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Journal of Contemporary Research in Social Sciences
ISSN : 2641-0249
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25-38.
2024
Publisher: Learning Gate
DOI: 10.55214/26410249.v6i1.988
© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
History: Received: 3 April 2024; Revised: 22 May 2024; Accepted: 31 May 2024; Published: 4 June 2024
* Correspondence: kezechi@gouni.edu.ng
Interrogating Chinese going global policy in Nigeria: Implications for Neo-
colonialism
Ezechi, Kingsley Chukwuka1*, Mbaeze, Netchy Christian2, Nnamani, Felix Vincent2
1Department of Political Science and International Relations, Godfrey Okoye University, Enugu, Nigeria; kezechi@gouni.edu.ng
(E.K.C.).
2Department of Political Science, Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Nigeria; christian.mbaeze@esut.edu.ng
(M.N.C.); felix.nnamani@esut.edu.ng (N.F.V.).
Abstract: The study sets out to examine Chinese going global policy in Nigeria in the context of the four
key strategic objectives of the policy- resource seeking, market seeking, asset seeking and political gains-
and how these have had some neo-colonial ramifications on the Nigerian state, based on the degree to
which the Nigerian state asserts its agency in its relations with the Chinese State. By adopting a
qualitative case study research design, documentary method of data collection, and theory of neo-
colonialism, the study discovered that Chinese infrastructure aid and investment packages to Nigeria have
aided the achievement of the Chinese strategic objectives in its going global policy to the detriment of
Nigeria’s political and economic independence in a neo-colonial fashion, with little or no remediation from
the Nigerian state or its agency. The study concludes and recommends that China and other great powers
will continue to have a neo-colonial experimentation with Nigeria if it fails to assert its agency with such
powers.
Keywords:
Agency, Chinese, Going global policy, Neo-colonialism, Nigeria, Political economy.
1. Introduction/Problematique
The Chinese “going global” or “going out” policy, popularly known as zou chu qu in China, is a policy
by the Chinese government meant to encourage Chinese investors, businessmen and state-owned
enterprises to invest abroad by providing them financial incentives and subsidies to help them thrive
(Wang, 2016). This policy is borne out of domestic accumulation of capital and the need to seek for new
territories to invest in and to market their excess products arising from overcapacity and overproduction
(Jiang, 2009). More so, as China faces acute shortages of resources to sustain its massive economic growth
and development, it became necessary for the Chinese state to fashion the going global policy as a means
of scouting for resources to feed local industries and to support rapid urbanisation and industrialisation
back home (Yeo, 2018). Beyond this, a now prosperous China who has the second largest economy in the
world with an $18trillion economy behind the United States (US) and might become the largest by 2040
(Chan & Wallace, 2024). With this, Beijing equally looks to assert itself in international relations as it
aims to unite all of China under the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To make all this happen the PRC
crafted four key strategic objectives for its going global policy – resource seeking, market seeking, asset
seeking and political gains (especially gaining support for its One China Policy) (Shen & Mantzopoulos,
2013).
Two key strategies were adopted to achieve the going global policy objectives in Nigeria and in other
African countries. First was the establishment of Forum on China African Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000
(Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, 2009) a year after the going global policy was launched. FOCAC
is a triennial dialogic and negotiation forum created to discuss and frame political and economic policies
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Journal of Contemporary Research in Social Sciences
ISSN: 2641-0249
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25-38, 2024
DOI: 10.55214/26410249.v6i1.988
© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
for the benefit and creation of a “win-win” outcome for Beijing and Addis Ababa. Second is the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) created by President Xi Jinging in 2013 with a $1trillion endowment fund to support
and provide infrastructure development finance for its current 148 countries globally (Green Finance and
Development Centre, 2023) which include 53 out 54 African countries. These two platforms have been
highly instrumental for the achievement of the strategic objectives of the going global policy in Nigeria.
The reason for this is because Abuja has what Beijing needs – resources, markets, assets and as the biggest
country in Africa (both in economy and population) to lend its voice to its “One China Policy”. On the
part of Nigeria, the government understands it has huge infrastructure deficit which its current revenue
stream will not be able to address. For context, it has been estimated that Nigeria will need about
$150billion annually for the next 30 years to be able to close its infrastructure deficit in the country
(Federal Ministry of Finance Budget & National Planning, 2020). In Augusto (2021) view, Nigeria will
require a combined $3trillion over the next 30 years to bridge its infrastructure gap. In the light of this,
the government strongly believe that the Chinese going global policy through its aid, particularly directed
at infrastructure development, will help improve the economy of the State, and also, close the
infrastructure gap.
For asset seeking, China has acquired a number of assets in Africa for default in payments of its
infrastructure aid packages through majority shareholding in key national asset, like Zambia National
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) and Ogun-Guandong Free Trade
Zone (OGFTZ) in Nigeria as cases in point (Ajayi, Iriekpen, Ifijeh, & Okocha, 2020). For resource seeking,
China has had a number of oils for infrastructure deals signed in oil rich nations like Nigeria and Angola,
as well dealing in illegal mining of resources like rosewood, pangolins, and gold in places like Zamfra and
Osun states of Nigeria (Andolu Agency, 2020; Ikpoto, 2023). For market seeking, it has flooded Nigerian
markets with its Chinese made goods, which has crowded its markets and undermined local production
and entrepreneurs (Muhammad, Mukhtar, & Lola, 2017). Finally, for political gains, it has succeeded
diplomatically, through its infrastructure aid and financing, to coerce Nigeria and other African countries
to accept and help legitimise its “One China” policy (Aderele, 2017; Dollar, 2019) with only one exception,
Eswatini as at the time of writing. The achievement of these objectives in Nigeria reflects the nature and
character of Nigerian agency in its dealings with the Chinese state.
In view of the foregoing, Nigerian agency, the right of Nigeria as a sovereign state to make
independent choices and act in an unconstrained manner will determine to a large extent whether or not
China will exhibit neo-colonial tendencies in its relations with the country. While it is well within
Beijing’s right as a sovereign state to craft its strategic objectives aptly laid out in its going global policy
and the pursuit of the attainment of same, it is also a corresponding right of the Nigerian government to
be assertive, circumspect and cautious in scrutinising agreements and engagements with external actors
like China who are interested (and rightly so) in getting the most out of their international relations with
Abuja to achieve their national interests and foreign policy objective.
Against this background, the study focuses on Chinese going global policy in Nigeria, with its neo-
colonial implications. Section one laid out the introduction and problematized the study. Section two
outlined the methodology used for the study. Section three focuses on the neo-colonial construct of
Chinese going global policy in Nigeria. Section four examines Nigerian agency and Chinese going global
policy in Nigeria. Section five examines Chinese going global policy as a neo-colonial experiment in
Nigeria, while section six concludes the study and makes recommendations.
2. Methodology
The study adopted a qualitative ‘case-study’ research design. In understanding case study designs,
Gerring (2004) conceptualises it as an intensive study of a unit having a specific spatially bounded
construct, phenomenon or geography like a state, nation, political party, revolution or a person that are
observed in a single point in time within a (de)limited period of time. In this regard, Nigeria was taken as
a single case study because the study aims to analyse whether Chinese going global policy in Nigeria
implemented through infrastructure aid packages has neo-colonial tendencies or ramifications of any kind.
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Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25-38, 2024
DOI: 10.55214/26410249.v6i1.988
© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
To this end, documentary data from secondary sources were collected regarding Chinese infrastructure
aid disbursements and other dealings with Nigeria. The researcher adopted a purposeful sampling of data
for the study. Maxwell (2012) notes that qualitative researchers often make use of purposeful sampling,
rather than probability sampling in their study because it helps them sieve rich and relevant text of
documents that are germane to their research. Specifically, datasets from China Africa Research Initiative
(2023) and American Enterprise Institute (2024) were used to analyse capital export, trade relations and
investment and construction contracts in Nigeria. Others were from Journals, books and online sources
written by renowned scholars on the subject matter of Chinese engagements in Africa and neo-
colonialism.
3. Theoretical Framework
This study adopted theory of neo-colonialism. This theory has been widely attributed to the writings
of the former President of Ghana, Nkrumah (1965) in his publication title: Neo-colonialism: the last stage of
imperialism, as a follow up to Lenin’s Imperialism: the final stage of capitalism (Ziai, 2020). The title of the
works of both scholars cited above underscores the nexus between capitalism and neo-colonialism which
describes the activities of the Chinese state in African economies. Although, the Chinese state has noted
that it practices “socialism with Chinese characteristics” under President Xi. However, scholars like
Pearson, Rithmire, and Tsai (2021) have described China’s economy as “state capitalism” or “party-state
capitalism”. These are terms used to refer to a mixed economic system wherein the state retains a
dominant role in a market driven economy.
According to Braidotti and Hlavajova (2018) there is a relationship between capitalism and neo-
colonialism. Capitalism, characteristically known for its primitive accumulation of wealth and capital
through overcapacity and overproduction, was embraced by China in 1978 under the then leader Deng
Xiaoping, through his “open door” policy. He created a free market economy after observing the economic
boom of its counterparts in Hongkong, South Korea, Singapore, etc. This free-market economy led to
accumulation of wealth in Beijing (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022).
According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2022) China has posted an average
annual GDP growth rate of 9% from 1990 to 2019. In order to preserve the robust growth back home, it
needed new source of raw materials and resources, as well as outlet for its overproduction and capacity.
Africa became one of the outlets and new markets identified by the Chinese state. It was this accumulation
capital borne out of overproduction that led Beijing to formulate the going global policy (Xing, 2019).
Although neo-colonialism is usually understood to be the political and economic control exercised by
former colonial masters over the territory of newly independent states; this is not always the case.
Nkrumah referred to the United States (US), who never colonised any country, but yet, is one of the
foremost neo-colonial states. This can be said of China too. China has always claimed that it is not a neo-
colonial state in Africa since it was also a victim of colonialism, and thus meant well for Africa. This
statement by China can equally be attributed to the case of the United States who also was once colonised
by Britain before its independence in 1776.
Neo-colonialist, according to Nkrumah often employ economic and monetary means to exact control
and influence over the neo-colonial states. Sometimes, they provide aid to help the neo-colonial state fund
its budget. This assumption appears to characterise Chinese engagement, not just in Nigeria, but in Africa.
Since the first Ministerial conference of FOCAC in 2000, China has consistently provided billions of
dollars to African countries for the purpose of funding several infrastructure projects identified in its
budgets. As at 2023, the Chinese state has made available a total of 170billion in 1,243 loan commitments
to Africa, having implications for debt distress following default (China Africa Research Initiative, 2023)
with Nigeria being one of the top five recipients accounting for $8billion from 23 loan agreements. This
appears to be quite humongous and unsustainable in an era of economic downturn brought about by
Covid-19. In this regard, about 18 African countries are currently re-negotiating their loan agreements
with Beijing; while 12 others are in talks to restructure $28billion in loans through deferment of interest
payments and suspension of non-viable projects (Economic Times, 2021; Wachira, 2022). Nkrumah also
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DOI: 10.55214/26410249.v6i1.988
© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
notes that the aid given and investment undertaken by the neo-colonialists are not always in the interest
of the neo-colonial state, but as a tool to further their exploitation.
To capture an incident of neo-colonial exploitation on the continent through aid infrastructure,
mention must be made of Chinese non-human capital development project of US$200m built AU
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which was deliberately compromised by bugs and chips implanted
in the building for the purpose of carrying out espionage activities for Beijing on African leaders who
deliberate on sensitive continental issues. In this age of knowledge economy, information means
advantage, exploitation and control, especially for national governments. For five years, Beijing
transferred sensitive data from its gift of the AU headquarters to Shanghai between 12am – 2am from
2012 to 2017 (Financial Times, 2018). The continent’s leader’s dismissal of this act with the proverbial
wave of the hand, speaks to the neo-colonial grip of Beijing on the continent caused by weak agency on
the part of African leaders.
3.1. Nigerian Agency and Chinese Going Global Policy in Nigeria
According to Brown, agency simply means the “faculty of acting or exerting power” (Brown, 2012).
Drawing from this, Coffie and Tiky (2021) conceptualised African agency as the ability of African actors
to negotiate and bargain with their external counterparts for the benefit of Africans. For Chipaike and
Knowledge (2018) it means the development of autochthonous African initiative to improve the
continent’s socio-economic wellbeing, create socio-economic solutions to continental problems, while
projecting a posture of power and self-help in its international engagements. In the light of this, Nigerian
agency will simply be the collective bargaining power of its state agents (state and non-state agents) in
the conduct of negotiations and making of deals for the good and benefit of the Nigerian state, without
interference. The category of persons or structure of Nigerian agency include but not limited to Executive
Office of the President or simply the Presidency, which is the zenith and terminus of Nigerian agency having
the President, Vice President, the Chief of Staff, Secretary to the Government of the Federation, National
Security Adviser, Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and the State House Administrator, headed
by a Permanent Secretary. There is also the bureaucratic level agency which consists of agents in the
Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in Nigeria. The most important of these MDAs is the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as all other MDAs are subordinated to it. This accounts for why it must be
peopled by excellent personnel in all ramifications. The next is the institutional level agency comprising of
members of Nigeria National Assembly (NASS) who make strategic policies through Parliamentary
Enactments that agents are obliged to follow when engaging external actors. The last is the broad non-
state level agency which includes prominent and accomplished citizens, influential and civil society
organisations. Others in this category are big private corporations and enterprises. These non-state level
agents sometimes work with state agents to influence and make key decision and actions for the Nigerian
state.
With the benefit of hindsight, Nigerian agency has manifested itself strongly, although during
military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. During the Nigeria-Biafra civil war (1967-70), the Nigerian state
severed ties with China, although informally as there has not being an official diplomatic relations with
Beijing, for its tacit support of the secessionist state of Biafra. After the civil war however, official
diplomatic relations were established between Beijing and Lagos in 1971. Another key manifestation of
Nigerian agency strongly, albeit without any political economic benefit in return, was in its support for
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s (PMLA) government almost unilaterally against
the wishes of the United States and other western powers who favoured the enthronement of National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 1975 cited in (Jemirade, 2020).
In the 21st century however, the Nigerian agency, just like in other African countries appears to be
non-existent at worst or poorly projected at best, especially in their relations with the Chinese state. This,
sadly has created a leeway for Beijing to achieve its major strategic objectives of its going global policy
in Nigeria. Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999 coincided with the launch of the going global policy by
Jiang Zemin, who stressed the need to have a strong start and outright implementation. To make this
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Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25-38, 2024
DOI: 10.55214/26410249.v6i1.988
© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
happen, FOCAC was launched in 2000 with Nigeria as a participant. After attending the Conference, both
countries signed key infrastructure agreement within the administration of President Obasanjo to include
the Oil for Infrastructure Agreement, Protocol on Electric Power Projects in Nigeria, Bilateral
Cooperation on Steel Industry, Bilateral Cooperation on Oil Industry, Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, etc. (Ezeani & Ngoka, 2022). Within the same period China made Nigeria its
strategic partner in Africa with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to that effect in
2005 (Ezeani & Ngoka, 2022).
During the 7th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, former President Buhari, did not shy away from
expressing his gratitude towards Chinese largesse of $5billion that has led to the building of several
infrastructure-like railways, roads, refineries and seaport project in Nigeria (Debt Management Office,
2020). The signing of an MoU by Nigeria to be part of the BRI during FOCAC of 2018 cemented the
Chinese state grip on the largest economy in Africa as it equally implied a firm assurance of achieving its
going global policy objective in the country. The continued receipt of Chinese aid and investments under
the BRI by Abuja without proper scrutiny in view of the terms and conditions and following due process
of law in their relations with the Nigerian state; meant that China will continue to have unfettered access
to Nigeria’s resources, win choice contracts, and invest hugely in Special Economic Trade Zones and Sea
Ports where it will have the highest majority shareholding with little or no national scrutiny of its
activities. It is the argument of this study however, that China is on course to achieve its four strategic
objectives as set out in its going global policy. At this point, a brief review of this achievement with or
without Nigerian agency is imperative.
3.2. Attainment of Chinese Going Global Policy Objectives within the Nigerian State
In the area of resource seeking, Chinese government kicked off its resource acquisition in 2004 with the
signing of $800million deal with Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to supply 30,000 bpd
of oil to China (Cheru & Obi, 2011). The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) further
acquired a 45% share in the Nigerian Apo oil for gas field in 2005 at the sum of $3billion, the biggest
acquisition by the Chinese SOE at the time (Obi, 2019). In 2009, Chinese oil firm, Sinopec, acquired Addax
Oil Company which grants it rights to two offshore oil wells in Nigeria. In view of this Sinopec discovered
oil in Addax UDELE 3 oil well in the Niger Delta in 2010, giving Sinopec direct access to Nigerian oil
wells. Similarly, in 2012, Sinopec bought a 20% stake in a Nigerian oil field from Total of France at the
sum of $2.5billion (Hu, Wu, & Patel, 2012; Kavanagh, 2012). This further increased the level of Sinopec’s
direct access to Nigeria’s oil. Similarly, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), was awarded
Oil Processing Licence in exchange of providing US$2billion worth of financing to rehabilitate the
Kaduna Refinery; but this was however revoked by the incoming administration of Umar Yaradua for lack
of transparency and fraud (Umejei, 2013). Other resource seeking measures of the Chinese going global
policy in Nigeria are in the mining sector where Chinese nationals have engaged in illegal mining of
rosewood, pangolin scales and gold in Zamfara and Osun States respectively (Andolu Agency, 2020;
Ikpoto, 2023). All these illegal activities, according Kayode Fayemi, then Nigeria’s Minister of Mines and
Solid Minerals, were done under the protection of the Nigerian security agencies who supervise the
illegalities (Ajijeh, 2017); bringing the Nigerian agency to shambles and disrepute.
In the area of asset seeking, China has a majority stake of 52.5% in Nigeria’s Lekki Deep Sea Port for a
period of 45 years. Other equity investors include Tolaram Group having 22.5%, Lagos State Government
(20%) and Nigeria Port Authority owning the remaining 5% respectively (Anagor-Ewuzie, 2019).
Furthermore, China through its China Africa Investment Company (CAIC) also has a significant majority
share of 82% in Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone (OGFTZ), which sits on 10,000 hectares of land with
99 years concession agreement; while the Ogun State Government has the remaining 18% (De Freitas,
2019). With 100% CAIC management right, OGFTZ functions as an extension of Chinese territory.
Nigeria has little or no sovereignty in such zones as the financial transactions within the zone does not
pass through the Central Bank of Nigeria. More importantly, the Nigeria Police Force has no jurisdiction
within the zone, as it has its own law enforcement agencies and prisons under the control of Chinese
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nationals (Adunbi, 2019). One would have to wonder what state agent/agency agreed to the signing of
such deal without leaving a window of control by Federal authorities, and allowing its implementation in
a brazen neo-colonial fashion.
For market seeking, the Chinese state has achieved its going global objective by inundating the
Nigerian market with its product to the detriment of local producers and manufacturers. For instance, in
2002, the trade volume between both countries was $1.168billion, out of which Chinese export to Nigeria
was $1.047billion, and Nigeria’s export to China was a paltry $121million. China’s main export during
this period were finished products like light industrials, mechanical, and electrical products. Whereas
Nigeria’s exports were primary products like petroleum, cotton, timber, etc. (China Daily, 2006). Within
ten years, and with the signing of Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2005 by both countries (Uchendu,
2021) trade volume between them (largely in favour of China) reached a sum of $18billion in 2009 (Egbula
& Zheng, 2011). Table 1 shows that the trade volume between Nigeria and China continues to increase
marginally at the expense of Nigeria.
Table 1.
China – Nigeria trade relations as at 2021.
Indicators
China
Nigeria
Exports value
$22.5billion
$3.04billion
Top product export
Women suit/Telephones ($1.5billion)
Petroleum gas ($1.42billion)
GDP
$18trillion (2nd)
$489billion (39th)
Economic complexity
index (ECI)
25th
126th
Source:
Observatory of Economic Complexity [OEC] (2024).
The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) as shown in Table 1 is a set of metrics used in ranking the
diversity of a country’s export in international trade, by placing high rankings for countries that export
finished and manufactured goods above others that export mainly agricultural and primary products.
From Table 1, it is clear that Nigeria’s economic diversity ranking is very low compared to China’s. The
annual flooding ritual of Nigeria’s market with Chinese goods to the utter disadvantage of Nigeria is no
surprise considering that Nigeria was the highest importer of Chinese goods in 2021, as imports from
China reached an all-time high of $22.5billion in spite of Covid-19 shocks, with Nigerian export been
$3.05billion. This shows that Nigeria dwells more on (or is conditioned to) exporting primary goods like
crude oil to China, while she imports manufactured goods like women suit, synthetic filament yarn and
telephones as shown in the table. This is a clear unequal exchange regime between the two countries with
an excessive dependence of Nigeria economy on China without remediation from the Nigerian
government to bridge the gap through diversification of its economy, encouragement of local production
and creating enabling environment for small businesses to thrive.
Table 2.
Top articles of trade between Nigeria and China as at December, 2023.
Chinese export to Nigeria
Value
Nigeria’s export to China
Value
Synthetic filament yarn material
$84.8 million
Petroleum gas
$46.6 million
Vehicles, parts & accessories
$49.2 million
Other minerals
$25.1 million
Telephones
$42.1 million
Uranium and Thorium ore
$7.05 million
Bathroom ceramics
$41.3 million
Niobium, tantalum,
vanadium and zirconium ore
$7.03 million
Electrical transformers
$40.1 million
Refined copper
$4.05 million
+$184.95 million
$257.5 million
-$184.95 million
$90.55 million
Source:
Observatory of Economic Complexity [OEC] (2024).
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© 2024 by the authors; licensee Learning Gate
Besides the export of refined copper in December, 2023 as seen from Table 2, the trade relations
between Beijing and Abuja represents a clear reinforcement of the primary-finished goods dichotomy for
both countries. Beyond this, the Chinese state equally had a super favourable balance of trade in December,
2023 worth $184.95 million, which invariably was a corresponding loss and an unfavourable balance of
trade for Nigeria.
In the case of political gain, especially for support of its One China Policy, the Chinese government has
prevailed upon Nigeria to jettison support for Taipei and embrace Beijing fully. Following Beijing’s pledge
to facilitate an additional $40billion worth of FDI in 2017, President Buhari instructed that Taiwan
consular outpost in Abuja be shut down, and relocated to Lagos. This stance by Nigeria was properly
articulated and emphatically communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Geofrey Onyeama – who
categorically stated that the government of Nigeria no longer wish to officially engage in contracts with
Taiwan as it supports efforts made by the PRC to reunite all of China. As a result, Taiwan will stop
enjoying certain privileges because it is not a country recognised under international law. In this regard,
the Nigerian state directs that Taipei moves its embassy out of Abuja, the capital city to Lagos as a trade
mission with skeletal staff (Geofrey Onyeama, as cited in Aderele (2017)).
3.3. Chinese Going Global Policy as a Neo-Colonial Experiment in Nigeria
To carefully examine whether or not the going global policy in the Nigerian space are neo-colonial,
the study will analyse China and Nigeria relationship in comparison with 19th and 20th century British
European colonisation under the headings below. However, while Nigeria’s agency in rebuking European
activities on its territory during the 19th and 20th centuries were grossly weakened by its non-State status
with no sovereignty, it was equally compounded by the wide support the international structure of
colonisation enjoyed at the time. This however, is no longer the case in the 21st century as Nigerian agency
with its independent status can be invoked to reject all forms of neo-colonial overtures from international
actors like China whenever it chooses to. Now we turn to examining and drawing patterns between
European Colonial behaviour with that of Chinese neo-colonial tendencies.
a) That trade relations under the going global policy in Nigeria through BRI, is reminiscent of
European colonial patterns that create economic dependence.
b) That China’s lending practices in Nigeria undermines its political economy and sovereignty.
c) That Chinese companies only employ Nigerian labour at the menial level like their European
colonial counterparts in the last century.
d) That Chinese nationals and their multinational firms brutalise and dehumanise Nigerians, just like
the Europeans did during colonialism.
Instructively, it must be stated that while European colonial relationship with Nigeria and other
African countries was by compulsion; that of China is largely by persuasion. With this, the argument for
Nigerian agency to accept or reject these persuasions becomes imperative.
3.4. Trade Relations through the BRI in Nigeria, is reminiscent of European Colonial Patterns of Creating
Economic Dependence
In the 19th and 20th centuries, the British interest in Nigeria was largely economic, and its investment
during this period were for the purpose of securing Nigeria’s primary products for export to Europe. In
this regard, some vital infrastructures were built at the time. The railway line built from Enugu to Port
Harcourt, was to facilitate the evacuation of coal from the city and to Europe by sea. Similarly, when tin
was discovered in Jos, the eastern railway line was extended from Enugu to Jos for the same commercial
purpose of exporting tin from Jos through Enugu, then to Port Harcourt, and then to Europe (Ocheoha,
2017).
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Table 3.
Top 5 Chinese signed loan agreements with African countries.
2000-2022
Country
Signed commitments
Sectors with highest
commitment
Major
lenders
Angola
$45billion ($2bn avg. per year)
Transport and energy
CHEXIM/CDB
Ethiopia
$14.1billion ($641mil avg. per yr.)
Transport, energy & ICT
CHEXIM/CIDCA
Zambia
$9.1billion ($414 mil. avg. per yr.)
Transport, energy, & ICT
CHEXIM/CIDCA
Kenya
$9.7billion ($441 mil. avg. per yr.)
Transport and energy
CHEXIM
Nigeria
$8billion ($363 mil avg. per yr.)
Transport, ICT & energy
CHEXIM
This line of economic interests and relations through the BRI can be observed in Table 3 where the
Chinese state major loan agreement went to the transport sector for the purpose of building roads, ports
and rails to pave way for the evacuation of resources (especially oil, gas, tantalum, gold, rosewoods,
pangolins, etc.) and market for Chinese goods emanating from its Sichuan, Zhejiang, Guandong,
Shandong and Shanghai Provinces (Observatory of Economic Complexity [OEC], 2024). However, while the
preponderance of transport ($49.1billion), energy ($59.9billion), and ICT ($13.9billion) (see Figure 1)
loans are commendable showing an impressive and public needs oriented African agency, indicating a
slight departure from the European colonial era when they were weakened as a result of their lack of
independence.
Figure 1.
Sectors of Chinese loan agreements with African States from 2000 – 2022.
Source:
China Africa Research Initiative (2023).
Beyond this, the overwhelming neglect of the crucial sectors like education, agriculture, health and
sanitation needed for mass human capital development is quite disturbing. The combined loan agreement
Note:
N.B: CHEXIM- China’s export and import bank; CIDCA- China international development cooperation agency; CDB-
China development bank. Informationa and communication technology (ICT)
Source:
China Africa Research Initiative (2023).
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in water and sanitation, health, education, and agriculture ($12.7billion) reveals the weak and elitist
mindset of Africa’s agency. It further shows that State agents in Africa appears to only pretend to care for
the people only during election cycles as it was the case with Nigeria where entitlement politics of ethnic
dimension were rife in the 2023 election.
3.4.1. That China’s Lending Practices and Investments in Nigeria Undermines its Political Economy and
Sovereignty
Statistics provided by China Africa Research Initiative (2023) in Table 3 reveal that Nigeria is among
the top 5 countries currently indebted to China to the tune of $8billion. What is more worrisome are
terms of these loan agreements, being shrouded in secrecy, remains a subject of controversy. Gelpern,
Horn, Morris, Parks, and Trebesch (2023) examined 100 Chinese loan contracts and found that these
loans have conditionality of non-disclosure and sovereign immunity waiver clauses to the extent that
upon default in the loan agreement, debtor States are not allowed to plead sovereign immunity if Beijing
decides to acquire the national infrastructure the loans were tied to. When this becomes the case the
sovereignty of the State is undermined.
Sovereignty in its purest and traditional form, as dogmatically practised by the Chinese government
and other great powers, frowns at any form of interference under any guise. Consequently, conditional or
limited sovereignty under the restrictive immunity rule as a doctrine applied during commercial relations
between states clearly undermines its traditional variant. As a matter of fact, the sovereign immunity
clause waiver in Nigeria-China Loan Agreement in 2018, is an affront on Nigeria’s sovereignty in its
traditional sense, with neo-colonial implications. This provoked a robust debate amongst Nigerian
lawmakers who called for a probe and outright cancellation of the loan agreement. As a result, the decision
by the Nigerian House of Representative (HoR) of the National Assembly to probe the Chinese loan in
2020, the Chinese government sent a two-man delegation Li Ineijian and Wu Baocai to Nigeria to discuss
the probe with members of the opposition party (Peoples’ Democratic Party [PDP]) that instigated the
probe. A month later, Wu led another delegation to Nigeria, to meet with the Interparty Advisory Council
(IPAC), an umbrella body for registered political parties in Nigeria. The outcome of the meeting yielded
positive fruits for the Chinese government following statements issued by then PDP National Chairman
(Iyorcha Ayu) and his IPAC counterpart, Sani Yabagi, who made positive remarks of compliments
regarding China’s activities in the country (Oshodi, 2022). These visits however, have several
implications. First, it led to the abrupt end of the probe. Second, it shows the level of political interference
of Chinese government in Nigeria’s internal affairs by meeting Nigeria’s apex political body, the IPAC, to
influence political decisions in the country. Another question to ask in this case is: where was the Nigerian
agency to rebuke this neo-colonial tendency manifesting through these intruding and subversive visits
from Beijing.
Table 4.
Top 5 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Africa from 2005 – 2023.
S/N
Countries
Value
1
Nigeria
US$36.94billion
2
Algeria
US$28.42billion
3
Angola
US$27.71billion
4
Egypt
US$25.25billion
5
Congo D. R
US$22.89billion
Source:
American Enterprise Institute (2024).
Furthermore, while Nigeria held the fifth spot in the top five countries with loan agreements with
China in Table 3, it occupies the top position as the investment destination and construction sites of
Chinese companies in Table 4, accounting for $36.94billion in investments and construction contracts
from China. This is no surprise as there are about 920 Chinese firms operating in Nigeria, the highest
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compared to any African country (Statista, 2022). The challenge however, is that the bidding processes of
the contract lack transparency and due process of law. As of 2019, the Asian giant boast of being in charge
of $47billion worth of key Federal Government Projects across the country (Amaefule, Basiriyu, Ihua-
Maduenyi, Ogunfunwa, & Asu, 2019). With this, it goes to show that whatever Beijing has given Nigeria
in loans or investment it takes back through choice contracts and repatriates the proceeds back home. The
Nigerian state have failed to observe and remedy this trade and investment anomaly that undermines its
political economy.
3.5. That Chinese Companies Only Employ Nigerian Labour at the Menial Level Like their European Colonial
Counterparts in the Last Century
One of the reasons advanced for Nigeria’s independence struggles was the discriminate manner in
which British colonial officers employed Nigerians in low level jobs, even though some were more
qualified than their European counterparts who were given higher positions. Nigerians were not allowed
to hold administrative or managerial positions in the colonial service, and they were variously exploited
and racially segregated by foreign firms during colonialism (Iyer, Archieng, Borokini, & Ludger, 2021).
The Chinese have adopted similar approach in their trade relations with Africa, and by extension Nigeria.
In Africa, there have been debates regarding Chinese use and exploitation of local labour. While it is
established that Chinese firms employ local labour in their investment relations in Africa (Oya & Schaefer,
2019; Shen, 2013; Wang & Zadek, 2016) most of the managerial positions were filled by Chinese labour
(Wegenast, Struver, Giesen, & Krauser, 2017).
In Nigeria, this is also rife as Chinese firms treats Nigerian labourers as slaves in their own country.
Ndudi Elumelu, a Nigerian lawmaker, described Nigerian workers’ condition at the hands of their Chinese
bosses as “slavish conditions.” To be sure, and as at 2017, there are over 920 Chinese firms operating in
Nigeria (Statista, 2022). In a survey conducted on two agencies – Nigerian Investment Promotion Council
(NIPC) and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) - to ascertain the number of Chinese firms
operating legally in Nigeria, found that there were 221 firms registered by NIPC and 297 identified by
MOFCOM. Out these numbers, about 160 of these firms, located in various rural areas of Nigeria (Adunbi
& Stein, 2019). Some of them are into manufacturing, employing not more than seven per cent of Nigerians
mostly at the lower rung of the ladder to engage in menial jobs (Amusan, 2022; Ngwu, 2019). With this,
there is apparent lack of local capacity building, technology transfer and backward integration of Chinese
investments in the country.
3.5.1. That Chinese Nationals and their MNCs Brutalise and Dehumanise Nigerians, just like the Europeans did
during Colonialism
Just like in the days of British colonialism in Nigeria, the Chinese multinational firms and their
nationals in Nigeria have brutalised and dehumanised Nigerians who work for them. While the case of
European dehumanisation was a case of racism or racial abuse, that of the Chinese reflects the labour
practices back home. According to Jiang (2009) trade policies and practices of Chinese multinationals and
other businesses is an externalisation of domestic economic practises. By adopting this methodology,
China’s remarkable growth and development have come at huge cost of labour abuse, dehumanisation and
low/insignificant wages (Ofosu & Sarpong, 2022). Back home, the Chinese government limits labour
power by banning activities of independent unions, while providing little or no support for strike actions
or demonstrations (Qi & Pringle, 2019).
In Nigeria, evidence shows that in some Chinese factories, Chinese nationals demands that their
Nigerian workers refer to them as “master” whenever they are at work (Egbunike, 2021). Other evidence
points to inhumane treatment, poor welfare, neglect of workers, sexual assault and child labour, with the
Nigerian government looking the other way (Abolade, 2022; Egbunike, 2021). For instance, a Chinese
national was responsible for the death of some Nigerians in Ikorodu, Lagos, whom he had locked up in
his factory at night and went to his apartment to sleep. While he was away, fire broke out in the factory,
some of the Nigerian workers, unable to get themselves out of the factory, lost their lives in the fire
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incident. Others sustained various degrees of injuries before help came (This Day Editorial, 2020). In
another instance, in October, 2020, a Nigerian worker died in a Chinese owned Xiyuan Quary in Kobape
area of Ogun state, following the non-provision of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) needed for him
to work in the factory. One of the hospitalised survivors who sustained various degrees of injuries notes
that the firm refused to pay for the medical bills as he sourced them from friends and relatives. Three
years after, the factory is still open for operation with many of the factory workers still without PPE,
which is a violation of section 5(3 III) of the National Policy on Occupational Safety and Health. And yet,
the Nigerian government remains mute, looking the other way as usual (Abolade, 2022). These are few of
countless cases of brutality and inhumane treatment of Nigerians at the hands of their Chinese employers.
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
Based on the strength of the evidence presented above in terms of Chinese political and economic
relations with Nigeria, it suffices to say that Chinese behaviours are neo-colonial to the extent that
Nigerian agency allows. In the case of the oil for infrastructure deal signed by one government and
revoked by another on the basis of non-transparency and fraud, reflects the presence or the lack thereof
of Nigerian leadership willingness to be assertive and cautious in scrutinising contracts and loan
agreements with external actors like China. Similarly, the continued yawning gap and imbalance of
Nigeria-China trade in favour of China, labour abuses, political interference, asset acquisition through
majority shareholding rights, sovereign immunity waiver clauses in loan agreements, economic
subversion through excessive Chinese imports, unfettered access to resources (sometimes illegal), etc.,
strongly reflects Nigerian states leadership and its elites’ weak and poor agency to rebuke, rebuff and
ward-off Chinese neo-colonial tendencies and behaviours in the state.
In the light of this, the study recommends that the Nigerian state must meritoriously bureaucratise
its leadership with persons of integrity and strong willed character to stand up to obtrusive and intrusive
demands and offerings made by external actors like China with potential to undermine the political
economy of the Nigerian state. Furthermore, scholars must likewise shine the intellectual light on the
incompetent and enabling behaviours of African leadership and its elites who collude with foreign agents
to undermine their states; instead of just focusing on the international structure or external actors and
conditions that encourages neo-colonial tendencies on the continent.
Funding:
This study received no specific financial support.
Institutional Review Board Statement:
Not applicable.
Transparency:
The authors confirm that the manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study; that
no vital features of the study have been omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as planned
have been explained. This study followed all ethical practices during writing.
Competing Interests:
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ Contributions:
All authors contributed equally to the conception and design of the study. All authors have read and
agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
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Copyright:
© 2024 by the authors. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of
the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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