How to reach external citizens? Comparing varieties of transnational party infrastructure

Abstract

With a growing number of citizens living abroad, incentives and strategies to reach diasporas have become increasingly important for political actors. National political parties respond to new competitive transnational environments and engage with citizens living outside their country of origin. However, compared to traditional national party organisations, we know little about parties going abroad and what affects varieties in transnational instruments. To address this question, I compare transnational infrastructures of all parliamentary parties in Switzerland, Germany and Austria. By examining official party documents and information from party secretaries and representatives, I evaluate how parties reach external citizens and analyse factors that correspond with their organisational models. I find that internet voting from abroad does not increase the scope and extent of the analysed parties’ physical infrastructure, whereas the ability to donate correlates with more investment into formal party branches abroad. In addition, I argue that larger institutionalised parties are more likely to invest in formal transnational infrastructure, and that left–right wing ideology and populism have little impact on organisational models across the selected countries.

Full text

Vol.:(0123456789)
Acta Politica
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00344-8
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties
oftransnational party infrastructure
AdrianFavero1
Accepted: 8 April 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Abstract
With a growing number of citizens living abroad, incentives and strategies to reach
diasporas have become increasingly important for political actors. National politi-
cal parties respond to new competitive transnational environments and engage with
citizens living outside their country of origin. However, compared to traditional
national party organisations, we know little about parties going abroad and what
affects varieties in transnational instruments. To address this question, I compare
transnational infrastructures of all parliamentary parties in Switzerland, Germany
and Austria. By examining official party documents and information from party
secretaries and representatives, I evaluate how parties reach external citizens and
analyse factors that correspond with their organisational models. I find that internet
voting from abroad does not increase the scope and extent of the analysed parties’
physical infrastructure, whereas the ability to donate correlates with more invest-
ment into formal party branches abroad. In addition, I argue that larger institutional-
ised parties are more likely to invest in formal transnational infrastructure, and that
left–right wing ideology and populism have little impact on organisational models
across the selected countries.
Keywords Party abroad· Transnationalism· Party organisations· Citizenship·
Representation· Diasporas
Introduction
Citizenship has often been perceived as membership of a socio-political community
within a defined territorial-jurisdictional boundary (Sassen 2008). In this so-called
Westphalian state system (Caramani and Grotz 2015), citizenship rights have been
tied to a congruence between nationality and territorial sovereignty, but this system
* Adrian Favero
a.v.favero@rug.nl
1 Faculty ofArts, University ofGroningen, Oude Kijk in ‘t Jastraat 26, 9712EKGroningen,
theNetherlands

A.Favero
may become antiquated. Over the past decades, higher levels of mobility have raised
questions about the democratic representationand political participation of non-
resident citizens (Lafleur 2013; Kernalegenn and Van Haute 2020a, b). In 2020, an
estimated 281 million people (about 3.6% of the world’s population) lived in a state
other than their country of origin (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021). This is an
increase of nine million since 2019, and 128 million people more than in 1990.
Nowadays, political will formation and democratic participation are no longer
exclusively based on the congruence of place and citizenship (Sassen 2008). Cit-
izens often retain their rights when they move abroad, which includes the ability
to vote (Bauböck 2003). Globally, over 149 states have introduced voting rights for
non-resident citizens (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b) but their legal enfran-
chisement does not account for differences in voting rights and the implementa-
tion of them. Variations occur as countries may apply restrictions related to time
spent abroad, type of election in which non-resident citizens can participate, voter
registration, and the procedures for casting a vote from abroad (Ellis etal. 2007;
Lappin 2016). In their database on external voting rights and restrictions, Wellman
etal. (2023) address and acknowledge a range of variations in extraterritorial voting
rights, while stating that by 2020, around 127 countries have organised voting from
abroad in at least one national election.
In light of increased numbers of citizens living abroad, it is timely to ask what
varieties of transnational party organisations exist and what factors are connected to
the parties’ implementation of transnational models. I include 22 parties of differ-
ent size, institutionalisation, and ideology represented in the national parliaments in
Switzerland, Austria, and Germany. In the selected countries, we find large diaspo-
ras with eligible voters having the right to vote from abroad, although differences in
voter registration, participation rights, and funding exist (see Table1), which in turn
may influence the parties’ outreach incentives. The aim of this foremost explora-
tive research is therefore to understand what infrastructures national parties set up to
reach external citizens and how certain factors at different levels of analysis corre-
spond with organisational varieties. Hence, the paper is based on publicly available
party documents supplemented by information received from party secretariats and
representatives.
To examine different organisational structures and potential factors interrelated
with the establishment of specific models, this study uses a broad range of avail-
able and measurable indicators to analyse first the level of transnational party infra-
structure and organisational varieties—differing in their formality and the rights
transferred by the national parties to external members (Rashkova and van der Staak
2020). Second, for the analysis of corresponding factors, at the macro-level, I evalu-
ate the legal rules regarding donations and voting from abroad. At the meso-level,
I include party size and institutionalisation, and at the micro-level, I distinguish
between populist parties and their mainstream competitors (Zulianello 2020, Alber-
tazzi and van Kessel 2021). This endeavour leads to conclusions on correlations
between external factors at different levels of analysis and varieties in physical trans-
national party infrastructure.
Whereas many studies offer crucial insights into the diasporas’ side of citizen-
ship rights and transnational politics (e.g., Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015;

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
Table 1 Overview of population and diasporas 2023
Sources Switzerland: Bundesamt für Statistik (BfS) (2023), Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (EDA) (2023), Swiss Community (2023). Aus-
tria: Bundesministerium für Europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten BMEIA (2023), Statistik Austria (2023), Bundesministerium Inneres (2023). Germany: Par-
teiengesetz (2020), Destatis – Statistisches Bundesamt (2023), Bundeswahlleiterin (2023)
a Passport holders living within country and abroad
b Registered voters in 2020 (Switzerland), 2022 (Austria) and 2021 (Germany)
Switzerland Austria Germany
National population 8,812 Mio 9,130 Mio 84.4 Mio
National citizens totala7,318 Mio 7,953 Mio 75.4 Mio
Diaspora
Number of citizens living abroad 800′000 587′620 ca. 3.4 Mio
As % of all national citizens 10.93% 7.38% 4.50%
Citizens abroad registered to voteb207′375 61′113 128′929
Participation rights
Voting from abroad Postal voting and E-Voting (in some parts) Postal voting only Postal voting only; disenfran-
chisement rules in place
Type of election National referendums and elections, regional
voting rights in some cantons
National legislative elections, presidential election
and referendums, regional voting rights in some
federal states, EP
Legislative elections only, EP
Donations Allowed Not allowed Allowed (restricted)

A.Favero
Escobar etal. 2014; Goldberg and Lanz 2021), I focus on the supply side of the
transnational connection between non-resident citizens and national political parties
and ask: How do national political systems connect citizens living abroad with their
home country and ensure their representation? Similarly to Paarlberg’s research, I
understand transnational outreach “as a reflection of party organisation and infra-
structure” (2019, p. 540). As such, the paper provides an intra—and cross-country
comparison but the study does neither include why parties decide to engage abroad,
nor does it include their finances, digital infrastructure, or individual objectives.
Such information is either difficult to obtain, or the collection of the data would go
beyond the scope of this research.
In the following sections I briefly outline the current state of research in the areas
of transnational citizenship and party organsations before focusing on debates sur-
rounding varieties in transational party infrastructure and organisational levels. In
the following sections, I outline the indicators and hypotheses to assess factors cor-
responding with the varities of transnational party infrastructure at different ana-
lytical levels. The next section includes an overview of the analysed parties and an
explantion how I measure the parties’ transnational arrangements. I then evaluate
and compare the levels of existing physical party infrastructure and organisational
varieties and analyse the different aspects that are linked with the national parties’
outreach models before I conclude with a discussion of the results, the study’s limi-
tations and potential avenues for further research.
Transnational citizenship rights andparty organisations
Citizen mobility has far-reaching implications for political rights and party outreach.
The concept of granting external citizens social and political rights in their country
of citizenship became prominent in the 1980s and 1990s and gained more track over
the following decades (Nohlen and Grotz 2000; Burgess 2014). The scholarly lit-
erature on transnational representation has essentially developed into two different
fields.
The first track evaluates the extension of citizenship rights beyond national ter-
ritories and—on the demand side—external citizens’ motivations to participate in
political processes in the country of origin (Bauböck 2009; Lafleur 2011; Caramani
and Grotz 2015). Some studies also evaluated transnational party outreach from a
diaspora perspective and demand side of political transnationalism, for example the
size and type of communities abroad (Paarlberg 2017), non-resident citizens’ vot-
ing preferences (Goldberg and Lanz 2021; Turcu and Urbatsch 2023), or factors of
mobilisation (Burgess and Tyburski 2020).
The second field concerns political institutions as the suppliers of political infor-
mation and channels of representation for migrant citizens (Benz and Stutzer 2004;
Detterbeck 2012; Strijbis 2014). This second research strand has tended to focus on
the relationship between political parties and immigrant voters. Lesser attention has
been paid to non-resident citizens, which is surprising as diasporas are a challenge
for national political parties. To fulfil their role as a link between the state and citi-
zens (Friedman and Kenig 2021), they compete in an arena that exceeds national

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
boundaries. This transnational party engagement is often examined using a macro-
level lens, such as national legal frameworks and participation rights (Lappin 2016),
or micro-level dimensions, such as the party’s ideology (Joppke 2003; Østergaard-
Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), financial resources and individual objectives (Rashkova
2020). Fewer studies seem to have included supply side factors at the meso-level of
analysis (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021), such as party institutionalisation and
size, which may correspond with the varieties of networks and adapted levels of
transnational infrastructure to connect political and civil societies (Yabanci 2016).
Little is known about the organisational varieties of parties’ transnational infrastruc-
ture to engage with citizens abroad, and the factors that correspond with their cho-
sen models.
Whereas some studies include both the demand and the supply side of trans-
national politics, I focus on political parties’ outreach across national borders and
aim to provide a comprehensive picture on transnational organisations, including
all three analytical levels. By adding meso-level factors, I strive to offer detailed
answers on how different parties engage with non-resident citizens.
Parties’ going abroad: dierences intransnational organisations
According to the classic party literature, political parties evolved as the central
actors of representation for social groups in democratic entities. Traditional party
types, such as cadre or elite parties, mass parties (Duverger 1951), catch-all par-
ties (Kirchheimer 1966), or cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995) have in common
that they usually operate within national boundaries. However, the extension of the
democratic sphere across national borders offered new challenges and opportunities
for national parties (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b). With the emergence of
transnational civil societies and changing connections to their home country,1 politi-
cal parties are compelled to develop transnational outreach strategies (Rashkova and
van der Staak 2020). Intriguingly, direct engagement is often seen as more effective
than online campaigns (Karp etal. 2008) and it is therefore essential to examine the
extent to which parties invest resources for a physical transnational presence in form
of branches operating abroad.
The few existing works on transnational party operations have commonly
addressed two inter-related questions: Why and how do parties decide to go abroad?
Research on parties going abroad indicate that they largely follow a cost–benefit
logic when deciding to set up transnational organisations (Østergaard-Nielsen and
Ciornei 2019). Party engagement abroad is mainly influenced by juxtaposing poten-
tial advantages against investments. However, it is the scope and type of investment
to reach external citizens, which still constitutes a puzzle in political party research.
In line with utilitarian assumptions, parties are assumed to establish branches abroad
1 I use the expressions “home country” and “country of origin” to emphasise the connection of territory
and citizenship rights and to avoid potential confusion of “home” with feelings of belonging or attach-
ment to a territorial level (Favero 2019).

A.Favero
if the benefits outweigh the costs (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Ump-
ierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). As such, why parties engage abroad may be
influenced by how close the election is, external voting rights, voter turnout among
non-resident citizens (Meseguer and Burgess 2014), the number and density of
external citizens (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021), their voting behaviour (Laf-
leur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Goldberg and Lanz 2021), parties’ individual
objectives—such as fundraising, campaigning, or voter mobilisation (Rashkova and
Van Der Staak 2020), or maintaining ties with the ethnic community (Friedman and
Kenig 2021).
Less attention has been paid to the organisational structure of parties abroad (van
Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). Paarlberg (2017) emphasises that we need to under-
stand how parties reach external citizens beyond campaign events as their engage-
ment could indicate a broader development of new party organisations. To examine
the varieties of parties’ engagement with non-resident citizens, scholars analyse the
level and scope of transnational party infrastructure and their link to the national
party (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Gherghina and Soare 2020; von Nos-
titz 2021). However, the majority of these studies focus on larger parties and sin-
gle country studies, when assessing influential factors at different levels of analy-
sis. Gherghina and Soare (2020, p. 13) analysing four Romanian parties, find highly
formalised and extensive party branches, concentrated in large European capitals.
They argue, at the meso-level, variations in how much autonomy national parties
allow their external branches, range from fairly independent to centralized power
at the party’s head quarter. In addition, they posit that some parties are not cam-
paigning for voter mobilisation but to increase their legitimacy. Similarly, Friedman
and Kenig (2021) demonstrate that Israeli parties engage abroad despite most citi-
zens not being allowed to vote or donate from abroad. Instead of vote-seeking, these
parties would focus on maintaining ties with the Jewish diaspora, influence Zionist
organisations abroad, and improve their own domestic position by promoting Israel
internationally.
Other authors focus on cross-country comparisons that strive to find common
denominators and differences of party strategies across the European party land-
scape. Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019, p. 630) argue that party branches
abroad range in their organisational variety “from staffed offices to a list of contact
persons per country of residence on the website of the party”. Rashkova and van der
Staak (2020) examined outreach strategies of several large parties in France, Ger-
many, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States. Their study focuses both on the
actual infrastructure and on legal frameworks, the organisational manner, and the
objectives that provide incentives for parties to operate abroad. They find two domi-
nant structures. The first is a more centralised transnational organisation with formal
rules and the some influence within the national party. The other model involves
local organisations, which often have informal status and the power resting firmly
with the national party. Comparing large parties in Germany, France, and the UK,
von Nostitz (2021) evaluates the scope and size of their transnational party branches.
According to his study, France has the highest number of party branches, while Ger-
man parties have the lowest. German parties predominately operate in Europe, while
French parties have a large network outside the European continent. The scope and

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
size of UK party branches abroad is rather mixed. Conservatives have considerably
more international branches than Labour and more of them being located outside of
Europe.
Factors corresponding withtransnational party organisations
atdierent levels ofanalysis
I examine political parties’ outreach arrangements at different levels of analysis in
three countries with large heterogenous diasporas that have the right to vote from
abroad. As Table1 shows, in Switzerland (10.93%), Austria (7.38%), and Germany
(4.5%), significant shares of national citizens live abroad. In Germany, non-resident
citizens can vote in legislative elections only, while in Switzerland and Austria, citi-
zens abroad are allowed to vote in legislative elections, presidential elections, as well
as referendums. The majority of Swiss, Austrian, and German non-resident citizens
are eligible to vote but fewer of them are registered (Switzerland: 207,375, Austria:
61,113, Germany: 128,929), which is a prerequisite to participate in national elec-
tions. Despite the relatively extensive voting rights in Austria and Switzerland, we
only see a fairly high voter registration in Switzerland, whereas in Germany and
Austria only a fraction of non-resident citizens are registered voters. This raises
questions of how political parties mobilise non-resident citizens because their strate-
gies influence transnational voter turnout even when controlling for institutional bar-
riers, socio-demographic characteristics of non-residents, and the political context
(Burgess and Tyburski 2020). In addition, these large untapped pools of external
voters may motivate national parties to reach citizens abroad.
Before outlining corresponding factors at different levels of analysis, it is worth
noting that political parties have different incentives to form organisations abroad
(Paarlberg 2019; Gherghina and Soare 2020). This study’s hypotheses focus on
physical organisational units that are related to the respective parties. It would go
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the entirety of organisational networks
of each party, such as individual connections, social media presence and collabora-
tions with non-political clubs (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019).
The macro‑level: legal constraints fornon‑resident citizens
At the macro-level, many countries legally allow external voting or offer some pro-
visions that enable electoral participation (Rashkova 2020; Østergaard-Nielsen and
Ciornei 2019). However, not all states, including some of the stable democratic
countries in Western Europe (von Nostitz 2021), recognise unrestricted voting from
abroad. In Denmark, Ireland and Malta, for example, residency is required to enjoy
all electoral rights while in other countries, such as Germany and the UK, time-
related constraints for non-residents’ transnational voting apply (Lappin 2016).
While legal constraints may not stop the parties’ engagement abroad, they could
affect the scope and extent of transnational party organisations.

A.Favero
In the three selected states, voting from abroad is allowed but the participatory
modes differ and could also influence parties’ motivations to invest in transnational
infrastructure. External citizens can either vote by post (in Austria and Germany) or
by post and e-voting2 in some parts of the country (in Switzerland). Although Swiss
centre-left and centre-right parties were concerned about the security of e-voting
(Østergaard-Nielsen etal. 2019), many voters appreciate the opportunity to vote via
internet. Studies indicate both a high willingness of Swiss non-resident citizens to
use e-voting and a higher turnout where they are allowed to cast their votes elec-
tronically (Pleger and Mertes 2018; Germann 2021). This may be due to the fact that
e-voting reduces costs (time and money) for non-resident citizens when casting their
vote (Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). These
findings lead to the assumption that parties invest in institutionalised transnational
infrastructure where e-voting is legally allowed because, despite security concerns,
their engagement could result in facilitated vote-seeking and electoral advantages
due higher turnouts.
H1a Parties in countries that allow e-voting are more likely to maintain a high level
of physical party infrastructure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident
party members.
In addition, with the exception of Austria, parties are also allowed to receive
donations from abroad—but in Germany, the amount is restricted to 1000€. This is
an important aspect as party branches abroad are often expected to seek donations
from members and to organise fundraising events (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021).
Whereas parties may still decide to operate abroad, denying access to these financial
sources could impact the parties’ objectives and organisational planning (Rashkova
and van der Staak 2020). As von Nostitz (2021) argues, different legal frameworks
and voting constraints may—at the macro-level—influence the organisational vari-
eties of transnational party branches. He argues that the national parties’ organi-
sational links and control over transnational branches is the highest where parties
anticipate the most benefits in terms of vote-seeking and donations (von Nostitz
2021, p. 1). In light of the available literature presented above, I make the following
assumption:
H1b Parties in countries that allow unrestricted donations from abroad are more
likely to maintain a high level of physical party infrastructure abroad with formal
rules and rights for non-resident party members.
The micro‑level: ideologies ofpolitical parties
Turning to the micro-level of analysis, recent research on the connection between
populism and external voting preferences shows that the emigrants’ more
2 In this study, e-voting means voting online by using the internet.

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
cosmopolitan mindset may result in ideological self-selection, which could incen-
tivise populist parties to operate in a more limited capacity abroad as they expect
a lower mobilisation potential (Turcu and Urbatsch 2023). Analysing non-resident
voters’ support for right-and left-wing populist parties, Umpierrez de Reguero and
Jakobson (2023) find that citizens abroad tend to vote more for left-wing populists
compared to voters living in their country of origin, but differences in support for
populist parties and voting preferences between domestic and external voters also
depend on country-of-residence-specific factors (Szulecki etal. 2023).
Beside the focus on non-resident citizens’ voting preferences, some studies high-
light the importance of populist party outreach (Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Ump-
ierrez de Reguero and Jakobson 2023). Although radical right populist parties are
often not very supportive of external voting rights (Østergaard-Nielsen etal. 2019),
campaigns abroad may provide important information and influence the diasporas
voting behaviour in their favour (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b). In this con-
text, some studies argue that right-wing parties are more motivated to connect with
external citizens (Joppke 2003), while some found institutionalised populist parties
on both the centre-right and left being more capable of engaging with emigrants
(Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019). Other studies claim that left–right ideolo-
gies do not guide decisions to engage abroad (Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy
2021).
Generally, the precise connection of party ideology and their propensity to estab-
lish transnational organisational structures to reach non-resident citizens appears, to
date, rather unclear. Here, research on domestic party organisations could deliver
important insights. Recent studies show that populist radical right parties are prone
to maintain mass organisations, which include a centralised organisation, formal
infrastructure, strong rootedness on the ground and close connections with the grass-
roots (Favero 2021; Hatakka 2021; Sijstermans 2021; Zulianello 2021). Considering
these findings, H2 argues the following:
H2 Populist parties are more likely to maintain a high level of physical party infra-
structure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident party members.
The meso‑level: party size andinstitutionalisation
Looking at the meso-level, many studies evaluated transnational operations and
strategies of larger institutionalised mainstream parties. Such research is important
as formality and size of political organisations constitute intermediary factors and
are linked to existing structural and individual factors (Yabanci 2016). It is impor-
tant to note here that party institutionalisation can include internal and external
actors (Yabanci 2016). It is important to note here that party institutionalisation
can include internal and external features (Harmel etal. 2018). Internal institution-
alisation refers to ‘routinised’ intra-party processes by which the party acts accord-
ing to regular formalised procedures, and ‘value infusion’, which depicts the party
member’s willingness to identify with, and commit to the party. External institu-
tionalisation denotes the society’s perceptions of the party’s ability to last. Previous

A.Favero
studies argue that bigger and more institutionalised national parties are more likely
to invest in formal and extensive transnational operations (Dalton etal. 2011; Øster-
gaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021) as they often com-
mand over a developed and refined party structure, which facilitates engagements
abroad. Similarly, von Nostitz (2021) finds formal organisational links and a high
level of control among larger parties in France, Germany and the UK. Transnational
branches often develop on the initiative of individuals (Collard and Kernalegenn
2021), but rapidly become institutionalised when the national political party takes
control (Jakobson etal. 2021). They then become more strongly linked to the central
party office (Gherghina and Soare 2020) and sometimes offer non-resident members
the opportunity to exert influence on national party politics (Rashkova and van der
Staak 2020).
This research provides important insights but the predominant focus on bigger
parties complicates broader assumptions as small parties are often excluded from
these comparisons. As opposed to bigger parties that operate with formal organi-
sations, some smaller parties may draw on less institutionalised, cost-effective net-
works to establish a transnational party infrastructure. Examples include the Greens
in France or M5S in Italy (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), or NEOS in Aus-
tria. With these available studies in mind, I formulate the following hypotheses.
H3 Large institutionalised parties are more likely to maintain a high level of physi-
cal party infrastructure abroad with formal rules and rights for non-resident party
members.
Data andmethod
I analyse transnational organisations from a total of 22 parties in Switzerland (11
parties), Austria (5 parties) and Germany (6 parties). All parties are represented in
the lower houses of their respective national parliaments—the Nationalrat in Swit-
zerland, the Nationalrat in Austria, the Bundestag in Germany. Table2 provides an
overview of the analysed parties, their size (seats in the national parliament) and
which are classified as populist parties according to Zulianello (2020).
To assess the level of existing physical party infrastructure, previous works
counted the existing number of local party branches, their distribution and the size
of their membership (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; von Nostitz 2021). I fol-
low these previous studies and further evaluate if national parties maintain an inter-
national section that serves as the organisational unit for all branches abroad. For
the sake of completeness, I provide the number of members abroad (if known) and
party-affiliated foundations and academies, but will not include these institutions
in the overall assessment. These institutes offer educational activities and serve as
transnational communication channels (Dakowska 2002) for political parties. How-
ever, they are legally independent from the affiliated parties and are not specifically
targeting citizens living abroad.
To examine the parties’ organisational varieties, previous studies assessed the
level of organisation and the branches’ links to the national party organisation

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
(Rashkova and van der Staak 2020). Alluding to previous research, I examine the
formality of the organisational structure abroad and the links to the national office.
The level of a party’s transnational infrastructure is measured by the registration
procedure of external branches, the membership status of external citizens, the
external branches rules and procedures and their type of activities. The level of links
to the national party assessed by evaluating if members have formal rights and a
certain influence in the party’s national organisation, if branches receive financial
support from the national party, and if they are allowed to send delegates to national
party assemblies in the home country. Table3 shows the indicators used to evaluate
transnational party infrastructure. In brackets is the ranking for each aspect.
To compare these organisational varieties and the level of physical transnational
party infrastructure, I look at party programmes and official statutory documents
Table 2 Overview of analysed parties
Source National lower houses in Switzerland, Austria and Germany, Zulianello (2020)
a Of which one independent
b Of which six non-attached to a faction
Switzerland
Total seats in the lower house 200
Parties and their size (# of seats in the lower
house—ranked from biggest to smallest party)
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) (53); Social Demo-
cratic Party of Switzerland(SPS) (39); FDP. The
Liberals (29); The Centre (28); Green Party of
Switzerland (GPS) (28); Green Liberal Party of
Switzerland (GLP) (16); Evangelical People’s
Party of Switzerland (EVP) (3); Ticino League
(LdT) (1); Solidarity (1); Swiss Party of Labour
(PdA) (1); Federal Democratic Union of Switzer-
land (EDU) (1)
Populist parties SVP, LdT
Austria
Total seats in the lower house 183a
Parties (# of seats in the lower house—ranked
from biggest to smallest party)
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) (71); Social Demo-
cratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) (40); Austrian
Freedom Party (FPÖ) (30); The Greens (26);
NEOS (15)
Populist parties FPÖ
Germany
Total seats in the lower house 736b
Parties (# of seats in the lower house—ranked
from biggest to smallest party)
Social Democratic Party of Germany(SPD) (206);
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU) (197); Alliance 90/The
Greens (118)
Free Democratic Party (FDP) (92); Alternative for
Germany (AfD) (78); The Left (39)
Populist parties AfD, The Left

A.Favero
from all parties selected for the study.3 Where information was not available in writ-
ten form, I reached out to party secretaries and representatives to obtain the missing
data.4 The indicators presented in Table3 will be rated to establish a categorisation
of the parties’ levels of physical transnational infrastructure and their organisational
models. First, I rate the level of political parties’ infrastructure “high” if parties
have an international organisation and a party branch or contact abroad. I rate them
“medium” when they have either party branches/contacts or an international organi-
sation, and “low” if they have no infrastructure. Secondly, I rate the level of a par-
ty’s transnational organisation “high” under the condition that a party has registered
external branches with official members or representatives according to the party
statutes—as opposed to supporters or activists-, institutionalised rules and regular
procedures. For this study I place importance on routinised, regular activities within
the branches abroad, such as informal meetings with other members, campaigns,
and official assemblies (Jakobson etal. 2021). The level of links to the national party
is rated “high” if members have formal rights and a certain influence in the party’s
national organisation. Financial support from the national party is not a necessary
requirement as this information is often not disclosed or made available by parties.
Table 3 Indicators to asses Transnational Party Infrastructure
Source Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019), Rashkova and van der Staak (2020)
Aspects Indicators
Level of physical party Infrastructure (high/
medium/low)
∙ International Organisation (yes/no)
∙ Number of party branches and/or contacts abroad
(numerical)
∙ Size of membership abroad (numerical)
∙ Affiliated foundations (yes/no)
Organisational varieties
Level of organisation (high/low) ∙ Registration of branches (formal/informal)
∙ Membership status (official/unofficial)
∙ Branches with institutionalised rules and procedures (yes/
no)
∙ Type of activities (regular/irregular)
Level of links to national party (high/low) ∙ Formal rights within the national party (yes/no)
∙ Influence over the party’s domestic policies (yes/no)
∙ Financial support from national party (yes/no)
∙ Delegate in the party’s national organisation (yes/no)
3 Switzerland: Die Mitte (2020, 2023), EDU (2019, 2023), EVP (2017, 2023), FDP (2022a, 2022b),
GLP (2014, 2020), GPS (2021, 2023), LdT (2022a, 2022b), PdA (2007, 2021), solidaritéS (1997), soli-
daritéS Vaud (2016), SP (2012, 2022), SVP (2018, 2019).
Austria: FPÖ (2011, 2019), Grüne (2001, 2017), NEOS (2021, 2023), ÖVP (2015, 2022), SPÖ (2018a,
2018b).
Germany: AfD (2016, 2022), Allianz 90/Die Grünen (2020, 2022), CDU (2019), CDU/CSU (2021),
CSU (2019), Die Linke (2011, 2022), FDP (2022c, 2022d), SPD (2007, 2021).
4 See Online Appendix for a list of questions and contacted party secretaries.

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
Eventually, this leads to a typology of organisational varieties with four dimensions
as presented in Table4.
To the best of my knowledge, so far, no study has examine Swiss and Austrian
parties’ transnational infrastructure and no research compared and classified all par-
ties in the three countries selected for this research.
Analysis oftransnational party organisations
The presented findings are based on official documents and information directly
obtained from party representatives and secretariats. However, some information
could not be obtained (indicated by n.a.), either because the party did not respond,
information was not gathered by the party, or because of confidentiality.
Levels ofexisting physical party infrastructure
In Switzerland, five of the eleven parties represented in the National Council have
no official party branches abroad. With the exception of die Mitte (the Centre) and
the GPS these parties are rather small. Two parties—the PdA and the GPS—have
no official external sections but are part of existing European and global networks
(European Left 2021; Grüne Schweiz 2022). Five parties have international branches
or sections. The GLP has recently founded the “GLP International” with 40 mem-
bers. This is, according to its designated president (2022), the only foreign section of
GLP Switzerland. The Centre has an international organisation that acts as an asso-
ciation for interested individuals but is not a formal organisation. The FDP Switzer-
land has an international section called “FDP International”, with around 200 mem-
bers but no branches abroad, according to the general secretary (2022). Instead, the
party cooperates with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
and maintains a global network of 14 contact persons. The SP also cooperates with
other social democratic parties and relies on the “SP International” to reach out to
the currently 155 external members. The SP international includes seven official
branches, so-called antennas, in Europe, Africa and North America and a network
Table 4 Varieties of transnational organsiations
Source Rashkova and van der Staak (2020)
Level of organisation
Level of links to national party Low High
Low Informal transnational
organisation without
rights at home
Formal transna-
tional organisa-
tion without
rights at home
High Informal transnational
organisation with rights
at home
Formal transna-
tional organisa-
tion with rights
at home

A.Favero
of 24 contact persons around the world. Similarly, the SVP operates a large interna-
tional network. According to the managing director (2022) the “SVP International”
has about 400 members, spread around the globe. Currently, three branches in Cen-
tral America and Africa (the one in Spain recently closed), and 4 country contacts in
Europe exist.
In Austria, parties seem less invested in implementing their own international
infrastructure. Instead, they run state supported “academies” namely: Dr. Karl Ren-
ner-Institut (SPÖ); Politische Akademie (ÖVP); Freiheitliches Bildungswerk (FPÖ);
Grüne Bildungswerkstätte (Greens), and NEOS Lab (NEOS). These academies
are in charge of the training and education of party elites (Dolezal etal. 2012) and
maintain international cooperations without specifically targeting Austrians living
abroad. Apart from these academies, few parties maintain transnational infrastruc-
tures. The ÖVP and the FPÖ have no international party organisations. The Austrian
Greens, like the Swiss Greens, are part of global and European networks. The SPÖ
has, according to the party’s international secretary, an international organisation
with several branches abroad, of which the one in Brussels is the most active. How-
ever, the number of members is unknown. NEOS is the only party with a clearly
developed international organisation called “NEOS X”. According to their speaker,
NEOS X has 24 representatives and around 100 members abroad. Some members
form groups with several members but most have only 1–2 and are no separate
organisational units.
German parties, like their Austrian counterparts, rely on political Stiftungen
(foundations) as transnational communication channels (Dakowska 2002). The main
goal of these foundations is the “development of democracy and the strengthening
of civil society inside and outside of Germany” (Pierobon 2017, p. 81). These foun-
dations are: The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung affiliated to the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Christian Democratic Union, CDU), the
Heinrich Böll Stiftung affiliated to the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), the Frie-
drich Naumann Stiftung (Free Democratic Party, FDP), the Rosa Luxemburg Stif-
tung (the Left), and the Desiderius Erasmus Foundation (Alternative for Germany,
AfD). The foundations affiliated with the SPD (over 100 international offices), the
CDU (111), the CSU (52), the Greens (33), the Left (28) the FDP (38), operate sev-
eral offices abroad (information retrieved from foundation websites), with the excep-
tion of the AfD.
Apart from political foundations, some German parties operate with transna-
tional infrastructure. The “SPD International” has around 5000 members and con-
sists currently of 13 recognised so-called ‘friendship groups’ and two local chapters.
Members living in a country with no official representation will be served by the
geographically closest group. The CDU has only one officially recognized foreign
association in Brussels with 260 members, but maintains ‘friendship circles’ around
the world, although their number is unknown. The Greens have three official local
chapters—Brussels, London, and Washington DC—affiliated with local sections in
Germany. The FDP Germany cooperates with other Liberal Parties in Europe within
the ALDE network and maintains its own organisation—the “Auslandsgruppe
Europa der FDP” (Europe Foreign Group of the FDP, AGE) based in Brussels,
which supports two local branches in Paris and Switzerland. The Left cooperates

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
with the International Left and has one grassroots organisation in Brussels, while
the AfD has no official branch abroad. For a general overview, Table 5 provides
information of the parties’ rated level of physical transnational infrastructure.5
Organisational varieties ofparty infrastructure
This section focuses on various types of organisational models of transnational party
infrastructures. According to Rashkova and van der Staak (2020) the party abroad
can be analysed based on their level of organisation and its links to the national
party.
In Switzerland, the SVP and the SP have both formally registered branches
abroad with official members as part of their international division. However, the
“SP international” is only accessible for members of the national party. The branches
of both parties operate according to formal rules and organise regular activities,
such as annual conventions and social gatherings, according to the party secretar-
ies (2022). Both international sections have a representative in the national parties’
leadership committees and send delegates to national general assemblies. The SVP
international has the same status as a cantonal branch within the national party but
is solely financed by membership fees and donations, while the SP international
receives additional financial support from the national party. The FDP International
has no officially registered branches with rules and regular activities but operates
with contact persons and offers official membership to citizens living abroad. The
FDP’s international section has some influence over the national parties’ policies by
sending four delegates to the general assembly and by having the head of the inter-
national section as a representative within the national party’s president conference.
However, the party does not provide information on financial support (FDP 2022b).
The Centre International has no registered branches, nor branches abroad and offers
only online meetings to members. Similar to the FDP, becoming a member of the
Centre international means also national party membership. However, external
members have no rights or influence over the party’s domestic policies and send
no delegates to national party bodies (Die Mitte 2020). The national party supports
Table 5 Level of parties’ physical transnational infrastructure
Source Authors own data
Level Switzerland Austria Germany
High SVP, SP, FDP SPÖ, NEOS SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP
Medium The Centre, GLP – Alliance 90/The Greens, The
Left
Low GPS, EVP, LdT, Soli-
darity, PdA, EDU
ÖVP, FPÖ, The Greens AfD
5 See Online Appendix for a detailed overview of national parties’ existing international organisations,
number of external party branches and contact persons, the size and location of their external commu-
nity, and affiliated foundations.

A.Favero
the international organisation with personnel resources. The GLP international is a
network that offers official membership status, regular meetings for members, and—
similar to the SVP—has the same status as a cantonal branch. According to its presi-
dent (2022), this means that members of GLP International are part of the party as
a whole and can exercise their rights through representation on the Executive Com-
mittee of GLP Switzerland or the national Assembly of Delegates. The GLP Inter-
national is financed by membership fees and donations, and receives support from
the national party for specific projects. All other parties (GPS, EVP, LdT, Solidarity,
PdA, and EDU) have no formally registered branches with official members, rules,
and activities. However, some parties mention that members abroad can register
(EDU Statutes 2023), constitute as a cantonal party (EVP Statutes 2017), or join a
cantonal party from abroad (GPS Statutes 2021).
In Austria, the SPÖ has three officially registered branches abroad. NEOS hosts
a network of groups and contact persons, which are not formally registered. In both
parties, members abroad are also official members of the national party, either
directly (NEOS) or they are assigned to the Viennese provincial organisation (SPÖ).
NEOS X and the institutionalized local branches of the SPÖ international organise
regular online and in-person meetings. Members in both parties have the same rights
as national party members. They can send delegates to members’ assemblies, have
a delegate in national party leadership council, and are allowed to help develop the
party programme. While the SPÖ only supports specific projects of international
branches, NEOS does finance the international branch with a few 1000 Euro per
year. In contrast the FPÖ, the Greens, and the ÖVP have no official branches with
members and regular activities. Members abroad have no specific rights or influence
over the parties’ domestic policies or receive financial support from the national
party.
In Germany, all parties but the AfD have officially registered branches with official
members and regular activities, although their links to the national party organisations
differ. “SPD International” is the umbrella association of all SPD friendship groups.
Organisationally, it is located at the SPD Regional Association Berlin—with the excep-
tion of the local sections in Brussels and Luxembourg that are linked to the party dis-
trict Aachen in North Rhine Westphalia and the district Saarbrücken in Saarland respec-
tively (SPD London 2023). The SPD International sends one advisory delegate to the
federal party conference. The CDU consist of several friendship circles and one foreign
section. It’s only official chapter abroad in Brussels is directly assigned to the CDU fed-
eral executive committee in Berlin. The foreign associations recognized by the National
Executive Board can send one delegate each to the National Party Congress (CDU
2019). The German Greens’ local chapters in Washington (affiliated with Berlin-Mitte),
Brussels (Aachen) and London (Berlin Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg) are connected to
German district associations (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen London 2019). Members living
abroad have the same rights as national members and can participate in delegate assem-
blies and working groups, although this is not always feasible due to distance accord-
ing to a leadership member of the section in Washington. The FDP’s Foreign Group
Europe (Auslandsgruppe Europa) is located in Brussels and has affiliated local sections
in Switzerland and Luxemburg (FDP AGE 2023). The AGE’s general assembly elects
two delegates for the national party conference. All other foreign groups each send one

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
non-voting representative elected by the general assembly of the AGE to the national
party conference (FDP 2022d). The Left also has official branches—so-called grass-
roots organisations (Basisorganisationen, BO) in Brussels and Greece, which are part
of the Berlin-Mitte district association (Die Linke 2018). The party does not mention a
formal representation of members living abroad but allows all members to participate
in events, elections, votes and party committees (Die Linke Bundessatzung 2022).
Table6 presents a summary and classification of the parties’ organisational varie-
ties. The table shows that 50% (11) of the analysed parties maintain either none, or
only informal transnational party organisations without rights in their home country
(low/low). Eight parties operate with formally structured party branches that have
official rights in their home country (high/high). In Switzerland, I find two par-
ties that maintain low levels of organisation but with strong links to the national
party (low/high). Both, the FDP and the GLP operate with an informal transnational
organisation with rights in their home country. In Germany, we find the only exam-
ple for a formal transnational party organisation without strong links to the national
party (high/low). The Left has officially registered branches with regular activities
for externals, but these members have no influence over the party’s national politics,
nor are they represented by delegates in the national assembly.
Discussion
With the extension of citizenship rights beyond the national arena (Schlenker and
Blatter 2014), the role of political parties as channels for information, representa-
tion, and mobilisation of non-resident citizens becomes more important. In this
Table 6 Organisational varieties of transnational party infrastructures
Source Party websites and secretaries, Authors own assessment
Level of organisation
Level of links to national party Low High
Low Switzerland Switzerland
The Centre, GPS, EVP, LdT,
Solidarity, PdA, EDU
–
Austria Austria
ÖVP, FPÖ, The Greens –
Germany Germany
AfD The Left
High Switzerland Switzerland
FDP, GLP SVP, SP
Austria Austria
– SPÖ, NEOS
Germany Germany
– SDP, CDU/CSU, Alli-
ance 90/The Greens,
FDP

A.Favero
context, my study evaluates what transnational infrastructure exists within Swiss,
Austrian and German parties to operate abroad and how it is organised. Obviously,
not all parties have the same approach to connect with citizens living abroad (Ker-
nalegenn and van Haute 2020a, b; Gherghina and Soare 2020). Physical party infra-
structures, and organisational varieties differ across parties and countries. This study
presents the first explorative comparison of transnational infrastructure of all parties
represented in the national parliaments of the three selected countries. Table7 offers
a summary of the findings.
Overall, the analysis yields a range of interesting findings. First of all, despite the
large untapped pool of potential voters in each country, the number of parties offer-
ing a high level of transnational infrastructure to reach and mobilise external citizens
is fairly moderate (8/22 parties). Many parties in Switzerland, Austria and Germany
(10/22), keep only a low level of physical transnational party infrastructure.
Rashkova and van der Staak (2020) argue that parties use information about the
size and type of the national communities living abroad in order to consider in what
manner they want to operate abroad. In all three selected countries, we find large
heterogenous diasporas with few registered voters, which should mitigate this influ-
ence on the selected parties’ willingness to invest in transnational organisations.
However, previous studies (Germann 2021) state that postal voting and especially
e-voting increase voter turnout among external citizens. It would therefore make
sense for parties to invest where the voting procedure has been legally facilitated,
despite potential security concerns (Østergaard-Nielsen et al. 2019). However,
looking at the scope and extent of transnational infrastructure, I do not find higher
or more formal levels in Switzerland, where e-voting is partially implemented, as
would have been expected according to H1a. At this macro-level of analysis, despite
allowing e-voting and a resulting higher turnout (Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen
2020), Swiss parties are—overall—not more invested in establishing extensive
Table 7 Overall classification of physical transnational party infrastructure
Source Authors own data and calculation
Organisational variety Level of physical party infrastructure
High Medium Low
Formal transnational org. with rights
at home
SVP, SP,
SPÖ,
NEOS,
SDP,
CDU/CSU,
FDP(D)
Alliance
90/The
Greens
Formal transnational org. without
rights at home
The Left
Informal transnational org. with rights
at home
FDP (CH) GLP
Informal transnational org. without
rights at home
The Centre GPS, EVP, LdT, PdA, EDU,
Solidarity, ÖVP, FPÖ, The
Greens, AfD

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
formal organisations to reach external citizens than in Austria and Germany. Rea-
sons could be found in parties’ utilitarian approaches, where they not only evaluate
voter turnout but also the individual electoral choices among emigrants (Goldberg
and Lanz 2021), their (lack of) attachment to the home country and interest in poli-
tics, registration procedures for long-distance political participation (Burgess and
Tyburski 2020), the moral legitimacy to vote from abroad (Szulecki etal. 2021),
or the fact that postal voting also reduces the voters’ costs (Hutcheson and Arri-
ghi 2015) and therefore offers similar incentives for German and Austrian parties to
reach non-resident citizens. In addition, e-voting in Switzerland was never available
for the whole country and recently re-applied only in certain cantons. Due to secu-
rity concerns, internet voting was suspended between 2019 and 2023, which poten-
tially impacts negatively on the trust and willingness of non-resident citizens to use
it (Pleger and Mertes 2018; Germann 2021). These concerns could prevent parties
from engaging more in transnational operations.
Looking at the macro-level and legal frameworks as a possible influence may also
prove important regarding donations to parties from the community of non-resident
citizens. The more restrictive voting constrains and the 1000€ cap on donations from
abroad in Germany did not deter the SPD, CDU/CSU, and the FDP to set up exten-
sive formal transnational organisations with rights for external citizens to influence
internal party policies. However, in Austria, where donations from abroad are not
permitted (Republik Österreich Parlament 2019), only the recently founded NEOS
and the SPÖ invest in structures to reach external citizens. Whereas, NEOS takes a
relatively cost-effective approach by relying on an extensive network of contact per-
sons according to NEOS X speaker Martin Wallner, Maria Maltschnig, the Director
of the Karl-Renner-Institute (see Online Appendix) outlines that the SPÖ operates
with three official branches abroad. In Switzerland, parties are not faced with simi-
larly restrictive legal frameworks, which could partly explain the SVP’s and SP’s
willingness to invest in a more costly and formal transnational structure with official
sections abroad. However, other Swiss parties did not follow this strategy. In sum,
and in line with previous research (von Nostitz 2021), legal rules on donations may
have a certain influence but with the available data, H1b cannot be confirmed.
At the micro-level of analysis, hypothesis H2, which argues that populist parties
are more likely to invest in extensive formal physical party infrastructure, can also
not be confirmed. While the Swiss SVP invests heavily in its transnational organi-
sation, the German AfD, and the Austrian FPÖ maintain a low and informal level
of transnational infrastructure. The populist The Left in Germany has two official
branches abroad but their members are not formally able to influence the party’s
domestic politics. These findings confirm that neither far-left or far-right ideolo-
gies, nor populism correspond with increased engagement abroad (Østergaard-
Nielsen and Ciornei 2019; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). Mass party
approaches with populist parties investing in organisations with roots on the ground
and regular activities (Albertazzi and van Kessel 2021) may—in many countries—
still be confined within national boundaries. However, further research could also
look into the voter preferences of diasporas from the selected countries to obtain a
more encompassing picture on the relation of populism and non-resident citizens
(Turcu and Urbatsch 2023; Umpierrez de Reguero and Jakobson 2023).

A.Favero
The results further show that, at the meso-level, the proportion of parties investing
in high levels of formal transnational infrastructure and rights for members abroad
is comparatively lower in countries with many smaller domestic parties. In Swit-
zerland with eleven parties in the national parliament, almost half of them (EVP,
LdT, Solidarity, PdA, EDU) are very small in size, regionally oriented, and lack the
resources to reach external citizens. Interestingly, I find that some of the larger par-
ties in the sample also show fewer incentives to establish transitional infrastructures,
such as the Centre in Switzerland, the ÖVP and the FPÖ in Austria, as well as the
Green parties across all selected countries—conceivably because they are part of
established Green party networks. Some parties are not very small but rather new
with a still developing infrastructure, such as the AfD in Germany, or the GLP in
Switzerland. However, this reasoning does not apply to NEOS in Austria, which was
only founded in 2012 and maintains an extensive transnational infrastructure with
formal rights for members abroad. This indicates that NEOS may have reacted to its
opponents’ practices and not only adopted but even surpassed the rivals’ strategies
to reach external citizens, using a structure based on contact persons that fits the
party’s needs (Gherghina and Soare 2020).
In sum, including the meso-level of analysis proved very insightful. The findings
point towards a combination of two factors—size and institutionalisation—that cor-
relate with the establishment of a formal physical infrastructure to reach external
citizens. Predominantly larger and well-established parties—with the exception of
NEOS—like the SVP, the SP, and the FDP in Switzerland, the SPÖ in Austria, the
CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP in Germany invest considerably in rules-based
transnational organisations with rights for external members. Whereas their models
(ratio of branches or contact persons abroad), size and geographical location differ
(see Online Appendix), their engagement confirms previous research (Østergaard-
Nielsen and Ciornei 2019), arguing that larger and better-institutionalised national
parties invest more in transnational approaches that ensure considerable formal
rights for external party members. These findings would then largely confirm H3.
This analysis reveals important correlations between previously understudied fac-
tors at different levels of analysis. Further research could further focus on national
legal frameworks, diaspora-related issues, or parties’ individual objectives, and
their connection to different levels of physical infrastructure, as well as the organi-
sational varieties implemented by parties to reach citizens abroad. Another strand
of research could also assess digital activities, which national parties undertake to
engage abroad.
Conclusion
This paper offers an important contribution to a better understanding of the sup-
ply side of transnational political engagements, by asking how much political par-
ties invest in reaching non-resident citizens. Much of the existing literature focuses
on parties and citizenship rights in domestic contexts but globalisation, increas-
ing mobility and migration strategies (e.g., Favero 2019), and external citizenship
rights challenge the traditional understanding of the relationship between territorial

How toreach external citizens? Comparing varieties of…
borders, citizenship and the delineating of national populations’ electoral rights and
duties (Bauböck 2009; van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). Importantly, the study
does not account for variables (socio-economic characteristics, voting preferences,
size of diaspora per country, length of stay abroad, etc.) pertaining to the various
non-resident citizens’ communities. Including this perspective would have been
beyond the scope of this study.
I compare 22 parties represented in the national parliaments in Switzerland, Aus-
tria, and Germany—three countries with large diasporas and low voter registration.
The thorough comparison leads to several country-specific findings at different lev-
els of analysis. In Switzerland, smaller regionally orientated parties do not invest
in transnational infrastructure. Similarly, in Germany, the big mainstream parties—
SPD, CDU/CSU, and FDP—are highly investing in formal transnational outreach.
Other parties, with the exception of the AfD, have also sections abroad but do not
grant the same rights and duties to non-resident members. In contrast, in Austria,
only the well-established SPÖ and the relatively new NEOS built a formal transna-
tional infrastructure with rights and influence for party members abroad. Looking at
the macro-level, one reason could be that donations from non-resident party mem-
bers are legally not allowed in Austria, which reduces incentives for parties to invest
in transnational infrastructure (von Nostitz 2021).
While political ideology and populist views do not matter, party institutionali-
sation and size play a role. At this meso-level of analysis, it is often the larger and
well-established parties that have the resources and the structure to expand across
borders. Naturally, these organsiations show certain varieties regarding rights and
duties for external members but a general pattern occurs nevertheless. Where par-
ties invest in formally organised physical outreach structures, they also provide
rights and influence to party members living abroad.
This study analysed how parties reach out to external citizens. Hence, the limi-
tations are obvious as the question why they do it remains unanswered. First, fur-
ther qualitative research should look into a comparison of the dominant compo-
nents of the parties’ individual cost–benefit calculations and how they influence
the decision-making process on why, and also where parties invest with specific
organisational models to reach citizens living abroad. Secondly, while this paper
analyses official party structures, further research could evaluate the role played
by the party-affiliated—but nominally independent—foundations and academies
in Austria and Germany in engaging with non-resident citizens. Third, this study
focusses on a comparison across all parties in three countries. Further studies
could focus on fewer parties but include further legal and political variables (e.g.,
democracies vs non-democracies) that may influence their transnational organisa-
tions and juxtapose these findings with the demand side—the non-resident voters.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1057/ s41269- 024- 00344-8.
Acknowledgement This article is made open access through funding from the NKWP.

A.Favero
Declarations
Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of
interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
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are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
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institutional affiliations.
Adrian Favero is an Assistant Professor in European Politics & Society at the University of Groningen,
NL. He previously received his PhD in Politics from the University of Edinburgh. His research explores
themes of (transnational) party organisation, European integration, and intra-EU migration.