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Mzondi, AMM 2024, ‘Christian Leaders (Theologians), Governance, and
the Moral Dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’: A Practical Theological
Approach’, African Theological Journal for Church and Society, vol. 5,
no. 1, pp. 237-260
Christian Leaders (Theologians), Governance, and
the Moral Dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’: A
Practical Theological Approach
Abraham Modisa Mkhondo Mzondi
South African Theological Seminary (SATS)
modisa@sats.ac.za
Abstract
The African National Congress (ANC) has been the governing party of
the ‘Rainbow Nation’ from the first democratic election held on 27
April 1994 to date. During the same period, different Christian leaders
(theologians) played diverse roles and expressed their perspectives
related to governance and the moral dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’.
Thus, the article explores distinct roles and perspectives of Christian
leaders (theologians) related to governance and the moral dilemma in
the ‘Rainbow Nation’ during the era of the past three presidents of the
African National Congress, namely, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Thabo
Mbeki, Jacob Gedleihlekisa Zuma, and the current presIdent of the
ANC, Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa. It excludes Kgalema Motlantle as he
was not an ANC president but only an interim president of the
‘Rainbow Nation’. The article uses a case study method to answer the
question: How have theologians and Christian leaders played their
roles and expressed their perspectives about of governance and the
moral dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ in the period under review?
Introduction and Research Approach
The African National Congress (ANC) first secured its position and mandate to
govern post-1994 after winning the first and historic democratic elections, held
on 27 April 1994. Except in a few instances, Africa’s old liberation movement,
now turned into a political party, has been ruling at nation, province, and
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municipality levels since 1994 to date. Through its collective leadership and
culture of providing space for diverse opinions in the organisation (GGGG), the
ANC subsequently managed to introduce some political stability, introduced
national and municipal democratic elections, and began to address historical
imbalances inherited from the long period of colonialism and, lately,
apartheid. Each of the four presidents of the ANC championed a different form
of governance that was accompanied by some moral dilemma. Such moral
dilemmas indicate the clash between perceived ethical and unethical actions
and decisions associated with each president’s term of office. Nelson Mandela
anchored his governance on national reconciliation, Thabo Mbeki on national
transformation, Jacob Zuma on the national development plan, and Cyril
Ramaphosa’s governance is currently anchored on the new dawn captured
through the ‘Thuma mina’ drive. The article aligns with De Gruchy and De
Gruchy (2004:207) that, although some Christian leaders retreated to be
involved in church matters, a few have continued to address structural issues
in the new dispensation as the ANC slowly assigned the political space to itself
and the moral space to the religious sector (West 2018:74). The article is
situated in the discipline of practical theology and intends to explore the
actions and decisions of the past four ANC and country’s presidents regarding
matters of governance. It thus uses a case study research approach which
Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead (1987:370) define as examining
a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple
methods of data collection to gather information from one or a
few entities (people, groups, or organizations).
The article explores the different post-1994 roles and perspectives of some
Christian leaders (theologians) associated and not associated with the four
presidents of the ANC (Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob
Gedleihlekisa Zuma, and Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa). These roles and
perspectives relate to matters of the governance of the ruling party on one
hand and the identified moral dilemma on the other. Hence the question, how
have theologians and Christian leaders played their roles and expressed their
perspectives about governance and the moral dilemma of the ‘Rainbow
Nation’ in the period under review?
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Moral Dilemma and Governance In South African
Governance
Matters of political governance attract different ethical perspectives and
discussions. The past four presidents governed in the context of the ANC’s
collective leadership that seeks to promote unity within contrasting views in
the organisation. The implementation of different national policies during the
tenure of each of the four presidents attracted criticism from different
theologians and Christian leaders who argued that some of the policies did not
benefit the poor and oppressed masses, thus creating a moral dilemma for
each president’s administration as is noticed below. These theologians and
Christian leaders spoke from an individual and ecumenical position (Smit 2003;
Coertze 2005; Tshawane 2009; Duncan 2019; Magezi 2019).
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1994–1999), Governance, and
National Reconciliation
Soon after his inauguration as the president of the country on 10 May 1994,
Nelson Mandela embarked on a programme of promoting a new nation by
establishing a Government of National Unity (GNU), consisting of the African
National Congress (ANC), National Party (NP), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP),
and other individuals (Gumede 2007:96). Pursuant to nation-building,
Mandela appointed F.W. De Klerk of the NP and Thabo Mbeki of the ANC as
his deputy presidents and appointed some members from the NP and IFP to
serve as ministers and deputy ministers. Demonstrating his commitment to
promote national reconciliation, Mandela also reached out and engaged
traditional leaders from the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
(Contralesa) established prior to 1994 (Collard 2013:262). His efforts stirred
Archbishop Desmond Tutu to christen this new nation the ‘Rainbow people of
God’ (Tutu 1995). Henceforth, the new post-1994 nation is called the ‘Rainbow
Nation’ (see Forster 2016).
Providing a critical response to the governance of Mandela, ecumenical
Christian leaders resolved at the 1995 SACC conference that, while the church
accepted the legitimacy of the new government, the church should also adopt
a position of critical solidarity and speak for the poor in matters of governance
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and service delivery, as it supported the Reconstruction and Development Plan
(RDP) and other initiatives to address past imbalances (De Gruchy 1995:19;
Boesak 2005:166–167). Three years before the 1995 SACC conference, Villa-
Vicencio (1992) argued for a shift from liberation theology to a theology of
reconstruction to engage the post-liberation context and to speak for the poor
and the marginalised in democratic contexts. As such, ecumenical Christian
leaders (theologians) viewed critical solidarity as working with the new
government to address past wrongs to create a new social order (Pityana and
Villa-Vicencio 1995:166). Ten years later, Boesak (2005:161-165) argued for a
shift from critical solidarity to constructive engagement as the church must be
in solidarity with the poor not the state.
The Moral Dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’
Mandela was conscious of his moral standing and authority; hence, he
advocated that socio-economic and political reconstruction need to be
accompanied by revisiting the moral dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’. This
advocacy stems from the ANC’s Commission on Religious Affairs in 1995, and
the 1998 moral summit to address the moral fibre of the ‘Rainbow Nation’.
Flowing from this summit, Nelson Mandela applied the RDP concept in
parliament to advocate that the nation needs to focus on the ‘RDP of the Soul’
(Mandela 1999). The ‘RDP of the Soul’ promoted that the religious sector was
to concentrate on the moral transformation of the nation while the
government will concentrate on the socio-economic and political
transformation. In addition, Mandela established an interfaith forum called
the National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF) to hold bi-annual interactions
with diverse religious leaders and advance service delivery initiatives in
partnership with the government. To this end, he included liberation theology
clerics as members of parliament, while others held political leadership roles
at the provincial level and in local municipalities (Kumalo 2009:250, 253; see
also Maluleke 1997:7). These developments prompted Nolan (1995:152) to
argue that the new democratic dispensation needed to take place in a form of
self-criticism that focuses on its own people, nation, kings, and institutions.
Villa-Vicencio, De Gruchy, and Pityana expressed concern that now Christians
and their leaders faced the new dilemma of witnessing in a ‘secular state’. Such
witnessing was expected from those Christian leaders assigned to important
state organs. Fr Mkhatshwa, the then deputy minister of education, who later
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served as the executive mayor of Tshwane Metro Municipality, was assigned
the responsibility to lead and guide the spiritual transformation that began
prior to and continued at the 1998 moral summit. Dr Alan Boesak contested
for the ANC’s Western Cape premiership (Jeppie 1999:8). Archbishop
Desmond Tutu was assigned to lead and guide the work of the Truth
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). A few years later, Maluleke (1998:14)
insinuated that its use of Christian symbols and language was bewitching.
The above developments demonstrate that Mandela, the first post-1994
president of the ANC and the first democratically elected president of the
‘Rainbow Nation’ surrounded himself with influential Christian leaders
(theologians) who were an intrinsic part of the struggle against apartheid.
Maluleke (1997:7) later strongly cautioned that the involvement of some
influential Christian leaders in the TRC and other state organs in the post-1994
era were mere political appointees instead of a planned church delegation. To
this, Forster (2016) emphasised that Mandela was the messiah of the new era,
Tutu the high priest, the TRC its penitentiary ritual acts, and the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights sacred texts. In this period, Archbishop Tutu led and
guided the TRC by employing a theology based on the Ubuntu worldview to
emphasise that there is no reconciliation without forgiveness (see Tutu 2009).
Nine years later, Maluleke (2020:219) argued that the final step of the TRC is
not reconciliation but fixing broken relationships.
The presence of influential ecumenical Christian leaders (theologians) in some
key state organs and the ‘Madiba magic’ did not prevent the emergence of
scandals in Mandela’s cabinet. First was the scandal of his first health minister
Dr Skosazana-Dlamini-Zuma, involving the tender awarded to the renowned
producer, musician, and actor Mbongeni Ngema to produce a national HIV and
AIDS education show (Gevisser 2009:278). Second and worst were the Pan
African Congress’s (PAC) member of parliament Patricia De Lille’s exposure of
the arms deal in parliament (Holden 2008:38–39) and Tony Yengeni’s scandal
(Holden 2008:71–86). Third were the fraud charges and the jail sentence of Dr
Allan Boesak (Boesak 2009:382). During this period key influential ecumenical
Christian leaders (theologians) had retreated from public politics while
Pentecostal-Charismatic church leaders took over and began critiquing the
ruling party’s governance and its ‘secular state’ moral basis (Kumalo
2009:250).
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Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), Governance, and National
Transformation
Confronted with the nation-building governance and moral standing of the
global icon and his predecessor, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, the
economist, skilfully followed his pre-determined pathway by steering away
from the agenda of national reconciliation Mandela emphasised, to set a new
direction for the ‘Rainbow Nation’. He based his administration on national
socio-economic transformation to focus on addressing the legacy of apartheid.
To achieve good governance and management, he went on to implement a
cost-management approach through the new policy GEAR (Gumede 2007:72-
73,76); Vellem (2013:2) later argued GEAR was anti-working class and pro-
capitalist.
Mbeki latter introduced the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South
Africa (ASGISA) – intended to boost infrastructure – as policy (Callard
2013:70,168) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), geared to promote an
economically active middle class (Butler 2013:351-352). Cyril Ramaphosa and
Molefe Tsele were appointed to serve in the BEE Commission. To achieve the
goals he set out in the GEAR and ASGISA frameworks, Mbeki surrounded
himself with influential middle-class African individuals (Gumede 2007:308)
and influential former anti-apartheid Christian leaders. He intentionally
brought the three former general secretaries of the SACC closer to him. Frank
Chikane was appointed as director general by the presidency; Brigalia Bam was
assigned to lead and guide the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); and
Molefe Tsele was appointed as ambassador to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). Mbeki also appointed the anti-apartheid former academic and
theologian Makhekhesi Stofile premier of Eastern Cape Province. He opted for
continuity by allowing the NRLF, established during his period as the deputy
president of the ANC and of the country, to function and ensured that the 1998
moral summit (with Mandela’s ‘RDP of the Soul’ in mind) produced tangible
outcomes by establishing the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM). He then
tasked his deputy president, Jacob Zuma, to lead the movement. The mission
of the MRM is “to initiate, facilitate, and coordinate societal networks and
programmes to regenerate and preserve the moral fibre of our nation” (Moral
Regeneration Movement).
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Mbeki relied on his international foreign relations experience, gained while in
exile, to concentrate on addressing continental issues and ended
conceptualising the notion of ‘Africa Renaissance’ which was later
incorporated into the New African Program for Africa Development (NEPAD)
(Butler 2013:369). While focusing on continental land global issues, three
notable developments occurred during his administration. First, sporadic
service delivery protests in several townships emerged as community
members resolved to voice their dissatisfaction about the performance of
several local municipalities. Such incidents led to the formation of ‘concerned
residents’ associations or forums’.
Second, as ecumenical Christian leaders (theologians) associated with the
SACC withdrew to focus on church ministry and a few others practised critical
solidarity, a new form of evangelical ecumenism emerged. Two influential
evangelical leaders, Michael Cassidy of Africa Enterprise (AE) and Moss Ntlha
of The Evangelical Alliance of South Africa (TEASA), initiated the establishment
of the two national leadership forums intended to address matters of
governance and national transformation. Moss Ntlha is an anti-apartheid
activist linked to the former group called Concerned Evangelicals (CE). The
Kairos document prompted this group to produce a document called the
Evangelical Witness of South Africa (EWISA). The two leaders collaborated to
organise the South African Christian Leadership Assembly II (SACLA II) held on
7-11 July 2003 at the Pretoria showgrounds. This assembly was followed by the
establishment of the National Initiative for Reformation in South Africa
(NIRSA).
Third was the establishment of Kairos Southern Africa and the South African
Christian Leaders Initiative (SACLI), a forum endorsed by TEASA, SACC, AE, and
Kairos Southern Africa. Through SACLI, several Christian leaders agreed to raise
the urgency of addressing national social cohesion and accountable leadership
in all spheres of government, the private sector, the church, civil society, and
the family. Eventually, the emergence of Kairos Southern Africa and SACLI
enabled the two national church bodies, SACC and TEASA, to collaborate in
some joint Christian national transformation initiatives despite some
contention that evangelicals (including PCCs) in the African continent primarily
focus on individual morality instead of addressing structural socio-political
challenges (Gifford 2009:215). Henceforth, the leaders from SACC and TEASA
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collaborated in shaping and influencing the post-Mandela Christian landscape
of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ and contributed to maintaining the pre-1994 anti-
apartheid struggle heritage. Ultimately, these leaders from different church
traditions were addressing matters affecting the poor on one hand and
promoting the interest of the governing party on the other hand.
The Moral Dilemma and the African Renaissance
Mbeki continued with Mandela’s legacy of placing influential ecumenical
Christian leaders (theologians) in his leadership and instilled the spiritual
transformation agenda (the ‘RDP of the Soul’) Mandela began. He further
continued the existence and function of the NRLF and did not interfere with
the ongoing task of TRC, promoted the worldview of Ubuntu Archbishop Tutu
popularised through the TRC, by implementing the ‘Batho-Pele-People First’
principle across all spheres of government. Embracing Ubuntu resulted in
Mbeki championing the ‘African Renaissance’ vision popularised through his ‘I
am an African’ speech to address African socio-economic and political issues
in the continent. He later positioned the ‘Rainbow Nation’ and his government
as the strategic partner to achieve his continental dream of revitalising Africa
and presenting it as a different continent in the global community. During this
period, Mbeki urged the church to be a ‘watchdog’. Boesak (2005:161-162)
dispelled the notion that the church should be a ‘watchdog’ and a partner of
the ANC as the struggle was over. Later, Vellem (2010:1-6) added his voice by
urging Christian theologians to begin to ‘read the time’ in the post-1994 South
Africa.
BEE, Service Delivery Protest, and Unemployment
As shown above, Mbeki promoted Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) to
introduce economic transformation. However, Boesak (2005:163) critiqued
that the elevation of the elite has added to increasing the gap between the rich
and the poor while Manala (2010:521-523) opposed the privatisation
initiatives by arguing that they are the bedrock of service delivery protests
emerging in the country. The implementation of neoliberal GEAR and later
ASGISA brought strict financial controls and budget surplus within the
government coupled with the privatisation and downsizing of parastatals,
causing many employees from these state entities to lose their jobs, resulting
in increasing the rate of unemployment in the country. Vellem (2013:14,17-
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18) warns that, despite the creation of a new black middle class by GEAR and
ASGISA, the gap between rich and poor has widened in South Africa, making it
one of the most unequal societies in the world. As a result, levels of poverty,
hunger and unemployment have increased for millions of poor people (Vellem
2020:4).
HIV and AIDS and the Zimbabwe debacle
Obsessed by driving his ‘African Renaissance’ vision, Mbeki supported
dissenting scholars who rejected the HIV and AIDS connection (Gumede
2007:187-215). He advocated that poverty, instead of HIV, causes AIDS, and
finally refused to allow for the use of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) for people
living with HIV and AIDS, much to the dismay of Christian leaders. Meanwhile,
Maluleke (2001) argued that HIV and AIDS need a new theological approach to
minimise their impact on the country and the SADC region. And Boesak
(2005:166-167) added that the church should engage issues like HIV and AIDS.
The nationalisation of resources, particularly the land expropriation process in
Zimbabwe and Mbeki’s subsequent quiet diplomacy, created tensions
between him and Christian leaders (theologians) who called for tough action
against Robert Mugabe. The tension between Robert Mugabe and the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) escalated the already existing
tenson between Mbeki and Christian leaders (theologians). This fact was
noticed when the Anglican Bishop of KwaZulu-Natal, Rubin Phillip, lodged a
high court interdict to stop the arms shipment of the Zimbabwean government
being offloaded at the Durban harbour and transported through South Africa
to Zimbabwe (Nakhoda 2011).
Jacob Gedleihlekisa Zuma (2009–2018), Governance, and
the New Growth Path-National Development Plan (NDP)
Jacob Zuma’s mission was to undo his predecessor’s efforts grounded on neo-
liberal policies by implementing the ANC 2007 Polokwane conference
resolutions to address the results of GEAR and ASGISA and to introduce a
developmental state. He resolved to (a) decentralise his government by
shifting power from the presidency and (b) focus on eliminating poverty and
creating equality by 2030 through the New Growth Path (NGP) (Callard
2013:39-41,58). In addition, and contrary to the position of the ANC regarding
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PCCs (African National Congress 2007:4), his administration ended the
relationship with previous ecumenical Christian leaders (theologians)
associated with the SACC and established a new relationship with Pentecostal-
Charismatic church leaders some of whom had already ordained him honorary
pastor prior to his presidency in 2012 (Makhaye 2007). This shift of association
led to the establishment of the National Interfaith Leadership Council (NILC)
chaired by Pastor McCauley. Conradie (2013:16) vehemently attacked the
formation of NILC and accused it of being a method to marginalise the SACC.
Furthermore, criticism from the SACC resulted in the formation of a new
forum, the National Interfaith Council of South Africa (NICSA), by merging the
NRLF and the NILC. Pastor McCauley was elected the chairperson of NICSA.
The concern that Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches (PCCs) and leaders would
erode the gains of ecumenical Christian leaders (theologians) associated with
the SACC (De Gruchy and De Gruchy 2004:229) was now real during the
administration of Jacob Zuma, who chose to surround himself with the
Pentecostal-Charismatic church leaders instead of the ecumenical Christian
leaders (theologians) who contributed to the end of apartheid. Jacob Zuma
further appointed Mogoeng Mogoeng, an ordained lay Pentecostal-
Charismatic pastor, as the chief justice of the Constitutional Court. At that
time, Maluleke (2015:36,38) lamented that the executive and the judiciary
were now in the hands of the leadership of two Pentecostal-Charismatic
leaders (Jacob Zuma and Mogoeng Mogoeng) while Boesak (2014:1060) earlier
emphasised that Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity supported capitalism
and consumerism.
Zuma also allowed both the MRM with its agenda of moral transformation (the
‘RDP of the Soul’) to function, and tasked the minister of health, Dr Aaron
Motsoaledi, to escalate the introduction of the National Health Insurance (NHI)
(Collard 2013:73). His international relations agenda focused on shifting from
relations with developed economies, G20 (Group of Twenty), to joining Brazil,
Russia, India, China to form a new economic block, BRICKS (Brazil, Russia,
China, India, South Africa) (Collard 2013:102).
Two phases characterised Zuma’s governance, the first being his first five-year
term and the second being his second five-year term. In the former phase, he
was the people’s president who was in touch with the grassroots of the ANC
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and the poor, helped to conceptualise and finalise the New Growth Path-
National Development Plan, and emphatically denounced his predecessor’s
position on HIV and AIDS and brought different stakeholders to establish the
national AIDS Consortium and implemented the administration of the ARVs to
people living with HIV and AIDS. In the latter phase, Jacob Zuma was engulfed
with severe criticism from all sections of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ accusing him of
maladministration and corruption.
Reflecting on Zuma’s administration, Vellem (2013:14,17-18) argued that
there was no material difference between Mbeki’s GEAR and Zuma’s NGP-NDP
as both had embraced neo-liberalism and ditched the aspirations of the poor
and the working class. West (2018:79) emphasised that, from the time of
Nelson Mandela to the presidency of Jacob Zuma, the ANC had already
demonstrated that it was not expecting the religious sector to question it on
socio-economic issues, but to concentrate on moral issues conceptualised
through the ‘RDP of the Soul’. Hence, it was not surprising that Zuma did not
expect his PCCs and AICs alliance to engage him on structural issues but to
provide him with the necessary unwavering support seen throughout his
presidency.
The Moral Dilemma and the New Growth Path-National
Development Plan
Zuma assumed the presidency of the ANC and the ‘Rainbow Nation’ with a
cloud of hanging ethical dilemmas, namely, the Shabir Shaik trail to accusation,
the arms deal collusion, and the rape trial. Urbaniak and Khorommbi (2020:62)
described him as an emblem of Christianity’s entanglement with both political
leadership and governance under the ANC’s twenty-five-year rule. This
entanglement is noticed in the Nkandla scandal that created a huge hole in
Zuma’s NGP-NDP agenda. The former public protector (PP) widened the hole
as she recommended that he pay back the extra money used for unrelated
renovation at his Nkandla home (Madonsela 2016). Later, the chief justice of
the Constitutional Court penned a majority judgement that instructed him to
pay back the money and lambasted Parliament for not practising proper
oversight in the matter. This was after Zuma had approached the
Constitutional Court to overrule the PP’s recommendation that he pay back
the money. Christian leaders from the SACC and TEASA supported the
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recommendations of the PP and decision of the Constitutional Court and
joined members of the civil society to demand that Zuma pay back the money
and also called that the parliament practise proper oversight.
Meanwhile, leaders of some sections of PCCs and AICs, led by bishop Zondi of
Natal, openly supported Jacob Zuma during his court proceedings. They also
condemned the recommendations of the former PP that Zuma repay the
money used in renovating his Nkandla home and argued that the review case
and PP recommendations were like persecuting Zuma whom they believed
was also battling with dark forces (Van Onselen 2014:14). These leaders then
accorded Zuma Christ’s experience by using Christian symbols and songs to
communicate his battle with dark forces (Cloete and Bürger 2009; Van Wyk
2019:120).
During Jacob Zuma’s second term as the president of the ANC and the
‘Rainbow Nation’, a clear line of distinction existed between the views and
actions of the two Christian groups, namely, his allies in the PCCs and AICs and
the SACC, Kairos Southern Africa, and TEASA leaders. The latter opposed his
governance while the former approved it, on a path of eroding the gains of
Christian leaders (theologians) who contributed to the political liberation of
the country. The latter Christian leaders wrote two letters asking about the rise
of corruption (Ntlha and Arrison 2011; Makgoba, Ntlha, and Arrison 2012).
Their letters seem to suggest that they were doing theology in the current
context (Tshaka 2014:6). However, Kumalo (2012) argued that the first letter
was moderate and lacked the critical tone of the ‘Challenge to the Church’ and
‘The Road to Damascus’. A few years later and speaking from his experiences
of being near the governing party during the period of Nelson Mandela, Boesak
(2014:1073) correctly observed that
As things stand, president Zuma is far less likely to seek wisdom
from John De Gruchy and Desmond Tutu than he is to ask advice
from Ray McCauley and the court prophets of Victory Chapel
International.
Still from the point of view of doing theology in the current context, the sacking
of Nhlanhla Nene as finance minister in 2015 caused resistance from influential
ANC leaders, Christian leaders (theologians), and the public. Following the
– 249 –
incident, allegations were made that the Gupta brothers influenced
governance and benefited from their close relationship with Jacob Zuma.
Behind these allegations are Mr Sipho Maseko (former director general of the
Government Communications and Information Service - GCIS) and Mr Mcebisi
Jonas (former Deputy Minister of Finance). Following these allegations, church
leaders of the Dominican Order of Southern Africa lodged a formal complaint
in 2016 about state capture allegations with the public protector (Public
Protector 2016). The latter presented the findings that showed prima facie
evidence of corruption linked to Jacob Zuma, the Gupta brothers, Duduzane
Zuma, and others (Madonsela 2016) and recommended that a judicial inquiry
be established to investigate the state capture allegations.
In addition, SACC leadership initiated a process for whistle-blowers to provide
information to a panel it established. The panel's findings, which reflect direct
collusion and interference in governance, were published in Soweto's Regina
Mundi (City Press 2017). In related developments, Frank Chikane and other
senior ANC members initiated a group of elders that acted as a pressure group
to have Zuma removed as president of the ANC and the ‘Rainbow Nation’.
Archbishop Thabo Makgoba added to these efforts and used his 2017
Christmas message to call that Zuma be recalled as ANC president and of the
‘Rainbow Nation’ as he was not fit to govern (Putini 2017).
Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa (2018-), Governance, and
Thuma Mina (Send Me)
Soon after his election as the ANC president, Ramaphosa began talking about
a ‘New Dawn’. Maluleke (2018b) described the period before his presidency of
the ANC and the ‘Rainbow Nation’ as ten years of nightmare. During his
inaugural address on 16 February 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa challenged
the citizens of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ to be a part of the ‘New Dawn’ by
concluding his speech with the ‘Thuma mina’ (Send Me) song. This 2002-
reworked Hugh Masekela version of a church chorus communicates a message
to revive and to rebuild the country’s institutions and to fight endemic
corruption seen during the administration of Jacob Zuma. Contrary to Zuma,
who popularly used a combatant revolutionary song, ‘uMshini wam’ (My
Machine Gun), Ramaphosa opted to use a mindset-changing and a self-
reflecting song used in church denominations and associated it with Hugh
– 250 –
Masekela, the anti-apartheid activist artist raised in a Christian family (see
Maluleke 2018a).
Maluleke (2018a) succinctly highlighted the religious context of the song, sung
in many denominations, and mentioned that Ramaphosa deliberately used
Hugh Masekela’s version to evoke themes of self-sacrifice, individual
responsibility and the importance of personal change in mindsets. Beckmann
(2019:2-3) associated the song with Ramaphosa’s leadership of a Christian
youth movement on one hand while, as Butler (2013:23,26,34,50-54) adds,
recapping his involvement in two Christian student activities and leaderships
(SCM and BEYO/BECO) on the other.
Ramaphosa’s governance attracted three different reflections. First, West
(2018:79-82) had earlier argued that Ramaphosa, then deputy president of the
ANC and the ‘Rainbow Nation’, would, as his predecessors, continue with the
‘RDP of the Soul’ perception that expected the religious sector not to engage
in socio-economic issues by pointing to his speeches to PCC and Jewish
gatherings as evidence of this continuing trajectory. Ramaphosa, then the ANC
and the country's president, later used Thuma mina's religious appeal and
ended his first Covid-19 national speech with the following phrase: ‘Nkosi
sikelel’ iAfrika! God Bless Africa!’ using several spoken South African
languages. Second, Louw (2020:2-3) argues that his governance is cooperative
and intended to change the moral bases of the country. Third, Mashau and
Kgatle (2020:4-7) argued that the governance of Ramaphosa will succeed if he
implements the mindset displayed in Thuma mina and its biblical grounding of
Isaiah 6:8, ‘whom shall I send? And who will go for us? Here I am. Send me!’.
Unlike his predecessor Jacob Zuma, Ramaphosa resolved not to lean towards
one section of the religious sector. He opted to use a two-pronged approach
to consult all the religious leaders. On one hand he consulted with religious
leaders of other faiths; on the other he consulted with religious leaders who
were part of the liberation struggle, and those from AICs and PCCs.
The Moral Dilemma and Thuma Mina (Send Me)
Ramaphosa’s Thuma mina is perforated with controversies that arose prior to
his presidency, namely, the 16 August 2012 Marikana massacre that occurred
– 251 –
while he was a non-executive director of Lonmin, the Ramaphosa 2017
campaign (CR17) debacle during his campaign to be the president of the ANC,
and the Bosasa scandal pointing to his son Andile Ramaphosa awarding
contracts because of being the son of the president. As for the Marikana
massacre, Archbishop Seoka intervened in the debacle and later testified in a
formal judicial inquiry (Nicolson 2012). Five years later, Ramaphosa apologised
to the family’s dead mine workers and to the ‘Rainbow Nation’. His apology for
the Marikana massacre did not deter Boesak (2019:111) from arguing that his
apology should be accompanied by a healing process. Regarding the CR17
campaign, the current public protector, Busisiwe Mkwebane, established that
Ramaphosa received a R500,000.00 donation from Bosasa, was involved in
money laundering, and violated his oath of office by misleading Parliament by
providing incorrect information about the Bosasa donation. In addition,
Nasrec's 2017 ANC meeting ‘step aside’ resolution sparked internal ANC
conflict and subsequent court proceedings as its national leadership was
enforcing the resolution against ANC secretary-general Alias Magashule
(Thinane 2021:4-5). Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) has
dismissed Magashule’s plea to appeal a judgement of the Johannesburg High
Court (Polity 2022). The Constitutional Court also dismissed his appeal against
his suspension from the ANC (Mahlati 2022).
Four recent developments created deep anxiety about Ramaphosa’s Thuma
mina drive. First, the first State Capture report released on 4 January 2022
(Zondo Commission 2021) and the second part released on 1 February 2022
(Matlala 2022) recommends possible criminal charges against implicated
individuals. Second, a recent leaked ANC meeting audio recording has created
a new moral dilemma for Ramaphosa as the Standing Committee of Public
Accounts (Scopa) sent him a list of questions to be answered and the Public
Protector (PP) is investigating the matter (Kumalo 2022). Third, a panel of
experts that led the South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) public
hearings into the Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal July 2021 civil unrest, resolved
that the president and the cabinet should be held accountable for failing to
contain the civil unrest that damaged property and infrastructure (Mokobo
2020). The most recent development that has raised anxiety and public outcry
is the Phala Phala scandal where the former State Security Agency director-
general, Arthur Fraser, laid a criminal charge of money laundering defeating
the ends of justice and kidnapping against the president at Rosebank police
– 252 –
station, related to a February 2020 burglary, involving $4 million at his Phala
Phala game farm (Sadike 2022). The public protector is investigating the matter
with the NPA. An independent panel was established to determine whether a
Section 89 inquiry should be held against president Ramaphosa (Chetty 2022);
the panel found that he might have violated the constitution and his oath
(Ensor 2022).
Summary
The article reflected on ANC’s governance from its first post-1994 president,
Nelson Mandela, who emphasised national reconciliation, to the current
president Cyril Ramaphosa, who is emphasising rebuilding through the Thuma
mina ‘Send me’ call. Thabo Mbeki focused on national transformation and
Jacob Zuma focused on national development. Additionally, several Christian
leaders (theologians) who were part of the liberation struggle formed a part of
the four leaders’ governance while others did not. Different governance and
moral issues emerged during the administration of the four presidents.
Consequently, those who were not a part critiqued the governance of the four
presidents. During the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, some evangelical Christian
leaders joined in critiquing his governance, similarly Jacob Zuma’s governance.
Alongside these developments, some Pentecostal-Charismatic and AIC leaders
supported Zuma while others raised criticism. Thus, the article established
those various Christian leaders/theologians performed different roles in
matters of governance and the moral dilemma of the ‘Rainbow Nation’ during
the presidency of the four ANC leaders and of the country.
– 253 –
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