The Hollow Parties: The Many Pasts and Disordered Present of American Party Politics
... These results suggest a "plutopopulism" model, one that integrates the discontent of broad swaths of the mass public with the power of the wealthy few (Baker 2004;Pierson 2017;Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2024). Trump was financed by both the top and the middle of American society, complicating theories of wealthy dominance and studies of working class populism alike. ...
... 36, 100). And by 2020, Trump had kept his word on tax and deregulation policies (Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2024). ...
... Instead, they can become electorally viable despite heavy defections from wealthy establishment donors, with a combination of a few wealthy establishment donors and a surge of mostly non-wealthy new donors. Right-wing authoritarian candidates can assemble a coalition of both wealthy and non-wealthy sectors of society, what some call "plutopopulism" (Baker 2004;Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2024) or a "strange merger of populism and plutocracy" (Pierson 2017). Here, we have fleshed out how this coalition finds expression in the campaignfinance regime of the United States. ...
Comparative scholarship suggests authoritarian candidates often rely on backing from the wealthy. The wealthy are also said to play an important role in American campaign finance. Studies of Donald Trump, however, found that he drew significant support from white Americans with less education and privilege. We evaluate wealthy and non-wealthy Americans’ financial support for Trump, compared to other candidates, by constructing a comprehensive dataset of property values matched to contributions and voter files. We find Trump underperformed among wealthy Republican donors while mobilizing new non-wealthy donors. Trump also diversified the donorate, especially by education. That is, Trump built an unusual coalition of wealthy and non-wealthy donors. Our results support an alternative, “plutopopulist” model of Trump’s financial base. This study demonstrates the importance of studying both non-wealthy and wealthy Americans, the group who give the most but whose individual behavior has been studied the least.
... Si bien hoy lo relacionamos con el racismo y el conservadurismo, en sus orígenes estaba atado a movimientos que iban contra el statu quo imperante. En su larga historia, siguió una trayectoria curiosa: uno podría argumentar que fue de movimiento a partido establecido y luego a partido capturado por movimientos, pero desplazándose al otro lado del espectro ideológico de quienes le dieron su primer impulso (McAdam & Kloos, 2016;Roberts, 2018;Schlozman & Rosenfeld, 2024). ...
Popular accounts of presidential nomination politics in the United States focus on factions, lanes, or even a civil war within the party. This Element uses data on party leader endorsements in nominations to identify a network of party actors and the apparent long-standing divisions within each party. The authors find that there are divisions, but they do not generally map to the competing camps described by most observers. Instead, they find parties that, while regularly divided, generally tend to have a dominant establishment group, which combines the interests of many factions, even as some factions sometimes challenge that establishment. This pattern fits a conception of factions as focused on reshaping the party, but not necessarily on undermining it.
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