A preview of this full-text is provided by Springer Nature.
Content available from Small Business Economics
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
Vol.: (0123456789)
1 3
Small Bus Econ
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-024-00928-w
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Organizing transactions betweenentrepreneurs andhuman
capital resources underKnightian uncertainty
RyanW.Angus · MatthewA.Barlow
Accepted: 15 April 2024
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2024
Abstract This paper develops theory to explore
when it is most efficient for entrepreneurs operat-
ing under Knightian uncertainty to contract with
human capital resource providers through market
governance as independent contractors or through
firm governance as employees or holders of resid-
ual rights of control (i.e., co-ownership stakes in
the entrepreneurial firm). We identify and develop
the notion of unintentional adverse skill selec-
tion which can occur if skill requirements change
as entrepreneurs experiment with the production
of new resource combinations of uncertain future
value. We explore the comparative efficiency of
the cooperative flexibility of firm governance
and the autonomous flexibility of market govern-
ance when unintentional adverse skill selection is
salient. We develop a typology of human capital
resources based on the breadth and depth of the
skills they possess. We propose that skill breadth
is positively associated with the expected effi-
ciency of firm governance and that skill depth is
positively associated with the expected efficiency
of market governance. We then utilize this typol-
ogy to theorize about which governance mecha-
nisms are most efficient for transacting with four
types of human capital resources: polymaths (high
skill breadth, high skill depth), novices (low skill
breadth, low skill depth), specialists (low skill
breadth, high skill depth), and Jacks/Jills-of-all-
trades (high skill breadth, low skill depth).
Plain English Summary This paper helps entre-
preneurs attempting to produce novel products and
services understand the pros and cons of working
with others as independent contractors, employees,
and co-owners in a startup. This is a critically impor-
tant decision, laden with pitfalls that can harm entre-
preneurs’ chances for success. In particular, we iden-
tify the contracting hazard of unintentional adverse
skill selection which can occur if skill requirements
change as entrepreneurs pivot to experiment with dif-
ferent products and services. We develop a framework
which suggests that for (a) “polymaths” with high
skill breadth and high skill depth, the most efficient
choice is co-ownership; (b) “novices” with low skill
breadth and low skill depth, the most efficient choice
is employee; (c) “specialists” with low skill breadth
and high skill depth, the most efficient choice is inde-
pendent contractor; and (d) “Jacks/Jills-of-all-trades”
with high skill breadth and low skill depth, the most
efficient choices is employee.
R.W.Angus(*)
Department ofManagement, John Chambers College
ofBusiness andEconomics, West Virginia University,
1601 University Avenue, PO Box6025, Morgantown,
WV26506, USA
e-mail: ryan.angus@mail.wvu.edu
M.A.Barlow
Department ofManagement, College ofBusiness,
University ofNebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA
e-mail: matthew.barlow@unl.edu
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.