Operationalizing spatial justice in urban planning: bridging theory with practice

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Operationalizing spatial justice in urban planning:
bridging theory with practice
Fillipe Oliveira Feitosa, Jan Hendrik Wolf & João Lourenço Marques
To cite this article: Fillipe Oliveira Feitosa, Jan Hendrik Wolf & João Lourenço Marques (24 Apr
2024): Operationalizing spatial justice in urban planning: bridging theory with practice, Urban
Research & Practice, DOI: 10.1080/17535069.2024.2341254
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2024.2341254
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Operationalizing spatial justice in urban planning: bridging
theory with practice
Fillipe Oliveira Feitosa , Jan Hendrik Wolf and João Lourenço Marques
Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences (DCSPT), Universidade de Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal
ABSTRACT
This research explores the challenges of using spatial justice as
a basis for public policy and urban planning. Philosophical princi-
ples of justice are useful for systematic reasoning but lack objec-
tive criteria for evaluating spatial justice. We propose a framework
based on criteria from social psychology – strict equality, need,
merit, and entitlement – to a territorial perspective to determine
the most appropriate distribution of amenities. We aim to provide
a foundation for policy evaluation and urban interventions based
on a selected spatial justice criterion.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 2 January 2023
Accepted 5 April 2024
KEYWORDS
Spatial justice; public
policies; urban planning;
criteria of justice; conceptual
framework
Introduction
Guaranteeing justice in the decisions involved in spatial policies is a fundamental goal.
Not only due to the inherent importance of justice as a policy goal, but also because it
is, ultimately, the claim of pursuing a just distribution of burdens and benefits which
confers legitimacy to any policy decision. Spatial justice, or related concepts such as
territorial cohesion, or spatial equity, have therefore been guiding principles in the
spatial planning field (Kunzmann 1998).
Spatial injustice and inequality are crucial to understanding poverty and vulnerability.
Geographic disparities in the risk and incidence of domestic energy deprivation, for
example, highlights the spatial dimension of justice. Alongside with vicious cycles of
vulnerability, spatial configuration may lead certain groups to material deprivation and
energy aordability problems (Bouzarovski and Simcock 2017). Moreover, it is possible to
understand several phenomena in the lights of spatial justice, such as pollution, ethnicity
and poverty (Banzhaf, Ma, and Timmins 2019), and how low-income groups tend to live
with poor access to urban amenities (Uwayezu and de Vries 2019). Therefore, it becomes
clear the pivotal role of spatial justice as reasonable framework of general interest.
Although the concept of spatial justice can draw from a large and well-established
body of literature, namely based on the liberal principles of justice of Rawls or Amartya
Sen (Alfasi and Fenster 2014; Frenkel and Israel 2018; Rauhut 2018; Sen 2009) or
Marxist approaches (Harvey 2009; Lefebvre 1991), there remains a very significant gap
between the theoretical discussions of justice and its assessment in context. As noted by
CONTACT Fillipe Oliveira Feitosa fillipefeitosa@gmail.com
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE
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Israel and Frenkel (2020), this diculty can partly be attributed to the diminished
importance of a normative discussion in spatial and social sciences, such as geography
or planning, and the lack of spatial analysis in political theory.
Moreover, applying principles of justice to assess spatial layouts also poses very
practical diculties. For example, Lefebvre’s (1991), understanding that space, being
socially constructed, enshrines, and reproduces the inequalities that characterize capi-
talist relations of production, or (Rawls 1971) argument that everybody should have
access to a scheme of liberties that allows for a similar scheme for all, provide inter-
esting perspectives on the (in)justices that are inherent to our societies. But they do not
provide a clear roadmap to judge the concrete distribution of spatial advantages or
disadvantages. Therefore, while there are abundant examples of studies on the percep-
tions and representations of spatial justice (Alfasi and Fenster 2014; Heikkila 2001;
Knudsen et al. 2015; Nylund 2014) or empirical studies of spatial inequality
(Chakravorty 1996; Márquez, Lasarte, and Lufin 2019; Panzera and Postiglione 2020;
Perez-Mayo 2019), translating normative arguments or abstract principles of justice
into measurable, spatialized, indicators of inequality are still a challenge.
The establishment of a working definition of spatial justice is further complicated by
the fact that, as noted by Sen (2009), there are many dierent definitions of justice
which can be applied to assess the fairness of a given situation and dierent dimensions
which can be included or excluded in this assessment. Nonetheless, any working
definition of spatial justice needs to answer two basics questions: What is the claim
to a given resource/advantage? And according to which criteria should it be assessed?
This article contributes to this subject by identifying objective criteria of spatial
justice and illustrating how they can be applied to assess the justice of dierent
geographical distributions of services, thus focussing on the distributive aspects of
spatial justice. For the practical assessment of spatial justice, we draw on the distribu-
tional principles of justice identified in psychological research – equality, need, merit,
and entitlement – showing how they can be associated with dierent distributions of
spatial advantages, and how these criteria are considered by dierent schools of thought
from the political philosophy.
Similar attempts to classify justice applications can be found in scientific literature,
specifically regarding health service provision. Mooney (1987) seeks for a robust defini-
tion of equity by indicating five dierent general concepts of justice that are generally
discussed in public health services, including some Rawlsian and Sen’s perceptions
regarding fair provisioning of goods and services. Hadler and Rosa (2018) go further on
their analysis by stating that ethical reasonings may lack objective definitions that may
lead to spatial discrimination based on merit or need. Gibson (2008) also apply
concepts of need and deservingness to assess squatters’ and owners’ rights to land.
This article is based on a similar approach but establishes a more comprehensive
conceptual framework which tries to apply all the four criteria of justice identified in
the social psychology and also analyses how they are related to the broader discussion
of justice in the political philosophy, namely considering Marxism, libertarianism,
utilitarianism, and liberal equality.
Considering the diculty in finding unequivocal practical formulations of the
philosophical discussions of justice, it is our understanding that their spatialization is
best understood by considering the way in which they are related to objective criteria.
2F.O. FEITOSA ET AL.

This allows to move towards an operational framework of spatial justice that, while
drawing from broader philosophical discussions, provides a roadmap for considering
a given geography just or unjust from a distributional perspective. This also allows
a practical analysis of spatial policy goals and how they are considered in the spatial
distribution of resources.
Our work proceeds with a discussion of abstract formulations of justice, stressing
how complex is their application in spatial terms. Then, we present how social psychol-
ogy describes underlying notions of justice (criteria) and how those criteria can be
related to the spatial distributions of services. Finally, we describe how authors are
judging to specific justice criteria when they approach spatial justice topics.
What is justice?
People are naturally inequal. Either by preferences, culture, mental states, and a myriad
of dierent aspects that make every person unique. This raises the question of how to
consider these dierent circumstances when weighting the claim to resources or
advantages, assuming that individuals will try to maximize their satisfaction in the
access to these resources or advantages (Karni and Safra 2002; Oppenheimer 2012). In
other words, when common resources are shared, there is the need for some rationale
for weighting dierent claims, according to a particular understanding on what would
be a fair distribution of goods and services (Dubas, Dubas, and Mehta 2014; Kamas and
Preston 2012).
Justice is the normative concept that defines a set of rules to morally evaluate the
distribution of resources between individuals. Hence, it tries to elaborate ‘what is right,
what is fair and what is morally correct’ (Wol 1997, 12). The complexity in trying to
answer these questions is considerable and is further increased when trying to assess
practical scenarios. First, since ethical rules claim for a certain universality and, there-
fore, tend to be based on philosophic, abstract reasoning, many authors elaborate justice
principles in a hypothetical fashion. Second, because these principles generally discuss
conicting perspectives and criteria, their outcomes can be controversial and have
considerable ethical implications (see, for example, Nyholm and Smids 2016 for
a discussion of the ethics of programming self-driving cars).
Hypothetical formulations of principles of justice
Dierent schools of thought have defined justice in very dierent ways. One of the most
significant eorts to explain the dierent allocation of resources in society can be found
in utilitarianism. For some authors, such as John Stuart Mill, utility is a measure of
pleasure and happiness. As this is a fundamental value, Mill’s defense on utility is
justified by the rationality on pursuing it: ‘(. . .) If so, happiness is the sole end of human
action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct’ (Mill
1863, 39).
This is a strong argument that shapes utilitarian reasoning, but in the same chapter
of this citation, Mill admits that there cannot be further proof for this, other than
people’s intrinsic desire for pleasure (1863, 35). This leads to a hypothetical scenario
where people will understand their overall happiness as a good, compete with one
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE 3

another to maximize their payos, establishing general happiness as an aggregate good
to be maximized (Millgram 2000).
While solving complex issues of commensurability by establishing utility as
a universal unit of measurement, this approach raises challenges to be overcome
when sharing limited resources in society, such as the number of available choices
(Sen 2009) and how to weight the dierent levels of utility that dierent people get from
the same resource. This can lead to utility being used to justify very dierent distribu-
tions of resources. It can, for example, be justified to provide a larger share of resources
to the already well-o, if this distribution is Pareto optimal, while the law of diminish-
ing marginal utility can also be used to justify redistributive policies (as is done by
Pigou 1932). Utilitarian perspectives of justice are also at odds with rights-based ethics,
such as those expressed by Kant’s categorial imperative.
An alternative formulation of justice is made by authors aligned with a liberal
egalitarian perspective, such as Amartya Sen or John Rawls. Rawls, whose principles
of justice are arguably the most acknowledged and discussed ones, proposes a scenario
where individuals are put into original positions without memories and without knowl-
edge of their previous and future lives – the ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls 1971, 34). If this
group is supposed to decide about the future outcomes of their unknown positions in
society, it is reasonable to assume that people would decide in favor of an egalitarian
distribution of resources and goods. Consequently, if an intervention must be done in
society, it should favor the least well-o, following the ‘dierence principle’ (Rawls
1971, 65).
Amartya Sen (Sen 2009), questioning the possibility to establish a single set of
principle of justice from an initial position, argues that there are many possible, and
unbiased, principles that can be used. This argument is illustrated through a scenario
where three children contend for a ute. One of them assumes a utilitarian perspective,
arguing that she is the only one who knows how to play the ute. The second one uses
an egalitarian argument, stating that his poverty and lack of toys would mean that he
should have at least one toy. Finally, the last kid argues that she made the ute, and
therefore, should hold possession of it. Sen uses this metaphor to describe how justice
can be complex to achieve. If pursuit of happiness and pleasure (utility) is the goal to be
achieved, the first kid should get the ute, disregarding the other two arguments,
including the third kid that put eort into creating the instrument. The second kid is
backed by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance reasoning. The third kid should be compen-
sated if merit for the eort is to be considered more important. Thus, according to
Amartya Sen’s approach, more than settling on a fixed principle, justice should be
concerned with guaranteeing equality in the substantive opportunities that are available
to dierent individuals or groups, according to their idiosyncratic capacity to translate
abstract access into actual advantages – each individual’s capabilities.
Another method to justice can be found in Marxist approaches, which tend to
assume that inequality and injustices are the natural outcome of the capitalist mode
of production, and the exploitative relationships they entail. Social inequality can, in
this sense, be understood as the reification of the social relations of production, and
only changes to the deeper structural forces linked to capital accumulation can truly
lead to any form of justice. In a way, the collective ownership of property and
a principle of distribution where each gives according to their ability and each receives
4F.O. FEITOSA ET AL.

according to their need, envisages a society beyond justice, and the degree to which
these criteria express principle of justice can be questioned altogether (Geras 1985).
And it can also be noted that the criteria of ability and need, notwithstanding their
axiomatic formulation, are radically contingent (Kellogg 1998), with their exact mean-
ing depending on the very idiosyncratic concepts of ability and need. Nonetheless, and
although it is more concerned with the social relations of production, in the hypothe-
tical scenarios discussed above it can be reasonable to assume that a Marxist approach
would lead to a need-based distributions or resources, and not the recognition of ones’
eort or utility.
Last not least, a justice perspective worth mentioning is the libertarian political
philosophy. From a libertarian perspective, there is a singular value to the notion of
individual liberty, in detriment of the role of State authority to enforce rights and
policies (Bevir 2012, 810). For the defenders of this line of reasoning, there is a strong
disbelief in the central form of government, such as the State, and the justice of a given
distribution of resources (or holding) is obtained by a just initial acquisition of this
resource and its voluntary exchange. Any distribution that follows these rules is, by
definition, just, and there are no other legitimate claims to be made (Nozick 1973).
Thus, and as is noted by authors such as Kymlicka (2002), libertarian approaches
emphasize property rights and the entitlement to ones’ holdings. There is a strong
inclination to the eects of market on resources distribution, but no general rule of how
to assess just outcomes. Results that came from the market interactions are just enough,
given some presumptions are assumed, such as autonomous individuals making fully
informed decisions. Therefore, the claim of imposed interventions makes no sense
because holdings and capital accumulation (or the lack of it) are already just outcomes.
It is true that the liberal egalitarian perspectives are easier to apply to distributive
justice, while Libertarian and Marxist approaches tend to be based on more general
assumptions of what would be a just societal organization. Nonetheless, all approaches
can be used to evaluate justice claims, and their eectiveness can depend either on
preferences or be rhetorical. In practice, dierent distributions of advantages or
resources can be justified according to dierent theoretical assumptions and reasonings,
and the criteria which are considered to assess them. When the criteria change, the
assessed injustice also changes, but the initial condition of inequality remains.
Consequently, the challenge is to identify what criteria arise from justice principles
and how to apply them.
From social to spatial justice assessment
Spatial justice is concerned with how to apply dierent principles to assess, and judge,
the distribution of social groups and dierent types of amenities throughout the
territory, as well as the advantages that are conferred by these distributions and the
processes that lead to them. It is closely related to the concept of spatial equity which,
according to Morrill and Symons (1977), can be understood as ‘justice with respect to
location’, and essentially expresses the moral obligation to guarantee a fair distribution
of spatial amenities and burdens, or the regulation of property rights.
All of the approaches discussed in the previous section have been applied to assess
spatial justice. One of the most significant contributions for defining spatial justice
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE 5

comes from the Marxist school of thought, namely Lefebvre, whose conception of ‘right
to the city’ (Lefebvre 1996) assumes that people should not be alienated from the spaces
of everyday life. The right to urban life should be surrounded by proper rights of access
to work, education, health, accommodation and so on, which are dicult to guarantee
under the rules of market and competition. And space, being socially constructed,
already entails the inequalities and reifications that are at the core of capitalist societies,
leading to systematic inequalities and the segregation and exclusion of the least advan-
taged (i.e. the working classes). However, as noted by Harvey (2009), from a Marxist
perspective social justice is contingent to specific processes, dependent on what we are
distributing and among whom it is being distributed and its main contribution to
spatial justice is to understand, and denounce, the exploitative relations that are shaping
our geographies. Therefore, and although examples based on Bourdieu’s conceptions of
capital have been made (Frenkel and Israel 2018), practical assessment of spatial justice
according to Marxist principles of justice tend to be scarce. This is also true for
libertarianism, which does not really provide a framework to assess spatial justice,
since it assumes that any distribution of spatial benefits that comes from free market
transactions between consenting adults is just (Pereira, Schwanen, and Banister 2017).
Liberal or utilitarian assessments of spatial justice are, however, frequently made.
From a liberal perspective, spatial justice is often understood to mean favoring the least
well o in a given intervention or situation. Rawls, 1971) principle of justice suggests
interventions on institutional level to favor the least well o. Therefore, if this concep-
tion of justice is to be applied on the territory, ‘fair distribution of benefits and
mitigating disadvantage should be the aims of public policy’ (Fainstein 2016). Utility,
on the contrary, can be used to justify better access to spatial resources for the better-o
groups, if their well-being exceeds the decrease in well-being that is experienced by the
least well-o (Pereira, Schwanen, and Banister 2017). It is true that inequality is being
reinforced between the two groups, but an egalitarian criterion is being observed by
considering all people with same importance, hence the focus where the overall well-
being if being maximized. It is also possible to create dierent weights for the dierent
groups, following the rule of more utility for the least well-o, to promote equality as
well as maximization of utility (Weirich 1983) being exceeds the decrease in well-being
that is experienced by the least well-o (Pereira, Schwanen, and Banister 2017). It is
true that inequality is being reinforced between the two groups, but an egalitarian
criterion is being observed by considering all people with same importance, hence the
focus where the overall well-being if being maximized. It is also possible to create
dierent weights for the dierent groups, following the rule of more utility for the least
well-o, to promote equality as well as maximization of utility (Weirich 1983).
However, not only socioeconomic features may be used to distinguish groups.
For example, Nassir (Nassir et al. 2016) proposed a utility-based model for public
transit modes, based on the passenger’s preferences and subjective perceptions on
how much journey times can take. By doing this, the author lays leverage on
dierent groups to achieve some sort of balance on public transport services, in
other words, some sort of equal equilibrium. Another application of dierent
weights to achieve fairness in distribution of services can be found on Feitosa
et al. (2021), who uses an impedance decay function to achieve optimal school
locations for those groups without proper access to education, focussing on peoples
6F.O. FEITOSA ET AL.

need. Oddly, the latter work is focused on a Rawlsian approach rather than
utilitarian, but both try to focus on some sort of egalitarian perspective to achieve
fairness. It seems that when authors argue about ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’, the egalitarian
criterion is the core concept they try to achieve.
Amartya Sen’s capability approach is also frequently used for assessing spatial justice
(Preston and Rajé 2007), for example, propose a model to assess and suggest interven-
tions based on Amartya Sen arguing that regular policy assessment methodologies leave
some groups systematically out of the benefits proposed by public agents, favouring the
rise of social exclusion. The capabilities approach is used by these authors to justify the
proper levels of accessibility and mobility, focused on identifying what groups (or
individuals) are being excluded, implying a certain level of balance. Another example
of Sen’s capability approach to assess spatial justice can be found in (Nuvolati 2009),
who applies Sen’s theory to the accessibility to dierent spatial amenities considering
the number of alternatives that are available to dierent groups.
While providing many examples of how broader philosophical approaches can be
applied to spatial justice, the literature also makes it clear that there are many ambi-
guities in this application. On the one hand, the same theory of justice can be used to
focus very dierent aspects. Amartya Sen’s capability approach can, for example, has led
to focussing the number of choices that are available in a given situation, but can also
be used to assess the exclusion of certain groups from proper access. And utilitarianism
can be used in a rather egalitarian way, by attributing equal weight to everybody’s
utility, or attributing dierent weights to dierent groups. On the other hand, dierent
theories of justice are used to justify the same kind of assessment. A focus on the least
well-o, in particular, can be found in utilitarian approaches that give higher weight to
the least well-o (assuming that their marginal utility will rise more from a smaller
increase in some benefit) but also in Rawlsian or Marxist approaches, that focus on the
position of those groups because it violates the dierence principle or because it
expresses exploitative social relations. Further, assessment of spatial justice frequently
focus the least well-o without reference to any specific principle of justice, such as can
be found in the works of (Jonkman and Janssen-Jansen 2018), who focus on the
distributive justice in housing mismatches, or (Dawkins 2021), who propose assessing
the justice of housing policies in its substantive implications by considering how they
reduce extreme poverty.
Distributional principles from the psychological and social-psychological justice
research
As noted by (Liebig, HHlle, and May 2016), psychological research has identified four
practical criteria according to which the distribution of a given resource tends to be
assessed: strict equality, need, merit, and entitlement.
The application of dierent criteria for assessing spatial justice can have significant
implications for the distribution of resources within urban environments. According to
the criterion of strict equality, resources should be distributed in a way that minimizes
the average levels of accessibility, with a focus on central locations. This approach seeks
to ensure that all individuals have an equal level of access to resources, regardless of
their individual circumstances or characteristics.
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE 7

On the other hand, the criterion of merit or entitlement suggests that resources
should be distributed to those who have contributed the most to financing them, often
favoring the upper and middle classes. This approach is based on the idea that those
who have contributed more to society should be rewarded with greater access to
resources and opportunities.
In contrast, a need-based approach to resource distribution would prioritize provid-
ing better access to those who are least well-o. This criterion is based on the idea that
resources should be allocated to those who have the greatest need, regardless of their
individual contributions or circumstances.
The choice of criterion can have significant implications for the distribution of
resources within urban environments and can ultimately shape the overall level of
spatial justice within a region. It is therefore important to carefully consider the
dierent criteria and their implications when developing public policies and urban
planning strategies. Figure 1 depicts what could be understood from justice criteria
prioritization, in a caricatural scenario. n considering the dierent configurations of
urban spaces that could arise depending on the criteria adopted for justice considera-
tion, it is important to recognize that real urban configurations are often more complex.
However, understanding the potential variations in spatial configurations that can result
from dierent justice criteria can provide valuable insights for policy makers and urban
planners seeking to create more equitable and just urban environments.
The scenarios are, naturally, rather caricatural – they assume a clean state for the
creation of a utopic distribution based on each criterion and also some simplifications
regarding the way the criteria are translated (e.g. equating being better-o with having
more merit). And it is also true that the categories are not completely independent.
Distributing resources according to peoples’ need can, for example, be considered a way
of maximizing equality – not in the access to the resources, but by considering the
dierent capabilities to transform a potential access into a substantial advantage.
Figure 1. Distribution of services based on justice criteria.
8F.O. FEITOSA ET AL.

Nonetheless, they provide interesting benchmarks according to which the priority given
to dierent criteria of justice can be assessed in spatial policies.
But how can these dierent criteria be related to the philosophical discussions of
justice? The rest of this section discusses this relationship.
Strict equality and need
The understanding of modern western societies that live under the rule of law is
that people should be treated as equals. This does not mean that individuals are
considered as equals per se, but rather that certain dierences between them are to
be considered irrelevant (Kelsen 1999, 439) Dierent types of philosophical theories
assume this intrinsic idea of equality as a core concept, with relevant reasoning as
a consequence. Before the illuminist viewpoint on empiricism and rational thinking,
Europe was socially forged by a Jewish/Cristian doctrine that evoked the idea that
all human beings should be treated as equals, as once created by a ‘superior creator’.
Nevertheless, there was a relatively strict inequal hierarchy among the social classes
on medieval feudalism, but this line of thinking paved the way for modern philo-
sophers to think about human relations and justice claims. The work of Willian
Paley (Paley and Faulder 1785), for example, grounds itself on utilitarianism and
Christian ethics to discuss what is right or wrong, good or bad concerning making
choices, hence, ethical issues (Hibberd, n.d.). His contribution still had religious
background but was considered inuential and served as basis for utilitarianism
theory. Later, Jhon Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham diverted from the religious
background and looked for a ‘foundation of a scientific and exact ethics on the basis
of a scientific and exact psychology’ (Stark 1941), considering a systematic and
objective way to propose utilitarianism as a general political philosophic theory. For
them, what matters is the individual’s perceptions of pleasure and pain and, there-
fore, to make appropriate choices regarding the maximization of one or the mini-
mization of the latter. This approach has several consequences when public policies
are formulated and applied, especially when spatiality is considered as previously
discussed on our topic ‘what is justice?’. The fact is that this underlying notion of
individual rights and equality started to become considered as settled when modern
revolutions took place and rearranged both the socioeconomic divisions of society
and ways of production, broke some of the barriers of the current time for
individuals to improve their wellbeing (Acemoglu et al. 2011), supported by the
legitimacy granted by society to the State, for example on the French and United
States modern revolutions (Bukovansky 2002).
But even if we are to be treated as equals, how shall one consider individual
preferences regarding the utility received by a benefit or good (let us say a basic service,
for example)? Utilitarianism has a strong focus on pleasure and pain, so it is reasonable
to assume that to measure utility one must also consider individual needs, and how
those individuals (or related groups) value those specific needs. We are aware that
several works may have dierent understandings and theoretical frameworks to support
either an individualized, preference guided form of utilitarianism, or an egalitarian
form of aggregated utility, where similar groups are counted with the same level of
utility regarding assumed socioeconomic needs.
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE 9

Nevertheless, equality and need are not the norm only from liberal perspectives.
Marxism, for example, proposes a classless reformulation of society, focused on extin-
guishing the private property of the means of production. If properly achieved, people
would not have intrinsic desire for accumulation and would produce at the best of their
capacities, consuming (goods and services) according to their needs, following an
altruistic fashion. When translated to spatial terms, this concept is not objective nor
clear. The usual interpretation observed on related works usually states that people have
similar basic spatial needs, such as access to housing, education, and health facilities,
and once those are fulfilled, people should get the same level of access to services.
On the former Soviet Union (USSR), uniform residential zones were created with
both equality and essential needs fulfillment as an urban design project, where housing
blocks had a basic service (such as a basic school), open green areas for commuting, and
planned street network to serve industry and work zones (Metspalu and Hess 2017), in
a way that all necessary services were on reasonable walking distances, leading people to
take transportation for workplaces. Another example of Marxism application can be
seen on the creation of Brasilia, from scratch. The city was brought to life following
Lucio’s Costa urban plan, and the understanding of Marxism design of a city would be
the notion of spatial equality, mostly related to the distribution of housing and access to
services, focused on equality of opportunities regardless of social distinctions and urban
qualities necessary for full human development (Rezende and Heynen 2021).
The dierent rationales and ethical reasonings that come with them bring a similar
understanding of equality and need. Even though the formulations and theories are
dierent, it is not hard to picture a scenario where the underlying notion of equality
and need are embossed on either of those philosophical perspectives. It is hard to track
history or scientific literature where this notion of equity being related to strict equality
and need came from. Even though it is not in the scope of this work to tackle the
history of this theorical reference, we can reasonably assume that these are intrinsic
values mostly taken for granted in modern western democracies. The spatial notion that
individuals have on these core concepts of social justice are naturally translated into
spatial terms that, in a larger scale, can assume dierent viewpoints on public policies.
As discussed above, it does not seem to be enough to define an objective intervention in
a specific justice principle, because equality and need can be pursued in dierent forms
in any of them.
Merit and entitlement
The idea of proportional compensation over the eort employed is directly related to
the notion of market and competition. Since resources are limited, there must be
reasoning on their distribution and, therefore, makes sense to reward individuals that
put energy on their development to achieve higher levels of contribution with more
resources (or goods).
Nozick (1974) argues about the necessity to value the entitlement over a distribution,
no matter how inequal it is, respecting the presumption that they were got via legit
means. By legit means, Nozick states that unowned ‘holdings’ must be acquired without
others prejudice, they can be voluntarily transferred (i.e. heritage) or by rectifying past
injustices regarding the acquisition or transfer (Nozick 1974, 150–3). For him, those
who worked hardest will have more (merit), as long as they did not harm anyone else
10 F.O. FEITOSA ET AL.

during the process, which poses a significant contrast with the egalitarian perspective
proposed by Rawls.
The main implication and contrast are that capital and resource accumulation
in the long term are valid and do not pose any sort of unfairness, hence there is
no need of State intervention to adjust the disparities caused by natural inequal-
ities, such as socioeconomic situation of birth, or caused by market dynamics. The
libertarian perspective proposed by Nozick puts strong focus on a minimal State,
because every type of intervention could be associated with restrictions to indivi-
dual liberty. Instead, markets should be taken as fair demonstrations of human
relations because they are the result of informed and capable individuals exchan-
ging their fairly won rewards. Dierent rationales are derived from this perspec-
tive, such as the idea of institutional competition for performance improvement,
including public sectors of government (Prosser 2005) and that a fair society is
related to the social mobility (Brown 2013), more than compensation over
inequality.
Nevertheless, libertarianism is another justice principle that does not translate
directly in spatial terms. If taken to the extreme, not even public policies should be
applied to solve any kind of identified inequality. There is still room for debate
regarding the application of those principles in practice (for an insight over the
dierences and similarities about Nozick’s and Rawls work see (Schaefer 2007). There
is still another argument over Nozick’s perception of community fairness, since an
egalitarian group could arise and establish their rules under libertarianism principles, if
no one was forced into this situation. This reinforces our argument on justice principles
are not comprehensive to assess spatial distribution of goods, even though they are
distributive justice principles.
We argue that merit and entitlement are strongly related as justice criteria for
inequality assessment. That is not to say that entitlement has not receive substantial
attention in academic literature. Several works discuss the social impacts caused by
gentrification processes, how people get pressed to move from their homes because of
land-price appreciation caused by public transport expansion (He et al. 2018), or
because touristic guided policies (Diaz-Parra and Jover 2021) that bring wanted
resources to local market but takes from natural inhabitants the possibility to aord
living.
In fact, market and preferences dynamics are so complex to consider that some
authors even describe gentrification as a tool to perform social cleanse (Epstein 2018),
to remove from specific places specific ethnicity or marginalized groups. Objective
reasoning guide us to understand that those inequalities should not be the reason to
alienate people to their right to live on their homes. Arguably, marginalized groups
would probably go to worst served places, leading them to a deprivation amplification
process (Macintyre, Macdonald, and Ellaway 2008), reinforcing their initial margin-
alized position.
However, since housing is the central space that individuals have stability, access to
urban resources and goods (Lefebvre 1996; Muñoz 2018), and we live in market driven
societies it is expected that better access to services and amenities have an underlying
cost (Allen 2015; Park et al. 2017; Yuan, Wei, and Wu 2020). Being rewarded for merit
will imply that individuals with higher performance in social competition will have
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE 11

better payo, higher contribution for society and, therefore, be able to aord ‘better’
housing, including the burden of paying more taxes for better served places.
There is evidence that the most well-o groups in society tend to live closer to
amenities and, interestingly, that the higher group tend to live further, since they can
choose to do it and aord multiple mobility ways to get to farther services (Marques,
Wolf, and Feitosa 2020). Following merit centered reasoning, if those groups worked
hard enough to have benefits, taking those advantages from them would be an oense
to their eorts. In a sense, entitlement is this sentiment of prerogative right, acquired in
legit ways, that is not supposed to be removed. To receive a house in a well-served
vicinity as heritage, for example, is an example of housing benefits that originate from
previous merit. When looking into justice principles to set a fairness claim, such as
libertarianism or Rawlsian approach, we argue that what we are looking for is the
primitive sense of what is fair, in the heritage case, the eort applied and right to own
that place, merit and entitlement as criteria for fairness justification.
The following table represents a explorative approach of the weight that the dierent
philosophical approaches give to the dierent criteria, as shown in Table 1.
Conclusions
Social justice criteria isolated from justice principles frameworks are widely discussed
(Liebig et al. 2016; Miller 1999; Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido 2012), but the
search for objective criteria to assess spatial justice poses very significant challenges.
Dierent philosophical approaches have put forward dierent criteria to justify the
claims from dierent groups, such as: individual need for a given resource; the broader
benefits from its use (does it contribute to society?); the utility that people get from it;
eort or merit; inherited or natural rights. In short, the criteria that are used, and the
principles to rank them, are fundamental to understand the dierent circumstances of
individuals or groups, and the advantage, or disadvantage, they get from a given state of
aairs, and how to judge it. Nonetheless, their spatial translation is far from straightfor-
ward, meaning that the same philosophical approaches can be used to justify dierent
criteria, and that similar valuing of criteria can be used by dierent approaches.
We, therefore, argue that principles of justice derived from philosophical discussion,
although important regarding the systematization of reasoning, are lens of analysis that lack
objective criteria for spatial (in)justice assessment. In practice, dierent distributions of
advantages or resources can be justified according to dierent theoretical assumptions and
reasonings, and those can be considered (un)fair according to the criteria which are used to
justify them (i.e. justice principle). When the criteria change, the assessment of the degree of
justice of a given geography also changes. In this sense, discussing the criteria that can be used
Table 1. Exercise to relate social justice principles and spatial justice criteria.
Strict equality Need Merit Entitlement
Utilitarianism +++ +
Marxism ++ +++
Liberal equality + ++ ++
Libertarianism + ++ +++
12 F.O. FEITOSA ET AL.

for judging spatial inequalities, and their justification according to dierent philosophical
reasonings, is an important aspect for the practical assessment of spatial justice.
We address this issue by applying four criteria of justice identified in the social psychology –
strict equality, need, merit and entitlement (Deutsch 1975, 1985; Liebig, HHlle, and May 2016)
to a territorial perspective. We also explore what spatial distribution of amenities or services
would best correspond to these criteria, and also how they can be related to the philosophical
discussions of justice from dierent schools of thought. Through this approach we aim to
contribute to establish a conceptual framework that allow to identify to which criteria a given
distribution of spatial resources is more related to, and to propose interventions based on
a selected spatial justice criterion. For public policies and urban planning, this can serve as
solid framework for policies evaluation and urban interventions since they need to serve the
public common interests.
Integrating the principles of spatial justice into urban planning and policy necessi-
tates a nuanced understanding, best illustrated through real-world applications. The
following examples each underscore dierent facets of spatial justice, demonstrating the
diverse ways in which urban planning can engage with and address the principles of
equality, need, merit, and entitlement to guide equitable outcomes. Firstly, the concept
of ‘In-Place Social Mobility’ (IPSM) illustrates how urban regeneration can be an
opportunity for homeowners to achieve social mobility without leaving their homes
and neighborhoods (Levine and Aharon-Gutman 2022). This approach oers a fresh
perspective on spatial justice, suggesting that equitable urban development can indeed
enhance the social opportunities of residents through targeted policy interventions,
reecting the need and entitlement criteria.
Secondly, the Singaporean government’s eort to ensure aordable homeownership by
setting housing price to income ratio targets showcases the implications of strict equality and
need criteria in addressing housing aordability and mitigating market volatility (Phang
2010). Lastly, the comparative study of urban redevelopment in Bogotá, Colombia, and
Buenos Aires, Argentina, reveals the complex interplay between libertarian and utilitarian
approaches to land titling and housing accessibility (Yunda and Sletto 2017). This case study
underscores the importance of recognizing merit and entitlement in urban policy to navigate
the challenges of formal and informal land markets. By integrating these principles into urban
policy frameworks, we can move towards a more equitable urban structure, addressing spatial
injustices through nuanced, context-specific interventions. In this work, we advocate for an
approach to spatial justice that transcends simplistic dichotomies of good versus bad, empha-
sizing instead the rational foundations that guide equitable outcomes. This perspective fosters
a dynamic, iterative engagement with equity, acknowledging that disparities surface uniquely
under dierent evaluative criteria. By foregrounding the critical, ongoing examination of how
inequalities manifest across various justice criteria, we propose a more nuanced, adaptable
framework for urban policy and planning. This approach underscores the importance of
a deliberate, thoughtful response to the ever-evolving landscape of urban disparities, promot-
ing a sustained commitment to addressing spatial injustices in their multifaceted dimensions.
In conclusion, the use of spatial justice as a guiding principle for public policies and urban
planning presents several challenges, including the lack of objective criteria for determining
what constitutes a fair and equitable distribution of resources and the diculties in acquiring
the data needed to address spatial injustices. By applying various criteria of justice identified in
social psychology to a territorial perspective, this study aims to propose a conceptual
URBAN RESEARCH & PRACTICE 13

framework that can help identify the criteria to which a given distribution of spatial resources
is most related and propose interventions based on a selected spatial justice criterion. This
framework has the potential to provide a solid foundation for policy evaluation and urban
interventions that prioritize the common interests of the public. However, it is important to
recognize that the application of spatial justice is complex and requires a nuanced under-
standing of the various criteria and their justifications. Further research is needed to continue
to explore and refine the use of spatial justice as a guiding principle for public policies and
urban planning.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
The first two authors contributed equality to this work with funding by Portuguese national
funds through the Foundation for Science and Technology, FCT, I.P., in the context of the
JUST_PLAN project [PTDC/GES-OUT/2662/2020].
ORCID
Fillipe Oliveira Feitosa http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1000-6986
Jan Hendrik Wolf http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8701-7117
João Lourenço Marques http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0472-2767
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