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Coalition government is an old phenomenon that has got its roots in Western European countries. It has since spread
all over the world including in South Africa. Coalitions in the local sphere of government have existed
predominantly in KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape, but it has since spread over to other provinces in South Africa.
The outcome of the 2016 local government elections brought about dramatic results which saw the governments of
three metropolitan municipalities change hands to coalitions of political parties. The Democratic Alliance (DA) and
other small parties with the assistance of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) constituted coalition governments
in Nelson Mandela Bay (in Eastern Cape), City of Tshwane, and Johannesburg in Gauteng province. However, the
DA mayor and his executive in Nelson Mandela Bay have since been removed with the one from the United
Democratic Movement (UDM) as a mayor and the executives from the African National Congress (ANC) and other
smaller parties. The EFF announced in July 2019 that it will not vote with the DA or ANC in all municipalities where
coalition councils must be formed. This paper seeks to identify challenges associated with coalition governments in
the local sphere of government and propose possible solutions for curtailing such challenges. The paper does so by
way of reviewing existing literature related to coalitions and alliances of municipal governments in South Africa.
One of the challenges is the differing policy positions of the political parties in the coalition. This paper proposes
that the needs and service delivery demands of the local communities must be given more preference over the
political ideologies of the political parties concerned.
Keywords: coalition, municipalities, political parties, service delivery, communities
Despite great efforts by European countries to conceptualise and
theorise this phenomenon, most scholars are agreeable that coalition
is not a straightforward process nor does it have a blue-print for
success in reality (Kadima, 2014; Maserumule et al., 2016). This
much is apparent in South Africa case, where thirty years into
democracy, the country is still grappling with finding a framework
for proper management of coalitions, especially in the local sphere
where a “series of alliances and sprinkling of coalitions” (Boysen,
2015:74) have emerged after every election period since the Local
Government Elections held in the year 2000 (Ndletyana, 2018;
Munzhedzi, 2021). Notably, the literature is replete with inherent
challenges associated with coalition practices in different South
African municipalities (Matoane, 2023; Masina, 2021; Boysen,
2015). This includes, among other things, the council's inability to
pass or agree on budgets and other crucial municipal decisions,
unstable municipal councils, the creation of parallel councils, and
the spontaneous removal of mayors. In light of the above, this
conceptual paper reviews existing literature to identify challenges
associated with coalition governments in the local sphere, and
further proposes possible solutions to curtail the identified
challenges in South African local government. The paper
commences with a broad understanding of the phenomenon of
coalition government within the local sphere of governments in
South Africa.
Contextualisation of Coalition Politics in South
African Local Government
The phenomenon of coalition intertwines with modern politics in
Western European countries (Oyugi, 2006; Kadima, 2014) and due
to their experiences, countries like Belgium, Germany, France, Italy,
and Spain have contributed greatly to the theorisation of coalition
governments. Coalition, as a practice in the political and public
administration spheres, has proven to be a convenient solution for
constituting governments, obviously in cases where the outright
majority in nonexistent following elections, particularly in
constitutional democracies across the world. It has been defined
differently by scholars and practitioners alike, with Makoa (2008)
referring to the phenomenon of formal cooperation based on an
agreement between or among two or more organised groups about
specified activities. Coalition or alliance involves the formation of
cooperating parties in a national, provincial and municipal government
both before and after municipal elections. Political coalitions are more
often than not designed to serve the individual and collective interests
of the cooperating parties. In this instance, either leaders of political
parties or political parties themselves (Oyugi, 2006).
The local sphere of government in South Africa is made up of 257
municipalities and is a sphere that is considered closest to the people
(Independent Electoral Commission, 2023). It consists of
© 2024 Indian Association of Health, Research and Welfare
ISSN-2347-3797
NAAS Rating 4.42
Coalition Councils in South African Local Government: Analysis
of the Challenges and Possible Solutions
1 2
Munzhedzi Pandelani Harry and Arthur Shopola
1
Department of Public & Development Administration, University of Venda, South Africa
2
Department of Public Administration and Local Government, North West University, South Africa
IAHRW International Journal of Social Sciences Review, 2024, 12(1), 21-28
Peer-reviewed and Indexed Journal
https://iahrw.org/our-services/journals/iahrw-international-journal-of-social-sciences-review/
Author Note
1Munzhedzi Pandelani Harry, Department of Public & Development
Administration, University of Venda, South Africa
Arthur Shopola, Department of Public Administration and Local
2
Government, North West University, South Africa
E-mail: Shopola3@gmail.com
We have no known conflict of interest to disclose.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Munzhedzi Pandelani Harry, Department of Public & Development
Administration, University of Venda, South Africa
E-mail: harry.munzhedzi@gmail.com
Unlike any other local government election outcomes before, the
2016 election outcomes were dubbed 'dramatic' in that no single
political party won an outright majority (50% plus 1) to govern at
least four of the metropolitan municipalities in South Africa
(Mokgosi, Shai, & Ogunnubi, 2017). All other local government
elections before were dominated by the African National Congress
(ANC) with the exception of the City of Cape Town and a few other
districts and local municipalities country-wide. Brooks (2014) is of
the opinion that the ANC overwhelmingly dominated the political
landscape in all spheres of government in South Africa in that it often
had a convincing majority (an average of not less than 60%) in the
national, some provinces, and municipalities. These municipalities
that were excluded from this dominance are predominately in
KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape provinces.
metropolitan, districts and local municipalities and all these
municipalities are mandated to provide a wide range of services to
the constituents within individual municipalities. South African
local government which is established in terms of chapter seven of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (hereafter
referred to as the 1996 Constitution) operates within a decentralised
system in that a considerable amount of power has been delegated to
it (Kahn, Madue, & Kalema, 2016). Municipalities have been
conferred with the power to function autonomously, distinctively,
and interdependently from other spheres (Shopola & Mukonza,
2020). The 1996 Constitution also makes a provision for the
executive and legislative authority of a municipality to be vested in
its municipal council.
Kadima (2014) postulates that the main reason for the formation
of coalition governments in Africa as elsewhere in the world is to
hold public or municipal office. Martin and Stevenson (2001) concur
with Kadima's assertion and further posit that the primary goal of
political parties entering into some coalition governments in their
respective municipalities is to hold office and attain power to
control. One of the benefits enjoyed most by parties in coalition
governments is occupying mayoral committee (municipal
executive) positions or any other positions agreed upon by the
parties concerned.
Understanding Municipal Coalitions in South Africa
The South African local sphere of government is no exception to this
in that many coalitions have been formed as early as the year 2000.
Each municipal election subsequent to the 2000 ones has always had
a substantial number of coalition governments including the one in
2016. Ndletyana (2018) indicated that the 2016 municipal election
results had a total of twenty-seven (27). This phenomenon of
coalition is defined differently by scholars and practitioners alike.
Makoa (2008) refers to a coalition as a formal cooperation based on
an agreement between or among two or more organised groups about
specified activities. Oyugi (2006) observes that a coalition or
alliance involves the formation of cooperating parties in national,
provincial and municipal governments both before and after
municipal elections. Oyugi further opines that political coalitions are
more often than not designed to serve the individual and collective
interests of the cooperating parties. In this instance, either leaders of
political parties or political parties themselves.
The 2021 local government election which resulted in over 60
hung councils also triggered coalitions (IEC, 2021). Similar patterns
of unstable coalition governments thus continued. The City of
Joburg, for instance, had five mayors reshuffled in less than two
financial years. Currently, the City is led by the Aljamah mayor a
party with just three seats in the City council. This decision was
supported by EFF, ANC, and other small parties and the arrangement
was such that the other parties will also have a stake in the mayoral
committee. As things stand, ten portfolio committee seats are shared
across the coalition arrangement in the following order; Finance
portfolio (ANC), Corporate and Shared Service (ANC), Public
Saf ety (EF F), Develo pme nt P lan ning (A NC) , Ec ono mic
Development (ANC), Human Settlement (PA), Community
Development (ATM), Transport (PA) and Health (EFF). Since
coalitions are highly dependent on cooperation from the involved
parties the sustainability of governance and building of stable
councils is not an easy task to do, and this is accompanied by the
ever-present possibility of metropoles and many other locals
collapsing at any given time. In other provinces such as Limpopo,
coalitions have led to municipal dysfunctionality and administrative
confusion. Modimolle Mookgopong Municipality is such a culprit
in that disagreements between parties have led to the establishment
of two separate councils and parallel appointments of two municipal
managers (Business Day, 2018).
The 2016 outcomes are considered to be dramatic in that they
were not anticipated hence the political parties involved in the
coalition governments did not undertake preliminary negotiations
preceding the election results (Mokgosi, Shai, & Ogunnubi, 2017).
The three met ropo lita n municipalities, namely, Tshwane,
Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, and Nelson Mandela Bay did not have an
outright winner which forced political parties to negotiate and enter
into a coalition governments (IEC, 2016). After that, the Democratic
Alliance and other small parties such as the Freedom Front Plus
(FFP) with the assistance of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)
constituted coalition governments in the City of Tshwane,
Johannesburg, and Nelson Mandela Bay. Differences between the
Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters ensued
thereafter in 2017 and saw the Democratic Alliance mayor and his
executive in Nelson Mandela Bay being removed with the mayor
from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the mayoral
executive from other parties including the African National
Congress and other smaller parties (Ndletyana, 2018). The African
National Congress (ANC) formed a coalition with an African
Independent Congress (AIC), the Pan African Congress (PAC), and
the Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa (IRASA) in
the City of Ekurhuleni. This goes to show that coalition governments
are political terrain that is often contested. It is for this very reason
that political factors outside of Nelson Mandela Bay were used to
vote out the then-mayor of the Democratic Alliance, Athol Trollip. It
must be noted that until 2021 the EFF was not in coalition in all these
three metropolitan municipalities, either with the DA in Tshwane
and Johannesburg or with the UDM and the ANC in Nelson Mandela
Bay.
On the other hand, Lodge (2014) and Rudge (2014) refer to a
coalition government as an agreed arrangement to cooperate under
which more than one political party unites and cooperates to form a
coalition government. In such instances, parties in a coalition
government agree in principle that they will vote together to approve
a municipal integrated development plan (IDP), budget and service
delivery, and budget implementation plan. Approvals that need the
majority of the municipal council are attended without difficulty
because of the coalition. In essence, regular consultation and
negotiation until common ground is achieved between the parties is
HARRYAND SHOPOLA/ COALITION COUNCILS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 22
Coalition municipalities are an old feature of South African local
politics which dates back to the 2000 municipal elections. Before the
2016 elections, the local government had experienced a total of 97
coalition municipalities. The 2016 elections pushed that tally up to
124. They were highest in 2011 at 37, followed by the 2006 elections
at 31. Despite the prominence of the 2016 elections, they produced
the least number of municipal coalitions which is 27. This is based on
the analysis of the database of the Independent Electoral
Commission of South Africa (IEC, 2016).
According to Siddle (2016), it is worth noting that all but one of
the eight metropolitan municipalities were controlled by the ANC
with the exception of Cape Town. Following the 2006 local
elections, the DA managed to form a coalition with a number of
smaller parties to take control of the City of Cape Town from the
ANC. This was the first example of a significant coalition
arrangement in local government in the country. Several other
smaller municipalities in the Western Cape were run by coalitions.
Siddle (2016) and Mokgosi, Shai, and Ogunnubi (2017) posited that
the 2016 local government elections were perhaps the most
significant elections to be held in South Africa at any level since
1994. Despite pre-election turmoil, the elections themselves were
conducted without major incidents. The dominant party, the ANC,
lost considerable support, dropping by 2% to just over 54%. The loss
was most severely felt in the large metropolitan municipalities. The
developments at many municipalities in South Africa including in
the City of Tshwane, Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay, and
Ekurhuleni necessitated the formation of coalitions precisely
because there was no outright winner. However, there are many
challenges associated with municipal coalitions including in South
Africa. Such challenges are discussed in detail in the subsequent
section of the paper.
solicited. Rudge (2014) goes further to claim that such cooperation
and consultation are paramount in that the parties in the coalition
share a mandate of power given to them by the local electorate.
According to O'Day (2014), the terms and conditions of any
coalition including the local government setup must be specific and
suitable for the particular political system and political culture in
which they operate. Political coalitions are not easy to form, but they
are even more challenging to sustain once they are formed. The
reason for this could be that coalitions are often about the
cooperation of parties and people with different political ideologies.
Other coalition governments are unable to sustain the cooperation
and the term of office due to the challenges that encounter during
their cooperation.
Singh (2006) is of the opinion that some coalitions are formed
with the objective of pulling down a party in power and also
providing an alternative government, and that is referred to as a
positive or constructive coalition. On the other hand, a coalition may
be formed with the sole intention of toppling the incumbent
government and not providing an alternative government, then such
a coalition is referred to by Singh (2006) as a negative or destructive
coalition. Lodge (2014) points out that coalitions may be classified
into pre-poll and post-poll alliances depending upon their time to
come into shape. A pre-poll coalition refers to a situation where a
number of political parties that participated in the municipal
elections come together into one formation before the elections. On
the other hand, Sharma (1989) suggests that a Post-poll coalition is
seen after election results, and in this formation, parties switch sides
to enter into an alliance to obtain the ruling power like the DA and
other small parties in the City of Tshwane and Johannesburg. All the
coalitions based on pre-election alliances were formed by the
political parties which were ideologically close.
The Speaker of the coalition council in the City of Joburg, Polly
Makhubele rejected the supposition that governance will be affected
amid an unstable council due to disagreements arising from the
coalition. She told the media that service delivery does not stop
because there is no council as the role of politicians is largely on
In the book “Future Realities of Coalition Government in South
Africa” the former mayor of Ekurhuleni, Mzwandile Masina argues
that in much as international literature provides no blueprint for
successful management of coalitions South Africa begins to
navigate around to find ways to make municipalities function
beyond councils (Mzwandile, 2021). The Parliament of South Africa
is currently ceased with the proposed coalition bill submitted by DA
which is an attempt to prevent managerial implications associated
with problematic coalition councils. This also in anticipation of the
predictions made by scholars that the local government coalition
results and dynamics are a microcosm of the upcoming national
elections (Booysen, 2023). In anticipation, the DA, IFP, Action SA,
and other small parties represented in the national assembly have
initiated a pact [moon-shot pact] which is a pre-arranged coalition
partnership for the post-2024 election coalition government
(Shopola, 2023). Notably, there seems to be an appreciation from
political players in South African body politic that coalitions are
difficult to manage because they demand a high level of cooperation,
maturity, and tolerance-characters that most parties have displayed a
lack of. However, the point raised by Masina (above) is important
but has its own hurdles. That is, if one considers for example-the
provisions of section 151 of the Constitution (1996) which
effectively vests both legislative and executive powers in the
municipal council, and the provisions in the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 03 of 2022 which defines the role and
significance of council within the local government planning and
budget decision-making process, it would prove very difficult
imagine municipalities functioning beyond council unless in
exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances in this case
may relate to mandatory interventions through section 139 of the
Constitution (1996) during the election day or in cases of
supervening impossibility.
Makoa (2008); Maserumule, Vil-Nkomo, and Mokate (2016),
point out that Since 1994 South Africa has witnessed an atrophying
and weakening opposition and the growth of ruling party hegemony.
However, the huge majority of the ANC has been dwindling with
each election. The electoral victory of the ANC went down from
69.69% in 2004, 65,90% in 2009, 62,15% in 2014 and 57.50% in
2019 (IEC, 2016). The ANC is still the dominant party, offering little
political space for the opposition, even though, at the local
government level, some councils are controlled by its rivals, while
on the other hand, Siddle (2016) shares the same sentiment as he
argues that the ANC has been the dominant political party in South
Africa since 1994. For this reason, the opposition parties might draw
the incentive to enter into a coalition to dismantle the dominant-party
system in which the ANC's election success has been an inevitable
conclusion from one election to the next. Unlike the pre-election
alliances, the post-election or coalition formed by opposition parties
is often done with the intention of beefing-up their strength in order
to win a combined electoral majority even out-winning the
incumbent party (Makoa, 2008; Lodge, 2014).
IAHRW International Journal of Social Sciences Review, 2024, 12(1), 21-2823
The major challenge with coalitions is that service delivery gets
compromised whenever there is a collapse in party agreements, and
Asivikelane's Service Delivery Index (2022) edifies in that regard.
The index assessed the City of Joburg's performance with respect to
water provision, sanitation, and refuse removal, and found that there
has been a service delivery decline in those areas. Over 58 % of
residents reported that there has been insufficient to no access when
it comes to the afore-listed services, and this was linked to an
unstable coalition council in the city (Ndlovu-Nachamba, 2023). To
a ponderable extent, therefore, it can be said that the answer or
solution lies in the hands of the electorates because they are the ones
responsible for coalition results. Perhaps a good question to be asked
is: Are there any available alternatives for residents to escape the
present quandaries precipitating from coalition realities? This
question rests upon the general premise that coalitions are a
convenient way of addressing certain problems, especially the ones
arising from election outcomes. However, international trends point
to a relatively huge shifts from the party-led cities to citizen-led cities
to the extent that there is even a theoretical construct “the New
Municipalism” that characterises these changes. The New
Municipalism is regarded as a nascent global social movement and is
a direct conceptual offshoot of the Fearless Cities Network summit
held in 2017 in Barcelona. As pointed out by Maserumule (2022) this
phenomenon is still developing, with just over 176 cities in existence
globally thus far. As it did in cities such as Rosario (in Argentina),
Bologna (in Italy), Madrid and Barcelona (in Spain) and Mississippi
in the US, this phenomenon is likely to make strides in South Africa
as it is easily and steadily perpetuated by the citizens' belief that local
politics have failed to offer solutions to their problems (Russell,
2019). Thus, the advent of coalitions and their unpredictable nature
and the inconvenient posture on service delivery provides a fertile
ground for new options to manage cities including the New
Municipalism. Considering this possibility in South Africa, the
question of context is of paramount importance, and this necessitates
extensive research-on this developing phenomenon-with more focus
placed on testing whether the idea represents change or represents
the left politics; what is its stand-point on electoral politics? is it a
new paradigm altogether or as Russell asks, is it a return “of yet
another round of 'particular localism'” (2019:994). The following
section looks into the theoretical insights that can assist in
understanding the phenomenon of coalitions. policy issues (ENCA, 2023). This argument is correct at a clinical
level, especially if one uses the circumstances outlined in the
foregoing paragraph as criteria. This, unfortunately, negates the
fundamental nitty-gritty of political leadership especially with
respect to local democracy. Local representatives are regarded as the
key bridge between municipalities (as public institutions) and
communities hence the periodical elections. Perhaps the former
Auditor-General of South Africa, Terrence Nombembe, argued the
point best in opining that “the first and final level of responsibility is
held by the executive leadership, who have front line role in setting
the tone for good governance and accountability”. Having regard to
the power granting section, section 151 (2) of the Constitution
(1996) which gives credence to the Municipal Council over
executive powers, the former AG correctly adds that the political
leadership [council in this case] “is best placed to set the tone for the
rest of the civil service culture: a culture of ethical conduct, a culture
of learning, high performance, and accountability, all of which will
help to prevent any threats to good governance and public
accountability”.
Theoretical Framework
Political party coalition including the local sphere of government is
often studied using two theories, namely, the theories of size and
ideology, and the new institutionalism (Gamson, 1961; Hinckley,
1972; Mokgosi, Shai, & Ogunnubi, 2017). This paper chose the
theory of size and ideology which claims that for a coalition
government to have a prospect of success, the size and ideology of
the coalition play a paramount role. The claim is that the political
parties in the coalition government must be as little as possible to
avoid many differing voices within the coalition. Equally, the theory
of size and ideology also encourages that the coalition parties should
be as close as possible as far as political ideologies are concerned.
The argument advanced is that the more closer the ideology of
parties is, the more likely the prospects of success in that coalition.
Gamson (1961) in concurrence is of the view that the smaller the
number of parties in the coalition the better. This will minimize the
prospective benefits in the form of executive positions to be
occupied in the municipality. The more the political parties are
involved in the coalition, the theory of size and ideology postulates
that the differences are more likely. It is even more difficult to
manage such parties let alone the differences, particularly if they are
more than a reasonable number (Riker, 1962). In essence, Riker's
(1962) assertion is that the smaller the number of political parties in a
coalition and the more closer the parties to their ideologies the better
and easier they are to manage. However, Kadima (2014) correctly
dismisses the view held by many including Franklin and Mackie
(1984) that policy goals of political parties play a central role in
coalitions, and advances the view that policy goals play a minimal
role in as far as forming a coalition is concerned.
The coalition governments are often formed as a result of the
absence of the absolute winner when municipal election results are
declared. As such, a general deduction from the mainstream
literature is that coalitions are often formed with the main reason
being that of occupying office no matter how far apart the coalition
partners are concerning their ideological proximities (Mokgosi,
Shai, & Ogunnubi, 2017). For example, the EFF voted for the DA to
govern Tshwane and Johannesburg with other smaller coalition
partners while the ANC formed a coalition with AIC and Ratepayers
Union in Ekurhuleni. EFF has since announced in July 2019 that they
will not vote with either the DA or the ANC where there are coalition
governments. However, it must be noted that the EFF was not part of
the coalition governments in these Metros besides voting with the
DA to pass a budget, by-laws and the IDP as well as voting for the
mayoral candidates put forwards by the DA. In essence, the EFF
voted with the DA without being in a coalition government with
them in Tshwane and Johannesburg. A different scenario played out
in the recent election of the Aljama candidate to the mayorship of the
City of Joburg where EFF, ANC, and ATM traded their support for
mayoral committee seats.
The DA's and the EFF's ideologies are far apart from each other
but the two have a working arrangement (not a coalition) where they
negotiated and agreed from time to time to vote together on issues of
common interest. This arrangement between the DA and the EFF
supports the argument which says that political ideologies and policy
goals play a minimal role in choosing coalition partners to form a
government (Mokgosi, Shai, & Ogunnubi, 2017). Seemingly, DA
and IFP have been working together to dethrone ANC in some
HARRYAND SHOPOLA/ COALITION COUNCILS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 24
● The elites are interested in preserving the system and their places
in it,
● People's agenda is set and determined by the elites, and
● The welfare of the local communities rests upon the elites rather
than the themselves,
Challenges of Municipal Coalition in South
Africa
● When public policy does not reflect the demands of the people,
Even though municipal coalition governments possess a number of
advantages for democracy, they certainly have challenges that they
are often confronted with that make them unable to pass credible by-
laws, municipal IDP, and budgets. The challenges are discussed in
the ensuing section of the paper.
municipalities in the KZN. In the absence of any other pointer that
can be used to locate the relationship between DA and IFP outside of
numeric interpretation of electoral outcomes in different
municipalities, a valid suspicion is that the two parties may be
knotted by their ideological orientation as they both believe in
federalism. The EFF had indicated in 2016 that the reason they are
voting with the DA is to punish the corrupt elements in the ANC
which was in power since the dawn of democracy in all metros in
South Africa with the exception of Cape Town (Maserumule, Vil-
Nkomo, & Mokate, 2016; TimesLive, 2016).
The two theories are adopted in this paper precisely due to the
reason that the theory of size and ideology correctly claims that the
fewer the number of parties in the coalition, the better it is to manage
it, while the elite theory believes that the interests of the elites in the
political space play a significant role. It is argued that ideologies are
an important element in a coalition, yet in practice, political
personalities play an even more primary role in forming or ending a
coalition. The subsequent part of the paper identifies and discusses
challenges in coalition municipal governments.
● The way of communication is perpetually from the elites to the
masses.
Trust Deficiencies Amid Political Leaders
The elite theory which has been selected because of its
applicability in this paper is about the dominance and the central
influence of the political elites in the municipal policies and
decisions. It therefore means that the decision to form and choose a
coalition partner is in terms of the elite theory more of an elitist
decision, meaning that the elites decide for the people. Largely,
political decisions are taken without the necessary consultations
with the affected communities. In the case of coalition governments,
it would be the members of the political parties in a coalition
government. More often than not, the ANC, DA, and the EFF entered
into several coalition discussions following the absence of the
absolute winners in some of the metropolitan municipalities in the
2016 local government elections. All decisions regarding the
coalitions were taken by the political elites of these parties. It can be
opined that the negative relationship between the former President of
the ANC Jacob Zuma and the leader of the EFF Julius Malema, in
2016, played a paramount role in the two parties not agreeing to form
a coalition government in several metropolitan municipalities,
especially in the City of Tshwane and City of Joburg. The two
political elites (Zuma & Malema in this case) play a central role. Shai
(2013) posits that the elite theory manifests itself in the following
manner:
Coalition governments dictate that political leaders of such parties or
coalitions should work together on an ongoing basis. Oyugi (2006) is
of the opinion that trust deficiency among political leaders of
coalitions, and such often generates friction between them. This is
often due to the fact that leaders do not trust that a leader of another
political party is likely to make a decision that is in the interest of that
party rather than of the coalition governments or at least of the
populace. Oyugi (2006) further alludes that the experience of South
Africa is relevant. The DA and the EFF's working relationship has
ended in mid-2019 because of such mistrust. The DA indicated that
they were not willing to give the mayoral seat of Tshwane Metro to
the EFF, this also includes Mookgophong-Modimolle Municipality
in Limpopo (IOL, 2019). As a consequence of that lack of trust, some
coalition governments never last for the entire term. The elite theory
also alludes to the fact that everything to do with the coalition is
about the leadership of political parties and not the interests of the
local communities.
The preceding elements discussed define the elites theory and
what it is about. In essence, elitism is about disregarding the views
and needs of the local communities and giving more preference to
the elite group which could be the top politicians and business
people. For example, we argue that the coalition talks between the
ANC, DA, and EFF after the 2016 local government elections were
largely influenced by the elites (relations between Zuma &
Malema). The EFF ended up voting with the DA in Tshwane and
Johannesburg while ANC partnered with the AIC and Ratepayers
Union. Surely all the political parties involved in the coalition
governments after the 2016 local government elections and beyond
did not consult their respective members and voters. Decisions are
often taken by the elites with the interests of the very same elites.
Local communities never decide for themselves in as far as elitism is
concerned. The elite theory extensively differs from the theory of
size and ideology which dictates that coalition governments are
formed with the size and ideologies of such political parties as being
the cornerstone.
Minor Political Parties
Coalitions have also had the effect of fragmenting the party system
in some countries (Kadima, 2014). Small political parties may get
weakened due to this fragmentation. After such fragmentation,
leaders of small political parties often obtain less number of votes in
the subsequent elections precisely due to the fact that they can't
prove as a political party that they can stand alone while large parties
will increase their support base from the experience of coalition.
Consequently, it can be safely maintained that party alliances and
coalitions tend to disproportionately weaken small political parties
In Nelson Mandela Baby, the EFF changed its position and
decided to vote out the DA because of what they characterise as the
“stubbornness of whiteness” (Politics Web, 2018). Notably, the EFF
has in a number of hung councils emerged as the 'kingmakers' and
have always tried to use its status to drive its own agenda without
being worried about leading from the helm (mayorship). One of
many examples is the North West based Metsimaholo Municipality
which produced a hung council in 2021 where EFF rejected the
mayorship offer on the score that the party would only assume such
responsibility through an outright majority. All these elements are
the ideals of the elite theory which has also been espoused in this
paper in addition to the theory of size and ideology.
IAHRW International Journal of Social Sciences Review, 2024, 12(1), 21-28
25
The challenges discussed in the preceding section of the paper are
an indication that coalition governments including the local sphere
of government cannot function without barriers. Many of these
challenges may be caused by ideologies that are far apart from each
other like that of the DA and the EFF. Some of these challenges are
also caused by the fact that coalition partners are too many which
results in differing policy positions of many partners. On the
contrary, the elite theory posits that ideologies are not the
determining factor in a coalition. The elite theory claims that all that
matters is the elite of the parties and not the local communities. The
theory of size and ideologies dictates that the coalition must be as
small as possible for it to function appropriately. Furthermore, the
theory of size and ideologies dictates that the coalition should be
comprised of partners with ideologies that are closer to each other.
This means that political parties with ideologies that are far apart
from each other like the DA and EFF, PAC and FFP are likely not to
function properly. The ensuing section of the paper recommends
possible solutions to the identified challenges.
Delegation of Authority and Responsibilities
Gautam (2018) identifies delegation of power, authority, and
responsibilities as another thorny challenge among different parties
forming a coalition municipal government. A leading party in a
coalition would have its members in decision-making structures so
that when important issues are debated they would make favourable
decisions. Power contest between coalition partners is bound to
occur like what transpired in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro when
differences between the mayor from the DA and the deputy mayor
from the UDM collapsed the coalition government between the DA,
UDM, and Patriotic Alliance (EWN, 2019). This was with the
support of the EFF in electing a mayor, speaker, IDPs, and a
municipal budget. The DA and EFF relationship has since ceased to
exist in all municipalities as a result of the EFF announcing that they
are no longer voting with the DA in all coalition municipalities
where support was there previously.
The public administration environment is always politicized in that
government administration and politics are like inseparable twins
(Cameron, 2009; Sebiloane, 2009; Munzhedzi, 2020). Municipal
administration is no different in that the municipal election outcomes
also have huge implications at an administrative level for
municipalities that have undergone changes in political control, and
not just those that have a coalition or minority governments (Siddle,
2016). This may be because the administrations of most
municipalities have become profoundly politicized after years of
single-party dominance, and are inhabited by political appointees
(Maserumule, Vil-Nkomo, & Mokate, 2016; Munzhedzi & Phago,
2020). Therefore, it is a challenge for the leader of a coalition
government to make decisions and plan and execute various policies
or obtain consensus from all sides (Gautam, 2018). South African
government like many governments of the world has adopted the
policy of cadre deployment which seeks to deploy cadres of the
ruling political party in the management of that municipality (Mello,
2013). This in essence means that politicians are deployed in
administrative departments of the municipalities. This is rather
incomprehensible in coalition governments in that they are
comprised of multiple parties which makes the deployment of a
municipal manager and directors a little challenging unlike when
there is an absolute winner in the municipal election. However,
senior managers such as municipal managers in coalition
municipalities can be generally assumed to be often sourced from the
dominant coalition partner.
Municipal Administration Politicized
Fragility of Coalition Agreements
while strengthening the main party in the alliance or coalition
(Kadima, 2014). Booysen (2014) also concurs with this assertion
and posits that one of the contributing factors is the migration of
supporters and to some extent members of a small coalition partner.
A good example is that in the 2011 municipal elections, the DA
obtained a substantial number of votes to now govern the City of
Cape Town on its own after dominating its small coalition partners in
the 2011 municipal election (Siddle, 2016). Thereafter, the coalition
arrangement came to an end in that metro, meaning that the DA's
support went up while those of its other coalition partners at the time
went down. This poses a major threat in the coalition because it
clearly shows that once a party gets enough votes to govern the
municipality, the small parties that they entered into a coalition with
are ditched. After all, their support is no longer needed which in turn
causes bitterness out of some parties as they would be used by the
party they entered into coalition with. In essence, small parties get
swallowed by major parties in the coalition in that its councillors
may get recruited into the main party in the coalition and vanish into
the thin air. This is particularly true if the difference in size between
the parties concerned is very enormous.
Siddle (2016) is of the opinion that coalition governments are by
their very nature fragile, and that often leads to their
dysfunctionality. Due to such a fragility, municipal by-laws, IDP,
and budget are difficult to pass without the support of all the parties
in the coalition go vernment inc luding mi nor ity parti es
(Maserumule, Vil-Nkomo, & Mokate, 2016; Mokgosi, Shai, &
Ogunnubi, 2017). The positions of elected office-bearers, such as the
mayor and the speaker are often put for motion of no confidence
whenever there are disagreements between coalition partners. One
of the main reasons for this fragility is the that the coalition is
constituted by many political parties which is the opposite of what
the theory of size and ideology postulates as discussed in the
preceding section of this paper. Equally important as provided for in
the discussion of the theory of size and ideology is that some of these
coalitions are comprised of parties that are far apart in terms of their
ideologies. However, the elite theory postulates that the ideologies of
parties in a coalition are not as important as the need to attain
political power in the municipality. Conversely, the fragility of the
arrangement in Johannesburg has already been demonstrated, when
the mayor, shortly after having been elected with EFF support,
announced his intention to privatize the city's refuse collection
service, only to be told in no uncertain terms that such a course of
action would cost him the EFF's support and his job (EWN, 2016).
The recent development has resulted in the EFF announcing that
they will not vote with the DA wherever they have coalitions
including in the City of Tshwane and Johannesburg (IOL, 2019).
This may be argued that it is influenced by different ideologies of
the DA and the EFF. However, the advantage is that whenever
there is a coalition government between political parties in a
municipality, good governance is advanced. This is because
management or the administration will be under pressure to
perform with the fear of being exposed to poor governance and
maladministration.
HARRYAND SHOPOLA/ COALITION COUNCILS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 26
According to Siddle (2016), for a coalition government to function
properly and address the fragility of the coalition, smaller parties in
the coalition must be represented in the executive of the
municipality, that is, selecting them as part of the mayoral committee
or even as a speaker. This is so different from the kind of arrangement
that existed in the City of Tshwane and Johannesburg where the EFF
voted with the DA in the council but its councillors have not been
included in the executive while the relationship lasted. However, it
must be noted that the EFF preferred that arrangement until July of
2019 when they wanted to be voted as a mayor in Tshwane with the
support of the DA (IOL, 2019). The representation of small parties in
the coalition executives also boosts the confidence of small parties in
the coalition as they know that their opinions matter in important
issues that are discussed. Equally important is that the major
coalition partner has to cooperate with the small parties because they
rely on them not to pull out of the coalition. Ensuring that all
coalition partners are included in the municipal executive or as a
speaker strengthens the relationship between the parties that are in
the coalition.
The above discussion indicated that coalition governments are an old
phenomenon which originated in Western Europe countries and later
spread over the world including in South Africa. As early as the year
2000, coalition municipalities came about in South African
municipalities. However, the 2016 local government election
ushered in a new era in that it was for the first time that, first, at least
four metropolitan municipalities did not have an ultimate winner,
and second, the ANC has never lost power and votes in the metros in
such a massive scale. It is worth noting that coalitions play a very
significant role in the local government sphere although they have
their challenges that make them not function optimally. Equally
important is the fact that this paper developed possible
recommendations to counter the identified challenges. To this end, it
is clear that the political landscape in South Africa is changing as
elections come and go, and that the playing field is no longer a one-
man show like it used to be before which shows that there is growth
in the political turf.
Co-governance
The challenges discussed above are an indication that coalition
governments within South African municipalities are confronted by
many challenges that have an effect on municipal service delivery.
The reason for this is that if coalition partners are fighting, the
smaller partners in the coalition are likely not to support the approval
of the policies, IDPs, and municipal budgets. This paper suggests the
possible solutions to the identified challenges in the subsequent
section of the paper.
Representation of Small Parties
Possible Solutions to Municipal Coalition Challenges
in South Africa
Political parties forming a coalition government must develop a
clear plan on how they intend to execute their obligations in ways
that support their given mandate. It is on this basis that Maserumule,
Vil-Nkomo, and Mokate (2016) contend that following the outcome
of the 2016 local government elections in South Africa, a need
necessitated coalition partners to put maximum effort into ensuring
that the coalition becomes a success. The claim is that two hands are
better than one so if political parties co-govern a municipality the
likelihood is that there will be better governance in the municipality
as a result because they hold each other accountable for their work.
However, others are of the view that this could not be executed as per
the Auditor-General of South Africa (2019) report where coalition
municipalities including the City of Tshwane and Johannesburg
obtained excessive irregular expenditures. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that co-governance is not a good strategy for political
parties in a coalition to hold each other to account. With co-
governance by coalition partners, the likelihood of divergence,
deviation, and corruption is minimal for the same reason that there
are good checks and balances in coalition governments.
The challenge of trust by coalition partners as identified above
may be adequately addressed through co-governance between
political parties in the coalition government. If all parties in the
coalition (big & small) are involved equally in the management of
that municipality, they are likely to trust each other. Co-governance
brings cooperation, trust, stability positivity to respective
municipalities. Equally important to addressing differing ideologies
in coalition governments is putting the needs and interests of the
local populace at the center of local politics. It is recommended that
the ideologies of political parties be secondary to the needs and
interests of the people within the jurisdiction of those municipalities.
The challenge is that political parties including in the context of
coalition politics function and operate on the basis of the ideologies
of their respective political parties. However, the elite theory
correctly postulates that even though ideologies should play a
fundamental role in coalitions, elitism plays an even more central
role. Attainment of political power becomes an ultimate aim at all
costs. This could even be the reason why DA and EFF worked
together (not in coalition) for some time from 2016- July 2019 with
differing ideologies. Elitism played a primary role in such
relationships as posited by (Mokgosi, Shai, & Ogunnubi, 2017).
The possible solutions discussed in the preceding part of the paper
designates that it is possible for coalition municipalities in South
Africa to function beyond the identified challenges. The identified
challenges including trust, weak and small partners, fragility, and
delegation of responsibilities are mere blockades to the effective and
efficie nt f unctioning of coalition governments. If these
recommended measures discussed above could be adequately
implemented, the management and operations of coalition
governments in South Africa may be well advanced.
Gautam (2018) is of the opinion that to manage divergence in
coalition government, the relationship between coalition partners
must be regulated by some form of a contract. The regulating
contract should seek to manage the equality of coalition partners, the
fragility of the coalition, politicisation of the relationship as well as
delegation of responsibilities and deployment into positions. If
deployment into positions of responsibility and delegation of powers
is not handled properly, conflicts within coalition partners are likely
to rise. It is a fact that different political parties have different visions,
and goals and the regulating contract may assist in managing the
relations between the parties. In essence, the coalition partners must
strive to behave within the confines of the regulating contracts.
Conclusion
The theory of size and ideology was one of the two theories
adopted in this paper, and it advocated that the fewer number of
political parties in the coalition government and the closer their
Regulating the Relationships
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HARRYAND SHOPOLA/ COALITION COUNCILS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 28
