ArticlePDF Available

An antitrust case in the diamond industry: The United States v. the De Beers cartel (1948)

Taylor & Francis
Business History
Authors:
Veronique Pouillard at University of Oslo
Veronique Pouillard
Download full-text PDF
Read full-text
Download citation
Content uploaded by Veronique Pouillard
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Veronique Pouillard on Apr 30, 2024
Content may be subject to copyright.
BUSINeSS
HISTORY
19
Berger, R., Chan, D., & Wing, M. (
2020
). The impact of managerial characteristics on business strategies
under the environmental change: An investigation in the Israeli diamond industry.
Journal of Small
Business & Entrepreneurship
,
32
(2), 123–148.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08276331.2019.1641660
Bernstein, L. (
1992
). Opting out of the legal system: extralegal contractual relations in the diamond
industry.
The Journal of Legal Studies
,
21
(1), 115–157.
https://doi.org/10.1086/467902
Bertilorenzi, M. (
2014
). Business, finance, and politics: The rise and fall of international aluminium
cartels, 1914–45.
Business History
,
56
(2), 236–269.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2013.771337
Bruyland, e
. (
2021
).
Cobalt blues. La sape d’un géant. Congo 1960–2020
. Lannoo.
Buelens, F. (
2007
).
Congo, 1885–1960: een financieel-economische geschiedenis
. ePO.
Cayen, A. (
n.d
.).
Le diamant au Congo et à Anvers
. C. Van Cortenbergh.
Danziger, P. N. (
2022
, 11 June). LVMH makes it official: Lab-grown diamonds are luxury.
Forbes
.
https://
www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2022/06/11/lvmh-makes-it-official-lab-grown-diamonds-
are-luxury/?sh=18198acc52b1
De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States. (
1945
). 325
US 212, 65
S. Ct. 1130, 89
L. e
d. 1566.
De Bruyn, O. (
2006
).
Histoires de diamants: la société minière du Bécéka au Congo
. Racine.
De Bruyn, O. (
2007
).
Inventaire des archives de la Société minière du Bécéka
. Archives Générales du
Royaume.
De Vries, D. (
2010
).
Diamonds and war. State, capital, and labor in British-ruled Palestine
. Berghahn.
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9m0w9v
Decker, S. (
2018
). Africanization in British multinationals in Ghana and Nigeria, 1945–1970.
Business
History Review
,
92
(4), 691–718.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680518001034
Declercq, R. (
2020
). The Congo Cartel: Governing raw materials chains and socio-economic stability,
1918–1950. In M. Shanahan & S. Fellman (e
ds.),
A history of business cartels
(pp. 249–266). Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003128922
Derksen, R. (
1983
). Forminière in the Kasai, 1906–1939.
African Economic History
,
12
(12), 49–65.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3601316
Dietrich, C. (
2002
).
The criminalized diamond economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its
neighbours
. The diamond and human security project, Occasional paper number 4.
https://media.
africaportal.org/documents/4_Hard_Currency_eng_June2002.pdf
Djelic, M. L. (
2005
). From local legislation to global structuring frame: The story of antitrust.
Global
Social Policy
,
5
(1), 55–76.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468018105050120
Donzé, P.-Y., Pouillard, V., & Roberts, J. (e
ds.). (
2021
).
The Oxford handbook of luxury business
. Oxford
University Press.
Dorsett, M. R. (
2005
). Diamonds are a cartel’s best friend: The rise and fall of anticompetitive business
practices within De Beer’s international diamond cartel.
Indiana International & Comparative Law
Review
,
16
(1), 145–182.
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/
iicl16&id=146&men_tab=srchresults
https://doi.org/10.18060/17856
PDF Page 19 /21  
... in countries like Russia, Canada, Angola, and Namibia(Grynberg et al., 2013: Pouillard, 2024). Additionally, review of beneficiation requirements imposed by other governments (McAdams & Reavis, 2008: Claasen & Roloff, 2012).Furthermore, assessment of local content provisions in comparable agreements. ...
Preparing to Negotiate Well: Botswana's Diamond Beneficiation Agreement with De Beers
Preprint
Full-text available
  • Jun 2025
This paper provides an in-depth preparatory framework for Botswana's impending renegotiation of its diamond beneficiation agreement with De Beers, a critical determinant of the nation's economic development and sovereignty over its natural resources. Recognizing the diamond sector's central role in Botswana's GDP and export earnings, the study highlights the need for meticulous groundwork across five key negotiation preparation areas: comprehensive market and corporate intelligence gathering, clear goal setting and prioritization, inclusive stakeholder management, rigorous determination of Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) and reservation price, and formulation of an initial negotiation strategy. The analysis draws upon comparative assessments with other diamond-producing nations, De Beers' evolving corporate strategy, and Botswana's domestic industry performance. The paper emphasizes the importance of aligning economic diversification, community development, environmental sustainability, and knowledge economy aspirations within the renegotiation framework. The study concludes that a well-prepared negotiation approach balancing national interests with international business realities is essential for Botswana to secure sustainable benefits from its diamond resources.
View
View
American Advertising Agencies in Europe: J. Walter Thompson's Belgian Business in the Inter-War Years
Article
  • Jan 2005
This article examines the growth of J. Walter Thompson in inter-war Belgium. This leading US advertising agency established a branch in London in the late nineteenth century, followed by an office in Antwerp, a leading European port as well as an industrial centre. Belgium, as a small multicultural market, was a perfect place to test the new American standards in advertising. Antwerp and London thus saw the first steps towards the development of rationalised, modern and globalised advertising in Western Europe.
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
View
Antitrust and Economic History: The Historic Failure of the Chicago School of Antitrust
Article
  • Sep 2019
This article presents an historical analysis of the antitrust laws. Its central contention is that the history of antitrust can only be understood in light of U.S. economic history and the succession of dominant economic policy regimes that punctuated that history. The antitrust laws and a subset of other related policies have historically focused on the negative consequences resulting from the rise, expansion, and dominance of big business. Antitrust specifically uses competition as its tool to address these problems. The article traces the evolution of the emergence, growth, and expansion of big business over six economic eras: the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, the New Deal, the post–World War II Era, the 1970s, and the era of neoliberalism. It considers three policy regimes: laissez-faire during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, the New Deal, policy regime from the Depression through the early 1970s, and the neoliberal policy regime that dominates today and includes the Chicago School of antitrust. The principal conclusion of the article is that the activist antitrust associated with the New Deal that existed from the late 1930s to the 1960s resulted in far stronger economic performance than have the policies of the Chicago School that have dominated antitrust policy since the 1980s.
View