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Abstract
A growing trend shows that global economic power is shifting away from the United States and Europe and towards the BRICS nations. The BRICS nations are predicted to hold the dominant position in the world by 2050. The rapid development of these economies and their markets is also raising a serious concern for the national antitrust enforcement authorities of the BRICS countries in their respective jurisdictions. This study attempts to examine the effectiveness of antitrust law, with a special focus on new developing trends in each of the BRICS jurisdictions. In addition, the study examines the proposed changes and limitations of the Indian Competition (Amendment) Bill 2022. The study reveals that the national antitrust laws and their enforcement processes are not fully developed and in need of considerable changes. Furthermore, the study indicates that while the proposed Amendment Bill 2022 is a progressive step in the right direction, it fails to cover certain key areas of the digital era, requiring further modifications to anticipate future impacts of economic development. In conclusion, the author recommends some points for effective policymaking, along with their future implications.
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China and the European Union (EU) signed the first international circular economy (CE) agreement shortly after China issued the ‘Waste Ban’ (WB) on the import of 24 categories of solid waste. While the WB gained global attention, limited research addresses its political implications for international CE. Based on 72 expert interviews, 52 documents and participant observation, we study political WB narratives and corresponding perceptions of ‘Chinese’ and ‘European’ agency in the China-EU case. Our results show a political gridlock in China-EU CE coordination: the main narratives on the WB diverge on the very roles and rules of CE cooperation, scales of implementation, and the assessment criteria for environmentally and socially sustainable CE(s). To enable fruitful CE cooperation, we suggest three critical points for reflection and negotiation: (1) overcome ‘student–teacher’ roles rooted in linear development that run counter to CE ideas; (2) reconsider the focus on international and national waste diversion, instead of local waste prevention, that propels global waste markets sustained by increasing waste volumes; and (3) evaluate both the benefits and impediments of (new) trade relations for a CE cooperation that contributes to environmental and social sustainability.
Can adoption of an antitrust/competition law substitute for a formal competition policy that lays down principles for reforming other government policies that affect competition? We address this question in the context of India, which has a track record of antitrust enforcement as well as a history of extensive controls over the private sector and domination of key sectors by state owned firms. After briefly summarizing these features, we argue that several clauses of the Competition Act, 2002, allow the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to challenge public restraints on competition. We then undertake a detailed review of several cases that have addressed public restraints and that have gradually extended the jurisdiction of the Act. We also identify some areas that remain beyond its reach—government policies that violate competitive neutrality, and discretionary purchases by public buyers—and we note possible social or business justifications for such restraints. Finally, we briefly discuss conflicts between the CCI and other regulatory agencies. We suggest that these remaining challenges can be addressed without laying down a broader policy.
We review the legal framework and case law pertaining to anti-cartel enforcement in India. We begin with a very brief review of enforcement under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, which was in force from 1969 to 2009. We then discuss in detail the anti-cartel clauses of its successor, the Competition Act. This serves as a prelude to our critical review of cases decided under this statute up to the end of 2016, with particular emphasis on those resulting in important precedents or major penalties. Most of these decisions have, however, been remanded, reversed, or modified on appeal. We discuss the major reasons for these setbacks, including violations of the principle of natural justice, arbitrary levels of fines, and inadequate evidence. The emerging trend in jurisprudence is that evidence of anti-competitive effects will be necessary to establish a contravention, even in cases involving hard-core cartels. We find that the antitrust regime has paid insufficient attention to issues of deterrent penalties, price transparency, and the collusion-facilitating role of vertical restrictions and government policies. We also note the disuse of some of the progressive features of the Competition Act, such as provisions for a leniency programme, dawn raids, and extra-territorial application. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
[IN RUSSIAN] The establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank signals the maturing of the financial relationships among thepartners of the “club.” This has acquired a heightened profile through the Cape Town Declaration, whereby the BRICSministers of science and technology committed to cooperation on science, technology and innovation (STI). This articleexplores some of the questions raised by the declaration, for example regarding the status of intra-BRICS STI cooperation,the rationale for the choice of specific fields of cooperation and the countries’ strengths in these fields. How do these fieldsalign with each country’s domestic STI strategy? What bilateral STI agreements are already in place, and what have theydelivered? How does the Cape Town Declaration align or compromise the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) process? Willrising geopolitical tensions (Black Sea, China Sea) limit the scope of STI cooperation? This article also demonstrates whySouth Africa is important to the club. Addressing these questions requires a study of geopolitics, finance, trade and othermodes of engagement, STI included. One convenient framework is a macro-level PESTEL analysis, with a more detailedlook at the ‘T’ for technology, for which read STI. Other document analysis, and economic, social and STI indicators,together with bibliometric data provide the empirical basis for the arguments. The analysis, together with the identificationof national imperatives, allows an interrogation of the potential of the Cape Town Declaration. It is argued that South Africa is not only the “Gateway to Africa,” but also that it displays the highest level of intra-BRICS scientific cooperation.
India being the fastest growing economy for e‐commerce would likely to generate revenue of USD 120 billion by 2020. The gross merchandise value, mobile phone subscriber and growth rate of internet user are expected to reach at USD 17.8 billion, 1,173.75 million and 889 million in 2020 respectively (CCI, 2020). The rapid growth of e‐commerce retail 60 million per month confirms the speed of the digital market in India. This rapid growth of economy through Digital Market also invites various challenges including high competition, unfair competition practices, abuse of dominant position etc. before the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The participation of the micro small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in terms of the manufacturing in online sales in India is a challenge in itself. Further, it is also observed that if the growth digital economy is need of the hour than its adverse effect on consumer, competitor and economy cannot be ignored. Hence, the author attempts to trace the issues and challenges dealing with digital economy and the Competition Act, 2002 including the definition of digital market, application of the Act, powers and functions of the CCI and some other relevant and upcoming issues which are also highlighted by the BRICS countries (2019) and the Competition Law Review Committee report (July 26, 2019). The result of this study is relevant for the concerned authority including CCI, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) and the Ministry of Corporate Affair, Government of India for framing the rules and necessary amendment in the present Act, 2002 to meet the upcoming challenges.
Competition laws have become a mainstay of regulation in market economies. At the same time, past efforts to study the drivers or effects of competition laws have been hampered by the lack of systematic measures of these laws across a wide range of years or countries. In this paper, we draw on new data on the evolution of competition laws to create a novel Competition Law Index (the 'CLI') that measures the stringency of competition regulation from 1889 to 2010. We then employ the CLI to examine trends in the intensity of competition regulation over time and across key countries. We also use our data to create several alternative indexes of competition law that may be appropriate for specific research applications. In doing so, we hope to demonstrate how the CLI can facilitate new empirical research on comparative and international competition law. © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Within the group of BRICS, China, Russia, and South Africa use conduct remedies more often than developed jurisdictions. Remedies are applied under merger approval or as an outcome of investigation of anticompetitive conducts. Effects of conduct remedies on companies’ decisions and market performance still need explanation. This chapter explains the use of conduct remedies, with special emphasis on Russia, by the specific position of BRICS in international division of labor, which allows the large companies, and first of all domestic ones, to discriminate customers in BRICS home markets, vis-à-vis international customers. Together with positive effects on domestic customers, competition economics predicts the possibility of negative effects of remedies on the managerial decisions within the target company. Under some circumstances, remedies may even weaken competition in the global product markets.
The paper provides a comparative overview of the BRICS competition regimes with a special focus on the institutional design of the national competition authorities in these countries. It analyses the institutional design of the competition law authorities in the BRICS countries by looking at their autonomy, resources (financial and human), enforcement powers, technical capacity and workload. The paper represents an academic contribution to the mutual learning and experience sharing in the field of competition law currently pursued by the competition authorities of the BRICS countries with the aim to strengthen their institutional and procedural competition enforcement frameworks.
The year 2015 witnessed a bifurcated direction for BRICS and emerging economies: all BRICS members' economic growth slowed or stagnated, resulting in more gloomy forecasts for the future. But at the same time, the New Development Bank was set up. The progress of the preliminary institutionalization of the BRICS was mainly driven by China and Russia, which reflected their strong desire to advance a multilateral world order, and to form a new power base for the non-Western countries. The further substantial development of the BRICS depends upon its capability to overcome the structural obstacles among the five countries, amongst which the huge discrepancy between the economies and the heterogeneous nature of the membership are the most prominent ones.
The five countries known as brics, while not homogeneous in interests, values, and policy preferences, do have a common interest in checking US/Western power and influence through collaboration with non-Western powers. They vary considerably but all are ahead of other developing countries on population, military power, economic weight, geopolitical clout, and global reach and engagement. They are unrepresentative of the typical developing country in terms of interest, capacity, and resources, but they can represent the interests and goals of developing countries as a group on those issues for which the North–South division is salient. The diversity within brics, their differences from other developing countries, and their potential to reflect and represent the global South are explored with respect to climate change, finance, trade, aid, human rights and intervention, and development. It remains unclear whether brics can morph from a countervailing economic grouping to a powerful political alternative.
An Assessment of Progress towards Universal Health Coverage in Brazil
- Robert Marten
Robert Marten et al., An Assessment of Progress towards Universal Health Coverage in Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), 384(9960) Lancet 2164 (2014).
An Issue Neglected in the Revision of China's Anti-Monopoly Law: How to Connect with the Anti-Unfair Competition Law?
- Feng Zhao
Feng Zhao, An Issue Neglected in the Revision of China's Anti-Monopoly Law: How to Connect with the
Anti-Unfair Competition Law?, 1(1) Sci. L.J. 38 (2022).