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Are authoritative international organizations challenged more? A recurrent event analysis of member state criticisms and withdrawals

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Member states’ challenges to international organizations (IOs) are at the heart of the supposed crisis of our multilateral order – from the “African bias” debate surrounding the International Criminal Court, to the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” from the European Union, to Trump’s attacks on the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic. IOs are regularly challenged by their member states in different ways, ranging from verbal criticisms to withdrawals. But why are some IOs challenged more than others? An important – but so far largely theoretical – academic debate relates to the authority of IOs as an explanatory factor for why some face more challenges: Authoritative IOs may invite more challenges (for example, due to domestic contestation) or fewer challenges (due, in part, to the investment of member states and their greater capacity to resolve conflicts internally). Our article assesses these explanations using the Andersen-Gill approach for analyzing recurrent events of member states’ public criticisms and withdrawals. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that more authoritative IOs are more regularly challenged by their own member states. There is some evidence that authoritative IOs experience fewer withdrawals, but we find stronger evidence for alternative factors such as preference heterogeneity between members, the existence of alternative IOs, and the democratic composition of an IO’s membership. Our study is significant for scholarly debates and real-world politics, as it implies that granting IOs more authority does not make them more prone to member state challenges.
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The Review of International Organizations
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09557-0
1 3
Are authoritative international organizations challenged
more? Arecurrent event analysis ofmember state criticisms
andwithdrawals
HylkeDijkstra1 · FarsanGhassim1,2
Accepted: 7 June 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Abstract
Member states’ challenges to international organizations (IOs) are at the heart of the
supposed crisis of our multilateral order – from the “African bias” debate surround-
ing the International Criminal Court, to the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” from the
European Union, to Trump’s attacks on the World Health Organization during the
COVID-19 pandemic. IOs are regularly challenged by their member states in dif-
ferent ways, ranging from verbal criticisms to withdrawals. But why are some IOs
challenged more than others? An important – but so far largely theoretical– aca-
demic debate relates to the authority of IOs as an explanatory factor for why some
face more challenges: Authoritative IOs may invite more challenges (for example,
due to domestic contestation) or fewer challenges (due, in part, to the investment of
member states and their greater capacity to resolve conflicts internally). Our article
assesses these explanations using the Andersen-Gill approach for analyzing recur-
rent events of member states’ public criticisms and withdrawals. We do not find
strong and consistent evidence that more authoritative IOs are more regularly chal-
lenged by their own member states. There is some evidence that authoritative IOs
experience fewer withdrawals, but we find stronger evidence for alternative factors
such as preference heterogeneity between members, the existence of alternative IOs,
and the democratic composition of an IO’s membership. Our study is significant
for scholarly debates and real-world politics, as it implies that granting IOs more
authority does not make them more prone to member state challenges.
Keywords International order· Multilateralism· Global governance· Authority·
Legitimacy· Repeated events· Quantitative
Responsible editor:Axel Dreher
Author contributions to research design and conceptualization: HD 60%, FG40%;
statistical analyses: HD 20%, FG 80%; writing: HD 50%, FG 50%. The order of authors is
chosenalphabetically.
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
1 Introduction
International organizations (IOs) are regularly challenged by their own member
states. Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), cut funding from the World
Health Organization (WHO), and blocked the appointment of judges to the Appel-
late Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has demanded more rep-
resentation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, set up the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and challenged the United Nations
(UN) human rights institutions. The United Kingdom (UK) has left the European
Union (EU), Japan the International Whaling Commission, and Burundi the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC). Such challenges by member states have become a
regular feature in the lifecycle of IOs.
Member state challenges to IOs, and the crisis of liberal international order more
generally, have attracted considerable academic attention (Ikenberry, 2018; Lake
et al., 2021). Much of this literature takes states and the domestic politics within
them as the main unit of analysis, since the causes of such challenges are presumed
to be found at the state-level. Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) explain states’
withdrawal from IOs in terms of geopolitics and democracy, qualified by Choi
(2022) who finds that nationalism is an important driver of withdrawals. Relatedly,
De Vries etal. (2021) analyze how political entrepreneurs within states politicize
international cooperation, building on Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 5) who note
that public opinion and political parties constitute a “constraining dissensus” for
IOs (cf. Dellmuth et al., 2022b). Similarly, Voeten (2020) argues that backlashes
against international courts are often initiated by governments relying on the sup-
port of populist movements. While advancing the literature in important ways, such
analyses tend to treat IOs as black boxes, despite significant variation between them.
Several empirical studies show that some IOs are regularly challenged by their
members while others are not. Sommerer et al. (2022, p. 73) show, for instance,
that IO legitimacy crises driven by state actors’ discontent occurred in about half of
their sample of IOs. They find a considerable amount of state criticism of the UN,
EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American
States (OAS), as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE). At the same time, the WHO, International Labour Organization (ILO),
and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are less frequently criticized
(see our Appendix 1b).1 There is similar variation between IOs with regard to state
withdrawals – another type of challenge by member states. The UK’s withdrawal
from the EU – a first for this IO – has received much public and scholarly attention
(Koller etal., 2019). The World Tourism Organization and the International Whal-
ing Commission, on the other hand, are the two IOs that have experienced most exits
by states since 1945 (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019, p. 343). Conversely, no
state has ever withdrawn from the Benelux, UN, or WTO. Such variation in state
1 Our online appendix is available on the website of The Review of International Organizations.
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
challenges at the level of IOs raises the question why some IOs are more frequently
challenged by their own member states than others.
To answer this research question, many scholars suggest considering the insti-
tutional design and features of IOs themselves. In this context, academics have
theorized that the current crisis of the liberal international order is rooted in the
increasing delegation of authority to IOs since the 1990s (Hooghe & Marks, 2009;
Kreuder-Sonnen & Rittberger, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2019; Zürn, 2018). They argue
that, like all institutions with authority, IOs have been challenged more as their power
increased. Based on this line of argumentation, we should therefore expect that IOs
with more authority are more prone to member state challenges (see Hypothesis 1
below). While this authority-contestation logic has almost become conventional
wisdom in the study of IOs, other scholars suggest that authority makes IOs less
subject to and more robust to challenges. The liberal-institutionalist perspective, for
instance, holds that authority results from investments of members in the IO and
thus implies a higher degree of buy-in (Keohane, 1984; Wallander, 2000), which
should reduce member state challenges (see Hypothesis 2 below). Furthermore, IOs
with more authority are more able to adjust to a changing environment and relegiti-
mate their rule, as well as prevent and resist external pressures (Chorev, 2012; Debre
& Dijkstra, 2021; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018a; Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016; Hirschmann,
2021; Lenz & Söderbaum, 2023).
Building on this theoretical debate, our study provides an innovative empirical
test of the different logics by analyzing which IOs most experience public criti-
cism and withdrawalsby their memberstates. While members may, of course, con-
test IOs in many other ways, public criticism and withdrawals are two important
yet distinct types of contestation to help us understand why some IOs are more
challenged than others. For our dependent variables of member state criticism and
withdrawal, we rely on the data of Sommerer and colleagues (Sommerer, 2022;
Sommerer etal., 2022) as well as Pevehouse etal. (2020) respectively. In terms of
independent variables, we consider different conceptions of IO authority and use
recent data from Debre and Dijkstra (2021), Hooghe etal. 2017, 2019a, 2021), as
well as Zürn etal. (2021). Because IOs may experience criticism by member states
and withdrawals at multiple points in their lifecycle, we employ Andersen and
Gill’s (1982) method to assess the explanatory power of authority and other vari-
ables for the likelihood of these different kinds of recurrent member-state-based
challenges to IOs.
We find no strong and consistent evidence for Hypothesis 1 of a positive associa-
tion between IO authority and member states’ challenges. Moreover, there is only
mixed and weak evidence for Hypothesis 2 of a negative relationship between IO
authority and member state withdrawals. These are surprising findings, challeng-
ing much recent domestic politics and International Relations (IR) research which
attributes the supposed crisis of IOs to their increased authority. Overall, the author-
ity of IOs does not seem to explain why some IOs are challenged significantly more
frequently than others by their member states. Going against the grain, our article
shows that there are better explanations for member state challenges. We find that
preference heterogeneity within the membership is associated with more criticism
and withdrawals. We also find that the presence of competing IOs is associated with
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
less member state criticism. Finally, while IOs with a more democratic member-
ship tend to face fewer withdrawals, greater power divides are associated with more
withdrawals.
Our article makes three contributions: Theoretically, we advance the vibrant
debate on the contestation of IOs through our innovative focus on IO-level drivers
of member-state-based challenges. We concentrate on one of the most salient theo-
rized factors – IO authority – and deduce two contrasting hypotheses in this respect
to study IO-level variation. Methodologically, our application of recurrent event
analysis – a well-developed, but under-utilized approach – demonstrates the useful-
ness of this method for many pertinent questions in Political Science. Empirically,
our results demonstrate that a widespread assumption about a positive association
between IO authority and contestation needs qualification. We show that IOs with
greater authority are not significantly more (and in some ways perhaps even less)
challenged by member states through public criticisms or withdrawals. This bears
crucial lessons for policymakers faced with immense transnational challenges: Giv-
ing IOs more authority generallydoes not expose them to more challenges by mem-
ber states.
Next, we outline different theories on how IO authority may relate to public cri-
tique and withdrawals by member states. We then present our research design, intro-
ducing the different variables, the Andersen-Gill method, as well as our data setup.
Following that, we show and discuss the results of our empirical analyses. In our
concluding section, we reflect on our study’s implications for research on IOs and
international policymaking.
2 Concepts andtheory
Challenges to international cooperation, norms, and IOs by states and other actors
come in different forms (e.g. Börzel & Zürn, 2021; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann,
2020; Hurd, 2019; Wiener, 2018). In this article, we limit ourselves to member
states’ challenges to IOs that are publicly observable. We focus on member states
because they are the core stakeholders, as per the standard definitions of IOs (e.g.
Pevehouse etal., 2020), and since their challenges may put IOs under serious pres-
sure. We focus on publicly observable challenges by member states rather than, for
instance, insider lobbying, diplomatic strategies, internal dissent, or sabotage. Such
challenges, where states go public and challenge their own IOs, take place outside
of regular diplomatic dialogue within IOs (but see Stimmer & Wisken, 2019). There
are many publicly observable member state challenges, including public criticism,
the reduction of (voluntary) funding, strategic non-participation, non-compliance
with rules or decisions, and withdrawal. While acknowledging that states may chal-
lenge IOs in many other ways, we focus on two distinct and important types of chal-
lenges: public criticism and withdrawal. Concentrating on these two phenomena
allows us to obtain better insights into why some institutions are more frequently
challenged by their own member states than other IOs.
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
Before delving further into our theory on these challenges, let us acknowledge
that neither action is necessarily negative for IOs. Constructive criticism by member
states can increase public attention. It can also create windows of opportunity for IO
bureaucracies, for instance, to rally support for reforms which may lead to less con-
testation in the long run. Similarly, member state withdrawals can have positive long-
term effects on IOs as well. For instance, if a member state that frequently clashes
with other members decides to withdraw from the IO, that action may improve the
institutions’ ability to act and thus ultimately strengthen it. Withdrawals or the threat
of withdrawals may also result in overdue IO reform (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas,
2023). Nevertheless, both public criticisms and withdrawals are – on the face of it
– challenges to IOs and also treated as such by the media and IOs doing their part to
defend themselves. Public criticism by member states may reduce the legitimacy of
IOs and harden negotiation positions, thus making it more difficult for IOs to perform
productive functions. State withdrawals can undermine the IO mandate, when the IO
requires universal buy-in (for example, for issues such as climate action or arms con-
trol), result in a withdrawal cascade, and/or leave IOs with fewer resources. The rest
of our study thus treats these two types of actions as challenges to IOs.
When dissatisfied with the status quo, member states may use an escalation lad-
der in which they voice their discontent internally, then publicly criticize the IO, and
eventually withdraw from the organization altogether. Public criticism by member
states is, in this respect, normally seen as a lesser challenge to IOs than withdrawal.
Yet, public criticism is not necessarily a precursor to withdrawal. In his standard
work, Hirschman (1970) argues that “voice” and “exit” are different types of strat-
egies for dissatisfied actors. There is a complex interaction between both: More
opportunities for voice may, for instance, reduce risks of exit. Clearly, this is also
relevant for IOs. While the same factors may often be presumed to drive public criti-
cisms and withdrawals, this is not necessarily so. Indeed, the same factors can have
different effects on criticisms and withdrawals. To provide an illustration, states may
feel compelled to publicly criticize an IO but refrain from withdrawal as they may
be dependent on that IO. For instance, the Greek government during the Euro cri-
sis may not have liked IMF conditionality, and publicly said so, but still took IMF
loans (Featherstone, 2016). Therefore, in this article, we do not link both challenges
a priori, or assume that they can be explained by the same variables; instead, we
study them separately.
To identify possible explanations for member state challenges, we focus on IOs’
level of authority as one of the central characteristics and main factors in the lit-
erature. We define authority as the power and capacity of IOs to take and enforce
decisions that are binding for their members. Authority of IOs normally includes
the delegation of tasks by states to IO agents and the pooling of decision-making in
collective IO bodies (Hooghe & Marks, 2015). IOs with authority have substantial
administrative capacity, such as staff and budgetary resources, to carry out their
functions. Over past decades, IOs have gained more and more authority (Hooghe
etal., 2017, 2019a; Zürn, 2018; Zürn etal., 2021).
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
2.1 Hypothesis 1: Positive association betweenIO authority andmember state
challenges
The link between IO authority and member state contestation is especially promi-
nent in the scholarship of Zürn, who argues that, due to the global governance
system that emerged in the 1990s, “world politics is now embedded in a norma-
tive and institutional structure that contains hierarchies and power inequalities and
thus endogenously produces contestation, resistance, and distributional struggles”
(Zürn, 2018, p. 3, emphasis in the original). The assumed link between IO author-
ity and state contestation is also heavily informed by and promoted in the work of
EU scholars (De Vries etal., 2021; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Zürn, 2018). Similar to
Zürn, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that politicization in Europe started when the
1993 Maastricht Treaty significantly increased the EU’s authority (see also Hooghe
etal., 2019a, pp. 89–90). Even prominent Realist scholars such as Mearsheimer note
that “problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial
decision-making authority to international institutions” (Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 7).
For him, democracy promotion and “hyperglobalization” pursued by international
institutions have undermined sovereignty, ultimately resulting in Brexit and Trump’s
election (Mearsheimer, 2019, pp. 34–43). Not unlike Zürn, he states that “[t]he
intensity of this problem will depend on how much power and influence the relevant
institutions wield over their member states” (Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 35).
There are many examples of member state contestation of IOs. Major powers
have prominently objected to IOs affecting their sovereignty. Russia has long chal-
lenged the liberal dimension of the OSCE, which includes human rights and election
monitoring (Kropatcheva, 2015; Schuette & Dijkstra, 2023). The United States has
challenged the powers of the WTO and particularly its Appellate Body (Hopewell,
2021; Pollack, 2023; Shaffer etal., 2016; Zaccaria, 2022). Moreover, various mem-
ber states have challenged the authority of international courts (Alter et al., 2016;
Madsen etal., 2018; Voeten, 2020).
The variation and overall rise in IO authority over time are thus important as they
are often argued to be the main endogenous cause for member states’ challenges.
If IOs have authority, they may get individual states to do things they would not do
otherwise (cf. Dahl, 1957). As a result, the argument goes, states will likely resist
and challenge IOs that push them in such a direction. Conversely, if an IO is power-
less because its decisions are non-binding, the argument goes, states may not care
what that particular IO wants them to do; and may also not care enough to challenge
it. In other words, IO authority may invite challenges, while low-authority IOs are
challenged less.
Scholars suggest that increased IO authority does not just bind member states
and push them around, but that its intrusiveness triggers domestic political back-
lash against IOs. To legitimate their “right to rule,” IOs often disguise their policies
in technical language (Louis & Maertens, 2021; Steffek, 2021; Zürn, 2018) which
results in a “democracy gap” (Goddard etal., 2024; Kreuder-Sonnen & Rittberger,
2022). IO policies may also have distributive consequences producing “losers” of
globalization (Broz etal., 2021; Rodrik, 2021; Walter, 2021). IO authority does not
automatically trigger contestation, but domestic political entrepreneurs including
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
populist parties may take advantage of such a democracy gap and the adverse impact
on parts of society (De Vries etal., 2021). Even if such populist parties are not rep-
resented in government, they may affect the positions of more established parties
through domestic politicization strategies. Ultimately, governments may feel com-
pelled to act on these domestic pressures, triggering member state challenges of
IOs (Voeten, 2020). This leads to our first hypothesis that more authoritative IOs
face more challenges by member states in the form of criticisms and/or withdrawals
(Hypothesis 1).
Various facets of IO authority may relate differently tocriticisms and withdraw-
als. In IOs with more pooling (for example, when majority voting is the rule in an
IO), there will be member states that find themselves more frequently outvoted than
in IOs where decisions are made by consensus (Daßler & Heinkelmann-Wild, 2022).
Given that majority voting leaves less space for internally voicing dissent, member
states may challenge IOs through other means when they are repeatedly outvoted
and less able to protect their domestic political interests. The delegation of author-
ity implies, by definition, that decisions are taken or implemented elsewhere, leav-
ing states with fewer opportunities to influence decisions that they are subject to.
Thus, in IOs with more delegation (for instance, when the IO secretariat has strong
agenda-setting powers or an IO court has adjudication powers), some states will
more frequently be confronted with policies that are at odds with their preferences,
or face the risk of overruling by adjudication bodies in case of disputes. Moreover,
if IOs have significant administrative capacity, they may pursue their own interests
at the expense of some member states. In other words, in IOs with high levels of
authority, we may more frequently expect to see member states that are dissatisfied
with IO policies, which would likely lead to more challenges by such states. As this
discussion shows, manifold aspects of IO authority may have different associations
with member state challenges. Yet, not least for conceptual parsimony and empirical
robustness, we treat IO authority as a continuous and uniform variable, much like
the existing literature.
Although scholars often implicitly assume that IO authority endogenously leads
to different types of challenges by member states and thereby problems for IOs,
Zürn (2018) and others focus mostly on politicization and public criticism rather
than withdrawal. While it is relatively easy for member state representatives to pub-
licly criticize an IO after being outvoted during a meeting or subjected to stringent
conditionality, withdrawing from the IO is much more consequential. As noted
above, an escalation ladder is not automatic. Voice and exit can be different types of
strategies subject to different cost–benefit calculations (Hirschman, 1970). Moreo-
ver, IOs may be responsive to public criticism – or even withdrawal threats – from
member states, and take action to avoid exit (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2023).
We will therefore test Hypothesis 1 for both public criticism and withdrawal, as the
literature suggests it is relevant for both types of member states challenges, but may
expect a stronger positive association between IO authority and public criticism by
member states.
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
2.2 Hypothesis 2: Negative association betweenIO authority andmember state
challenges
While IO authority is widely seen as the endogenous cause in the recent politiciza-
tion and contestation literature, and increasingly considered conventional wisdom,
it is – at least implicitly – at odds with a long-standing liberal-institutionalist argu-
ment in IO research. Although liberal-institutionalist scholars have not presented us
with a similarly clear logic of IO contestation, we can deduce that IOs are authorita-
tive because member states have invested in them through complex negotiations and
often tiresome ratification procedures (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Koremenos etal.,
2001). As a consequence, states may be less likely to challenge such IOs, as they put
so much effort into creating them, express their buy-in, and might well benefit from
increasing returns, positive feedback, as well as lower transaction costs (Pierson,
2000; Wallander, 2000). Challenging an authoritative IO might also be futile for
individual member states. They have to spend a lot of political capital and would
probably not get a better deal. In this vein, Ikenberry notes that IOs and the Ameri-
can-led international order are “easy to join” and “hard to overturn” (2018, p. 25). In
sum, the alternative argument is that stronger IOs face fewer challenges by member
states in the form of criticisms and/or withdrawals (Hypothesis 2).
Apart from the arguments around member states investment and buy-in, as well
as the futility of confronting authoritative IOs, there are two complementary logics
why authoritative IOs may be challenged less by their member states. Once again,
different aspects of IO authority may relate in diverse ways to criticisms and with-
drawals. First, authoritative IOs with high levels of pooling and delegation may be
more capable of absorbing and mitigating member states’ demands and concerns
through regular diplomatic channels. After all, on some accounts, the very point of
IOs is that they reduce the transaction costs – or friction – between states (Abbott &
Snidal, 1998; Keohane, 1984). If the political system of IOs can absorb divergent
inputs, there is a lower chance of “gridlock” (Hale etal., 2013) and no need for
member states to publicly contest IOs, let alone withdraw. Scholars have found that
authoritative IOs tend to perform better (Lall, 2017; Sommerer etal., 2022), which
is important as almost half of member states threatening withdrawal cite dissatisfac-
tion with IO performance (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2023, Fig.4).
Second, authoritative IOs may also be politically responsive and able to preemp-
tively adapt to external pressures. Scholars have shown how IOs are contracted
“around uncertainty” (Koremenos, 2005) and may include flexibility and escape
clauses to absorb exogeneous shocks (Koremenos etal., 2001; Rosendorff & Mil-
ner, 2001; Thompson, 2010). Some IOs have sufficient administrative capacity
and a qualified staff to act as honest brokers between dissatisfied member states
(Beach, 2004; Daßler & Heinkelmann-Wild, 2022; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018a; Gronau
& Schmidtke, 2016; Hirschmann, 2021; Lenz & Söderbaum, 2023). Indeed, these
studies point at the considerable agency of IOs to prevent and respond to state chal-
lenges, among others, through the relegitimation of their rule. On the other hand,
IOs with little authority may be rigid, easily captured by minority concerns, and
relatively inefficient, attracting more member-state-based challenges overall.
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
Several examples help to illustrate Hypothesis 2. In the EU context, Pierson
(1996, p. 47) stated that “[w]hile the governments of ‘sovereign’ member-states
remain free to tear up [the EU] treaties and walk away at any time, the constantly
increasing costs of exit in the densely integrated European polity have rendered
this option virtually unthinkable.” Two decades later, the UK’s exit from the EU
arguably served as a case in point of a withdrawal that resulted in high costs and
low benefits for the challenging state. The UN Secretary-General’s “good offices”
are an example of IO powers that can help deescalate conflicts between member
states (Goodrich, 1974; Ravndal, 2020), while the NATO Secretary-General Stolten-
berg was instrumental in managing relations with a hostile US President Trump
(Schuette, 2021). Various authoritative IOs have been able to adapt to a changing
international environment, including the World Bank which has reinvented itself
several times over the decades (Bridgeman, 2000).
Hypothesis 2 therefore builds on liberal-institutionalist IO theory, focusing on
cooperation logics (Abbott & Snidal, 1998). This theoretical approach is thus closer
to questions of membership and withdrawal than contestation. More authoritative
IOs may well be more frequently criticized by member states, but also better at
avoiding further escalation such as state withdrawal. Indeed, IOs with quality staff
and substantial resources are more vital and survive longer (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021;
Dijkstra & Debre, 2022; Gray, 2018). Perhaps as a result of public pressure by mem-
ber states, IOs may strategically deal with challenges, engage in self-legitimation
behavior including dedicated public relations offices (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018b), or
reform themselves (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2023). We thus test Hypothesis
2 for both public criticism and withdrawal, but may expect a stronger negative asso-
ciation between IO authority and withdrawal by member states.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 provide alternative logics, but they are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. Authoritative IOs may well be more likely to face more criticisms
but not more withdrawals, and vice-versa. Moreover, different kinds of authority
may have divergent effects on criticisms and withdrawals. Our hypotheses are thus
intended to provide broad expectations on how IO authority relates to member states
challenges, but require empirical testing with regard to specific types of challenges
and facets of IO authority.
2.3 Alternative explanations
In addition to the authority of IOs, we consider several alternative explanations.
In the international context, much of IR theory has placed the causes of state-
based contestation outside IOs themselves (see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2021 for a
review). Hegemonic stability and power transition theories, for instance, point out
that cooperation is most stable when there is a (regional) hegemon (Gilpin, 1981;
Mearsheimer, 2019, pp. 44–48). We may therefore expect that member-state-based
challenges are less likely in IOs where there is a strong asymmetric distribution of
capabilities among members. Similarly, since IOs are products and drivers of inter-
national cooperation, we may expect that diverging preferences between member
states could lead to challenges. Indeed, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) find
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
that if states are outliers in IOs, they are more likely to withdraw. Finally, we con-
sider the presence of competing IOs which may give states more credible outside
alternatives. This may reduce the need to publicly criticize and increase opportuni-
ties to withdraw as governance can be supplied through other IOs (Abbott et al.,
2016; Morse & Keohane, 2014; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2015).
We also consider a set of challenges arising from domestic politics. We may
expect that economic crises lead to more challenges. Declining GDP can put pres-
sure on public spending, including expenditure on IOs, potentially resulting in mem-
ber states’ withdrawal. Furthermore, IOs can serve as scapegoats in times of eco-
nomic crisis and therefore attract criticism. At the same time, Haftel etal. (2020)
find that IOs may benefit from economic crises (if only in the medium-term). Finally,
we examine possible associations between the average democracy level of members
and their challenges to IOs. This is based on the finding of von Borzyskowski and
Vabulas (2019) that states are less likely to withdraw from IOs composed of demo-
cratic members. At the same time, IOs with a more democratic membership may
face more public contestation resulting from their members’ domestic politics.
Lastly, aside from IO authority, we consider two alternative institutionalexplana-
tions for increased member state challenges. For one, general purpose IOs may be
perceived as more encompassing and intrusive than functionally specific IOs, thus
provoking more challenges from member states (Hooghe etal., 2019b, p. 739). Con-
versely, it has been argued that general-purpose IOs are sustained by a stabilizing
force of community (Hooghe etal., 2019a), which makes member states more loyal
(Hirschman, 1970) and thus less likely to express public criticism or withdraw. The
final explanation we account for is that more challenges may simply be the result of
a larger membership. That is, assuming that every member state has some likelihood
of challenging an IO, more member states may increase the overall likelihood of
criticisms and withdrawals merely as a result of their greater number.
3 Research design
To test our hypotheses on member-state-based challenges of IOs, we draw on dif-
ferent data and methods, which we will present in turn in the subsections below.
As noted, our events of interest are member state criticisms and withdrawals. The
available data on these dependent variables vary significantly in terms of included
IOs and time horizons. Moreover, we use three different operationalizations of our
independent variable of IO authority. After discussing our variables, we present our
methodology for the analysis of recurrent events, namely the Andersen-Gill method,
and introduce our datasets at the time-to-event-level.
3.1 Dependent variables
This article seeks to explain the occurrence and recurrence of two dependent varia-
bles. The first is public criticism of IOs by their member states. For this dependent
variable we rely on the dataset by Sommerer (2022) who has identified 6,622 cases
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
of newswire articles reporting criticisms of IOs by various actors – elites and masses,
state and non-state, constituent and non-constituent (Sommerer etal., 2022, pp. 53–54).
Sommerer and colleagues conducted automated searches and manual coding of Eng-
lish word strings in reports from various international news agencies, for example, the
Associated Press, the Russian News Agency, and the Japan Economic Newswire. They
searched for phrases indicating instances of contestation by member state representa-
tives “accusing”, “blaming”, or “criticizing” certain IOs. Their search focused on 30
IOs (see Appendix 1a), plus the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), during the period 1985 to 2020
(Sommerer etal., 2022). While this is by no means a comprehensive sample of IOs
and not an excessively long time period, it is the best source available. The 30 IOs
were selected after stratified random sampling and “to provide representativeness and
generalizability regarding both policy and geographical scope” (Sommerer etal., 2022,
p. 48). The same sample is widely used in the literature (Sommerer & Tallberg, 2017;
Zürn etal., 2021). For the purpose of our study, the selection of IOs is broad enough
and the observation period goes sufficiently far back.
Since we are interested in member state criticisms, we only use such instances from
Sommerer etal. (2022) and not IO criticism expressed by non-state actors or non-mem-
ber states. Our dependent variable thus indicates if an IO in a given year was criticized
by any member state representative, namely, members or heads of government, spokes-
persons, parliamentarians of the governing party, or representatives of the governing
coalition, dynasty, or military junta (Sommerer etal., 2022, p. 54). The data of Som-
merer (2022) contains 2,897 cases of public IO criticisms related to IO member states,
that is, state-based challenges from insiders – or constituencies (Sommerer etal., 2022,
p. 54) – of the IO in question. Since the Sommerer (2022) data is annual, and given
that Andersen-Gill analyses require dependent variables to be binary (namely, occur-
rence of an event of interest in a given time period or not), our final dataset of member
state criticisms contains 259 observations (see Appendix 1b). By dichotomizing mem-
ber states criticism to an IO-year variable we lose qualitative information on the argu-
ments made and the intensity of the criticism. While that is clearly a limitation of our
analysis, this study aims to provide a novel evaluation of contrasting hypotheses about
associations between IO authority and member state challenges. Despite requiring such
a dichotomization, the Andersen-Gill approach is the most suitable method for our pur-
pose of analyzing repeated events such as criticisms by IO member states (see below).
For the second dependent variable, member state withdrawal, we use the dataset by
Pevehouse etal. (2020) which captures IO membership data between 1816 and 2014.
We record a withdrawal event if any member state withdraws from the IO in question
in an observation year. This data contains 534 IOs from this dataset (see Appendix2a)
and 1,292 observations for our Andersen-Gill analysis (see Appendix2b), significantly
reduced in our analyses due to limitations of the other datasets we use – specifically,
their much lower numbers of IOs and the more restricted timeframes that they cover.
While the discrepancies in terms of IOs and time make it difficult to directly compare
the frequency of member state criticism and withdrawal in IOs overall, intuitively
member state criticism is a more frequent and less serious event than withdrawal (as
discussed in the previous section). Both variables are summarized in Table1.
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
3.2 Independent variables
Our main independent variable of interest is IO authority. Different measures are avail-
able that capture this concept. The data vary in their coverage of IOs, as well as the
breadth and depth of their indicators. We conduct our analyses on three different oper-
ationalizations of IO authority. While possibly allowing us to identify the divergent
effects of different kinds of IO authority on the two types of challenges we focus on
(as theorized in the previous section), our design mainly serves to ensure robustness
between the findings on our two conceptions of the dependent variable, since their
base datasets diverge significantly in terms of the number of IOs and years included.
Our first operationalization of IO authority (Authority 1) is based on Debre and
Dijkstra (2021) who have provided an IO-level analysis explaining how institutional
features affect the survival of a sample of 150 IOs from Pevehouse etal.’s (2020) data-
set. Their data include three aspects of IO authority. First, they use a measure of IO
institutionalization adopted from Karreth and Tir (2013, p. 101) which distinguishes
between IOs’ bureaucratic infrastructures and their ability to adjudicate, mediate, and
coerce member states. Second, they hand-coded certain authority-related characteris-
tics of IOs based on their foundational treaties (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021, pp. 320–1),
including majority voting in IO decision-making, how precisely cooperation objec-
tives are defined, the presence of amendment clauses to change IO treaties, and the
existence of clauses whereby states may withdraw from the IO. Finally, they included
secretariat staff data based on the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union
of International Associations, 2022). Together these variables adequately capture the
powers and capacities of IOs, that is, their authority. The advantage of these data is
that they cover a relatively large and random sample of IOs, while a drawback is that
the data points are constant as IOs rarely fundamentally change their treaties and sel-
dom expand a small secretariat into a large one (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021).
Our second operationalization of IO authority (Authority 2) is based on Hooghe
etal. (2021) who measure pooling and delegation in 76 IOs between 1950 and 2019.
Hooghe and colleagues have more restrictive inclusion criteria than Pevehouse etal.
(2020). They require IOs to have “at least thirty permanent staff, a written constitu-
tion or convention, and a decision body that meets at least once a year” (Hooghe
et al., 2021, p. 16). Thus, in their conception and operationalization, IOs need to
have at least some formal powers and staff capacity. For each IO, their pooling
measure constitutes an annual estimate of member states’ authority-sharing through
collective decision-making. Meanwhile, their delegation measure estimates the
Table 1 Dependent variables
Variable Operationalization Time-variance Source
Member state withdrawal Any member state with-
drawal from the IO (1)
or no such event (0)
Annual Pevehouse etal. (2020)
Member state critique Critique of the IO by any
member state (1) or no
such event (0)
Annual Sommerer (2022)
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
authority of non-state bodies in an IO’s decision-making process on a yearly basis.
Hooghe etal. (2021) therefore provide a useful dataset capturing valuable qualitative
information of relevance; but their IO sample is not random, includes fewer IOs than
Debre and Dijkstra (2021), and is restricted to the post-1945 timeframe.
Our final operationalization of IO authority (Authority 3) is based on Zürn et al.
(2021). This dataset draws on a stratified random sample based on a region-issue com-
bination and includes 34 IOs for the years 1919 through 2013 (Zürn etal., 2021, pp.
434–435).2 We use the normalized sum of seven function-level authority scores per IO
and year: agenda setting, rule-making, monitoring, norm interpretation, enforcement,
evaluation, and knowledge generation. As such, our final operationalization of author-
ity includes a wide range of indicators on the “autonomy and bindingness of rules and
decisions” (Zürn etal., 2021, p. 432). While Zürn et al. (2021) provide high-quality
data, their number of IOs is smaller than for our Authority 1 and 2 variables. To con-
clude, these three operationalizations of authority are all concerned with formal pow-
ers and capacity, while differing in terms of their indicators and sampling.
Because of variation in the coverage of these datasets, there were some discrepan-
cies in the availability of data on our dependent and independent variables. While
the 30 IOs in the dataset on state criticism (Sommerer etal., 2022) are largely cov-
ered in the datasets of Zürn etal. (2021) and Hooghe etal. (2017), they are not fully
Table 2 Independent variables
Variable Operationalization Time-variance Source
Authority 1 Majority voting Majority voting (1) or consensus (0) Constant Debre and Dijkstra
(2021); own coding
Withdrawal
clauses
Withdrawal clause (1) or not (0) Constant Debre and Dijkstra
(2021); own coding
Amendment
clauses
Amendment procedure (1) or not (0) Constant Debre and Dijkstra
(2021); own coding
Contract precision Precise (1) or imprecise (0) Constant Debre and Dijkstra
(2021); own coding
Institutionalization High (1) or low (0) Constant Karreth and Tir
(2013); own coding
Staff size Low (1): 0–49 staff; medium (2):
50–249 staff; high (3): 250 + staff
Constant Yearbook of Interna-
tional Organizations
Authority 2 Pooling Estimate of member states’ authority-
sharing through collective decision-
making in the given IO (0–1)
Annual Hooghe etal., (2017,
2019a, 2021)
Delegation Estimate of the authority of non-
state bodies in an IO’s decision-
making process (0–1)
Annual Hooghe etal., (2017,
2019a, 2021)
Authority 3 Authority score Normalized sum of 7 function-level
authority scores per IO and year:
agenda setting, rule-making,
monitoring, norm interpretation,
enforcement, evaluation, and
knowledge generation (0–1)
Annual Zürn etal. (2021)
2 We impute the 2013 data for 2014 to match the data range of our two dependent variables.
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
covered in Debre and Dijkstra (2021). We therefore hand-coded data on the flexibility
scores for 16 out of 30 IOs of Sommerer etal. (2022) ourselves, following the coding
approach of Debre and Dijkstra (2021) to ensure consistency. We did the same for all
IOs included in Zürn etal. (2021) and Hooghe etal. (2017) but not included in Debre
and Dijkstra (2021). By coding such missing data ourselves, we made the different
datasets more compatible. All our independent variables are summarized in Table2.
3.3 Alternative factors
With regard to factors external to IOs, we include three variables. For hegemonic
stability, we focus on the distribution of capabilities among member states (power
divide). For each IO-year, we calculate the standard deviation of member states’
capabilities based on the National Material Capabilities data, specifically the Com-
posite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores (Singer, 1988). For preference
heterogeneity, we use the measure suggested by Bailey etal. (2017), which is based
on ideal points of annual voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. Preference
divide captures the standard deviation between the ideal points of all member states
of an IO per year. To capture the extent of competition between IOs (competing
IOs), we compute for each IO and year the number of IOs in the same policy domain
(political-security, economic, social-environmental, technical-legal, or general pur-
pose) and region (Africa, Americas, Asia–Pacific, Europe, or global).
With regard to challenges arising from domestic politics, we include two vari-
ables. We account for the annual change in the total GDP (GDP change) of all IO
Table 3 Alternative factors
Variable Operationalization Time-variance Source
Power divide Standard deviation of the CINC scores
of all IO member states
Annual Singer (1988); own
calculations
Preference divide Standard deviation in ideal preference
points of all IO member states based
on votes in the UN General Assembly
Annual Bailey etal. (2017);
own calculations
Competing IOs Number of IOs in the same policy field
and region of the given IO
Annual Debre and Dijkstra
(2021); own coding
and calculations
GDP change Annual change in GDP divided by
number of member states (natural
logarithm of the absolute value of the
change to the previous year, maintain-
ing the sign of change)
Annual Inklaar etal. (2018);
own calculations
Democracy Average Polity5 scores of all IO member
states, ranging from very autocratic
(-10) to very democratic (10)
Annual Marshall and Gurr
(2020); own calcula-
tions
Purpose General purpose (1) or task-specific (0)
IO
Constant Hooghe etal. (2017);
own coding
IO members Natural logarithm of the number of
member states of the given IO
Annual Pevehouse etal. (2020);
own calculations
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
members divided by the number of IO member states (natural logarithm of the abso-
lute value, maintaining the sign of change). GDP data is taken from the updated
Maddison dataset (Inklaar et al., 2018). Moreover, we account for the average
democracy level of member states (democracy) which we compute as the mean Pol-
ity5 scores (Marshall & Gurr, 2020) of all IO member states in a given year.
Finally, we include two variables relating to IO characteristics other than their
authority. First, we draw on and augment Hooghe etal. (2017) measure of the func-
tional focus of IOs, distinguishing between issue-specific and general-purpose IOs.
Furthermore, we include the logged number of IO member states per year (IO mem-
bers). All remaining independent variables are summarized in Table3.
3.4 Methodology
This article contributes to exploring new methodological ground in Political Science
by using an approach adopted from the natural sciences: the Andersen-Gill method
to analyze recurrent events (Andersen & Gill, 1982). Scholars in diverse fields
– ranging from epidemiology to psychiatry – are interested in uncovering the cor-
relates and causes of recurring events such as outbreaks of diseases in a population
or mental breakdowns in individuals (Amorim & Cai, 2015; Donaldson etal., 2009;
Ullah etal., 2014; Yadav etal., 2020). Despite significant advances to promote the
use of recurrent event analysis approaches in Political Science (Box–Steffensmeier
& Zorn, 2002), we have yet to witness a widespread application of these models to
manifold issues in the study of international relations.
Survival analysis is by now relatively well-established in Political Science (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001). Yet, this approach
is not appropriate for the present purpose, since it only focuses on the occurrence of
one event per subject, for instance, the death of an IO (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021). In
the present study, we are interested in explaining repeated events per subject, that
is, member state criticisms of and withdrawals from IOs. Dropping all observations
beyond the first occurrence of events (as other studies have done) leads to an unnec-
essary loss of data and a biased sample (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 158).
However, given that observations relating to the same IO are not independent from
one another, we require an analytical approach that accounts for this non-independ-
ence and adjusts the standard errors of estimates accordingly. Variance-correction
models offer exactly that (Box–Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2002, p. 1073).
Accounting for the non-independence of recurrent events is important, as it
reflects our data generation process better than standard multivariate regression
models do. As with natural phenomena such as mental breakdowns in individu-
als or disease outbreaks in populations, the reoccurrence of our events of interest
– namely, member state critiques of and withdrawals from IOs – is not independent
from their initial occurrence. In other words, an IO which member states have criti-
cized or exited before may be more likely to be affected by critique or withdrawals
again, for example, during periods of media polarization or mass exodus. Variance-
correction models are thus suitable for identifying factors that are associated with
the first occurrence and reoccurrence of a certain kind of event among a sample of
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
subjects, while refraining from treating observations of a single subject as independ-
ent from one another (as standard multivariate regression models do).
Different methods have been developed for the analysis of recurrent events (Clayton,
1994; Ozga etal., 2018). Aspects to consider when deciding on the specific approach
include the importance of timing, whether the research question is explanatory or predic-
tive, whether hazards are event-specific or common, and the correlation of events with
the units of analysis (Kaster etal., 2021, p. 7). Moreover, as outlined by Kaster etal.
(2021, p. 9), the various methods differ on the basis of risk intervals (that is, calendar,
gap, or total), their way of accounting for previous events (namely, conditional, marginal,
or random effects), and their baseline hazard (that is, common or event-specific). Based
on these criteria and using the decision tool provided by Kaster etal. (2021), we selected
Andersen and Gill’s (1982) approach as the most suitable time-to-recurrent event frame-
work for our purposes. We formally introduce this method in Appendix3.
One of the Andersen-Gill approach’s advantages is that it preserves the sequence
of events, allowing us to evaluate the risk for an event if previous events occurred
(Box–Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2002, p. 1078; Fleming & Harrington, 2011; Oakes,
1992, p. 372). Moreover, compared to other modeling approaches, the Andersen-
Gill method is relatively straightforward to implement and interpret. Conversely, the
approach has been criticized for its restriction of baseline hazards across all events
and its assumption of independence across events within a unit (Box–Steffensmeier
& Zorn 2002, pp. 1073–1074). As suggested by Therneau and Hamilton (1997, p.
2034), we address the issue of assumed non-independence by using robust variance
estimates (White, 1980). Given its significant advantages, the Andersen-Gill method
has often been used for analyzing recurring events in various disciplines (Ozga
etal., 2018, p. 4), and also serves our purpose of examining repeated events of IO
criticisms and withdrawals by member states well.
3.5 Data
Our two datasets for the analysis of member state critique and withdrawals are set up
at the IO-time-to-event-level. That is, the first observation for any IO in our dataset r
efers to the time from IO inception (or beginning of the observation period) to the
occurrence of the first event in question (that is, the year in which the IO is criticized
by member states or experienced any member’s withdrawal). Subsequent
observations refer to the time periods from event to event. The last observation for
any IO is from the final event in question (namely, the last episode of member state
critiques or withdrawals) until the death/replacement/integration of the IO or cen-
sorship from the dataset. In case an IO did not experience the event in question, it
still features as one observation in our dataset, ranging from its inception (or begin-
ning of the observation period) to its death (or censorship from the dataset). While
pooling across time periods in which no events of interest occur leads to some loss
of information among time-varying factors (posing a more general issue for recur-
rent event analysis methods), the approach nonetheless bears significant benefits
for our purposes (see above). Figure1 illustrates the data setup of Andersen-Gill
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
recurrent event analyses. Our dataset on member state criticisms ranges from 1985
to 2014. It contains 30 IOs and 259 observations (see Appendices 1a and 1b). Our
state withdrawals dataset ranges from 1816 to 2014. It contains 534 IOs and 1,292
observations (see Appendices 2a and 2b).
4 Results anddiscussion
The results of our Andersen-Gill analyses do not support Hypothesis 1, while pro-
viding mixed evidence with regard to Hypothesis 2. We find that more authoritative
IOs (along different dimensions) are not challenged significantly more frequently by
member states in terms of criticisms and withdrawals. This null finding for Hypoth-
esis 1 is surprising as many domestic politics and IR scholars attribute the supposed
crisis of IOs to their increased authority. We do find some support for the compet-
ing Hypothesis 2 that more IO authority is associated with fewer state withdrawals.
However, the most consistent predictor of challenges to IOs is the preference hetero-
geneity between member states. In addition, we find that the number of competing
IOs is negatively associated with criticisms by member states. Meanwhile, a more
democratic membership composition is negatively associated with withdrawals,
whereas greater power divides are related to more withdrawals. Importantly, with
the exception of preference heterogeneity (which is significant in all models), dif-
ferent variables are associated with public criticism and withdrawals, implying that
these distinct types of member state challenges are indeed driven by different fac-
tors. Table4 presents the underlying regression analyses which are further discussed
below.
IO a
IO a
Start to 1
st
event
Start to 1
st
event
1st to 2nd
event
1st to 2nd
event
2nd event to censorship
2nd event to censorship
IO b
IO bStart to censorship
Start to censorship
IO c
IO cStart to 1st event
Start to 1st event
1st event to censorship
1st event to censorship
IO dIO d
Start to
1st event
Start to
1st event
1st to 2nd
event
1st to 2nd
event
2nd to 3rd event2nd to 3rd event
3rd to 4th
event
3rd to 4th
event
4th event to censorship
4th event to censorship
Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of Andersen-Gill data setup. This illustration refers to four hypothetical IOs
(a, b, c, and d), all in different shades of gray. Every framedbox illustrates one observation at the IO-
time-to-event-level. Thus, this hypothetical dataset contains 11 observations
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
Table 4 Results of recurrent events analyses on member-state-based challenges to IOs
The dependent variables are member state criticisms and withdrawals. There are three models for each
of these two dependent variables, including different (groups of) variables to measure IO authority. The
independent variables in each model are listed in the first column. Our variables’ coding is explained in
Tables1, 2 and 3. The coefficients can be interpreted as magnitudes of associations between the stated
independent variable with the likelihood of occurrences of the event of interest for IOs in the sam-
ple across the observation period. Standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficients,
while p-values are indicated by symbols after the coefficients (+ = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01,
*** = p < 0.001)
Criticisms Withdrawals
(1)
Authority 1 (2)
Authority 2 (3)
Authority 3 (4)
Authority 1 (5)
Authority 2 (6)
Authority 3
Contract precision -1.239 -0.0568
(0.757) (0.260)
Majority voting 0.508 0.499+
(1.563) (0.300)
Amendment clauses -0.622 -1.303***
(1.165) (0.320)
Withdrawal clauses -0.822 0.551+
(0.641) (0.307)
Institutionalization 0.681 -0.441
(0.540) (0.317)
Staff size 0.191 -0.178
(0.832) (0.156)
Pooling -2.016 0.144
(1.406) (1.318)
Delegation 3.432+-3.635+
(2.003) (2.166)
Authority 2.119 -1.456
(1.384) (2.013)
Power divide -39.50 -25.88 -43.14+18.58** 8.931 40.57*
(32.39) (24.68) (22.03) (6.388) (11.57) (18.95)
Preference divide 2.368*1.934** 1.710+0.730* 2.135* 1.499*
(0.984) (0.725) (0.954) (0.323) (0.881) (0.675)
Competing IOs -1.871** -2.084*** -2.287*** 0.0442 -0.276 0.172
(0.593) (0.571) (0.606) (0.187) (0.518) (0.429)
GDP change 0.631 0.685+0.748*-0.0167 0.0287 -0.494*
(0.464) (0.353) (0.340) (0.0186) (0.0320) (0.203)
Democracy 0.0120 -0.0304 -0.00593 -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.0864
(0.0664) (0.0400) (0.0405) (0.0285) (0.0474) (0.0648)
Purpose -1.241 -0.741 -1.077 0.0387 -0.697 -0.342
(0.759) (0.809) (0.988) (0.380) (0.672) (0.694)
IO members 0.416 0.830*** 0.502** 0.461** -0.0701 0.0698
(0.446) (0.214) (0.170) (0.165) (0.229) (0.302)
N 259 259 254 327 140 111
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
4.1 IO authority
Overall, our results do not provide strong and consistent evidence that increased IO
authority is associated with more or fewer member state criticisms or withdrawals.
To start with member state criticisms along our different operationalizations of IO
authority (Models 1–3), we find that only one of the variables across all three mod-
els – delegation in Model 2 – has a weak (p < 0.1) positive association with mem-
ber state criticisms. While this points in the direction of Hypothesis 1, none of the
other variables has a statistically significant association at conventional levels and
the coefficients point in different directions. This leads us to conclude that there is
no strong and consistent evidence that more authoritative IOs face more or less criti-
cism by their member states.
With regard to member state withdrawals (Models 4–6), we find that amend-
ment clauses and delegation are negatively associated with such events at conven-
tional levels of statistical significance. That is, IOs that include formal amendment
clauses in their treaties and those that have delegated more authority are less likely
(at p < 0.001 and p < 0.1 respectively) to experience one of the arguably most serious
challenges by states – their withdrawal. Amendment provisions and delegation of
authority to IO bodies hence seem useful for dealing with the concerns of challeng-
ing member states and prevent withdrawals. There is thus some limited evidence
for Hypothesis 2 with regard to withdrawals. Conversely, the coefficients on major-
ity voting and withdrawal clauses are positive and weakly significant (p < 0.1). This
indicates that IOs whose treaties include withdrawal clauses indeed experience more
withdrawals, while IOs that use majority voting procedures are more likely to see
member states withdraw – perhaps as a result of (the risk of) being outvoted – which
provides some limited evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. In sum, the evidence is
mixed, but largely tending toward null findings again.
These results have serious implications. Most prominently, our findings challenge
the thesis that authority endogenously causes “contestation, resistance, and distribu-
tional struggles” (Zürn, 2018, p. 3). Even though we use three different operation-
alizations of authority, varying in terms of conceptualization and coverage, we do
not find substantially diverging results. This suggests the need to qualify and rethink
the significance of IO authority in explaining the politicization and contestation of
global governance. While Zürn finds higher levels of politicization, this does not
appear to lead to more serious instances of member state criticism or withdrawal.
Our findings also challenge Hooghe and Marks (2009) as well as other scholars
who have focused on the politicization of international cooperation (De Vries etal.,
2021; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). While such studies are more indirect in their argu-
ments about the effects of international authority, their explanation for politicization
may need to be revised. Moreover, our results challenge the findings of Daßler and
Heinkelmann-Wild (2022) who argue that pooled authority leads to more state with-
drawals. These divergent findings can partly be explained by the fact that the litera-
ture on politicization is heavily informed by a limited number of major IOs, primar-
ily the EU, which have in fact faced more critique than other less prominent IOs (see
Appendix 1b). This underlines, once more, the need for IO-level analyses to comple-
ment existing state-level analyses, and provide a more comprehensive understanding
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
of variation between IOs. IO-level analyses may help us overcome biases in state-
level analyses (for instance, a bias toward prominent states like the United States and
major IOs like the EU), while providing more clarity on how variables such as IO
authority relate to other factors.
4.2 Alternative explanations
The most consistent explanation we find for member-state-based challenges to IOs
is preference heterogeneity. The coefficient of our preference divide variable is posi-
tive and statistically significant across all models in our main analyses at p < 0.05 to
p < 0.01 (except Model 3 where the level of statistical significance is only p < 0.1).
This provides consistent evidence indicating that a more diverse membership makes
IOs more prone to different kinds of challenges by said members. It is also important
to underline that preference heterogeneity may capture this point better than simply
the number of IO members which does not produce consistent results across the dif-
ferent models, although the three significant coefficients in models 2, 3, and 4 are all
positive. That is, we have some evidence that larger IOs are more likely to be criti-
cized by their member states (models 2 and 3, at p < 0.001 and p < 0.01 respectively)
and experience more withdrawals (model 4 at p < 0.01). Hence, the frequency and
intensity whereby IOs are challenged appears to be determined both by the quantity
of member states and especially their quality, specifically how divergent their pref-
erences are. Our finding is consistent with von Borzyskowski and Vabulas’s (2019)
country-level analysis showing that member states which are further away from the
IO average in terms of preferences are more likely to withdraw.
We find that the number of IOs in the same policy field and world region (com-
peting IOs) is negatively associated (at p < 0.01 to p < 0.001) with member state cri-
tique, but not with withdrawals. This is surprising as a higher number of IOs is often
equated with more competition and disputes (Morse & Keohane, 2014). Instead, it
seems that competing IOs may give states the opportunity to pursue their prefer-
ences through the IO that best suits them, making them less reliant on any particular
IO, and reducing the need to publicly criticize a specific IO. At the same time, the
presence of competing IOs does not imply that states withdraw more easily to rely
exclusively on outside alternatives(cf. Reinsberg, 2024).
The democratic composition of an IO (democracy) seems to work the other
way around: IOs with a relatively democratic membership experience significantly
fewer withdrawals, but are not prone to significantly more or less critique by mem-
ber states. It seems plausible that states would be hesitant to leave IOs with mostly
democratic members, as Gray (2013) shows that membership in largely democratic
IOs is an important signaling device for investors seeking political stability. It may
also well be that democratically composed IOs are better at deliberation and more
sympathetic to concerns by challenger states, which might preempt withdrawals. At
the same time, our resultsdo not indicate that IOs with a more democratic member-
ship are any less faced with member state criticism than less democratic IOs, all else
equal.
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
Finally, with respect to the other alternative explanations that we tested in our
models – captured by the variables power divide, GDP change, and purpose – our
results turn out insignificant or different for member state criticisms and withdraw-
als, further supporting our conceptual and empirical separation of these two types
of member state challenges. Power divide is positively associated with withdrawals
in models 4 and 6 (at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 respectively), while being weakly nega-
tively associated with criticisms only in model 3 (at p < 0.1). Thus, there is some
evidence that greater power divides in IOs lead to less critique but more withdraw-
als by member states, in contrast to what hegemonic stability theory would predict.
GDP change is positively associated with member state critiques in Models 2 and
3 (at p < 0.1 and p < 0.05 respectively), and negatively associated (at p < 0.05) with
withdrawals only in Model 6(cf. Haftel & Nadel, 2024). Thus, our results suggest
that while member state criticisms are somewhat more likely in times of economic
growth, withdrawals may indeed be rather less likely in such times. Finally, we do
not find any significant results for the variable purpose, indicating that the func-
tional specialization or general nature of IOs are not associated with criticisms or
withdrawals by member states when other factors are accounted for.
4.3 Robustness checks andmulticollinearity analysis
One limitation of our analyses relates to sample sizes, given that the coverage and
overlap of IOs in our different datasets, as well as the occurrence of events of inter-
est in the observation timeframes of those datasets, are limited. We thus conduct
robustness checks on a sample with fewer variables but more data points. Apart
from the key authority variables that we do not want to drop due to our substantive
focus here, the variable preference divide causes gaps in our data and thus reduc-
tions of our sample sizes in Models 4 and 6, given its relatively limited reach back to
1946. Moreover, based on the rather clear results of our main analyses with respect
to preference heterogeneity, we conducted robustness checks on all six models in
which we dropped the preference divide variable. The results are summarized in
Models R1 to R6 in Appendix4.
Our robustness checks largely confirm the results presented above. First, in terms
of our main variables of interest, we still find relatively consistent null results. The
coefficients of our authority variables across all six models turn out insignificant,
except in Model R4 where – as in the main analysis above (see Table4) – amend-
ment clauses is negative and statistically significant at p < 0.01. Similarly, as in our
main analysis above (see Table4), withdrawal clauses are positively associated with
actual member state withdrawals at p < 0.05. We can thus conclude that our findings
about amendment clauses being associated with fewer member state withdrawals,
while withdrawal clauses are associated with more withdrawals, are both robust. The
weakly positive coefficients for majority voting and delegation in our main analy-
ses are not confirmed by our robustness check. Although the staff size variable now
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
turns out negative and weakly significant, we do not interpret this finding as robust,
since it is not reflected in our main analyses.
Our robustness checks also confirm our main analyses with regard to alternative
explanations. The variable competing IOs is once again negative and significant (at
p < 0.01 and p < 0.001) across all three models in our robustness checks on member
state critiques. This corroborates our finding above. Similarly, our robustness checks
in Models R4 to R6 confirm our finding regarding the association between mem-
ber state withdrawals and democratic membership of an IO. Democracy is negative
and statistically significant in all three withdrawal models (at p < 0.01 to p < 0.001)
– see Appendix 4. Moreover, the coefficient of GDP change is again negative in
Model R6 at p < 0.01, providing some more support for the finding above that states
may be less likely to withdraw from IOs in times of economic growth, and more
likely to do so in times of austerity. The coefficient for IO members is positive and
highly significant (p < 0.001) in Model R4, albeit insignificant in R5 and R6, provid-
ing some more evidence for the finding above that member state withdrawals are
associated with the size of an IO’s membership. Lastly, our robustness checks con-
firm our main analysis on power divide above. While the coefficient in Model R3
is negative and weakly significant (p < 0.1) as in Model 3 above (see Table4), it is
positive and significant in all three robustness checks on member state withdrawals
(at p < 0.01, p < 0.1, and p < 0.05 respectively). This provides some more evidence
that the greater the spread of power between IO members, the less likely they are to
criticize an IO, but the more likely they are to withdraw.
As a further quality check of our analyses, we examined our Andersen-Gill
regression models for multicollinearity. The results are presented in Appendix 5.
Following conventions, we interpret a variance inflation factor (VIF) above ten as
cause for multicollinearity concerns. Indeed, several of our variables’ VIFs cross
this conventional threshold. Among our authority variables, Hooghe and colleagues’
delegation variable, Zürn and colleagues’ authority measure, as well as Debre and
Dijkstra’s contract precision, withdrawal clauses, and institutionalization variables
are unproblematic. However, majority voting, amendment clauses, and staff size in
model 1 as well as pooling in models 2 and 5 have VIFs larger than ten. It is note-
worthy that none of our significant results above relate to authority variables that
appear to be affected by multicollinearity issues. As for the remaining independ-
ent variables, power divide, preference divide, democracy, and purpose appear to be
largely unaffected by multicollinearity issues, while the VIFs for IO members, GDP
change, and competing IOs are mostly above the conventional threshold of 10. The
most consistent factor of preference heterogeneity thus seems unaffected by multi-
collinearity issues, just like other significant results on power divide and democracy.
Yet, our findings for competing IOs, GDP change, and IO members are potentially
affected by multicollinearity issues. Overall, our main conclusions regarding the
(null) findings on various authority measures, as well as preference heterogeneity as
the most consistent explanatory factor for member states’ criticisms and withdraw-
als, remain intact after checking for robustness and multicollinearity issues.
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
5 Conclusion
The contestation of IOs has taken center stage in academic discussions in recent
years (Bexell etal., 2022; Dellmuth etal., 2022a; Tallberg etal., 2018; Zürn, 2018).
This trend is underlined and reemphasized by political controversies at the highest
levels. The UK’s exit from the EU, the Trump administration’s public dispute with
the WHO during the coronavirus pandemic, and Israel’s ongoing clashes with the
UN over the war in Gaza at the time of writing are cases in point. Given the impor-
tant role that member states play in IOs, much scholarly attention has focused on
the agency of states in challenging IOs (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). Less
attention has been given to the role of IOs themselves. Turning to an IO-level of
analysis, we investigated why some IOs are more frequently challenged by their own
member states than other IOs. An IO-level of analysis not only allows us to study
specific IO features such as the authority of IOs, preference heterogeneity, or mem-
bership composition; it can also complement studies that may be biased toward spe-
cific IO member states.
We focused on two types of member state challenges: public criticism and with-
drawals. We theorized that greater IO authority may lead to more challenges because
power might invite contestation (Zürn, 2018), or that greater IO authority may lead
to fewer challenges, for example, due to IOs’ ability to reduce transaction costs for
states (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Keohane, 1984). Our method to analyze the recur-
ring events of member state criticisms and withdrawals (Andersen & Gill, 1982)
accounts for the non-independence of events relating to the same IO by adjusting
the standard errors of estimates accordingly, preserves the sequence of events, and
is widely used in various disciplines (Amorim & Cai, 2015; Box–Steffensmeier &
Zorn 2002; Kaster etal., 2021; Ullah etal., 2014). In order to conduct a robust test
of the divergent hypotheses, we drew on different data sources, augmenting them
with our own coding and calculations: data on member state criticisms from Som-
merer etal. (2022), member state withdrawal data from Pevehouse etal. (2020), as
well as authority data from Debre and Dijkstra (2021), Hooghe etal., (2017, 2019a,
2021), and Zürn etal. (2021).
Our results demonstrate that IO authority is generally not positively associated with
member-state-based challenges, and to some extent even negatively associated with
member state withdrawals. This leads us to reject Hypothesis 1, while there is some
mixed and weak evidence for Hypothesis 2. Specifically, we find that amendment
clauses are robustly negatively associated with member state withdrawals, while with-
drawal clauses are positively associated with such events. We find more consistent sup-
port for several alternative explanations of member-state-based challenges to IOs. First,
preference heterogeneity between IO member states is positively associated with mem-
ber state criticism and withdrawals. Second, greater competition between IOs in a par-
ticular policy field and world region is associated with less public criticism by member
states. Third, IOs with a more democratic member state composition experience fewer
withdrawals. Importantly, with the exception of preference heterogeneity, the two types
of member state challenges (criticism and withdrawals) are driven by separate explana-
tions and are therefore justifiably considered distinct types of challenges.
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H.Dijkstra, F.Ghassim
1 3
Our study carries significant implications for the academic study of IOs and the
practice of real-world politics. Much of the current literature on the contestation and
politicization of IOs (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Zürn, 2018) stresses the increasing
authority of IOs as the cause for discontent. Our study and other research casts doubt
on this widely held assumption. With regard to challenges by member states, we find
that other factors explain public member state criticism and withdrawals. While propo-
nents of the alleged authority-contestation link may want to limit their argument to the
public politicization of IOs, recent research casts doubt on this assertion with regard
to IO contestation by elites (Uhlin & Verhaegen 2023, p. 8) and shows that citizens
worldwide tend to prefer more authoritative IOs (Ghassim etal., 2022; Ghassim&
Markus, fortcoming). Thus, in contrast to Realist beliefs that the liberal international
order is “bound to fail” (Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 7), we have shown that authoritative
IOs, which provide the cornerstones for this order, are not more likely to confront
more member state challenges and – if anything – less likely to face member state
withdrawals than weaker IOs. This has important implications for policymakers with
a view to the transnational challenges of the 21st century: Granting IOs more author-
ity does not expose them to more challenges by memberstates, but may indeed make
them less likely to fall apart.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1007/ s11558- 024- 09557-0.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Maria Debre, Thomas Sommerer, as well as organizer Stefanie
Walter, discussants Julia Gray, Nina Obermeier and Hortense Jongen, and the audience at the annual
conference of the American Political Science Association 2022, the Annual Political Science Workshops
of the Low Countries in Leuven in June 2023, and the final workshop of the Decline and Death of Inter-
national Organisations (NestIOr) project in Maastricht in June 2023. Moreover, we would like to thank
the editor of The Review of International Organizations, Axel Dreher, and our anonymous reviewers for
their constructive critique.
Funding This article is par t of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council
(ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement
No 802568).
Data availability The datasets compiled for this article will be made publicly available upon publication.
Declarations
Competing interests The authors have no competing interests to declare.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen
ses/ by/4. 0/.
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1 3
Are authoritative IOs challenged more?
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Authors and Aliations
HylkeDijkstra1 · FarsanGhassim1,2
* Hylke Dijkstra
h.dijkstra@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1 Faculty ofArts andSocial Sciences, Maastricht University, P.O. Box616, 6200MDMaastricht,
Netherlands
2 The Queen’s College, University ofOxford, High Street, OxfordOX14AW, UnitedKingdom
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... Dissatisfied powers contest international institutions, i.e., international agreements and organizations, in various ways (Chan 2021;Dijkstra and Ghassim 2024;Hirschmann 2020;He et al. 2021;Stephen and Zürn 2019). They publicly voice criticism of international institutions. ...
... Our argument builds on and contributes to existing institutionalist literature on the contestation of international institutions. We build on this scholarship by embracing their fundamental claim that endogenous features of international institutions are crucial for understanding their contestation (Lipscy 2017;Zürn 2018;Börzel and Zürn 2021;Dijkstra and Ghassim 2024; Kreuder-Sonnen and Rittberger 2023; Debre and Dijkstra 2020;Biermann and Daßler 2024;Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2024). We advance this literature by theorizing how states' negative institutional power shapes the bargaining logic underlying institutional contestation. ...
... Not all states lacking positive power engage in their contestation; and if they do, they engage in various contestation modes. The NIPT specifies how states' negative power to avoid undesired institutional outcomes shapes the radicalness of their contestation modes -regardless of whether their original dissatisfaction stems from institutional characteristics or has other domestic or international sources (see, e.g., Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019;Choi 2021;Walter 2021b;Dijkstra and Ghassim 2024;Lipps and Jacob 2024;Vignoli and Onderco 2024). A strong negative power endowment of both inside options to prevent and outside options to evade provides dissatisfied powers with a substitute to positive power. ...
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