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The Oxford Olympics Study 2024:
Are Cost and Cost Overrun at the
Games Coming Down?
May 2024
Alexander Budzier, University of Oxford
Bent Flyvbjerg, University of Oxford, IT University of Copenhagen
2
Abstract
The present paper is an update of the "The Oxford Olympics Study 2016" (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016).
We document that the Games remain costly and continue to have large cost overruns, to a degree
that threatens their viability. The IOC is aware of the problem and has initiated reform. We assess
the reforms and find: (a) Olympic costs are statistically significantly increasing; prior analyses did
not show this trend; it is a step in the wrong direction. (b) Cost overruns were decreasing until 2008,
but have increased since then; again a step in the wrong direction. (c) At present, the cost of Paris
2024 is USD 8.7 billion (2022 level) and cost overrun is 115% in real terms; this is not the cheap
Games that were promised. (d) Cost overruns are the norm for the Games, past, present and future;
they are the only project type that never delivered on budget. We assess a new IOC policy of
reducing cost by reusing existing venues instead of building new ones. We find that reuse did not
have the desired effect for Tokyo 2020 and also looks ineffective for Paris 2024. Finally, we
recommend that the Games look to other types of megaprojects for better data, better forecasting,
and how to generate the positive learning curves that are necessary for bringing costs and overrun
down. Only if this happens are Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032 likely to live up to the IOC’s
intentions of a more affordable Games that more cities will want to host.
3
Why Study Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics?
In July 2023, Victoria, Australia surprisingly cancelled the 2026 Commonwealth Games. The cost had
reportedly increased from AUD 2.6 billion to AUD 6-7 billion for the 12-day event (Kelly et al. 2023). Less than
a year later, in March 2024, media reports emerged that Brisbane considered pulling out of the 2032 Summer
Olympics due to rising costs. The Queensland Government and the International Olympic Committee quickly
refuted the news (Kirk 2024).
Our previous studies (Flyvbjerg et al. 2021, 2016; Flyvbjerg and Stewart 2012) have documented high cost
and cost overrun at the Olympic Games. This was initially a contested finding. Today, it is broadly accepted in
the academic debate (see Appendix A). High cost and cost overrun have been argued to threaten the
economic sustainability of the Games (Müller et al. 2021).
Given that the last three Summer Games cost USD 51 billion (in 2022 prices) and overran budgets by 185%
in real terms – not including road, rail, airport, hotel, and other infrastructure, which often cost more than the
Games themselves – the financial size and risks of the Games warrant study.
Understanding the magnitude of cost overruns in relation to the original budget is crucial to assessing financial
risk for prospective host cities. The Paris 2024 games, for instance, have seen costs surge from EUR 3.6
billion to 8.8 billion. Similarly, Los Angeles 2028 has revised its forecast from USD 5.3 billion to 6.8 billion.1
These figures underscore the risks and challenges that host cities and national governments must foresee
and manage.
As part of bidding to host the Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) requires host cities and
governments to guarantee that they will cover any overruns to the Olympic budgets. The Olympic Host
Contract locks the hosts into a non-negotiable commitment to cover any such increases. If overruns are likely,
hosts and the IOC must consider cost escalation in planning the Games to get a realistic picture of the final
outturn costs. Hosts typically set aside a contingency of 10%-15%. Historically, this has proven inadequate.
Presently, cost escalation on the 2024, 2028, and 2032 Summer Games are already above this level of
contingency.
Moreover, Flyvbjerg et al. (2016) argued that given the current global economic climate and subsequent
tightening of government spending in many countries, understanding the implications of significant
investments like the Games is critical for governments to make sound fiscal and economic decisions about
their expenditures. The global economic climate has not changed since 2016, in fact, COVID-19 has only
further restricted governments’ ability to spend (World Bank 2022). For instance, cost overrun and associated
debt from the Athens 2004 Games weakened the Greek economy and contributed to the country's deep
financial and economic crises, beginning in 2007 and still playing out almost a decade later (Flyvbjerg 2011).
For Rio 2016, the Brazilian economy was doing well when the city bid for the Olympics. Fast forward a decade
to two months before the opening ceremony and this was no longer the case. Rio was now in such dire straits
that the governor declared a state of emergency to secure additional funding for the Games from money
reserved for dealing with natural and other disasters (Zimbalist 2020). Other hosts – especially those in small
and weak economies – may want to ensure they do not end up in a similar situation by having a realistic
picture of costs and cost risk before considering hosting the Games. The data presented in the present paper
will allow such an assessment.
The IOC is not unaware of the issues. In 2015, Budapest, Hamburg, Los Angeles, Paris, and Rome submitted
their first stage bids for hosting the 2024 Olympics. In 2015, Hamburg dropped out of the process after a
referendum failed to garner support for the event (Livingstone 2015). In 2016, Rome withdrew because of the
high level of debt it would create for the city (BBC 2016). In 2017, Budapest pulled out due to local opposition
and a call to spend the money on health care and education instead (Wharton 2017). In the same year, the
two cities remaining in the process, Paris and Los Angeles, were unconventionally awarded the 2024 and
2028 editions of the Games, without a proper bid process for the 2028 Games, for the simple reason that the
1 Widely reported and used side-by-side, the original estimates do not include provisions for inflation, while the
latest ones do. Below we remove those effects and compare like with like.
4
IOC was running out of host cities. This development has been coming for a long time. Since Chicago's bid for
the 2016 Olympics, organisers have faced increased scepticism about the claimed economic legacy and
leverage of hosting the event (Lauermann 2019).
The unravelling of the bidding process culminated in 2017. It further fuelled the IOC's reform program, already
underway. In 2015, the IOC had agreed on a program, the so-called Agenda 2020. The reforms continue
today, now called Agenda 2020+5. The reforms aim to ensure the continued relevance of the Olympic
Movement, safeguard the Olympic values, and strengthen the role of sports in society (Nicoliello 2021). In
Agenda 2020, the only reform directly aimed at cost was a slight reduction of the effort required in the bidding
process (Zimbalist et al. 2024), which we earlier dubbed "too little too late." (Flyvbjerg et al. 2021, p. 251).
With Agenda 2020+5, the objective became "long-term sustainability, including from an economic standpoint."
(IOC 2020, p. 7). The IOC now attempts to target cost savings by simplifying events, reusing solutions (e.g.,
ticketing), and avoiding the over-scoping of service levels and non-sports-related events. Whether those
objectives are achievable remains to be seen and some observers already question them (Zimbalist et
al. 2022). Below, we assess whether the reforms have so far reduced cost and cost overrun at the Games as
was the intention with Paris 2024 as a case in point.
5
Cost of the Olympic Games 1960-2024
Table 1 shows the actual outturn costs of the Olympic Games 1960-2024 together with the number of events
and number of athletes in each Games, in constant 2022 US dollars2.
Table 1 Outturn cost, number of athletes and events of the Olympic Games 1960-2024, constant 2022 US dollars.
Games Edition
Outturn Cost
billions USD
Athletes
Events
Summer Games
Rome 1960
5,338
150
Tokyo 1964
0.3
5,152
163
Mexico City 1968
5,516
172
Munich 1972
1.1
7,234
195
Montreal 1976
7.1
6,048
198
Moscow 1980
7.7
5,179
203
Los Angeles 1984
0.8
6,829
221
Seoul 1988
8,397
237
Barcelona 1992
11.6
9,356
257
Atlanta 1996
4.7
10,318
271
Sydney 2000
5.2
10,651
300
Athens 2004
3.1
10,625
301
Beijing 2008
8.3
10,942
302
London 2012
16.8
10,568
302
Rio 2016
23.6
10,500
306
Tokyo 2020*
13.7
11,420
339
Paris 2024**
8.7
10,500
329
Winter Games
Squaw Valley 1960
665
27
Innsbruck 1964
0.0
1,091
34
Grenoble 1968
1.0
1,158
35
Sapporo 1972
0.1
1,006
35
Innsbruck 1976
0.1
1,123
37
Lake Placid 1980
0.5
1,072
38
Sarajevo 1984
1,272
39
Calgary 1988
1.2
1,432
46
Albertville 1992
2.1
1,801
57
Lillehammer 1994
3.4
1,737
61
Nagano 1998
2.2
2,176
68
Salt Lake City 2002
2.7
2,399
78
Torino 2006
4.7
2,508
84
Vancouver 2010
3.2
2,566
86
Sochi 2014
28.9
2,780
98
Pyeong Chang 2018
3.4
2,833
102
Beijing 2022
8.7
2,871
109
Note:
* Cost of USD 10.6 billion based on official accounts; see discussion below
** Paris costs are still in part estimates. The number of athletes is estimated from the cap stipulated in the host
agreements
2 Our approach to data collection and analyses is explained in Appendix B. The cost of Mexico City 1968 and
Sarajevo 1984 are excluded due to hyperinflation, which results in unplausible figures.
6
The mean cost for the Summer Games is USD 8.04 billion (median USD 7.38 billion, in 2022 prices). The
Winter Games have a mean cost of USD 4.15 billion (median USD 2.18 billion, 2022 prices). The difference is
statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.015).
The most expensive Summer Games to date were Rio 2016 at USD 23.6 billion and London 2012 at USD
16.8 billion. The official Games Report puts the cost of Tokyo 2020/21 at USD 13.7 billion. Zimbalist et al.
(2024) documented significant budget exclusions from official figures - "financial legerdemain," they call it
(Zimbalist et al. 2024, p. 702). The Tokyo OCOG's costs exclude, for example, land costs and the City
of Tokyo's budget. Adding those costs puts the cost of the Tokyo Games between USD 19.2 billion and 33.4
billion (2022 USD, excluding inflation). Zimbalist et al.'s 33.4 billion figure includes transport infrastructure and
other investments, such as a weather satellite, which this study excludes. Even so, we can reasonably
consider Tokyo the second most expensive, if not the most expensive, Summer Games in Olympic history.
For the Winter Games, Sochi 2014 was the most expensive at USD 28.9 billion, followed by Beijing 2022 at
USD 8.7 billion. However, it is important to bear in mind that these figures do not include wider capital costs
(OCOG indirect costs) for urban and transportation infrastructure, which are typically substantial. This
omission raises questions about the true cost of hosting the Games and the potential implications of these
rising costs, a topic that warrants further exploration.
Figure 1 presents a comprehensive view of the cost trends from 1964 to 2024. The trend lines clearly
demonstrate a significant increase in the cost of hosting the Olympic Games over time. This finding is not only
highly statistically significant overall (t(27) = 5.51, sandwich corrected p < 0.001), but also separately for
Summer (t(12) = 3.68, sandwich corrected p = 0.005) and Winter Games (t(13) = 5.15, sandwich corrected p
= 0.003). This upward trend, which was not statistically significant in our previous study (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016),
is a new and important finding. It indicates that the Games have become increasingly expensive in today's
money, a fact that should not be overlooked.
Figure 1 Time series of outturn cost for Olympics 1964-2024 in billion 2022 USD, cost data shown as log10 and trends
fitted for Summer and Winter Games using local polynomial regressions.
One of the changes in the IOC's Agenda 2020 is the shift from sports to events. The shift allows the IOC to
engage in more granular discussions with the athletes and sporting federations about their requirements for
each event that is part of the sport. For example, in Milano-Cortina 2026, the speed skating events will be held
at the Fiera Milano Exhibition Centre. The choice of venue resulted from discussions between the IOC,
OCOG, and the International Skating Unit – the governing body for competitive ice-skating disciplines. The
IOC successfully pushed for a lower-cost solution than a purpose-built venue. Compare this to Beijing 2022.
The specially constructed Ice Ribbon was the dedicated venue for the 166 athletes competing in the 14 speed
Innsbruck 1964
Tokyo 1964
Grenoble 1968
Sapporo 1972
Munich 1972
Innsbruck 1976
Montreal 1976
Lake Placid 1980
Moscow 1980
Los Angeles 1984
Calgary 1988
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002
Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008
Vancouver 2010
London 2012
Sochi 2014
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Beijing 2022 Paris 2024
0.01
0.10
1.00
10.00
1980 2000 2020
Date of actual opening
Total Constant Outturn Cost in 2022 USD, billions
Type Summer Winter
7
skating events. The Ice Ribbon was estimated to cost USD 227 million (2022 USD), but the Beijing organisers
have not disclosed the final actual cost of the venue (Teh and Stonington 2022). The high cost of the Olympic
Games stems from the cost of each sporting discipline and event, which illustrates the difficulty of reducing
costs, because each event must be negotiated.
Table 2 shows the cost per event and athlete from 1960-2024 in 2022 USD. The mean cost per athlete in the
Summer Games 1960-2024 is USD 0.86 million (median USD 0.79 million), and in the Winter Games, USD
1.69 million (median USD 1.13 million). The cost per athlete is not statistically significantly different between
the Summer and Winter Games (p = 0.683, Wilcoxon test).
The mean cost per event for the Summer Games is USD 28.7 million (median USD 27.0 million), while for the
Winter Games, the mean is USD 49.1 million (median USD 33.3 million). Despite the difference, it's important
to note that the costs are not statistically significantly different (p = 0.870, Wilcoxon test).
Table 2 Cost per event and cost per athlete in the Olympics 1960-2024 in million 2022 USD.
Summer Games
Cost per
Athlete (USD
2022, millions)
Cost per Event
(USD 2022,
millions)
Winter Games
Cost per
Athlete (USD
2022, millions)
Cost per Event
(USD 2022,
millions)
Rome 1960
NA
NA
Squaw Valley 1960
NA
NA
Tokyo 1964
0.1
1.8
Innsbruck 1964
0.0
0.1
Mexico City 1968
NA
NA
Grenoble 1968
0.9
28.5
Munich 1972
0.1
5.5
Sapporo 1972
0.1
3.4
Montreal 1976
1.2
35.7
Innsbruck 1976
0.1
2.8
Moscow 1980
1.5
37.9
Lake Placid 1980
0.5
13.6
Los Angeles 1984
0.1
3.5
Sarajevo 1984
NA
NA
Seoul 1988
NA
NA
Calgary 1988
0.9
26.8
Barcelona 1992
1.2
45.0
Albertville 1992
1.2
37.5
Atlanta 1996
0.5
17.3
Lillehammer 1994
2.0
55.7
Sydney 2000
0.5
17.2
Nagano 1998
1.0
32.0
Athens 2004
0.3
10.2
Salt Lake City 2002
1.1
34.8
Beijing 2008
0.8
27.5
Torino 2006
1.9
55.7
London 2012
1.6
55.6
Vancouver 2010
1.2
36.9
Rio 2016
2.3
77.2
Sochi 2014
10.4
295.1
Tokyo 2020
1.2
40.5
Pyeong Chang 2018
1.2
33.3
Paris 2024
0.8
26.5
Beijing 2022
3.0
79.6
Figures 2 and 3 show the cost per athlete over time. Statistical tests show that Sochi 2014 and Beijing 2022
are extreme values in their cost per athlete. Sochi 2014 cost USD 10.4 million per athlete. Beijing 2022 had a
cost of USD 3.0 million (both in 2022 terms).
Figure 3 shows the same data with the two extreme values removed. This is to test whether the trend towards
higher cost is robust, which it is. Without the extremes, there is still a statistically significant trend over time for
higher costs, both overall (t(25) = 3.95, sandwich corrected p = 0.007), for the Summer Games separately
(t(12) = 2.56, sandwich corrected p = 0.040), and for the Winter Games separately (t(11) = 3.19, p =
0.009). This upward trend, which again was not statistically significant in our previous study (Flyvbjerg et al.
2016), is a new and important finding.
The analyses show that the Games have become increasingly expensive over time measured in today's
money, both overall and for each type of Games, and both measured per athlete and per event.
8
Figure 2 Cost per athlete in million 2022 USD for the different editions of the Olympic Games, cost data shown as log10
and trends fitted for Summer and Winter Games using local polynomial regressions.
Figure 3 Cost per athlete in million 2022 USD of the different editions of the Olympic Games, cost data shown as log10
and trends fitted for Summer and Winter Games using local polynomial regressions, extreme values removed.
Innsbruck 1964
Tokyo 1964
Grenoble 1968
Sapporo 1972
Munich 1972
Innsbruck 1976
Montreal 1976
Lake Placid 1980
Moscow 1980
Los Angeles 1984
Calgary 1988
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002
Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008
Vancouver 2010
London 2012
Sochi 2014
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Beijing 2022
Paris 2024
−4
0
4
8
1960 1980 2000 2020
Date of actual opening
Cost per Athlete
Type Summer Winter
Innsbruck 1964
Tokyo 1964
Grenoble 1968
Sapporo 1972
Munich 1972
Innsbruck 1976
Montreal 1976
Lake Placid 1980
Moscow 1980
Los Angeles 1984
Calgary 1988
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002
Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008
Vancouver 2010
London 2012
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Paris 2024
0
1
2
1960 1980 2000 2020
Date of actual opening
Cost per Athlete
Type aa
Summer Winter
9
Cost Overrun at the Games 1960-2024
Tables 3 and 4 show cost overrun for the Games, which is a key interest for our research. Overruns are
measured in real terms, i.e., with inflation removed, and in local currencies (see Appendix B). Table 3
presents an overview while Table 4 provides the detailed figures for each Games. For cost overrun in real
terms, the numbers document a systematic and highly significant tendency to overrun (overruns are
statistically significantly greater than 0%, Wilcoxon test, p < 0.001). Judging from these statistics it is clear that
large risks of large cost overruns are inherent to the Olympic Games.
Despite the Winter Games being smaller in scope than the Summer Games, their cost risks are not
statistically significantly different (Wilcoxon, real-term overruns, p = 0.605). This suggests that the scale or
complexity of the Games is unlikely to be the sole explanation of overrun. This finding challenges conventional
wisdom and opens up new avenues for research and discussion.
For cost overrun in nominal terms, these are the figures that typically make the headlines in media reports.
We stress, however, that nominal cost, unlike real cost, does not present a like-for-like comparison. The
candidature files do not include a provision for anticipated inflation. Estimates are in real terms, usually at a
price level a year before the host selection. Subsequent budget announcements often - but not always -
include inflation, and reported outturn costs all include inflation. In other capital projects, providing for inflation
in forecasting is standard practice. The planners for the Games have yet to do the same. These numbers are
thus only correct if we take the candidature files at face value, which means that the hosts did not anticipate
any inflation between the estimate and the expenditure. Again, this is how bidders misrepresent their
estimates, making them look low.
Table 3 Mean and median cost overruns of the Olympic Games 1960-2024.
Real terms
Nominal terms
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
Summer
195%
121%
336%
142%
Winter
132%
118%
277%
169%
Overall
159%
118%
302%
146%
From Table 4, which shows cost overrun in nominal and real terms for all Games with available data, we
further observe:
• All Games (100%) have cost overruns,
• 18 of 23 Games (78 percent) have cost overruns above 50 percent in real terms, and
• 13 of 23 Games (57 percent) have cost overruns above 100 percent in real terms.
10
Table 4 Cost overruns of the Olympic Games 1960-2024.
Summer Games
Nominal
Real
Winter Games
Nominal
Real
Rome 1960
NA
NA
Squaw Valley 1960
NA
NA
Tokyo 1964
NA
NA
Innsbruck 1964
NA
NA
Mexico City 1968
NA
NA
Grenoble 1968
230%
181%
Munich 1972
NA
NA
Sapporo 1972
NA
NA
Montreal 1976
1266%
720%
Innsbruck 1976
NA
NA
Moscow 1980
NA
NA
Lake Placid 1980
502%
324%
Los Angeles 1984
NA
NA
Sarajevo 1984
1257%
118%
Seoul 1988
NA
NA
Calgary 1988
131%
65%
Barcelona 1992
609%
266%
Albertville 1992
169%
137%
Atlanta 1996
178%
151%
Lillehammer 1994
347%
277%
Sydney 2000
108%
90%
Nagano 1998
58%
56%
Athens 2004
97%
49%
Salt Lake City 2002
40%
24%
Beijing 2008
35%
2%
Torino 2006
113%
80%
London 2012
108%
76%
Vancouver 2010
36%
13%
Rio 2016
673%
352%
Sochi 2014
508%
289%
Tokyo 2020
139%
128%
Pyeong Chang 2018
14%
2%
Paris 2024
146%
115%
Beijing 2022
190%
149%
For the Summer Games the largest cost overrun was found for Montreal 1976 at 720 percent in real terms,
followed by Rio 2016 at 352 percent. The smallest cost overrun for the Summer Games was found for Beijing
2008 at two percent, followed by Athens 2004 at 49 percent. The last three Summer Games all had cost
overruns greater than 100%, Rio 2016, Tokyo 2020, and Paris 2024 more than doubled their budgets.
For the Winter Games, the largest cost overruns are Lake Placid 1980 at 324 percent in real terms followed
by Sochi 2014 at 289 percent. The smallest cost overrun for the Winter Games was found for Pyeong Chang
2018 at 2 percent, followed by Vancouver 2010 at 13 percent.
Again, we emphasise these are conservative figures. Observers of the Games have indicated that the
OCOGs’ final accounts are likely to understate the true cost of the Games, e.g., Tokyo 2020 (Zimbalist 2020,
Zimbalist et al. 2024) and Beijing 2008 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016, Flyvbjerg et al. 2021). Thus, the true overruns
are likely to be higher.
Table 5 compares the overruns of the Olympics with other capital projects. The data further stress the
financial and economic risk of hosting the Olympic Games because:
1. All Games, without exception, have cost overrun. For no other type of megaproject is this the case,
not even the construction of nuclear power plants or the storage of nuclear waste. For other capital
investment types, typically 10-60 percent of investments come in on or under budget. For the
Olympics, it is zero percent. It is worth considering this point carefully. A budget is typically
established at a reasonable maximum value to be spent on a capital investment. However, in the
Games the budget is more like a fictitious minimum that was never sufficient. Further, the host
guarantees that they will cover the cost overruns of the Games. Flyvbjerg et al. (2016) suggest that
this guarantee is akin to writing a blank check for the event, with certainty that the cost will be more
than what has been quoted. We called this the “Blank Check Syndrome.” In practice, the bid budget is
on average a 38% down payment; further instalments will follow, written on the blank check.
2. The Olympics have the second highest average cost overrun of any type of megaproject, at 159
percent in real terms. Only nuclear waste disposal projects have higher overrun at 238% in real terms.
11
To compare, nuclear power plants have the highest mean cost overrun after the Olympics at 120
percent. Despite frequent objections, the Games have nowhere near the degree of local opposition
that is typical for nuclear waste storage and nuclear power plants. Rather, the high cost overruns for
the Games may be related to the fixed deadline for delivery and fixed scope. The opening date cannot
be moved and scope is negotiated directly between the Athletes’ Federations and the IOC, neither of
whom have skin in the Game for any overspend. Therefore, when problems arise there can be no
trade-off between schedule, scope and cost, as is common for other megaprojects. All that OCOGs
can do is to allocate more money, which is what happens. This is the Blank Check Syndrome, again.
3. The high average cost overrun for the Games, combined with the existence of extreme values, should
be cause for caution for anyone considering hosting the Games, and especially small or fragile
economies with little capacity to absorb escalating costs and related debt (Flyvbjerg et al. 2021). A
one-in-five risk of a 50+ percent cost overrun of the Olympics should concern government officials
and taxpayers. Such overrun may have fiscal implications for decades to come, as happened with
Montreal where it took 30 years to pay off the debt incurred by the 720 percent cost overrun on the
1976 Summer Games (Vigor et al., 2004: 18), and Athens 2004 where Olympic cost overruns and
related debt exacerbated the 2007-17 financial and economic crises, as mentioned above (Flyvbjerg,
2011).
Table 5 Comparison of the cost overruns at the Olympics and other types of capital projects (real terms, local currencies).
Project Type
n
Mean cost
overrun
Percentage of
projects on
budget or below
Percentage of
projects with
cost overrun >
50%
Nuclear Storage
23
238%
9%
48%
Olympics
23
159%
0%
78%
Nuclear Power
196
120%
3%
55%
IT
5403
73%
59%
18%
Dam
334
71%
26%
35%
Aerospace
97
60%
9%
42%
Building
310
52%
29%
25%
Defence
132
49%
49%
18%
Nuclear Decommissioning
29
48%
21%
38%
Rail Station
70
43%
30%
24%
Rail
540
34%
29%
25%
Oil and Gas
101
32%
19%
18%
Stadium
51
32%
25%
16%
Mining
886
27%
51%
16%
Healthcare Infrastructure
102
19%
50%
11%
Steel Mill
19
19%
11%
5%
Thermal Power
189
18%
44%
13%
Road
2250
16%
42%
9%
Water
345
15%
40%
11%
Pipeline
412
14%
45%
6%
Wind Power
82
13%
45%
7%
Pumped Hydro
36
11%
39%
8%
Battery Storage
10
6%
40%
0%
Energy Transmission
54
5%
63%
4%
Solar Power
41
1%
61%
0%
Source: Oxford Projects Database Q2 2023
12
Have Cost Overruns Decreased?
In Flybjerg et al. (2016) we examined the impact of the Olympic Knowledge Sharing Program, which was first
used in Sydney 2000. We observed a decrease in cost overruns up to 2008 and saw anecdotal evidence of
increasing overruns after 2008. Now, with more data, we can statistically test this pattern.
Figure 4 shows historical trends with cost overrun on a log scale. We pooled the data because cost overrun is
not statistically significantly different between the Summer and Winter Games, as we saw above. The data
indicate a convex trend: Until 2008 cost overruns decreased and from 2010 it increased. Figure 5 formally
tests this impression with a segmented linear fit; the algorithm identifies 2008 as the most likely change point
with the change trends being statistically significant (bootstrapped p-values all < 0.02).
The data show, with statistical significance, that the Knowledge Sharing Program failed to reduce cost and
cost overrun at the Games. More fundamental interventions are needed.
Figure 4 Cost overruns for the Olympic Games 1968-2024 in real terms, local currencies, cost data shown as log10 and
trend fitted using local polynomial regressions.
Grenoble 1968
Montreal 1976
Lake Placid 1980
Sarajevo 1984
Calgary 1988
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002 Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008
Vancouver 2010
London 2012
Sochi 2014
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Beijing 2022
Paris 2024
1
3
10
1960 1980 2000 2020
Date of the Opening of the Games
Actual/estimated cost
13
Figure 5 Segmented fit and change-point analysis of the cost overruns of the Olympic Games 1968-2024 (estimated
change point and 95% confidence interval of the change point in red using Delta method).
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
1980 2000 2020
Date of opening ceremony
ln(actual/estimated cost)
14
Paris 2024
Paris was selected for the 2024 Games after a conventional bid that went awry because of several potential
hosts withdrawing, as mentioned above. Importantly, Paris 2024 is the first Games to extensively follow the
reuse and retrofit policy of Agenda 2020+5. The only new construction for Paris 2024 is the Aquatics Centre
and the Athlete’s Village (IOC 2024). We wanted to test whether the new policy has impacted cost and cost
overrun.
The latest cost estimate for Paris 2024 is USD 8.7 billion (2022 prices, real terms). This is USD 1.32 billion
more than the historic median for the Summer Games. It is lower, however, than the three most recent
Summer Games (Tokyo 2020/21, Rio 2016, London 2012), while it is higher than the three Games before that
(Beijing 2008, Athens 2004, Sydney 2000), as Figure 6 shows.
It may be that the shift to reuse/retrofit facilities has contributed to the lower costs for Paris 2024 compared
with the three previous Summer Games. But given that Paris 2024 is not in the low end of cost for all Games,
and given that the Paris costs are still an estimate that could end up higher, this conclusion is not particularly
convincing.
Moreover, so far Paris 2024 has had a 115% cost overrun in real terms, which places them in the middle
range of previous Summer Games, with a substantial risk of further overrun (see Figure 7).
In conclusion, costs have decreased for Paris 2024 compared with the three most recent previous Summer
Games. But Paris costs are still just an estimate, they are above other recent Games, and they are more than
a billion USD above the historical median cost. Moreover, the Paris decrease in cost has not happened at the
rate expected, which is attested by the cost overrun incurred. Paris 2024 is a first, however, in terms of
reuse/retrofit and perhaps it will take time before the new policy matures and becomes effective, meaning that
future Games could have lower costs than Paris. The IOC will certainly hope so in order to give potential host
cities less reason to walk away from the Games due to high costs.
Figure 6 Comparison of estimated cost for Paris 2024 (red, estimate) with actual outturn cost of previous Games 1990-
2022 (black), billion 2022 USD, real terms.
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002
Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008
Vancouver 2010
London 2012
Sochi 2014
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Beijing 2022
Paris 2024
3
10
30
Summer Winter
Type
Outturn cost (real terms, 2022 USD billions)
15
Figure 7 Comparison of cost overrun for Paris 2024 to date (red, estimate) with actual cost overrun for previous Games
(black), real terms.
Grenoble 1968
Montreal 1976
Lake Placid 1980
Sarajevo 1984
Calgary 1988
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002
Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008 Vancouver 2010
London 2012
Sochi 2014
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Beijing 2022
Paris 2024
1
3
5
Summer Winter
Type
Cost overrun (actual/estimated cost, real terms, local currency)
16
Future Games 2026-2034
The next Winter Games are Milano-Cortina 2026, the French Alps 2030, and Salt Lake City-Utah 2032. The
next two Summer Games are Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032. Table 6 shows the latest cost estimates
for these four Games.
Milano-Cortina 2026 shows the same pattern as Paris 2024 in the sense that (a) the estimated cost (2.6 billion
2022 USD) is higher than the historic median for all Winter Games by USD 420 million and (b) it is lower than
the cost of the most recent Winter Games in Beijing 2022 (USD 8.7 billion), Pyeong Chang 2018 (USD 3.4
billion), and Sochi 2016 (USD 28.9 billion), but (c) higher than Nagano 1998 (USD 2.2 billion) and Albertville
1992 (USD 2.1 billion). Similarly, current estimates for French Alps 2030 and Salt Lake City-Utah 2034 are
higher than the historic median but lower than recent extremes.
The similarity of Milano-Cortina with Paris continues with a large cost overrun, of 78% in real terms, so far.
This places Milano-Cortina in the middle range of previous Winter Games regarding cost overrun. Again, it
must be remembered that the cost for Milano-Cortina 2026 is an estimate that could end up significantly
higher, that is, with a higher cost overrun than the 78% recorded to date.
Table 6 Latest cost estimates and cost overruns of the Games 2026-2032. Estimates and overruns are likely to increase in
the future.
Games
Latest estimate in billion
2022 USD
Cost overrun
nominal terms
Cost overrun
real terms
Milano-Cortina 2026
2.6
102%
78%
Los Angeles 2028
5.9
28%
-5%
French Alps 2030
2.8-3.5
-
-
Brisbane 2032
3.6
44%
2%
Salt Lake City-Utah 2034
3.5
-
-
Further into the future we find Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032. Both Games have had escalating
budgets, Los Angeles from USD 5.3 billion to USD 6.8 billion, Brisbane from AUD 4.9 billion (USD 3.8 billion)
to AUD 7.1 billion (USD 4.7 billion). Both of the latest budgets include inflation provisions, while the original
budgets did not.
In Table 6, we used IMF and OECD forward inflation projections to calculate cost overrun incurred so far in
real terms. Removing inflation shows that Los Angeles could be the first Games ever to deliver under budget
(5% under budget in real terms). But this would only happen if the estimated budget were to remain
unchanged and US construction inflation to not run higher than the 2.6% forecasted by the OECD. Both of
those assumptions are big ifs when we look at the history of persistent cost overrun for the Games and
persistent construction cost inflation above other inflation. Similar considerations apply even more to Brisbane
2032, where, unlike Los Angeles, organisers are still debating venue options and their possible costs
(Messenger 2024). Such fundamental uncertainties make it likely that Brisbane will see further increases in
cost and cost overrun.
While the outturn costs of the future Games are highly uncertain, we do know the estimated bid cost for the
full period 1960 to 2032, more than 70 years total. Figure 8 shows those numbers. We emphasize that these
are all estimated cost and note an increase in bid budgets up to 2010 followed by a decrease. The regression
analysis illustrated in Figure 9 finds the change in trend to be statistically significant (all p < 0.001).
But what could possibly explain this marked shift in trend?
First, there might be a political bias in the data. Agenda 2020 intended to decrease the cost of the Games, but
17
without any real changes, which were only introduced with Agenda 2020+5. Zimbalist (2020) and Zimbalist et
al. (2024) document how the IOC put pressure on the Tokyo 2020/21 organizers to reduce the publicly stated
budgets below expert cost forecasts. Cost overrun followed cost underestimate, as always.
Second, optimism bias may also be present in the data. The budgets of both Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane
2032 are based on optimistic assumptions of (a) low future inflation and (b) no further scope changes. History
does not support these assumptions. Similarly, optimism is likely also present in assumptions of how effective
the reuse/retrofit policy will be. The estimates assume their effectiveness. But as we saw for Paris 2024 that
assumption may not hold up.
If the decrease in estimated cost after 2010 is indeed caused by such biases then the future is likely to bring
more cost overruns at the Games, not less, because overruns follow underestimates as surely as day follows
night.
Figure 8 Bid cost estimate of the Olympics 1960-2032 in billion 2022 USD, cost estimate data shown as log10 and trends
fitted for Summer and Winter Games using local polynomial regressions.
Rome 1960
Grenoble 1968
Montreal 1976
Lake Placid 1980
Calgary 1988
Seoul 1988
Albertville 1992
Barcelona 1992
Lillehammer 1994
Atlanta 1996
Nagano 1998
Sydney 2000
Salt Lake City 2002
Athens 2004
Torino 2006
Beijing 2008
Vancouver 2010
London 2012 Sochi 2014
Rio 2016
Pyeong Chang 2018
Tokyo 2020
Beijing 2022 Paris 2024
Milano − Cortina 2026
Los Angeles 2028
Brisbane 2032
French Alps 2030
Salt Lake City−Utah 2034
0.1
1.0
10.0
1970 1990 2010
Date of Host Selection
Bid Cost Estimate (2022 USD, billions)
Summer Winter
18
Figure 9 Change-point analysis and segmented fit of the bid cost estimates for the Summer and Winter Games 1960-2032
(estimated change points and 95% confidence interval of the change points in red using delta method.
0
1
2
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Date of bid award
Estimated cost at bid (2022 USD, real terms)
Summer Games
−2
−1
0
1
2
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Date of bid award
Winter Games
19
What More Can Be Done?
After many years of debate, finally, there seems to be a growing consensus that the Olympics tend to be
expensive and run over budget. There is also increasing agreement regarding what the numbers for cost and
cost overrun are for each Games. Now that these facts are no longer swept under the carpet, we can begin to
focus on improving the situation.
A first improvement would be better planning. Our longstanding advocacy for the use of historical data in
decision-making is rooted in its ability to enhance the quality of decisions by reducing bias (Flyvbjerg 2006).
Kahneman et al. (2021, pp. 326-27) call this 'decision hygiene' and it comes highly recommended with solid
proof of its efficacy. However, this practice is contingent upon the availability of valid data. Historically,
unfortunately neither host cities nor the IOC have been conducive to producing such data. Sometimes quite
the opposite. For example, the Rio 2016 Games have yet to submit their final accounts, while Tokyo 2020/21
has provided data that align better with the true cost than pre-event estimates, though uncertainties persist for
Tokyo, too.
Enhancing the quality of data necessitates a commitment to transparency, which has not traditionally been
part of IOC culture. While some progress has been made in this area, the inclination to present
underestimated costs persists, as we saw above. To truly improve, complete costs must be shared,
encompassing private contributions and non-OCOG budgets. The IOC should take the lead in this by
transparently capturing data on the cost of the Games. This is particularly important given the potential cost
savings from venue reuse/retrofit and the use of temporary venues, which the IOC recommends but which
have yet to be quantified and monitored.
Second, the new practice of non-committed dialogue for selecting host cities has extended the preparation
time for the Games. Los Angeles and Brisbane, for instance, have 12 years to prepare compared to the usual
8 years. Our study underscores the significant challenge that inflation poses for projects of this magnitude
over such a long time horizon. Given that provisions for inflation are standard practice for other megaprojects,
it should also be a mandated component of future Games budgets, or the budgets will continue to be
misleading, and the more misleading the longer the planning period, other things being equal.
Third, planners need to be more realistic about the uncertainties that projects as large as the Olympics face.
Figure 6 shows the cost and cost overrun distributions for the Olympic Games 1968-2024. Half of the Games
had a cost overrun of more than 118% in real terms, the other half less than that. For planning purposes, this
means that if the funder of the Games had a risk appetite that accepts a 50% chance of overrun, then a 118%
contingency would need to be added to the bid cost estimate to arrive at a realistic budget, still with a 50% risk
of going over that budget. If the funder had a lower risk appetite, say 20%, then 273% would need to be
added, as a historical fact.
This approach to using historical data assumes that the next Olympics will perform like previous ones. While
this is not the intention of anyone involved, history shows that unfortunately it is a prudent assumption for
forecasters and decision makers. Other megaprojects use something called the “20-50-70 approach”: They
evaluate the economic benefits case for their project at a 20% risk appetite (resulting in a 273% contingency
for the Games), they budget for the project at a 50% risk appetite (118% contingency), and finally set a stretch
target for the delivery team, to put pressure on them to perform, at a 70% risk appetite (72% contingency).
The Olympics need to learn from approaches like this, which are standard elsewhere for project types that
have been forced to take cost and cost overrun more seriously than the Games.
20
Figure 10 Reference class forecast of the cost risk of the Olympic Games, real terms.
These realistic contingencies exceed the typical 10-15% in the Games' budgets, which history has proven to
be are fairy-tale optimistic, over and over. The first big question that potential hosts need to ask of the Games
is therefore: Do the benefits make economic sense even if costs quadruple? If not, how can we increase the
benefits?
A further obvious question is: How can we overcome history and outperform historical costs and cost
overruns? Our analysis shows that reuse/retrofit of existing venues might reduce costs, but so far not to the
degree anticipated by budgets. To bring realism into budgets, we need detailed sharing of data and
experience about the actual cost savings from reuse and retrofit. Realistic budgets will also help reduce cost
overruns. Emerging data show that the cost savings fall short of targets to make the Games affordable.
Additional ideas and more work are needed.
Agenda 2020+5 established a focus on events. These may be considered the Games' modular building blocks
(Flyvbjerg 2021, Flyvbjerg and Gardner 2023). Positive learning curves from reusing and repeating modules,
over and over, are needed for effective improvement, both at the level of the building blocks (the events) and
at the level of integrating all necessary building blocks (the Games).
The biggest objection we hear to reusing and repeating modules is the mental image of prefabricated 1970s-
1980s housing projects. But nothing could be further from the truth with today's technology, materials, and
build quality. An exciting challenge is how to make each edition of the Games iconic at significantly lower cost
and cost overrun than we have seen to date. This can be done, but for it to happen the IOC and hosts need to
change their tack and become more innovative in their approach to delivering the Games.
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
150%
175%
200%
225%
250%
275%
300%
325%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Risk appetite for a cost overrun
Required cost contingency (%)
21
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Allison Stewart, University of Oxford, for commenting on an earlier draft
of the paper; Giuseppe Sassano, UCL, for supporting data collection; and Mariagrazia Zottoli,
University of Oxford, for checking the statistical analyses.
Author Statement
The authors are listed alphabetically based on equal contributions to the paper.
22
Appendix A: Previous Studies
Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) conducted the first systematic study of cost and cost overrun at the Olympic
Games, expanding on previous work by Chappelet (2002), Essex and Chalkley (2004), and Preuss (2004).
This research was further extended in Flyvbjerg et al. (2016) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2021). Today, cost studies
of the Games attract sustained and broad attention in both research, policy, and practice.
Since 2012, additional studies problematized Olympic costs and cost overruns (e.g., Zimbalist 2015, Baade
and Matheson 2016). Research has also documented the cost and overruns of Rio 2016 (Zimbalist 2016) and
Tokyo 2020/21 (Waldenberger 2020). These studies show a continuation of the "high cost and large cost
overrun" pattern documented in Flyvbjerg et al. (2021), Flyvbjerg et al. (2016), and Flyvbjerg and Stewart
(2012).
In Flyvbjerg et al. (2021), we discovered that a Pareto distribution with infinite mean and variance best
describes cost overrun for the Games. Mathematically-statistically, the power law explains why the Games are
so difficult to plan and manage successfully: with infinite mean and variance conventional forecasting quite
simply does not work. Substantively, we explained this convex outcome by the irreversibility of the hosting
decision; the fixed deadlines that apply to the Games unlike to other project types;3 something we called the
"Blank Check Syndrome;" tight coupling; long planning horizons; and finally, an "Eternal Beginner Syndrome."
Preuss et al. (2019 and previously Preuss 2004) contained the first economic analyses of multiple Games.
Preuss found that since 1972, every Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which leads the
planning of the Games in the host city, has produced a balanced budget. However, the study excluded sports-
related investments such as venues. Others, including us, have argued that such investments should be
included in cost analyses of the Games (Müller et al. 2021).
Recently, the debate has converged. Preuss and Weitzmann (2023, p. 471) now conclude, using more
extensive sources than OCOG budgets, that "cost overruns occur at all Games". However, the reasons for
overruns and their sizes are still contested (Weitzmann and Preuss 2023).
The debate over cost and cost overrun has further led to questions of sustainability. Cost is an essential
indicator of the economic sustainability of the Games. Müller et al. created a database of megaevents
covering the Olympics and Football World Cups (2022a), which found that these megaevents suffer from a
persistent and systematic negative return on investment independent of the local context of decisions, project
delivery, and economic cycles (Müller et al. 2022b). Müller et al. also questioned the Games' ecological,
social, and economic sustainability. Their data show a declining trend toward less sustainable Games (Müller
et al. 2021). Subsequent analysis of Tokyo 2020/21 documented improvements in
environmental sustainability through a reduction in the number of constructed venues, reduced visitor
footprint, and reduced number of attendees. Nevertheless, economic sustainability suffered because the
share of private co-finance decreased, while the economic benefits are still unclear as they depend on the
long-term viability of venues (Trendafilova et al. 2022).
Similarly, Leeds et al. (2022) found that economic benefits are often lower than expected because of
substitution, crowding out, and leakage effects. Winner's curse and all-or-nothing demand curves are why
cities decide to host mega events that make little economic sense, argue Little et al.
Contrary to these studies, Firgo (2021) established a significant boost for the regional GDP per capita for
hosts of the Summer Olympics (but not the Winter Olympics) compared to applicant hosts who failed in their
bids.
Research has also critically examined the upcoming Olympic Games, Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028.
Lauermann (2022) traces the urban planning history of Games hosted in the US. The study finds no American
3 It should be noted that, for the first time, Tokyo 2020 saw a delay in the Games due to the Covid-19
pandemic. Thus, the mean schedule overrun of the Olympic Games is no longer 0% but 0.34%.
23
exceptionalism and shows no other host could repeat the supposedly successful LA 1984 model.4 American
hosts experienced cost overrun like everyone else, realised only weak economic gains, and saw politically
damaging protests like Chicago's bid for the 2016 Olympics and Boston's bid for the 2024 Games. Lauermann
found no support for the argument that the Olympics can achieve economic growth through public-private
partnering and cost control. Instead, hidden cost overruns and public sector subsidies are the norm.
Moreover, urban planning has changed from a primary focus on economic growth to include a broader set of
policy goals.
In sum, previous academic research on cost and cost overrun for the Olympic Games shows:
1. The issue of cost and cost overrun with the Games is now firmly accepted, which was not the case
earlier;
2. Issues of cost and cost overrun have bearing on the sustainability of the Games;
3. The lack of sustainability of its flagship events is a critical, and acknowledged, challenge in keeping
the Olympic Movement alive;
4. Attempts to reform the Games are underway but their impact remains to be seen.
4 "Supposedly" because data have never been made available that documents that Los Angeles 1984 was in
fact successful in terms of cost and cost overrun.
24
Appendix B: Measuring Cost and Cost Overrun
Our method for measuring cost overrun is documented in Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) and Flyvbjerg et al.
(2016, 2021). In short, we collected data on
1. Operational costs incurred by the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) for "staging"
the Games. The most significant components of this budget are technology, transportation,
workforce, and administration, while other costs include security, catering, ceremonies, and medical
services. These may be considered the variable costs of staging the Games and are formally called
"OCOG costs" by the IOC, and
2. Direct capital costs incurred by the host city or country or private investors to build the competition
venues, Olympic village(s), and international media and broadcast centre required to host the
Games. These are the direct capital costs of hosting the Games and are formally called "non-OCOG
direct costs."
Our data exclude indirect capital costs such as road, rail, airport infrastructure, hotel upgrades, or other
business investments incurred in preparation for the Games but not directly related to staging the Games.
These are wider capital costs, they are formally called "non-OCOG indirect costs," and typically they are
substantial.
We sourced estimated costs from the candidature files. We collected actual costs from the final accounts
published after the Games, which are accessible at the Olympic World Library (Olympics Study Centre n.d.).
Two exceptions are noteworthy:
1. Rio 2016 has yet to publish its final accounts. The latest estimates for actual cost were taken from
the OCOG's published budgets and from accounts at relevant federal and local agencies.
2. For Paris 2024, we used the estimated budget of EUR 8.8 billion, as reported in January 2024
(Menocal Pareja 2024), when the preparations were more than 80% complete (Munana 2024). It
should be emphasized again that judged by history there is a real risk that final outturn cost for Paris
2024 could end up higher than this estimate.
Milano-Cortina 2026, Los Angeles 2028, French Alps 2030, Brisbane 2032, and Salt Lake City-Utah 2032 are
still preparing for the Games. We collected the latest budgets from the organizers' announcements. Los
Angeles 2028 did not disclose a comprehensive budget in the candidature files, but cost estimates were
sourced from public announcements at the launch of their bid. French Alps 2030 and Salt Lake City-Utah
2032 have yet to be officially selected, as such their candidature files are not public yet. Again, we collected
data from the announcements made at the bid submission. It should be noted that French Alps 2030 is
particularly vague with regard to venue costs, estimated between USD 0.7 and 1.4 billion.
We collected data for all Olympics between 1960 and 2024 (n=34). For 25 Games, data on estimated costs
were available, and for 31 Games, data on actual costs were available.
To calculate cost overrun, we first removed inflation from actual cost data, which is reported in nominal terms,
using GDP Deflators (World Bank, 2023a). Then, we calculated overrun as actual divided by estimated cost in
local currencies in the constant price levels used in the respective candidature files.
For the cost analysis, we converted all local currencies into USD using average annual exchange rates
provided by the World Bank (2023b). For the future Olympics, we used the latest 2023 average annual
exchange rates to the USD, the IMF's GDP-deflation predictions for 2023 and 2024 for Paris (IMF 2023), and
the long-range GDP deflator forecast by the OECD (2024) for Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032.
The method of treating the data is consistent with previous results in Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) and
Flyvbjerg et al. (2016, 2021). The underlying GDP deflators and exchange rates are the only updates.
25
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