure increased proportionally. According to the data from
SIPRI, Azerbaijan increased its arms imports by 378% between 2004–2008 and
2009–2013. Russia was the largest provider of armaments for Azerbaijan 80%
others were Belarus, Ukraine, Israel and Turkey (Wezeman & Wezeman, 2014).
Azerbaijan’s annual military expenditure fluctuated above $2 billion, and it was
above $3 billion annually from 2011 to 2014 as Figure 3 shows. Between 2017 and
2021, Israel replaced Russia as the main supplier of armaments for Azerbaijan,
accounting for 61% of the imports, while Russia accounted for just 21% for the
same period (Wezeman et al., 2022). Azerbaijan imported advanced technological
defence systems, armed drones and other advanced military technologies from
Israel and helped to modernise its military inventory.
While Armenia’s military expenditure never reached a billion, it pendulated
around $500 million for the same period, as can be seen in Figure 3. Armenia’s
arms imports increased by 415% between 2010 and 2019, and Russia accounted
for 94% of the imports. Despite the increase in Armenian imports, Azerbaijan’s
imports for the same period were 3.3 times higher than Armenia’s. Both countries
imported missiles that were capable of targeting deep targets in each other’s
territory and creating a security threat.
Figure 3. Annual Military Expenditure by Countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

200 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
Armenia and Azerbaijan are considered small states in the international
relations literature considering their territory, economy and manpower.
However, it would be helpful to see military comparisons between the two
states before the 2020 war started. As Table 1 shows, Azerbaijan had an
advantage over Armenia in each section of traditional military armaments.
Indeed, this is an important factor, however, when considering that Armenia
was defending the territories that it took control of in the 1990s and Azerbaijan’s
objective was to liberate those territories this strength did not allow Azerbaijan
to achieve its objectives. Only, the introduction of combat drones and their use
for striking deep inside defence lines materially and psychologically affected
the Armenian defence (Khalilzada, 2022a).
While both countries increased their imports, Azerbaijan diversified its arms
suppliers, but Armenia was dependent on the Russian military industry.
Particularly, Azerbaijan purchased various defensive and offensive advanced
military technologies from Israel and Turkey and Armenia lacked defensive
encounters of these weapons. In the 2016 April clashes, Azerbaijan tested an
Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions kamikaze drone against Armenia to
eliminate supply lines and target in deep positions of Armenian defence lines
(Khalilzada, 2022a). The April 2016 fighting resulted in little strategic gains for
Azerbaijan, but it demonstrated that the balance between the two states has
changed, and Azerbaijan gained an offensive advantage. Also, after the experience
of advanced military technologies, combat drones and their effectiveness in the
2016 April War, Azerbaijan further invested in modern weapon systems to increase
its offensive capacity that Armenia lacked to deter.
Azerbaijan diversified its military suppliers and Israel replaced Russia as a
major military equipment market. Azerbaijan purchased several defensive and
offensive weapons systems, including a Barak-8 surface-to-air missile system;
75 Barak-8 missiles; one EL/M-2080 Green Pine air search radar system;
Gabriel-5 ship-to-ship missiles; five Heron drones; and five Searcher drones that
will cost $1.6 billion (Ismayilov, 2013). Extensive use and satisfactory performance
Table 1. Personnel and Military Equipment Arsenal of the Armies Before the 2020 War.
Arsenal Armenia Azerbaijan
Geography 29,740 km² 86,600 km²
Population 2.7 million 10.1 million
Active personnel 45,000 70,000
Reserve personnel 210,000 300,000
Tank 529 665
Armoured vehicles 1,000 1,637
Total artillery 293 740
Self-propelled artillery 38 237
Rocket artillery 105 196
Fighter jets 18 37
Attack helicopters 16 15
Note: The table was prepared by the author using data from Al Jazeera (2020), McCarthy (2020)
and Statista.

Khalilzada 201
of these technologies in the 2016 clashes convinced Azerbaijan to purchase
and renew its armament inventory. The next import included the Hermes-450
drone and 100 Spike-MR/LR anti-tank missiles, and air defence systems that
cost $5 billion for the country (Khalilzada, 2022a). Following Turkish drones’
TB2 performance in Libya and the Syrian wars Azerbaijan also purchased
military technologies and drones from Turkey. Details are unknown, but
Turkish sales amounted to close to $400 million in the first nine months of 2020,
while in 2019, it was just $20.7. These details show how Azerbaijan achieved
offensive capacity before the start of the war in September 2020.
Following the introduction of Turkish drones and their performance in the
Syrian and Libyan civil wars, Azerbaijan purchased Turkish drones and other
modern weapons to increase its offensive capacity. Turkish sales amounted to
close to $400 million in the first nine months of 2020, while in 2019, it was
just $20.7 million for the same period (Khalilzada, 2022a). In addition to
economic and demographic power, Azerbaijan possessed advanced modern
weapons that Armenian had nothing to deter Azerbaijani ambitions except
the geographical terrain that favoured Armenian defensives. However, the
2016 April war showed that Azerbaijan could overrun Armenian defence
lines, and possessing armed drones gave the upper hand to Azerbaijan.
Applying advanced military technologies enabled Azerbaijan to overrun
Armenian defence lines in a short period and force Armenia to surrender.
Thus, increasing the military budget allowed Azerbaijan to change the balance
of power on the ground and increase its offensive capacity. However, before
examining the war it is important to evaluate the political developments
between the two states.
The Cost of Miscalculation: Political Causes of the War
In the past 30 years, political conditions were not ripe for peace between Armenia
and Azerbaijan to resolve the conflict. Indeed, there were several attempts to
resolve the conflict with diplomacy, however, at the last moment, either Armenia
or Azerbaijan retreated from proposed plans, like Key West, Madrid Principles,
and Kazan talks (Ali, 2020; De Waal, 2013). Following the April 2016 war, the
negotiations intensified to resolve the conflict; however, talks ended without any
positive outcome. After the 2020 war and Azerbaijan’s control of the Karabakh
region, a new round of diplomatic negotiations started to demarcate and delimit
state borders, but it is uncertain whether the parties will sign a peace deal or
whether another round of fighting will erupt between the two countries. Indeed,
politicians are not ready to sign the peace deal as both societies object to getting
maximum from the peace. Thus, it prevents politicians from signing a peace that
will not meet the expectations of their society.
Following the overthrow of the Karabakh clan in Armenia with the Velvet
Revolution, revolutionary Nikol Pashinyan came to power. Initially, the
regime changes were positively perceived in Azerbaijan, and it was perceived
that as the Karabakh clan lost power in Armenia, it would lead to positive

202 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
developments in negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Shiriyev,
2018). However, Nikol Pashinyan and his team wanted to re-design negotia-
tion conditions that were long agreed on (Nikoghosyan et al., 2022). Nikol
Pashinyan presented a tougher position on negotiations and visited Nagorno
Karabakh and Shusha City, a majority Azerbaijani city before the 1990s, the
visit increased tensions in Azerbaijan and public pressure on President Aliyev
(Əhmədli, 2019). It was followed by an announcement of moving the de-facto
entity’s capital from Khankendi/Stepanakert to Shusha. The culmination of
tensions peaked with Pashinyan’s ‘Karabakh is Armenia slogan’. This made it
clear to the Azerbaijani public that Armenia had no intention of withdrawing
its forces from the occupied territories. Moreover, changing public approaches
towards territories outside Karabakh and the settlement of Syrian and Lebanese
Armenians in these regions increased tensions in Azerbaijan (Kucera, 2018;
Teicher, 2017).
Armenia further intensified tensions by declaring the ‘new wars for new
territories’ doctrine announced by Armenian Defence Minister David Tonoyan
(Kucera, 2019b). Armenian Defence Minister elaborated it as the change
of ‘“trench defence” strategy to the active “active deterrence” by boosting the
military’s assault capabilities’ (Abrahamyan, 2019). Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan defended the strategy and highlighted that Armenia would use military
power to deter Azerbaijan in case of a fighting flare-up (Abrahamyan, 2019). For
years, Armenia and Azerbaijani leaders negotiated the withdrawal of Armenian
forces from the occupied territories; however, the regime change in Armenia
ended these negotiations, and even the new elites in Armenia threatened Azerbaijan
with ‘new wars for new territories’. It shows that Armenia’s new leadership did
not consider the balance of power between the two states.
As the relations intensified another breach of ceasefire occurred in July 2020
in the undisputed state borders between the two states known as the Tovuz
clashes (BBC, 2020a). It is not clear who started the fighting though some stated
that Pashinyan wanted to divert internal criticism and therefore used the war
card (Wilson, 2020). Azerbaijan blamed Armenia for its attempt to capture new
territories as their new strategy proclaimed, and Tovuz was chosen to cut oil and
gas pipelines that pass through Tovuz and railroads that link Azerbaijan with the
West via Georgia. On the other hand, the Tovuz clashes showed Azerbaijan that
Russia would not intervene militarily to defend its ally Armenia if Azerbaijan
sought a military solution to the problem. The clashes occurred between the
state borders of both states and neither Russia nor any member of the CSTO
encountered Azerbaijan, and this might be perceived by Azerbaijan that in case
of military operations, CSTO would not intervene.
During the clashes, the death of popular Major General Polad Hashimov stirred
an outpouring of emotions in the Azerbaijani public. Protesters marched to the
parliament and demanded war and revenge. It was the first time President Aliyev
experienced such public pressure and anger that threatened his authority in the
country. As the president himself recognised during the meeting with youth and
Hashimov’s daughter, ‘his death united the nation to prepare the war and liberate
the occupied territories’ (AZTV, 2022). It was not expected that another breach of

Khalilzada 203
the ceasefire would transform into a full-scale war. Although Azerbaijan was
investing and preparing to liberate territories it was claimed, the hawkish behavior
of the new ruling elites in Armenia provoked Azerbaijani society and public
demand to resolve the Karabakh conflict by Azerbaijani leadership. Even former
Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan criticised Pashinyan for the mismanagement
of negotiations with Azerbaijan (Caucasus Watch, 2021).
Armenia–Azerbaijan Karabakh War 2020–2023
The 2020 war started on 27 September, lasted 44 days, and ended with a trilateral
deal between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia on 9 November. Power disparity
and offensive capacity enabled Azerbaijan to liberate almost 80% of occupied
territories as shown on Map 2, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Gubadly regions, and
Hadrut and Shusha city of Nagorno Karabakh on the battlefield, and according
to the deal, Armenia left Aghdam, Kalbajar and Lachin by the end of 2020.
Russia deployed its peacekeeping forces to control the ceasefire between the two
states and prevented Azerbaijan from taking full control of Nagorno-Karabakh
(BBC, 2020b). As Map 2 shows, Azerbaijan took control of a large portion of the
formerly occupied territories in a short period.
As Table 1 shows Azerbaijan had an advantage in almost every aspect of
its military compared with Armenia before the 2020 War. However, Azerbaijan
has had a larger territory and population past 30 years, and even when it lost in
Map 2. Azerbaijan Liberated South of the Nagorno Karabakh, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan,
Gubadly and Shusha during the War, and According to the Deal, Armenia Left Aghdam,
Kalbajar and Lachin by the End of 2020.
Source: Voice of America (VOA): https://www.voanews.com/a/armenia-leader-questions-work-of-
russian-peacekeepers-after-flareup-/6686659.html

204 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
the 1990s the ratios were similar. NKAO and the surrounding seven adjacent
regions could be considered a small territory around 11,000 km² that was
controlled by breakaway authorities. However, the region is a mountainous
territory that enables better defence strategies and creates natural obstacles for
an offensive party. To defend the territory Armenia built, ‘The “Ohanyan Line,”
named after former Armenian Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan, the complex
defence system consists of trenches, long and short-range firing positions, anti-
tank trenches, wire fences, mixed minefields (both infantry and antitank), and
command posts, to maintain the captured positions and prevent the opponent’
(Kazimov, 2021). However, Azerbaijan overcame the defence lines and in a
short period forwarding through the Aras River valley and mountains encircled
Armenian forces in the east to force Armenia to surrender.
In addition to traditional military technology, Azerbaijan heavily used Israeli
Harop and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drones and others to eliminate enemy
defence and supplies (Detsch, 2021). During the war, Azerbaijan shared videos of
its operation captured by drones showing how units and defence lines were elim-
inated and this strategy was not just utilised to win the war but also psychologi-
cally outmaneuver the adversary. As experts state, Azerbaijan did not win just
with drones, but it employed them tactically and strategically to overcome
Armenia (Postma, 2021). Thus, Azerbaijan utilised advanced technology strategi-
cally that Armenia lacked to encounter.
Following the 2020 defeat in the war Armenia started to seek partners for the
purchase of advanced weapons to rebuild its army and counter Azerbaijani
pressures. Since neither Russia nor CSTO provided the security shield that
Armenia expected, it bought French and Indian weapon systems to diversify its
armament and seek new partners for security cooperation (Iddon, 2023). Armenia
increased its spending by 50% in 2022 and accelerated the buildup of its military
(Mejlumyan, 2022). However, Azerbaijan also continued investment and
modernisation of its army, increased military spending by 10%, and created new
commando units (Natiqqizi, 2022). The increase in military spending and power
rivalry continues between the two states.
While the 2020 War was another stage of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,
it did not end with a peace agreement. Azerbaijan continued its assertive
military pressure on Armenia and the Karabakh region, but they could not
resist. Azerbaijan demanded withdrawal and surrender of all military units in
Karabakh which was not implemented. Subsequently, Azerbaijan established
a border checkpoint on the state border in the Lachin transit route which was
controlled by Russian peacekeepers (Loe, 2023). Next, Azerbaijan demanded
the subjugation of the breakaway authorities and rejected any idea of autonomy
on its territory. However, as discussions deadlocked, on 19 September 2023,
Azerbaijan launched anti-terror operations in the region that was under
the control of the breakaway authorities. Less than a day later, authorities
surrendered, and the de-facto Karabakh/Artsakh Republic signed a decree
dissolving on 1 January 2024. Indeed, the 2020 victory, its military power, and
capacity allowed Azerbaijan to assert its claims on Armenia. In the following

Khalilzada 205
three years, Azerbaijan achieved its objectives of controlling the former
breakaway region and forced it to sign a decree to dissolve itself.
The Karabakh war was also the result of new geopolitical competition at the
global level that has unfolded since the Arab Spring. While the regional powers
did not intervene directly in the war, diplomatic and political support of Turkey
and Israel, in the course of the war and the post-war period created new power
dynamics and competition in the South Caucasus and the greater Middle East. In
the next section, the article examines the explicit and implicit role of the great
powers in the conflict and the implications of the consequences of the war for the
broader region.
Consequences of the War and Great Power
Competition in the Region
While great powers were not directly involved in the 2020 Karabakh War,
regional and global powers explicitly and implicitly supported warring parties.
Turkey unilaterally supported Azerbaijan to liberate its territories, warned other
states not to be involved in the conflict, and defended the Azerbaijani cause at
the diplomatic level (Rehimov, 2020). Moreover, Turkey positioned fighter
jets and military personnel in Azerbaijan in case of external intervention (Yeni
Şafak, 2020). Indeed, it was an extension of revisionist Turkish foreign policy,
expanding its influence on the broader Middle East (Ataman & Özdemir, 2018;
Taş, 2022). The victory of Azerbaijan consolidated Turkish existence in the South
Caucasus as the regional power, both states signed the Shusha Declaration a year
after to defend each other in case of an attack on one of the states. Azerbaijan used
Turkish drones during the war, and these drones increased Azerbaijan’s offensive
capacity. Turkey also receives construction projects in the liberated territories,
and the Turkish President attended the opening of newly built airports in liberated
Fuzuli and Zangilan cities (RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, 2020). Thus, Turkey
economically and militarily consolidated its existence in the South Caucasus
through bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and trilateral relations with Azerbaijan
and Georgia (MSB, 2021).
Following the war, Azerbaijan and Turkey offered 3+3 regional cooperation
for three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and regional
powers (Iran, Russia, Turkey), respectively. However, it did not materialise due to
distrust between Turkey and Armenia, Iran and Azerbaijan, and also due to the
conflict between Russia and Georgia. Thus, disorder prevails in the post-war
South Caucasus, and states compete to increase their regional influence.
Russia, which sees the region as its privileged influence zone, and at the
same time, bonded to protect Armenia in case of external threat with CSTO, did
not defend Armenia militarily except by supplying it with weaponry. Indeed,
Karabakh is an internationally recognised part of Azerbaijan, and Putin stated
that the international community recognises this (MEMO, 2020). Thus, CSTO’s
protection of alliance members in case of external threat does not apply to
Karabakh; however, considering that Russia encountered Georgia and defended

206 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
South Ossetia in the August war in 2008 (Khalilzada, 2022b), the same did not
happen in Karabakh. Tovuz clashes demonstrated that Russia is unwilling to
encounter Azerbaijan to defend Armenia. Unlike the 2016 April War, Russia did
not demand to stop fighting. Experts say that Azerbaijan compromised with
Russia on mutual recognition of geopolitical and security interests (Valiyev &
Narmina, 2019) to achieve its neutrality. Other members of CSTO, like Belarus
and Kazakhstan, stayed impartial, calling to stop fighting and resolve the
problem peacefully. Overall, Armenia missed the support of states in the former
Soviet region, particularly its military allies.
While Russia did not directly intervene during the war, it also prevented
Azerbaijan from taking complete control of Nagorno Karabakh initially. According
to the 10 November 2020, deal, Russia deployed its peacekeeping forces to
Karabakh’s leftover region. Russia achieved a foothold in the region as a
peacekeeper in Azerbaijan, though the Azerbaijani public criticised it, officially
Russia has military units in all three South Caucasus states after the war. Russian
peacekeeping is controversial because of its presence and experience in the
conflicts in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia)
(Khalilzada, 2022c). Russia protected its influence by playing as the primary
power broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, its war in Ukraine and
weak military performance leave Russian existence uncertain in the South
Caucasus. Particularly, Azerbaijan’s full control of Karabakh in 2023 diminished
Russian Peacekeeping’s status and power, prompting them to leave the territory
before the initial five-year mandate finished.
The Western stance on the conflict was restricted to official statements since
any country offered a practical solution to the problem. Particularly, the EU was
inactive before and during the war due to its limited influence in the region
(Simão, 2012). Due to the large Armenian diaspora, France and the US showed
activity to stop fighting. However, as co-chairs of the Minsk Group, France and
the US’s pro-Armenian position deteriorated relations with Azerbaijan and
sparked outrages (Aslanli, 2020). Other major powers like Italy and the United
Kingdom quiescently supported Azerbaijan as these two have energy partnerships
with Azerbaijan and take part in reconstruction projects in the liberated regions
(Salamoglu, 2021). In the past two years, the EU and the US have been interested
in supporting peace negotiations and achieving sustainable peace, but their limited
influences and Russia’s considerable influence in Armenia have prevented any
breakthrough.
Israel is another regional actor that benefitted from the late status quo change
in the region. Azerbaijan utilised Israeli drones and defence systems extensively,
the two have developed economic and security ties, and Israel takes part in the
reconstruction projects. Azerbaijan–Israel economic and military cooperation
intensified following the war, and the Azerbaijani public also welcomed coopera-
tion with Israel as the latter provided sophisticated weapon systems to Azerbaijan,
which helped Azerbaijan win the war. These developments will be consolidated as
Azerbaijan decided to open an embassy in Israel after 30 years of close relations
(Lis, 2022). However, Azerbaijan’s increasing cooperation with Israel enrages the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Abbasov & Emil, 2022).

Khalilzada 207
Iran seems to be a major dissatisfied regional power from the consequences of
War and could not change it, and its support to Armenia did not change the course
of the war. Iran seems to have lost its connections with Karabakh after Azerbaijan
took control of its formerly occupied borders with Iran. This new development
prevented Iran from direct cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.
Azerbaijani claim on opening the corridor through Armenia to bridge its exclave
Nakhchivan and Turkey frustrated Iran, as it perceived this as the closing of
Armenian–Iran borders and bridging Central Asia with Europe bypassing the
route through Iran (Cutler, 2022). Further, Iran’s military drills across the Aras
River of recently liberated territories of Azerbaijan outraged the public and
political discourse towards Iran, and the discussion of the rights of Azerbaijani
people in Iran intensified in public (Azadliq Radiosu, 2022). The 2020 Karabakh
war unfolded new dynamics between Iran and Azerbaijan that increased distrust
between the two states. While both states are not interested in increasing tensions,
domestic and regional politics will be directed in the course of relations in the
South Caucasus.
Conclusion: What Is Next?
The offence–defence theory argues that war is inevitable when a balance between
the states changes in favour of the offence. The theory is substantially studied in
the international relations literature particularly focusing on great power politics,
war onsets and change of balance of power politics. However, there is a gap in the
literature on whether the theory also explains war onsets between small states. I
employed the offence–defence theory to examine the onset of the 2020 Armenia–
Azerbaijan war to study why and how Azerbaijan was able to end the secessionist
region in its territory and assert its sovereignty over the territories that were
under the control of Armenia for the past 30 years. Applying the offence–defence
theory beyond great powers and examining other case studies would improve the
exploratory power of the theory.
Armenia and Azerbaijan War shows that the offence–defence theory could
explain the war onset between the small states. Particularly, examining military
powers and observing the change of balance would allow us to predict war
occurrence. The purchase of advanced military technologies particularly combat
drones increased offensive capacity of Azerbaijan. After experiencing their
advantages in the April 2016 clashes, Azerbaijan further invested in these
advanced technologies. Israel replaced Russia as a major armament supplier for
Azerbaijan, which consisted of advanced military technologies that Armenia
could not balance. Thus, Azerbaijan gained offensive capacity and indeed these
military technologies enabled Azerbaijan to win the 2020 war and assert its
sovereignty in 2023 over Karabakh.
Although Azerbaijan is larger with demographic and economic power than
Armenia it did not save it from the defeat in the 1990s. However, Azerbaijan
invested in its military with the increase of its GDP and achieved an offensive
advantage over Armenia. Thus, the status quo was not sustainable with this

208 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(2)
regional power disparity. Indeed, there have been political conditions making
the peace inevitable, since the new ruling elites of Armenia tried to restructure
negotiations, if Azerbaijan lacked material military capacity and military
technology it is most likely that the war would not erupt on this scale as it was
in the last 20 years. The war also showed how the miscalculation of politicians
could lead to unexpected results. It is unclear whether Armenia bluffed
or miscalculated Azerbaijan’s military power and offensive capacity, but
the ‘new wars for new territories’ doctrine cost Armenia to lose almost 80% of
the territories it controlled in 2020. While Russian peacekeepers prevented
Azerbaijan from asserting its sovereignty all over the Karabakh in the subsequent
three years Azerbaijan followed an assertive strategy, but Armenia lacked the
deterrence power and strategy to stop Azerbaijan. It also showed how states
must solely trust their capacity for security, as Russia and CSTO did not help
Armenia.
There is growing literature on combat drones’ performance on battlefields and
wars. The studies show that combat drones and advanced anti-tank weapons
enable the Azerbaijani offensive to overrun defensive lines with low casualties
(Khlilzada 2022). However, there is still a gap in the offence–defence literature to
show how these technologies change the balance of power between states, and
how non-state actors use these technologies. These advanced military technologies
have been used in the Karabakh war, Libya and Syria civil wars, and most recently
in the Russian–Ukraine war. Thus, examining technological development and
examining it through the offence–defence theory perspective would increase the
exploratory power of the theory not just for great power politics but also behavior
of small states and non-state actors.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the reviewers and editors for their comments on the previ-
ous version of the article, as their feedback increased the quality of the article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no nancial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.
ORCID iD
Javadbay Khalilzada https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2729-5331
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