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Competition, coinsurance and moral hazard in banking
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The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of moral hazard on the effectiveness of deposit insurance in achieving banking stability. If moral hazard explains banking instability arising from the adoption of deposit insurance, then deposit insurance will be associated with bank insolvency more than with bank runs. To test the hypothesis, we develop a new empirical framework distinguishing between banking instability initiated by panic withdrawals of deposits, and banking instability initiated by the insolvency problem of banks. Using a dataset covering 118 countries over the period 1980–2004, we find that deposit insurance per se has no significant effect either on bank insolvency or on bank runs. However, interacting deposit insurance with credit to the private sector, we observe a positive and significant effect on bank insolvency and bank runs, suggesting that moral hazard outweighs the positive effect of deposit insurance on banking stability.
Banks face two moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects or simply being lazy and uninnovative). The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It balances efficiently the market discipline imposed by owners of risky debt on managerial rent-seeking against the asset-substitution induced at high levels of leverage. However, when correlated bank failures can impose significant social costs, regulators may bail out bank creditors. Anticipation of this generates an equilibrium featuring systemic risk in which all banks choose inefficiently high leverage to fund correlated assets. A minimum equity capital requirement can rule out asset substitution but also compromises market discipline by making bank debt too safe. The optimal capital regulation requires that a part of bank capital be unavailable to creditors upon failure, and be available to shareholders only contingent on good performance.
This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources; (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership.The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.
This paper studies reputation formation and the evolution over time of the incentive effects of reputation to mitigate conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers use the proceeds of their loans to fund projects. In the absence of reputation effects, borrowers have incentives to select excessively risky projects. If there is sufficient adverse selection, reputation will not initially provide improved incentives to borrowers with short credit histories. Over time, if a good reputation is acquired, reputation will provide improved incentives. General characteristics of markets in which reputation takes time to work are identified. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.
This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk‐taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path.
This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts. This article is reprinted from the Journal of Political Economy (June 1983, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 401--19) with the permission of the University of Chicago Press. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. ...
Developments in theories of financial markets and institutions, using the tools of the economics of uncertainty and of contracts, as well as results in game theory, have, over the last two decades, constituted an exciting and burgeoning field of research. This collection of readings draws together highlights of the ‘second generation’ literature in this area, emphasizing the theoretical, institutional, and policy-oriented regulatory implications of some of the key modelling techniques in the field. The collection divides into seven sections covering the monitoring role of banks and other intermediaries; liquidity demand and the role of banks and the government; bank runs and financial crises; bank regulation; inter-bank competition and bank--firm relationships; comparative financial systems; and imperfect credit markets and the macroeconomy. Each section comprises four articles previously published in top-ranking economics and finance journals, plus a discussion by a prominent scholar, who provides a synthesis and critique of the literature, and suggests promising directions for future research and application of results.
We examine a policy in which owners of banks provide funds in the form of a surety bond in addition to equity capital. This policy would require banks to provide the regulator with funds that could be invested in marketable securities. Investors in the bank receive the income from the surety bond as long as the bank is in business. The capital value could be used by bank regulators to pay off the banks’ liabilities in case of bank failure. After paying depositors, investors would receive the remaining funds, if any. Analytically, this instrument is a way of creating charter value but, as opposed to Keeley (1990) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), restrictions on competition are not necessary to generate positive rents. We demonstrate that capital requirements alone cannot prevent the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance.
This paper analyzes capital requirements in combination with a particular kind of cash reserves, that are invested in the risk-free asset, from now on, compensated reserves. We consider a dynamic framework of banking where competition may induce banks to gamble. In this set up, we can capture the two effects that capital regulation has on risk, the capital-at-risk effect and the franchise value effect (Hellman et al., 2000). We show that while capital alone is an inferior policy, compensated reserves, will complement capital requirements, by creating franchise value, and are therefore efficient in solving moral hazard problems.
Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one.
This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like
liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal
to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may
spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and
shadow banking institutions.
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation, and they otherwise substitute for screening ability. Crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks.
This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4,333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.
Capital requirements are the principal tool of macropru-dential regulation of banks. Bank capital serves both as a buffer and as a disincentive to excessive risk taking. When general equilibrium effects are taken into account, however, it is not clear that higher capital requirements will reduce the level of risk in the banking system. In addition, an increase in the required capital ratio can force banks to take on more risk in order to achieve target rates of return.
We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against
the benefit of equity in attenuating risk shifting. However, faced with socially costly correlated bank failures, regulators
bail out creditors. Anticipation of this generates multiple equilibria, including one with systemic risk in which banks use
excessive leverage to fund correlated, inefficiently risky loans. Limiting leverage and resolving both moral hazards—insufficient
loan monitoring and asset substitution—requires a novel two-tiered capital requirement, including a “special capital account”
that is unavailable to creditors upon failure. (JEL G21, G28, G32, G35, G38)
Received April 23, 2015; accepted September 16, 2015 by Editor Paolo Fulghieri.
Financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. Because liquidity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions, banks hold interregional claims on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, the first-best allocation of risk sharing can be achieved. However, this arrangement is financially fragile. A small liquidity preference shock in one region can spread by contagion throughout the economy. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of interregional claims. Complete claims structures are shown to be more robust than incomplete structures.
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.
This paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where the banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks' franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist. In this case, either flat-rate capital requirements or binding deposit rate ceilings can ensure the existence of a prudent equilibrium, although both have a negative impact on deposit rates. Such impact does not obtain with either risk-based capital requirements or nonbinding deposit rate ceilings, but only the former are always effective in controlling risk-shifting incentives.
This study examines the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on bank stock returns and risk. We find that FDICIA had a generally positive effect on bank stock returns and resulted in a significant reduction in bank risk. The extent of the risk reduction varies based on the capitalization, size, and credit risk of the institutions with poorly capitalized, large, and high credit risk banks experiencing the greatest risk reduction. The results obtained using two separate control groups also bolster the conclusion that FDICIA’s passage resulted in a significant decline in bank risk.
In a dynamic framework it is shown that capital adequacy rules may increase a bank's riskiness. In addition to the standard negative effect of rents on risk attitudes of banks a further intertemporal effect has to be considered. The intuition behind the result is that under binding capital requirements an additional unit of equity tomorrow is more valuable to a bank. If raising equity is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to increase risk today.
Cross-country bank lending appears to be subject to market imperfections leading to persistent interest rate differentials.
In a model where banks need to cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing or by liquidating assets, we study the scope for international
interbank market integration with unsecured lending when cross-country information is noisy. We find that an equilibrium with
integrated markets need not always exist, and that it may coexist with one characterized by segmentation. A repo market reduces
interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentation equilibrium. However, it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium.
Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond-Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first-best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first-best allocation. Copyright 2002 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Resarch Association
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking
model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors.
Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance
may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We
further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable
subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase
the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.
We study the propagation of financial crises among regions in which banks are protected by limited liability and may take excessive risk. The regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks, so liquidity coinsurance is Pareto improving. The moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized. Under autarky a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk-taking, but when financial markets are open capital becomes insufficient. Thus, bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crisis spreads to other regions via financial linkages. Opening financial markets is nevertheless Pareto improving; consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance, although they pay the cost of excessive risk-taking. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.
The authors examine debenture yields over the period 1983-91 to evaluate the market's sensitivity to bank-specific risks and conclude that investors have rationally reflected changes in the government's policy toward absorbing private losses in the event of a bank failure. Although this evidence does not establish that market discipline can effectively control banking firms, it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally differentiate among the risks undertaken by the major U.S. banking firms. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.
A fixed-rate deposit insurance system provides a moral hazard for excessive risk taking and is not viable absent regulation. Although the deposit insurance system appears to have worked remarkably well over most of its fifty-year history, major problems began to appear in the early 1980s. This paper tests the hypothesis that increases in competition caused bank charter values to decline, which in turn caused banks to increase default risk through increases in asset risk and reductions in capital. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
L'int�r�t de l'approche par les jeux globaux ("global games'') est pr�cis�ment d'ancrer les anticipations sur des variables exog�nes r�elles. On peut ainsi garder l'aspect auto-r�alisateur des anticipations mais en restaurant l'unicit� de l'�quilibre et donc un meilleur pouvoir pr�dictif du mod�le. Nous illustrons ces m�canismes sur deux exemples. Le premier a trait au choix r�sidentiel d'agents qui ont une pr�f�rence "identitaire''. Le second a trait � la contagion de paniques bancaires d'un pays � un autre. De mani�re plus g�n�rale, tous les jeux qui pr�sentent des compl�mentarit�s strat�giques sont susceptibles d'�tre analys�s au moyen des techniques des "global games''. Il convient toutefois de rappeler que les techniques utilis�es demeurent assez sp�cifiques: l'incertitude strat�gique porte essentiellement sur les croyances de premier degr� des autres acteurs. Or, si de mani�re plus g�n�rale on suppose que cette incertitude peut porter sur des ordres plus �lev�s, les conclusions des mod�les peuvent changer. Ainsi, Weinstein et Yildiz (2004) montrent que dans un oligopole de Cournot, il y a une tr�s grande multiplicit� d'�quilibres si on suppose que l'incertitude porte sur les croyances de niveaux suffisamment �lev�s.
The rise of managed healthcare organizations (MCOs) and the associated increased integration among providers has transformed US healthcare and at the same time raised antitrust concern. This paper examines how competition among MCOs affects the efficiency gains of improved price coordination achieved through integration. MCOs offer differentiated services and contract with specialized and complementary upstream providers to supply these services. We identify strategic pricing equilibria under three different market structures: overlapping upstream physician-hospital alliances, upstream-downstream arrangements such as Preferred Provider Organizations, and vertically integrated Health Maintenance Organizations. The efficiency gains achieved depend not only on organizational form but also on the toughness of premium competition. We show that, contrary to popular thinking, providers and insurers do not earn maximum net revenue when they are monopolies or monopsonies, but rather at an intermediate level of market power. Furthermore, closer integration of upstream and downstream providers does not necessarily increase net revenues.
Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk-shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk-based capital requirements and other deposit-insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt-todeposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk-shifting incentives. 1 The Savings and Loan (S&L) insurance debacle taught U.S. taxpayers that they cannot rely on bank or government accounting reports to signal how well or how poorly insured institutions are being supervised. To ameliorate incentive conflicts that might flow from the absence of this ...
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