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An abyss of uncertainty:
The developmental lines of internal working models
and reflective functioning
Alexander Kriss*
A child’s ability to meet the affective, cognitive, and interpersonal demands of deve-
lopment is determined in great measure by an ongoing dialectic between objective
and subjective experience. In the present paper, two attachment-related constructs are
identified as central to this dynamic process: internal working models (IWMs) and
reflective functioning (RF). They are reviewed respectively in terms of their theory,
ontogeny, and relationship to social-emotional development (SED). The review
ultimately proffers a moderating model to explain how the developmental lines of
IWMs and RF intersect and predict future development. Specifically, higher RF is
predicted to weaken the relationship between IWMs and later SED, and viceversa.
Keywords: attachment, developmental theory, social-emotional development, reflec-
tive functioning, internal working models.
Un abisso di incertezza: Linee di sviluppo dei modelli operativi interni e della fun-
zione riflessiva
La capacità di un bambino di affrontare, durante lo sviluppo, le sfide affettive, cogni-
tive e interpersonali è determinata in larga parte da una dialettica continua tra espe-
rienze obiettive e soggettive. In questo lavoro sono stati individuati due costrutti col-
legati all’attaccamento come centrali in questo processo dinamico, i modelli operativi
interni (IWM) e la funzione riflessiva (RF), i quali vengono passati in rassegna, ri-
spettivamente, nei termini della loro teoria di riferimento, del loro sviluppo ontoge-
netico e della relazione con lo sviluppo socio-emotivo (SED). Questa rassegna offre
in definitiva un modello per spiegare in qual maniera le linee di sviluppo dei modelli
operativi interni e della funzione riflessiva si intersecano e sono predittivi dello svi-
luppo futuro. In particolare, ci si può aspettare che una funzione riflessiva elevata in-
debolisca la relazione tra modelli operativi interni e il successivo sviluppo socio-emo-
tivo e viceversa.
Parole chiave: attaccamento, teoria dello sviluppo, sviluppo socio-emotivo, funzione
riflessiva, modelli operativi interni.
Attaccamento e Sistemi Complessi (Attachment and Complex Systems), Vol. 2, n. 1, gennaio 2015, pp. 65-86
ISSN 2283-8279 -
©
2015 Scione Editore Roma
* Interfaith Medical Center, New York, USA.
Corresponding author:
Alexander Kriss, Interfaith Medical Center, 1545 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11213, USA.
alexkriss@gmail.com
Rassegne e discussioni teoriche/Reviews and theoretical discussions
What an abyss of uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by itself;
when it, the seeker, is at the same time the dark region through which
it must go seeking and where all its equipment will avail it nothing.
- Proust (1913/2003), p. 61
A child’s ability to meet the affective, cognitive, and interpersonal demands of
development is determined in great measure by an ongoing dialectic between objec-
tive and subjective experience. Early environment informs psychic reality, which in-
fluences real-world behavior, which in turn contributes to experiences that reinforce
or contradict expectations. Throughout development, we exist in an “abyss of uncer-
tainty” (Proust, 1913/2003, p. 61), treading the line between inner and outer worlds,
attempting to predict difficult-to-predict outcomes. The mechanisms underpinning
this process are complex, involving various intrapsychic and interpersonal structures
with distinct developmental lines, that is, they emerge and solidify at different rates
and times. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980) provides a particu-
larly salient lens through which to understand how infants and children internalize
and reflect on their interactions with others, especially primary caregivers,1in order
to form internal models of the outside world, use those models to predict future
behaviors, and develop strategies to cope with those potential realities.
In order to understand the tug-of-war between objective and subjective experi-
ence and how that dynamic impacts the development of the child, two attachment-re-
lated constructs require careful examination: internal working models (IWMs;
Bowlby, 1969/1982) and reflective functioning (RF; Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991).
These represent two independent but closely related strands of the development
of the self.
IWMs form early and set early, they are preverbal, pre-symbolic notions borne
out of infant-caregiver interactions that inform our perceptions and behaviors on a
largely unconscious level. RF, on the other hand, is a set of processes that develops
more slowly over time, and is heavily tied to language and conscious cognitive func-
tioning. Through RF we come to understand behavior and think about thinking in a
reflective fashion, rather than the reflexive manner with which IWMs guide our
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Being automatic and largely out of awareness, IWMs are difficult to consciously
evaluate or change. In the present paper, I argue that RF makes the appraisal and
modification of IWMs possible in the course of development. If IWMs inhabit
the “dark region” (Proust, 1913/2003, p. 61) of our minds – the part to which we
are both intrinsically bound and largely unfamiliar – then RF is the means by which
we explore it.
Attaccamento e Sistemi Complessi (Attachment and Complex Systems), Vol. 2, n. 1, gennaio 2015, pp. 65-86
66 –Kriss
1Much of the attachment literature has focused on the child’s relationship with the biological
mother. The scope of this work prohibits a satisfactory review of the research on other attachment
figures, such as the biological father (e.g., Steele & Steele, 2005), older siblings (e.g., Ainsworth,
1985), adoptive parents (e.g., Steele, Hodges, Kaniuk, Hillman, & Henderson, 2003), and so on.
As much as possible I attempt to use the term “primary caregiver” in order to respect the most con-
temporary research that shows that being a central attachment figure is not the exclusive purview of
the biological mother. However, the context of certain research or theory at times demands that I use
“mother”, which I intend as interchangeable with the preferred term “caregiver”.
1. Internal Working Models
The attachment system is a behavioral, physiological, and affective system that
is activated in the presence of external danger, and the IWM is the subjective repre-
sentation that forms in the infant according to how caregivers respond to his or her
needs. IWMs come to serve as templates for future relationships; they determine in
large part what the child expects from new or ambiguous interpersonal experiences.
1.1 Theoretical development
The concept of IWMs is so well-accepted in the psychological and psychoa -
nalytic communities today that it is easy to forget how radical its introduction was
half a century ago. Attachment theory represented John Bowlby’s synthesis of psy-
choanalysis, cognitive psychology, and evolutionary theory, a combination of
disparate elements that initially provoked resistance from nearly all sides. In fact,
IWMs can be traced back theoretically to the notorious rivalry between Anna Freud
and Melanie Klein.
In seeking to carry on her father’s legacy in London in the late 1930s, Anna Freud
felt the focus of psychoanalysis should be on the study of defenses and the reality
principle (Makari, 2008), examining how individuals resolve unconscious conflict in
order to function. Her work formed the basis of the ego psychology movement led by
analysts like Hartmann (1939/1964), who emphasized that the individual’s ability to
make compromises in the face of internal conflict was indicative of an instinctual hu-
man striving toward health. Bowlby would ultimately combine this idea of the adapt-
ability of the human psyche with contemporary developments in evolutionary science
concerning “imprinting” (Lorenz, 1935), which suggested that certain creatures are
biologically pre-programmed to attach to caregivers in the interest of survival.
Across the aisle from Anna Freud was Melanie Klein, who – rather than looking
at relatively observable phenomena of ego defenses – plunged into the roiling depths
of the unconscious fantasies of preverbal infants. Klein’s concept that our representa-
tions of others, or “internal objects”, impact our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
was radical and controversial to the more conservative Freudians (Likierman, 2001;
Makari, 2008). The idea that psychic reality was informed by a chorus of internaliza-
tions acted as an affront to the established concept of a cohesive ego. If we are not
only populated but influenced by many internal objects, then what is the self?
Some analysts became frustrated or disinterested with the political pressure to
choose an allegiance with either the Freudians or the Kleinians, and instead borrowed
ideas from both sides and worked between the factions. They were appropriately
known as the British Independent group or British Middle group. One of their mem-
bers was a young John Bowlby. He mixed Freudian, Kleinian, evolutionary, and de-
velopmental psychology theories to argue that infants were biologically driven from
birth to seek social attachments to others, and that survival in particular demanded
the internalization of the mother in order for the infant to adequately adapt to the
environment (Bowlby, 1969/1982). If the infant was unable to anticipate the mother
and develop appropriate strategies to maximize chances of being fed, protected from
danger, and so on, she would die.
Attaccamento e Sistemi Complessi (Attachment and Complex Systems), Vol. 2, n. 1, gennaio 2015, pp. 65-86
Internal working models and reflective functioning –67
Bowlby’s most important diversion from Klein and other object relations theo-
rists was his emphasis on the role that actual experience played in the formation of
IWMs. Rather than internal objects being shaped by intrapsychic processes, the in-
fant’s internal reality was informed by his interactions with external reality. Bowlby
(1969/1982, 1973) was also deliberate in his use of the term “working model” over
“object”, as he intended this to imply the malleability of IWMs, and the fact that they
are based on an accrual of objective experiences rather than innate and largely prede-
termined subjective states.
The notion of IWMs was also informed by early cognitive theorists operating at
a great theoretical (if not geographical) distance from the tumult of mid-twentieth
century British analytic institutes. The influence of Kenneth Craik, a Cambridge-
based philosopher and psychologist, is readily apparent: “If the organism carries a
small-scale model of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head,
it is able… to react in a much fuller, safe and more competent manner to the emer-
gencies which face it” (Craik, 1943, p. 61, quoted in Bretherton, 1985).
At first, theorists and researchers from various camps had qualms with IWMs.
Kleinian analysts were dismissive of Bowlby’s assertion that IWMs were born from
real-world experiences, while developmental researchers were wary of the idea that
such sophisticated cognitive templates could form in infancy. Some researchers (e.g.,
Schaffer & Emerson, 1964) argued that Bowlby had misapplied evolutionary theory
to attachment theory. However, these critiques tended to misunderstand Bowlby’s
argument for the special nature of the infant-mother attachment, understandably so,
as there was little concrete evidence at the time to support his notions. It was not
until attachment theory began to be tested empirically that the theory as a whole and
the construct of IWMs in particular showed their robustness.
The work of Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues demonstrated firstly that IWMs
could be systematically and concretely measured, and secondly that IWMs could
be differentiated and categorized. Using Ainsworth’s Strange Situation Procedure
(SSP; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) – a behavioral measure of infant
arousal and regulation that is still used in attachment research – investigators
observed how an infant reacted during separation from and reunion with her attach-
ment figure, typically the mother. From this work, IWMs were subdivided into three
discrete categories: “secure”, “insecure-avoidant”, and “insecure-resistant”. The
addition of another pattern of attachment, “disorganized/disoriented”, in the 1990s
(Main & Solomon, 1990; Solomon & George, 1999) was invaluable in applying
attachment theory to clinical populations. These categories are discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
The cementation of IWMs as a sound and vital concept may be best attributed to
the body of research that has demonstrated its powerful predictability and significant
predictive power. De Wolff and van Ijzendoorn (1997) reviewed over 60 studies that
predicted secure versus insecure attachment outcomes based on interactions with pri-
mary caregivers in the earliest months of life. Fonagy and colleagues demonstrated
that mothers’ attachments when pregnant with their first-born children predicted their
children’s attachments at 12 and 18 months (Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Hig-
gitt, 1993) (This phenomenon, known as “intergenerational transmission of attach-
ment”, is discussed later in this paper). Evidence for the stability of IWMs over the
Attaccamento e Sistemi Complessi (Attachment and Complex Systems), Vol. 2, n. 1, gennaio 2015, pp. 65-86
68 –Kriss
life span is less abundant, due both to methodological issues and the fact that, as
Bowlby originally theorized, IWMs are pliable. Nevertheless, numerous studies have
shown the relative stability of attachment throughout development (e.g., Allen,
McElhaney, Kuperminc, & Jodl, 2004; Sroufe, 2005; Steele & Steele, 2005), further
suggesting that IWMs play a significant and long-lasting role in the individual’s
negotiation of objective and subjective realities.
1.2 Ontogenetic development
IWMs are considered to stabilize as early as 12 months of age (Main, Kaplan, &
Cassidy, 1985), though by definition they begin to form during the infant’s first inter-
actions in the earliest days of life. It is around the 12-month mark, however, that be-
havioral strategies can be reliably observed in paradigms such as the SSP, suggesting
a solidification of expectations and internal schemata on behalf of the infant. Broadly,
infants in the SSP are identifiable as belonging to one of four categories.
“Secure” infants display normative distress when left alone with a stranger. As
babies cannot fend for themselves it is evolutionarily logical that they would cry
when their primary caregiver leaves them in a strange and potentially dangerous
place. Upon reunion, however, secure infants are easily soothed and quickly return to
a state of curious exploration of the environment. This dialectic between autonomy
when safe versus proximity-seeking and distress when threatened is viewed as the
two primary states of the attachment system (Bowlby, 1973). A secure infant there-
fore forms an IWM that encapsulates both these aspects, conceptualizing his primary
caregiver as a secure base and a safe haven.
Most infants are securely attached: approximately 65% of community popula-
tions, which holds fairly stable across cultures and geographic location (Prior &
Glaser, 2006). The majority of the remaining infants fall into one of two “insecure”
categories. “Insecure-avoidant” infants show minimal visible distress upon separa-
tion and reunion with their mothers. Their IWMs are hypothesized to contain expec-
tations of an overwhelming experience when their mothers attempt to comfort; the
infants therefore precociously self-regulate to ward off intrusion.
“Insecure-resistant” infants are distressed by separation and remain inconsolable
after reunion, though they remain preoccupied with seeking to be near their mothers.
The infant’s palpable feelings of anxiety and anger are reflective of IWMs that anti-
cipate an unavailable or inconsistently available caregiver. Exploration and autonomy
must be forsaken in the interest of ensuring the proximity of a safe haven.
Some infants appear “disorganized/disoriented” during the SSP, behaving in
bizarre or inconsistent ways that do not readily appear to have adaptive value. The
IWMs of such infants are lacking stable expectations in relation to their caregivers,
who in turn are often frightened, threatening, and dissociative when interacting with
their babies (Main & Hesse, 1990). While disorganization is fairly uncommon in
community populations, it can be normative in clinical populations. Prevalence ap-
proaches 80% in some high-risk samples (Carlson, Cicchetti, Barnett, & Braunwald,
1989), which stands as strong evidence for a link between chaotic environments and
disorganized attachment. However, that as much as 20% of some low-risk com -
munity samples also show evidence of disorganized attachment (van Ijzendoorn,
Attaccamento e Sistemi Complessi (Attachment and Complex Systems), Vol. 2, n. 1, gennaio 2015, pp. 65-86
Internal working models and reflective functioning –69
Schuengel, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999) suggests a more complex origin, poten-
tially involving genetic predisposition (Madigan et al., 2006) and the infant-caregiver
dyadic system (Beebe, Lachmann, Markese, & Bahrick, 2012) in addition to parental
and ecological factors.
Though they are not wholly fixed, IWMs are also not easily changed (Bowlby,
1973, 1980). They develop early and are therefore preverbal and unconscious, and
thus less subject to reevaluation than beliefs that are rooted in language (Bretherton,
1985). Even when initially deprived children go on to develop healthier IWMs based
on new relational experiences, such as in adoption cases, these representations do
not eradicate the older, problematic IWMs (Hodges, Steele, Hillman, Henderson, &
Neil, 2000; Steele et al., 2003; Steele et al., 2008). Rather, the old and new coexist
and continue to influence the child’s expectations and behavior to greater or lesser
degrees (Bowlby, 1973; Main, 1991).
Initially, IWMs are dyadic in nature, being inextricably linked to the infant-care-
giver relationship. As cognitive capacities increase over the course of development,
so too do IWMs become internalized, moving from the behavioral and physiological
to the representational (Main et al., 1985). Adults no longer need to seek out physical
proximity to caregivers in order to ensure feelings of safety, but their experiences
from infancy and childhood continue to inform how relationships and situations are
perceived. Adult IWMs are chiefly measured through analysis of how individuals
speak about important relationships rather than behavioral observation. The “gold
standard” measure of attachment in adulthood is the Adult Attachment Interview
(AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985), which like the SSP provides categorizations
that elucidate how IWMs manifest at the level of representation.
Secure adults hold IWMs that continue the autonomy-safety dialectic from in-
fancy into the intellectual and emotional realm. They express the capacity for needing
and relying on others, while also maintaining an exploratory attitude toward their
own internalizations, including openness about the failings of caregivers and other
important relationships (Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2008).
“Insecure-dismissing” adults can be viewed as the representational equivalent of
avoidant infants. Just as the latter would show little reaction to the coming and going
of caregivers in the SSP, the former tend to portray themselves as strong and inde-
pendent in the AAI, minimizing negative experiences and denying feelings of distress
or dependence on others (Main et al., 2008). Insecure-resistant IWMs in infancy, on
the other hand, translate into “insecure-preoccupied” IWMs in adulthood. The palpa-
ble sense of infants being inconsolable and not having their needs met in the SSP
manifest in adults in the form of marked inflexibility during the AAI. Preoccupied
adults tend to be excessively blaming toward themselves or their caregivers, and
often attempt to elicit agreement from the interviewer (Main et al., 2008).
“Unresolved” adults display many of the bizarre or disturbing signs of disorgan-
ized infants. During the AAI, these adults verbally present contradictory or incompat-
ible strategies in the same way such inconsistencies can be observed behaviorally
in infants during the SSP (Main et al., 2008). In the most extreme cases, adults may
enter into dissociative “state shifts” during the interview, offering firsthand evidence
of the chaotic and disintegrated IWMs within.
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70 –Kriss
1.3 IWMs across cultures
The taxonomy of IWMs outlined above was largely validated on Anglo-Saxon
and European samples, although the origins of Ainsworth’s tripartite system of
secure, insecure-avoidant, and insecure-resistant can be found in her work with
Ugandan infants (Ainsworth, 1967). As a result, researchers like Rothbaum and
colleagues have criticized attachment theory for confusing Western cultural values
with universal indicators of development (Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, &
Morelli, 2000). In particular, the authors take issue with the assumption that secure
IWMs by definition involve templates for autonomy, exploration, and individuation,
which are characteristics less relevant to or even in direct conflict with normative
development in non-Western cultures. Though distribution of secure versus insecure
attachment has been shown to be relatively stable across cultures (Prior & Glaser,
2006; van Ijzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008), it may indeed be the case that the
structural content of IWMs differs based upon the dominant values of the culture in
which the infant is raised. This idea requires further research – while we know
that securely attached infants look the same across cultures in terms of behavior
(i.e., distressed without caregiver, easily soothed upon reunion), it is less clear how
IWMs are organized to reflect the differential influences of innate biological drives
versus sociocultural values.
Divergent patterns of insecure attachment exist across cultures – Germany, for
instance, has shown high rates of insecure-avoidant infants, while Japanese and
Israeli infants have demonstrated greater tendency toward insecure-resistant attach-
ment (van Ijzendoorn, 1990). Though some claim these discrepancies speak against
any assertions of the universality of attachment and IWMs, van Ijzendoorn and others
argue that while culture influences which strategies are most adaptive – and thus
which type of IWMs are most prevalent in a given culture – no evidence has arisen
to seriously challenge attachment theory as a correlate of evolutionary processes, and
therefore a system pertaining to our entire species (Main, 1990; van Ijzendoorn,
1990; van Ijzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2008).
1.4 Impact on social-emotional development
Secure IWMs are a significant protective factor during the challenges of normal
social-emotional development, SED (De Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 1997). The secure
infant has formed stable internalizations that promote both autonomous exploration
and a sense of safety, and as he develops these templates are applied to the outside
world. Infants who develop insecure IWMs are less protected from SED challenges.
Though they have consistent, often rigid, expectations and strategies, the early com-
promises made to autonomy, safety, or both can inhibit functioning as the child grows
older, resulting in adjustment problems (Easterbrooks & Abeles, 2000). However, it
is essential to keep in mind that attachment classification is not a diagnosis, and inse-
cure IWMs are not especially predictive of pathological outcomes. In fact, Fonagy
and colleagues point out that insecure IWMs are commonly found in community and
clinical populations alike (Fonagy, Target, Gergely, Allen, & Bateman, 2003), and are
therefore too indiscriminant to be considered a significant risk factor in development.
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Internal working models and reflective functioning –71
Other moderating factors likely play a large role in differentiating the developmental
pathways of individuals who form insecure IWMs in infancy. Later in the present
paper, I argue that RF may be one such moderating factor.
Disorganized attachment is also not a clinical diagnosis, but mounting evidence
shows that infants with disorganized IWMs are at risk for long-term pathological
outcomes, including affect dysregulation, dissociation, and behavioral problems
(Carlson, 1998; Hesse & Main, 2000; Lyons-Ruth, Alpern, & Repacholi, 1993; Moss,
Cyr, & Dubois-Comtois, 2004; van Ijzendoorn et al., 1999; West & George, 1999).
Children with disorganized IWMs are often the victims of maltreatment (Carlson
et al., 1989), but as discussed above ecological factors cannot solely account for the
rate of disorganization in the general population. As such, disorganized IWMs in
infancy should not simply be considered a marker of a chaotic environment, but
rather an important mediating link in a causal chain. As development proceeds, the
fragmented and inconsistent templates indicative of disorganized IWMs significantly
interferes with important milestones such as learning to self-regulate distress and
forming close interpersonal relationships outside of the home.
2. Reflective Functioning
Reflective functioning (RF) is a collective term for the psychological processes
that allow individuals to “mind-read”, or appreciate the existence and nature of other
people’s mental states, as well as their own (Fonagy & Target, 1997). This apprecia-
tion, which begins in childhood, makes behavior “meaningful and predictable” (p.
679), and facilitates the development of more complex internal representations than
are possible in infancy. The abilities to hold ambiguous or mixed feelings about im-
portant interpersonal relationships, speculate on the motivations of self and others,
and consider intrapsychic and interpersonal changes over time are all examples of the
advanced modes of thinking inherent in the development of RF.
RF is associated with the individual’s capacity to enter an “as-if” mode in which
he can freely consider, accept, or discard aspects of his objective and subjective life,
rather than being bound to consider a given internal or external state as an absolute
reflection of reality (Fonagy & Target, 1996, 2000, 2007; Target & Fonagy, 1996). It
also serves a bridging function between concrete, somatic levels of experience and
more abstract levels of mental representation (Lecours & Bouchard, 1997).
One challenge in reviewing the historical and current literature surrounding RF
is the fact that the construct itself has, at different times and by different authors, been
referred to by several different names. Mentalization (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006), re-
flective-self function (Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Higgitt, 1993), metacogni-
tion (Kuhn, 1999; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994), mind-mindedness (Meins, 1997),
and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) have all been used to de-
scribe some or all of the phenomenon referred to presently as RF. Parsing the litera-
ture for real differences versus attempts at proprietary ownership is often an exercise
in frustration. For the sake of clarity, I will use the term RF even when citing source
material that uses a different term, as long as the two may be interpreted synony-
mously by my best estimation.
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72 –Kriss
2.1 Theoretical development
RF was born out of “the epistemic space” (Steele & Steele, 2008, p. 134) be-
tween psychoanalytic and developmental psychological theory. Its subsequent expan-
sion and operationalization has been equally indebted to empirical research stemming
from those and other branches of academic and clinical psychology.
The basic notion of a set of processes that connects somatic and motoric im-
pulses with mental experience – thus opening the possibly for self-reflection – came
from Freud (1911) and his concept of “linking”. Freud distinguished primary process
and the state of the unconscious mind, in which experience is immediate, instinctual,
and irrational, from secondary process and the preconscious and conscious minds, in
which basic physical drives become connected with thoughts, associations, and other
mental operations in order to generate a more coherent subjective experience that al-
lows the individual to engage with external reality. Though the concept of linking
lower and higher levels of abstraction is central to the whole notion of the develop-
ment of reflectiveness, Freud did not directly write about phenomena resembling RF,
as his early conceptualizing of physical and psychical processes in energic terms
made it difficult to do so (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2004). Once Freud
(1923/1949) introduced the structural model of the mind, however, it became easier
for analysts to theorize about how the mind might think about itself and other minds.
Richard Sterba was one such Freudian analyst who pursued this avenue. In an
influential 1934 paper, Sterba described how, in a successful analysis, the patient’s
ego “splits” into two parts: one part is realistic and self-critical, while the other is
driven by instinctual wishes. Sterba believed that if the analyst could enlist the for-
mer, “observing” ego-part to direct its attention to the latter ego-part, the patient
could gain mutative insight into his condition. Freud echoed these ideas at around the
same time: “The ego can take itself as object; it can treat itself like any other object,
observe itself, criticize itself, do Heaven knows what besides with itself” (Freud,
1933, p. 80, quoted in Sterba, 1934).
Melanie Klein’s contributions to RF theory are most evident in the object relations
theorists her ideas inspired. Expanding on Klein’s (1975) concept of projective identi-
fication, Bion (1970) outlined how the caregiver naturally contains the infant’s experi-
ences and reflects them back in a more processed form, and in so doing teaches the in-
fant how to think about affects and physical sensations that were otherwise nameless
and overwhelming. Winnicott (1971/2005) similarly prized the caregiver’s role in help-
ing the child symbolize interpersonal and intrapsychic experience. He observed that
infants and children required an attuned caregiver to help them navigate the “potential
space” between internal and external realities. This space, often manifested in pretend
play, allowed children to test out various ways of being in a manner that was felt but
not overwhelming. Out of the exploration of potential space emerged the important
developmental abilities to differentiate inner and outer realities, take on multiple per-
spectives, and self-regulate overwhelming experiences – all aspects central to RF.
In the 1990s, Peter Fonagy and his colleagues began synthesizing the psychoan-
alytic literature on self-reflective capacities with contemporary developmental
research (e.g., Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy et al., 1991; Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991;
Fonagy, et al., 1995; Fonagy & Target, 1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996). Developmen-
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Internal working models and reflective functioning –73
tal psychologists had begun earnestly trying to understand when and how children
develop an understanding of other people’s mental states, and through that capacity
become able to make predictions, assumptions, and causal attributions about behav-
ior (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Perner, 1991). Gergely, a researcher who walked in
both the psychoanalytic and cognitive-developmental worlds, proposed a “social
biofeedback” theory of early infant-caregiver interactions’ impact on the future de-
velopment of reflective capacity. Specifically, and following Winnicott’s observa-
tions, he emphasized the way in which a caregiver “mirrored” the affect of the infant
in face-to-face interactions (Gergely & Watson, 1996, 1999).
Fonagy, Steele, and Steele (1991) brought many of the above hypotheses to bear
on analyses of adult narratives, in which discussion of mental states and self-reflec-
tiveness could be measured reliably. This work marked the initial dovetailing of psy-
choanalytic and developmental psychological theories under the banner of RF (Steele
& Steele, 2008). The last two decades have yielded growing theoretical and research
literatures on the nature of RF, its origins, its role in normal, pathological, and inter-
generational development, and its usefulness in clinical work.
2.2 Ontogenetic development
RF emerges over time according to normative developmental milestones and the
particular characteristics and circumstances of the child (Fonagy & Target, 1996).
Though RF is not, for the most part, observable in the first few years of life, early in-
fant-caregiver interactions may facilitate or inhibit the development of RF. Gergely
and Watson’s (1996) concept of “marked” mirroring – in which caregivers subtly in-
dicate to the infant that their own faces are an affective reflection of the infant’s ex-
pressions – is hypothesized to be an antecedent to being able to understand mental
states. It is difficult, however, to differentiate the impact these early interactions have
on RF from the formation of organized versus disorganized IWMs (Beebe, Lach-
mann, Markese, & Bahrick, 2012; Gergely, 2004), and in fact the two constructs may
not be distinguishable in infancy.
After the acquisition of language, charting the development of RF becomes more
straightforward, and it clearly deviates from the trajectory of IWMs. Beginning around
age three years, a normal child can readily distinguish his internal experience from the
outside world, which facilitates his ability to shift knowingly between modes of fan-
tasy and reality, such as in games of pretend. However, the child remains cognitively
egocentric (Piaget, 1957) and does not appreciate that her affective and intellectual
experience differs from those around him; in fact, the idea that others have their own
distinct mental states has not yet occurred to her (Fonagy & Target, 1996).
By age four years, a “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) typically be-
comes evident, wherein the child demonstrates a cognitive appreciation that her per-
spective is distinct from the perspectives of others. From here the child begins to see
that behavior of self and others are guided by mental states, though initially these
states are viewed as concrete and absolute. Around age five, however, the normal
child comes to understand mental states as representations, including the important
appreciation that they “may be fallible and change, because they are based on but one
of a range of possible perspectives” (Fonagy & Target 1996, p. 221). This marks the
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74 –Kriss
beginning of a more nuanced, flexible, and abstracted stance on the behavior and
thoughts of self and others that continues over the course of normal development.
Though RF depends on and interacts with developmental milestones such as lan-
guage acquisition and certain cognitive achievements, it is not a passive skill that
automatically comes online as the child ages. Formation of RF typically requires the
child to experience caregivers reflecting on mental states, most importantly during
times when the child is distressed or otherwise affect-laden (Gergely & Watson,
1996). Pretend play with caregivers is another activity facilitative of the development
of RF. The play itself allows the exploration of different feelings and perspectives in
a safe but responsive environment, while the transitions in and out of play help the
child differentiate internal fantasy worlds from the outside world (Emde, Kubicek,
& Oppenheim, 1997).
Another important feature of the development of RF is its inconsistency (Fon-
agy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). Rather than being a single, uniform skill, RF is
better conceived of as a collection of “dynamic skills” (e.g., Fischer & Farrar, 1987;
Fischer, Kenny, & Pipp, 1990). For instance, an individual may be highly reflective
in discussing his professional relationships but strikingly less so when talking about
family relationships. As the formation of RF is informed by specific interactions and
events happening both interpersonally and intrapsychically, it develops contextually
and unevenly across situations and relationships.
Being composed of a complex group of cognitive, affective, and interpersonal
processes, it is difficult to make a blanket statement concerning the age at which most
children “acquire” RF. As outlined above, the capacity for RF is theorized to begin
around age five – and its building blocks earlier still – but it does not form and
quickly set in the way that IWMs do. The child’s nascent RF interacts dynamically
with developing skills in language, affect regulation, and cognition. RF is therefore
something of a moving target throughout development, which makes it particularly
difficult to measure prior to adulthood.
For this reason – even though it is theoretically assumed to exist much earlier –
RF is most commonly and easily assessed in adulthood, when the process and content
of language can be analyzed.2Fonagy and colleagues (1998) developed a method of
measuring RF using narratives generated by the AAI. The authors highlighted four
broad indicators of high RF in adult interviews: 1) awareness of the nature of mental
states (including their opaqueness), 2) the explicit effort to understand the mental
states underlying behavior (e.g., recognition of diverse perspectives that may inform
otherwise difficult-to-understand behaviors), 3) the recognition of developmental as-
pects of mental states (e.g., envisioning changes in mental states between past and
present or present and future), and 4) a tacit acknowledgment of mental states in the
here-and-now of the interview (e.g., not assuming knowledge on behalf of the inter-
viewer). Conversely, low RF is often represented by a rejection or disavowal of mental
states, or alternatively a view of mental states that is naïve, simplistic, or self-serving.
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Internal working models and reflective functioning –75
2As measuring RF is largely predicated on language, the construct has occasionally been criti-
cized for being biased by or conflated with verbal intelligence. However, comparisons of RF scores
on the AAI with measures of verbal IQ have consistently shown the two constructs to be discrete
(Steele & Steele, 2008).
2.3 RF across cultures
RF stems from Western theoretical positions in psychoanalysis and developmen-
tal psychology, and its empirical validity is based almost exclusively on Western
samples. Virtually no extant research explores the manifestation of RF in other cul-
tures, or indeed if it is even an applicable construct. However, “theory of mind” – a
notable component and antecedent of RF – has been investigated cross-culturally.
Researchers have found that theory of mind developmental trajectories in U.S. chil-
dren parallel Chinese children (Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008), and that the
construct similarly correlates to other aspects of cognitive development across both
cultures (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). These early findings support
the claim of many developmental psychologists that theory of mind is a universal
aspect of normal human development.
Of course, RF and Baron-Cohen’s (1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) concept of
theory of mind are not synonymous. RF involves more complex intrapsychic ope -
rations that not only allow individuals to consider other perspectives and possible
realities, but also engage their reflective capacity toward the purpose of mental and
affective regulation. Is the use of RF as a means to self-regulate pertinent in other
cultures? Cultural psychologists point out that the sense of self in collectivist cultures
differs greatly from individualistic cultures like in the United States. Members of the
former identify not only individually but also by familial associations, and there is
often a sense that each person is less an autonomous entity than part of a larger whole
(Roland, 1989). Processes indicative of RF – such as self-reflection and self-defini-
tion through contrasting the mental states of self and others – may be counterintuitive
or even explicitly discouraged in more traditional cultures (Guisinger & Blatt, 1994).
More research is required before conclusions may be drawn concerning the role of
RF in non-Western cultures.
2.4 Impact on social-emotional development
A dearth of RF in childhood – in which limited distinction is established between
the objective and subjective, and the behaviors of self and others remain unpre-
dictable – has been theorized to relate to poor SED outcomes, especially borderline
pathology (Fonagy, 1991, 1995; Fonagy et al., 2003; Fonagy & Target, 2000). Ac-
cording to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V;
American Psychiatric Association, 2013), Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD)
consists of, among other traits, a pattern of unstable interpersonal relationships; feel-
ings of derealization, unstable identity, and labile affect; impulsivity problems includ-
ing difficulty controlling anger and recurrent suicidal behavior; and transient but se-
vere dissociative symptoms. These attributes are indicative of “a state of mind in
which there is ‘no in-between’” (Ogden, 1986, loc. 843). In an individual with BPD,
internal perceptions of others (e.g., “My boyfriend is a traitor”, “My therapist is the
only one who understands me”) are regarded as absolute truths rather than being
viewed as contextually derived and part of a diverse range of attitudes. Similarly, the
individual has no intrapsychic space in which to hypothesize about the mental states
of others: as all thoughts and feelings are treated as concrete objects, there is no room
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76 –Kriss
to consider that any given perspective, including one’s own, is only one of many
possibilities (Fonagy & Target, 2000). The connection between low RF and BPD has
received modest empirical validation to date (Fischer-Kern et al., 2010).
Beyond being negatively correlated with borderline traits in adults, Fonagy
(2000) argues that RF plays a significant part in the disorder’s etiology. Specifically,
he suggests that some individuals who were victims of abuse in childhood – a factor
that is highly related with the later development of BPD (Zanarini, Gunderson,
Marino, Schwartz, & Frankenburg, 1989) – “defensively inhibit their capacity” for
RF, and that “some characteristics of personality disorder may be rooted in develop-
mental pathology associated with this inhibition” (Fonagy, 2000, p. 1132).
Outside of BPD, there is less research on links between RF and psychopathol-
ogy. A study by Rothschild-Yakar and colleagues showed that a sample of adolescent
and adult eating-disordered psychiatric inpatients presented with lower RF and
poorer quality of relationship with their parents than non-eating-disordered controls
(Rothschild-Yakar, Levy-Shiff, Fridman-Balaban, Gur, & Stein, 2010). This mirrored
an earlier study by Ward and colleagues, who found low RF in anorexia nervosa pa-
tients as compared to a healthy control group (Ward et al., 2001). Ostler, Bahar, and
Jessee (2010) demonstrated that children exposed to parental methamphetamine
abuse reported fewer mental health problems and were rated by foster parents as
more socially competent when they scored higher on a measure of RF. However, as
data from these studies were collected concurrently and involving clinical samples, a
chronological relationship cannot be inferred in terms of how low or high RF im -
perils or protects development over time.
While a lack of RF implies problematic outcomes, high RF may stand as a sig-
nificant protective factor. The perspective-taking inherent in RF is associated with the
ability to regulate affect during times of distress (Fonagy et al., 2004), and therefore
RF may be an essential coping mechanism throughout the challenges of childhood
and adulthood. The validity of this idea is most powerfully evidenced by the increas-
ing interest in improving RF as a means of treating psychiatric disorders in adults. In
addition to being theoretically tied to the etiology of BPD and related disorders, the
increased clinical interest in RF may also be attributable to the fact that, because RF
develops over a longer period of time than IWMs, it may also be more malleable.
Multiple psychotherapy treatments now expressly aim to improve the patient’s RF.
These modalities have demonstrated effectiveness in treating various conditions, in-
cluding depression (Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kächele, & Staun, 2011), PTSD
and other trauma-related disorders (Schottenbauer, Glass, Arnkoff, & Gray, 2008;
Seligman, 2007), and BPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2009).
3. The Lines converge
Mary Main and her colleagues were the first to document the links between a
mother’s attachment as reflected in the AAI with the quality of her child’s attachment
to her at 12 months (Main et al., 1985). Many researchers went on to validate this
link (see reviews by Carlson & Sroufe, 1995; Main, 1995; van Ijzendoorn, 1995),
supporting a theory of intergenerational transmission of attachment. But though at-
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Internal working models and reflective functioning –77
tachment patterns were repeatedly shown to pass from caregiver to child, the under-
lying mechanisms of the transmission remained unclear – a problem van Ijzendoorn
(1995) dubbed the “transmission gap”.
As investigators turned their attention to understanding how attachment is trans-
mitted from parent to child, they identified RF as one of the central mediating factors.
To date, the literature concerning the relationship between RF and IWMs centers
around the idea that RF in large part “fills in” the transmission gap, i.e., that caregiver
RF determines the formation of infant IWMs. The assumption is that secure IWMs
are borne out of the caregiver’s sensitivity and understanding of the child, a psycho-
logical attunement that demands RF (Steele & Steele, 2008). In turn, secure IWMs
are thought to promote healthy development of RF in the child (Fonagy, 2000),
though its longer developmental line implies that people and experiences beyond the
early caregiver-infant environment may critically aid or impede its progress, includ-
ing caregiver interactions into early adolescence (Steele, Steele, & Johansson, 2002).
In outlining their ideas for the etiological roots of BPD, Fonagy and colleagues
(2003) argue that “the failure of a secure base” (p. 412) inhibits the development of
RF, which can contribute to the development of characteristic borderline traits (see
previous section). Empirical investigations have yielded robust findings in support of
RF’s role in the intergenerational transmission of attachment (Fonagy et al., 1991,
1993, 1995; Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005).
While the literature shows that RF in the caregiver is strongly connected with
IWMs in the child, little research exists concerning how RF and IWMs interact and
impact development within the individual child. Both Fonagy and Main have theo -
retically proposed RF as a protective factor for children from abusive or deprived
backgrounds who would otherwise be expected to develop disorganized IWMs in the
first year of life (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgitt, & Target, 1994;
Fonagy & Target, 1998; Main, 1991). In other words, RF may moderate the impact
of IWMs on SED, including the development of psychopathology, particularly in
children predisposed to poorer outcomes due to problematic IWMs.
3.1 Toward a moderating model
Imagine that you have arrived at a museum in order to view an Ancient Grecian
statue. Your experience, including your thoughts, emotions, and physiological reac-
tions, would be dictated by two factors: the nature and quality of the artwork itself, and
the space within which it is presented. The statue may be beautiful or frightening, stur-
dy or fragile, well-preserved or in a state of disrepair. These are immutable properties
that cannot be easily changed, but your reaction to the piece will also be informed by
how it is presented. The size and layout of the gallery determines whether or not you
may move around the statue to see it from all angles, appraise it from afar or up close,
or even gain enough distance to see multiple statues at once and compare them.
Such is the IWM-RF dialectic. Each child represents an intersection of develop-
mental lines that includes automatic, unconscious templates (IWMs) and the internal
space in which those templates exist (RF). A child with low RF has little room to
move around, but the extent to which this impacts SED ought to depend on the qual-
ity of that child’s IWMs. Confinement to a small gallery may not be disadvantageous
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78 –Kriss
if the statue therein is well-made and intact. On the other hand, a child with low RF
and disorganized IWMs would be trapped in a tight space populated with a terrifying
and broken object, making for an overwhelming and inflexible subjective experience.
The child with insecure or disorganized IWMs but high RF would have the
space to consider his problematic models from all sides, compare and contrast them,
and choose how near or far to “stand” from them. This reflective reconfiguration
of firmly-rooted internalizations may significantly influence the trajectory of the
child’s SED.
As IWMs are pre-symbolic and preverbal, they are expressed automatically and
difficult to modify. RF provides a means through which IWMs may be brought to
conscious awareness, reevaluated, and potentially changed. Children who would
otherwise be bound to chaotic and threatening internalizations may use RF in order
to gain a psychic distance from them – they would be able to reshape their largely
unconscious IWMs through the more conscious, linguistically-based mechanisms of
RF. Conversely, children with disorganized IWMs who also fail to develop adequate
RF would be unable to take a new perspective on their early experiences as they
mature. As a result, their internal worlds would continue to be defined by fractured
models of self and others operating outside of awareness, and they would be at par-
ticular risk for psychopathology or other undesirable SED outcomes. This constella-
tion of disorganized IWMs and lack of RF is consistent with Fonagy and colleagues’
views on the origins of BPD (Fonagy, 2000; Fonagy et al., 2003).
Children who form less problematic IWMs may similarly be less dependent on
RF to mitigate their developmental trajectories. Though children with secure IWMs
would be theoretically likely to develop high RF, they may not “need” it in the way
that children with insecure and disorganized IWMs would. Fonagy and colleagues
(1993) found this to be the case in a study of adult mothers responding to the AAI,
in which RF only differentiated secure from insecure attachments in those from
deprived backgrounds. Therefore, RF would not be expected to significantly impact
SED outcomes in children with secure IWMs.
The above predictions ultimately yield a moderating model of the impact of the
intersecting developmental lines of IWMs and RF on SED. Specifically, decreased
RF would hypothetically strengthen the relationship between IWMs and SED. With-
out the ability to reevaluate or step outside early-established IWMs, those models
would have relatively unfettered influence on development. Conversely, increased
RF would be expected to weaken the relationship between IWMs and SED, as the ac-
quisition of RF would provide new perspectives on IWMs, and thereby broaden po-
tential pathways toward healthy SED. This model is ripe for empirical investigation
– exploring its validity would help to fill in a major gap in our understanding of how
IWMs and RF interact during development. Furthermore, revealing RF as a signi -
ficant moderator in SED would hold broad implications for the value of RF-based
interventions for children and adolescents at risk for problematic outcomes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to acknowledge Howard Steele and Miriam Steele for their invaluable
guidance and support.
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Internal working models and reflective functioning –79
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Received July 2014
Final version received October 2014
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*Interfaith Medical Center, New York, USA.
Indirizzare le richieste a:
Alexander Kriss, Interfaith Medical Center, 1545 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11213, USA.
alexkriss@gmail.com
Un abisso di incertezza:
Linee di sviluppo dei modelli operativi interni e della funzione riflessiva
Alexander Kriss*
La capacità di un bambino di affrontare, durante lo sviluppo, le sfide affettive, cognitive
e interpersonali è determinata in larga parte da una dialettica continua tra esperienze obiettive
e soggettive. Il primo ambiente forma la realtà psichica, la quale influenza il comportamento
nel mondo reale, che a sua volta contribuisce ad avere esperienze che rinforzano o contrad-
dicono le aspettative. I meccanismi sottostanti questo processo sono complessi e coinvolgono
varie strutture intrapsichiche e interpersonali con linee di sviluppo distinte, le quali, in altri
termini, emergono e si solidificano secondo gradi differenti e secondo tempi diversi. La teo-
ria dell’attaccamento offre delle lenti particolarmente efficaci attraverso le quali si può com-
prendere in che modo i bambini interiorizzino e riflettano sulle loro interazioni con gli altri,
in particolar modo con le figure di accudimento primarie, così da formare dei modelli interni
del mondo esterno, usare questi modelli per prevedere i comportamenti futuri e sviluppare
strategie per affrontare potenziali realtà.
In questo lavoro sono stati individuati due costrutti collegati all’attaccamento come cen-
trali in questo processo dinamico, i modelli operativi interni (IWM) e la funzione riflessiva
(RF), i quali vengono passati in rassegna lungo dimensioni multiple. Prima viene esplorata
l’origine teorica e lo sviluppo degli IWM e della RF, rintracciando un punto di partenza co-
mune nella teoria psicoanalitica per poi considerare il successivo processo di incorporazione
di idee provenienti dalle scienze dello sviluppo e da quelle evoluzionistiche. Viene inoltre
presa in considerazione la validità cross culturale degli IWM e della RF. In seguito questi co-
strutti sono esaminati da un punto di vista ontogenetico, considerando nel dettaglio come cia-
scun processo emerga e si solidifichi nel corso dello sviluppo individuale, dalla nascita in
poi. Come terzo punto è esaminata la letteratura che lega gli IWM e la RF allo sviluppo so-
cio-emotivo (SED). I due apparati teorici ed empirici sono infine messi insieme dalla consi-
derazione del come le linee di sviluppo degli IWM e della RF si influenzano l’un l’altra e si
intrecciano. Ma mentre molte ricerche hanno dimostrato il legame intergenerazionale tra RF
dei genitori e IWM dei figli, la letteratura sull’argomento fornisce poche conoscenze su come
i due costrutti interagiscano all’interno dell’individuo durante il suo sviluppo.
Questa rassegna offre un modello teorico per spiegare come le linee di sviluppo degli
IWM e della RF potrebbero intersecarsi e predire lo sviluppo futuro. In particolare ci si
aspetta che una RF alta indebolisca la relazione tra IWM e SED e viceversa. Questa ipotesi
si basa sulle ricerche esistenti le quali mostrano come la RF abbia il potere di far sì che gli
adulti revisionino i loro IWM. Questo modello vuol essere un primo passo verso ricerche fu-
ture che potranno spiegare meglio il ruolo differenziale degli IWM e della RF nello sviluppo
sociale ed emotivo.
LONG ABSTRACT
