Social classes and autocratization

Full text

Social Classes and
Au
tocratization
Gábor Scheiring
– Accepted manuscript –
Cite as: Scheiring, Gábor. 2024. “Social Classes and Autocratization.” Pp. 108-
23 in The Routledge Handbook of Autocratization, edited by A. Croissant and L.
Tomini. London: Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003306900-8
Introduction
This chapter reviews the role of social class dynamics behind
autocratization. Before discussing this topic, a brief conceptual clarification
is in order. The first key term defining the chapter’s scope is
“autocratization.” In Chapter 3, Tomini defines autocratization as “the
process
of change towards autocracy and away from democracy within a
political regime or between
political regimes.” Democratization is the
opposite of autocratization; therefore, the literature on the class basis of
democracies is also vital to understand autocratization. Elected
politicians are key actors driving the contemporary wave of
autocratization. Consequently,
this chapter pays special attention to the
class background behind the electoral breakthrough
of new authoritarian
leaders. Among these new authoritarian leaders, radical right populists
are
particularly important today.1 Thus, the well-developed literature on the
social causes of populism is also relevant for the research on class and
autocratization. Military coups are less
frequent today, but the chapter will
discuss some paradigmatic examples.

The second key term is “class.” Marx (1976[1867]) famously defined
social class as a
position in the social division of labor based on the
ownership of the means of production. Those who own them, the
capitalists, need workers to produce value and profit. Those who
do not
own the means of production, the workers, need to sell their labor to earn a
living and
reproduce themselves. Beyond their objective positions, classes
also have subjective characteristics. In the beginning, a class is a mere
position in relation to capital; in contrast, a “class
for itself” has developed
awareness of itself and is capable of collective action (Marx, 1976, p. 211).
While Marx knew that the transition from the former to the latter takes
political
organizing, he emphasized a quasi-automatic emergence of class
identity based on economic relations. Weber’s (2018) notion of class
centers on market power and the capacity of different groups to control
and hoard resources that define their life chances. Additionally, he
argued that class is but one of the social hierarchies. First, relations of
power, i.e., positions in
the state hierarchy, and second status, i.e., positions
in culturally defined prestige hierarchies,
are also defining elements of
social structure.
Without getting lost in the century’s long debate on the nature of
class, this chapter follows a post-Marxist approach to class analysis,
bridging Weber and Marx, reaching across economic, political, and
cultural hierarchies. This approach to class incorporates the long-lasting
insight emerging from the “cultural turn” that the economy, i.e., position in
the social
division of labor based on the ownership of the means of
production, does not overdetermine political agency and identity
(Chibber, 2022). Society is a multi-dimensional space; the political field
has relative autonomy. Even if politics is not overdetermined by class,
“politics
is classed” (cf. Jarness et al., 2019). Equally, the webs of
meaning encompassed in culture
have their own dynamics that cannot
be simply read off from the relations of production. Furthermore, class
relations are shaped by countries’ position in the asymmetrical
international division of labor. As Wright (2009) argued, this integrated
post-Marxist approach to
class differs from stratification research, which
reduces class to a set of individual attributes
defined by education and
income (lower, middle, and upper class). However, it accepts the
Weberian argument concerning power, status, and opportunity hoarding
but foregrounds
the exploitative class relationships.
This chapter views classes as groups in the social hierarchy, defined in
relation to broadly
conceived means of production, such as ownership of

and exclusion from economic, social,
and cultural capital. Classes have
shared life chances, but shared identities are conditional on political
organizing. At the most general level, class-centric approaches to
democracy argue
that at the heart of democracy is a delicate social
compromise whereby social forces with
conflicting interests find a way
to guarantee mutual security. The distribution of resources,
opportunities, and means of production shapes the balance of power
among these competing
social classes and thereby influences the chances
of democracy. Based on this conceptualization of class, this chapter
discusses the role of major social classes in democratization and
autocratization. These major social classes are the business class, which
includes the upper
echelons of the managerial class, the working class,
and the middle class.
The business class and autocratization
One of the main theoretical alternatives to the class-based approach to
democracy is modernization theory. As famously formulated by Lipset
(1959), modernization theory posited
that economic development
contributes to urbanization, education, industrialization, wealth
creation,
and the rise of the middle class and the bourgeoisie, facilitating
democratization.
New institutionalist economists also incorporated the
arguments developed by modernization theorists concerning the role of
the business class in democratization. They frequently
cite Barrington
Moore’s (1993[1967]) famous thesis, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.”
However, Moore was not a modernization theorist; much of his book
shows how, under certain circumstances, the bourgeoisie supported
autocratic regimes, such as in Nazi Germany.
This section concentrates on
the bourgeoisie, or the business class, as it is more frequently
called
today.2
Modernization theorists identified several reasons why the business
class might be against
autocracy. First, they argue that the business class
in capitalism requires secure property
rights and the rule of law. Because
authoritarian regimes cannot guarantee the rule of law
and the security of
property rights, business elites prefer democracy over autocracy (Brennan
& Buchanan, 1985). Second, authoritarian regimes are prone to
arbitrary decisions and
attempt to coopt economic elites into rent-seeking
coalitions, distorting markets and undermining “ordinary” businesses’
profitability (Hellman et al., 2003). Third, they argue that
capitalist
economies thrive under democratic regimes leading to higher growth and

profitability (Leblang, 1996). Inspired by this theory, radical economists
during the transition from state socialism to democratic capitalism in
Eastern Europe argued that rapid market-making
reforms would facilitate
democratic consolidation leading to higher growth and social welfare.
Competitive markets would dislodge entrenched socialist economic
elites, the newly
emerging bourgeoisie would demand secure property
rights and the rule of law, and ally with
liberal-minded political reformers
to push for parallel economic and political liberalization
(Aslund, 1994).
Analysts inspired by modernization theory also hypothesize that the
business class is naturally opposed to the new wave of authoritarian
populism (Curran & Eckhardt, 2020).
The economic approach to
populism “remains current among economists and journalists”
(Mudde
& Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 4), leading to an outsized influence on common-
sense beliefs
about populism. Many think populists oppose sound
macroeconomic management, are prone to overspending and follow lax
fiscal policy to buy voters’ support (Dornbusch & Edwards,
1990).
Populists’ “noisy politics” is supposed to be alien to business elites
(Culpepper,
2010). Many characterize populism as a “threat to the
neoliberal order” (Cherlin, 2019, p. 747), leading to fierce conflicts with
businesses. Evidence indeed suggests that, in some
cases, businesses
tend to mobilize against populist politicians in favor of liberal democracy
(Kinderman, 2020).
The fundamental statement of modernization theory about
development and democracy
captures a crucial component in the history
of modern societies, especially Western advanced
democracies. Historical-
sociological work has shown that the bourgeoisie supported political
liberalization in England and France and was a critical actor behind
democratization (Moore,
1993[1967]). A vast quantitative empirical
literature has also supported the positive correlation between economic
growth and democratic consolidation (see the review by Robinson, 2006).
These findings also mean that economic development seems to be an
essential social
condition making autocratization less likely.3 Varieties of
capitalism scholars have also shown
that, under certain circumstances,
businesses might support the development of the welfare
state, which has
also been crucial for democratic consolidation in Western countries
(Mares,
2003).
However, several sociologists and critical political economists have
been skeptical about
the mutually beneficial relationship between
capitalism and democracy and the supposed
clash between authoritarian

populism and the business class. For example, Weyland (1999)
has shown
that populism and neoliberalism cohabited comfortably in Latin America
and
Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Slobodian (2018) has shown that
right-wing populism has
emerged within neoliberalism in Germany and
Austria, not in opposition to it. Several supporters of Brexit have also
argued for a return to the British state not to challenge neoliberalism but
to shield it from European regulation and embark on a new export-
oriented neoliberal trajectory (Wood & Ausserladscheider, 2021). This
argument also implies that
some businesses support right-wing
populists (Feldmann & Glenn, 2021; Scheiring, 2022).
The history of
autocratization in Latin America offers some of the most paradigmatic
examples of the alliance between the business class and autocrats. After the
Great Depression
of the 1930s and the 2nd World War, Latin America’s
dependent economies attempted to
break the dominance of foreign
capital through import substitution industrialization (ISI).
This economic
strategy aimed to replace imports with domestic production to facilitate
the modernization of dependent economies through industrialization.
This strategy was built
on a cross-class alliance between the bourgeoisie,
workers, the state, and some domestic
industrial capitalists (Cardoso &
Faletto, 1979). These social coalitions gave birth to various
populist
regimes, such as Peronism in Argentina. Even though these post-WW2
populist regimes were not liberal democracies, they were more
democratic than their predecessors,
offering political inclusion to large
parts of the population.
These populist democracies were subverted by right-wing
autocracies in many Latin
American countries around the 1970s.
Socioeconomic inclusion built on import substitution
and expansive
welfare ran into difficulties due to growing international debts, the
balance
of payments problems, and inflation. When the exhaustion of
populist import substitution
regimes aggravated economic and political
conflicts, right-wing military elites, in alliance with
the business class,
mounted political attacks to push the economy towards stabilization,
austerity, and export orientation. This strategic economic shift required
restrictive policies, i.e.,
excluding previously included popular masses. As
right-wing military regimes attempted to
consolidate and open the
economy, they closed the polity; thus, economic liberalization and
political autocratization went hand-in-hand (Diaz-Alejandro, 1981).
Guillermo O’Donnell
(1978) famously called this phenomenon
bureaucratic authoritarianism. The proto-neoliberal right-wing civil-

military dictatorships of Brazil (1964–1985), Argentina (1966–1973,
1976–1983), and Chile (1973–1990) are prime examples of such
bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes, resting on an alliance of the business
class and right-wing military elites.
The tensions between economic reforms catering to the needs of the
business class and
democracy are not confined to Latin America in the
1970s. Recent events in Zimbabwe
provide a further direct example of
the entanglement of neoliberal capitalism and authoritarianism (Bond,
2020). Robert Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe from the country’s independence
in 1980 until his removal in a coup in 2017. Mugabe’s regime was
marked by widespread
human rights abuses, including violence against
political opponents, journalists, and civilians. He was removed from
power in a soft coup by Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s former vice-
president, in November 2017. Mnangagwa appointed a neoliberal finance
minister
Mthuli Ncube who immediately imposed a regressive 2 percent
tax on all electronic financial
transactions, cut significant chunks from the
state budget, imposed a 150% increase in the price of gasoline, and
announced that he would prioritize the repayment of $1.8 billion in
international debt arrears to maintain good rapport with global
creditors. These austerity
policies led to widespread social unrest and four
days of protest. In response, the army killed
at least a dozen people,
injured scores, and abducted hundreds more (Bond, 2020, p. 152).
This
brutal repression shows that the end of Mugabe’s rule is not the end of
authoritarianism, and pro-business economic policies can go hand in
hand with autocratic regime consolidation.
Finally, East-Central Europe, specifically Hungary, also offers a
paradigmatic example
of cooperation between the business class and
autocrats (Fabry, 2019; Johnson & Barnes,
2015).4 As Scheiring (2022) has
shown, the deep inequality between national and transnational
capitalists has contributed to the rising popularity of economic
nationalism among
Hungarian national capitalists. The alliance between
the national bourgeoisie and Viktor
Orbán’s Fidesz is a crucial
component behind the stability of illiberal rule in Hungary after
2010.
However, national capitalists are too weak in Hungary to overthrow the
dominance
of transnational capital. Thus, the real innovation of Viktor
Orbán’s Fidesz is that they renegotiated the deal with transnational
corporations, maintaining the dominance of foreign
industrial export
capital while making more space for domestic businesses in the service
sector and agriculture.

Maintaining this alliance between national capitalists and foreign
industrial export capital
comes at a price; it precludes catering to the
needs of workers, who had high hopes that
Fidesz would change their
fate. The accelerated capital accumulation of national capital-ists, the
embourgeoisement of the upper-middle class, and the continued
competitiveness
of major foreign manufacturing businesses required
measures that reduced the bargaining power of labor and contributed to
continued wage repression. The Fidesz government
changed the existing
structure of social rights, dismantled trade unions and all primary
institutional forms of the interest representation of the socially vulnerable,
abolished social policies to redistribute money upwards, and increased the
socioeconomic protections of worthy
(upper-middle class) citizens
(Scheiring, 2021).
To make this highly conflictual model politically sustainable, Fidesz’s
nationalist-populist strategy uses identity politics to appease the losers
of export-led growth and politically exclude the victims of his political-
economic strategy. Orbán’s project is, in essence,
a project of the
dominant classes exploiting popular sentiments against liberal elites to
execute a nationalist half-turn in economic policymaking to integrate
national capitalists
into the growth coalition while maintaining the
dominance of foreign industrial capital.
Embracing economic
nationalism in industrial policy did not challenge the core of
neoliberalism (Johnson & Barnes, 2015; Orenstein & Bugarič, 2020;
Scheiring, 2022). Fiscal
policy and social and labor market policy
became even more neoliberal. However, neoliberalism is not the same
today as in the 1990s and 2000s. Certain peripheral institutions
could
be abandoned; avant-garde excesses could be corrected without
jeopardizing the core of the neoliberal project. While economic
nationalism serves to pacify and incorporate
national capitalists,
populism works as a legitimation strategy that systematically draws a
large segment of the population into the orbit of the governing
sociopolitical alliance see
also.5 Thus, autocratization and catering to the
needs of business elites also go hand in hand
in Hungary.
The working class and autocratization
The biggest challenge against modernization theory and institutionalism
has been mounted
by sociologists showing that the working class was
essential for democratic consolidation
(Berman, 2006; Przeworski &

Wallerstein, 1982; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Economic development
does not automatically lead to democratization. Capitalism is insufficient
for
democracy without workers achieving significant results in the class
struggle. Once the working class is organized and strong enough
politically, it can successfully fight for rights and
institutions that elites
would not grant to the masses otherwise. The extension of the franchise,
the prohibition of child work, and the expansion of social and economic
rights resulted
from working class pressures. These institutions guarantee
that fundamental political rights
at the heart of liberal political theory have
actual meaning and can be practiced by the masses,
without which
democracy cannot consolidate. These conflicts were temporarily resolved
in
a democratic class compromise that guaranteed the rights of capital
owners to accumulate
wealth in return for sharing some of it with the
workers (Tilly, 2007), thereby stabilizing
democracy.
The distributive class compromise also figures centrally in the neo-
structuralist political
economy literature on democracy and
autocratization. In the formal models of Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005)
or Boix (2003), the stability of democracy hinges on the question of
whether the ruling classes find it too costly to maintain the democratic
compromise and how
they perceive the potential cost of political
exclusion, which is a function of the level of socioeconomic inequality.
Thus, if inequality is rampant, elites might be interested in intensifying
political exclusion, undermining democracy.6
However, even if the class compromise between workers and capitalists
stabilized democracy in advanced democracies, it failed to include racial
or racialized minorities. Scholars of racial capitalism (Du Bois, 2014[1935];
Robinson, 2000) have argued that capitalism, as an
economic system, is
not only about the production and distribution of goods and services
but
also about the production and reproduction of social relations of power
based on race.
Elites have used racism to divide workers and maintain
their power. Racism justifies why
some racialized others, people of color,
are incapable of the same rights as others, those
who are socially defined
as White, primarily White capitalists. White workers were exploited,
but
they were at least White, carrying the promise of privilege — the
“psychological wage
of Whiteness,” as Du Bois (2014[1935]) called it.
Right-wing elites have used this strategy
until today. Because of the
entanglement of race and class, the public goods that workers
fought for
were unequally distributed. For example, Katznelson (2005) has shown
how racial
capitalism and unequal citizenship were connected by

excluding Black Americans from New
Deal programs after the Great
Depression, contributing to ongoing racial wealth disparities.
The
incorporation or exclusion of working-class masses in liberal democracies
is crucial
for the future of democracy today. Researchers have argued that
the parties of the status quo have become deaf to the plight of workers
left behind by globalization and technological
change, leading to the
hollowing of democracy (Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013). A new fundamental
cleavage has emerged between the winners and losers of globalization and
deindustrialization (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012; Häusermann, 2020).
Established left-wing parties have
increasingly concentrated on educated
urban voters, distancing themselves from the provincial working classes
(Mudge, 2018). The erosion of the democratic class compromise opens
the
door to anti-establishment, populist forces and the decline of the quality
of democracy
(Hopkin 2020).7 Working-class voters in deindustrialized
rural areas are more likely to revolt
against the establishment by
supporting radical political change (Essletzbichler et al., 2018;
McQuarrie,
2017). Workers’ experience of economic change, sense of status loss and
abandonment, and the increasing rift between credentialed and non-
credentialed workers pave
the way for illiberal identity politics, which
offers a promise of inclusion or re-integration
to those left behind by
globalization (Hochschild, 2018; Kalb & Halmai, 2011; Rydgren,
2012).
The costs and benefits of incorporating workers into the newly
emerging democracies
of postsocialist Eastern Europe were at the
center of the attention of liberal reformers.
They feared that radical
reforms could generate social problems and create a backlash of
disgruntled voters, so they proposed technocratic exclusion in the
framework of shock therapy (O'Donnell, 1995; Sachs, 1994). The newly
independent Baltic States went furthest in
excluding workers. In the
name of getting rid of the Soviet yoke and building a new nation
state,
these countries literally excluded 30% of their population from
democracy (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). They limited the political
participation of ethnic minorities, mostly
Russians, who also happened
to be dominantly industrial workers and thus were among
the biggest
victims of neoliberal economic reforms. These policies effectively
prevented the working-class victims of postsocialist economic shocks
from using the political process and
fighting back. As Bohle and
Greskovits (2007, p. 451) summed up the strategy of “exclusionary
democracy” in the Baltics: “Political exclusion was coupled with and
buttressed by
social exclusion.”

Most other countries could not rely on literal political exclusion to
smooth the economic transition. For them, disciplinary neoliberalism
meant insulating economic decision-making
from mass political pressures
by relying on a small group of technocrats or experts to make critical
decisions. Technocrats were appointed to key positions in government
and given
significant authority to make economic policy decisions,
often without significant input
from elected officials or the broader
public (King, 2003). Stealthily prepared austerity packages, sidelining
trade unions and other social partners, independent central banks,
currency
boards, fiscal councils, and voluntarily imposed external
constraints were among the solutions to enshrine economic liberalism and
protect it from political interference.
Some countries combined technocratic insulation with the half-hearted
political incorporation of workers. Governments in East-Central Europe
offered early retirement and other strategic social policies in response to
workers’ economic woes. “Embedding neoliberalism” in welfare policies
helped consolidate democracy during the transition (Bruszt, 2006;
Vanhuysse, 2006). These governments also established corporatist interest
mediation channels involving trade unions. However, these institutions
were often empty and symbolic.
Token negotiations and nonbinding
agreements demonstrated that tripartite procedures
were deployed to
introduce neoliberal outcomes, not social-democratic ones. As David
Ost (2000, p. 91) argued, this “illusory corporatism” gave “symbolic
voice to the formerly
included now headed for exclusion. Ultimately,
tripartism helped secure labor’s acceptance
of its own marginalization.”
Radical economic reforms in postsocialist Eastern Europe led to the
massive destruction of existing industrial capacities, ushering in a region-
wide process of deindustrialization
(Amsden et al., 1994). Perhaps the
most striking sign of these economic shocks was the skyrocketing
working-class death rates in the 1990s in Eastern Europe (Brainerd &
Cutler,
2005; Scheiring et al., 2023). Around 7.3 million Eastern
Europeans died prematurely due
to postsocialist economic shocks
(Stuckler, 2009). Male life expectancy in Russia declined by
seven years
between 1988 and 1995. Working-class men without a college degree
suffered
the most. In the 1990s, blue-collar male workers had 111%
higher odds of dying than those
with a college degree in Hungary, a 17%
increase from the 1980s, and 50% higher odds of dying in Russia, a 14%
increase from the 1980s (Doniec et al., 2018). Life chances have
improved since the second half of the 1990s, but vast health inequalities

still plague most
countries. In addition to emigration and low fertility,
these health problems are the primary
reasons why fifteen out of the
twenty fastest-shrinking countries worldwide are located in
Eastern
Europe (United Nations, 2022). This demographic crisis indicates that a
significant
part of the population experienced the market transition as a
social shock, contributing to the later loss of legitimacy of liberal reforms.
During the “peaceful” decade between 1998 and 2008, most countries
managed to grow,
and it seemed that democracy would consolidate in the
ravaged societies of Eastern Europe. However, even in the economically
most prosperous countries, such as the countries of East-Central
Europe, serious social problems were brewing under the surface
(Ghodsee &
Orenstein, 2021). Employment remained chronically low. A
large share of the new jobs created during the transition was precarious.
In Poland, average household income grew at
only half the pace of GDP
per capita between 1992 and 2010. Hungary’s GDP per capita
grew by
1.92 percent between 1991 and 2012. However, real household incomes
shrank
by an average of 0.22 percent per year at the same time (Ghodsee
& Orenstein, 2021). The
increase in the Gini coefficient in the 1990s in
Eastern Europe was almost three times as
fast as the rise recorded in
those Western countries where inequality rose most rapidly in the 1980s
(Milanovic, 1998).
A large and growing literature links working-class dislocations to
illiberalism in Eastern
Europe (Fabry, 2019; Gagyi, 2016; Kalb & Halmai,
2011; Ost, 2006; Scheiring, 2021; Szombati, 2018). The region’s
neoliberalized leftwing parties collapsed because of their economic policy
agenda: voters punished leftwing parties for moving to the right on
economic policy (Bagashka et al., 2022; Snegovaya, 2022). This trend fits
in the global decline of the left as it moves to the right and embraces
neoliberalism (Mudge, 2018). The economic shocks Eastern Europeans
experienced during the postsocialist transformation were more
severe
than shocks in Western Europe. Therefore, the disillusionment with
liberalism is also
much stronger, and so is the ability of right-wing
authoritarian populists to capitalize on workers’ resentment. As most
Eastern European states went further in adapting avant-garde
neoliberalism (Appel & Orenstein, 2018), they are now the avant-garde of
the authoritarian
populist countermovement.
For example, working-class support for the Hungarian Socialist Party
(Magyar Szocialista
Párt—MSZP) dropped significantly during the 2000s.
In comparison, the right (Fidesz and
Jobbik) had gained support among

workers by the end of the 2000s (Scheiring, 2021). In
Poland, 50% of the
bottom 40% of income earners thought establishing the market economy
in Poland was not beneficial (Paczynska, 2005). The working-class
countermovement kicked
off by neoliberal market-making policies fueled
the rise of authoritarian populism in Poland
(Kalb, 2009; Ost, 2006). Even
in the Czech Republic, where social disintegration was comparatively
lower than in other countries, a significant part of workers was left behind
by the transition, and they express their anger by supporting populist
politicians (Wyss, 2021).
Farmers and rural agricultural workers were also
among the biggest victims of neoliberalism
and are the biggest supporters
of authoritarian populists in the region (Malewska-Szałygin,
2021).
The middle class and autocratization
Proponents of modernization theory argue that the growth of the middle
class is crucial for
the development and stability of democracy and
democratic civic culture (Almond & Verba,
1963; Lipset, 1959). Several
hypotheses have been proposed to explain this. First, a robust
middle
class typically possesses disposable income and job security. This stability
allows individuals to participate in political processes actively, demand
accountability from the government, and resist potential authoritarianism.
Second, the middle class is often defined by its
high level of education.
Well-informed citizens are more likely to demand democratic rights,
engage in political discussions, and participate in elections. Third, the
middle class’s relative
economic stability and high education make them
politically moderate. Middle-class groups
have no reason to support
radical change. Fourth, because of its position “in the middle,”
members
of the middle class have diverse social networks and interactions,
fostering tolerance and understanding. Therefore, modernization
theorists posit that the middle class is
crucial for mediating social
conflicts, which is essential for the sustainability of democracy.
Several
quantitative studies show a positive correlation between the size of the
middle class
and democratic stability (Barro, 1999; Inglehart & Welzel,
2005).
In recent history, the most crucial support for modernization theory
came from the democratization of erstwhile authoritarian developmental
states in East Asia. From Korea and
Taiwan to still authoritarian Singapore,
Malaysia, and China, developmental states combined
political exclusion
with rapid capitalist economic development, high-quality governance, and

increasing albeit partial socioeconomic inclusion. By the 1990s, East
Asian developmental
states became developed nations with high life
expectancy, low infant mortality, high adult
literacy, very low
unemployment, and high levels of human development (Tang, 2000,
pp.2-3). However, their success in industrializing their countries
strengthened the middle class,
whose demands and intrusion into politics
undermined the state’s autonomy. Educated middle classes were growing
in the cities, galvanizing grassroots movements against autocracy
(He,
2021). Because of these dynamics, East Asia’s two paradigmatic
authoritarian developmental states—South Korea and Taiwan—
transitioned to democracy in 1987.
However, a more detailed look at democratization in Taiwan
underscores the arguments of class-centric sociologists concerning the
political incorporation of the working class. Taiwan
is one of the success
stories of the third wave of democratization. While liberal economic
policies presented economic shocks, the state responded by significantly
increasing welfare
spending in the democratic era (Templeman, 2020).
The Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP)—the current Taiwanese
governing party—effectively channeled economic grievances
into the
political arena on a progressive-left platform (Chacko & Jayasuriya,
2018). While
still in opposition, the DPP successfully campaigned for
introducing universal health insurance. Competing with the DPP, the
conservatives of the Kuomintang (KMT), who had displayed a firm anti-
welfare stance in the past, also made important welfare concessions during
the transition era.
Once elected to power, the DPP increased the coverage and generosity
of unemployment
protection. As a result of continued welfare expansion,
income inequality remained very low
throughout the transition.
Furthermore, Taiwan did not see such a rise in nonstandard and
precarious employment as Korea (Tarohmaru, 2011). Nevertheless, the
DPP leadership was
enmeshed in corruption scandals, leading to waves of
middle-class protest and a massive electoral defeat in 2008. In 2010, former
DPP President Chen Shui-bian was sentenced to 17.5
years for
corruption. However, the party managed to distance itself from
corruption, and
relying on a working-class and middle-class electoral
coalition, it returned to power in 2016.
In short, Taiwan seems to have
successfully embedded neoliberalism in a social-democratic
framework,
which contributed to the consolidation of democracy.
Several recent cases of democratic backsliding have challenged the

image of a harmonious relationship between the middle class and
democracy. The middle class often sides
with authoritarian-populist
politicians and facilitates autocratization. If the middle class loses
interest
in public services and redistribution, they might turn against the
democratic-welfarist class compromise and support exclusionary right-
wing politics. If inequality is high,
the desertion of the middle class from
the democratic compromise is higher. The middle
class has more to lose
due to redistribution that democratically elected leaders push through
in
response to the demands of impoverished masses. This dynamic goes to a
great length in
explaining democratic backsliding in Thailand and the
Philippines, where the middle classes
are at the center of the social
coalition supporting authoritarian-populist anti-human-rights
political
forces (Einzenberger & Schaffar, 2018; Garrido, 2021).8
The story of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines highlights the role of
middle-class disillusionment with democracy particularly well (Garrido,
2021). Unlike in Taiwan, inter-class
cleavages, poverty, precarity, and
inequality remained high during the democratic transition
period in the
Philippines. The country has the highest Gini coefficient in Southeast
Asia
(Tuaño & Cruz, 2019). The country’s capital, Manila, is
geographically and culturally highly
segmented, with sharp class
boundaries, and hosts most of the country’s upper and middle
classes.
Rodrigo Duterte’s support is particularly strong among these upperand
middleclass groups in Manila. Based on in-depth interviews in Manila,
Garrido (2021) has shown
that middle-class interviewees expressed
frustration with how democratically elected leaders
catered to the needs of
the urban poor and fear for their own economic privileges vis-à-vis
thelower classes. They associate the urban poor with encroachment and
crime. In recent years,
they have been looking for a political strongman to
protect the rights of the upper-middleclass and discipline the poor. These
processes eventually undermined the social compromise
that temporarily
stabilized democracy, leading to Duterte’s authoritarian-disciplinary turn.
Latin America offers several other recent examples of the same
dynamic.9 Holland and
Schneider (2017) argue that the expansion of the
welfare state under social democratic governments elected throughout
Latin America in the 2000s (the so-called “pink tide”) has
generated
upper-middle-class resentment. These upper-middle-class groups are
leaving the social collation that supported welfare previously. They are
irritated by the increasing costs
of welfare and prefer high-quality private
services. To stop democratically elected left-wing
governments and

discipline the lower classes, the revolt of the middle class is fueling various
authoritarian maneuvers against left-wing politicians, ushering in a new
era of authoritarianism and welfare retrenchment (Niedzwiecki &
Pribble, 2023). The election of the Right in
Argentina and Paraguay and
the impeachment of Lula in Brazil are prime examples.
Patrick Heller’s (2020) research on Brazil confirms the theoretical
hypothesis concerning
the right-wing backlash against progressive
reforms formulated by Holland and Schneider
(2017). In line with the
previously discussed political-economic argument, which states that
elites
may be interested in limiting democracy to prevent redistribution, Heller
argues that
the middle classes and the bourgeoisie felt their privileges were
threatened by those who had
risen from the lower classes. Peter Evans
(2020) adds that the Workers Party initially forged
a class compromise
that allowed for the slow but steady inclusion of the poor while allowing
the financial elite to make substantial profits in the 2000s. However,
Dilma Rousseff
took over from Lula in a less favorable international
economic environment. She introduced
reforms to the financial system
that negatively affected the profits of the financial elite, eliminating the
foundations of the previous class compromise. The financial elites started
to look
for a new leader to end the rule of the Brazilian Workers Party.
Progressive organizations’ declining ability to politically mobilize and
integrate popular
masses and the growing mobilizational potential of the
right are also central to Bolsonaro’s success. Heller (2020) has
highlighted that Bolsonaro relied heavily on exaggerating cultural
differences, using the typical rhetoric of welfare chauvinism, branding the
poor as lazy
freeloaders and criminals to mobilize middle-class voters.
Elizabeth McKenna (2020) has
extended Heller’s argument by analyzing
the role of trade unions’ declining mobilizational
capacity, the weakening
of the organizational base of the Workers Party, and the rise of new
religious groups among the urban poor. As the organizational power of
progressive institutions declined, voters began to engage with politics
through new channels through religious
groups.
Finally, it is also vital to see that downwardly mobile middle-class
voters partly fuel the rise of radical-right populism in advanced
democracies. Economic insecurity in the era of neoliberal globalization
has eaten away middle-class privileges. Recent studies have shown
that
economic insecurity “has risen steadily since the mid-1980s for virtually
all sub-groups
of Americans” (Hacker et al., 2014, p. S5). Insecurity is also
widespread in Europe, extending “across income groups and occupational

classes, reaching into the middle classes” (Ranci et al., 2021, p. 539).
While these downwardly mobile middle-class groups might not be
excluded from consuming basic goods and services, they are excluded
from occupational
and institutional structures that guarantee security and
middle-class status. Kurer (2020) has
shown that relative shifts in the
social hierarchy, a perception of relative economic decline,
and not abject
impoverishment drive support for right-wing populist parties.
Technological advancement in automation, robotization, and the spread
of artificial intelligence solutions
are crucial sources of labor market
uncertainty.
Similarly, workers who previously joined the middle class thanks to
strong trade unions
and lifetime industrial jobs are threatened by
exposure to trade with China. In a path-breaking study, Autor et al. (2020)
showed that electoral districts with greater exposure to Chinese
imports
were more likely to elect Republican members of Congress after 2010
and vote
for Republican presidential candidates in the 2008-2016 period.
Another highly influential
paper by Colantone and Stanig (2018)
analyzed the political impact of import exposure in
15 Western European
regions from 1988 to 2007. Their results show that the import shock
in
the period investigated fueled the support of the protectionist right,
leading to a decline in
support for the pro-trade left and contributing to
the erosion of status-quo parties.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that class-centric sociological and political-
economic analyses of democratization and autocratization have much to
offer. First, the business class sometimes
sides with liberal democratic
forces against populists, such as in Germany. In other cases, the business
class sides with authoritarian leaders who promise enhanced economic
opportunities at the cost of the lower classes, such as in Hungary. The
same ambiguity characterizes
the history of capitalism around the world.
Business elites supported liberal politicians in
England but sided with the
Nazis in Germany. They were also at the helm of the authoritarian
coalitions against left-wing populist regimes in Latin America.
Second, the relationship between the middle class and democracy is
also less clear-cut
than modernization theory suggests. Empirical
evidence suggests that the higher share of the middle class, the lower the
chance of autocratization. However, recent cases also suggest
that middle-

class groups tend to revolt against democratic arrangements if lower-class
groups
and redistribution threaten their interests. Upper-middle-class
support for autocratization
is prevalent outside advanced democracies,
such as Brazil, Thailand, and the Philippines.
In advanced democracies,
the middle class allied with workers for a long time to stabilize
democracy. Nevertheless, downward social mobility generated by
globalization and economic insecurity pushes lower-middle-class voters
to support anti-establishment parties in
Western Europe and the US.
Third, class-centric sociologists and political economists have shown
that the mobilization and political incorporation of the working class was
central to democratic stabilization
in Western Europe and America.
Capitalist economic development does not automatically
generate
democracy, only if it can ensure the socioeconomic security of the
masses, which
is contingent on the welfare state, which, in turn, is
contingent on organized class struggle. Even if conservative elites initiate
welfare reforms, they do this to appease workers and
reduce the
likelihood of strong working-class mobilization. The resulting democratic
class
compromise has never been full. Scholars of racial capitalism have
shown that it excluded
racialized minorities. The unraveling of this
compromise has led to democracy’s hollowing.
Western and Eastern
European authoritarian populism has similar roots in the lived and
culturally filtered experience of working-class class dislocation and
downward social mobility
of middle-class groups. Workers’ support for
anti-establishment populism is a correlate of established parties’ inability
to secure workers’ socioeconomic inclusion.
Autocratization is a complex political phenomenon. Therefore, its
explanations cannot
be reduced to mono-causal theories. Political agency,
perceptions, culture, changing social coalitions, and socioeconomic
structures, among other things, all play a role. No universal
law would
explain the political behavior of workers, middle-class groups or business
elites.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that class politics is dead; it
means that politics is classed.
This calls for complex, interdisciplinary
approaches to social class and autocratization.
Quantitative analyses
have their place in highlighting the association between well-defined
variables and large groups of people. Historical case studies, qualitative
analyses, and comparative approaches are better equipped to capture the
complex nature of real-world autocratization and class dynamics. The
literature on the role of social classes in autocratization
offers a rich source
of examples of these diverse approaches.

Notes
1. See Chapter 20 on populism by Keith Prushankin and Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser.
2. For more details on this topic see Chapter 23 by Alexander
Libman.
3. For more details on this literature see Chapter 6 by Carl Henrik
Knutsen and Svend-Erik Skaaning.
4. For more details on illiberalism in East-Central Europe, see
Chapter 33 by Séan Hanley and Licia
Cianetti.
5. On the alliance of national-populism and neoliberalism, see also
Ban et al. (2021); Hendrikse
(2018).
6. For more detail on the role of inequality in autocratization see
Chapter 7 by Christian Houle.
7. For more detail on autocratization in Western Europe see Chapter
32 by Assem Dandashly and
Eliyahu Sapir.
8. See Chapter 39 by Kasuya and Wang on East and Southeast Asia
9. See Chapter 36 by John Polga-Hecimovich.

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