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The Mechanics of Spaceborne Warfare:
Integrating Stealth Technology in Orbital Assets
Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Cyber/Electronic Operations and Warfare
Table of Contents
1. Disclaimer
2. Document Identifier
3. Dedication
▪ Introduction
▪ The Principles of Spaceborne Warfare
• Precision
• Guarantee
• Continuity
• Consistency
• Interoperability
• Integration
• M2 Factor
• Protection
• Independent Balanced Access
▪ Orbital Suppression principle
• STAP (Smart Target Acquisition Protocol)
• DHS (Direct Harmonized Suppression)
• MOTC (Maneuverable Orbital Targeting Components)
• AID (Adaptive Integration and Development)
▪ Stealth in the Concept of Force Protection
▪ Understanding Stealth Technology
• Primary Design Concepts (Passive)
• Secondary Design Add-ons (Passive)
• Active Stealth Components
▪ The Concept of Stealth in Spaceborne Warfare
▪ Satellite Detection, Identification and Tracking
• Terrestrial Based Radar Tracking
• Optical Tracking
• Hybrid Tracking and Signal Mapping
• Radio and Communication Tracking
• Space Based Sensory Detectors
• Suborbital Detection
• MASINT, SIGIN, ELINT, CYBER and Intelligence Operatives
▪ Understanding the Detection and Tracking Methodology
▪ Incorporating Stealth into Spaceborne Assets Design and Development
▪ Introducing Spaceborne Mission Control Hubs (SMCH)
▪ Adapting the Use of Active Spaceborne Decoys
▪ References
DISCLAIMER
The contents of this paper are exclusively formulated by the author and do not reflect or utilize the views or data from any United States
government entity, agency, or institution. The objective of this paper is to present the fundamental concepts, limitations, and factual
insights pertaining to its title and the associated subject matter. It is important to clarify that the author has no affiliation with any
governmental military or intelligence agency. Therefore, any attribution of the author's work to such entities is unfounded and without
merit.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFIER
CopyrightⒸ and Author’s Notice
Author: Adib Enayati, Ph.D. —Cyber/Electronic Operations and Warfare
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Date of Publishing: 05/30/2024—00:00 EST
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This notice is in effect as of May 30, 2024, 00:00 Zulu time.
//RELTO/P00
To the brave men and women who serve and protect the United States’ interests in the vast
expanse of space, your unwavering dedication, pioneering spirit, and relentless pursuit of
excellence inspire us to push the boundaries of innovation and technology.
May this work contribute to the advancement of your mission and the continued security and
superiority of the United States’ space capabilities.
Introduction
As we delved into the role of satellites in the
previous paper, titled “The Mechanics of
Spaceborne Warfare: Exploring Anti-
Satellite Operations,” we established the
indispensable role of satellites in today’s
military networks and how the Space-based
ISR assets are crucial for any modern
military networks. Satellites play roles from
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance) to communications and
strategic navigation, which enable the
guidance and precision of many of the United
States arsenal. We also discussed the role of
satellites in enabling many disciplines of
Intelligence such as MASINT
(Measurements and Signatures
Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic
Intelligence), SIGINT (Signals Intelligence),
IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), GEOINT
(Geospatial Intelligence), and FISINT
(Foreign Instrumentation Signals
Intelligence).
Anti-satellite operations and warfare are a
vast subject that has not really changed much
since its conception, which is why I
introduced the novel concept of orbital
suppression in the paper titled, “The
Mechanics of Spaceborne Warfare:
Redefining Orbital Suppression Dynamics.”
The concept of orbital suppression gave a
new definition to anti-satellite operations
and warfare, a concept with its own
principles that changed our perception of
modern spaceborne warfare. The principles
that we have defined for spaceborne warfare
gave a whole new practical understanding to
the subject in discussion, and as I introduced
its enhanced principles in orbital
suppression, we outlined the future of
spaceborne operations and warfare.
In this paper, I will be introducing the
integration and incorporation of stealth
technology into future spaceborne assets.
However, before we can get there, we should
cover a lot of ground and delve into the past,
as well as the concepts surrounding the
introduction of stealth in satellite designs
and spaceborne warfare.
My determination on ensuring the absolute
superiority of the United States in space is
very much the core driving factor for this
paper, as I aim to lay the foundation for a
new concept in satellite design. Much like
any meaningful advancement in history, this
is an interdisciplinary approach. You must
have the knowledge of advanced aerospace
engineering, as well as electronic warfare,
radar design, material science, military
science, intelligence, and cyber operations.
The concept aims to encourage the design
and development of several key components
before one is able to design a “Stealth”
satellite that can live up to its name and
purpose. This subject requires further
investment and development if we are to
build the next generation of spaceborne
assets with the objective of “Absolute
Superiority of the United States” in sight.
First, we will dive into the spaceborne
warfare principles for both anti-satellite
operations and the novel concept of orbital
suppression, and then move on to
introducing stealth technology while
understanding how adversarial detection
works and finally painting the picture of the
concept of stealth satellite design. I dare to
deviate and introduce the novel concept of
the use of Spaceborne Mission Control Hubs
(SMCHs) and active spaceborne decoys in
order to enrich the subject of spaceborne
warfare at the end. Since this paper is a
public release, I must refrain from expanding
on some of the concepts that I introduce to
maintain a veil of secrecy in the interest of
national security. Therefore, I may not dive
deep into some subjects and do a detailed
How-to as I aim to introduce this concept in
the favor of the United States and not its
sworn adversaries.
I, once again, would like to emphasize the
importance of the expansion of redundant
terrestrial capabilities to ensure the
preservation of force-protection principle,
and to ensure that the United States can
maintain its strategic capabilities in any
theater conditions as adversaries focus on
the development of the capabilities to target
the United States’ spaceborne assets and
capabilities. It is paramount to understand
the adversarial aim and planning as well as
monitoring their capabilities and capacities,
and it is paramount to begin the
development of the next generation
spaceborne assets to maintain the
technological gaps between the United States
and its adversaries.
The Principles of Spaceborne Warfare
Much like any military operations; the core
principles of war apply in any mission
planning. However, the Spaceborne warfare
has its own core principles. While the
essence of the military operation is the same,
the very nature of the space-borne
operations and warfare demanded its own
principles. I established the following core
principles in “The mechanics of spaceborne
warfare: Exploring Anti-Satellite
Operations”:
▪ Precision: Any kinetic and non-kinetic
action has its own consequences.
Precision implies the importance of
targeting what we want while inflicting
minimum unwanted damage to others.
Precision is highly regarded in the
modern electronic warfare because as we
aim to target the adversarial capabilities,
while safeguarding our own. So,
precision while can be resource
exhaustive, must be implemented unless
the theater requires otherwise.
▪ Guarantee: The operation should
guarantee to achieve the laid-out
objectives. Regardless of what we do or
the theater, the principles of war apply.
We have to manage our EOF (economy of
force) while ensuring mission success as
prescribed by the mission objectives.
▪ Continuity: The ability to target the
adversarial capabilities must be
continuous and the components of the
mission must be able to operate with
continuity. None-Kinetic options are
extremely important as they have the
potential for operational continuity yet
they are dependent and limited by the
energy factor. We must ensure the
operational continuity in our designs and
engagements. Managing the resources
are extremely important in maintaining a
steady combat capability.
▪ Consistency: The Components must be
able to achieve results with consistency.
This emphasizes the important of
understanding the adversarial defensive
capabilities in a continuous manner in
order to be able to maintain the offensive
capabilities.
▪ Interoperability: The abilities,
hardware, weapon systems and human
resources should be employable and
operable by all branches of the armed
forces. This will enhance the combat
capacities across the armed forces
spectrum and ensures mission success
especially if regulated None-Kinetic
options are authorized for wider use by
all the components.
▪ Integration: The existing concepts,
strategies, abilities, hardware and
weapon systems must be integrated into
all branches of the armed forces to
maximize their combat readiness and
protection.
▪ M2 factor: This refers to the Mass and
Mixture, the weapon systems and the
concepts used should have the power and
the effective mixture to be combat
effective against the adversarial
capabilities at all times. The redundancy
in the offensive capabilities is extremely
important.
▪ Protection: Regardless of what we do to
achieve our combat objectives, one of our
primary goals is force protection. Our
operations, concepts and planning
should consider the survival and
continuity of the friendly capabilities at
all times.
▪ Independent Balanced Access: As I
have written about the concept of a
resilient and redundant COC several
times in the past, we should understand
that the adversaries are aiming to achieve
the same objectives as ours. While they
might achieve some levels of success, all
regional commands must have the ability
to utilize the Anti-satellite warfare
independently while being able to protect
the friendly capabilities. This will
enhance the survivability and combat
effectiveness should the necessity arise.
However, strong protocols should be in
place and as we have already established,
ensuring that the friendly and adversarial
“strategic” protocols are not disrupted
should be a fundamental principle.
Orbital Suppression is a new concept in
spaceborne warfare. The concept would
utilize hybrid technology rather than pure
kinetic and non-kinetic methods to suppress
the entire orbit in a tactical or strategic
manner. This new modern approach, in
contrast to the classical spaceborne warfare,
presented a new range of options. The
following Enhanced Principles in “The
Mechanics of Spaceborne Warfare:
Redefining Orbital Suppression Dynamics”
have been introduced to support the concept
and the future developments for the
operations supported by this concept:
▪ STAP (Smart Target Acquisition
Protocol): This core principle works
based on the adversarial spaceborne
command and control dynamics.
Since we are still focusing on a
geographical area opposed to the
orbit itself, targeting the right area
that can tactically contain the
components of the adversarial C6ISR
is the key. This would recommend the
target area to be the Uplinks, Mission
Control Centers, Command and
Control Infrastructure and Fixed
Strategic Missile Silos, Adversarial
Communication Relays as well as
mobile components which are
enabling field tactical access to the
existing strategic network. By
digesting this principle, a target bank
can be constructed based on the
order of battle in any theater.
▪ DHS (Direct Harmonized
Suppression): In the previous
paper we have established that the
adversaries have a special focus
towards their terrestrial capabilities
and capacities in the absence of
superior spaceborne capabilities and
as a redundant protocol. The success
of the orbital suppression missions
demands the kinetic and none-
kinetic destruction or disruption of
the adversarial terrestrial capabilities
across the theater to ensure that full
suppression can be achieved as the
adversarial terrestrial capabilities are
core components of their redundancy
protocols, identifying and targeting
the terrestrial capabilities via kinetic
and none-kinetic means is essential
to a successful orbital suppression
mission. This will ensure the full
termination of any redundant
protocols in place. This, however, can
be achieved by tactical or strategic
approaches.
▪ MOTC (Maneuverable Orbital
Targeting Components):
Mobility and developing mobile
components are essential for
strategic and tactical orbital
suppression. Mobile capabilities
guarantee maneuverability and
therefore rapid deployment and
redeployment as required by the
theater. Maneuverability and
sustainability are a very important
factor when it comes to the design of
military equipment. Mobile and self-
sustainable systems are capable of
conducting missions in an extended
time and rage and therefore support
other principles of the warfare and
spaceborne warfare.
▪ AID (Adaptive Integration and
Development): Building
Multipurpose weapon systems
should be a standard protocol. The
suppression weapon systems can be
incorporated into the existing
platform and can have a universal
modular design concept. This cuts
both ways, part for suppression and
part to support the redundancy of the
friendly capabilities to combat any
form of adversarial suppression. This
will ensure that the preservation of
the friendly capacities at all times.
This, however, demands great
mobility.
As you might have noticed by reading the
previous papers, the principle of “Force-
Protection” is the fundamental principle in
any spaceborne operation. The ability to
preserve friendly capabilities while being
able to disrupt adversarial capabilities
remains a key focus and challenge, which is
why I placed great emphasis on the
enhancement of terrestrial and temporary
suborbital redundancies. The force
protection concept has a far broader aim
than just preserving friendly assets and
capabilities. The emphasis is also on
spaceborne asset survivability as much as the
preservation of friendly capabilities, as both
have a direct correlation with each other.
Stealth in the Concept of Force
Protection
The current focus of this paper is the
introduction of stealth technology for
spaceborne assets. Incorporating stealth
technology will enhance the survivability of
spaceborne assets and therefore contribute
to the principle of “Force Protection.” There
are, however, serious challenges with regards
to this concept that we will address as we
introduce it.
It is also important to understand the stealth
technology itself, which is why we will take a
short time to introduce and digest it. Part of
the reason that stealth has never been
incorporated in space has a direct
relationship with the needs and
requirements for spaceborne assets. As
adversaries have evolved and developed their
arsenal to combat the United States’
spaceborne assets, the need for protection
for these assets has increased rapidly.
We have covered the concepts of anti-
satellite warfare thoroughly in the first paper
(“The Mechanics of Spaceborne Warfare:
Exploring Anti-Satellite Operations”) and we
are not going to expand on them here.
However, I would dare to say that applying
the concept of stealth in an asset-specific
manner would enhance asset survivability
against kinetic and non-kinetic techniques.
Take note that espionage and cyber
operations and warfare still remain a
challenge for the protection of spaceborne
assets.
Understating Stealth Technology
I would define stealth as a mantra of active
and passive techniques and technologies
which enable assets to remain undetected by
the detection assets of an adversary. Take
note that stealth in any way does not mean
invisible; the incorporation of stealth into an
asset will only make it hard to detect, as
adversarial assets in stealth detection are
limited. The cost and complexity of the
detection of stealth assets are high for the
adversaries, and the United States’
advancement in stealth technology has
enabled it to produce great stealth assets
which have become a focus for the
adversaries.
I have mentioned that stealth has active and
passive components. The passive
components of stealth technology can be
broken down into “Primary Design
Concepts” and “Secondary Design Add-ons.”
We will break down these two shortly, and I
try to simplify the concepts as much as
possible.
Primary Design Concepts (PASSIVE):
As we are designing any airborne or
spaceborne object, we start with the design of
the physical features. The science behind
stealth design is not so simple when it comes
to cost effectiveness as well as the
functionality of the designed platform.
Understanding the interaction of radar and
radio waves with the material to symmetrical
design that will aid the dispersion or
absorption of incoming radio waves and
balancing the design with functionality and
cost is the actual challenge. The stealth
design would avoid right angles and cavities
that can reflect or become the propagator of
standing waves, which is why we usually put
a lid on everything and try to cover
everything within the airframe of the object.
Further on, we have to create symmetry,
which is nothing short of an art in design. As
I have been describing this, you probably
were imagining the airframes of the superior
F22-Raptor or the F35; Keeping the shape
and concepts in mind for a fighter jet, the
length and shape of wings and control
surfaces are extremely important as well. If
you notice, both jets have a cone shape
contributing to lowering their RCS (Radar
Cross Section). Their control surfaces are
designed to avoid Rayleigh Scattering. A
fighter jet requires evading a wide array of
radar systems, which is why its design has to
be balanced. Remember, Stealth does not
mean invisible to radar; it is just harder to
detect at certain frequencies and sometimes
it is invisible to certain frequencies.
However, as a fighter jet or a bomber has to
remain undetected to a wide range of
terrestrial and airborne assets, active stealth
components are incorporated. Take note that
as we aim to introduce several design
components for spaceborne assets, it is
paramount to understand that incorporating
stealth into spaceborne assets will have far
more implications on asset functionality and
cost, not to mention the cost of deployment
into orbit.
▪ Secondary Design Add-ons
(PASSIVE): Passive design
components alone are not going to
create a fully functional stealth
design. Once again, I would like to
bring your attention towards the
known stealth assets such as the F22-
Raptor and the B2-Sprit. The
secondary design add-ons involve
coating and composite materials. The
composite materials as carbon fiber
reduce the RCS greatly especially if
they are used for wings and control
surfaces. The use of RAM (Radar
Absorbing Materials) is an important
part of the design add-ons. Take note
that in a fighter jet; the main causes
of standing waves are the engine
intakes and the canopy which is why
the canopy has to be coated with
special materials. The use of the
composite materials will also greatly
reduce the conductive surface area of
the object (Utilizing Maxwell’s
Theory) to reduce the reflecting
surfaces of the craft. Since the subject
of this paper has a special focus on
the satellites, we will not be
dissecting the RAMs and the coating
materials in depth; however, it is
extremely important to understand
that the RAMs and Coatings are very
expensive and have a short lifespan
which is why the stealth jets usually
“Shed Skin” after a while and
therefore maintenance is required to
reapply the coating on the surface of
the planes. While so, we will not be
having the luxury of doing the same
kind of maintenance for the
spaceborne assets. It is impractical to
use traditional RAMs and Coatings
for the spaceborne assets. Take note
applying traditional RAMs and
Coatings to any spaceborne assets
will increase the weight of the asset
greatly and therefore increasing the
cost of the deployment of the asset as
well as shortening its lifecycle.
Furthermore, we will not do the
subject justice if we ignore the optical
stealth component of camouflage for
terrain masquerading.
As we briefly delved into the passive
components of the stealth mantra, we now
understand the challenges surrounding the
integration of stealth technology in
spaceborne assets. However, these
challenges are relatively easy to overcome
with the integration of active stealth
components into the design. At the end of the
day, we have to balance the design and the
cost. Space missions are not cheap; while we
have made great advancements in making
the cost of space missions more balanced and
cheaper, every mission comes at great
logistical costs. Additive manufacturing
plays a vital role in keeping space missions
cost-effective, but the design and
development of a space asset are still high.
▪ Active Stealth Components:
Active stealth components are a work
of art. The DRFM (Digital
Radiofrequency Memory) technology
has enabled manufacturers to
produce a wide range of
countermeasures as well as active
stealth components. You need to
have a basic understanding of radar
systems as well as the principles of
interference to comprehend this
small subject. Radar is short for
Radio Detection and Ranging. It
propagates radio waves to the target
and analyzes the reflected signal.
Unlike sound, radio waves are what
we call transverse waves. While
sound requires a medium (AIR),
transverse waves (e.g., radio waves)
do not require a medium, and they
can travel at the speed of light in the
atmosphere, which makes them
suitable for radar applications.
However, the frequency of the radar
and its interaction with the Earth’s
atmosphere is an in-depth concept of
its own, which has led to the
development of OTH (Over the
Horizon) and Space Monitoring
Radars. There are many concepts
that enable a radar system to become
what it is. The radar pulse, signal
processing, and Doppler frequency
mechanics are basic concepts that
enable the development of advanced
radar systems. Since we are not in a
radar design course, we will not be
diving into those concepts. If you are
familiar with the principles of wave
interference, you would understand
that radio waves (and all forms of
waves, even sound waves) follow this.
The active components are capable of
recording the incoming radar pulses
and generating canceling waves,
which will in effect cancel or disrupt
the incoming radar pulse in order to
prohibit the transmission of the radar
pulse from the plane, and therefore
blend in with the noise floor below
the radar detection threshold (also
known as the Signal to Noise Ratio of
the radar system). This can be done
to the search and detection radars as
well as targeting and firing solution
radar systems. There are several
active components that grant the
stealth plane the ultimate capability
to avoid radar detection. Remember,
stealth does not mean invisible and
doesn’t grant invincibility to an asset.
Aside from the DRFM, which is the
foundation of modern stealth, this
category involves active cancellation
devices designed to emit canceling
waves to create interference with
radar signals, Electromagnetic
Cloaking Techniques involving the
use of materials that can essentially
bend electromagnetic waves around
an object and make it undetectable to
certain frequencies, plasma stealth,
and ultimately adaptive radar
absorption materials. These are
comprehensive topics in active
stealth technology and have practical
applications in this paper. However,
due to the sensitivity of the subject, I
refrain from expanding on these
subjects further.
By now, we have delved into the concept of
stealth, and as you understand, it is a
complex yet easy-to-navigate concept.
Stealth design is a force multiplier that can
increase asset survivability and greatly
contribute to mission success. Combining
stealth technology will make spaceborne
assets harder to detect and track by
adversaries, therefore directly contributing
to the force protection principle and
protecting the assets. In the next section, we
are going to dive into satellite detection,
identification, and tracking, as
understanding these concepts is crucial for
any individual who is planning to
incorporate stealth design into future
platforms. Stealth can be interpreted as a
form of hardening the assets as well.
The Concept of Stealth in Spaceborne
Warfare
Incorporating stealth into spaceborne asset
design can introduce a whole new concept of
the fog of war in spaceborne warfare. The
stealth concepts will also help protect these
critical assets and their missions. I have
always prioritized the absolute superiority of
the United States in the final frontier above
all considerations. However, this does not
mean blind deployment and development of
space-borne assets. If we break down the
spaceborne assets, I would categorize them
into two categories:
▪ ISR/Communication Assets
▪ Weaponized Assets
Both series of assets must be present to
contribute to United States supremacy in
space, and one cannot exist without the
protection of the other. Stealth design is
needed to protect both categories of assets
with different configurations. Perhaps
maintaining the fog of war, itself is a
contributing factor to force protection.
Adversaries should work hard to gather
intelligence with the lowest rate of success.
Spaceborne assets are the backbone of any
modern military networks, and defending
them is becoming more complicated every
day. By introducing stealth into the design of
space-borne assets, we might increase costs,
but we create the new generation of
spaceborne assets. This is not just about
passive and active stealth components. The
concept itself, as we will explore, addresses
far more complex concepts for the creation
and protection of next-generation space
assets that can guarantee the fog of war
remains in the favor of the United States and
keeps stretching the technological gap
between the United States and its
adversaries. It is now about balancing costs
and lifecycles with individual asset
superiority, which is a contributing factor to
overall dominance in space.
Furthermore, we need to consider the use of
stealth in single assets or asset
constellations. While I encourage the use of
the stealth concept, I suggest this concept
remain asset specific until the full design and
development lifecycle are researched and
developed. This is a major leap in satellite
design, and when such a major leap is
discussed in the development of critical
strategic assets, caution is often advised to
avoid unwanted complications or mishaps.
The stealth technology itself is well known
and researched, but the integration of the
technology must be balanced with
operational and logistical limitations.
I believe that this concept defines the future
of satellite design. I believe that this concept,
much like orbital suppression, will usher in a
new era of spaceborne warfare as we muster
and master our capabilities, and I am
confident that the United States will pioneer
this development as it always has.
Satellite Detection, Identification and
Tracking
While we are discussing the concept of
stealth in spaceborne assets, one must
understand the limitations of spaceborne
asset detection. Detection of spaceborne
assets starts from the moment of the
preplanned launch of the asset. As we have
established in the previous papers, tracking
adversarial satellite launches is an important
factor in enabling the establishment of a
robust detection strategy. Unlike civilian
satellites, military satellites do not announce
their identification and position publicly for
tracking. As satellites are the backbone of
United States strategic capabilities, it is only
fair to assume that adversaries are carefully
observing and tracking every mission launch
in the United States. However, the concept of
satellite detection consists of:
▪ Terrestrial Based Radar
Tracking: Ground-based radar
systems are designed to track high-
altitude objects following specific
patterns. We know that for a vector to
break orbit, there are specific
requirements, and each stage can be
monitored via ground-based radar
tracking stations. Do not get
confused; there are many radar
systems designed to cover high
altitudes and azimuths. These radars
usually operate in UHF (300 MHz to
3 GHz), L-Band (1 GHz to 2 GHz), S-
Band (2 GHz to 4 GHz), C-Band
(4 GHz to 8 GHz), X-band (8 GHz to
12 GHz), Ku (12 GHz to 18 GHz), and
Ka (26.5 GHz to 40 GHz) bands. The
tracking detection varies as the
resolution of the radar has a direct
correlation with the frequency it
operates in. The UHF band is usually
used to detect objects, whereas
higher bands are used for accurate
tracking due to the higher resolution
they offer. You must assume that
tracking is being done with all the
resources available to adversaries
and identify all adversarial tracking
assets.
▪ Optical Tracking: There are
telescopes dedicated to acquiring
visuals from spaceborne assets. The
optical tracking assets are designed
to track and capture footage and
photos of satellites as they pass over
a geographical area. This will aid in
the identification of satellites in orbit,
and it will help classify their
capabilities.
▪ Hybrid Tracking—Signal
Mapping and Observations: The
use of multiple sensory systems in
real-time is called hybrid tracking.
Special sensors that are able to detect
spectrum-specific communications
can be deployed to detect any form of
communications from unknown
objects (e.g., Nightshade’s Odin
Electro-Optical Sensor). The concept
of hybrid tracking can have different
definitions in different disciplines,
but as I focus on passive and active
detection of spaceborne assets, it is
important to understand the concept
in the context of this paper in order to
avoid confusion. Signal mapping is
another technique that can aid in the
detection of satellites by mapping
and categorizing all known signals
with their corresponding
modulations used by spaceborne
assets and their terrestrial mission
controls.
▪ Radio and Communication
Tracking: Every satellite has to
communicate with its mission
control; military assets are no
different from civilians’. Every
satellite or class of satellites has to
communicate on a certain frequency.
This involves two-way
communication from the satellite’s
downlink and terrestrial mission
control’s uplink. Monitoring of space
and terrestrial assets and correlating
the data can provide valuable
information for the identification and
classification of spaceborne assets.
These communications can be
intercepted, as satellite
communication is still a wireless
broadcast.
▪ Space-based Sensory
Detectors: The space-based sensory
detectors are satellites placed in
higher orbits and are dedicated to
observing and monitoring the lower
orbits for any satellite activities. They
play a vital role in tracking satellites
in the lower orbits. These sensory
systems are also capable of
monitoring satellite launches and
pinpointing their launch positions,
tracking the vector to its destination
with predictive algorithms.
▪ Suborbital Detectors: High-
altitude missions are used to detect
spaceborne assets in different
geographical regions where detection
methods are less accurate or
available. High-altitude balloons or
aircraft can collect ELINT and
photography from orbital assets for
further processing.
▪ MASINT, SIGINT, ELINT, Cyber
and Intelligence Operatives:
Perhaps the most comprehensive
discipline of intelligence gathering
and analysis mastered by the United
States is MASINT (Measurement and
Signatures Intelligence), capable of
tracking and tracing the smallest
signatures using a wide range of
superior spaceborne and terrestrial-
based sensory networks. The United
States’ adversaries, such as Russia
and China, have made progress in
expanding their sensory networks to
support their MASINT endeavors.
ELINT (Electronics Intelligence) and
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) are
also crucial disciplines in intelligence
and satellite detection. It is important
to note that the classification of
satellites, identification of their
systems and subsystems, as well as
their uplinks and downlinks, all fall
under SIGINT and ELINT, not to
mention traditional espionage to
access designs and other important
data surrounding an orbital asset.
Accessing classified or even
controlled classified information by
intelligence operatives or cyber
operations can provide invaluable
insights regarding spaceborne assets.
Take note that some satellites are able to
determine their own accurate position via
GNSS and send the information via downlink
to their mission control, which can be
intercepted and decoded.
Understanding the Detection and
Tracking Methodology
If we break down the tracking methodology,
the first step involves space-based sensory
detectors detecting and tracking any
launches (excluding espionage). As these
systems track the vector to its intended
destination, terrestrial-based radar tracking
assets can focus on scanning the orbit to
detect the new object and determine its
speed, position, and orbit to plot an orbit for
the tracked object. The third phase is to
acquire a visual of the object to identify and
classify it. The fourth phase involves
determining its telemetry frequency, as well
as downlink and uplink frequencies, to feed
ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) for future
anti-satellite or orbital suppression
operations planning.
Unlike airborne objects that can change
trajectory, speed, and altitude at will,
satellites are static objects and must follow
orbital dynamics. While a fighter jet can
change trajectory, speed, and altitude to
utilize surrounding natural terrain for
concealment, a satellite does not have this
luxury. Once a satellite is placed into orbit, it
must maintain a constant velocity to remain
in orbit, exposing important characteristics
like altitude, velocity, and direction to
adversaries. This information is sufficient to
plot a course and predict the object’s exact
arrival, aiding adversaries in developing
Doppler-based models for accurate detection
and tracking of spaceborne assets.
After a satellite is detected, the process of
collecting ELINT (Electronic Intelligence),
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), and FISINT
(Foreign Instrumentation Signals
Intelligence) begins. The collected data can
be recorded for further processing, where it
will be used to classify the satellite, decode its
transmissions, and set for continuous
monitoring and tracking. This information is
crucial for electronic and cyber-attacks
against the asset and its mission control. This
standard operating procedure for handling
exposed adversarial orbital assets involves
continuous effort in electronic and signals
data collection.
Incorporating Stealth Into
Spaceborne Assets Design and
Development
Take a moment to digest the previous
section. It is apparent that in order to avoid
being tracked, we need to evade detection or
make it very difficult, time-consuming, and
resource-intensive for adversaries. This will
inherently degrade their capabilities because
they will have to expend significant time and
resources to track and identify objects.
Unlike airplanes, satellites do not have
engines for maneuvering or much room for
maneuvering, so stealth must be
incorporated at the drawing board while
accounting for expensive redundant systems
and systems that ultimately bring the
satellite to life. It is crucial to maintain a cost-
effective design to avoid going over budget
or, worse, building something heavy that
costs a lot to deploy. Those who have
designed any component for the military
understand that everything must be cost-
effective yet meet rigorous standards.
Adding stealth to the mix is going to
complicate things, and since we rarely have
an unlimited budget, we have to design
smart. The key is understanding the asset’s
purpose and importance in the broad
concept of spaceborne warfare. Different
levels of stealth design can be incorporated
based on the asset’s role.
We know that the detection of an object by
radar or optical means has a direct
correlation with the shape, size, material
composition, and characteristics of the
object. Perhaps the most common defining
factor for satellites are the large solar panels
used to power the satellite subsystems.
Utilizing RTGs (Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generators) together with
advancements in battery and capacitor
technology can contribute to eliminating the
use of large solar panels, thereby reducing a
significant contributor to the satellite’s RCS.
(Note that MASINT becomes more relevant
in detecting such configurations.) The power
source is the most critical component of the
satellite, as it should provide uninterrupted
power for the satellite’s entire lifecycle.
While RTGs do not contain high levels of
fissile material capable of achieving critical
mass, they are extremely toxic, and the risk
of spreading radioactive materials on Earth
is higher if they crash into the Earth’s
atmosphere during launch or prematurely
prior to the end of service. If we assume that
we develop a suitable and safe RTG for
satellites, we risk increasing the weight of the
power source and therefore negatively
impacting satellite design as it will increase
the mission’s cost.
One could potentially design compact and
retractable panels or sails for the satellite to
address this factor; however, it is important
to understand that more moving parts mean
more unpredictable errors, and as we know,
we do not have the luxury of satellite repair.
As the most fundamental stealth design
principle suggests, everything must be
covered to avoid cavities that contribute to
the generation of standing waves. Satellites
have several communication antennas with
different configurations, ranging from dishes
to helical or monopole antennas; therefore,
designing storage and cavities with proper
covers is necessary for them. While this
introduces more moving parts into satellite
design, it can protect communication and
telemetry components.
As we have established, satellites are static
objects orbiting Earth in predetermined
orbits with known velocities. There are
several components that can help satellites
become less visible. Understanding that
stealth design dictates covering cavities with
a lid or cover, this concept can be applied
based on the type and classification of the
satellite. It is important to note that the
detectability of an object is determined by its
shape, size, composition, and surface
characteristics. Taking the sphere as an
example, a spherical object tends to scatter
radio waves more uniformly in all directions
compared to flat edges, so let us assume
spherical shapes in the frame design in this
context.
I chose the spherical shape to demonstrate
the concept, but before we delve into that, I
want to point out the advantages and
disadvantages of such a shape in satellite
design. A sphere has perfect geometry,
making it easy to design and manufacture.
Spheres also offer structural integrity, as the
load is distributed evenly, providing
resistance to stress. Additionally, its minimal
air resistance makes it suitable for satellites
in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), where
atmospheric drag is a concern. Lastly, if the
antenna is incorporated into its frame, it can
accommodate antennas with
omnidirectional coverage.
However, this design is not without
disadvantages and trade-offs. You cannot
incorporate many components inside the
sphere due to the volume efficiency of the
structure, assuming that we are not going to
use solar panels in our design (opting for
RTGs instead). Additionally, the spherical
design may pose challenges to the
deployment mechanisms of the vector
during launch. Overall, please consider this
as an example only.
Below, we plot the Radar Cross Section
(RCS) of a simple sphere for comparison.
The first plot shows the RCS of a sphere with
a diameter of four meters across frequencies
ranging from 300 MHz to 40 GHz. The
second plot depicts the same sphere in Low
Earth Orbit (LEO).
Figure 1 Radar Cross Section (RCS) of a Sphere with a 4-meter diameter
Take note that these plots are only a
demonstration of the potential use of the
spherical design.
Figure 2 Radar Cross Section of a Sphere at LEO (2000 km) with four meters Diameter
To determine the actual Radar Cross Section
(RCS), various factors must be considered,
including the composition of the materials
covering the sphere’s surface, its shape,
surface roughness, orientation concerning
the observer, and environmental conditions
such as atmospheric effects and
electromagnetic interference. Each of these
elements can substantially impact the RCS
and must be meticulously examined to
accurately determine the actual RCS, which
is conditional. (The configuration of the
actual radar pulse is also important.)
The next plot shows the spectral response of
a sphere with a diameter of four meters at
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) altitude of 2000
Kilometers.
▪ The x-axis represents the wavelength
of the radar waves, expressed in
micrometers (micrometers). This
axis spans a range of radar
wavelengths used for detection,
ranging from longer wavelengths
(corresponding to lower frequencies)
to shorter wavelengths
(corresponding to higher
frequencies).
▪ The y-axis represents the radar cross-
section (RCS) of the sphere, which is
a measure of how much
electromagnetic energy is scattered
back towards the radar receiver. The
RCS is expressed in square meters
(square meters).
Figure 3 the Spectral Response of the sphere with 4Meters diameter -
300 MHz to 40 GHz
Analyzing this plot reveals the variation in
the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of the sphere
across different radar wavelengths. Peaks or
dips in the plot indicate wavelengths where
the sphere reflects radar waves particularly
strongly or weakly. This insight is vital for
comprehending the sphere’s interaction with
radar waves across the electromagnetic
spectrum, aiding in the design and
optimization of stealth technology to reduce
radar detection. It is important to note that
the sphere used in this example is a
simplified model meant to illustrate the
concept.
The next plot shows the spectral response of
a sphere with a diameter of four meters at
different altitudes (2000 kilometers, 5000
kilometers, and 10,000 kilometers)
Representing Different Orbits.
▪ X-axis (Wavelength): Represents the
radar wavelength, measured in
micrometers (micrometers). It spans
a range of wavelengths
corresponding to radar frequencies
from low to high.
▪ Y-axis (RCS): Represents the radar
cross-section (RCS) of the sphere,
measured in square meters (square
meters). This indicates how much
electromagnetic energy is scattered
back towards the radar receiver.
▪ Lines: Each line on the plot
corresponds to a different altitude.
Specifically, the altitude of each orbit
is labeled in the legend.
The plot shows how the RCS of the sphere
varies with different radar wavelengths at
various altitudes. Peaks or dips in the plot
indicate wavelengths at which the sphere
exhibits particularly strong or weak radar
reflection.
Figure 4 Spectral Response of a Sphere at Different Altitudes (Diameter = four
meters)/300 MHz to 40 GHz
By analyzing this plot, one can gain insights
into how altitude affects the spectral
response of the sphere, and how specific
radar wavelengths are absorbed,
transmitted, or scattered by the sphere at
different altitudes.
Next plot illustrates the spectral response of
a sphere with a diameter of four meters at
different altitudes (2000 kilometers, 5000
kilometers, and 10,000 kilometers),
considering the respective orbital velocities
of the orbits.
▪ X-axis (Wavelength): Represents the
radar wavelength, measured in
micrometers (micrometers). It covers
a range of wavelengths
corresponding to radar frequencies
from low to high.
▪ Y-axis (RCS): Represents the radar
cross-section (RCS) of the sphere,
measured in square meters (square
meters). This indicates the amount of
electromagnetic energy scattered
back towards the radar receiver.
▪ Lines: Each line on the plot
corresponds to a different altitude,
with the altitude labeled in the
legend. Additionally, the orbital
speed of the sphere at each altitude is
provided in the legend.
Figure 5 Spectral Response of a Sphere at Different Altitudes with Orbital
Velocities (Diameter = four meters)
The plot demonstrates how the RCS of the
sphere varies with different radar
wavelengths at various altitudes, considering
the Doppler shift effect induced by the orbital
velocities. Peaks or dips in the plot indicate
wavelengths at which the sphere exhibits
particularly strong or weak radar reflection.
By analyzing this plot, insights can be gained
into how altitude and orbital speed influence
the spectral response of the sphere, and how
specific radar wavelengths are absorbed,
transmitted, or scattered under these as
mentioned earlier, the configuration of the
radar pulse is crucial. The simulations
provided above are general and do not
consider a specific radar pulse, as this would
vary depending on the capabilities of
potential adversaries.
Additionally, the materials used in satellite
construction are important due to the harsh
conditions of space. Satellites experience
rapid temperature fluctuations, particularly
when transitioning from the shadow to the
sunlight side of Earth. While lightweight
composite materials (LCMs) are
recommended, it is essential to select
materials with the correct composition for
the satellite frame. For example, materials
like GSD24, introduced in Nightshade, are
designed to withstand these conditions.
Moreover, the chosen composite material
should shield the satellite and its critical
subsystems from background radiation
resulting from space weather conditions and
potential man-made electronic, microwave,
laser, and electromagnetic bombardment
attacks.
I personally would not recommend the use of
Radar Absorbing Materials (RAMs) in
satellite design unless the material is
uniquely developed to be lightweight. The
use of RAM in spaceborne assets is
somewhat irrelevant yet not entirely
impractical. This specific subject requires
extensive research and development. One
reason I do not advocate for the use of RAMs
in satellites is the added weight of the
material to the finished design. While RAMs
are indispensable to the configurations of
stealth jets and bombers, their use would be
problematic in maintaining weight and cost,
not to mention the cost of orbital
deployment.
Next is incorporating active stealth
components into the Satellite. The use of
active stealth components is the most
valuable tool in stealth design for satellites.
Active stealth components are more practical
due to the fact that they can cover a large
portion of the spectrum (based on their
design and capabilities). This would enable
spaceborne assets to avoid detection from a
wide range of adversarial surveillance
systems. However, one must understand that
since satellites are positioned in orbit, they
are being surveilled by a large composition of
radars from almost every nation on this
planet. This wide range of surveillance force
and focus should be taken into account, and
correct configurations must be applied for
accurate processing and countermeasures.
There are fundamental differences when
designing an active component for a satellite
compared to a plane.
The detection method dictates the use of a
wide array of terrestrial-based assets to
detect and proceed with the optical detection
of spaceborne assets. The use of the concept
of terrain masquerading is a viable
countermeasure to combat optical detection
of spaceborne assets. Digital camouflage will
give the satellite the symmetry it requires to
combat optical detection. The use of Light
Absorbing Materials (LAMs) is encouraged
to mask the satellite with the terrain in order
to create advanced optical camouflage to
combat optical detection and visual
information gathering from the asset.
The signals that the satellite propagates and
receives are used to identify the satellite
communications. Telemetry and
communication masquerading are not only
contributing to hardening of spaceborne
assets against adversarial attacks but will
also contribute to force protection and
redundancy. The use of techniques such as
FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread
Spectrum) as well as randomizing
communication channels and developing
next-generation encryption protocols and
signal masquerading will guarantee
operational continuity and uphold the
principles of force protection as well as
hiding the satellite’s communication
signatures. Signal masquerading is crucial to
ensure minimizing the electronic signature
of satellites and other spaceborne assets.
Remember that satellite communication is
still a wireless broadcast and anyone with
adequate hardware can listen or collect
sample data for further processing.
As I stated earlier, “STEALTH” is a mantra of
techniques and technologies that contribute
to the subject in discussion. Due to the
sensitivity of the subject, I withheld critical
information and design components, but I
expect readers to understand the subject in
discussion and expand the idea in the
interest of the United States. My point of
view has always been to ensure and
guarantee the absolute superiority of the
United States, and this paper is dedicated to
the United States Space Force, aiming to take
another step toward that objective.
Introducing Spaceborne Mission
Control Hubs (SMCH)
As we delve into the subject of detecting
spaceborne assets, a major aspect is
identifying their communications and
telemetry. Observing the orbital layers,
Nightshade dictates the utilization of higher
orbits to create space-borne mission control
platforms for consolidation, masquerading,
and backup. (We are not talking about orbital
relays.)
This can be utilized to create a
communication “HUB” or “Router” for
stealth satellites, avoiding direct
communications with ground stations. The
SMCH (Spaceborne Mission Control Hubs)
will act as routers to communicate with
stealth spaceborne assets. Note that while
introducing this methodology, it does not
imply all assets will no longer have direct
communication capabilities with ground
stations and mission controls. Instead, it
adds another layer of protection and
redundancy. If targeted by jamming or
cyber-attacks, the relay network can
maintain access and communications with
the assets and vice versa, creating an
effective EMCON (Emissions Control)
Strategy to uphold the stealth aspect of the
communications.
We should never lose access or
communications with spaceborne assets.
The principle of force-protection dictates
that redundancy is key to survival. As seen,
there is much more to integrating and
incorporating stealth into orbital assets than
presented.
Developing a stealth asset requires
protecting its secrets. Just because an asset
has stealth capabilities does not mean we can
abandon it. The concept has shifted to
developing the next generation of
spaceborne military networks. I refrain from
expanding this subject due to its sensitivity
and because this is a public release.
This concept minimizes communications
from stealth assets but never aims to create a
centralizing platform which can be easily
targeted. Each asset maintains redundant
and independent channels for backup
communications, aiming to minimize
electronic signatures.
Avoiding a centralized infrastructure without
redundant protocols is essential. In the event
of a targeted attack against the centralized
master asset, you lose access to slave assets.
Therefore, each asset maintains its own
redundant communication protocols with
mission controls on Earth. Assets only
communicate with the SMCHs, which acts as
a centralized hub for communication with
mission control. To mitigate risks, increasing
the number of SMCHs in upper and lower
orbits ensures multilayered redundancy, but
ensuring all assets have redundant
communication protocols is paramount.
Additionally, this will introduce the concept
of a shadow network for communications
with the assets.
In the event of orbital suppression attacks,
only fixed and mobile terrestrial
redundancies ensure survivability and
continuity of ISR, communications, and
strategic capabilities. Besides, in the event of
deploying a nuclear anti-satellite device,
orbit disruption and catastrophic damage
occur to strategic assets, along with debris
dispersion into higher orbits. These primary
effects, along with secondary effects like
HEMP effects or ionization of the
atmosphere, could result in a
communications blackout. Therefore,
regardless of incorporated technology or
novel concepts, maintaining redundant
terrestrial capabilities is the most important
defensive strategy against adversarial
interruptions.
Adapting the Use of Active Spaceborne
Decoys
Perhaps one of the greatest concepts that
Nightshade has introduced is the use of
active decoys and countermeasures, from
cyber operations to satellite and spaceborne
warfare. We use decoys in our terrestrial
military operations all the time, and most
existing decoys are passive. Night Shade
introduced the use of active terrestrial and
spaceborne decoys. Unlike terrestrial decoys,
spaceborne decoys are much more expensive
to deploy also passive decoys are easy to
detect if we take the full-detection cycle into
consideration.
Active decoys can mimic the behavior of an
asset via pre-recorded means. They could
mimic the behavior and electronic emissions
of satellites to divert the focus of adversaries
toward the decoys rather than the stealth
assets. Creating stealth assets does not mean
you can leave them in the wild. Remember,
Stealth is the mantra of techniques, some are
asset-related, and other strategies relate to
tactics. These assets, while emitting signals,
are still managed by EMCON (Emissions
Control) protocols and still have to
communicate with a ground station and
transmit scrambled data to register as active
assets to adversaries.
The fact that they have to mimic a satellite’s
behavior means they have to have some form
of electronics onboard, which means a costly
asset. Note that decoys must be present in
your networks. Passive decoys have little to
no place in orbit, unless we consider making
a hybrid decoy, which is less complicated and
costs less. Active decoys, however, are a
whole new concept and scenario. They can be
used for deception campaigns and the
protection of stealth assets in space. The use
of such decoys would degrade adversarial
detection capabilities and create a much-
needed fog of war in space. As always, it is
only fair to assume that adversaries would
use the same principles for deploying decoys,
and therefore the advancement and
perfection of the detection cycle are required
to ensure full detection and classification of
adversarial capabilities.
References:
o Enayati, Adib. (2024). The Mechanics of
Spaceborne Warfare: Exploring Anti-Satellite
Operations. 10.13140/RG.2.2.32664.00005.
o Enayati, Adib. (2024). Mechanics of Spaceborne
Warfare: Redefining Orbital Suppression
Dynamics. 10.13140/RG.2.2.26471.66725.
o Nightshade Advanced Polymorphic Defense and
Warfare Doctrine, by Adib Enayati, Ph.D. (Not
Available for Public).
o Nightshade Advanced Polymorphic Defense and
Warfare Doctrine, by Adib Enayati, Ph.D. (Not
Available for Public)—Section 5, Spaceborne
warfare and the associated spaceborne weapon
systems and the proposed designs.
o Nightshade Advanced Polymorphic Defense and
Warfare Doctrine, by Adib Enayati, Ph.D. (Not
Available for Public)—Subsection 1. Principles of
the spaceborne warfare Arbiter Framework—
Electronic deterrence and the adaptive strike chain,
Adib Enayati, Ph.D. —J Def Stud Resour
Manage 2023, 11:1—1 February 2023, DOI:
10.4172/2324-9315.1000162—Manuscript No.
JDSRM-22-81303 ®.
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