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Wasting public money to buy turnout: quasi-experimental evidence from the Polish battle for fire trucks
Abstract
It is well known that incumbents enjoy advantages in elections. Among others, they may use public resources to increase their electoral chances by mobilizing specific social groups to vote. In the 2020 presidential elections, the Polish government organised a competition: small municipalities with the highest turnout could win a fire truck. We exploit the threshold of 20,000 that arbitrarily divided municipalities into competing and non-competing for this public good and apply the quasi-experimental Regression Discontinuity Design. The competition aimed to increase the turnout in districts supporting the incumbent president. However, we find no evidence of any significant impact of the competition on the turnout or support for the incumbent around the threshold. We discuss why similar practices are common despite this result.
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A critical barrier to generating cumulative knowledge in political science and related disciplines is the inability of researchers to observe the results from the full set of research designs that scholars have conceptualized, implemented, and analyzed. For a variety of reasons, studies that produce null findings are especially likely to be unobserved, creating biases in publicly accessible research. While several approaches have been suggested to overcome this problem, none have yet proven adequate. We call for the establishment of a new discipline-wide norm in which scholars post short “null results reports” online that summarize their research designs, findings, and interpretations. To address the inevitable incentive problems that earlier proposals for reform were unable to overcome, we argue that decentralized research communities can spur the broader disciplinary norm change that would bring advantage to scientific advance. To facilitate our contribution, we offer a template for these reports that incorporates evaluation of the possible explanations for the null findings, including statistical power, measurement strategy, implementation issues, spillover/contamination, and flaws in theoretical priors. We illustrate the template’s utility with two experimental studies focused on the naturalization of immigrants in the United States and attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Jordan.
This article reports on two sets of field experiments testing text messaging (SMS) among native Norwegian voters and live phone calls among young voters eligible to vote in their first election. The two sets of experiments are done in both local and national elections. Most previous studies of election salience and voter mobilization use data from countries with generally lower levels of turnout than in Northern Europe (including Norway). This article addresses how the effectiveness of voter mobilization varies by election salience, in a generally high-salience political context. We find the two experiments to be more effective in low/middle salience elections, with turnout around 60 percent, than in high salience elections with turnout higher than 75 percent.
In political science literature, it is often argued that compulsory voting can serve as a remedy against turnout inequality and thereby contribute to more egalitarian societies. However, the literature neglects differences between compulsory voting systems, and most studies consider the obligation to vote as a dichotomous variable. As a result, relatively little is known about the causal effects of particular stimuli and features of compulsory voting. By exploiting quasi-experimental conditions from direct-democratic decision-making in Switzerland, this research assesses the degree to which abstention fines account for a citizen’s willingness to vote under a compulsory voting context. The findings reveal that a marginal increase in monetary sanctions for voter-abstention leads temporally to a sizeable increase in turnout. However, it does not necessarily contribute to the expression of preferences by those traditionally underrepresented in direct-democratic decision-making since a third of those motivated to vote by the threat of a heavier fine will cast an empty or invalid ballot. The effect on turnout is further found to be moderated by income.
Does unemployment increase or decrease electoral participation? A considerable body of work has examined this classic question, focusing on individual and contextual unemployment. However, this literature has scarcely examined the role of past experiences of unemployment, and not yet addressed their interaction with contextual unemployment. In this article, we extend the framework of unemployment scarring to study electoral behaviour. First, we posit that unemployment scars decrease electoral participation. Second, we formulate competing hypotheses on the macro–micro interactions between unemployment rates and scarring at the country, NUTS1 and 2 levels. We test these hypotheses relying on Rounds 4–8 (2008–2016) of the European Social Survey, for 26 countries. Results from logistic regressions with country and year fixed effects indicate that citizens with long unemployment scars are 9% less likely to vote than the non-scarred. We further find that higher unemployment rates at the sub-national levels slightly increase turnout, while there is no significant effect at the country level. For the sub-national levels, we find that lower unemployment rates exacerbate the individual scarring effect on turnout up to 13%. These findings remark that the framework of the scar effects of unemployment further illuminates the relationship between social stratification and political behaviour.
Public resources are often allocated neither effectively nor equitably, and they serve as a tool for securing re-election. Despite compelling evidence for pork-barrel politics, little is known about voters’ perceptions of this practice. Moreover, limited findings from Western countries are also contradictory – voters perceive such a strategy both positively and negatively. To contribute with findings from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), we conducted two survey experiments – in Czechia and Slovakia – which randomized people’s exposure to fairness of the distribution and profit for the respondent’s country. Our results suggest that once voters realize their profit from pork-barrel politics, they are less critical of unfair distributions of resources and the responsible decision-maker.
Recently, mandatory vote-by-mail has received a great deal of attention as a means of administering elections in the United States. However, policy-makers disagree on the merits of this approach. Many of these debates hinge on whether mandatory vote-by-mail advantages one political party over the other. Using a unique pairing of historical county-level data that covers the past three decades and more than 40 million voting records from the two states that have conducted a staggered rollout of mandatory vote-by-mail (Washington and Utah), we use several methods for causal inference to show that mandatory vote-by-mail slightly increases voter turnout but has no effect on election outcomes at various levels of government. Our results find meaning given contemporary debates about the merits of mandatory vote-by-mail. Mandatory vote-by-mail ensures that citizens are given a safe means of casting their ballot while simultaneously not advantaging one political party over the other.
This research shows that prior studies have been based on a survey methodology that systematically underestimates vote buying. Survey questions that rely on filter questions and include the phrase “in exchange for your vote” make respondents less likely to self-report receiving gifts during political campaigns. In turn, direct questioning that help respondents remember whether they received an electoral gift makes them more likely to report it. The findings of this paper suggest that prior vote-buying surveys have underestimated the amount of clientelism by political parties in Latin America. When following our proposed question wording, our research finds that the clientelistic linkages between parties and voters are stronger than previously considered.
The May 13, 2019 midterm elections were generally seen as a referendum on the first three years of the presidency of Rodrigo R Duterte. The elections tested and consolidated the political strength of Duterte as the country’s populist strongman president. Most of the national and local candidates he endorsed won their contests for the 18,066 national and local positions. The election also resulted in a victory for the administration’s nine senatorial candidates (out of 12 seats) and a majority of its governors, mayors, and local legislators. The results follow the historical patterns of midterm elections in the post-authoritarian period. But unlike previous Philippine presidents, Duterte did not personally endeavor to consolidate his political support under his dominant party solely through the systematic mobilization of patronage. Duterte eschewed patronage-based political party building in favor of populist mobilization or the rallying of mass supporters toward contentious political action with minimum institutional intermediation. With a record high trust rating, Duterte was not only an active endorser of candidates, but he was also both a staunch defender of his allies and a relentless attacker of the opposition. In the end, the biggest winners in the 2019 midterm elections were not the candidates but Duterte himself.
We undertake a comprehensive examination of restrictive voter ID legislation in the American states from 2001 through 2012. With a dataset containing approximately one thousand introduced and nearly one hundred adopted voter ID laws, we evaluate the likelihood that a state legislature introduces a restrictive voter ID bill, as well as the likelihood that a state government adopts such a law. Voter ID laws have evolved from a valence issue into a partisan battle, where Republicans defend them as a safeguard against fraud while Democrats indict them as a mechanism of voter suppression. However, voter ID legislation is not uniform across the states; not all Republican-controlled legislatures have pushed for more restrictive voter ID laws. Instead, our findings show it is a combination of partisan control and the electoral context that drives enactment of such measures. While the prevalence of Republican lawmakers strongly and positively influences the adoption of voter ID laws in electorally competitive states, its effect is significantly weaker in electorally uncompetitive states. Republicans preside over an electoral coalition that is declining in size; where elections are competitive, the furtherance of restrictive voter ID laws is a means of maintaining Republican support while curtailing Democratic electoral gains.
In distributing clientelistic payoffs to citizens, the best strategy a party machine can pursue, we argue, is to target citizens who are opinion-leading epicenters in informal conversation networks. This persuasion-buying strategy carries the highest potential yield for the party since the payoff can create a social multiplier: the effect of the clientelistic gift can be magnified via the conversion of multiple voters within a payoff recipient’s personal networks. Using cross-sectional survey data from 22 Latin American countries and a panel survey from Mexico, we confirm that individuals who engage in frequent political persuasion and who are located in large political discussion networks are the most likely recipients of clientelistic payoffs. We also show that a finding that is key to previous theories, namely that loyal partisans are the most likely targets of clientelism, is driven by omitted-variable and endogeneity bias.
Politicians often buy votes with impunity. Despite formal laws against vote buy-ing, Brazil rarely prosecuted politicians for this common practice. What explains a recent and dramatic shift? In the late 1990s, over one million Brazilians signed a petition against vote buying, leading to the country's first law by popular initia-tive (Law 9840). Under this law, nearly 700 politicians have been removed from office for vote buying. This study examines how civil society and the judiciary played an instrumental role in both enacting and implementing Law 9840.
We consider implementation issues regarding two mechanisms that have been used to increase voter turnout in elections: fines and lotteries. We focus on the amount of the fine or lottery prize needed to achieve full participation. We then propose a combined, self-financing mechanism by which the fines imposed on non-participants are used to finance the prize that is awarded by lottery to one of the individuals choosing to participate in voting. We argue that this combined mechanism has some advantages over the other two mechanisms and merits consideration.
We analyze the effects of a volunteer-led postcard writing campaign intended to turn out registered voters to support specific candidates in two state legislative districts. After adjusting for known selection bias in treatment assignment, we find that the postcards had a surprising negative effect on overall voter turnout. There is no evidence of effects being conditional on socioeconomic status or prior voting history. Of several explanations for this unexpected result, the most promising is that the focus on a down-ballot race distracted subjects from being aware of higher-profile contests on the ballot that might have motivated them to vote. We encourage researchers and practitioners to take negative findings seriously and develop tests for the explanations we offer.
We report on a large-scale (randomized) field experiment we designed and conducted to assess ATMs’ (automatic teller machines) capacity to “get out the vote”. This is a heretofore unexploited method of voter mobilization. Our experimental design used the full universe of functioning ATMs in Portugal, which benefits from a sophisticated world class system, with wide national coverage. We randomly selected a set of treatment civil parishes, where a civic message took over the totality of ad time in ATMs, which we compare with a set of control civil parishes where advertisements ran as usual. The ATM campaign we follow was active for three days immediately before and during the 2017 local elections in Portugal. When we consider the intensity of treatment, for both the entire campaign period and the weekend, results show a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of voting. All three proxies for treatment intensity we employ deliver robust positive coefficients. Placebo tests using turnout rates in previous elections do not show significant coefficients, strengthening our interpretation of the experimental results.
How do politicians motivate voters to turn out and support them? We posit that incumbents construct tournaments between groups and distribute rewards to groups based on the levels of electoral support provided. We test our propositions in Japan, where incumbents can discern relative levels of support provided by municipalities in their districts and influence spending in ways that reward certain municipalities over others. Using new data on approximately 3,300+ Japanese municipalities in 1980 to 2000, we show that when municipalities are ranked according to their levels of support for Liberal Democratic Party winners in their district, those at higher ranks get larger rewards, the difference in size of the reward increases at higher ranks, and those in districts where municipalities vary more in size also receive larger rewards. Our findings support the theory and help explain other features of Japanese politics, including why pork tends to flow to relatively unsupportive districts.
The prevalence of vote-buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world; potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians, and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected. In this paper, we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability. Using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya, we find that vote payments reduce voters' willingness to hold politicians accountable: holding fixed politician identity, voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent-seeking, and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted. Unsurprisingly, the politician then engages in a higher level of rent-seeking. A simple model of multi-faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings.
This article discusses research on public opinion, political communication, and political attitudes. It looks at political communication research methods in the contexts of convergence and new media. A brief discussion of the key concepts of framing, agenda-setting, and priming, and the state of comparative political communication research is covered in this article as well. The micro-level effects of media use, the macro-level consequences of changes in media environments, and the future opportunities for political communication research are discussed in the latter portion of this article.
In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the “wrong” way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? This book uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that clientelistic strategies must be disaggregated based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. The authors document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions, and also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians’ personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous studies have argued.
In this Element and its accompanying second Element, A Practical Introduction to Regression Discontinuity Designs: Extensions, Matias Cattaneo, Nicolás Idrobo, and Rocıìo Titiunik provide an accessible and practical guide for the analysis and interpretation of regression discontinuity (RD) designs that encourages the use of a common set of practices and facilitates the accumulation of RD-based empirical evidence. In this Element, the authors discuss the foundations of the canonical Sharp RD design, which has the following features: (i) the score is continuously distributed and has only one dimension, (ii) there is only one cutoff, and (iii) compliance with the treatment assignment is perfect. In the second Element, the authors discuss practical and conceptual extensions to this basic RD setup.
Minority voters are more likely to vote in the presence of a co-ethnic candidate. We argue that co-ethnicity should be significantly related to the decision to cast a ballot prior to Election Day. We use national survey data and voter registration files from Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina to test this extension of the co-ethnic mobilization literature. Our findings support the co-ethnic mobilization thesis by demonstrating that black voters were significantly more likely to vote in 2008 and 2012 than in previous elections. This effect, however, is smaller than the significant change toward voting prior to Election Day.
This brief study revisits the issue of whether higher unemployment rates elicit an increase in the voter participation rate. Using a state-level panel dataset for all five of the Presidential election cycles of this century, it is hypothesized that, following Cebula (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014), the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the degree to which eligible voters, whether unemployed or employed, show up at the polls, arguably because they are expressing the concerns and fears regarding prevailing economic policies and conditions and because by voting they are expressing the desire for changes to address those concerns and fears. The estimation implies that a one percentage point higher unemployment rate leads to a nearly 1.0% higher voter participation rate. This result is in principle compatible with and supportive of the hypothesis that higher unemployment rates motivate voters and the empirical finding of a positive voter turnout/unemployment rate association obtained in the studies by Cebula (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014). Moreover, this finding is potentially important because it implies that elected officials are, to at least some degree, held accountable by the electorate for a weakly performing economy.
Several studies suggest that people suffering from ill health or disabilities have a lower propensity to vote. Using six rounds of the European Social Survey, we examine whether the effect of health or functional disabilities on electoral participation is less or more pronounced in countries which utilize a wider range of facilitation instruments, such as advance or postal voting, proxy voting and voting outside the polling stations. Our findings show that with the exception of proxy voting, voter facilitation instruments not only have insignificant main effects but also a negative interaction effect with poor health/functional ability (FA). As a result, voter facilitation intensifies the health-related differences but not by activating those who are more active to begin with, as suggested in previous studies. The endogeneity argument thus seems most warranted explanation for our findings: countries with low turnout among people with impaired FA or health are more likely to adapt facilitation practices.
Despite the widespread scholarly attention given to get-out-the-vote tactics the recent one and a half decade, few have studied the effect of short text messages (SMS) on voter turnout, and no previous such study has been conducted outside the US. We analyze four SMS experiments with more than 300,000 voters conducted in relation to two elections in Denmark and find intention-to-treat (ITT) effects between 0.33 and 1.82 percentage points with a pooled effect of 0.74 percentage points. Furthermore, we vary the timing and the content of the messages to test existing theories of text messages as mobilization tools. In one experiment, we find messages delivered before Election Day to have a higher effect than those delivered on Election Day, while we find no additional effect of delivering multiple messages. We also vary message content and in general find no significant differences from sending different messages.
Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.
Winner of the 2013 Best Book Award -- Race, Ethnicity, and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association. Winner of the 2013 Ralph Bunche Award given by the American Political Science Association. Which get-out-the-vote efforts actually succeed in ethnoracial communities-and why? Analyzing the results from hundreds of original experiments, the authors of this book offer a persuasive new theory to explain why some methods work while others don't. Exploring and comparing a wide variety of efforts targeting ethnoracial voters, Lisa García Bedolla and Melissa R. Michelson present a new theoretical frame-the Social Cognition Model of voting, based on an individual's sense of civic identity-for understanding get-out-the-vote effectiveness. Their book will serve as a useful guide for political practitioners, for it offers concrete strategies to employ in developing future mobilization efforts. © 2012 by Lisa García Bedolla and Melissa R. Michelson. All rights reserved.
While much of the literature on voter turnout focuses on institutional and socioeconomic factors related to the 'input' side of the political process, we examine the 'output' side, and advance this field of research by studying the impact of corruption perceptions on turnout in the most recent national legislative elections across 170 European regions. Using data from a novel measure of regional perceived corruption of government services and the electoral process, together with several control variables, we find through multilevel modeling that regional quality of government positively impacts regional turnout. In more detail, our results indicate that citizens' perceptions of corruption make them, in the aggregate, less likely to cast a ballot.
Abstract This paper analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure expenditures by the Italian government to the country’s 92 provinces between 1953 and 1992. Extending implications of formal theories of legislative behavior to the context of open-list proportional representation, we examine whether individually powerful legislators and ruling political parties direct spending to core or marginal electoral districts, and the extent to which opposition parties share resources via a norm of universalism. We show that districts characterized by politically more powerful individual deputies from the governing parties received higher amounts of investments. We interpret this result as indicating that legislators with political resources sought to reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. The governing parties, by contrast, were not able to discipline their own members of parliament suciently to target the parties’ areas of core electoral strength. In Italy’s weak party system, the political influence of powerful individual legislators trumped the political imperatives of the ruling parties. Finally, we find no evidence that a norm of universalism operated to direct resources to areas where the main opposition party was strong.
Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring whether individuals vote. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying. Reward targeting helps to distinguish between these strategies. Whereas Stokes's vote-buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposers, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters. Although the two strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes 2005 are more consistent with turnout buying.
Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.
Vote buying and political intimidation are characteristic dimensions of African election campaigns. According to survey-based estimates, almost one out of five Nigerians is personally exposed to vote buying and almost one in ten experiences threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated. These effects are as follows: violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. But, perhaps because most citizens condemn campaign manipulation as wrong, compliance with the wishes of politicians is not assured. Defection from threats and agreements is more common than compliance, especially where voters are cross-pressured from both sides of the partisan divide.
Duda zabiega o głosy na wsi: Chodzi o to, by rolnik miał poczucie spokoju
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Get out the Vote!: How to Increase Voter Turnout
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Comparative Political Corruption
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The 2005 Parliamentary Election Lottery in Bulgaria
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Electoral Turnout in Poland
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Poznaniacy za wysoką frekwencję w wyborach dostaną koncert. Radny chce też po 100 tys. zł dla najaktywniejszych osiedli
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Premier Morawiecki rozdawał czeki samorządowcom. Są ciągle warte tyle co papier
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Bezrobocie a kształtowanie się układu sił politycznych w Sejmie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Próba analizy korelacji
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Trzaskowski w spocie opowiada o sobie krytykuje go Duda. ‘Bitwa o wozy’ w akcji MSWiA
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