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Biometrics-Based Authenticated Key Exchange with Multi-Factor Fuzzy Extractor
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Abstract
Existing fuzzy extractors and similar methods provide an effective way for extracting a secret key from a user's biometric data, but are susceptible to impersonation attack: once a valid biometric sample is captured, the scheme is no longer secure. We propose a novel multi-factor fuzzy extractor that integrates both a user's secret (e.g., a password) and a user's biometrics in the generation and reconstruction process of a cryptographic key. We then employ this multi-factor fuzzy extractor to construct personal identity credentials which can be used in a new multi-factor authenticated key exchange protocol that possesses multiple important features. First, the protocol provides mutual authentication. Second, the user and service provider can authenticate each other without the involvement of the identity authority. Third, the protocol can prevent user impersonation from a compromised identity authority. Finally, even when both a biometric sample and the secret are captured, the user can re-register to create a new credential using a new secret (reusable/reissued identity credentials). Most existing works on multi-factor authenticated key exchange only have a subset of these features. We formally prove that the proposed protocol is semantically secure. Our experiments carried out on the finger vein dataset SDUMLA achieved a low equal error rate (EER) of 0.04%, a reasonable averaged computation time of 0.93 seconds for the user and service provider to authenticate and establish a shared session key, and a small communication overhead of only 448 bytes.
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The Internet of Things (IoT) enabled wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are used to collect data from various nodes in hostile environments, but it is essential to authenticate legitimate nodes to prevent malicious attacks. Traditional authentication schemes may be vulnerable to attack, necessitating the development of more secure authentication techniques. To address this problem, we propose a novel authentication technique for multi-gateway IoT-enabled WSNs that achieves effective and secure data communication. The proposed scheme is based on biological information, hash, and XOR operations, which reduce computational costs. Passwords, biometric information, and session keys are updated securely to maintain forward and backward secrecy during communication. We provide an informal security analysis of the proposed scheme and a formal security analysis of the session key using the real-or-random (ROR) model. We also use the AVISPA simulation toolkit to verify the proposed user authentication scheme. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed scheme is more effective than previous multi-factor multi-gateway authentication protocols.
In a smart city, there are different types of entities, such as nature persons, IoT devices, and service providers, which have different computational limitations and storage limitations. Unfortunately, all of the existing authentication and key exchange (AKE) protocols are designed for either client–server or client–client authentication, including the ones designed for smart cities. In this paper, we present the idea of a compatible authentication and key exchange (CAKE) protocol which provides cross-species authentication. We propose the first CAKE protocol for a smart city that any two valid entities can authenticate with each other and create a secure session key without the help of any third party, while there is also no password table and no public key issuing problem. The entity can be a natural person having biometrics, an IoT device embedded with a physical unclonable function (PUF), or a service provider. Moreover, we extend the CAKE protocol to an anonymous CAKE (ACAKE) protocol, which provides natural persons an anonymous option to protect their privacy. In addition, both the proposed CAKE and ACAKE protocols can deal with the entity revocation problem. We define the framework and the security model of CAKE and ACAKE protocols. Under the security model, we formally prove that the proposed protocols are secure under the elliptic curve computational Diffie–Hellman (ECCDH) problem, the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) problem, and hash function assumptions. Comparisons with the related protocols are conducted to demonstrate the benefits of our protocols. Performance analysis is conducted and the experience results show that the proposed protocols are practical in a smart city.
For authentication schemes based on smart card in multi-server environment, there is a common problem—the parameters stored in a user’s smart card linearly increase with the number of the registered servers without involving registration center in helping with authentication process. Therefore, in order to save storage cost and raise efficiency, an authentication scheme based on smart card is proposed in multi-server environment. In the proposed scheme, a user only needs one time registration, and keeps a password to realize the authentication with different servers without involving the registration center in helping with authentication process. The server is unnecessary to store any users information to achieve authentication between the users and the server. Moreover, the security of the proposed scheme is proved by Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic. The security analysis and the performance analysis show the proposed scheme is secured against various well known attacks, and has lower communication cost, computation cost and storage cost compared with several related schemes.
Remote user authentication is a cryptographic mechanism through which a remote server verifies the legitimacy of an authorized user over an insecure communication channel. Most of the existing authentication schemes consider single-server environments and require multiple registrations of the same user for multiple servers. Moreover, most of these schemes do not consider biometric template revocation and error correction for noisy biometric signals. In addition, the existing schemes have several weaknesses, including stolen smart card attack, lack of user anonymity, user impersonation attack, and non-diversification of biometric data. To overcome these disadvantages, we propose a new three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme using a fuzzy commitment approach. The three factors used in the proposed scheme are the user’s password, smart card and personal biometrics. The security of the proposed scheme is verified using a formal security analysis under the broadly accepted Real-Or- Random (ROR) model for the session key security. The widely accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic is also applied for mutual authentication between a legal registered user and a server, and formal security verification using the broadly accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) is performed for the proposed scheme through simulation to show that it is secure. In addition, the informal security analysis of the proposed scheme shows that the scheme can resist other known attacks. Finally, a comparative study of the proposed scheme with the existing related schemes is conducted to measure the trade-off among the security and functionality features and the communication and computation costs.
According to advancements in the wireless technologies, study of biometrics-based multi-server authenticated key agreement schemes has acquired a lot of momentum. Recently, Wang et al. presented a three-factor authentication protocol with key agreement and claimed that their scheme was resistant to several prominent attacks. Unfortunately, this paper indicates that their protocol is still vulnerable to the user impersonation attack, privileged insider attack and server spoofing attack. Furthermore, their protocol cannot provide the perfect forward secrecy. As a remedy of these aforementioned problems, we propose a biometrics-based authentication and key agreement scheme for multi-server environments. Compared with various related schemes, our protocol achieves the stronger security and provides more functionality properties. Besides, the proposed protocol shows the satisfactory performances in respect of storage requirement, communication overhead and computational cost. Thus, our protocol is suitable for expert systems and other multi-server architectures. Consequently, the proposed protocol is more appropriate in the distributed networks.
Today, digitalization decisively penetrates all the sides of the modern society. One of the key enablers to maintain this process secure is authentication. It covers many different areas of a hyper-connected world, including online payments, communications, access right management, etc. This work sheds light on the evolution of authentication systems towards Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) starting from Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) and through Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). Particularly, MFA is expected to be utilized for human-to-everything interactions by enabling fast, user-friendly, and reliable authentication when accessing a service. This paper surveys the already available and emerging sensors (factor providers) that allow for authenticating a user with the system directly or by involving the cloud. The corresponding challenges from the user as well as the service provider perspective are also reviewed. The MFA system based on reversed Lagrange polynomial within Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme is further proposed to enable more flexible authentication. This solution covers the cases of authenticating the user even if some of the factors are mismatched or absent. Our framework allows for qualifying the missing factors by authenticating the user without disclosing sensitive biometric data to the verification entity. Finally, a vision of the future trends in MFA is discussed.
An authentication scheme handling multiple servers offers a feasible environment to users to conveniently access the rightful services from various servers using one-time registration. The practical realization of distribution of online services efficiently and transparently in multiple-server systems has come true by virtue of multi-server user authentication schemes. Due to distinguished properties like, difficulty to forge or copy, in-feasibility to lose or guess or forget, etc., biometrics have been widely preferred as a third authenticating factor in password and smart card based user authentication protocols. In this paper, we design a new biometrics-based multi-server authentication scheme based on trusted multiple-servers. We harness the concept of fuzzy extractor to provide the proper matching of biometric patterns. We evaluate our scheme through informal discussions on performance and also using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN-logic) & random oracle model for formal security analysis. We also compose a comparative assessment of our scheme and the related ones. Outcome of the analysis and assessment shows our scheme an edge above many related and contemporary schemes.
Takahashi et al. (ACNS 2015) introduced the notion of fuzzy signature, which is a signature scheme that allows a signature to be generated using “fuzzy data” (i.e. a noisy string such as a biometric feature) as a signing key, without using any additional user-specific data (such as a helper string in the context of fuzzy extractors). They gave a generic construction of a fuzzy signature scheme from the combination of an ordinary signature scheme with some homomorphic properties regarding keys and signatures, and a new primitive that they call linear sketch, and showed a concrete instantiation based on the Waters signature scheme (EUROCRYPT 2005). A major weakness of their scheme is that fuzzy data is assumed to be distributed uniformly, and another is that it has somewhat large public parameter (proportional to the security parameter), and requires bilinear groups, and either (or both) of these properties could be barriers for implementation and/or practical use.
In this paper, we revisit the results of Takahashi et al.: We show that in their generic construction, the requirements on each of the building blocks can be relaxed in several aspects. More specifically, our relaxation for the underlying linear sketch scheme allows us to use a new linear sketch scheme (that we propose) for a fuzzy key setting different from that of Takahashi et al., for which we only require that the average min-entropy of fuzzy data is high (under the situation some part of its information is leaked). Furthermore, our relaxation on the underlying signature scheme enables us to now use the Schnorr signature scheme as a building block. Our concrete instantiation of a fuzzy signature scheme is, although relying on a random oracle, arguably much more practical than the scheme by Takahashi et al. The latter relaxation routes through a variant of related key security for signature schemes.
The authentication scheme is an important cryptographic mechanism, through which two communication parties could authenticate each other in the open network environment. To satisfy the requirement of practical applications, many authentication schemes using passwords and smart cards have been proposed. However, passwords might be divulged or forgotten, and smart cards might be shared, lost, or stolen. In contrast, biometric methods, such as fingerprints or iris scans, have no such drawbacks. Therefore, biometrics-based authentication schemes gain wide attention. In this paper, we propose a biometrics-based authentication scheme for multiserver environment using elliptic curve cryptography. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the first truly three-factor authenticated scheme for multiserver environment. We also demonstrate the completeness of the proposed scheme using the Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic.
Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) are designed to work despite the use of passwords drawn from
a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, all possible passwords. While several such protocols have
been suggested, the underlying theory has been lagging. We begin by defining a model for this problem, one rich enough to
deal with password guessing, forward secrecy, server compromise, and loss of session keys. The one model can be used to define
various goals. We take AKE (with “implicit” authentication) as the “basic” goal, and we give definitions for it, and for entity-authentication
goals as well. Then we prove correctness for the idea at the center of the Encrypted Key-Exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin
and Merritt: we prove security, in an ideal-cipher model, of the two-flow protocol at the core of EKE.
Password-based encrypted key exchange are protocols that are designed to provide pair of users communicating over an unreliable channel with a secure session key even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. In this paper, we present two simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols based on that of Bellovin and Merritt. While one protocol is more suitable to scenarios in which the password is shared across several servers, the other enjoys better security properties. Both protocols are as ecien t, if not better, as any of the existing encrypted key exchange protocols in the literature, and yet they only require a single random oracle instance. The proof of security for both protocols is in the random oracle model and based on hardness of the computational Die-Hellman problem. However, some of the techniques that we use are quite dieren t from the usual ones and make use of new variants of the Die-Hellman problem, which are of independent interest. We also provide concrete relations between the new variants and the standard Die-Hellman problem.
A wide variety of systems requires reliable personal recognition schemes to either confirm or determine the identity of an individual requesting their services. The purpose of such schemes is to ensure that the rendered services are accessed only by a legitimate user and no one else. Examples of such applications include secure access to buildings, computer systems, laptops, cellular phones, and ATMs. In the absence of robust personal recognition schemes, these systems are vulnerable to the wiles of an impostor. Biometric recognition, or, simply, biometrics, refers to the automatic recognition of individuals based on their physiological and/or behavioral characteristics. By using biometrics, it is possible to confirm or establish an individual's identity based on "who she is", rather than by "what she possesses" (e.g., an ID card) or "what she remembers" (e.g., a password). We give a brief overview of the field of biometrics and summarize some of its advantages, disadvantages, strengths, limitations, and related privacy concerns.
Based on the Threshold Predicate Encryption (TPE), the biometric authentication scheme
PassBio
aims to correctly authenticate genuine end-users without leaking their biometric privacy information. However, this article proposes two impersonation attacks to
PassBio
by merely sending very few query messages. Specifically, an attacker is able to cheat the authentication server with probability 50% by sending the server a random query, or almost 100% by sending the server a collusion of old genuine queries, without being identified. Moreover, in order to defeat the impersonation attacks, this article presents a Verifiable Threshold Predicate Encryption (VTPE) scheme which includes three components: (1) a multi-segment TPE for reducing the computational cost and communication overhead significantly; (2) a segment-wise watermarking for defeating the random attacks; and (3) a challenge-response mechanism for defeating the replay and collusion attacks. In addition, the watermarking also creates a secure channel between the querying user and the server. The experiments on both simulated feature vectors and real face images demonstrate that the present attacks and countermeasures are effective and efficient.
To avoid identity theft or impersonation in biometric authentication schemes, fingerprint data is typically stored locally, e.g., in a trusted hardware module, in a single device that is used for user enrollment and authentication. Local storage, however, limits the ability to implement distributed applications, in which users can enroll their fingerprint once and use it to access multiple resources afterwards. In this paper, we present a distributed authentication system that stores fingerprint data in a server or cloud infrastructure in a privacy-preserving way. Multiple devices can be connected and perform user enrollment or verification. To secure the privacy and integrity of sensitive data, we employ a cryptographic construct called fuzzy vault. As a proof of concept, we build an authentication system for access control using resource-constrained devices (Raspberry Pis) connected to fingerprint scanners and the Microsoft Azure cloud environment. Furthermore, we evaluate the fingerprint matching algorithm against the well-known FVC2006 database and show that it can achieve comparable accuracy to widely-used matching techniques that are not designed for privacy, while remaining efficient with an authentication time of a few seconds.
In the quest to devise new alternatives to password-based authentication, behavioral biometrics have become more and more appealing due to the improved usability that comes with their unobtrusiveness. One such type of biometric are brainwaves, which can be nowadays easily measured and used to prove a person's identity. Given the potential for this technology to be adopted in the near future, it is paramount to analyze its security implications. Furthermore, recent advances in brain computer interfaces make feasible the usage of brainwaves to prove users' identity. This work presents a comprehensive framework for assessing the vulnerabilities of brainwave authentication systems, incorporating new attack vectors that target specific features of brain biometrics. Resting on this theoretical groundwork, we analyze the existing literature on attacks and countermeasures, identifying gaps and providing a foundation for future research. Furthermore, we evaluated a subset of attacks identified through the framework and report our preliminary results.
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) allows mobile users to have on-demand access to cloud services. A mobile cloud model helps in analyzing the information regarding the patients' records and also in extracting recommendations in healthcare applications. In mobile cloud computing, a fine-grained level access control of multi-server cloud data is a pre-requisite for successful execution of end users applications. In this paper, we propose a new scheme that provides a combined approach of fine-grained access control over cloud-based multi-server data along with a provably secure mobile user authentication mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the first to pursue fine-grained data access control over multiple cloud servers in a mobile cloud computing environment. The proposed scheme has been validated extensively in different heterogeneous environment where its performance was found good in comparison to other existing schemes.
We introduce a privacy preserving biometrics-based authentication solution by which users can authenticate to different service providers from mobile phones without involving identity providers in the transactions. Authentication is performed via zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, based on a cryptographic identity token that encodes the biometric identifier of the user and a secret provided by the user, making it threefactor authentication. Our approach for generating a unique, repeatable and revocable biometric identifier from the user’s biometric image is based on a machine learning based classification technique which involves the features extracted from the user’s biometric image. We have implemented a prototype of the proposed authentication solution and evaluated our solution with respect to its performance, security and privacy. The evaluation has been performed on a public dataset of face images.
The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been used in wide range of applications, such as smart living, smart health and smart transportation. Among all these applications, smart home is most popular, in which the users/residents can control the various smart sensor devices of home by using the ICT. However, the smart devices and users communicate over an insecure communication channel, i.e., the Internet. There might be the possibility of various types of attacks, such as smart device capture attack, user, gateway node and smart device impersonation attacks and privileged-insider attack on a smart home network. An illegal user, in this case, can gain access over data sent by the smart devices. Most of the existing schemes reported in the literature for the remote user authentication in smart home environment are not secure with respect to the above specified attacks. Thus, there is need to design a secure remote user authentication scheme for a smart home network so that only authorized users can have access to the smart devices. To mitigate the aforementioned isses, in this paper, we propose a new secure remote user authentication scheme for a smart home environment. The proposed scheme is efficient for resource-constrained smart devices with limited resources as it uses only one-way hash functions, bitwise XOR operations and symmetric encryptions/decryptions. The security of the scheme is proved using the rigorous formal security analysis under the widely-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model. Moreover, the rigorous informal security analysis and formal security verification using the broadly-accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool is also done. Finally, the practical demonstration of the proposed scheme is also performed using the widely-accepted NS-2 simulation.
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is one of the most important applications in applied cryptography, where a user interacts with a server to set up a session key where pre-registered information (aka. authentication factor), such as a password or biometrics, of the user is stored. While single-factor AKE is widely used in practice, higher security concerns call for multi-factor AKE (MFAKE) schemes, e.g. combining both passwords and biometrics simultaneously. However, in some casually designed schemes, security is even weakened in the sense that leakage of one authentication factor will defeat the whole MFAKE protocol. Furthermore, an inevitable by-product arise that the usability of the protocol often drop greatly. To summarize, the existing multi-factor protocols did not provide enough security and efficiency simultaneously. In this paper, we make one step ahead by proposing a very efficient MFAKE protocol. We define the security model and give the according security analysis. We also implement our protocol on a smartphone and a cloud server. The theoretic comparisons and the experimental results show that our scheme achieves both security and usability.
Recently, in 2014, He and Wang proposed a robust and efficient multi-server authentication scheme using biometrics-based smart card and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In this paper, we first analyze He-Wang’s scheme and show that their scheme is vulnerable to a known session-specific temporary information attack and impersonation attack. In addition, we show that their scheme does not provide strong user’s anonymity. Furthermore, He-Wang’s scheme cannot provide the user revocation facility when the smart card is lost/stolen or user’s authentication parameter is revealed. Apart from these, He- Wang’s scheme has some design flaws, such as wrong password login and its consequences, and wrong password update during password change phase. We then propose a new secure multiserver authentication protocol using biometric-based smart card and ECC with more security functionalities. Using the Burrows- Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, we show that our scheme provides secure authentication. In addition, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted and used AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool, and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks. Our scheme provides high security along with low communication cost, computational cost, and variety of security features. As a result, our scheme is very suitable for battery-limited mobile devices as compared to He- Wang’s scheme.
While more accurate and reliable than ever, the trustworthiness of biometric verification systems is compromised by the emergence of spoofing attacks. Responding to this threat, numerous research publications address isolated spoofing detection, resulting in efficient counter-measures for many biometric modes. However, an important, but often overlooked issue regards their engagement into a verification task and how to measure their impact on the verification systems themselves. A novel evaluation framework for verification systems under spoofing attacks, called expected performance and spoofability framework, is the major contribution of this paper. Its purpose is to serve for an objective comparison of different verification systems with regards to their verification performance and vulnerability to spoofing, taking into account the system's application-dependent susceptibility to spoofing attacks and cost of the errors. The convenience of the proposed open-source framework is demonstrated for the face mode, by comparing the security guarantee of four baseline face verification systems before and after they are secured with antispoofing algorithms.
Conventional single-server authentication schemes suffer a significant shortcoming. If a remote user wishes to use numerous
network services, he/she must register his/her identity and password at these servers. It is extremely tedious for users to
register numerous servers. In order to resolve this problem, various multi-server authentication schemes recently have been
proposed. However, these schemes are insecure against some cryptographic attacks or inefficiently designed because of high
computation costs. Moreover, these schemes do not provide strong key agreement function which can provide perfect forward
secrecy. Based on these motivations, this paper proposes a new efficient and secure biometrics-based multi-server authentication
with key agreement scheme for smart cards on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) without verification table to minimize the
complexity of hash operation among all users and fit multi-server communication environments. By adopting the biometrics technique,
the proposed scheme can provide more strong user authentication function. By adopting the ECC technique, the proposed scheme
can provide strong key agreement function with the property of perfect forward secrecy to reduce the computation loads for
smart cards. As a result, compared with related multi-serve authentication schemes, the proposed scheme has strong security
and enhanced computational efficiency. Thus, the proposed scheme is extremely suitable for use in distributed multi-server
network environments such as the Internet and in limited computations and communication resource environments to access remote
information systems since it provides security, reliability, and efficiency.
KeywordsAuthentication-Multi-server-Key agreement-Smart card-Biometrics-Elliptic curve cryptosystem
Biometric-based user authentication is no longer just the domain of James Bond movies or government installations. Fingerprint sensors, in particular, are now showing up standard on notebooks from IBM, HP and Toshiba, and in new line of peripherals from Microsoft. The benefits to the user and organization are clear: unlike passwords or tokens, fingerprints cannot be lost, forgotten, or easily lent to others. The consequence is a reduction in administration costs, improvement in audit logs for compliance, and the prospect of heightened security by reducing reliance on each user to adhere to security policy. However, the potential weaknesses are also well known, such as reversible templates, gummy fingers, storage of secrets, and central databases. Since no single security approach is a magic bullet, the strengths and weaknesses of biometric authentication must be considered in light of the threats in a given environment. This talk will survey the current state of the art of biometric authentication algorithms, readers and security architectures used for network security with a critical analysis of the security and privacy considerations.
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