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CHAPTER 9
The European Security Order
Kjell Engelbrekt
Even befor e the Russian Federation launched its war of aggression
against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it was evident that the conflict
also concerned the security order in Europe and the values and prin-
ciples that underpin it since the middle of the last century. As 2021
came to a close, some 150,000 Russian troops were stationed along the
border with Ukraine, and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister,
was demanding that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
refrain from expanding to the east and from deploying offensive weapons
in Russia’s immediate vicinity (Kramer & Erlanger, 2021). Consequently,
the sovereignty of individual European states within the realm of security
and defence was called into question.
If Russia ultimately fails to subdue Ukraine by military means, then the
conditions should be present for recreating a European security order,
consolidating it, in part, by Finland and Sweden joining NATO. On a
more general level, however, it is far less certain that most of the world’s
great powers, such as Russia, will relinquish their seemingly increasing
demands that smaller states conform to their wishes. The effect of such a
K. Engelbrekt (B)
Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: Kjell.Engelbrekt@fhs.se
© The Author(s) 2024
A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al. (eds.), The Borders of the
European Union in a Conflictual World,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54200-8_9
205
206 K. ENGELBREKT
trend, over the long run, will be to weaken the rules-based international
order.
In this chapter, Russia’s war in Ukraine will be treated as a concrete
and specific threat to the continent’s largest country (geographically
speaking), but above all as a deliberate attempt to break up the current
security order in Europe. The question of the inviolability of borders
is thereby also raised at the level of global politics and of international
law. Although Ukraine is not a member of either NATO or the Euro-
pean Union (EU), both of these institutions are now confronted with an
antagonistic regional power that opposes, by military means, the vision
of a ‘European neighbourhood’ with stable and increasingly prosperous
societies in the east and south. While NATO had taken several steps and
measures to deal with the situation that arose in 2014, with Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists in southeastern
Ukraine, the large-scale war that broke out in February 2022 brought
about an abrupt awakening for the EU as a political system.
This chapter begins with a description of what is usually termed the
European security order from 1946 to 2021. It then proceeds to an
examination of how this order was openly challenged by Russia’s express
demands in the late autumn of 2021, and above all by the decision of
that country’s leadership in February 2022 to order a large-scale war
of aggression against a neighbour on the European continent. A third
section discusses the various measures that the EU and NATO took
during the spring and summer of the same year to defend the existing
security order in Europe, and to preserve cohesion within both organi-
sations on the subject. The focus of the fourth section is on the bilateral
military support that Ukraine has received from a number of countries in
order to resist the Russian invasion, and on what this concrete coopera-
tion says about the prospects for more integrated policies among Europe’s
democracies in the area of security and defence. A fifth section looks at the
demands made by great powers in a global perspective, as they may rein-
force the trend towards European integration. Finally, in its last section
the chapter returns to the overall question of Europe’s security order, and
whether the EU and the non-American part of NATO need to shoulder a
greater responsibility for it, now that Russia has chosen direct confronta-
tion and the involvement of the us in Asia, and the Pacific is steadily
increasing.
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 207
European Security 1945–2021
According to two American political scientists, David Lake and Patrick
Morgan, a regional security order consists of member states which are
so intertwined in their security policies that actions by their individual
governments, and significant events within each country, have a substan-
tial impact on all of them (Lake & Morgan, 1997). It is this mutual
dependence that distinguishes a regional security order, although many
such arrangements are also strongly affected by external actors, in this
case the United States and the Russian Federation (previously the Soviet
Union). Global and regional institutions—such as the United Nations
(un), the EU, and NATO—may exert significant influence as well.
In part, it can be said that the European security order has existed
since the late 1940s, as an extension of the rules-based world order that
came about through the establishment of the un. The victorious powers
were prepared to guarantee this order through political, economic, and
military means in countries and regions over which they exercised control.
This reflected not least the commitment to reintegrating Germany and
Japan—the two former ‘Axis powers’ that had tried to subjugate large
parts of Europe and East Asia respectively during the Second World War—
into the international community. The first and second articles of the un
Charter laid down that war is only legitimate for self-defence, or when
conducted under a mandate from the un Security Council. Furthermore,
all un members must undertake to observe certain principles for relations
between states: above all, to settle disputes by peaceful means; to respect
the sovereignty of states and their formal equality; and, in the words of
Article 2(4) of the un Charter, to ‘refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations’ (UN Charter, 1945).
However, precisely because the European continent had experienced
two world wars within the space of less than a generation, such pledges
were regarded as insufficient. With mainly American support, therefore,
several joint organisations were established, for the primary purpose of
reducing the risk for renewed serious conflict on the European continent.
It may also be said here that Europe’s security order gained credibility and
grew deeper as a result of institutional innovations in several policy areas,
in line with what is usually known as a ‘collective security system’—with
208 K. ENGELBREKT
a common commitment to stability and the suppression of aggression,
whether political or military (Kupchan, 1995; Inis, 2006).
The foundations for this security or der were laid in 1949, with
the establishment of NATO under American leadership. However, the
Council of Europe and its European Court of Human Rights, created in
1949 and 1958 respectively, bear mentioning here as well. The European
Coal and Steel Community was formed in 1952, and in 1967 the six
founding countries of that body—Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and West Germany—merged it with the European
Economic Community (eec) and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom), thereby forming the European Communities (ec). In
1993, finally, the latter were brought together in the European Union
(EU), which then had twelve member states. NATO had sixteen members
at the time (Wallace, 1994).
While the EU and NATO contributed the most to Europe’s security
order—alongside the Council of Europe, with its efforts to strengthen
human rights and the rule of law—the importance of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (csce) should be recognised
too. The csce provided diplomatic mechanisms for promoting security
between the countries of Western Europe and their counterparts in the
communist bloc, including the then-Soviet Union. The Helsinki Confer-
ence of 1975 was unique in this regard, as it resulted in a commitment
by thirty-five European states, and by us and Canada as well, to recog-
nise existing borders, to increase trade, and to respect human rights. Up
until 1990, when a new charter was adopted that transformed it into the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce), the csce
was one of the few places where government representatives from both
sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ on the continent could meet (Flynn & Farrell,
1999).
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the osce also func-
tioned as a diplomatic buffer between the Russian political leadership
under President Vladimir Putin, who took office at the New Year of
2000, and Western leaders. Cooperation with the us also proceeded
well to begin with, following the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington on 11 September 2001. Then-President George W. Bush
sought partners beyond the traditional ones, and he hoped to take advan-
tage of Russia’s geographical location and its knowledge about Islamist
extremism in Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union. This collab-
oration then flourished within the framework of the G8, in the form
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 209
of intelligence exchange. It was when ‘colour revolutions’ took place
in Georgia and Ukraine, with demands for greater independence from
Moscow, that Putin’s suspicions seem to have been awakened (or sooner
strengthened) that the us government was trying to curtail Russia’s
freedom of action. In 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, he
decided to speak frankly, sharply criticising what he saw as intervention
in Russia’s sphere of influence (Fried & Volker, 2022).
After this, the osce too became the scene for constant Russian
objections to the European security order (Engelbrekt, 2013). These
objections have concerned attempts by Western leaders to encourage
democratic reforms within Russia or in its immediate vicinity, and they
have evinced strong irritation on the part of Russian leaders at criti-
cisms aimed at the functioning of the Russian legal system, or at the
corruption believed to be particularly widespread in countries that were
formerly part of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin has felt an ever greater
need to limit freedom of expression for political and social movements
that have sought closer ties with Europe or the United States, or which
have demanded political and economic reforms in line with how Western
democracies function. Moreover, Russian officials have repeatedly claimed
that the underlying motive for the concern displayed by governments
in Europe and particularly the United States for the political freedoms
of post-Soviet citizens has lain ultimately in a desire to expand Western
geopolitical influence at Russia’s expense.
The EU and NATO---Complementary Institutions
A great deal has been written about friction and organisational rivalry
between the EU and NATO (see, for instance, Ewers-Peters, 2021). It
has been difficult at times to sort out the distribution of roles and respon-
sibilities in the security area. Viewed historically and on an overarching
level, however, the two Brussels-based organisations have almost always
taken complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches to the Euro-
pean security order. The EU has been ‘liberated’ from purely defence
questions (such as how to achieve deterrence by military means), and
NATO has not needed to take on complex foreign-policy issues like the
Middle East.
NATO’s expansion in the 1990s and 2000s paved the way for post-
communist states to reach association agreements with the EU, and to
become members of the Union after some years. To become a member
210 K. ENGELBREKT
of NATO, a country must have civilian control over its armed forces; it
must respect democratic rights and freedoms; and its state administration
must function according to the rule of law. There is also one thing it
cannot have: namely, an unresolved border dispute with a neighbouring
country. In reality, the post-communist states were asked to qualify for
EU membership gradually—first by joining the Council of Europe, and
then by joining NATO. In the case of the former organisation, the need
for a well-functioning rule of law was the biggest stumbling block; in the
case of the latter, it was the manner in which defence and security affairs
were organised. As candidates in the ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme,
finally, the countries in question received support from NATO members
throughout their period of preparation.
Scholars of international relations often depict security policy as
dictated by the interests and desires of great powers, such that the
preferences of smaller states almost always have to take a back seat.
John Mearsheimer, political scientist at the University of Chicago and
renowned researcher in the theory-driven ‘realist’ school, has repeatedly
argued that it was ultimately the us that pushed for NATO’s expansion
into Central and Eastern Europe (Mearsheimer, 2014). The empirical
research, however, shows with all due clarity that it was sooner the
other way round: i.e., that the expansion was demand-driven, reflecting
the concern felt by voters and political decision-makers in these coun-
tries—dominated as they had been by the Soviet Union—about Russia’s
lingering imperialism and its military bullying of smaller neighbours.
It is true, however, that Russia rarely expressed opposition to the
eu’s eastward expansion until the 2010s (Engelbrekt & Nygren, 2010).
Table 9.1 shows the progress of European integration following the
formation, on 18 April 1951, of the European Coal and Steel Community
by six countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and West Germany. In the years following the collapse of communism and
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow too seemed to see increasing
prosperity in Europe as offering economic opportunities for Russia itself.
Between 2004 and 2007, a total of twelve states joined the EU, of which
ten had been part of the Soviet sphere of influence and members of the
Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.
The line went, however, at the borders of Belarus and Ukraine. This
became clear alr eady in 2004, in connection with the ‘Orange Revolu-
tion’ in the latter country. There is much to indicate that the Kremlin’s
involvement in Ukrainian politics from that time on has consisted both
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 211
in open support for various leaders and parties and in covert attempts
at exerting influence via economic policy, intelligence activities, and the
like (Belton, 2020). In addition, the large pipeline systems that had been
built in Ukraine during the Soviet era—for storing and exporting gas to
a number of countries in Europe—have been the subject of recurrent
conflict and tough negotiation (see the chapter on energy by Torbjörn
Becker and Anders Åslund in this volume.) The same has been true of
the Russian naval base in Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula—it too a
legacy of the Soviet era.
Around the New Year of 2014, what the Kremlin described as a
geopolitical tug-of-war between the West and Russia over the most impor-
tant component in the latter’s sphere of interest—namely Ukraine—grew
more intense. Ukraine’s then-President Viktor Yanukovych—who had
promised in his election campaign to negotiate an association agreement
with the EU, and who also received such an offer from Brussels—
suddenly did a U-turn in favour of a proposal from Moscow for greater
cooperation. The ‘Maidan Revolution’, born of the disappointment of
many Ukrainian citizens with this reversal, became for Moscow a direct
challenge to the idea of incorporating Ukraine into an economic union
with its eastern neighbour. When Yanukovych fled to Russia in February
2014, Putin decided to take control over Crimea by military means, to
annex it, and to support Russian-speaking separatists in the Donbass in
southeastern Ukraine (Allison, 2014; Bukkvoll, 2016).
One way of describing the situation over the past fifteen years is to
say that two rival conceptions of a security order have confronted one
another. According to the one, coercive military power is the sole effective
means for creating real stability, which must be based ultimately on the
military might of a great power. According to the other, if regional actors
prefer a multilateral order where diplomacy and economic relations play
an important role, they can bring a more polycentric security order into
being. The contrast between the two conceptions has been described by
Derrick Frazier and Robert Stewart-lngersoll, as they examined Russia’s
unilateral, paternalistic, and not seldom openly revisionist behaviour in
the so-called post-Soviet sphere (Frazier & Stewart-Ingersoll, 2012). In
the view of the two authors, Russia represents an almost stereotypical
illustration of the first-mentioned approach.
212 K. ENGELBREKT
The Kr e m l i n ’sRepeatedDemands
for an Alternative Security Arrangement
There is thus a clear continuity between, on the one hand, Russian diplo-
macy in the osce for some fifteen years (Stronski & Sokolsky, 2020),
and, on the other, the specific demands Moscow made in late 2021—i.e.,
prior to the war in Ukraine breaking out—that the European security
order adapts to its desires (Kramer & Erlanger, 2021). Three demands
were recurrent: Russia would have veto power over significant changes in
the security regime; the deployment of weapons systems capable of hitting
military installations deep within Russian territory would be banned; and
nato and eu countries would refrain from political intervention in the
post-Soviet sphere.
Where the demand for a Russian veto over adjustments in the secu-
rity order is concerned, the question of nato membership for additional
European states has been paramount. Ever since Putin assumed the pres-
idency, the Kremlin has consistently demanded that no further nato
expansion take place without Russia’s consent. This applies above all to
countries with which Russia shares a border, as Moscow believes the effect
thereof would be to shift geopolitical conditions to the West’s favour. As
a rule, any domestic debate about joining nato in any country—whether
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Sweden, or Ukraine—has resulted in
criticism and threats of countermeasures from Russian officials (on threats
against the non-NATO Nordic countries, see Roth, 2022).
The demand for a ban on the deployment of weapons systems has
mostly been made in narrower contexts, in connection with negotiations
over disarmament. Russian leaders have aimed their harshest criticism
at the possible deployment of long-range missiles in nato countries in
Central Europe, and they have called attempts to differentiate between
offensive and defensive systems into question. At the same time, the
Russian defence industry has continually developed new robotic systems
which, in the view of many experts, have violated agreements entered
into—above all the 1987 agreement not to develop medium-range
missiles (with a range from 500 to 5500 kilometres), due to the risk they
pose of undermining the military balance on the European continent. In
2019, after the publication of documents detailing how certain types of
Russian missiles had violated the terms of previous agreements, the us
withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Lopez,
2019).
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 213
However, it is the demand for political non-intervention in the post-
Soviet sphere that has posed the greatest challenge for Western democra-
cies, as it conflicts both with the European security order and with Russian
commitments to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. As noted
above, the European security order is more ‘finely meshed’ than that of
other regions, in the sense that the principles and rules of the un Charter
are reinforced in its case by additional agreements and institutions. These
include the Council of Europe, with its Convention on Human Rights;
the osce, with its Helsinki Accords and its 1990 Paris Charter; and the
eu and nato, with their respective frameworks for how their members
are to act towards each other and in relation to third par ties.
When countries like Georgia and Ukraine have chosen leaders who
have tried to break away from economic and political dependence on
Russia, formal and informal norms of behaviour have been broken, and
the conflict between Europe and Russia has deepened. This was seen
in 2003–2004, with the ‘colour revolutions’, and again with Russia’s
military intrusion into Georgian territor y in 2008 and into Ukrainian
territory from 2014 on. On the surface, the aim of official Russian state-
ments may seem to have been to defend the rights of Russian-speaking
populations—in connection, for example, with Ukraine’s legislation on
the standing of the Russian language in that country. Observers with
knowledge, however, of how the opposition within Russia has not just
been restricted but also eliminated—through politically controlled trials,
repression by government agencies, forced exile, and even political assas-
sination—realised early on that the Kremlin’s actions evinced no true
concern for the rights of Russian-speakers in the post-Soviet sphere
(Snegovaya, 2023; Umland, 2021).
Despite a large number of clear signs of what was to come, relatively
few outsiders read the situation correctly in the months leading up to
the invasion in February 2022. Most observers expected a military opera-
tion limited to the Donbass—the area in southeastern Ukraine over which
Russia already exercised considerable control. Others pointed to the enor-
mous financial losses that members of Putin’s inner circle would likely
suffer in the event of open military conflict. It is well-known that Russia’s
political leaders are intertwined with the members of its economic elite,
who control a wide range of industries—above all in oil and gas—and
who have taken enormous assets out of Russia and placed them in a
number of European countries instead. Observers expected both Putin
214 K. ENGELBREKT
and his closest confidants to take care first and foremost not to risk endan-
gering such assets through actions that would elicit far-reaching economic
sanctions or political isolation (Gardner, 2022).
European Security: Signs
of Renewed Consolidation
The portrayal of the EU as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), has
sometimes been criticised for expressing smugness or even a sense of
moral superiority among EU citizens and leaders. In this understanding,
the EU does not behave in the classical fashion of a great power: instead
of practising power politics, it conducts a positive type of foreign policy—
thereby exerting an ‘attraction’ over others in the world, rather than
inspiring respect or fear for its military might or material strength (For
a more extensive treatment of this concept, see Ann-Kristin Jonasson’s
chapter in this volume). It can be argued that the war in Ukraine has
shown the potential strength of consistent action in accordance with
strong moral conviction, which according to many is central to the
concept of ‘normative power’. S uch moral conviction not only increases
the power of resistance, the will to defend; it also boosts the fighting
morale of the soldiers charged with defending a Ukraine oriented towards
Europe and the EU. Similarly, many EU leaders and officials, and millions
of EU citizens, strongly empathise with Ukraine’s struggle in the face of
tough military odds—a struggle to which citizens themselves ar e showing
great commitment.
Russian political leaders clearly hoped that the ‘special military oper-
ation’, not unlike the takeover of Crimea in February 2014, would
be accomplished quickly and with overwhelming force (Harris et al,
2022). There would be no time for any far-reaching mobilisation of
Ukraine’s armed forces or civil society; nor would outside assistance to
the Ukrainian authorities be possible. This proved, however, not to be
the case. Already in the first days of the combat, moreover, the lack of
any justification for the invasion in terms of international law served to
strengthen Ukraine’s cause. At an emergency special session of the un
General Assembly on 2 March 2022, the Russian invasion was condemned
by 141 votes to five; 35 countries abstained, while another twelve were
absent (UN News, 2022). The resolution also demanded that civilians be
protected and that access to humanitarian aid be ensured.
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 215
Unlike the case in the un, the condemnation from NATO and the EU
regarding the invasion was altogether unison, and emphatic besides. It
was also quickly followed up by a series of concrete countermeasures. In
the course of 2022 and 2023, as shown in Table 9.2, a series of joint deci-
sions and sanctions ‘packages’—coordinated with the us and a number of
like-minded countries—expanded the breadth and depth of the Union’s
economic sanctions. The legal basis for EU action had already been laid in
important respects in 2014, when sanctions were imposed in connection
with Russia’s takeover of Crimea (European Council Regulations 208/
2014 & 269/2014). However, the Union’s efforts in this regard were
gradually expanded and specified through expor t bans on technology in
the maritime, space, and aviation sectors; on technology and services in
the area of energy; on electronics and machinery with a potential for
strengthening Russia’s industrial capacity; on trade in gold and gold prod-
ucts; on petroleum products via a so-called price cap; on Russian media
companies broadcasting in Arabic; on the Wagner Group private military
entity. Similarly, in several stages over the course of 2022, the access of
Russian banks to the so-called SWIFT system was restricted.
Illustrating: implemented sanctions
against Russia by the european union
and like-minded entities, autumn 2023.
Imports banned during the spring and summer of 2022 included wood,
coal, cement, fossil fuels, petroleum products, and iron and steel prod-
ucts. Bans were then extended as well to other products that generate
significant revenues for the Russian state—revenues that can be used in
turn to finance Russia’s warfare in Ukraine. Some of the most effective
sanctions—the price cap on crude oil and a ban on maritime transport
of Russian oil and petroleum products—took effect in late 2022 or early
2023. Already on 31 August 2022, the eu cancelled the relaxation of visa
rules that had applied for Russian citizens since 2007.
One significant weakness in the sanctions regime in 2022 was the fact
that several European countries—notably Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, and Poland—had grown dependent on imports of Russian fossil
fuels through long-ter m agreements and shared infrastructure for the
transport of natural gas (see Becker and Åslund this volume). The Kremlin
was clearly aware of this weakness, and imagined it meant that European
216 K. ENGELBREKT
governments would not be able to put very great economic pressure on
Russia. Greek shipping companies were allowed to continue transporting
Russian oil, and Belgian diamond merchants could continue to import
rough diamonds. However, these concessions were of minor importance
for Russia’s state revenues overall. Overall, the problem of sanctions-
evasion had more to do with a lack of political support for EU objectives
in parts of the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.
Had the war ended quickly, the political calculation in European coun-
tries might not have changed. However, the protracted situation that
followed Ukraine’s successful resistance to the invasion meant there was
enough time to mobilise s tructural countermeasures, and not least to take
various steps to reduce dependence on Russian gas. The coordinating role
played by the European Commission—and maybe also the fact that its
current president, Ursula von der Leyen, was once Germany’s defence
minister—contributed to the ability of the Union’s member states to
come together and to mitigate the impact of reduced imports of natural
gas. The problem here consists, however, not just in the dependence
itself, but also in the enormous revenues that Russia generates through
its combined energy exports—revenues that far exceeded the loans and
aid offered to Ukraine until the fall of 2022.
While political solidarity with Ukraine has been unanimous, the readi-
ness to supply Kyiv with military support has been more variable, both
over time and as between different governments. Training assistance for
Ukraine’s armed forces has been ongoing since 2014. For the most part,
however, the delivery of complete weapons systems was long conspicuous
by its absence. This sluggishness was due in part to Ukraine’s financial
situation (the country struggled with deficits during the 2010s), and in
part to political considerations (Goldberg, 2016). NATO countries have
been aware all along that the Kremlin can cite the sale (or transfer) of
advanced weapons systems to Ukraine in support of its claim that Western
countries, especially the US, seek to advance their geopolitical position to
Ukraine’s eastern border and ‘contain’, and eventually threaten, Russia.
Even the delivery of state-of-the-art defensive systems, such as the Javelin
anti-tank missile, has come under constant scrutiny in arms-producing
countries. It was first in early February 2022 that the uk started exporting
the British-Swedish equivalent of the Javelin—the nlaw system—to the
Ukrainian army.
The situation changed very soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion in
late February 2022. The governments first and foremost of NATO
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 217
countries bordering on Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine itself started deliv-
ering various weapons systems. A ‘triangular’ pattern of export emerged,
whereby Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria supplied Ukraine with
Warsaw Pact-era materiel; and Germany, the uk,and the us supplied
more modern, NATO-compatible weaponry to the former countries. It
could be a question of tanks, artillery pieces, or military vehicles. This way,
the Ukrainian armed forces would not need to spend time practising with
the equipment supplied; instead, they could start using it immediately.
An accelerated modernisation of materiel within Central Europe’s armed
forces took place thereby—a modernisation which would otherwise, on
the basis of regular methods of procurement, have taken a longer time.
A qualitative shift in terms of military support took place in the spring
of 2022, when the us and France started transferring long-range missile
and artillery systems—of the himars, m777, and Caesar types respec-
tively—to the Ukrainian army. These require time for training and for
incorporation into logistics systems, which is why it was only in June
and July that they could start being used. At that point, however, the
military impact was considerable: Russian command centres and ammu-
nition depots behind the front lines were attacked to great effect, and the
Russian offensive in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions came to a halt. In
addition, deliveries of American-made Harpoon anti-ship missiles—from
among other sources the Danish military—helped persuade Russia’s Black
Sea fleet to stay further away from the Ukrainian mainland, as did an
increasingly effective use of drones by Ukrainian armed forces.
It bears noting too that the EU and NATO, after decades of friction
and mutual rivalry in the area of security, seem to have reached a new
consensus as a result of the Ukraine war and their concerted action in
2022–23. This consensus applies not least to the need for an autonomous
European conventional military capacity that can be deployed in the
continent’s immediate proximity. The two organisations have also taken a
quite pragmatic stance where the shared utilisation of logistical resources
is concerned.
Why a Security Order Is Ultimately
Dependent on Military Capacity
The normative power of the Union is insufficient, however, when the
adversary is a great power whose political leadership has already shown
itself prepared to use military means to enforce its will, to conquer
218 K. ENGELBREKT
territories, and to destroy the infrastructure, economic life, and social
institutions of its enemies—as well as to undermine the authority of the
EU and NATO. There is no doubt that the European security order
is at stake in the war between Russia and Ukraine. The demands that
the Kremlin, with increasing intensity, has made on NATO, the EU, and
all of their member states are extremely far-reaching. Moscow claims the
right to veto the deployment of weapons systems in Russia’s vicinity, as
well as the membership of other countries in security organisations. It
also aims, at least as much, to force former Soviet republics—especially
those with Russian-speaking or other Slavic populations—to adhere to
its preferred political and economic order. In other words, the Kremlin
does not regard sovereignty or territorial integrity as valid principles for
Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (Deyermond, 2016).
As long, however, as these demands wer e made through diplomatic
channels and within the framework of organisations like the OSCE—
as they were until 2014—they could be dealt with by political means.
Western powers have made various concessions over the years, without
by virtue of that accepting any undermining of the European security
order itself. Now, however—after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—there is
a large consensus among observers that diplomacy is no longer an effec-
tive means. The tools of Realpolitik must be used in defence of Europe’s
security order. Since February 2022, moreover, it has been clear that
they must be used before opposed military forces create realities ‘on the
ground’ that are extremely hard to reverse (Bugayova, 2022).
As early as the fall of 2021, the administration of President Joe Biden
seems to have had highly reliable information on the far-reaching plans of
Russia’s political and military leaders. us leaders understood early on that
Europe’s security order was under direct threat. They found themselves
faced with several decision-making dilemmas, having among other things
to do with the leaders of Ukraine, who wanted to keep their economy
going as long as possible, and who therefore sought to avoid giving public
expression to their unease. In addition, President Biden, Secretary of State
Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan found it hard to convince their European partners
that the intelligence was credible, and the attempt of us leaders to mislead
the world before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 seems to have played a role
here (Beaumont, 2022).
These dilemmas and past experiences were swept aside the moment
Russian troops crossed the border on 24 February. Their place was
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 219
taken by a consensus regarding the threat to Europe, and to the insti-
tutions that had more or less guaranteed peace on the continent—with
exceptions such as the Cyprus conflict in 1974 and the violent disinte-
gration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s—since the end of the Second World
War. Achieving unity on the need to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty was
suddenly easy, and all were agreed on the need to provide humanitarian,
political, and financial support to that country. As noted above, however,
there has been less agreement on the provision of military support, or
on what economic and other sacrifices the citizens of Europe should be
called upon to make in order to help Ukraine resist Russia’s territorial
demands.
One manifest challenge for Europe’s countries lies in the fact that
political and economic commitments need to be aligned with the will to
maintain the European security order (Engelbrekt & Hallenberg, 2007).
This will is far from identical, for geographic and historical reasons, across
the whole continent. Nevertheless, the experience of successful coopera-
tion over several decades does furnish fairly firm ground on which to
stand. Furthermore, Western countries are the time of writing (autumn
2023) providing resources—including military ones—needed to repel
Russia’s attack and thus to refuse its demands for an alternative secu-
rity order. Anything that might be interpreted as a Russian ‘victory’ risk
undermining the entire security order in the long run. In such a case,
namely, rules and principles which are perceived as fundamental would
be set at nought. Restoring the status quo ante—i.e., the situation that
prevailed prior to 24 February 2022—was always viewed as a minimum
requirement for being able to say that Russia’s demands have been denied.
By the autumn of 2023, President Volodomyr Zelenskyy told the UN
Security Council that nothing short of full restoration of the 1991 borders
including Crimea was acceptable to his fellow citizens (Lederer and Peltz
2023).
The stamina shown by European countries and their common institu-
tions will likely be decisive for whether the security order on the continent
lasts. Already after six months of warfare, it was clear that Ukraine had
been the biggest loser, that the economy of the Union’s member states
had been negatively affected, and that the Russian Federation had mainly
suffered losses in terms of reduced imports. Exports of gas, coal, crude
oil, and petroleum products, which constitute Russia’s main sources of
income, fell only slowly, while their prices rose sharply. As a result, the
country’s revenues from its energy exports remained large until they
220 K. ENGELBREKT
began decreasing in early 2023, thus for many months helping to finance
the war.
Due to a range of factors—military, geographic, economic, and
politico-moral—Ukraine’s ability to retake most of what Russian forces
captured in 2022 is likely to be critical for the credibility of Europe’s secu-
rity order. To be sure, one can argue that the very failure of Moscow’s
most ambitious war goals—to take over the whole country save for a
quarter portion in the west—demonstrates the viability of said security
order. The fact that Ukraine and its European allies resisted the attack
and were able to limit its success to less than half of Russia’s original
plans would thus be a sign that the security order largely endures, and that
greater vigilance going forward may be sufficient to keep it alive. A more
pessimistic view, in line with the predictions of Ukrainian leaders and
of Russia experts, is that Putin and his sympathisers within and outside
Europe will consider such an outcome to be a partial victory. The risk
in that case is that Russia’s leaders will try to conquer more Ukrainian
territory at a later stage. Moreover, an outcome of this kind might inspire
others who seek border changes in violation of Europe’s current security
order, e.g., rendering permanent the separate status of Transnistria from
the Republic of Moldova.
European decision-makers were also increasingly worried about what
they perceived as a gr eatly increased propensity on the part of Russian
leaders to take risks. In the same way that European leaders viewed
the continent’s security as under challenge and as requiring defence by
all available means, the Kremlin saw regime stability as dependent on
a successful military campaign. That the stakes were seen as high was
already evident in Putin’s repeated warnings to Western leaders against
intervening on Ukraine’s side in the war. He announced, notably, that
nuclear forces would be put on alert. When Russian troops occupied parts
of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya region and placed combat vehicles and artillery
in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant there, Europe’s
largest, the aforementioned propensity was confirmed again. In 2022 and
2023, representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea)
repeatedly expressed great concern that the nuclear plant could be seri-
ously damaged by the fighting, thereby causing a nuclear accident with
consequences far beyond Ukraine.
Some of these fears nevertheless abated in the second year of the war, as
Ukraine’s armed forces were able to independently recapture large swaths
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 221
of the Kharkiv and Kherson regions as part of the broader counterof-
fensive. Given that Russia’s reputation as a major international power
inevitably is at stake when allegations of war crimes, genocide and gross
violations of the UN Charter have accumulated, restraining factors are
assumed to be at work. As long as the United States and European
allies and partners only gradually provided advanced military assistance
to the Ukrainian armed forces in 2022–2023, this incrementalism was
expected to reduce the risk of rash escalation on the part of the Kremlin.
In the spring of 2023, however, voices urging Western governments to
tip the scales in favour of Ukraine’s armed forces grew stronger (see, e g,
Schadlow, 2023).
The Demands of Great Powers in the Future,
Both Within and Outside Europe
For more than two decades now, Putin’s Russia has been calling for a
multipolar world order where the us no longer plays the role of guarantor
of regional stability, free trade, and freedom of navigation in Europe,
the Middle East, East Asia, and Central and South America. It was with
the aim of achieving such an order that, already in 2005, Russia entered
into a ‘special partnership’ with the People’s Republic of China (prc).
Subsequently, it spearheaded the establishment of the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organisation, as well as—together with Brazil, China, India, and
South Africa—of the ‘brics’ group. Russia has also been very active in
the informal body for cooperation between the world’s twenty biggest
economies, the G20, especially after it got expelled from the G8 in 2014
due to its annexation of Crimea. (The current G7 only includes coun-
tries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the uk,and the us—that
recognise each other as functioning democracies, plus the EU.)
Although Russia in particular was the driving force behind the launch
of bodies like brics and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, signs
have been accumulating for some time that other regional powers wish
to expand their own room for manoeuvre. Not least the brics coun-
tries have become more active in their neighbouring areas, even as they
have worked together to support each other’s interests vis-à-vis the us
and its allies. For example, they have discussed the possibility of laying
underwater cables between them, so as to offer an alternative communi-
cation infrastructure to the one in place (provided as the latter has been
222 K. ENGELBREKT
by the West and especially the United States) (Braw, 2023). Recent mili-
tary investments by regional great powers, which have been significant in
both quantitative and qualitative terms, suggest that diplomacy and trade
policy may be marked in the future by an undertone of coercion—some-
thing of which neighbouring countries may need to take account in their
security policy. The most important player here, not unexpectedly, is the
prc, with its ever larger defence budget.
The main arena within which the struggle between the us and the
prc may end up being fought out is currently Taiwan, to which Wash-
ington has made renewed security commitments in recent years. The
prc’s line towards Taiwan, which it regards as a kind of apostate from the
true fatherland, has hardened significantly under the current president, Xi
Jinping. This in turn must be interpreted as aimed at the position of the
us in East Asia generally. The fact that few members of the international
community recognise Taiwan as an independent state facilitates attempts
by the prc to get other countries to discontinue their protests and expres-
sions of solidarity with Taipei. The way in which Beijing managed to
‘discipline’ Hong Kong—by introducing several new laws (especially the
Security Law that went into force in mid-2020) and revoking various
rights and freedoms—looks like a dress rehearsal for what it hopes to
achieve in Taiwan over the next few years.
It is logical and probably unavoidable for the EU and the European
part of NATO to respond to such global and regional challenges in the
future with a more robust security and defence policy, following the pro-
Taiwanese example of Lithuania (Lau, 2023). Such a policy will need,
moreover, to be accompanied by the development of a larger and more
usable military capability. Relying on the Union’s diplomatic voice seems
naive here, particularly now that China’s leaders and like-minded people
have sided with Russia rather than Ukraine in connection with the most
serious military conflict in Europe since 1945. In this regard, Germany’s
dramatic investment over the next few years in defence—to the tune of
100 billion euros, alongside its regular defence budget of 50 billion—
stands out as the most important development (Fleischer, 2023). This
special appropriation is intended for the German Air Force, which wants
to acquire helicopters and more F-35 fighter jets. But it is not enough
for European countries simply to increase their defence budgets. If they
are to be capable of acting jointly vis-à-vis other parts of the world, they
must also maintain their unity and internal stability.
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 223
The Americans, for their part, have long thought—since well before
the outbreak of the war in Ukraine—that their European allies ought to
increase their defence spending substantially. At least since Obama’s first
term as president (2009–2013), the us has sought to convince its Euro-
pean allies of the need to upgrade their defence capabilities significantly.
Such a move would be particularly apposite, in the American view, given
the steadily growing weight of Asia’s economies in the world, and the
consequent need to transfer American military resources to the region.
It is only in recent years, however, that leading politicians and defence
experts in NATO and the EU have started systematically collaborating
to accomplish such a shift—now that they see an acute need and expe-
rience broader public support for European defence (Engelbrekt, 2022;
Karampekios, 2015).
Building up a robust conventional military capacity in Europe capable
of replacing the American one will take time. The same applies to getting
the armed forces of the different countries to cooperate in the absence of
any strong American component (which has always served as a common
denominator in a NATO context). The funds which the EU is now
prepared to invest in ‘military mobility’—i.e., on being able to move
troops and resources from one part of Europe to another—are a good
start, as are the Permanent Structured Cooperation (pesco)and the
European Defence Fund (the last of which was added to the Union’s
budget in 2021) (Britz, 2023). The year 2022 saw the completion of the
work of developing a ‘strategic compass’ within the EU, the aim of which
was to get a better overview of various cooperative projects, to coordinate
them more effectively, and thereby to strengthen the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP). On this basis, it is hoped, cyber defence can
be strengthened, cooperation on intelligence matters improved, defence
expenditures utilised more effectively, and the fight against deception
and disinformation expanded—thereby enhancing military capacity and
operational readiness in the EU’s immediate surroundings.
The European External Action Service (eeas) headed by the High
Representative—currently Josep Borrell of Spain—has been an important
component of the Union’s ambition to play a ‘strategic role’ in the world
beyond Europe. The eeas today has over 4,000 employees, of whom
about half serve in more than 140 EU delegations in most independent
states, with multilateral accreditation in the remaining countries repre-
sented in the un, and in cities that host international organisations (Addis
Ababa, Geneva, New York, Paris, Rome, and Vienna). Roughly half of the
224 K. ENGELBREKT
employees in these delegations are sent out by the various directorates-
general of the European Commission or the EEAS; and their work is
often in the areas of trade, migration, energy supply, counter-terrorism,
or development assistance.
The British decision to leave the EU has the effect of temporarily
undermining the latter’s ambition to gain greater credibility as a strategic
actor and to increase its independence vis-à-vis the us,the prc,and a
number of regional powers. Yet, in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, a
more optimistic sense of the matter—that work can continue in the same
spirit towards a Union that is ‘sharper’ and more capable of making and
implementing decisions—may be showing itself to be warranted. It has
really only been, after all, in the course of managing crises in connec-
tion with Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine that
the Union’s main decision-makers and institutions have had to show
clear and firm leadership. Not having given in to populist pressures from
British negotiators; having agreed on the joint purchase and distribution
of COVID-19 vaccines; and having instituted increasingly effective sanc-
tions against Russia—these achievements seem to have resulted in greater
self-confidence in Brussels.
The Ro ad to a Mo re Ro b u s t
European Security Order
As long as Russia fails to renounce its political and military claims on
Ukraine, as well as its efforts to dictate the terms of the foreign and
domestic policies pursued by its Western neighbours, the acute threat to
the European security order will persist. A change of regime in Moscow,
combined with a Russian military collapse in southeastern Ukraine, could
remove the short-term threat; but not even a new Russian government
would necessarily take a different attitude. Nor would new leaders neces-
sarily succeed in altering the views of those elements in society that
support the country’s aggression against Ukraine; or which are deeply
suspicious of NATO, the us, and the Western world in general. In other
words, the security problems that have resulted from the war in Ukraine,
and from the demands Moscow has made in connection with it, are likely
to last for quite some time.
As far as Europe and the EU are concerned, there is therefore no
alternative at present to putting the house in order in terms of secu-
rity and societal resilience. This means preserving political unity on the
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 225
continent as best one can; further reducing the dependence on Russian
oil, gas, fertiliser, rare metals and other income-generating exports; and
preparing to defend Europe against the threat from the east with such
societal and military means as may be necessary. It means working with
several different types of question at the same time, so as to increase
stamina and resilience in E urope as a whole. And it means taking defence
issues more seriously than has been done over the last three decades—i.e.,
since the end of the Cold War.
Satisfaction is in order, to be sure, at Europe’s relatively robust and
unified response during the first eighteen months of this crisis: the sanc-
tions imposed on Russia, the financial and diplomatic support extended
to Ukraine, and so on. In this regard, as the situation looks now in
the autumn of 2023, the Union’s institutions, its member states, and
Europe’s civil society have passed the test with flying colours. Military
defence, however, is clearly neglected in the majority of EU countries,
and it will take a period approaching a decade to build up the capability
to defend European territory with conventional forces without American
help. In addition to joint investments in defence industries, in transport
capacity, and in infrastructure, efforts are needed in the training of offi-
cers and the recruitment of soldiers and conscripts. Measures must be
taken to ensure that, in the face of changing conditions on the labour
market, members of the military are retained. Defence capabilities must
be developed in close cooperation with industrial enterprises and academic
institutions—ideally in European research networks and consortia—so as
to achieve synergies and to ensure that scarce resources are well-spent.
Where the ‘nuclear umbrella’ over Europe is concerned, dependence
on the us will continue for a longer time, largely irrespective of what
measures are taken in Brussels in the coming years. Neither France, nor
Germany, nor the uk is in a position to replace American nuclear weapons
over the short or medium ter m. It is not least here that the transatlantic
link needs to be nurtured (Engelbrekt, 2022). This will be necessary in
order to ensure that the us, or indeed Europe, does not neglect over the
long run to conduct successful cooperation on matters of security. To the
extent that strategic and geopolitical rivalry at the global level continues
to intensify over the next few decades, the value of a robust transatlantic
link will likely increase rather than diminish.
226 K. ENGELBREKT
0 102030405060708090
USA
EU-instuons
United Kingdom
Germany
Canada
Poland
France
Norway
Japan
Italy
Czech Republic
Sweden
Netherlands
Spain
State support to Ukraine, 24/1-2022 to 31/7-2023 (in
billions of euros), and type of support
Military Humanitarian Financial
Fig. 9.1 Govermental support to Ukraine. Source ‘Ukraine support tracker’,
website to a database on military, financial, and humanitarian aid to
Ukraine, KIEL institute for the World Economy, 2023
Table 9.1 EU’s enlargement following the signing of the European coal
and steel community on april 18, 1951 (European Parliament 2023) EU’s
enlargement
January 1973 Denmark, Ireland, and the UK
January 1981 Greece
January 1987 Portugal and Spain
January 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden
May 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland. Slovakia, and Slovenia
January 2007 Bulgaria and Rumania
July 2013 Croatia
Source ‘History of the EU’, official EU homepage, European union
9 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER 227
Table 9.2 Sanctions imposed on Russia by EU and like-minded countries, Fall
2023
Type of support for Ukraine Number of countries
participating
Countries
Imposed financial sanctions
on Russia 45 EU’s 27 member states,
Albania, Australia,
Bahamas, Canada, Iceland,
Japan, Kosovo,
Liechtenstein,
Montenegro, New
Zealand, North
Macedonia, Norway,
Singapore, South Korea,
Switzerland, Taiwan, the
UK, and the US
Restricted Russian banks’
access to the SWIFT
system for financial
transactions
33 EU’s 27 member states,
Canada, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, the UK,
and the US
Closed airspace to Russian
aircraft 36 EU’s 27 member states,
Albania, Canada, Iceland,
Montenegro, North
Macedonia, Norway,
Switzerland, the UK, and
the US
Adopted full suspension of
visa facilitation with Russia. 34—full suspension
2—not full suspension, but
in the process of
implementation
EU - Announced full
suspension of VFA as from
12 September 2022.
Albania, North Macedonia,
Norway, Switzerland,
Taiwan and the US have
aligned
Montenegro—Aspires to
align with EU. Have
proposed cancellation of
the visa-free regime for
Russian citizens
Kazakhstan—Ends
unlimited stay for Russians
Agreed on level of price
caps for Russian petroleum
products
32 EU’s 27 member states,
G7 Countries (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United
States) and Australia
Source Official EU Homepage, European Commission 2023
228 K. ENGELBREKT
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