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Legitimacy through Diversity: China's Leadership in the BRICS+
Expansion for Global Balance
Brice Tseen Fu Lee
Fudan University, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, PhD Candidate
Universidad Del Desarrollo, Faculty of Government, Senior Researcher
Oxford Global Society, Research Associate
briceleetseenfu@gmail.com
Juan Pablo Sims
Universidad Del Desarrollo, Faculty of Government, Associate Professor
Fudan University, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, PhD Candidate
jsims@udd.cl
Abstract:
This analysis explores China's quest for international legitimacy through its leadership in the
BRICS+ expansion, a strategic maneuver to foster a multipolar world that integrates diverse
political and economic systems. The evolution into BRICS+ is significant, with the collective GDP
of member countries reaching $30.76 trillion, accounting for 30% of the global economy. This
underscores the alliance's economic impact and challenges the existing world order. The
inclusion of nations like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, and the UAE offers a blueprint for
shared benefits and mutual growth. China advocates for an alternative, inclusive pathway to
legitimacy, promoting a world order that values sovereignty, cultural identity, and balanced
global governance.
Keywords: China, International Legitimacy, BRICS+, Multipolar World, Global Governance,
Mutual Growth, Sovereignty, Cultural Identity, Strategic Expansion, Resource Diplomacy.
Introduction
China's meteoric rise as a global economic powerhouse has been accompanied by multifaceted
challenges in the international system. Historically, China has faced exclusion or limited
participation in various international initiatives and organizations. For instance, its influence in
Bretton Woods institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was
limited for many years, and it has been excluded from major economic groupings such as the G7
(Kent 2002). Furthermore, China's absence from the world's most significant multilateral energy
institutions underscores its reluctance to join these restrictive organizations and their lack of
engagement with China (Kong 2011).
However, in the realm of international relations, legitimacy plays a pivotal role. Legitimacy is
often sought by states to validate their actions, policies, and global outreach. In the case of China,
its quest for legitimacy is intricately linked to its historical exclusions and its aspirations to
reshape the international order in alignment with its interests (Benabdallah 2019). A recent
manifestation of China's legitimacy-building efforts is evident in the expansion of the BRICS bloc.
The inclusion of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates
into BRICS, which this paper will term as BRICS+, is not merely a strategic move for economic
cooperation. A closer examination reveals that many of these countries are among the world's
top oil producers, with Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, UAE, Iran, and Brazil being notable members
of BRICS+. Moreover, the combined GDP of BRICS+ countries amounts to $30.76 trillion,
accounting for 30% of the global economy, further emphasizing their collective economic clout.
This paper delves into China's strategic and thoughtful expansion of BRICS+, focusing particularly
on integrating countries rich in natural resources and predominantly situated outside the
influence of the Western liberal order. This initiative is a calculated strategy aimed at enhancing
China's international legitimacy amidst the escalating great power rivalry, especially with the
United States and its allies. China, in its pursuit of global recognition and influence, has
recognized the critical importance of fostering inclusivity in the international arena. By
intentionally extending its diplomatic and economic outreach to regions historically marginalized
and underrepresented in global governance structures, China is articulating a clear and powerful
vision. It is advocating for a more inclusive, multipolar world order that transcends traditional
power dynamics and offers representation to nations from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.
This strategic alignment with resource-rich countries, many of which have experienced tensions
with the Western liberal order, underscores China's commitment to reshaping the global
governance landscape. It represents a bold move to recalibrate the international system,
ensuring it more accurately reflects the diverse nature of our global society. In doing so, China is
not only solidifying its own position on the world stage but also promoting a more equitable
distribution of power and influence. By aligning itself with countries rich in natural and human
resources, and advocating for the inclusion of underrepresented regions in the global governance
structure, China is contributing to the establishment of a more balanced and representative
international system. This emerging multipolar world envisions a distribution of power that is
more evenly spread, allowing for a true representation of the global community. In this context,
China is positioning itself as a central player, a nation that is willing and able to challenge existing
global hierarchies and offer an alternative vision for the future of international relations.
In summary, this paper contends that China's expansion of BRICS+ is a strategic and deliberate
effort to build international legitimacy and challenge the existing world order. By aligning with
nations rich in resources and often positioned outside the Western liberal order, and by
promoting the inclusion of underrepresented regions in global governance, China is actively
contributing to the creation of a more inclusive, balanced, and multipolar world order.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 delves into the Theoretical Framework:
Legitimacy in International Relations. This section is subdivided into various segments that
explore different facets of legitimacy in the context of global governance and power dynamics.
Specifically, we discuss "Great Power Competition and the Quest for Legitimacy," "BRICS+
Expansion and Legitimacy Building," "Inclusion of Resource-Rich Nations," "Engaging with the
Marginalized," and "Implications for the International System," culminating in a discourse on
"Towards legitimacy."
Following the theoretical exploration, Section 3 focuses on "China's Great Power Rivalry and
Quest for Legitimacy." Here, we examine the intricacies of the US-China rivalry, highlighting the
instances and implications of China's exclusion from Western-led international organizations.
This section provides a nuanced understanding of China's strategic maneuvers within the global
arena, shaped by its interactions with established powers.
Section 4, the Discussion, offers an in-depth analysis of "Acceleration of China's Need for
International Legitimacy" and "Building Legitimacy through International Organizations and
Partnerships." It further elaborates on how "BRICS: A Platform for China's Legitimacy Building"
and the "BRICS+ Expansion: Strategic Inclusion of Resource-Rich Countries" serve as mechanisms
for China to enhance its standing and influence on the global stage. Additionally, this section
delves into "The Quest for Legitimacy," emphasizing the broader implications of China's actions
for international relations and global governance.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper by synthesizing the findings and outlining the implications
of China's quest for legitimacy through its leadership in the BRICS+ expansion and its strategic
engagements in the international system. The conclusion reflects on the potential future
trajectories of China's role in global governance and the evolving dynamics of international power
structures.
The research purpose of this study is to critically analyze China's strategic expansion of the BRICS+
bloc as a pivotal element in its broader quest for international legitimacy amid the great power
rivalries and its historical marginalization from key global institutions. This study aims to unravel
the implications of China's integration of resource-rich and geopolitically significant nations into
BRICS+, examining how this expansion not only enhances China's economic and political clout
but also serves as a vehicle for promoting a more inclusive and multipolar world order. The issues
being addressed encompass China's response to its exclusion from the Western-dominated
liberal world order, its efforts to construct an alternative global governance framework through
BRICS+, and the potential ramifications of these actions for the established international order.
By delving into China's motivations, strategies, and the broader geopolitical context, this study
seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of China's aspirations to reshape global power
dynamics and foster a world system where diverse nations have a voice and their sovereignty
and developmental paths are respected and valued.
Theoretical Framework: Legitimacy in International Relations
Great Power Competition and the Quest for Legitimacy
The concept of great power competition, particularly evident in the strategic rivalry between
China and established powers such as the United States, plays a crucial role in shaping the
dynamics of international relations. This competition extends beyond mere military might,
encompassing economic, technological, and ideological dimensions, thereby challenging the
existing global power structure (Goldstein 1997). China's ascendance introduces a new paradigm,
necessitating a reevaluation of power relations and the balance of influence, particularly in the
context of both hard and soft power (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016).
However, China's rise has not been without resistance. The established liberal world order,
predominantly influenced by Western powers, has exhibited instances of apprehension and
containment, leading to China’s exclusion from certain aspects of global governance (Zhao 2015).
This exclusion extends to participation in international institutions and the shaping of global
norms and rules, reflecting a reluctance to adapt to changing power dynamics and accommodate
new rising powers (Zeng and Breslin 2016). Ikenberry (2008) further questions the ability of the
liberal system to survive in the face of China's rise, highlighting the challenges and uncertainties
that accompany this power transition. This underscores the importance of understanding the
implications of China's ascendance, not just for the existing powers, but also for the international
system as a whole. In response to these challenges, China has embarked on a path of innovation,
developing alternative strategies to assert its influence and build legitimacy on the global stage.
This includes the formation and expansion of new international institutions and partnerships,
such as BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative, which embody China’s vision for a more inclusive
and multipolar world order (Zhai 2018)
Through these initiatives, China engages with countries often marginalized by the traditional
liberal world order, positioning itself as a leader in the emerging multipolar world. This approach
challenges existing hierarchies and advocates for a more equitable distribution of power and
resources, reflecting China’s commitment to reshaping the global governance landscape (Zhao
2008). Collectively, these scholarly works provide a comprehensive understanding of the great
power competition and its implications for China's quest for legitimacy. They highlight the
strategic rivalry, the challenges of exclusion, and China's innovative responses as it seeks to
establish itself as a legitimate and influential actor in the international system.
BRICS+ Expansion and Legitimacy Building
The strategic expansion of BRICS to include additional countries, as seen in the BRICS+ format, is
a deliberate effort by China to enhance its global influence and establish legitimacy beyond the
Western liberal order. This move aligns with China's broader strategy of promoting a more
inclusive and multipolar world order, challenging existing global power structures, and
advocating for a fairer distribution of power and resources (Lissovolik 2023; Hallding et al. 2013).
The inclusion of new members in BRICS, such as South Africa in 2010, has sparked varied views
in the literature, ranging from dismissing BRICS as a mere acronym to recognizing it as a
significant player impacting the global economic order (Kirton and Larionova 2022).
The expansion of BRICS has led to discussions on how this format, particularly BRICS+, can
strengthen the position of BRICS in the global arena and among the Global South (Ye 2023;
Lissovolik 2023). Moreover, the success of initiatives like the New Development Bank (NDB)
within BRICS could influence the group's ability to enhance global governance. However, there is
limited evidence suggesting that BRICS intends to overhaul the current global order (Kutu and
Ngalawa 2017). Recommendations have been made for BRICS countries to maintain policy
consistency, especially in monetary policy, to stimulate industrial output effectively (Panin 2023).
The potential expansion of BRICS to include countries like Ethiopia and Egypt has been viewed as
a consideration of South Africa's interests, ensuring its continued significance within the
organization in Africa (Sergeeva 2024). The prospects of an expanded BRICS membership in the
global economy and the directions of cooperation between Russia and foreign partners within
BRICS have also been explored. In conclusion, the literature on BRICS expansion and legitimacy
building underscores the evolving dynamics of global power shifts, the strategic motivations
behind BRICS+, and the implications for global governance and economic cooperation among
member countries.
Inclusion of Resource-Rich Nations
The strategic incorporation of resource-rich nations into the BRICS+ framework marks a
significant pivot in China's global strategy, aiming to secure essential natural resources vital for
its burgeoning economic needs while simultaneously establishing robust partnerships that
enhance its geopolitical sway and global influence. This calculated maneuver aligns with the
concept of output legitimacy, as delineated by Steffek (2003), emphasizing an entity's capability
to deliver tangible results and uphold the global public interest to garner legitimacy.
In parallel, the discourse on the interconnectedness of economic development, resource
utilization, and environmental degradation gains prominence in the context of the BRICS+
expansion. Rafei, Esmaeili, and Balsalobre-Lorente (2022) delve into the intricate dance between
economic complexity, natural resource exploitation, and ecological footprints, illuminating how
variations in institutional quality across nations precipitate disparate environmental impacts. This
narrative is particularly resonant within the BRICS+ consortium, encapsulating nations with
diverse levels of institutional robustness and resource endowments, thereby accentuating the
imperative for policy frameworks that are sensitive to the unique economic and environmental
tapestries of these countries (Yu et al. 2024).
Furthermore, the intricate relationship between economic activities and environmental
degradation underlines a global concern over climate change and its ties to economic paradigms
(Gao et al. 2024). The environmental strain wrought by human consumption and exploitation of
natural resources echoes through the strategic underpinnings of the BRICS+ expansion, where
economic collaboration is intrinsically linked to resource acquisition and its ensuing
environmental repercussions (Cai and Zhang 2022). The discourse extends to the nuanced role
of the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) in shaping nations' economic trajectories and their
environmental footprints (Lee and Olasehinde‐Williams 2024). The Economic Complexity Index
(ECI) measures the productive capabilities and accumulated knowledge within an economy,
relating to the diversity and sophistication of its export products. High ECI values, seen in
countries like Japan or Germany, indicate a varied and advanced economy, exporting unique and
complex products. Conversely, low ECI scores, as observed in Angola or Botswana, suggest an
economy with limited diversity and simpler, more common export products. The ECI is calculated
using a mathematical approach that assesses the interconnectedness of countries and the
products they export. Dogan et al. (2020) as well as Pata and Caglar (2021) elucidate how the ECI
serves as a dual-edged sword, driving economic growth while also fostering opportunities for
sustainable development through research, development, and clean energy adoption, offering a
valuable lens to examine the economic strategies and environmental engagements of BRICS+
nations.
The significance of institutional quality in sculpting environmental outcomes emerges as a central
theme, with Fu, Lu, and Pirabi (2023)as well as Haqi (2023) shedding light on the pivotal role
governance structures play in steering sustainable development and environmental governance.
This facet is particularly salient for the BRICS+ coalition, aspiring to synergize cooperation among
nations with disparate governance frameworks and institutional capacities, thereby influencing
their collective and individual approaches to sustainable development and environmental
stewardship. At the heart of the sustainability discourse is the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
hypothesis, explored within various contexts, including Jahanger et al. (2022)'s examination
within NAFTA, revealing an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and
environmental impact. This paradigm is crucial for BRICS+ countries, suggesting that while
economic expansion may initially exacerbate environmental degradation, a turning point can be
reached where further economic maturation and technological advancements precipitate a
reduction in environmental harm.
The dialogue on the tension between economic growth and environmental health is further
enriched by Ahmad et al. (2019) who emphasize the inherent trade-offs in pursuing economic
expansion at the expense of ecological well-being. This conversation is particularly pertinent to
the BRICS+ ensemble, where rapid economic ascension is often predicated on resource-intensive
and environmentally detrimental practices. Therefore the importance of economic development,
resource management, and environmental sustainability, BRICS+ nations are positioned at a
critical juncture. Their collective and individual paths forward will not only define their economic
trajectories but also their environmental legacies, underscoring the pressing need for an
integrated approach that harmonizes economic aspirations with sustainable and eco-friendly
practices.
Engaging with the Marginalized
China’s intentional engagement with countries frequently marginalized by the traditional liberal
world order is a strategic move to position itself as a leader in the emerging multipolar world.
This strategy challenges existing hierarchies and underscores China’s dedication to transforming
the global governance landscape. Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg (2019)emphasize the
importance of institutional qualities, including democratic, technocratic, and fair procedural and
performance qualities, as sources of legitimacy for international organizations. Through the
establishment and expansion of BRICS+, China is fostering a more democratic and inclusive global
governance structure, enhancing its own legitimacy in the process.
China is proactively crafting an alternative development model, offering a complementary
pathway for global growth, particularly for states that often find themselves at the margins of
the prevailing liberal world order. Through initiatives like BRICS+ and institutions such as the New
Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China is not
merely challenging the existing frameworks but is presenting an inclusive alternative that
underscores democratic engagement and broader participation in global governance (H. Wang
2019; Hawkins et al. 2022; Johnston 2019). This approach is rooted in China's own experiences
of exclusion and seeks to create a platform where marginalized nations can find their voice and
pursue development within a supportive, multipolar context. China's endeavors, exemplified by
the Belt and Road Initiative and its leadership within the AIIB, underscore its commitment to
fostering a model where development is not a zero-sum game but a shared journey towards
collective prosperity (Kumar 2023; Kirton and Larionova 2022).
In positioning itself as a key proponent of this alternative model, China aims to redefine the
contours of international relations, emphasizing cooperation and mutual growth. Its involvement
in sectors like global energy governance illustrates a broader ambition to offer governance
solutions that are adaptable and responsive to the needs of the Global South, thereby advocating
for a balanced global architecture where diverse development narratives can coexist and flourish
(Hawkins et al. 2022). Hence, China's strategic engagement in the global arena, particularly
through BRICS and its affiliated frameworks, is emblematic of its aspiration to establish a platform
for South-South cooperation, enabling nations to chart their own development trajectories in
tandem with others, free from the constraints of traditional Western-centric paradigms
(Nuruzzaman 2022; Duggan et al. 2022). In this light, China's initiatives are not seen as revisionist
challenges to the established order but as constructive contributions towards a more inclusive
and equitable global governance model.
Implications for the International System:
The enlargement of BRICS+ has profound implications for the international system, signaling the
potential emergence of a more inclusive and multipolar world order. It undermines the
dominance of Western powers and opens avenues for cooperation and collaboration among
emerging economies. This development resonates with the findings of Dorussen and Ward
(2008), who highlight the role of intergovernmental organizations in forging network ties
between states, thereby enhancing their capacity to effectively intervene in conflicts and
contribute to global stability. By promoting a more inclusive and cooperative international
environment through BRICS+, China is not only bolstering its legitimacy but also affirming its role
as a pivotal player in the global governance system.
The strategic expansion of BRICS+ serves as a pivotal mechanism for China to navigate the
complexities of international relations and assert its legitimacy amidst great power competition.
Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015) insights into the social legitimacy of international organizations
underscore the importance of delivering tangible results and maintaining public confidence,
which China aims to achieve through BRICS+. By fostering effective collaboration and delivering
economic benefits, BRICS+ enhances the perceived legitimacy of China’s role in global
governance.
Stephen (2018) discussion on legitimacy deficits due to legitimacy drift highlights the challenges
faced by traditional international organizations, and by extension, emphasizes the necessity for
innovative platforms like BRICS+. China’s initiative to expand BRICS+ can be seen as a proactive
measure to prevent legitimacy drift, ensuring that the organization remains aligned with the
evolving needs and expectations of the international community. Nasiritousi and Faber (2021)
shed light on the sources of legitimacy in a complex institutional landscape, suggesting that the
expansion of BRICS+ contributes to China’s legitimacy by diversifying its diplomatic engagements
and creating a more inclusive international order. This aligns with Gronau and Schmidtke (2016)
exploration of international institutions’ legitimation strategies, as China leverages BRICS+ to
articulate a clear vision and rationale for its role in global governance, further solidifying its
legitimacy. Together, these works provide a comprehensive framework for understanding how
the expansion of BRICS+ serves as a strategic tool for China to build and consolidate its legitimacy,
navigate the challenges of institutional complexity, and position itself as a central actor in the
evolving international order.
Towards legitimacy:
In the theoretical framework, we have delved into the intricate dynamics of great power
competition, focusing on China's strategic rivalry with established powers, particularly the United
States. We highlighted how this rivalry has led to China’s exclusion from certain facets of the
liberal world order, necessitating innovative approaches and alternative strategies to assert its
influence and build legitimacy on the global stage. The formation and expansion of BRICS and
BRICS+ serve as quintessential examples of these strategies, providing a platform for emerging
economies to collaborate, assert their influence, and challenge the existing global order.
The significance of understanding China’s actions within this context cannot be overstated. The
great power competition is not just a contest of military or economic might; it is also a battle for
influence, legitimacy, and the ability to shape the global governance landscape. China’s strategic
actions, including the expansion of BRICS+, are aimed at enhancing its standing in the
international system, building legitimacy, and fostering a more inclusive and multipolar world
order. The potential long-term implications of China’s strategy for the international system and
global governance are profound. By creating and expanding platforms like BRICS+, China is
challenging the dominance of Western powers and advocating for a more equitable distribution
of power and resources. This could lead to a more balanced and multipolar international system,
where emerging economies have a greater say in global affairs.
However, the journey is not without challenges. The existing literature highlights the complexities
and nuances of building legitimacy in the international system. Material power, while significant,
is not the sole determinant of a country's influence in global governance. The attitude of a
country's leadership towards the international order, the length of its membership in major
international organizations, and the strength of its civil society all play crucial roles in shaping its
participation and influence in global governance (H. Wang and French 2013). Additionally, the
legitimacy of international governance hinges upon popular assent to the justifications of its goals,
principles, and procedures (Steffek, 2003). Therefore, China’s strategic actions in the realm of
great power competition, particularly its efforts to build legitimacy through the expansion of
BRICS+, are reshaping the international system and the landscape of global governance.
Understanding these dynamics is crucial for comprehending the potential trajectories of
international relations and the future of global governance. The journey is complex, and the
outcomes are uncertain, but the implications for the international system and global governance
are undeniably significant.
China's Great Power Rivalry and Quest for Legitimacy
Overview of the U.S.-China Rivalry
The U.S.-China rivalry has manifested in various forms of exclusion, significantly impacting China's
quest for international legitimacy and influence. In the realm of economic and technological
domains, the U.S. has implemented policies restricting China's access to advanced technologies,
particularly in sectors deemed crucial for national security. This has led to a partial decoupling of
technological supply chains, pushing China to invest significantly in its own technological
development and strive for self-reliance (Zhao 2019). Despite these challenges, Christensen
(2006) suggests that the U.S. could potentially exert more regional influence through cooperation
with China, rather than attempting to contain its economic and diplomatic growth. The
ideological divide between the U.S. and China further complicates their relationship. The U.S.
promotes a liberal democratic model, while China advocates for a state-led authoritarian
approach, fostering mutual suspicion and impeding collaboration in various international settings
(Ferchen 2013). Zhao (2015) highlights that this strategic rivalry is deeply rooted in ideological
differences, adding a layer of complexity to their interactions.
In terms of international governance, China perceives itself as marginalized from the prevailing
structures dominated by Western influences. In response, it has actively sought to establish and
participate in alternative international platforms, such as BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative,
aiming to enhance its global influence and cooperation with other nations (Zhao 2022). This is a
deliberate strategy to counteract its exclusion and assert its role in the global arena. The
relationship is further strained by perceptual gaps and normative exclusion, with both nations
viewing each other with suspicion and often framing each other as challengers to the existing
international order (Chengqiu 2020). In the military and security domain, China feels encircled by
the U.S.'s network of military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, interpreting these security
partnerships as a containment strategy (He and Feng 2023). This has prompted China to seek
alternative means of ensuring its security and expanding its influence. Collectively, these various
forms of exclusion have accelerated China's quest for international legitimacy, prompting it to
explore innovative strategies and form new partnerships to navigate these challenges and assert
its role in the global arena.
For example, The Group of Seven (G7), a coalition of some of the world's major industrialized
democracies, has increasingly positioned itself in opposition to China, reflecting a shift
reminiscent of Cold War dynamics. This stance was evident at the Hiroshima summit, where the
G7 nations, along with several of China's neighbors, convened in a manner that some observers,
including Shi Jiangtao from the South China Morning Post, characterized as an event that views
China in a negative light (Shi 2023). The summit highlighted the G7's concerns over China's
growing assertiveness and its strategic partnership with Russia. The Economist notes that the
G7's original formation did not consider China, which has since grown into a formidable global
force, challenging the group's economic and democratic ideals (The Economist 2021). British
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, as reported by Tessa Wong of the BBC, has labeled China as 'the
greatest state-based threat to the UK's economic security,' as the G7 would see a disturbing rise
of the weaponization of economic vulnerabilities as the G7 believes that these coercion measures
would undermine the foreign and domestic policies and position of G7 members as well as
partners all around the world which leads to the underscoring of the group's ideological rift with
Beijing (Wong 2023). Lili Yan Ing, writing for the Jakarta Globe, warns that the G7's anti-coercion
campaign against China could have unintended consequences, potentially backfiring (Ing 2023).
Collectively, these developments and the media coverage surrounding them, including reports
from the South China Morning Post, the BBC, the Jakarta Globe and many legitimate news site,
contribute to a narrative that challenges China's legitimacy and portrays the G7's posture as a
unified front aimed at countering China's influence.
Furthermore, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as
characterized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is often viewed as an
exclusive "club" of affluent democracies, accounting for a substantial share of global GDP and
establishing benchmarks across a spectrum of economic and policy realms. The membership
prerequisites of the OECD, highlighting shared democratic values and economic systems,
implicitly preclude nations that diverge from these tenets. Notably, China, with its distinctive
state-led authoritarian schema, does not conform to the conventional profile of an OECD
member state. This exclusion may be construed as a form of anti-legitimacy, insinuating that the
organization's standards and practices are crafted to endorse and validate certain types of
economic and political frameworks while discrediting others, such as that of China (Runde, Askey,
& McKeown, 2020). The OECD's pivotal role in steering global economic governance, through its
advisories and norm-setting in domains like taxation, anti-corruption, and the digital economy,
further emphasizes this schism. The focus of the organization often mirrors the interests and
modalities of its member states, which predominantly are aligned with market-oriented
economic models and liberal democratic governance structures. This emphasis can be perceived
as a counterpoint to China's state-driven approach, potentially feeding into a narrative that the
OECD's undertakings are part of a more extensive anti-legitimacy campaign against China's
economic and political system (Runde, Askey, and McKeown 2020).
Moreover, the internal discourse within the OECD regarding China's status—whether to extend
an invitation for full membership or to sustain its present level of engagement—highlights the
intricacies of assimilating China into a system of governance that maintains values at odds with
its own. The deliberations concerning China's prospective membership evoke questions about
the organization's willingness to embrace diverse economic models and governance practices. In
essence, the OECD's membership criteria, strategic orientation, and governance frameworks can
be seen as implicitly sidelining China, thereby contributing to a perception of anti-legitimacy
efforts aimed against it. This perception is bolstered by the organization's role in establishing
global standards that may not resonate with China's internal policies and global ambitions (OECD,
n.d.). In crafting this narrative, the insights of Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President, William A.
Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, and Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development at
CSIS, alongside Thelma Askey, former Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD, are particularly
instructive, providing a nuanced understanding of the OECD's position and its implications for
global economic governance (Runde, Askey, and McKeown 2020).
Another example is reflected in the deliberate exclusion of China from the International Space
Station (ISS) by the United States, as highlighted by Jeffrey Kluger, an esteemed author of 12
books including "Apollo 13," exemplifies a strategic move that has implications for legitimacy and
competition in the domain of space exploration (Kluger 2015). This exclusion, rooted in concerns
over national security, has not only sidelined China from participating in a significant
international endeavor but has also inadvertently contributed to the legitimacy building of
China's own space program. As China was compelled to forge its own path, it has achieved
remarkable milestones, such as the development of multi-crew spacecraft and the planning of
interplanetary missions, thereby establishing its own space exploration credentials. This self-
sufficient progression in space technology, in the face of exclusion, serves as a testament to
China's resolve to construct and legitimize its space capabilities independently, challenging the
notion that legitimacy in space can only be conferred through collaboration with established
space-faring entities (Kluger 2015).
The narrative of China's global engagement is one of resilience in the face of exclusion, as seen
in its space endeavors, and strategic adaptation within international trade systems. The
deliberate sidelining of China from the International Space Station (ISS), as noted by Kluger (2015),
has not only highlighted geopolitical tensions but also spurred China to bolster its own space
program, thereby enhancing its legitimacy in the realm of space exploration. Similarly, China's
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) marked a pivotal shift in its economic trajectory.
Embracing the liberalization policies of the 1990s, China's integration into the WTO catalyzed a
period of unprecedented economic growth and innovation, as evidenced by the surge in patent
applications by Chinese firms, a move that solidified its legitimacy as a global economic
powerhouse despite the backdrop of competitive tensions (Liu et al. 2011; Ianchovichina and
Martin 2001). This juxtaposition of exclusion from space collaboration and inclusion in global
trade underscores the complex dynamics of legitimacy and participation that China navigates on
the world stage.
Despite these integrative steps, China's relationship with the WTO has also been characterized
by selective contestation, particularly in sectors like steel and agriculture, suggesting a nuanced
stance towards the WTO's liberal trade order (Weinhardt and ten Brink 2020). Moreover, the
compliance of China with the WTO Dispute Settlement System underscores its commitment to
the international trading order, despite the reputational costs associated with noncompliance
(Harpaz 2010).However, the area of export restrictions reveals a bias against late accession
members like China, hinting at an embedded form of exclusion within the WTO's framework
(Karapinar 2011). The narrative of exclusion extends beyond the WTO, as seen in China's absence
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The expected negative impact on China's trade with the TPP
region post-implementation of the agreement exemplifies the tangible consequences of such
exclusion (Sikdar and Mukhopadhyay 2017). It is also worth noting that the TPP has also been
seen as a strategy to contain China in international trade which can be further seen as an anti-
legitimacy initiative (Chow 2016). Despite this, there have been calls for the U.S. to encourage
China's participation in the TPP, recognizing the potential benefits of inclusivity.
Another example can be seen in China's approach to its Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) which
demonstrates a conscious effort to maintain WTO compatibility, suggesting a deliberate strategy
to uphold legitimacy within the international trade norms, even as it navigates the complexities
of compliance and criticism, such as in environmental regulations post-WTO accession (Snyder
2009; Long, Oh, and Cheng 2013). This strategic adaptation, coupled with internal policy diversity
in response to international trade norms, reflects China's multifaceted engagement with the
global trade system (Khan, Congmei, and Ali 2024). Therefore, China's experience with global
trade governance encapsulates a struggle for legitimacy, marked by both integration and
exclusion. The country's efforts to adapt and comply with international norms, while facing
embedded biases and exclusion from key trade agreements, highlight the ongoing challenges and
dynamics of legitimacy in the context of global economic governance.
The governance structure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has been
a subject of scrutiny and debate, particularly concerning the distribution of voting power among
member countries. The United States, as the largest shareholder in these institutions, wields
significant influence, which some argue borders on a de facto veto power due to its substantial
voting share and the requirement for a supermajority for key decisions. This disproportionate
influence has been criticized for favoring elite interests within wealthy nations, with the United
States alone commanding 16.4% of votes within the World Bank, a share that is large enough to
block major decisions that require an 85% supermajority (Birn and Dmitrienko 2005). The political
alignment with the United States has also been found to increase a country's probability of
receiving an IMF loan, suggesting that geopolitical considerations may play a role in the decision-
making process (Thacker 1999). Moreover, the IMF and World Bank have been accused of
defending their institutional supremacy in a fast-changing global system, which may not always
align with the interests of rising powers like China (Güven 2017).
The current voting structure within these institutions has been characterized as undemocratic by
some scholars, who argue that it disproportionately favors the interests of the United States and
other wealthy member countries at the expense of a more equitable representation of all
member states (Birn and Dmitrienko 2005). This has led to calls for reform in the governance of
the IMF and World Bank to preserve a multilateral system of monetary and financial cooperation
that is fair and representative of all member countries (Ocampo 2005). Therefore, while the
United States does not hold formal veto power in the IMF and World Bank, its significant voting
share and the institutions' decision-making rules effectively give it a powerful say in their
operations, which can be seen as a form of de facto veto power. This has implications for the
legitimacy and inclusivity of these global financial institutions, particularly in how they interact
with and represent the interests of emerging economies like China.
Furthermore, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the AUKUS security pact represent
pivotal shifts in the Indo-Pacific's strategic landscape, with direct implications for China's quest
for regional legitimacy. The Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,
engages in joint military exercises and diplomatic consultations, which (Kliem 2020) interprets as
a collective response to perceived challenges posed by China's assertive policies. AUKUS, a
trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, further
consolidates this trend by enhancing military collaboration and intelligence sharing, particularly
in the realm of underwater capabilities and cyber warfare (Wilson 2018). These alliances not only
serve as platforms for their members to project power but also as instruments to counteract
China's influence, thereby impeding Beijing's efforts to build legitimacy as a benign regional
power. Pan (2014) argues that such alignments, while not explicitly anti-China, effectively
function as constraints on China's strategic space, thereby shaping the regional order in a manner
that dilutes China's authority. The activities of the Quad and AUKUS, which include freedom of
navigation operations and infrastructure investment initiatives, are seen as counterweights to
China's Belt and Road Initiative and its maritime claims, reflecting a broader strategy of 'inclusive
institutional balancing' that seeks to curtail China's influence without direct confrontation (Zhou
and Esteban 2018). This strategic containment, as Medcalf (2014)suggest, aims to preserve a
multipolar regional order and prevent China from translating its economic might into
unchallenged geopolitical clout.
Discussion
Acceleration of China's Need for International Legitimacy
The intense competition with the United States has accelerated China's need for international
legitimacy. As the most viable peer competitor to U.S. power, China's actions and strategies are
closely scrutinized on the global stage (Schweller and Pu 2011). In this context, legitimacy
becomes a crucial asset for China, as it seeks to navigate the challenges posed by the rivalry and
assert its own vision for the international order as reflected in their exclusions in various
international organizations (Zhao 2019; Karapinar 2011; Birn and Dmitrienko 2005). The quest
for legitimacy is not just about gaining acceptance; it is also about challenging and reshaping
existing norms and institutions that have been dominated by Western powers (Dorussen and
Ward 2008; Ferchen 2013; He and Feng 2023).
China's quest for international legitimacy within the liberal world order is a complex and
multifaceted endeavor, shaped by the need to navigate and potentially reshape a system that
has historically been dominated by Western powers. The rise of China has transformed the
international system into a multipolar world, challenging the unipolarity that allowed the liberal
international order to flourish (Mearsheimer 2019). This shift necessitates an acceleration in
China's pursuit of legitimacy as it seeks to assert its vision for the international order and gain
acceptance, not merely within the existing norms but also by promoting alternative norms that
align with its interests (Schweller and Pu 2011). China's approach to this challenge is strategic
and differentiated. It defends liberal pluralism within the hegemonic order while contesting
liberal cosmopolitan anti-pluralism, and endorses state-centric solidarism in constructing a liberal
global governance order (Zhang 2016). This nuanced strategy reflects China's position as a
revisionist stakeholder, embracing the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and adapting
to the liberal norms of globalization, without being fully satisfied with its status in the hierarchy
of the order (Zhao 2019).
The legitimacy crisis in the contemporary global order, symptomatic of tensions within it,
threatens the fabric of this order (Clark 2003). China's efforts to make global governance
institutions ideologically neutral, not representing liberal values, complicate the West's ability to
export liberal democracy and economic liberalism to the developing world (van der Putten 2013).
This is part of China's broader strategy to navigate the dialectical interchange between upholding
the existing international order and promoting alternative norms and practices to reform parts
of the order that are unsatisfactory to its interests (Benabdallah 2019). Therefore, China's
accelerated need for international legitimacy is driven by the imperative to establish itself as a
viable peer competitor to U.S. power and to play an important role in determining the future
shape of international politics (Schweller and Pu 2011). This need is further amplified by the
strategic competition and the quest to construct and legitimize its own version of an international
order that accommodates its rise as a global power.
Building Legitimacy through International Organizations and Partnerships
China's strategy of building legitimacy through international organizations and partnerships is a
calculated response to the challenges it faces within the liberal world order. Legitimacy is crucial
for China as it seeks to secure its place as a global power and to mitigate the strategic
containment efforts by Western powers. By engaging with and sometimes creating international
institutions, China positions itself as a key player in global governance, which is essential for its
acceptance and influence on the world stage (Liping 2001).
The importance of legitimacy stems from the need for recognition and respect for a country's
political system, economic model, and cultural values. For China, a non-liberal state, legitimacy
is not just about being powerful; it's about being seen as rightfully powerful and having its status
acknowledged by others. This recognition is vital for China to advance its interests and to shape
international norms and rules in ways that reflect its values and priorities (Johnston 2019). The
pursuit of legitimacy is also a way for China to counteract the narrative of being an outlier or a
challenger to the existing order. By contributing to international stability and development, China
demonstrates its commitment to being a responsible global actor. This is particularly appealing
to other non-liberal states that have felt marginalized or bullied by the West. Countries like Russia,
India, Brazil, and South Africa, which are part of BRICS, as well as participants in the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), find in China a powerful ally that champions a more inclusive and multipolar world
order (Stuenkel 2021). This is important as reflected by the work of Steffek (2003) that legitimacy
is dependent on popular assent to the justifications of goals, principles and procedures.
These countries, along with new members seeking to join BRICS, are attracted to the idea of an
alternative global platform where their voices are heard, and their interests are represented. This
is especially important for states that have faced Western sanctions or criticism for their domestic
policies. By aligning with China, these countries can bolster their own legitimacy and push back
against Western dominance (Zhou and Esteban 2018).Therefore, China's engagement with
international organizations and strategic partnerships is a multifaceted effort to build legitimacy
and reshape the international order. It provides a platform for non-liberal states to collaborate
and support each other in the face of Western pressure, thereby creating a counter-narrative to
the Western-centric model of global governance. As China continues to rise, its approach to
legitimacy building through international cooperation will likely play a significant role in the
evolution of global politics (Liping 2001). This is also due to the fact that China was able to grow
despite the exclusion of many liberal led organizations and other states could potentially see this
as a alternative growth model in comparison to the liberal led world order (Ferchen 2013; Zhao
2022; 2008; 2015; Runde, Askey, and McKeown 2020).
The evidence from the research supports the view that China is actively creating a new
international economic order where its political power is more aligned with its economic power,
and its creation of new international institutions is a significant part of this strategy. These
institutions are intended to be open and inclusive, introducing "better practices" to global
economic governance (Paradise 2016). However, China's engagement is not without its
challenges, as it must overcome skepticism about its intentions and a narrow view of its national
interest to make a major contribution to global economic governance (Paradise 2016).
Furthermore, China's absence from key multilateral energy institutions highlights its reluctance
to join restrictive organizations, as well as these organizations' lack of seriousness in engaging
with China (Kong 2011). This absence speaks to the broader issue of how international
organizations have sometimes marginalized or failed to fully engage with non-Western powers.
In terms of social legitimacy, international organizations derive their legitimacy from their
capacity to deliver and the general confidence of citizens in political institutions. This challenges
the belief that more democratic procedures automatically lead to greater social legitimacy for
international organizations (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). This perspective is crucial for
understanding China's engagement with international organizations, as it seeks to build
legitimacy not only through procedural compliance but also through substantive contributions to
global governance.
The evidence also suggests that China has embraced the norms of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to a significant extent, indicating a pragmatic approach to international institutional
pluralism (Ferdinand and Wang 2013). This engagement with international financial institutions
is part of China's broader strategy to gain legitimacy and reshape the international order in a way
that accommodates its rise as a global power. In summary, China's engagement with
international organizations is a deliberate effort to build legitimacy and counter the legitimacy
deficits that arise from the dominance of Western powers in global governance. This strategy is
particularly relevant for other non-liberal states seeking to assert their own legitimacy and
challenge the Western-centric international order (Steffek 2003; H. Wang and French 2013).
BRICS: A Platform for China's Legitimacy Building
China's strategy of bolstering its international legitimacy through active engagement in
international organizations and strategic partnerships is a meticulously crafted response to its
perceived marginalization within the liberal world order, a system dominated by Western
ideologies and governance structures. Recognizing the imperative of legitimacy in its quest to
affirm its status as a global power, China endeavors to counteract the strategic containment
measures employed by Western nations, seeking to reshape the global governance landscape in
a manner that accommodates its interests and reflects its governance model, thus challenging
the existing international order to promote a more inclusive and multipolar world (Zhao 2022;
Chengqiu 2020; He and Feng 2023). By engaging with and sometimes creating international
institutions, China positions itself as a key player in global governance, which is essential for its
acceptance and influence on the world stage (Liping 2001). This is also reflected through multiple
initiatives such as the NDB, AIIB and so on which is deeply rooted in China’s own experience of
exclusion (Hawkins et al. 2022; H. Wang 2019; Kirton and Larionova 2022).
The imperative of legitimacy in the international realm extends beyond mere power acquisition;
it necessitates a nuanced recognition and respect for a nation's unique political framework,
economic paradigm, and cultural identity. China's pursuit of legitimacy is a multifaceted endeavor
aimed at securing a respected place within the global order, particularly challenging given its
divergent governance model from the prevalent liberal democratic norm. Legitimacy enables
China to influence international norms and policies, ensuring they are reflective of its values and
strategic imperatives, thereby fostering a global environment conducive to its interests (Zhao
2015; Johnston 2003). This endeavor is not solely about power projection but about attaining
rightful acknowledgment in the global arena, allowing China to advocate for its interests and
perspectives effectively. This quest is crucial for China to mitigate narratives that cast it as a
peripheral or adversarial entity within the international system. Through its contributions to
global stability and development, China seeks to assert its role as a constructive global
stakeholder, countering the West's strategic containment and ideological exclusions (Chengqiu
2020; He and Feng 2023).
Moreover, China's engagement in building legitimacy resonates with other nations, particularly
within frameworks like BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative, which are platforms for
collaboration among countries that feel marginalized by or seek alternatives to the Western-
centric global order. These nations view China as a formidable ally advocating for a more inclusive,
multipolar world order, where diverse governance models are acknowledged and respected, thus
providing a counter-narrative to the dominant Western discourse (Stuenkel 2021; Zhao 2022).
These countries, along with new members seeking to join BRICS, are attracted to the idea of an
alternative global platform where their voices are heard, and their interests are represented. This
is especially important for states that have faced Western sanctions or criticism for their domestic
policies. By aligning with China, these countries can bolster their own legitimacy and push back
against Western dominance (Zhou and Esteban 2018). Therefore, China's engagement with
international organizations and strategic partnerships is a multifaceted effort to build legitimacy
and reshape the international order. It provides a platform for non-liberal states to collaborate
and support each other in the face of Western pressure, thereby creating a counter-narrative to
the Western-centric model of global governance (H. Wang and French 2013). As China continues
to rise, its approach to legitimacy building through international cooperation will likely play a
significant role in the evolution of global politics (Liping, 2001).
The evidence from the research supports the view that China is actively creating a new
international economic order where its political power is more aligned with its economic power,
and its creation of new international institutions is a significant part of this strategy. These
institutions are intended to be open and inclusive, introducing "better practices" to global
economic governance (Paradise 2016). However, China's engagement is not without its
challenges, as it must overcome skepticism about its intentions and a narrow view of its national
interest to make a major contribution to global economic governance (Paradise 2016).
Furthermore, China's absence from key multilateral energy institutions highlights its reluctance
to join restrictive organizations, as well as these organizations' lack of seriousness in engaging
with China (Kong 2011). This absence speaks to the broader issue of how international
organizations have sometimes marginalized or failed to fully engage with non-Western powers
as reflected by the previous literature (Zhao 2019; Ferchen 2013; Chengqiu 2020; Karapinar 2011).
In terms of social legitimacy, international organizations derive their legitimacy from their
capacity to deliver and the general confidence of citizens in political institutions. This challenges
the belief that more democratic procedures automatically lead to greater social legitimacy for
international organizations (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). This perspective is crucial for
understanding China's engagement with international organizations, as it seeks to build
legitimacy not only through procedural compliance but also through substantive contributions to
global governance. The evidence also suggests that China has embraced the norms of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to a significant extent, indicating a pragmatic approach to
international institutional pluralism (Ferdinand and Wang 2013). This engagement with
international financial institutions is part of China's broader strategy to gain legitimacy and
reshape the international order in a way that accommodates its rise as a global power.
Therefore, China's engagement with international organizations is a deliberate effort to build
legitimacy and counter the legitimacy deficits that arise from the dominance of Western powers
in global governance. This strategy is particularly relevant for other non-liberal states seeking to
assert their own legitimacy and challenge the Western-centric international order (Schweller and
Pu 2011). However, BRICS states individually are considered important states and hold
advantages in population, natural resources, and future development, which are essential for
building international legitimacy. The collective demographic heft of BRICS, particularly with India
and China's massive populations, presents a formidable consumer market and workforce that
can drive sustained economic growth and innovation (Sidorova, 2018). The abundance of natural
resources across these nations, from Russia's energy reserves to Brazil's agricultural outputs and
South Africa's mineral wealth, provides a significant economic base that enhances their global
trade influence (Wilson 2015). Economic growth and development are further bolstered by
strategies such as increasing energy consumption and employment levels, which have been
shown to spur growth within BRICS nations (Doğanalp, Ozsolak, and Aslan 2021). Moreover, the
adoption of sustainable practices like biomass energy consumption can contribute to economic
resilience and reduce dependency on external energy sources (Aydin 2019). The potential for
improving export volumes through technological advancements, such as fixed broadband and
internet usage, also positions BRICS countries as competitive players in international trade (M. L.
Wang and Choi 2019).
Innovation is another cornerstone for legitimacy, with BRICS countries needing to develop
industries, financial institutions, and technological capabilities to attract quality foreign direct
investment, which in turn can improve their international standing (Rafique et al. 2020). It is also
worth noting that the BRICS countries produce 50% of the world’s food supply and the emphasis
on cooperation and joint action, particularly in areas of scientific and technological cooperation,
information sharing, and trade complementarities, underscores the BRICS commitment to
improving global competitiveness and contributing to a multipolar world order (Ren et al. 2020).
Despite these advantages, the BRICS nations face challenges in fully capitalizing on their resource
wealth, indicating that while it contributes to their growing international status, it is not an
unmitigated boon (Wilson 2015). Furthermore, the commercial interests of BRICS countries often
drive their resource strategies, using their international engagement, such as in Africa, to
enhance their legitimacy and credibility on the world stage (Soko and Qobo 2016).
In Summary, China can leverage the collective and individual strengths of BRICS nations in
population, resources, and development as a centerpiece for its international legitimacy
campaign. By steering BRICS towards alignment with sustainable development goals, China
showcases a commitment to global development priorities, which is essential for earning
recognition and respect on the international stage (Ali et al. 2018). China's leadership within
BRICS is not merely a pursuit of power; it is a strategic move to shape a global governance
structure that reflects a more diversified and equitable international order, countering the
prevailing Western-dominated model. Through BRICS, China can promote an alternative vision
for international cooperation, one that resonates with the interests and values of emerging
economies and enhances its own standing as a global leader (Lissovolik 2023; Soko and Qobo
2016; Duggan et al. 2022; Lukin and Xuesong 2019; Panin 2023; Kirton and Larionova 2022).
BRICS+ Expansion: Strategic Inclusion of Resource-Rich Countries
The expansion of the BRICS consortium to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt and the
United Arab Emirates, now termed "BRICS+", represents a strategic endeavor to enhance the
bloc's legitimacy and influence in the global economic order. This move is not merely an
expansion of membership but a deliberate strategy to incorporate countries with significant
economic potential and geopolitical influence, thereby bolstering the consortium's collective
bargaining power on the world stage which solidifies the argument by Steffek (2003) which
emphasizes the ability to deliver results to strengthen legitimacy.
Saudi Arabia's pivotal role in the global oil market, as evidenced by its ability to influence global
oil prices, enhances the economic leverage of BRICS+. The kingdom's strategic decisions in the
crude oil market, which can stabilize or destabilize global prices, underscore its importance in the
energy sector and, by extension, its contribution to the legitimacy of the BRICS+ bloc (Krane 2017;
Fattouh, Poudineh, and Sen 2016). Iran's substantial natural gas resources and its influence on
global energy dynamics further underscore the strategic value of its inclusion in BRICS+. Despite
the challenges posed by the resource curse, Iran's energy sector significantly impacts global trade
and economic stability, thereby contributing to the consortium's collective clout (Balsalobre-
Lorente et al. 2019; Ahmed, Mahalik, and Shahbaz 2016; Cui et al. 2021).
Ethiopia's rich natural resources, including gold and natural gas, position it as a key player in the
global commodities market. The country's potential to enhance trade with emerging economies
and European countries demonstrates its capacity to contribute to the global trade dynamics,
thus reinforcing the legitimacy of BRICS+ (Baraybar Hidalgo and Dargent 2020; Koop and Tole
2008; Yeshineh 2014). Egypt's vast reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and rare earth elements
are critical to global energy security and supply chains. The nation's strategic role in global trade
flows, particularly with the European Union, highlights its significance in reinforcing the
legitimacy of the BRICS+ alliance (Bahmani-Oskooee, Hegerty, and Hosny 2015). Its role in the
renewable energy sector enhances the consortium's legitimacy in global climate change policies
(Shever 2008). The UAE's substantial petroleum and natural gas wealth, coupled with its strategic
investments in the oil and gas sector, amplify its geopolitical relevance. Its position as a "nexus
state" in the international system contributes significantly to the geopolitical influence and
legitimacy of BRICS+ (Aljarallah 2020; Henderson 2017; Hassan Al Marzouqi et al. 2019).
The inclusion of these resource-rich countries in BRICS+ is a strategic move that enhances the
bloc's legitimacy and bargaining power in the global economic order. It represents a collective
effort to promote a more plural world, reform international economic institutions, and curb
unilateral global power interventions. The BRICS+ nations, with their combined economic might
and strategic resources, are poised to influence global trade dynamics, supply chains, and
geopolitical alignments, thereby contributing to the broader architecture of international
relations in the era of great power competition. Therefore, the strategic inclusion of these
countries into BRICS+ is a testament to the consortium's commitment to building a more
diversified and equitable international order. By leveraging their collective resources and
economic strengths, BRICS+ nations are not only enhancing their own legitimacy but are also
challenging the traditional paradigms of global governance and economic dominance. The
strategic inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates into the
BRICS+ framework is underpinned by a multifaceted rationale that aligns with both the
consortium's objectives and China's strategic interests.
Rationale for Inclusion:
The rationale behind expanding BRICS to include these nations is rooted in their significant
natural resources, which hold considerable sway over global economic dynamics. These countries
are not just resource-rich; they occupy strategic geopolitical positions that can serve as fulcrums
for regional influence and global power plays. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran are key players
in the global oil and gas markets, while Egypt controls the Suez Canal, a critical chokepoint for
global maritime trade. Ethiopia is emerging as significant players in agriculture and renewable
energy, and the UAE is a pivotal hub for international finance and trade.
Global Significance of Resources, Benefits to China and BRICS+ an Economic Complexity Index
perspective:
The strategic expansion of the BRICS consortium to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt
and the United Arab Emirates, now branded as BRICS+, is a testament to China's sophisticated
global strategy. This expansion isn't merely about increasing the bloc's numbers but strategically
incorporating nations endowed with significant natural resources and economic potential,
thereby enhancing BRICS+'s global influence and legitimacy. This move aligns with the concept
of output legitimacy, emphasizing tangible results that contribute to the global public interest
(Steffek, 2015). The inclusion of these nations, each a key player in global resource markets—like
Saudi Arabia's dominance in oil, Iran's significant natural gas reserves, Ethiopia's precious metals,
Egypt's strategic Suez Canal and the UAE's strategic energy reserves—underscores the critical
role resources play in global economic development and stability.
Figure 1: GHG emissions per capita in top emitting economies, 1970-2022
This strategic integration is contextualized against the backdrop of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, where major economies play crucial roles. In 2022, China, the United States, India, the
EU27, Russia, and Brazil were among the top GHG emitters as seen by the graph above. These
countries collectively accounted for 50.1% of the global population, 61.2% of global GDP, 63.4%
of global fossil fuel consumption, and 61.6% of global GHG emissions. Notably, China, the United
States, and India saw an increase in their emissions in 2022, with India experiencing the most
significant rise (5%). In contrast, Russia, alongside other top emitters, recorded a decrease, with
Russia showing the most substantial reduction (-2.4%) (Crippa et al. 2022). These emissions
statistics are crucial for understanding the intricate link between natural resource utilization and
economic development within the BRICS+ framework. The data reflects how resource-endowed
nations, through their developmental trajectories, contribute to global GHG emissions,
underscoring the need for sustainable resource management and environmental stewardship.
The BRICS+ initiative, thus, signifies a collective endeavor toward fostering a more pluralistic and
equitable global order, emphasizing sustainable development and environmental sustainability
alongside economic growth. By leveraging their collective resources and strategic advantages,
BRICS+ nations aim to influence global trade dynamics, supply chains, and geopolitical alignments,
while concurrently addressing the critical challenges of reducing GHG emissions and promoting
sustainable development practices.
The inclusion of BRICS+ countries, many among the world's fastest-developing nations, into this
framework highlights the pivotal role that resources play in their economic trajectories. This
expansion allows for a nuanced exploration of the interplay between economic development,
resource exploitation, and environmental sustainability, as evidenced by the varying GHG
emission trends and the critical need for sustainable resource management strategies. Studies
like those by Rafei, Esmaeili, and Balsalobre-Lorente (2022), Lee and Olasehinde‐Williams (2024)
and Ahmad et al. (2019)emphasize the environmental repercussions of economic activities,
especially in resource-rich settings, advocating for a balanced approach that aligns economic
growth with environmental stewardship. The ECI's role, as explored by Dogan et al. (2020) and
Pata and Caglar (2021), in understanding economic and environmental dynamics, alongside the
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis, suggests a path where economic maturity can
coexist with reduced environmental degradation (Jahanger et al. 2022).
China's pivotal role in BRICS+ offers a unique opportunity to foster collaborative sustainable
development approaches, leveraging the collective resources and economic strengths of these
nations to enhance their legitimacy, challenge traditional global governance paradigms, and
promote a development model that integrates economic growth with environmental
sustainability. Thus, the BRICS+ expansion represents a strategic endeavor to build a more
diversified and equitable international order that acknowledges the integral role of resources in
development while advocating for strategies that ensure economic growth aligns with
environmental integrity.
In this study, I employ data sourced from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) to
conduct a nuanced analysis of the BRICS+ states, with a specific focus on the Economic
Complexity Index (ECI) and detailed trade data (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011; The Observatory of
Economic Complexity (OEC) 2023). The OEC is acclaimed for its methodological rigor, which
underpins the reliability of its data. This rigor is manifested in the OEC's systematic aggregation
and harmonization of data from an array of reputable international sources, ensuring a
comprehensive and accurate representation of global economic activities. The reliability of the
OEC's data is further reinforced by its adherence to robust analytical frameworks and its
commitment to data transparency, allowing for verifiable and reproducible research findings. The
ECI, a cornerstone metric developed by the OEC, offers profound insights into the economic
capabilities and potential of nations, making it an indispensable tool for the analysis of the BRICS+
economies. Given the OEC's established reputation within the academic and policy-making
communities as a source of authoritative economic data, it serves as a solid foundation for
scholarly inquiry. The use of the OEC's data in this study not only enhances the credibility of the
analysis but also aligns it with the broader discourse on BRICS+ states.
The economic interactions between China and the BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, and South
Africa—embody a complex web of mutual growth and shared benefits, underlined by the
Economic Complexity Index (ECI) of each country. China, with an ECI of 1.01, is at the forefront,
offering a vast array of sophisticated products to its BRICS partners while importing a significant
amount of essential resources and commodities from them.
In 2022, Brazil exported $90.1 billion to China, mainly in soybeans, iron ore, and crude petroleum,
tapping into China's large market and contributing to its own ECI of 0.29. Conversely, Brazil's
import of $64 billion from China, including high-tech items like semiconductor devices, fuels its
technological and infrastructural development. Russia, with an ECI of 0.42, exported $101 billion
worth of key resources like crude petroleum to China, essential for China's energy demands.
Meanwhile, Russia's import of $75.4 billion from China supports its technological advancement
and aligns with its developmental goals.
India, reflecting an ECI of 0.57, exported $15.3 billion to China, focusing on refined petroleum
and iron ore, while importing $110 billion worth of Chinese goods such as computers and
integrated circuits, crucial for its tech industry's expansion. South Africa, with a relatively low ECI
of 0.033, exported $23.4 billion, mainly in precious metals, to China, and imported $23.5 billion,
including electronics and machinery, aiding its economic diversification efforts.
This vibrant trade relationship exemplifies a mutualistic growth trajectory, where China's
technological exports complement the natural resources and commodities from BRICS nations,
fostering economic diversification and enhancing the global legitimacy of the BRICS coalition.
Such interdependence not only strengthens each nation's standing in the global economy but
also underscores the BRICS group's role as a powerful economic bloc, enhancing its members'
legitimacy and influence on the world stage, and contributing to a more multipolar global
economic order.
For China, access to these resources offers substantial economic and strategic benefits.
Economically, securing supply chains for essential commodities such as oil, gas, and minerals is
crucial for sustaining China's industrial growth (Lee and Olasehinde‐Williams 2024; Jahanger et
al. 2022; Pata and Caglar 2021). Strategically, fostering alliances with these resource-rich
countries can provide China with leverage in international forums and negotiations, as well as in
its competition with other great powers. Moreover, these alliances can facilitate China's Belt and
Road Initiative, expanding its influence through infrastructure and investment.
The inclusion of these states into BRICS+ is special because it represents a concerted effort to
diversify the centers of economic power and challenge the traditional Western-dominated global
order. By bringing together a coalition of countries with significant resources and strategic
positions, BRICS+ is poised to offer an alternative axis of global influence that can advocate for a
more multipolar world order. This expanded alliance can provide a platform for these countries
to exert greater collective influence on global issues such as trade policies, climate change, and
economic governance.
Therefore, the expansion of BRICS+ to include these countries is a strategic move that enhances
the consortium's legitimacy and bargaining power. It aligns with China's interests in securing
resource supplies and expanding its strategic influence, while also offering a platform for these
nations to amplify their global significance and contribute to a more balanced and multipolar
international order.
Geopolitical and Regional Dynamics:
Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE):
These countries are located in a region that is pivotal for global energy security and political
stability. The Middle East's vast oil and natural gas reserves are crucial for the global economy,
and the region's geopolitical dynamics often have far-reaching implications. However, the
political systems in these countries are not fully aligned with Western democratic ideals, which
sometimes leads to tensions and a sense of exclusion from the liberal world order.
China and Saudi Arabia: China's exports to Saudi Arabia amounted to $36.5 billion in 2022, with
key exports including Cars ($2.69B) and Broadcasting Equipment ($1.67B). This aligns with China's
diversified industrial base, as reflected by its ECI of 1.01. Conversely, Saudi Arabia, with an ECI of
0.78, exported $68 billion to China, predominantly in Crude Petroleum ($56.1B). This trade
illustrates a reciprocal dynamic where China gains essential energy resources, while Saudi Arabia
benefits from access to a variety of Chinese manufactured goods, supporting its economic
diversification efforts.
China and Iran: China exported $9.44 billion worth of goods to Iran in 2022, including Motor
Vehicles and Broadcasting Equipment. With an ECI of 1.01, China's diverse exports help meet
Iran's varied industrial and technological needs. Iran, having an ECI of 0.071, exported $5.72
billion to China, with major exports like Ethylene Polymers ($2.13B). This relationship is crucial
for Iran, offering economic engagement beyond its regional constraints, while China secures
valuable petrochemical resources.
China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE): China's exports to the UAE, valued at $57.7 billion,
and including items like Broadcasting Equipment and Computers, showcase its industrial capacity
and technological prowess. The UAE, with an ECI of 0.15, exported $32.5 billion to China, mainly
in Crude Petroleum and Petroleum Gas. This trade highlights a complementary relationship
where the UAE leverages its energy resources for economic benefit, and China enhances the
UAE's technological and infrastructure development.
In each of these relationships, the trade flows and ECI values highlight a symbiotic relationship.
China's higher ECI indicates a diverse and complex economy benefiting from importing essential
resources and exporting a range of manufactured goods (Rafei, Esmaeili, and Balsalobre-Lorente
2022; Pata and Caglar 2021; Jahanger et al. 2022). In contrast, the partner countries, with lower
ECIs, benefit from exporting their natural or agricultural resources while importing a variety of
goods that support their development and diversification objectives. This mutual economic
interdependence fosters growth, diversification, and a strategic partnership beyond mere
economic transactions.
Geopolitical and Regional Dynamics in the Middle East:
The deepening trade relationships between China and Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and the UAE represent a pivotal shift in global economic dynamics, offering a
nuanced counterbalance to traditional Western economic models. These nations, each with their
unique Economic Complexity Index (ECI) values, find in China a partner that not only respects
their distinct political and economic structures but also presents an opportunity to diversify their
international relations and economic dependencies. Moreover, the political systems and regional
dynamics of these Middle Eastern countries, which often diverge from Western models, find a
more neutral and pragmatic partner in China. This partnership allows them to navigate
international diplomacy and trade with greater autonomy, reducing economic vulnerabilities
linked to geopolitical tensions.
For China, with its relatively high ECI of 1.01, engaging with these nations is strategically
beneficial, primarily for securing critical energy resources essential for its vast industrial sector.
This partnership is reciprocal, as China exports a diverse array of products, from technological
goods to infrastructure services, aiding these nations in their quest for economic modernization
and diversification. Specifically, Saudi Arabia (ECI of 0.78), Iran (ECI of 0.071), and the UAE (ECI of
0.15) benefit from accessing the Chinese market, which in turn supports their development goals
and reduces their over-reliance on oil exports (Pata and Caglar 2021; Lee and Olasehinde‐
Williams 2024; Gao et al. 2024; Jahanger et al. 2022).
The integration of these countries into BRICS could amplify these benefits, enhancing their
economic complexity and global standing. Such an alignment would foster a symbiotic
relationship, where mutual economic growth and strategic collaboration contribute to a more
multipolar and balanced global economic order. For these Middle Eastern nations, this means
not just an expansion in trade but also a significant step toward increasing their global legitimacy
and influence, while China secures its position as a key player in a diversified global energy market.
Africa (Ethiopia, Egypt):
Ethiopia and Egypt, while rich in natural resources and cultural heritage, often find themselves
on the periphery of global economic decision-making processes. Their strategic locations, with
Ethiopia being a gateway to the Horn of Africa and Egypt controlling the Suez Canal, are critical
for trade routes and regional influence. The trade dynamics between China and Ethiopia, as well
as China and Egypt, showcase a significant economic interaction that reflects their respective ECI
values, highlighting the depth and nature of their bilateral trade relationships.
China-Ethiopia Economic Engagement:
China's export to Ethiopia, totaling $2.92 billion in 2022, includes key products like Broadcasting
Equipment, Refined Petroleum, and Video Displays. This robust trade growth, increasing at an
annualized rate of 17.4% since 1995, underscores China's role in supporting Ethiopia's
technological and energy sectors. Ethiopia, with an ECI of -0.86, reflects a less complex economy
heavily reliant on agricultural exports, as evidenced by its exports to China, which mainly consist
of Coffee, Cotton Yarn, and Oily Seeds totaling $175 million. This trade relationship is crucial for
Ethiopia's economic development, providing it with essential goods for modernization and
infrastructure development while offering China valuable agricultural products.
China-Egypt Trade Relations:
Egypt's exports to China reached $1 billion in 2022, with main exports including Petroleum Gas,
Refined Petroleum, and Crude Petroleum, illustrating the importance of Egypt's energy sector in
its trade portfolio. With an ECI of -0.069, Egypt's economy shows a potential for diversification
and complexity enhancement. Conversely, China's exports to Egypt, valued at $16.7 billion and
encompassing items like Broadcasting Equipment and Synthetic Yarns, demonstrate China's role
as a key supplier of industrial and technological goods, which is integral for Egypt's industrial
diversification efforts. The trade, growing at an annualized rate of 14.2% since 1995, not only
fuels Egypt's industrial capabilities but also aligns with China's strategy to expand its export
markets.
In both cases, the trade relationships are symbiotic, with China providing essential industrial
goods that aid in the development and modernization of Ethiopia and Egypt, while receiving
crucial raw materials and agricultural products in return. These dynamics are pivotal for the
economic growth trajectories of Ethiopia and Egypt, offering them avenues to enhance their
economic complexity and global trade presence. For China, these relationships deepen its
economic ties in Africa, ensuring a diversified supply of raw materials and expanding its global
trade network, reflecting its ECI value of 1.01, which denotes a highly complex and diversified
economy.
Geopolitics and Regional Dynamics in Africa
The integration of Ethiopia and Egypt into deeper economic engagements with China, within a
BRICS-like framework, marks a significant transformation in global economic and geopolitical
dynamics. Ethiopia, with its ECI of -0.86, and Egypt, with an ECI of -0.069, are leveraging their
partnerships with China, which boasts a higher ECI of 1.01, to diversify their economic portfolios
and enhance their global trade presence (Jahanger et al. 2022; Lee and Olasehinde‐Williams
2024; Pata and Caglar 2021). Ethiopia's interaction with China is crucial for its infrastructural and
technological progress, facilitated by imports such as broadcasting equipment and refined
petroleum, while its exports, predominantly agricultural, find a vast market in China. Egypt's
relationship with China serves as a conduit for industrial and technological advancement through
the import of various Chinese goods, alongside providing China with vital energy resources.
This burgeoning economic synergy is not merely about trade; it's a strategic alliance that
augments Ethiopia's and Egypt's economic diversification and global standing. The potential
inclusion in a BRICS-like alliance could propel their economic complexities, foster foreign
investment influx, and amplify their voices on the global stage. Concurrently, for China, this
partnership solidifies its influence in Africa, ensuring access to critical resources and new markets,
thereby reinforcing its global economic leadership.
In essence, the deepening ties between China, Ethiopia, and Egypt embody a mutualistic growth
trajectory, highlighting a shift towards a more interconnected and balanced global economic
order. This collaborative framework not only catalyzes economic diversification and
modernization for Ethiopia and Egypt but also fortifies China's strategic engagements across
Africa, underscoring a collective stride towards enhanced economic resilience and geopolitical
repositioning in a rapidly evolving global landscape.
The Quest for Legitimacy
For these nations, legitimacy on the international stage is vital. It is not just about economic
benefits but also about political recognition and the ability to participate in global governance as
equals. Their inclusion in BRICS+ serves as a platform to assert their sovereignty and to challenge
the norms of a system that has often marginalized them due to their unique political structures
and policy choices that diverge from Western liberalism.
Exclusion and the Liberal World Order: These countries' unique characteristics and governance
models have often led to their exclusion from the core of the liberal world order, which is
characterized by democratic governance, human rights, and market-oriented economic policies.
By banding together under the BRICS+ umbrella, they seek to create a collective voice that can
advocate for their interests and perspectives, which are often underrepresented in Western-
centric international institutions.
Importance of Legitimacy for Non-Democratic States: Legitimacy is particularly important for
these states as it can help mitigate the challenges they face due to their non-democratic status.
By enhancing their legitimacy through BRICS+, they can gain more equitable access to
international markets, attract foreign investment, and reduce the impact of sanctions or
diplomatic isolation imposed by Western powers (H. Wang and French 2013). This collective
legitimacy can also provide a buffer against external pressures to conform to the liberal world
order, allowing these nations to maintain their unique identities while still engaging with the
global economy (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015).
Therefore, the inclusion of these strategically located and resource-rich countries in BRICS+ is a
testament to their shared desire to enhance their international legitimacy and to assert a more
prominent role in global affairs. By joining forces, they aim to reshape the international order to
be more inclusive and representative of their interests, which have historically been sidelined by
the dominance of Western liberal democracies.
Implications for International Relations
The perception of China and the BRICS+ countries as revisionist powers is nuanced by their
expressed intent not merely to reshape the international order for their own benefit but to offer
an alternative path for those who have been marginalized by the liberal world order(He and Feng
2023). This alternative path suggests a form of global governance that does not require states to
conform to Western institutions and cultural norms but allows them to maintain their
sovereignty and unique identities.
Research indicates that China's approach to international relations, particularly through BRICS+,
is not solely about displacing the current hegemony but about providing a counter-narrative to
the Western-centric model of development. This is seen as a way to correct perceived imbalances
and injustices within the existing global system (Lukin and Xuesong 2019). China's strategy
involves promoting a more inclusive form of globalization that respects the political and cultural
diversity of nations (Zhang 2016).
The pursuit of international legitimacy by China and its BRICS+ partners is thus framed as a quest
to demonstrate that there are viable development pathways outside the Western liberal
paradigm. This approach is appealing to many countries that have faced the conditionalities and
often intrusive policies associated with Western aid and economic integration (Lukin and
Xuesong 2019). By offering development finance, investment, and trade on terms that are
perceived as less prescriptive, China and the BRICS+ nations are positioning themselves as
champions of a more equitable international order that respects national sovereignty and self-
determination (Pieterse 2010). In this context, the expansion of BRICS+ and China's resource
diplomacy can be seen as efforts to build a coalition of states that support reforming the
international system to better reflect the interests and values of a broader range of stakeholders
(Lissovolik 2023). This coalition-building is not just about gaining influence but about validating
different models of governance and development, providing a platform for countries to engage
with the global economy on their own terms (Watkins and Rosegrant 1996). The implications for
the U.S. and other traditional powers are significant. They are now faced with a challenge to
adapt to a global landscape where influence is more diffused and where other nations are
increasingly assertive about their right to choose their own developmental paths. This shift could
lead to a more multipolar world where power is more evenly distributed and where international
institutions are reformed to be more inclusive and representative of the world's diversity.
In summary, the narrative of China and the BRICS+ as revisionist powers is complex and reflects
a desire not just for self-aggrandizement but for the creation of a global order that offers
legitimacy and opportunity to a wider array of nations. Their actions are thus seen as part of a
broader movement towards a world order that is less hierarchical and more respectful of the
sovereignty and distinctiveness of all nations.
Policy Recommendation
In the current global environment where geopolitical tensions and diverse governance structures
prevail, it is crucial for the BRICS coalition to adopt policy recommendations that emphasize
inclusivity, mutual respect, and shared prosperity. These policies should aim to bolster the
legitimacy and effectiveness of BRICS as a key player in international affairs, ensuring that its
actions and strategies are geared toward fostering cooperative relationships and supporting the
collective growth of its member nations. By prioritizing these values, BRICS can set a standard for
international collaboration, emphasizing the importance of unity and constructive engagement
in addressing global challenges. The forthcoming recommendations are intended to guide BRICS
in enhancing its standing on the global stage, promoting an agenda that is inclusive, respects the
varied political structures of its members, and is dedicated to achieving mutual growth and
development.
1. Mutual Respect and Inclusivity: BRICS should prioritize mutual respect for different
political and economic systems within its framework. Acknowledging the diversity in
governance models, as illustrated by China's unique path and its efforts to establish
platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative (Zhao 2022), BRICS can foster a more inclusive
and cooperative environment that transcends ideological divides.
2. Non-Counteractive Stance: BRICS should avoid positioning itself as a counterbalance to
other international groups or alliances, such as AUKUS, which is perceived as a strategy
to contain China's influence (Wilson 2018). Instead, BRICS should focus on constructive
engagement and collaboration that promotes global stability and prosperity, irrespective
of the members' political affiliations.
3. Economic Collaboration Over Ideological Conformity: Drawing on Zhao (2019) analysis,
BRICS should emphasize economic interdependence and technological cooperation,
fostering an environment where political ideology does not impede economic and
technological progress. This approach will counteract exclusionary practices seen in other
international domains, promoting a unified front for development and innovation.
4. Enhancing Legitimacy through Constructive Engagement: BRICS should actively engage
with existing global institutions, addressing concerns similar to those China faces with the
OECD (Runde, Askey, and McKeown 2020). By advocating for reforms that ensure fair
representation and consideration of diverse economic models, BRICS can enhance its
legitimacy and contribute positively to global governance.
5. Strategic Communication and Diplomacy: In light of the perceptual gaps highlighted by
(Chengqiu 2020), BRICS should invest in strategic communication and diplomacy to bridge
misunderstandings and build a coherent narrative that reflects the coalition's goals and
values, emphasizing cooperation over competition.
6. Leveraging Economic Strengths: Inspired by China's economic trajectory post-WTO
accession ((Ianchovichina and Martin 2001; Liu et al. 2011), BRICS should leverage the
economic strengths and complementarities of its members to foster economic resilience
and growth, ensuring that economic partnerships within BRICS are geared towards
mutual benefit and sustainable development.
By adhering to these policy recommendations, BRICS can cultivate an environment where diverse
political and economic systems coexist and collaborate, enhancing the coalition's role as a pivotal
player in international relations and global governance. This approach will not only solidify the
legitimacy of BRICS on the world stage but also contribute to a more balanced and equitable
global order.
Conclusion
Figure 2: China's Strategy for Co-Prosperity and Enhanced Legitimacy
China's ascent on the global stage represents a strategic navigation through the complexities of
great power dynamics and systemic exclusions from key international platforms. This journey,
characterized by a proactive response to these challenges, has catalyzed China's drive towards
innovation and self-reliance, culminating in the establishment of BRICS+. This initiative is not
merely a testament to China's resilience but also a platform through which it seeks to redefine
international legitimacy and foster a more inclusive global order.
BRICS+ embodies China's commitment to a cooperative global framework, emphasizing mutual
growth and benefits over hegemonic dominance. This vision, resonant with nations feeling
marginalized under the current global paradigm, advocates for a world where diversity in
governance and development is not just acknowledged but celebrated. China's advocacy for a
multipolar world underscores its dedication to a governance model that prioritizes cooperation,
respects national sovereignties, and promotes shared prosperity.
Through BRICS+, China is illustrating an alternative narrative to the prevailing liberal world order,
presenting a collaborative approach that promises mutual growth. This initiative is a clear signal
of China's desire not to dominate but to constructively engage with the world, offering a
paradigm where different economic and political systems can coexist and flourish. Such a model
paves the way for a reimagined form of global governance, emphasizing inclusivity, pluralism,
and collective leadership.
In this evolving international landscape, China's strategy extends beyond enhancing its own
legitimacy; it is about forging a path that others can follow, creating a more balanced and
equitable global order. The continued promotion of partnerships based on mutual respect and
shared interests will not only bolster China's position internationally but also inspire a broader
Great Power
Rivalry
•China's ascent triggers containment efforts
Exclusion from
Organizations
•Barriers in global institutions lead to a search for alternative paths
Competitio n
Spurs
Innovation
•Necessity breeds independent initiatives like BRICS & the Belt and Road
Initiative
BRICS+ as
Legitimacy
Platform
•A new coalation challenging the established order
Multipolar
World Vision
•A call for a world that respects diverse systems
Path of Mutual
Growth
•Promoting shared prosperity and equitable global engagement
shift towards a more inclusive, cooperative global community. This shift has the potential to
redefine global partnerships, steering them towards a future marked by diversity, equity, and
shared success for all nations involved.
Limitations and Future Research
While this study provides an insightful exploration into China's strategic expansion of BRICS+ and
its implications for global governance, several limitations warrant attention, paving the way for
future research directions.
Limitations:
1. Data Availability: The analysis primarily relies on available literature and current
geopolitical observations. Future developments within BRICS+ and their global impact
may not fully align with the study's projections, necessitating continuous observation and
analysis.
2. Geopolitical Dynamics: The fluid nature of international relations and geopolitical
dynamics poses a challenge. The study's findings are contingent upon current global
power structures, which are susceptible to rapid changes, potentially altering the context
of China's actions and the relevance of BRICS+.
3. Internal BRICS+ Dynamics: This study does not delve deeply into the internal political,
economic, and social dynamics of the new BRICS+ members, which could significantly
influence the bloc's cohesion and effectiveness in achieving its stated objectives.
4. Quantitative Analysis: The research predominantly employs a qualitative approach. A
more comprehensive quantitative analysis could further elucidate the economic and
political impacts of BRICS+ expansion.
Future Research:
1. Longitudinal Studies: Future research could undertake longitudinal studies to track the
evolution of BRICS+ and its long-term effects on global governance, particularly observing
how China's role within the bloc and its international standing evolve over time.
2. Comparative Analysis: Comparing China's BRICS+ strategy with other similar initiatives,
such as the G7 or G20, could offer richer insights into the effectiveness and uniqueness
of different global governance models.
3. Internal Perspectives: Investigating the perspectives of BRICS+ member countries
regarding their participation, expectations, and perceived benefits could provide a more
nuanced understanding of the bloc's internal dynamics and potential challenges.
4. Impact on Global North-South Relations: Future studies could explore how the expansion
of BRICS+ and China's growing influence affect North-South relations, particularly in terms
of economic development, technology transfer, and political alliances.
5. Sector-Specific Impacts: Examining the impacts of BRICS+ on specific sectors, such as
energy, technology, or finance, could yield detailed insights into how the bloc's activities
influence global economic and technological landscapes.
By addressing these limitations and exploring the suggested future research avenues, scholars
can continue to build a comprehensive understanding of China's international strategy and the
evolving landscape of global governance, offering valuable insights for policymakers, academics,
and global leaders.
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