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https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12591
Abstract:
This paper explores how elected policians’ decisions impact place-based policies (PBPs) and the
resulng consequences. It emphasizes that understanding the polical factors inuencing PBPs oers
insights into their eecveness and potenal pialls. The arcle draws upon the behavioural polical
economy theory, suggesng that polical decisions oen deviate from the purely raonal due to
cognive biases and social inuences. It examines the crical role of territorial intermediaon, explores
the potenal discord between policy designs and ground realies, and invesgates how broader polical
dynamics shape these trajectories. Addionally, the arcle probes the obstacles, including psychological,
instuonal and contextual factors, that may hinder policy implementaon. In conclusion, the arcle
proposes new avenues of research in regional, urban and planning studies that highlight the complexity
of the polical processes inuencing these policies and call for a muldimensional analysis of these
processes.
Key words: polical economy; place-based policies; NIMEY; territorial intermediaon; polics
JEL: P00; O38, R38
1. Introducon
Place-based policies (PBPs) have emerged as pivotal tools for policymakers seeking economic
development and spaal jusce in diverse territorial contexts (Barca et al., 2012; Glaeser & Golieb,
2008). These policies, designed to address the unique potenal and challenges of specic areas (Pike et
al., 2007), can range from boosng local businesses through nancial incenves (Neumark & Simpson,
2015; Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2022), to urban regeneraon (Galster, 2010) and infrastructure
enhancement (Heres et al., 2014; Vasilakos et al., 2023). Their place-centered approach disnguishes
them from uniform ‘space-blind’ strategies, reecng a commitment to tailored, local soluons (Barca
et al., 2012; Bachtler, 2019). In aiming for spaal jusce, PBPs aempt to balance regional disparies
and local agglomeraon eects (Soja, 2010; Neumark & Simpson, 2015; Weck et al., 2022). They
underscore the imperave of equitable resource distribuon across regions (Fainstein, 2009), evolving
beyond mere economic objecves to recfying spaal inequalies and ensuring a more balanced
development landscape (Brenner et al., 2012; Ausn et al., 2018; Ehrlich & Overman, 2020).
The applicaon of polical economy, which broadly encompasses the study of the inuence of polical
forces on the shaping of economic policies and outcomes, provides a valuable perspecve for analysing
the formaon and implicaons of these PBPs (Bardhan, 1997; Ehrlich & Seidel, 2018). Over the years,
considerable research eorts have been devoted to understanding the eciency of PBPs through
rigorous impact analyses (Kline and More, 2014a, 2014b; Neumark and Simpson, 2015; Brachert et
al., 2019). Scholars have also sought to unravel the complex movaons and mechanisms that underpin
the implementaon of these policies (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Do, 2016; Morisson & Doussineau, 2019;
Duranton & Venables, 2021). Nonetheless, a comprehensive exploraon of the interplay between
polical economy and local polics deserves to be undertaken. Such an exercise could deepen our
understanding of how the entwined polical and economic forces shape regional development
strategies and outcomes.
In this context, it is essenal to further explore the polical economy of local policies by examining the
role of polical processes in shaping these policies and the consequences that ow from them. This
paper seeks to answer the following queson: How are PBPs inuenced by the decisions of elected
policians, and what are the consequences? This paper takes a reecve approach, providing a synthesis
of the explanatory factors relang to polics in the literature. It further suggests underexplored avenues
for future research. Drawing on literature from both polical economy and regional science, we argue
that a deeper understanding of the polical factors inuencing PBPs can provide fresh insights into their
eecveness and potenal drawbacks. The polical economy’s intersecon with PBPs invites novel
research into how spaal inequality and regional economic disparies inuence polical decision-
making (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Ehrlich & Overman, 2020). From this perspecve, this arcle proposes a
muldimensional analysis that underlines the complexies and potenal future direcons for
understanding the polical processes that inuence PBPs.
In this paper, we begin with an introducon on how behavioural polical economy theory can help to
understand the decisions of elected policians. Then we propose a discussion on the role of territorial
intermediaon in facilitang the implementaon of PBPs. Conversely, we explore how elected policians
can hinder the implementaon of these policies. Finally, we conclude with a reecon on avenues for
future research.
2. Seng the scene: behavioural polical economy theory and place-based
policies
To beer understand place-based policies in the light of behavioural polical economy theory, it is
necessary to consider both internal dynamics, such as individual preferences and interacons between
various actors, and external inuences, such as cultural and spaal characteriscs, in order to eecvely
evaluate policies and their impacts. This allows us to highlight the challenges inherent in implemenng
and evaluang PBPs, and the diversity of factors that inuence policy decisions and outcomes. It is
necessary to also consider the role of instuons as mediators between the internal and external
dynamics that inuence the formulaon and impact of these policies.
2.1. The factors inuencing decision-making of elected policians
Jonas & Ward (2007) are among the pioneers who highlighted the role of polical and economic elites
and how their behaviors inuence the governance and structure of urban regions. In their paper, they
emphasize how elected policians shape cies through successive policies implemented. Drawing from
raonal choice theory (Downs, 1957), they suggest that it is individual preferences that have led to the
current urban situaon. Our arcle is in line with their work. For this, we lean on the behavioural polical
economy (Schnellenbach & Schubert, 2015), a theory that is tradionally used in polical economy to
explain polical behaviours in terms of policy making and polical arrangements (Olson, 1965; Shepsle
& Bonchek, 1997). At its core, behavioural polical economy seeks to integrate insights from behavioural
economics into the study of polical decision-making. Unlike classical polical economy, which assumes
that polical actors are fully raonal, and act based on straighorward ulity maximizaon, behavioural
polical economy recognizes that policians oen deviate from this raonal model due to cognive
biases, heuriscs, and social inuences.
From this point of view, Lee’s study (2017) is enlightening because it highlights the signicant impact
that personality traits and psychological disposions (such as openness to experience, neurocism,
extraversion, agreeableness, and conscienousness) have on patenng acvity and contribute to
regional innovaon paerns. Lee suggests that individual preferences, oen inuenced by cognive
biases and social pressures, play a crucial role in shaping policies that promote or hinder innovaon
within regions. This perspecve aligns with our thinking in behavioral polical economy as it emphasizes
the need to move beyond the classical view of polical actors as purely raonal. By drawing on this
approach, we can beer understand how place-based policies are conceptualized, negoated, and
implemented, while recognizing the pivotal role of individual and collecve characteriscs in regional
development dynamics. From this perspecve, Lee’s study can help us beer understand how cognive
biases and social inuences shape the decision-making of elected policians.
The choices made by elected policians are also based on social inuences, resulng from interacons
between various stakeholders involved in the formulaon of place-based policies. Indeed, the processes
of decision-making and policy formulaon are complex and involve a multude of actors beyond elected
policians. While elected policians occupy prominent and visible posions in the nal decision-making
(Mansbridge, 1990), they do not make decisions in isolaon (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Partridge et al.,
2015; Beer et al., 2020). Contemporary place leadership studies emphasize that the eecveness of
PBPs is not solely rooted in the formal processes of governance but is intrinsically ed to the intricate
web of relaonships between actors within specic regions (Collinge & Gibney, 2010; Beer et al., 2019).
Such leadership emerges not just from governmental structures but also from the community, private
sectors, and inuenal individuals who act as agents of change, somemes even against the tradional
status quo (OECD, 2009; Gray, 1991; Sotarauta et al., 2017). This perspecve underscores the
importance of ‘framing’ and the role it plays in facilitang or inhibing regional transformaons
(Sotarauta, 2016; Sotarauta & Beer, 2017).
PBPs are oen embedded within a complex web of polical, economic and social inuences that can
signicantly shape policy outcomes (Sotarauta, 2009; Tomaney, 2010; Shenoy, 2018). The policy-making
ecosystem of PBPs oen encompasses elected policians, sectoral experts, economic and commercial
actors, interest groups, unions, as well as third-sector and volunteer organizaons (Barca, 2019). These
enes play diverse roles, ranging from consultaon to direct inuence, from allocaon of resources
and benets to the actual implementaon of policies. In the decision-making framework, elected
policians oen negoate among various stakeholders to arrive at consensual policies (Heernan,
2002). We posit that, by virtue of their democrac legimacy, elected policians hold posions that not
only allow them to make choices with a tangible inuence (posive or negave) on policy orientaon
and formulaon, but also that their individual preferences play a pivotal role in the design and
implementaon of place-based policies. As a testament to their unique leadership posion with formally
constuted power (Sotarauta, 2009), these elected policians frequently emerge as primary agents of
transformave leadership within regional development dynamics.
Alongside analyzing the polical and social dynamics that underlie PBPs, it is crucial to acknowledge the
impact of spaal and environmental factors on the behavior of individuals within these contexts. Eveline
S. van Leeuwen (2020) provides an insighul perspecve on this maer, advocang for disnguishing
between the relave eects of spaal composional and contextual factors on the environmental
behavior of cizens in urban and rural areas. Van Leeuwen suggests that the clustering of individuals
with similar proles in specic areas, as well as external social and environmental factors, can explain
regional variaons in pro-environmental behavior. This approach highlights the fact that pro-
environmental values or atudes do not always translate into expected behavior, revealing a behavioral
‘gap’. Similarly, when applied to elected policians, we incorporate this perspecve to underscore how
spaal and environmental factors can inuence their implementaon of PBPs.
When considering the external factors that inuence decision-making by elected policians, the work
by Robert Huggins and Piers Thompson (2015) on place-based development and culture is a signicant
contribuon. Their study conceptualizes and operaonalizes a framework for place-based culture,
examining the relaonship between economic culture and local community culture. They highlight the
presence of place-based culture and emphasize how these cultures interact in shaping the development
trajectories of regions and localies. The authors demonstrate that cultural characteriscs vary
signicantly between Welsh regions and localies, but disnguishing between community culture and
economic culture is challenging because each reinforces the characteriscs of the other. Therefore,
taking local culture into account is an addional factor that can inuence the behavior of policy-makers.
2.2. Instuons as a mediator of the factors inuencing decision-making
When examining place-based policies from the perspecve of behavioral polical economy, it is essenal
to acknowledge the crucial role that instuons play in mediang between the internal and external
dynamics that aect the formulaon and impact of these policies (Raco & Flint, 2001; Barca et al., 2012).
Instuons not only act as guardians of the norms and regulaons that guide the decisions of elected
policians but also are shaped by these same interacons. The decisions made by instuons are
grounded in specic instuonal contexts that, in turn, inuence the available opons and strategies
adopted by elected policians. By viewing instuons as acve parcipants in the polical decision-
making process rather than stac enes, we recognize that place-based policies are the result of an
ongoing balance between individual preferences, external factors, and exisng regulatory frameworks.
Thus, by applying instuonal theory to regional development issues, we can gain insight into how
organizaonal structures and norms impact the formulaon and implementaon of policies. From this
perspecve, the work of Andrés Rodríguez-Pose (2013 & 2020) oers an interesng insight into this
queson. He argues that the quality and adaptability of local instuons are crucial for economic
development and the outcomes of regional development policies. Rodríguez-Pose’s argument, that
development strategies tailored to the specic instuonal environments of dierent regions are likely
to produce beer results, aligns with the recognion in behavioral polical economy of the interacon
between the choices of polical actors and the local context. Furthermore, the author’s emphasis on
the instuonal dimension as a key factor in regional development eorts corresponds to our strategy
of highlighng the signicant role played by elected policians in shaping urban and regional policies.
Frank Moulaert, Bob Jessop, and Abid Mehmood (2016) also emphasize the interacon between human
agency, structural constraints and opportunies, organized norms and pracces, and the creaon of
shared meaning and signicance in the implementaon of local and regional policies. Therefore, the
authors explain how the relaonship between structure and agency creates both possibilies and
limitaons for acon, such as rounes, organizaonal pracces, convenons, and rules, that both
maintain and transform the instuons themselves. Thus, polical acon is seen as an intervenon
within a complex network of structural constraints and opportunies, guided or hindered by instuons
that are themselves shaped and reshaped by collecve and individual agency.
Finally, studies in polical geography and polical analysis have also shown how instuonal frameworks,
such as electoral systems, forms of local and regional governance, and mechanisms of public
parcipaon, shape polical decisions and public policy outcomes. For example, Aboal (2020) bridges
the gap between literature on the eects of electoral systems on public policy and the eects of public
policy on economic growth. Mansuri & Rao (2012) demonstrate how parcipatory processes with the
populaon inuence the way elected policians implement their policies locally. Pike et al (2007) explore
how regional development strategies are designed and implemented within dierent instuonal
frameworks, and how they aim to respond to specic territorial challenges. Thus, by integrang these
dimensions, our analysis not only recognizes the acve role of instuons in the polical decision-
making process but also broadens our understanding of territorial development dynamics, illustrang
the importance of governance in the design and implementaon of regionaal and local policies tailored
to the specicies of each territory (Torre, 2023).
3. When policians facilitate the implementaon of place-based policies
In this secon secon, we propose to analyse how elected policians can encourage the implementaon
of PBPs by mobilising the concept of territorial intermediaon. Understanding the development of PBPs
through the lens of behavioral polical economy brings to light the importance of territorial
intermediaon. This perspecve emphasizes how individual and group behaviors, movated by various
socio-polical factors, shape policy outcomes by brokering, networking, facilitang.
3.1. Elected policians as territorial intermediaries
The development of PBPs is a process that engages various stakeholders at mulple levels of governance.
The interplay and collaboraon among these enes are pivotal not only in the planning but also in the
implementaon and management of these programmes. However, aligning the interests and eorts of
these dierent stakeholders poses a signicant challenge. From this perspecve, local elected policians
are oen viewed as intermediaries who act as brokers and facilitate the deployment of PBPs. By
examining territorial intermediaon in light of behavioral polical economy, one can decode the
underlying movaons and behaviors that drive these intermediaon processes. In this secon, we
provide a denion of territorial intermediaon and the various forms it can take before proposing
territorial intermediaon as an analycal framework for examining the role of elected policians in
facilitang the design and execuon of PBPs.
The concept of intermediaon has been widely studied in management science and generally refers to
the process of acng as a link or facilitator between two pares who are not directly in a relaonship
(Howells, 2006). Applied to regional, urban and planning studies, territorial intermediaon refers to the
role played by certain enes or individuals in facilitang communicaon, collaboraon and interacon
between dierent actors in the same territory (horizontal territorial intermediaon) or evolving at
dierent scales (vercal territorial intermediaon) in the implementaon of local projects or policies
(Bourdin et al., 2020; Wang & Bourdin, 2024). Interpreted through the behavioral polical economy, this
role is inuenced by a range of cognive biases, percepons, and individual interests that elected
policians harbor. We therefore use this conceptual framework to study the roles played by elected
policians in facilitang the deployment of PBPs.
Beer and Clower (2014) emphasize the importance of facilitave leadership, one that leverages
collaboraon, power-sharing, and trust among mulple agencies in a complex policy environment. This
is in line with their understanding that leadership is about seng visions, implemenng plans, insgang
change, adjusng strategies, and monitoring performance. From this point of view, territorial
intermediaries have to be place leaders to navigate between these dierent roles. By connecng to
Sotarauta’s descripon of “policy networks” (Sotarauta, 2010), several roles can emerge in these policy
networks, such as boundary spanners, networkers, or brokers. In a behavioral polical economy context,
these roles might be inuenced by various external factors, including electoral incenves, peer
pressures, and cognive biases. Such posions can play a pivotal role in ensuring that there’s a
harmonizaon of interests and acons among stakeholders.
Territorial intermediaries can be instuons, organisaons or individuals (such as mayors) who act as
mediators or facilitators between various stakeholders in a specic territory. They seek to establish close
links between stakeholders. The behavioral dynamics that drive these intermediaries are of keen interest
in the behavioral polical economy, given that they inuence policy outcomes. This is how the concept
of intermediaon is closely linked to that of proximity. Torre (2014) established this connecon by
menoning intermediaries who are responsible for smulang the networking of actors and who behave
in a way that gives them internal legimacy when they facilitate the emergence of local iniaves. For
example, based on a comparison between France and Quebec, Wang and Bourdin (2024) demonstrate
how the involvement of territorial intermediaries as “trusted” facilitators and mediators, contribute to
enhancing innovaon and regional compeveness through fostering exchanges and collaboraons.
Consequently, this legimacy is fundamental when establishing governance for the development of
PBPs. Elected policians have legimacy because they have been elected by the local populaon.
The formulaon of PBPs is a process that mobilises mulple stakeholders at dierent levels of
governance (Morisson & Doussineau, 2019). Synergy and collaboraon between these actors are
essenal not only in the design but also in the implementaon and management of these programmes
(Bachtler, 2019). However, harmonising the interests and acons of these dierent stakeholders is a
major challenge (Niang et al., 2022b; Torre, 2023). Conicts of interest can arise and hamper the
eecveness of local policies (Niang et al., 2022a). In line with the emphasis on the role of agency in
collaborave governance, it is thus crucial to have an actor capable of facilitang the coordinaon of the
system during all phases. Recent studies suggest that local governments can play a crucial role in
facilitang this coordinaon (Gustafsson & Mignon, 2020). For instance, Bourdin & Nadou (2020)
analyzed the role of the mayor as a key actor in implemenng biogas projects. Most of the me, these
projects encounter issues with social acceptability and the project leader requires local support. As these
authors argue, elected policians are in an ideal posion to promote the networking of stakeholders,
facilitate communicaon, share informaon, and establish support mechanisms for implemenng policy
at the local level.
In this regard, we argue that policians, driven by a desire to maximize their chances of re-elecon and
bolster their polical posion, have a pronounced incenve to collaborate with other place-leaders in
the design and implementaon of PBPs (Ayres et al., 2018). This movaon can be deeply understood
and predicted using principles from behavioral polical economy, which analyzes how policians weigh
their personal interests against broader societal goals. In pursuit of this, they engage in consultaons,
exert inuence, and negoate with various stakeholders involved in PBPs, aiming for consensual policies
(Heernan, 2002). These eorts not only serve their individual interest in re-elecon but also promote
the well-being of the local community—a broader societal benet. This viewpoint underscores the idea
that elected policians might be parcularly movated to work alongside other place-leaders (Sotarauta
et al., 2017), especially if such collaboraons align with the aspiraons and requirements of their
constuents, potenally boosng their public standing and chances of electoral success. In Portland,
Oregon, the “20-minute neighborhoods” iniave stands out as an example of place-based policy. This
iniave involves policians collaborang with community leaders to align societal benets with their
polical interests (Mackness et al., 2023). This innovave urban planning approach ensures that
residents have access to essenal services within a 20-minute walk from their homes. It promotes
sustainability, reduces car dependence, and strengthens community es. The city’s government,
including mayors and city council members, champions this policy and implements it in partnership with
urban planners, local businesses, and residents. The success of Portland in advancing the 20-minute
neighborhoods concept demonstrates the potenal for elected ocials to strategically engage with
place-based policies. This engagement can help secure electoral support while fostering urban
development strategies that priorize sustainability, health, and accessibility.
3.2. Territorial intermediaon as an analycal framework
In the context of PBPs, territorial intermediaon can provide a useful analycal framework for
understanding the processes and outcomes of policy design and implementaon. This framework can
be applied to dierent stages of PBPs. First, territorial intermediaon involves various actors who play
crucial roles in designing PBPs. As territorial intermediaries, elected policians can bring their unique
perspecves, local knowledge and understanding of the territory’s needs, helping to create policies that
are more responsive and relevant to the unique characteriscs and challenges of the place. Second, the
eecveness of PBPs oen relies on eecve coordinaon and collaboraon among various actors
(Bourdin & Nadou, 2020). Through territorial intermediaon, these actors can work together to
implement policies, mediate conicts and facilitate cooperaon. Territorial intermediaon can also
enable more eecve ‘boom-up’ and ‘top-down’ interacons in policy implementaon. Third, it can
contribute to the eecveness of PBPs by ensuring that they are tailored to the specic needs and
contexts of dierent places. It can also enhance policy adaptability by facilitang connuous dialogue
and negoaon among actors, allowing policies to be adjusted in response to changing circumstances
or emerging challenges (Bachtler, 2019).
Figure 1: The territorial intermediaon roles played by elected policians
Source: Author
There are three main roles that elected policians can play (Figure 1): (i) the role of ‘matchmaker’, (ii)
the role of ‘mediator’ and (iii) the role of ‘orchestrator’. First, local elected policians can play an
essenal ‘matchmaker’ role in the deployment of territorialised policies. According to Howells (2006),
one of the main roles of intermediaon is to link the players in a network or system. In the context of
PBPs, this can involve bringing together key players, such as policymakers at dierent levels, community
organisaons, local businesses and cizens. By acng as a broker, the matchmaker facilitates the creaon
of links and exchanges between these actors, which can lead to greater cohesion and commitment in
the implementaon of PBPs (Bourdin and Nadou, 2020). As brokers (Sigler et al., 2023), intermediaries
can help bring together stakeholders who might otherwise have been isolated or overlooked in the
design of PBPs. This is parcularly important in light of recent studies on the smart specialisaon
strategy, which found that the lack of inclusion of stakeholders in the design of Smart Specialisaon
Strategy aects the implementaon and eecveness of these local policies (Estensoro & Larrea, 2016;
Capello & Kroll, 2016).
Second, the role of mediator is also essenal in the design and implementaon of territorialised policies.
According to Howells (2006) and Bakici et al. (2013), this role involves represenng one or more pares
in a transacon. For local authories, this may mean represenng the interests of local cizens or other
stakeholders in negoaons about the design and implementaon of PBPs. The role of the mediator is
also crucial for building trust, which is a determining factor in PBPs (Weck et al., 2022). Michels and De
Graaf’s (2010) work on partnerships between local governments and local communies also highlights
the essenal role of trust in the delivery of local development iniaves. They found that mutual trust
between local authories and cizens can facilitate the decision-making process and lead to more
eecve policy outcomes.
Third, as orchestrators, the role of an intermediary can further include the idencaon and integraon
of partners who are able to contribute knowledge and resources that are not available locally but are
necessary for the implementaon of PBPs (Agogué et al., 2013). In this way, local authories can idenfy
and select relevant and eecve stakeholders – be they individuals, organisaons or businesses – to
parcipate in the design and implementaon of PBPs. These actors can bring valuable resources, such
as specialist knowledge, technical skills, networks of contacts, nancial capital or project management
skills (Torre, 2023). The introducon of these new partners can enrich the pool of resources available to
the project, which can increase the eecveness of the implementaon of PBPs. In addion, the
orchestrator can play an important role in ensuring that the PBP implemented ts well with other
possible policies, such as sector policies. Finally, as orchestrators, local policians oen have detailed
knowledge of the resources available (tangible and intangible) and the expectaons of local
stakeholders. Therefore, they are in a beer posion to design appropriate policies.
In addion, in the context of PBPs, elected policians can play an essenal role in ensuring that resources
are allocated in a way that meets the specic needs of their regions. Elected policians have in-depth
knowledge of the challenges and opportunies facing their regions, which can enable them to design
policies and allocate resources more eecvely. Rodden’s (2002) work conrms this hypothesis, showing
that local governments are oen more eecve than central governments in allocang resources to
meet local needs.
4. When elected policians hinder the implementaon of place-based policies
Elected policians can be seen as facilitators in the implementaon of PBPs, but somemes, they can
alter their implementaon and reduce their eecveness. In this secon, we propose a theorecal
framework for pinpoinng the potenal reasons why elected policians could obstruct the formulaon
and execuon of PBPs, as well as how these explanatory factors are interconnected. Three main types
of factors are idened in this framework. These factors are all related to the behavioural polical
economy (Schnellenbach & Schubert, 2015): psychological variables, polical variables and contextual
variables. This framework takes into account the empirical ndings from an extensive literature survey,
arranging these elements and processes based on theorecal insights and incorporang components
that are theorecally inferred but have yet to be empirically examined in the context of PBPs.
4.1. Psychological variables
Among the factors that can be put forward to explain why policians are reluctant to implement a place-
based policy are intrinsic to the individual. The rst factor refers to cognive biases, i.e. the way in which
individuals perceive and interpret informaon (Ajzen, 1996; Forgas et al., 2015). Thus, elected policians
may be subject to systemac errors of judgement, such as conrmaon bias (the tendency to favour
informaon that conrms their pre-exisng beliefs) or status quo bias (the tendency to prefer
maintaining the current state of aairs) (Arceneaux, 2012). In concrete terms, elected policians may
minimise the seriousness of a problem in their areas, underesmate the benets of implemenng PBPs
to resolve these problems or overesmate their cost and complexity. This is also what Jones (2022)
showed when he explained that the outgoing mayor had denied the problem of gentricaon in his city.
In his example, elected policians downplayed the negave impact of luxury real estate projects on local
communies and ignored studies or reports that highlighted the negave consequences on low-income
residents.
A second factor is the inuence of emoons and feelings. Local elected policians, as representaves of
the local community and holders of decision-making power, can also be inuenced by emoonal
reacons when considering whether or not to implement a place-based policy. For example, they may
posively associate improved transport infrastructure with increased connecvity and accessibility,
economic growth and job creaon in their areas. However, they may also associate such projects
negavely with disrupon to local communies, increased polluon and noise and inequity in the
distribuon of benets and costs. This is what Torre (2023) explained using the example of airport
construcon, renewable energies and freeways. Similarly to cizens, local elected policians might have
varying percepons of the implementaon process for transport infrastructure projects, inuenced by
their sense of the process’s fairness (Bourdin & Nadou, 2020). If an elected polician perceives the
process as unfair (e.g. if they feel they have not been suciently consulted or involved in the decision-
making process), this may elicit a negave emoonal response and reinforce their opposion to the
project. As Beer et al. (2020) explained, the implementaon of PBPs oen involves mul-level
governance, which does not guarantee that all levels are fairly involved in decision-making. This can be
explained by the fact that the “policy network” (Sotarauta, 2010) is complex.
4.2. The Not in My Electoral Year Eect
In addion to their personal feelings, elected policians may also be inuenced by their peers, polical
pares or electors. If these groups are hosle to certain PBPs, elected policians may be reluctant to
implement them. Elected policians are likely to weigh the potenal advantages and disadvantages
before making a decision (Slovic et al., 1977; Pollack, 2007). For example, an elected policians might
perceive the risk of high costs, administrave complexity or negave polical fallout as outweighing the
potenal benets. They might also downplay the potenal benets if they are not immediately visible
or tangible, parcularly in the context of a potenal re-elecon.
Thus, elected policians can obstruct PBPs for polical reasons. To illustrate this, we refer here to the
expression ‘Not In My Electoral year eect’ (NIMEY), a variant of the beer-known phrase ‘Not In My
Back Yard’, which is used to describe opposion by residents to a proposal for a new development
because it is close to them, oen with the implicaon that such developments are needed but should
be further away (Van der Horst, 2007; Bourdin et al., 2020). Applied to the polical realm, NIMEY refers
to a phenomenon in which policians avoid controversial decisions or policies in the run-up to an
elecon year to prevent any potenal backlash from voters. They might avoid taking stances on hot-
buon issues, pushing for major policy changes or undertaking other acons that could be polically
risky. This could lead to a delay in decision-making and policy implementaon and could potenally
impact the eecveness and eciency of government.
Thus, the NIMEY eect can be used to analyse PBPs by examining how electoral cycles and polical
consideraons inuence the implementaon and outcomes of these policies. This can involve studying
PBPs, such as infrastructure projects, tax incenves for businesses or social programmes targeted at
specic neighbourhoods or communies, and asking whether policians tend to propose or implement
these policies more oen in non-elecon years or whether controversial or potenally unpopular
policies are delayed unl aer elecons. An example might be a mayor postponing the construcon of
a controversial new industrial complex or wind farm unl aer the elecons. The mayor fears that public
discontent will harm his re-elecon, even though the project could have boosted the local economy in
the long term. It may also involve comparing the outcomes (e.g. in terms of ambion) of policies
implemented in elecon years versus non-elecon years. The inuence of the NIMEY eect can vary
depending on the specic context, including the type of policy, the polical dynamics in the area and the
characteriscs of the local electorate.
In addion, other factors besides the electoral cycle, such as economic condions (Bendor et al., 2010)
or changes in government (Jones, 2022), can also inuence policy implementaon and outcomes. An
appropriate example is New York State in the United States, where the ‘Start-Up NY’ economic
development programme was launched in 2014. This is a typically place-based policy, as it creates tax-
free zones for new businesses on or near New York State university campuses. However, its eecveness
and popularity were called into queson during the 2018 elecons. Indeed, despite inial promises to
create several thousand jobs, a 2016 report
1
revealed that it had only created 408 jobs. As a result, faced
with these disappoinng results, several policians were reluctant to support the programme during the
elecon campaign for fear of suering a backlash from voters. This probably slowed down decision-
making and policy adaptaon (Jean-Snarr et al., 2017). Another example to illustrate another type of
1
hps://taxfoundaon.org/new-york-reports-raise-quesons-about-excelsior-and-start-ny-job-programs/
phenomenon related to the NIMEY eect can be found in Olfert et al.’s (2014) arcle. The authors
highlight that regions that are polically controversial or sensive may be neglected in favour of regions
that are more likely to bring polical advantage to elected policians.
Sll referring to the behavioural polical economy framework, NIMEY can appear in two situaons in
parcular. First, the elected polician may be in a situaon of dissonance (Yahya & Sukmayadi, 2020).
This is when they are faced with a dicult choice, for example, between implemenng a PBP that is
benecial in the long term but unpopular in the short term and maintaining the status quo. Let us take
the example of an elected policians who supports a wind farm project or the installaon of a biogas
unit in his locality to ensure local energy autonomy. This could create a renewable energy source and
bring jobs to the area in the long term, which would be benecial for the enre community. However,
this project could face opposion from some local residents who are concerned about the impact on
the landscape, noise or the potenal reducon in the value of their properes (Bourdin et al. 2020;
Torre, 2023). The elected policians is then faced with a situaon of dissonance between the desire to
do what is benecial for the local community in the long term and the desire to respond to the
immediate concerns of certain constuents. Second, elected policians may face sunk costs (Cornelio et
al., 2021). They may have invested a signicant amount of me, eort and money in supporng a project
to build a new motorway in their region, with the aim of opening it up and making it more aracve.
The project has been underway for several years and has involved environmental studies, land
acquision and inial construcon work. However, a recent study suggests that the project will have a
negave impact on the local environment and that alternave soluons are available that are less costly
and less damaging to the environment. Despite this new informaon, the elected policians may be
reluctant to stop the project because of the resources already invested. This is known as sunk cost (Roth
et al., 2015); the elected policians does not want to lose the investment already made in the project,
even if the new informaon suggests that connuing the project is not the best decision. A concrete
example of the sunk cost eect is the Belo Monte dam project in Brazil (Mayer et al., 2021). Started in
the 2010s, this hydroelectric project was meant to boost economic growth by providing energy.
However, subsequent studies uncovered considerable adverse environmental eects, including
deforestaon and the impact on indigenous communies. Despite these ndings and the availability of
less harmful energy alternaves, the Brazilian government proceeded with the project, partly due to the
substanal investments already made.
Finally, referring to the seminal work of Sotarauta (2010) on “policy networks”, elected policians can
also fail in negoang with stakeholders of a regional development project. This failure in negoaon
may stem from the ocial opng for a decision that maximizes their personal interest rather than that
of other place-based leaders with whom they negoate. Consequently, these choices made by the
polician may undermine collecve eorts, erode trust among stakeholders, and ulmately jeopardize
the overall success and sustainability of the regional development iniave. Such decisions can create a
ri between elected policians and other place-based leaders, leading to fragmentaon in strategic
direcon and objecves. This can result in the inecient allocaon of resources, missed opportunies
for synergies, and a lack of cohesive vision for regional development (Sotarauta & Beer, 2017).
Furthermore, when stakeholders perceive a misalignment of interests, it may deter them from fully
invesng their eorts, resources, and commitment in future collaboraons (Beer et al., 2019). Over me,
this can erode the very foundaon of cooperave frameworks and dilute the potency of collecve acon
in driving regional development forward (Sotarauta, 2016).
4.3. Contextual variables
Contextual variables refer to external factors that can inuence policy decisions and the acons of
elected policians. In behavioural polical economy, these determinants can play an important role in
aecng the decision-making of an elected policians (Schnellenbach & Schubert, 2015). A disncon
can be made between variables relang to the socioeconomic environment and those relang to
informaon and media contexts. First, the economic resources of a local authority will necessarily
inuence the policies that are implemented (Oulasvirta & Turala, 2009). In many countries, the nancial
autonomy of local authories is precarious and, following the example of France, Torre and Bourdin
(2022) explained that the decentralisaon policy in many European countries has not always been
accompanied by the nancial resources that go with it. As a result, the ability of regional and subregional
authories to implement PBPs may be called into queson or, at least, limited. Indeed, the addionality
principle of many PBPs implies that the local authority must be able to co-nance the projects (Del Bo &
Sirtori, 2016). This is parcularly the case for Cohesion Policy (Bachtler et al., 2017). Consequently, if the
local authority is unable to provide its own funds, it may decide not to implement a project.
The socioeconomic and geographical environment of the local authority will also inuence an elected
policians’s ability to implement a PBP. First, the global economic environment must be taken into
account. Several studies have shown that the 2008 nancial crisis and the pandemic may have limited
the investment capacity of local governments, although for dierent reasons (Marn, 2011; Gray &
Barford, 2018; Bourdin et al., 2023). Thus, elected policians may not have all the informaon they need
to fully understand the implicaons of these global crises on their investment capacies. As a result,
they may decide to delay or avoid certain PBPs that require signicant investment, even though these
policies could be benecial in the long term. On the other hand, the local socioeconomic environment
and more specically the existence of localised crises can aect policy decisions. In the event of a local
crisis, elected policians may focus on immediate crisis management, neglecng long-term policies that
may not bring immediate benets but are essenal for long-term resilience (Wink et al., 2016). Recently,
some authors showed that many local authories have focused on short-term measures to address the
economic and social consequences of the global health crisis (ESPON, 2021 & 2022; Bourdin et al., 2023).
Finally, the informaon environment is likely to inuence the commitment of elected policians
(Entman, 2007). Cook (2012) explained that with the rise in power of the media, elected policians were
led to govern with the news. This line of argument refers to agenda-seng theory in behavioural polical
economy (Weaver et al., 2004; Protess & McCombs, 2013). Thus, elected policians will make decisions
that will somemes hinder the design and implementaon of PBPs because they will have assessed that
a policy could have a negave impact on their media image. It would therefore be a queson of social
pressure in the media (newspapers, radio and social media), which would lead to the slowing down or
even the abandonment of a policy. One example at the local level involves the bid by Boston for the 2024
Summer Games (Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017). Inially, the proposal was presented as a way to
smulate urban development and improve infrastructure. However, as public scruny and media
coverage intensied, raising concerns about costs, environmental impact, and displacement, local
elected policians began to express doubts. Faced with increasing opposion fueled by social media
campaigns and negave press, Mayor Marn J. Walsh and other ocials became more cauous about
supporng the bid, ulmately leading to its withdrawal. This case demonstrates how public pressure
driven by the media can result in a retreat from large-scale urban projects (Andranovich & Burbank,
2021).
5. Implicaons and reecons on future avenues of research
5.1. Implicaons and recommendaons
In our arcle, we explore the inuence of internal and external dynamics on the decision-making of
elected policians, which in turn aects the eecveness of PBPs. We have idened the roles of elected
policians as intermediaries, as well as the psychological, polical, and contextual obstacles that can
impede policy implementaon. Given these challenges, it is crucial to enhance the capacity of elected
policians, as they are tasked with making complex decisions while considering mulple parameters and
facing uncertainty. Therefore, training programs for elected policians should focus on (i) managing
biases, (ii) mediaon, and (iii) territorial leadership. Bias management training would involve raising
awareness among elected policians about dierent forms of cognive and aecve biases that can
inuence their decisions, and providing techniques to idenfy and overcome them. Mediaon training
aims to develop the skills of elected policians in managing conicts, promong dialogue, and fostering
collaboraon among stakeholders. Territorial leadership training would concentrate on developing and
implemenng strategic visions for regional development, encouraging a forward-thinking and
parcipatory approach. Addionally, it is vital to consider the systemac introducon of rigorous
monitoring and evaluaon mechanisms, and to provide beer support to elected policians in order to
measure the impact and eecveness of these policies in advance (to inform decision-making), during
(to allow policy adjustments), and aerwards (to learn from any mistakes and improve).
Another crucial aspect is to consider cizen parcipaon. While cizen parcipaon has become
popular and may redene democracy (Michels, A., & De Graaf, 2017), it is important to acknowledge
that involving cizens in decision-making is not without challenges and can be a source of concern for
elected policians. Royo et al. (2011) explain that our ndings reveal how elected policians primarily
mobilize cizen parcipaon to enhance their perceived legimacy or to meet basic legal requirements,
rather than ulizing cizen parcipaon to improve decision-making processes. Parcipaon is oen
perceived as lacking the power to bring about change (Koch, F., & Sanchez Steiner, 2017), which can lead
to frustraon among residents and failure from the perspecve of elected policians. However, when
parcipaon is eecvely implemented, it can lead to tangible soluons for local issues and assist
elected policians in making informed decisions (Rosen & Painter, 2019).
5.2. Avenues of research
The future of PBPs looks both promising and full of challenges. Considering potenal changes in polical
or economic condions, emerging problems or new ideas in the eld, a number of avenues for reecon
emerge, based on the frameworks we mobilised in this arcle (see Figure 2). In this paper, we
emphasised that PBPs need to be analysed without forgeng polical aspects.
Figure 2: A behavioural polical economy approach to analysing place-based policies
Source: Author
First, the role of territorial intermediaries in the implementaon of PBPs should be further explored.
What funcons do they assume in their design and implementaon (facilitator, orchestrator, mediator,
etc.)? As Coano and Foray (2014) argued, the implementaon of PBPs requires good instuons and
strong polical capacity at the regional level. Analysing the involvement of territorial intermediaries as
agents capable of acvang the networking of local actors and having internal legimacy when PBPs
emerge could be a promising avenue for research. In our arcle, territorial intermediaries are considered
facilitators, mediators or orchestrators. However, this vision may be limited and may fail to capture the
full potenal of these actors. As locally rooted agents with a deep understanding of local dynamics,
elected policians are in a unique posion to ancipate the changing needs of the region and idenfy
opportunies for implemenng PBPs. Other roles could be assigned to them. It would also be interesng
to analyse how these roles evolve over the course of a PBP (from its design to its operaonalisaon).
However, the legimacy of elected policians as intermediaries has been debated in the literature. Bakici
et al (2013) have emphasized the issues related to conicts of interest that elected ocials may have,
as well as the challenges posed by bureaucracy and budget constraints. These factors not only make the
role of intermediary more dicult but also raise concerns about the trust and legimacy bestowed upon
them by the public. For example, Mastens et al (2016) emphasize the dicules caused by budget
limitaons and bureaucrac processes in the management of drinking water. Choices made based on
economic factors, without sucient regard for the impact on public health, resulted in a signicant
health crisis. The handling of this crisis exposed conicts of interest and a lack of eecve oversight,
greatly diminishing public trust in elected ocials and underscoring the limitaons of their role as
mediators in safeguarding the well-being of the populaon.
Second, the NIMEY eect presents an interesng line of enquiry. Future research could invesgate how
the proximity of an elecon inuences policians’ willingness to support or oppose controversial
policies. It could also idenfy factors that might inuence the NIMEY eect in the design and
implementaon of PBPs. This could include polical factors (e.g. popularity of policians and
compeveness of the elecon) but also territorial factors (economic health of the region, local
resources, path dependency, etc.). Finally, it would be interesng to study how the NIMEY eect can
inuence the implementaon of PBPs. This could involve an analysis of how the NIMEY eect can delay,
modify or hinder the implementaon of territory-based policies. In the same vein, it would be
appropriate to study how stakeholders in PBPs implement strategies to overcome the NIMEY eect,
notably through stakeholder engagement, the use of appropriate governance mechanisms or the
adopon of measures to migate the impact of the NIMEY eect.
In conclusion, regional, urban and planning studies, enriched by the theorecal framework of
behavioural polical economy, can connue to oer a substanal eld of invesgaon for the analysis of
PBPs. Exploring these research perspecves could deepen our understanding of the entanglements
between polical and economic mechanisms, and also guide the design of more eecve policies
tailored to local specicies in order to avoid leading to regional disparies or other unintended eects
(Telle et al., 2019; Grossman, 2019).
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