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Setting the agenda for climate assemblies. Trade-offs and guiding principles
Climate Policy
... Indeed, one of the key hopes pinned on CAs is to drive more ambitious, just, and effective climate policy, and thus improve legitimacy and acceptance of policies (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2019, Wells et al 2021, Willis et al 2022, Ejsing et al 2023, Pfeffer 2024. One important mechanism through which this may be achieved is by encouraging deeper engagement with citizens' views and ensuring policies can better reflect people's values, experiences and preferences (Demski 2021, Perlaviciute 2022, Boswell et al 2023. ...
... For example, Willis et al (2022) discuss how a narrow framing of climate change as a scientific or technical problem can overlook the social, ethical or political context of the issue. Some argue that narrow framings can produce more practical and effective policy recommendations, while others believe that more open and transformative framings could provide avenues to more effectively tackle climate change (Ainscough and Willis 2024, Mellier and Capstick 2024, Pfeffer 2024. According to Bussu and Fleuß's (2023) framework, both the CAUK and CCC could be considered top-down in terms of the actors that initiated both processes (state-led). ...
... Essentially this means we know little about public perspectives on these issues and there was little opportunity for assembly members to explore more innovative or creative proposals that go beyond existing policy paradigms. While the CCC had a more open remit to come up with more disruptive or transformative proposals (Hammond 2020, Pfeffer 2024, our analysis suggests that the structure of the process closed-down any serious exploration of these (e.g. alternative economic paradigms). ...
Climate change is among the most complex problems facing societies, with far-reaching implications for the structure of economies to everyday life. There is no one way to meet carbon targets but decisions on how to do so have, so far, mostly involved politicians and experts. Climate assemblies (CAs) are attempting to give citizens a more direct role in decision-making. There is hope that by engaging more deeply with public perspectives, climate policies could be more ambitious, just, and effective. Existing research has shown that the ways in which CAs are designed has an important influence on their outcomes. This paper contributes to this literature by examining how the recommendations of CAs are influenced by the design of the deliberations, as well as the overall scope and remit of the process. We use two case studies–the Climate Assembly UK (CAUK) and the French Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat (CCC), combining our own observations from attending both processes with analysis of openly available materials. We discuss the extent to which the CAUK and CCC could be considered opening-up or closing-down deliberations and what this means for the way they represent public perspectives on climate policy. We find that both CAs had relatively closed framings around a specific policy target, but the CCC avoids the overly technical framing of climate change, by also including elements of urgency and social justice. The CAUK used a predominantly top-down approach to deliberations whereby the structure of process strongly privileged expert opinion within discussions and recommendations. The CCC used a much more bottom-up approach with recommendations being iteratively developed by citizens. Both processes struggled to engage with more systemic and transformative issues. These insights are important for those designing CAs as well as those who hope to understand more about public preferences on climate policies.
... In contrast, tensions arising from unclear roles and hierarchical power relations can limit citizens' impact within DMPs, as witnessed in the Ariadne project (Blum 2024). While there is evidence of CCAs and DMPs overcoming reformist incrementalism, there are no guarantees that they will be able to accelerate the transformation, as their agendas might be constrained (Pfeffer 2024) or their proposals less ambitious or not consistent with public opinions (de Búrca 2020; Wells et al. 2021). This concern is amplified by the temporal dimension of CCAs, which, on the one hand, extends beyond the typical four-year cycle of electoral democracy, allowing for intergenerational dialogues (Smith 2021), but, on the other hand, assumes a linear process of deliberation and decision-making that is at odds with how climate change has and will evolve (Ejsing et al. 2025). ...
Governing sustainability challenges such as climate change or biodiversity loss presents a profound democratic dilemma. Although democratic practices and procedures are widely regarded as essential for collectively addressing complex sustainability issues, liberal democracies have been criticized by some scholars for their inability to effectively tackle global environmental threats like climate change. We reconcile these positions by outlining how the emerging field of democratic innovations can help to address the critical challenges that democracies face when governing sustainability transformations. We focus on three issues liberal democracies are confronted with: reformist incrementalism, (de)politicization, and imaginary boundaries. We then exemplify how democratic innovations such as deliberative mini-publics, participatory budgeting, and material participation can help address these challenges. Our review suggests that democratic innovations hold the potential to address political concerns, find compromises between extreme positions, reconnect people’s everyday lives with the grand sustainability challenges they face, and allow for alternative visions of a desirable future society. However, we also address cautionary tales, discuss the limitations of democratic innovations, and outline avenues for future research, which we believe can help further elaborate and develop participatory approaches to critical sustainability challenges.
... Thus, critical questions remain concerning which reality is represented and by whom. Lastly, DIs are often closed processes with predetermined agendas of varying degrees of rigidity and procedures set within traditional institutions and knowledge structures (Machin 2023;Pfeffer 2024). It thus invites the question of whether radical realities beyond growth that differ from a status quo can be constructed if TSI rely on financial means, socioeconomic status, social capital and expert knowledge. ...
The Wellbeing Economy has emerged as an alternative development approach that focuses on human and ecological wellbeing instead of material growth, but its implementation, particularly at the local level, remains underexplored. This paper argues that Democratic Innovations as specific forms of Transformative Social Innovations can help operationalise the Wellbeing Economy by fostering participatory, place-based interventions. Transformative Social Innovations can challenge, alter, or replace dominant institutions in specific socio-material contexts. However, their transformative impact and ability to change institutional configurations is hampered if their inherent ‘paradoxes’ are not adequately addressed.
Using the cases of citizens’ juries in Vienna and Oxford, the paper examines how Democratic Innovations align normative visions, enable mechanisms of exchange, and operationalise transformative change to achieve more just governance outcomes. We highlight whether, and how, these deliberative democratic processes contribute to a Wellbeing Economy in place and how they dealt with their paradoxes and contradictions. Our findings indicate the relevance of socio-material, political-institutional, and cultural-discursive contexts for these types of innovations. We thus contribute to a more nuanced understanding of transformative impact for wellbeing in place and argue that Transformative Social Innovations can help bridge the gap between global and abstract notions of a Wellbeing Economy and local implementation if their paradoxes and contradictions are adequately considered.
Bürgerräte sind in den letzten Jahren zu einem populären Beteiligungsinstrument avanciert und werden in Deutschland zunehmend auf kommunaler, Landes- und Bundesebene eingesetzt. Mit ihnen sind große Hoffnungen verbunden: Sie sollen die Bürger:innen in den Prozess der Politikgestaltung einbinden und dadurch demokratische Legitimität stärken, politische Entscheidungen verbessern und das Vertrauen der Bürger:innen in die Politik fördern. Der Artikel untersucht die aktuelle Nutzung von Bürgerräten in Deutschland und hinterfragt kritisch, inwiefern sie den Erwartungen ihrer Befürworter:innen gerecht werden. Anhand von Fallbeispielen von Bürgerräten auf der nationalen Ebene wird veranschaulicht, wie sie durch eine mangelnde Einbindung in laufende gesetzgeberische Tätigkeiten und ihre strukturelle Abhängigkeit von politischen Entscheidungsträger:innen dem Risiko ausgesetzt sind, dass ihre Empfehlungen gar nicht oder nur selektiv aufgenommen werden („Cherry-Picking“). Sie laufen Gefahr, lediglich symbolisch als „Particitainment“ genutzt zu werden – ein Format, das Bürger:innen zwar einbindet, ihnen aber keine echte Einflussmöglichkeit auf politische Entscheidungen bietet. Eine nachhaltige Stärkung der Demokratie kann nicht allein durch „von oben“ eingesetzte Bürgerräte erreicht werden. Vielmehr sollte sich die Einführung demokratischer Innovationen nach den institutionellen Vorstellungen der Bürger:innen richten.
Addressing the climate crisis requires innovative governance mechanisms that integrate citizen participation with environmental, social, and economic dimensions of sustainability. While democratic innovations have gained traction in climate governance, their capacity to drive systemic environmental change remains underexplored. This study identifies how they contribute to environmental sustainability by mapping their linkages to specific Sustainable Development Goals. Based on a systematic literature review, the study examines the environmental dimensions of democratic innovations and the policy domains through which they incorporate sustainability goals. Findings reveal that democratic innovations influence public perception and policy, revealing their capacity to reshape governance frameworks and align local priorities with climate policies. However, institutional constraints, fragmented policy uptake, and varying national governance capacities hinder their full potential. Strengthening the political embedding of participatory processes and fostering cross‐sectoral integration is essential to ensure that democratic innovations contribute to long‐term and transformative sustainability transitions.
Scholars and practitioners discuss how to increase the policy impact of climate assemblies (CAs) noting that their proposals tend to be more ambitious than government policy. CAs comprise groups of randomly selected citizens (minipublics) who deliberate on climate policy issues. We argue for greater focus on how political actors strategically use CAs and suggest welcoming some of this strategic use. We propose that CAs, and minipublics more generally, need political embedding. That means, minipublic designers should first consider how political actors will likely interact with a process given their interests and political context, and subsequently make deliberate use of strategies to foster objectives like policy impact. Using a thought experiment, we then demonstrate that the effectiveness of such political embedding strategies to promote CAs’ policy impact depends on political context. Our analysis shows that the impacts of mass publicity, commissioning actors, inclusion of perspectives, and strategic framings vary with the constellation of interests of climate political actors. This exercise challenges sweeping statements about optimal CA and minipublic design, contributing to more realistic theorizing. Considering political embeddedness will help democratic reformers assess potential models for minipublic institutionalization more accurately.
There is a growing body of scientific evidence supporting sufficiency as an inevitable strategy for mitigating climate change. Despite this, sufficiency plays a minor role in existing climate and energy policies. Following previous work on the National Energy and Climate Plans of EU countries, we conduct a similar content analysis of the recommendations made by citizen assemblies on climate change mitigation in ten European countries and the EU, and compare the results of these studies. Citizen assemblies are representative mini-publics and enjoy a high level of legitimacy.
We identify a total of 860 mitigation policy recommendations in the citizen assemblies’ documents, of which 332 (39 %) include sufficiency. Most of the sufficiency policies relate to the mobility sector, the least relate to the buildings sector. Regulatory instruments are the most often proposed means for achieving sufficiency, followed by fiscal and economic instruments. The average approval rate of sufficiency policies is high (93 %), with the highest rates for regulatory policies.
Compared to National Energy and Climate Plans, the citizen assembly recommendations include a significantly higher share of sufficiency policies (factor three to six) with a stronger focus on regulatory policies. Consequently, the recommendations can be interpreted as a call for a sufficiency turn and a regulatory turn in climate mitigation politics. These results suggest that the observed lack of sufficiency in climate policy making is not due to a lack of legitimacy, but rather reflects a reluctance to implement sufficiency policies, the constitution of the policy making process and competing interests.
In recent years, countries like France, UK, Germany, and Denmark have all carried out climate citizens’ assemblies where a group of representatively selected citizens come together to discuss issues around climate politics and provide policy recommendations to decision-makers. The hope is that these deliberative-democratic innovations can circumvent the flaws of representational politics and help break the existing gridlock around climate politics. In this article, relying on the case of the Danish climate citizens’ assembly that began its work in 2020, we argue that to truly realize the democratic potentials of climate citizens’ assemblies, there is a need to think about how citizens’ assemblies might come to multiply and proliferate in political spaces away from, or at least in addition to, those in and around the state, so they can become local drivers of democratic action and community empowerment. The argument is not that citizens’ assemblies should give up on affecting the state and parliamentary politics altogether, but that we must be careful not to put too much faith in state institutions, and also look for spaces outside the state where the conditions for transformative change and democratic capacity-building currently appear more fecund. Drawing together these arguments, we offer what we call a more radical vision of the democratic potentials of climate citizens’ assemblies, and provide some guidelines for what that would look like in practice.
Recent years have seen a “wave” of national climate assemblies, which bring together randomly‐selected citizens to deliberate and make recommendations on aspects of the climate crisis. Assessments of the legitimacy of these interventions and their capacity to improve climate governance have focused on their internal design characteristics, but the fundamental question of how they are integrated into complex constellations of political and policy institutions is underexplored. This article constructs a framework for understanding their integrative design characteristics, drawing on recent work on “robust governance.” The framework is used to explore the connection of six national‐level climate assemblies with political institutions, public debate, and civil society. Our findings highlight significant variety in the integrative design of these climate assemblies. This variety challenges the view of assemblies as a standardized object with predictable effects on legitimacy and governance capacity, while also refining deliberative systems theory's highly abstracted conceptions of integration and impact.
This symposium examines the challenges and opportunities of recent efforts at embedding participatory governance. It draws together original research that engages theoretically and empirically with some fundamental questions:
•What are the challenges of embedding participatory governance in policy-making?
•What happens when social movements have opportunities to shape the institutionalization of PG processes? Can they reanimate the radical potential of citizen participation for social transformation?
•How can the tensions between the different demands of lay citizens, organized civil society, political parties, and public officials be managed?
In this introductory article, we provide a definition of embeddedness, outlining its spatial, temporal, and practices dimensions, in so doing distinguishing embeddedness from institutionalization, with which it has often been used interchangeably. Our aim is to delineate the breadth of the concept, drawing together its many uses into a systematic framework that can both guide future research and practical experimentation. In particular, our hope is to turn more attention to the informal practices that are essential for embedding. The contributions to the symposium shift attention from institutional design to embedding dynamics and how these work to open or close spaces for meaningful citizen input.
Adopting public policies to deliver the ambitious long-term goals of the Paris Agreement will require significant societal commitment. That commitment will eventually emerge from the interaction between policies, publics and politicians. This article has two main aims. First, it reviews the existing literatures on these three to identify salient research gaps. It finds that existing work has focused on one aspect rather than the dynamic interactions between them all. Second, it sets out a more integrated research agenda that explores the three-way interaction between publics, policies and politicians. It reveals that greater integration is required to understand better the conditions under which different political systems address societal commitment dilemmas. In the absence of greater research integration, there is a risk that policymakers cling to two prominent but partial policy prescriptions: that 'democracy' itself is the problem and should be suspended; and that more deliberative forms of democracy are required without explaining how they will co-exist with existing forms.
No democratic state has yet implemented a climate plan strong enough to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This has led some to argue that democracy cannot cope with a challenge of this magnitude. In this article, we take stock of the claim that a more deliberative democratic system can strengthen our ability to respond effectively to the climate crisis. The most visible development in this direction is the recent citizens’ assemblies on climate change in Ireland, France, and the UK. We begin our analysis of the promise of deliberative democracy with a recognition of the difficulties that democracies face in tackling climate change, including short‐termism; the ways in which scientific and expert evidence are used; the influence of powerful political interests; and the relationship between people and the politicians that represent them. We then introduce the theoretical tradition of deliberative democracy and examine how it might ameliorate the challenges democracies face in responding to the climate crisis. We evaluate the contribution of deliberative mini‐publics, such as citizens’ assemblies and juries, and look beyond these formal processes to examine how deliberation can be embedded in political and social systems around the world. We conclude that deliberation‐based reforms to democratic systems, including but not limited to deliberative mini‐publics, are a necessary and potentially transformative ingredient in climate action.
This article is categorized under: Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Communication
Policy and Governance > Governing Climate Change in Communities, Cities, and Regions
Randomly selected deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) are on the rise globally. However, they remain ad hoc, opening the door to arbitrary manoeuvre and triggering a debate on their future institutionalization. What are the competing proposals aiming at institutionalizing DMPs within political systems? I suggest three ways for thinking about institutionalization: in terms of temporality, of legitimacy and support, and of power and role within a system. First, I analyze the dimension of time and how this affect DMP institutional designs. Second, I argue that because sortition produces ‘weak representatives’ with ‘humility-legitimacy’, mini-publics hardly ever make binding decisions and need to rely on external sources of legitimacies. Third, I identify four institutional models, relying on opposing views of legitimacy and politics: tamed consultation, radical democracy, representative klerocracy and hybrid polyarchy. They differ in whether mini-publics are interpreted as tools: for legitimizing elected officials; to give power to the people; or as a mean to suppress voting .
In recent times we have seen a spate of climate assemblies across Europe as the climate emergency gains increasing prominence in the political agenda and as the citizens’ assembly approach to public engagement gains popularity. However, there has been little empirical research on how the scope of citizens’ assemblies affects the internal logic of the assembly process and its impacts on external policy actors. This is a significant oversight given the power of agenda setting. It is also of particular importance for climate assemblies given the exceptional scale and complexity of climate change, as well as the need for co-ordination across all policy areas and types of governance to address it. In this paper, we start to address this gap through an in-depth case analysis of the Climate Assembly UK. We adopt a mixed methods approach, combining surveys of the assembly members and witnesses, interviews with the assembly members, organisers, MPs, parliamentary staff, and government civil servants, and non-participant observation of the process. We find that attempts to adapt the assembly’s scope to the scale of the climate change issue compromised assembly member learning, the co-ordination of the resulting recommendations, assembly member endorsement of the recommendations, and the extent of their impact on parliament and government. We argue that more democratization in setting the agenda could help combat these issues.
In light of increasing pressure to deliver climate action targets and the growing role of citizens in raising the importance of the issue, deliberative democratic processes (e.g. citizen juries and citizen assemblies) on climate change are increasingly being used to provide a voice to citizens in climate change decision-making. Through a comparative case study of two processes that ran in the UK in 2019 (the Leeds Climate Change Citizens’ Jury and the Oxford Citizens’ Assembly on Climate Change), this paper investigates how far citizen assemblies and juries are increasing citizen engagement on climate change and creating more citizen-centred climate policymaking. Interviews were conducted with policymakers, councillors, professional facilitators and others involved in running these processes to assess motivations for conducting these, their structure and the impact and influence they had. The findings suggest the impact of these processes is not uniform: they have an indirect impact on policy making by creating momentum around climate action and supporting the introduction of pre-planned or pre-existing policies rather than a direct impact by truly being citizen-centred policy making processes or conducive to new climate policy. We conclude with reflections on how these processes give elected representatives a public mandate on climate change, that they help to identify more nuanced and in-depth public opinions in a fair and informed way, yet it can be challenging to embed citizen juries and assemblies in wider democratic processes.
MPs face a dilemma when it comes to deliberative mini-publics (DMPs): in a context of distrust, they may see it as an opportunity to re-legitimize themselves and solve complex policy issues. But it could also challenge the quasi-monopoly they used to have on political decisions and undermine the role of the Parliament and the primacy of elections. The article is found on 91 face-to-face interviews with French-speaking Belgian MPs sitting in federal or regional parliaments. First, we describe the profile of supporters of DMPs. We then identify three ideal–typical discourses: the power-sharing discourse, the consultative discourse, and the elitist discourse. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it analyzes the argumentative frames used by MPs to assess deliberative mini-publics using a large number of interviews. Second, it demonstrates that their discourses depend on their evaluation of ordinary citizens’ competence to participate and on their resulting vision of representation. Political actors mainly perceive DMPs as power-sharing instruments that would alter their elected position and the legitimacy of the election.
It has been argued that a ‘new climate politics’ has emerged in recent years, in the wake of global climate change protest movements. One part of the new climate politics entails experimentation with citizen-centric input into policy development, via mechanisms of deliberative democracy such as citizens’ assemblies. Yet relatively little is known about the motivations and aspirations of those commissioning climate assemblies or about general public perceptions of these institutions. Addressing these issues is important for increasing understanding of what these deliberative mechanisms represent in the context of climate change, how legitimate, credible and useful they are perceived to be by those involved, and whether they represent a radical way of doing politics differently or a more incremental change. This article addresses these gaps by presenting findings from mixed method research on prior expectations of the Devon Climate Assembly, proposed following the declaration of a climate emergency in 2019. The research compares and contrasts the views of those commissioning and administering the citizens’ assembly, with those of the wider public. Findings indicate widespread support, yet also considerable risk and uncertainty associated with holding the assembly. Enabling input into policy of a broad array of public voices was seen as necessary for effective climate response, yet there was scepticism about the practical challenges involved in ensuring citizen representation, and about whether politicians, and society more generally, would embrace the ‘hard choices’ required. The assembly was diversely represented as a means to unlock structural change, and as an instrumental tool to achieve behaviour change at scale. The Devon Climate Assembly appears to indicate ‘cautious experimentation’ where democratic innovation is widely embraced yet carefully constrained, offering only a modest example of a ‘new climate politics,’ with minimal challenges to the authority of existing institutions.
The discourse on sustainability transformations moves beyond accommodationist, reformist framings of sustainability to imply a radical, systemic shift toward new sustainable trajectories. While democracy has been accorded a central role in sustainability governance of most kinds, this emphasis on systemic transformation, and the new context of existential ecological threat, prompt a reconsideration of the kind of democracy that would provide a political foundation for sustainability. Arguing that the politics of sustainability transformation inherently demand democratization – for both disruption (of established power structures) and normativity (in relation to the negotiated meaning of sustainability) – this article explores the potential of deliberation in particular to create these foundations. I contend that while the recent policy-oriented practice of deliberation has itself become overly accommodationist, the concept can equally encompass a more disruptive, yet still normatively driven form, the time for which might be just right.
The political uses of minipublics confront us with a dilemma: if we accept Cristina Lafont’s critique that minipublics should not have direct political traction but only yield a deliberation-promotion function in the public sphere, we are confronted by the fact that this function is muted in our mediatized, partisan and increasingly polarized political societies. To solve this dilemma, we propose an enhanced shortcut approach with semi-blind deference and an appreciation of citizen heterogeneity. We argue that minipublic recommendations can provide trustworthy signals to (some) citizens in the form of recommendations rather than being major contributors to or shapers of public discourse in the form of reasons. We also propose that deference to minipublic recommendations should hinge on four conditions, namely issue type, opinion strength, the direction of minipublic recommendation (confirming or disconfirming one’s previously held opinions) and the level of consensus reached by the minipublic. Depending on the configuration of these conditions, semi-blind deference asks citizens (especially those who are basically interested in minipublic recommendations) to search for additional and independent sources and engage with arguments produced by the minipublic. Finally, we claim that diverse sectors of the citizenry might have different utility and trust assessments of minipublic recommendations.
The COVID-19 imposed lockdown has led to a number of temporary environmental side effects (reduced global emissions, cleaner air, less noise), that the climate community has aspired to achieve over a number of decades. However, these benefits have been achieved at a massive cost to welfare and the economy. This commentary draws lessons from the COVID-19 crisis for climate change. It discusses whether there are more sustainable ways of achieving these benefits, as part of a more desirable, low carbon resilient future, in a more planned, inclusive and less disruptive way. In order to achieve this, we argue for a clearer social contract between citizens and the state. We discuss how COVID-19 has demonstrated that behaviours can change abruptly, that these changes come at a cost, that we need a ‘social mandate’ to ensure these changes remain in the long-term, and that science plays an important role in informing this process. We suggest that deliberative engagement mechanisms, such as citizens’ assemblies and juries, could be a powerful way to build a social mandate for climate action post-COVID-19. This would enable behaviour changes to become more accepted, embedded and bearable in the long-term and provide the basis for future climate action.
Minipublics count among the most celebrated democratic innovations. Scholars have extensively analysed the design and the internal dynamics of such forums that gather randomly selected citizens to discuss political issues. However, we still lack an understanding of how these innovations might influence the wider political system. This article introduces a new database (MINICON) covering 35 years of research on minipublics’ consequences (1984–2018). Our findings suggest that most work has adopted a narrow view on these consequences, focusing on what happens within the direct proximity of a minipublic. We argue that future research needs to examine minipublics’ more distant consequences if we are to assess their contributions to the functioning of mass democracies.
This book articulates a participatory conception of deliberative democracy that takes the democratic ideal of self-government seriously. It aims to improve citizens’ democratic control and vindicate the value of citizens’ participation against conceptions that threaten to undermine it. The book critically analyzes deep pluralist, epistocratic, and lottocratic conceptions of democracy. Their defenders propose various institutional “shortcuts” to help solve problems of democratic governance such as overcoming disagreements, citizens’ political ignorance, or poor-quality deliberation. However, it turns out that these shortcut proposals all require citizens to blindly defer to actors over whose decisions they cannot exercise control. Implementing such proposals would therefore undermine democracy. Moreover, it seems naïve to assume that a community can reach better outcomes “faster” if it bypasses the beliefs and attitudes of its citizens. Unfortunately, there are no “shortcuts” to making a community better than its members. The only road to better outcomes is the long, participatory road that is taken when citizens forge a collective will by changing one another’s hearts and minds. However difficult the process of justifying political decisions to one another may be, skipping it cannot get us any closer to the democratic ideal. Starting from this conviction, the author defends a conception of democracy “without shortcuts.” This conception sheds new light on long-standing debates about the proper scope of public reason, the role of religion in politics, and the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. It also proposes new ways to unleash the democratic potential of institutional innovations such as deliberative minipublics.
Ireland has become something of a trail-blazer in the use of deliberative methods in the process of constitutional review. It is the first case in which the process has been employed a second time: the Irish Citizens’ Assembly (2016–18) followed upon the Convention on the Constitution (2012–14). The creation of two mini-publics in quick succession and their significant role in supporting key referendums for constitutional change that followed (marriage equality in 2015 and abortion in 2018) suggests a degree of ‘systemization’ of deliberation in the Irish process of constitutional review. This report sets out the basic details of the most recent Citizens’ Assembly – how it was set up, its agenda, its manner of operation, and its outcomes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the recent Irish experience of constitutional mini-publics and the degree to which they speak to a process of systematizing deliberation in the Irish policy process.
What happens to the proposals generated by participatory processes? One of the key aspects of participatory processes that has been the subject of rare systematic analysis and comparison is the fate of their outputs: their policy proposals. Which specific factors explain whether these proposals are accepted, rejected or transformed by public authorities? In this article contextual and proposal-related factors are identified that are likely to affect the prospect of proposals being implemented. The explanatory power of these factors are tested through multilevel analysis on a diverse set of 571 policy proposals. The findings offer evidence that both contextual and proposal-related variables are important. The design of participatory processes affects the degree of implementation, with participatory budgeting and higher quality processes being particularly effective. Most significant for explaining outcomes are proposal-level, economic and political factors: a proposal's cost, the extent to which it challenges existing policy and the degree of support it has within the municipality all strongly affect the chance of implementation.
Despite some prominent critics, deliberative democrats tend to be optimistic about the potential of deliberative mini-publics. However, the problem with current practices is that mini-publics are typically used by officials on an ad hoc basis and that their policy impacts remain vague. Mini-publics seem especially hard to integrate into representative decision making. There are a number of reasons for this, especially prevailing ideas of representation and accountability as well as the contestatory character of representative politics. This article argues that deliberative mini-publics should be regarded as one possible way of improving the epistemic quality of representative decision making and explores different institutional designs through which deliberative mini-publics could be better integrated into representative institutions. The article considers arrangements which institutionalise the use of mini-publics; involve representatives in deliberations; motivate public interactions between mini-publics and representatives; and provide opportunities to ex post scrutiny or suspensive veto powers for mini-publics. The article analyses prospects and problems of these measures, and considers their applicability in different contexts of representative politics.
Scholars of environmental politics demand serious reform of international governance and institutions to protect planet Earth. There is therefore an urgent need to discuss what causes change and gridlock in environmental politics. Serious reform is inextricably tied up with questions of power. The diversity with which studies on environmental politics understand power is exposed through three ideal type concepts: power with (learning and cooperation), power to (resistance and empowerment) and power over (coercion and manipulation). So far, scholars have mainly used analysis of coercive power (over) to explain gridlock in environmental politics; also needed is explicit acknowledgement of coaction and individual agency that can enable transition to more sustainable societies.
Democratic deliberation is claimed to improve the legitimacy of democratic decision making. However, deliberation’s beneficial effects do not come about easily. If deliberative innovations want to contribute to the legitimacy of political decision making, they have to reflect the principles of legitimacy in their own functioning. In this paper, we set out to assess the input and output legitimacy of four deliberative events, and determine which are the favourable conditions for their legitimacy. Based on a comparison of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, the Belgian G1000, the Dutch Burgerforum, and the Irish We The Citizens, we argue that the institutional embeddedness of deliberative innovations strongly affect their claims to legitimacy, but also that their disruptive potential is unrelated to legitimacy.
Saturation is a core guiding principle to determine sample sizes in qualitative research, yet little methodological research exists on parameters that influence saturation. Our study compared two approaches to assessing saturation: code saturation and meaning saturation. We examined sample sizes needed to reach saturation in each approach, what saturation meant, and how to assess saturation. Examining 25 in-depth interviews, we found that code saturation was reached at nine interviews, whereby the range of thematic issues was identified. However, 16 to 24 interviews were needed to reach meaning saturation where we developed a richly textured understanding of issues. Thus, code saturation may indicate when researchers have “heard it all,” but meaning saturation is needed to “understand it all.” We used our results to develop parameters that influence saturation, which may be used to estimate sample sizes for qualitative research proposals or to document in publications the grounds on which saturation was achieved.
I contend that the popular ‘mini-publics’ approach to implementing deliberation in practice is unable to realize deliberative democracy in a way that fulfills the deliberative democratic standard of legitimacy. Deliberative democratic legitimacy requires citizens to actively claim their right to justification against government authorities, which the capacity of mini-public deliberation to serve authorities sidelines or even undermines. I propose an alternative account of deliberative democracy with an eye specifically to legitimacy: deliberative democracy as a political culture. On this view, it is cultural aspects (the ethos, social norms and self-understandings that shape and constrain political processes), not institutional specificities, that are decisive for deliberation fulfilling its legitimacy ambition. Deliberative democratic theory ought to conceptualize ways of opening up social and political space for widespread citizen-led engagement and critical scrutiny of authorities, rather than striving for the development of institutional short-cuts.
The systemic turn in deliberative democratic theory has shifted the focus away from seeking to design separate, internally deliberative ‘mini-publics’ and towards a new appreciation of their external, systemic quality. Yet, so far, such accounts have not gone beyond recognising a potential for mini-publics to contribute to deliberative systems. In this paper, we argue that a systemic conceptualisation of mini-publics must recognise their fundamentally ambivalent character: Since mini-publics have the potential both to foster and to undermine systemic deliberation, it is insufficient to celebrate their positive potential alone, and vital to develop frameworks that allow for a critical evaluation of mini-publics’ systemic role. To this end, we propose a framework based on the systemic qualities of deliberation-making, legitimacy-seeking and capacity-building, and conclude that key to mini-publics’ quality, when judged against these criteria, is not just their own features, but the degree of ‘co-development’ of all system components.
The last several decades have seen growing agreement among political theorists and empirical political scientists that the legitimacy of a democracy depends in part on the quality of deliberation that informs citizens and their representatives. Until recently, those who wanted to study and improve the quality of deliberation in democracies began with, basically, two strategies. One concentrated on deliberation in legislative bodies of all sorts and the campaigns that produce their members. The other strategy, not necessarily at odds with the first, addressed the design, promulgation, and empowerment of small deliberative initiatives in which citizens could deliberate under relatively favourable conditions. Both of these strategies, however, focused only on individual sites and not on the interdependence of sites within a larger system. Typically, the ideal has been cast in the image of the best possible single deliberative forum. Most empirical research on deliberative democracy, accordingly, has concentrated ‘either on a single episode of deliberation, as in one-time group discussions, or on a continuing series with the same group or in the same type of institution’ (Thompson 2008a: 213). Yet no single forum, however ideally constituted, could possess deliberative capacity sufficient to legitimate most of the decisions and policies that democracies adopt. To understand the larger goal of deliberation, we suggest that it is necessary to go beyond the study of individual institutions and processes to examine their interaction in the system as a whole. We recognize that most democracies are complex entities in which a wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work – including informal networks, the media, organized advocacy groups, schools, foundations, private and non-profit institutions, legislatures, executive agencies, and the courts. We thus advocate what may be called a systemic approach to deliberative democracy.
While the case for rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions is compelling, actions being taken by most senior decision makers (SDMs) in government and business compound the problem. Given the systemic reach of much senior decision making, including decisions that constrain their own actions, there is an urgent need to open up the SDM black box. Focused on Western governments and multinational corporations, this article examines a cross‐disciplinary range of literature to ask: What are the key factors affecting the preparedness of SDMs—particularly those who accept the climate science—to take the decisive actions needed to drive rapid and significant emission reductions? The review brings together multiple perspectives on the many compounding factors operating across three interconnected scales: micro (individual and interpersonal factors including disciplinary background, worldview, gender, and risk perceptions); meso (network, organizational and institutional factors including management paradigms, organizational culture, and institutional complexity); and macro (environmental, social, cultural, political, and economic factors including climatic extremes, vested interests, and public opinion). It concludes that SDMs are strongly focused on their ‘local’ professional context and near‐term pressures, including reputation among peers, relationships with competitors, and real‐time financial status. As a group they exist within a largely closed circuit and perceive the world from a particular narrow perspective. Combined with the complexity and embedded character of existing systems, this occludes more systemic or reflexive thinking or action. This deep propensity for inaction suggests that a coordinated multi‐frontal approach is essential for a new more effective mitigation approach. WIREs Clim Change 2014, 5:753–773. doi: 10.1002/wcc.305
This article is categorized under: Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Behavior Change and Responses
This article suggests that a common feature among democratic innovations is the lack of an agenda setting function. First, it argues that a lack of control over their own agendas opens democratic innovations to manipulation by elites. Second, it argues that democratic innovations focused on setting the policy agendas of public authorities can serve to democratise the policy process by providing citizens with a tool to place issues on the public agenda. The article analyses a series of actual and potential institutional designs that divert from the dominant ‘direct‐democratic’ nature of agenda setting innovations. It finishes with a discussion of the UK Sustainable Communities Act (2007), a process designed to allow communities to propose policy to government through their councils.
This paper argues that deliberative democracy is best placed to meet the challenge that climate change poses to systems of governance, although the task of implementing it is challenging. Deliberative democracy extends on the basic idea of democracy by emphasising the way in which citizens engage with issues, requiring reflection on all relevant dimensions. Where climate change is easily crowded‐out in the prevailing nature of political debate, deliberation helps to make salient less tangible and complex dimensions associated with the issue. Evidence is presented in support of the capacities of citizens to deliberate on climate change, with evidence drawn from a mini‐public in the Australian Capital Region. The possibilities for “scaling up” these benefits of deliberation to the polity as a whole are then discussed. Although it is not straightforward, specific mechanisms for engendering deliberation among the wider public are suggested. If successful, deliberation not only promises to transform the possibilities for action on climate change, but also to build the capacity to respond by improving the underlying conditions for environmental governance.
Among both scholars and practioners, the critical importance of framing processes in the realm of deliberative democracy has been neither formally acknowledged nor adequately studied so far. The purpose of this theoretical article is to craft and define the analytical concepts and methodological tools necessary to shed light on this complex relationship. After introducing the notion of 'deliberative frame', which is examined across two distinct framing processes – 'pri-mary' and 'derivative' (or secondary) – this article presents 'deliberative frame analysis' (DFA) as a qualitative method which can uncover the 'meta-frame' and the specific issue framings (or the deliberative 'frames') within a deliberation. This is achieved by examining selected elements both of the organizational context and information materials, and will be illustrated by the example of a famous deliberative poll carried out at European level. Finally, the introduction of authentically competing frames (i.e. 'counterframes' and not merely counterarguments) into the deliberative setting, along with the structural possibility for 'reframing' in the course of the deliberation, is indicated as a substantive precondition for neutralizing the overall framing effects and thus avoiding a heavily biased deliberation outcome. The article therefore offers a more comprehensive understanding of framing processes as a key challenge for deliberative politics, particularly as regards the legitimacy claims of its various experiments and practices, which are increasingly common in most established democracies.
Direct-democratic processes have won popular support but fall far short of the standards of deliberative democracy. Initiative and referendum processes furnish citizens with insufficient information about policy problems, inadequate choices among policy solutions, flawed criteria for choosing among such solutions, and few opportunities for reflection on those choices prior to decision making. We suggest a way to make direct democracy more deliberative by grafting randomly selected citizen assemblies onto existing institutions and practices. After reviewing the problems that beset modern direct-democratic elections and the long history of randomly selected citizen assemblies, we propose five different varieties of randomly constituted citizen bodies—Priority Conferences, Design Panels, Citizens’ Assemblies, Citizens’ Initiative Reviews, and Policy Juries. After selecting members through stratified random sampling of citizens, each of these assemblies would operate at a different stage of the legislative process, from initial problem identification through approval of a finished ballot measure. Highly structured procedures guided by professional moderators and featuring expert testimony on policy and legal matters would help to ensure deliberative quality, and careful institutional designs would make each body politically powerful. In the end, these citizen bodies would be likely to address the deliberative deficit of direct democracy and better achieve the public’s desired policy objectives.
Over the last few decades, an increasing number of governments have promoted the setting up of so called “mini-publics” to integrate policymaking processes in an attempt to improve policy decisions. This phenomenon has highlighted the importance of mini-publics to become fully integrated in our democratic systems. By presenting the findings of an empirical research conducted on 29 local mini-publics, this paper aims to explain how mini-public design elements can affect the capacity of mini-publics to trigger or hinder two key integration mechanisms: the social legitimation mechanism and the institutional collaboration mechanism.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that deliberation can affect how people think about complex policy options. In this paper, we operate on the assumption that while democratic processes cannot guarantee specific policy outcomes (without losing some of their legitimacy), certain types of democratic practices-such as deliberation-can be used to encourage people to support environmental policies. We test this assumption with an experiment that was designed to examine whether there are systematic differences in support for climate action policies among groups of people who deliberated the policies with each other and those who did not. In our experiment, 330 participants were asked to consider two policies designed to help mitigate climate change: (1) increases to the US federal gas tax; and (2) a tree planting policy. Our results show that those who deliberated became more supportive of government action on the gas tax policy, and they also became more willing to pay higher gas taxes than those who did not deliberate. These findings are consistent across model specifications and substantively significant.
Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly (CA) of 2016–18 was tasked with making recommendations on abortion. This paper shows that from the outset its members were in large part in favour of the liberalisation of abortion (though a fair proportion were undecided), that over the course of its deliberations the CA as a whole moved in a more liberal direction on the issue, but that its position was largely reflected in the subsequent referendum vote by the population as a whole.
Most writing on sociological method has been concerned with how accurate facts can be obtained and how theory can thereby be more rigorously tested. In The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss address the equally Important enterprise of how the discovery of theory from data-systematically obtained and analyzed in social research-can be furthered. The discovery of theory from data-grounded theory-is a major task confronting sociology, for such a theory fits empirical situations, and is understandable to sociologists and laymen alike. Most important, it provides relevant predictions, explanations, interpretations, and applications. In Part I of the book, "Generation Theory by Comparative Analysis," the authors present a strategy whereby sociologists can facilitate the discovery of grounded theory, both substantive and formal. This strategy involves the systematic choice and study of several comparison groups. In Part II, The Flexible Use of Data," the generation of theory from qualitative, especially documentary, and quantitative data Is considered. In Part III, "Implications of Grounded Theory," Glaser and Strauss examine the credibility of grounded theory. The Discovery of Grounded Theory is directed toward improving social scientists' capacity for generating theory that will be relevant to their research. While aimed primarily at sociologists, it will be useful to anyone Interested In studying social phenomena-political, educational, economic, industrial- especially If their studies are based on qualitative data. © 1999 by Barney G. Glaser and Frances Strauss. All rights reserved.
Concerned citizens across the globe fear that democracy is failing them, but civic reformers are crafting new tools that bring back into politics the wider public and its capacity for reason. This book spotlights one such innovation—the Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR). Each review gathers a random sample of twenty voters to study a statewide ballot measure. These citizen panelists interrogate advocates, opponents, and experts and distill what they learn into a one-page analysis for the official Voters’ Pamphlet. The Oregon government permanently established the CIR in 2011, and reformers have tested it in locations across the United States and Europe. This book introduces the citizen activists responsible for the development of the CIR, as well as key participants at the inaugural CIR whose experiences changed their lives. Along with these stories, this book provides evidence of the CIR’s impact on voters, who not only make better decisions as a result of reading the citizen analysis but also change the way they understand their role in government. The CIR fits into a larger set of deliberative reforms occurring around the world and into a long history of democratic experiments that stretch back through the American revolution to ancient Athens. The book weaves together historical vignettes, contemporary research, and personal narratives to show how citizens, civic reformers, and politicians can work together to revitalize modern democracy.
Against those who believe democracy is unable to address climate change effectively, we argue that a more deeply deliberative democracy can better equip the world to meet the challenge.
Over the last few decades, democratic theory has grown dramatically in its power and sophistication, fueled by debates among models of democracy. But these debates are increasingly unproductive. Model-based strategies encourage theorists to overgeneralize the place and functions of ideal typical features of democracy, such as deliberation or elections. Here I sketch an alternative strategy based on the question: What kinds of problems does a political system need to solve to count as “democratic”? I suggest three general kinds: it should empower inclusions, form collective agendas and wills, and have capacities to make collective decisions. We can view common practices such as voting and deliberating as means for addressing these problems, and theorize institutional mixes of practices that would maximize a political system's democratic problem-solving capacities. The resulting theories will be both normatively robust and sufficiently fine-grained to frame democratic problems, possibilities, and deficits in complex polities.
Qualitative Content Analysis designates a bundle of text analysis procedures integrating qualitative and quantitative steps of analysis, which makes it an approach of mixed methods. This contribution defines it with a background of quantitative content analysis and compares it with other social science text analysis approaches (e.g. Grounded Theory). The basic theoretical and methodological assumptions are elaborated: reference to a communication model, rule orientation of analysis, theoretical background of those content analytical rules, categories in the center of the procedure, necessity of pilot testing of categories and rules, necessity of intra- and inter-coder reliability checks. Then the two main procedures, inductive category formation and deductive category assignment, are described by step models. Finally the procedures are compared with similar techniques (e.g. codebook analysis) and strengths and weaknesses are discussed.
This book attempts to solve two problems in deliberative democratic theory and practice: How can agreements reached inside deliberative forums be legitimate for those who did not take part? And why should people with strongly-held views participate in the first place? The solution involves rethinking deliberative theory, but also draws on lessons from practical experience with deliberative forums in Britain's National Health Service. The book discusses the competing representation claims that different participants make, the pros and cons of different approaches to democratic accountability, and different conceptions of rationality and public reasoning. It concludes by rejecting the idea that we can have authentic, legitimate deliberation in any one forum. Instead, authentic, legitimate deliberation can only result from linkages between different kinds of institutions, drawing on different kinds of participants, at different points of a decision-making cycle. That is, it promotes a macro, society-wide view of deliberative democracy quite different from the micro, deliberative-forum view which dominates thinking on the subject in the UK. The book sketches the outline of such a deliberative system, suggesting how various institutions in civil society and elected government might link together to create public decisions, which are both more rational and more democratic.
The principle of public participation is increasingly recognized as central for effective climate governance, although underpinning assumptions about what constitutes participation are not always clearly articulated. This article inquires into the challenges faced when lay citizens are asked to engage in deliberative ‘mini-publics’ geared towards providing input into climate policy. While advocates claim that these innovative forums improve collective decision making by creating the conditions for a socially diverse constituency to learn about and deliberate on salient public issues, critics caution that the democratic potential of deliberative initiatives can be compromised from the outset by a deeper set of assumptions that position public meanings as the domain of expert institutions. Rather than opening up public issues to diverse meanings, mini-publics can inadvertently close down public debate where only expert issue framings are considered valid, reasonable and credible. The admirable objective to include lay publics in climate policy can be limited in practice by a tendency to frame climate change as an inherently expert-based issue. Defining the discussions as the exclusive preserve of experts can implicitly preclude wider public involvement, in turn limiting the knowledge and perspectives available for policy makers.
Deliberative democracy now dominates the theory, reform, and study of democracy. Working at its cutting edges, this book reaches from conceptual underpinnings to the key challenges faced in applications to ever-increasing ranges of problems and issues. Following a survey of the life and times of deliberative democracy, the turns it has taken, and the logic of deliberative systems, contentious foundational issues receive attention. How can deliberative legitimacy be achieved in large-scale societies where face-to-face deliberation is implausible? What can and should representation mean in such systems? What kinds of communication should be valued, and why? How can competing appeals of pluralism and consensus in democratic politics be reconciled? New concepts are developed along the way: discursive legitimacy, discursive representation, systemic tests for rhetoric in democratic communication, and several forms of meta-consensus. Particular forums (be they legislative assemblies or designed mini-publics) have an important place in deliberative democracy, but more important are macro-level deliberative systems that encompass the engagement of discourses in the public sphere, as well as formal and informal institutions of governance. Deliberative democracy can be applied fruitfully in areas previously off-limits to democratic theory: networked governance, the democratization of authoritarian states, and global democracy, as well as in new ways to invigorate citizen participation. In these areas and more, deliberative democracy outperforms its competitors. © John Dryzek 2010, except chapters 3 and 5, both: John Dryzek, and Simon Niemeyer. All rights reserved.