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Citation: Tabaczek, Mariusz. 2024. A
Contemporary Aristotelian–
Thomistic Perspective on the
Evolutionary View of Reality and
Theistic Evolution. Religions 15: 524.
hps://doi.org/10.3390/rel15050524
Academic Editors: Simon Maria Kopf
and Ignacio Silva
Received: 12 March 2024
Revised: 16 April 2024
Accepted: 18 April 2024
Published: 24 April 2024
Copyright: © 2024 by the author.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Swierland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Aribution (CC BY) license (hps://
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4.0/).
religions
Article
A Contemporary Aristotelian–Thomistic Perspective on the
Evolutionary View of Reality and Theistic Evolution
Mariusz Tabaczek
Faculty of Theology, Pontical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 00184 Rome, Italy; tabaczek@pust.it
Abstract: This article presents a coherent and comprehensive proposal of a renewed contemporary
Aristotelian–Thomistic approach to the evolutionary view of reality and the position of theistic evo‑
lution. Beginning with a proposal of a hylomorphically–grounded essentialist denition of species—
framed within a broader revival of biological essentialism—a constructive model of the Aristotelian–
Thomistic metaphysics of evolution is being oered, together with a reection on the alleged viola‑
tion of the principle of proportionate causation in evolutionary transitions and the role of teleology
and chance in evolution. The theological part of the article addresses a number of questions concern‑
ing the Thomistic school of theology in its encounter with the evolutionary worldview, including
the question of whether God creates through evolution, the query concerning the concurrence of
divine and created causes in evolutionary transitions, and the question regarding evolutionary and
theological notions of anthropogenesis. A list of ten postulates grounding a contemporary Thomistic
version of theistic evolution is oered as a conclusion to the research presented in the text.
Keywords: anthropogenesis; Aquinas; Aristotle; chance; creation; divine action; evolution; hylomor‑
phism; proportionate causation; speciation; teleology; theistic evolution
1. Introduction
The question concerning an Aristotelian–Thomistic response to the theory of evolu‑
tion has been an object of research conducted by a number of thinkers coming from and con‑
tinuing the classical school of thought in philosophical theology. Following the develop‑
ment and transformation of evolutionary theory throughout its history, they commented
on more speculative—philosophical and theological—repercussions of Darwin’s view of
nature.1I believe that the most recent changes in the evolutionary paradigm—grounding
the extended evolutionary synthesis—provide a suitable background for a new chapter in
the conversation engaging evolutionary biology, the philosophy of biology, metaphysics,
and the Christian theology of creation. Past strongly reductionist, anti‑teleological, and
anti‑essentialist views of species transformism—on the one hand—and theological inter‑
pretations of evolutionary theory leaning toward panpsychism and pan(en)theism—on the
other hand—we seem to face an opportunity for developing a multidimensional, open–
minded, and comprehensive account of evolutionary theory, one that remains in line with
and benets from a reference to the categories of classical metaphysics and Aquinas’s no‑
tion of God and divine action in the universe; one that is potentially aractive also to read‑
ers who do not have any prior commitment to Thomism.
Over the last several years of my academic research and writing, I addressed vari‑
ous aspects of the interdisciplinary dialogue between science, philosophy, and theology
related to the theory of evolution (see Tabaczek 2014,2015,2019b,2020,2022,2023a). To‑
ward the end of the year 2023, Cambridge University Press published my monograph, in
which I bring together, rethink, extend in various degrees, and organize this material into a
coherent and comprehensive proposal of a renewed contemporary Aristotelian–Thomistic
approach to the evolutionary view of reality and the position of theistic evolution (see
Religions 2024,15, 524. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15050524 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions
Religions 2024,15, 524 2 of 32
Tabaczek 2024 [copyright date of publication]). The present article oers a condensed ver‑
sion of the main arguments presented in the book, with several minor yet important further
clarications, developments, and answers to some of the rst responses to the arguments
presented in it.2
The rst part of the article concentrates on the notion of biological species. Beginning
with a proposal of a hylomorphically–grounded essentialist denition of species
(Section 2.1), framed within a broader revival of biological essentialism (Section 2.2), I em‑
phasize the dynamic aspect of this concept of species (Section 2.3) and juxtapose it with a
more general, including non–essentialist, views of species in biology (Section 2.4).
The second part of the article oers a hylomorphic model of the metaphysical aspects
of species transformism. It proceeds from the analysis of the notion of disposition of mat‑
ter and levels of potentiality (Section 3.1) and the notion of the tendency of maer for
ever higher perfection (Section 3.2). Its central part consists of a constructive proposal of
the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics of speciation (Section 3.3), followed by the reec‑
tion on the population versus individualistic/typological notion of the units of speciation
(Section 3.4), levels of similarity of adjacent biological species (Section 3.5), the alleged vio‑
lation of the principle of proportionate causation in evolutionary transitions (Section 3.6),
and the role of teleology and chance in evolution (Section 3.7).
The third and nal part of the article addresses a number of questions concerning
the Thomistic school of theology in its encounter with the evolutionary worldview. Begin‑
ning with Aquinas’s notion of creation (Section 4.1) and his use of Augustine’s category of
rationes seminales (Section 4.2), it suggests a move from Augustine’s gradualism to evolu‑
tionism (Section 4.3) and oers a reection on some of the central theological topics con‑
cerning evolution. These include the question of whether God creates through evolution
(Section 4.4), the query concerning the concurrence of divine and created causes in evolu‑
tionary transitions (Section 4.5), and the question regarding evolutionary and theological
notions of anthropogenesis (Section 4.6). As an outcome of this reection, the third part of
the article concludes with a reconsidered and updated list of ten postulates grounding a
contemporary Thomistic version of theistic evolution.
2. Biological Species
In order to speak about the evolutionary transformation of species, we need to begin
with the very category of species. Apart from the centuries–long controversy concerning
nominalism versus realism about species as a universal category, those in support of the
realist stance face the complexity of the debate on the denition of biological species.3
This debate has been going on for decades, and its subject remains probably the most con‑
troversial issue in contemporary biology and the philosophy of biology.4Approaching
it from the Aristotelian–Thomistic perspective, I propose the following hylomorphically–
grounded essentialist denition of species.
2.1. Hylomorphically–Grounded Essentialist Denition of Species
(1) Biological species is a universal category expressed in and abstracted from concrete
living beings that are determined by a particular type of essence;
(2) The laer is constituted by a specic kind of substantial form (SF) which—as a meta‑
physical principle of actuality—actualizes its correlative metaphysical principle of
pure potentiality; that is, primary maer (PM);
(3) Causing thus an organism to be what it is, SF grounds a range of essential and ac‑
cidental, intrinsic and extrinsic dispositions and properties, characteristic of a given
type of living creature;
(4) A provisional list of these dispositions and properties includes particularized kind–
specic morphological and physiological developmental programs and a variety of
genotypic and phenotypic traits that nd their distinctive expression in the historical
relationships of organisms that belong to a given species.
Religions 2024,15, 524 3 of 32
2.2. The Revival of Biological Essentialism
That this denition is not indicative of some sort of dogmatic entrenchment in scholas‑
ticism and detachment from the advances of contemporary science becomes clear in light
of the more recent revival of essentialism in the philosophy of biology. Indeed, a num‑
ber of thinkers have challenged a radically anti–individualistic and anti–essentialistic or‑
thodoxy, claiming that the relational approach in dening species—including biological,
phylogenetic–cladistic, evolutionary, and population–structure species concepts (outlined
in terms of relations among organisms in space and time)—requires at least supplemen‑
tation with the alternative, more classical view—one that acknowledges the reality of the
intrinsic natures (essences) of individual organisms.
Several suggestions have been made as to what should be taken to constitute an es‑
sential nature, including genetic properties, fundamental dispositions, or developmental
programs. Some are willing to dene essences in reference to both genetic and/or phe‑
netic properties and relational/historical aspects of organisms, breaking thus a clear–cut
boundary between the relational and the essentialist (intrinsic) schools of taxonomy. Oth‑
ers defend essentialism delineated in reference to the origin of a given organism (origin
essentialism).5The denition provided here goes one step further, dening essences in ref‑
erence to hylomorphism, i.e., as mixtures of actuality and potentiality, where the former
is dened as SF and the laer as PM. Regarded as causes—on the assumption that causal
principles, going beyond physical interactions, are understood as metaphysical principles
explaining essences of natural kinds—PM and SF are closely related with ecient and ‑
nal causes, as well as with the quasi (per accidens) causal character of chance and fortune.6
Taken together, they ground all types of genetic, phenetic, or dispositional properties of or‑
ganisms, mentioned in other variants/aspects of the essentialist species concept and listed
in my denition (3–4).
2.3. Dynamic Aspect of Hylomorphically–Grounded Biological Essentialism
Moreover, the fact that the category of species is seen here as “expressed in and ab‑
stracted from concrete living beings”, whose kind–specic dispositions and properties are
studied in their historical relationships, inspires a response to the claim that biological es‑
sentialism implies species xism (which is, in principle, inconsistent with the view that
species evolve). This accusation is based on Ernst Mayr’s popular and overly Platonic
phrasing of the essentialist species concept, in which he states that according to it, “[t]here
are a limited number of xed, unchangeable ‘ideas’ underlying the observed variability [in
nature], with the eidos (idea) being the only thing that is xed and real, while the observed
variability has no more reality than the shadows of an object on a cave wall” (Mayr 1976,
p. 27).7However, one must not forget that, contrary to this view, on Aristotle’s scheme,
essences or natures are not transcendental, xed “ideas” but “goal–directed capacities im‑
manent in the nature of the organism”. In other words, they exist as realized in concrete,
temporal, individual, and contingent organisms. Hence adds Denis Walsh, “It certainly
isn’t inconsistent with Aristotelian essentialism to suppose that natures could change over
time in just the way we have come to think that species do. Individual organisms may
well vary in their formal and material natures, in such a way that over time some variants
become more common than others” (Walsh 2006, p. 431).8
In support of his argument, Walsh refers to David Balme saying that “[t]here is noth‑
ing in Aristotle’s theory to prevent an ‘evolution of species’, i.e., a continuous modica‑
tion of the kinds being transmied. But he had no evidence of evolution” (Balme 1987,
p. 97). A contemporary philosopher of science, Travis Dumsday, states that “essentialism
not only allows for evolution but is plausibly required for it” (Dumsday 2012, p. 390). He
notes that a similar argument was already made by the scholastic scholar Richard Phillips
in 1934. In his textbook on the philosophy of nature, Phillips writes: “Considering, then,
natural species in the strict sense, do our principles allow us to say that they could be trans‑
formed? There seems to be nothing in them to render it impossible for we should only have
a striking example of substantial change” (Phillips [1962] 2013, p. 342).
Religions 2024,15, 524 4 of 32
2.4. Metaphysical and Biological Species Concepts
Concerning the question about the correspondence between this hylomorphically
grounded essentialist (and thus metaphysical) denition of species and the notion(s) of
species used in the practice of biological (and thus scientic) taxonomy, I argue that they
are related, although certainly not coextensive. The correlation between them nds ex‑
pression in numerous variants of the essentialist species concept that take into account
structural and historical, i.e., predominantly empirical, aspects and features of living be‑
ings. These substantive and accidental (intrinsic and extrinsic) dispositions and properties
may be treated as indicators of a particular kind of SF, which denes the metaphysical
foundation of a given natural kind. Consequently, I believe that properly conducted in‑
terdisciplinary research in biology, the philosophy of biology, and metaphysics enables us
to arrive at the situation in which a “scientic” species, as characterized by a practicing
biologist, corresponds closely to the “philosophical/metaphysical” species.9
3. Hylomorphism and Species Transformism
The primary objective of the logic of hylomorphism, applied in the preceding section
to the notion of biological species, was to provide a relevant account and analysis of the
causes and mechanisms of the processes of generation, change, corruption, and decay in
nature and to posit the plausible characteristics of both the changing and persistent as‑
pects therein. This fundamental metaphysical doctrine in Aristotle’s philosophy of nature
proves to be useful in an aempt to develop a constructive proposal of the Aristotelian–
Thomistic metaphysics of evolutionary transitions. A point of departure in this regard is
the notion of the potentiality and disposition of maer.
3.1. Disposition of Maer and Levels of Potentiality
In In Meta. V, lect. 14 (§ 963), Aquinas states, after Aristotle, that “what is capable
of being acted upon in some way must have within itself a certain disposition which is
the cause and principle of its passivity”. He understands disposition as an order through
which some qualities of a given thing direct it toward some other qualities (acquired in an
accidental change) or becoming something entirely new (in a substantial change).
A closer analysis of the notion of potentiality in Aristotle and Aquinas enables us to
say that while the pure potentiality of PM (materia prima) can be actualized by any logically
possible SF, the type of SF actualizing PM in the case of a substantial change in which a
given substance A(secondary maer) is replaced by another substance Bis not random. It
depends both on the SF and on accidental forms (AFs) actualizing A. These principles of
actuality dispose Ato enter specic accidental or substantial changes, which narrows the
scope of potentialities of PM that may be actualized in a given change.10 In other words, the
principles actualizing entities classied as instantiations of secondary maer dispose their
underlying PM in particular ways, enabling thus—in the course of substantial change—an
eduction of particular types of new substantial forms (SFs) (typical of other natural kinds)
from its potentiality. We might speak, respectively, about the “remote” and “proximate”
disposition of PM.11 To give an example, if you put a wooden log into a re, it does not melt
but burns and turns into a pile of ash and not, let us say, into a buery. Although the pure
potentiality of PM underlying the log can be actualized by any SF (“remote disposition”
of PM), the fact that it is currently actualized by the SF of wood and a number of AFs
(e.g., color, shape, and moisture) changes its disposition and sets up a limited scope of its
potentialities that can be actualized within a constrained range of substantial changes a
wooden log may undergo (“proximate disposition” of PM).
What is crucial in this account is—once again—what the Aristotelian–Thomistic meta‑
physics understands of the term “potentiality”. It does not perceive it as the potency for
a limited number of (xed) natural kinds to unfold from the already existing secondary
maer.12 Rather, it sees it, ultimately, as one of the most basic metaphysical principles
underlying the very fabric of the universe, a potency that may be actualized by any SF.
Obviously—as noted above—PM, as such, is always actualized by a given SF, which limits
Religions 2024,15, 524 5 of 32
the range of possible future actualizations it may go through. At the same time, the exi‑
bility of the dynamic processes is such that the fact that PM is informed at time t1by the
substantial form SF1, which disposes it to be actualized in the next substantial change at t2
by the substantial form SF2, while preventing it from being actualized (in the same substan‑
tial change at t2) by the substantial form of SF2*, does not prevent it from being actualized
by SF2* after a number of substantial changes it may go through. They may dispose it such
that, at one point, it may actually be “ready” to be informed by SF2*.
3.2. Maer as Striving for Perfection—Scala Naturae
I claim that the two levels of potentiality that we can dene within the Aristotelian–
Thomistic metaphysics enable us to provide an accurate description of the dynamic and
exible character and nature of reality—one that is in line with contemporary science.
Moreover, they also allow us to introduce the idea of evolutionary changes and transitions
as compatible with the framework of classical metaphysics and philosophical theology—
especially when referring to Aristotle’s notion of the scala naturae and Aquinas’s view of
maer as striving for perfection. In his biological works, Aristotle comments on an ap‑
parent ascent of perfection of the beings in nature. He speaks about a gradual crescendo
from nonliving, through plants and animals, to human forms: “Nature proceeds lile by
lile from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine
the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should lie”
(Hist. an. VIII, 1 [588b 4–6]).13 Aquinas moves this reection further, emphasizing that the
potentiality for perfection can be actualized only gradually and in accordance with some
determinate order:
[E]verything capable of being generated has a denite maer from which it comes
to be, because there must be a proportion between form and maer. For even
though rst maer is in potentiality to all forms, it nevertheless receives them in
a certain order. For rst of all it is in potency to the forms of the elements, and
through the intermediary of these, insofar as they are mixed in dierent propor‑
tions, it is in potency to dierent forms. Hence, not everything can come to be
directly from everything else unless perhaps by being resolved into rst maer.
(In Meta. XII, lect. 2 [§ 2438])
Moreover, speaking of the importance of the proper disposition of PM for particular
accidental and substantial changes that a given substance may go through, Aquinas for‑
mulates an observation that might inspire a new development of the classical notion of
hylomorphism, enabling it to provide a helpful metaphysical foundation for the contem‑
porary version of the theory of evolution:
From the fact that maer is known to have a certain substantial mode of existing,
maer can be understood to receive accidents by which it is disposed to a higher
perfection, so far as it is ingly disposed to receive that higher perfection. (Q.
de an. 9, co.)14
On another occasion, we nd him saying that maer, properly disposed, “turns to‑
wards the act or prepares itself to receive it” (Super IV Sent. 49, 3, 2, co.). Once again, in his
commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, Aquinas comes to a similar conclusion that “every‑
thing in a lower form of existence is inclined to the maximum possible assimilation to the
higher form” (In De an. II, lect. 7 [§ 315]).15 I believe this enables us to delineate and pro‑
pose the metaphysical foundation of the mechanism of biological evolution. Here, I agree
with O’Rourke, who is convinced that “If Aristotle’s metaphysical analysis of growth and
change is correct, the principles of form and the armation of potency will hold a fortiori
for the evolutionary process” (O’Rourke 2004, p. 27).
3.3. Metaphysics of Speciation
An evolutionary transition might be thus dened, in this account, as a series of mi‑
nor genetic and epigenetic changes that eect minor phenotypic variations (accidental
Religions 2024,15, 524 6 of 32
changes). These variations—remaining within the range of active and passive powers typ‑
ical for a given species (natural kind)—may become permanent (i.e., transmied from one
generation to the next), which, in turn, gradually changes the “proximate disposition” of
PM underlying subsequent organisms of the lineage L1of the species S1. This process,
highly complex and extended in time, might lead to a precise instant in which the PM un‑
derlying the ovum and the sperm coming from particular female and male organisms of
sexually reproducing species S1,16 at their entering the substantial change in which they
join and give origin to a new organism, is not disposed to be actualized by the “old” type of
SF that denes species S1but by a “new” type of SF that denes species S2, which is educed
from the potentiality of the PM that underlies them. The new organism (or organisms, as
the process described here is commonly considered to be taking place within a population)
starts a new lineage L2, which happens to be the lineage of the new species S2.
Gametes—parental ovum and sperm—are separate entities and may be treated as in‑
strumental causes, acting under the principal causation of the organisms that produced
them (see Q. de pot. 3, 11, ad 5). Normally, when they join, entering thus a substantial
change, which originates a new organism, the PM that underlies them is disposed to be
actualized by the original SF of the type S1. In the case of an evolutionary transition, how‑
ever, accidental changes in the DNA and the epigenetic causal factors inherently aecting
the phenotypes of the consecutive organisms within the lineage L1lead to the situation
in which PM, actualized by the SFs of given ovum and sperm, produced by female and
male organisms of species S1, is disposed to be actualized in the substantial change these
gametes enter by a new SF of the type S2, which is educed from its potentiality. This orig‑
inates the new evolutionary lineage L2. See Figure 1.
Religions 2024, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 33
propose the metaphysical foundation of the mechanism of biological evolution. Here, I
agree with O’Rourke, who is convinced that “If Aristotle’s metaphysical analysis of
growth and change is correct, the principles of form and the affirmation of potency will
hold a fortiori for the evolutionary process” (O’Rourke 2004, p. 27).
3.3. Metaphysics of Speciation
An evolutionary transition might be thus defined, in this account, as a series of minor
genetic and epigenetic changes that effect minor phenotypic variations (accidental
changes). These variations—remaining within the range of active and passive powers
typical for a given species (natural kind)—may become permanent (i.e., transmied from
one generation to the next), which, in turn, gradually changes the “proximate disposition”
of PM underlying subsequent organisms of the lineage L
1
of the species S
1
. This process,
highly complex and extended in time, might lead to a precise instant in which the PM
underlying the ovum and the sperm coming from particular female and male organisms
of sexually reproducing species S
1
,
16
at their entering the substantial change in which they
join and give origin to a new organism, is not disposed to be actualized by the “old” type
of SF that defines species S
1
but by a “new” type of SF that defines species S
2
, which is
educed from the potentiality of the PM that underlies them. The new organism (or
organisms, as the process described here is commonly considered to be taking place
within a population) starts a new lineage L
2
, which happens to be the lineage of the new
species S
2
.
Gametes—parental ovum and sperm—are separate entities and may be treated as
instrumental causes, acting under the principal causation of the organisms that produced
them (see Q. de pot. 3, 11, ad 5). Normally, when they join, entering thus a substantial
change, which originates a new organism, the PM that underlies them is disposed to be
actualized by the original SF of the type S
1
. In the case of an evolutionary transition,
however, accidental changes in the DNA and the epigenetic causal factors inherently
affecting the phenotypes of the consecutive organisms within the lineage L
1
lead to the
situation in which PM, actualized by the SFs of given ovum and sperm, produced by
female and male organisms of species S
1
, is disposed to be actualized in the substantial
change these gametes enter by a new SF of the type S
2
, which is educed from its
potentiality. This originates the new evolutionary lineage L
2
. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Hylomorphic metaphysics of an evolutionary transition.
It takes many genetic mutations and epigenetic changes (the outcomes of which are
regulated by natural selection and isolation barriers) to produce such an effect (i.e., the
difference in kind between parents and their offspring), and its actual instantiation may be
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to capture.
17
But this does not exclude the possibility
of its occurring, especially in a situation where some members of a species migrate to a new
ecological niche where they can enter processes of gradual modification in subsequent
generations to the point where they can no longer mate with the other descendants of their
ancestors. Thus, it becomes clear that, even if Aristotle’s biological research was far from
discovering the possibility of the transformation of species, his metaphysics, picked up and
developed by Aquinas in the Middle Ages, left much room for such a possibility.
18
3.4. Population and Individualistic/Typological Approach
The proposed metaphysical model of speciation concentrates on the individualistic
and typological approach to the notion of the units of evolutionary transitions. As such, it
Figure 1. Hylomorphic metaphysics of an evolutionary transition.
It takes many genetic mutations and epigenetic changes (the outcomes of which are
regulated by natural selection and isolation barriers) to produce such an eect (i.e., the
dierence in kind between parents and their ospring), and its actual instantiation may be
extremely dicult (if not impossible) to capture.17 But this does not exclude the possibility
of its occurring, especially in a situation where some members of a species migrate to a new
ecological niche where they can enter processes of gradual modication in subsequent
generations to the point where they can no longer mate with the other descendants of their
ancestors. Thus, it becomes clear that, even if Aristotle’s biological research was far from
discovering the possibility of the transformation of species, his metaphysics, picked up and
developed by Aquinas in the Middle Ages, left much room for such a possibility.18
3.4. Population and Individualistic/Typological Approach
The proposed metaphysical model of speciation concentrates on the individualistic
and typological approach to the notion of the units of evolutionary transitions. As such, it
is often portrayed as standing in radical opposition to the population thinking in biology.
The laer assumes that what explains the abundance of living forms is genetic variation
and the distribution of traits among organisms within populations, which are treated as
basic units subject to the pressure of natural selection. As Stephen Boulter notes, “In the
population thinking characteristic of evolutionary biology, to determine the eects of evo‑
lutionary mechanisms one need[s] only advert to statistical laws about the interactions
of the individuals in a population. One needs no knowledge of the particular properties
of particular individuals. It is only properties of populations that are truly explanatory”
(Boulter 2012, p. 92). I believe that both approaches are needed and that they complement
each other. In other words, the overemphasis on population thinking in evolutionary bi‑
Religions 2024,15, 524 7 of 32
ology should be mitigated with the typological and individualistic approach. Here, I side
with Oderberg and Walsh:
Genes are not ‘disembodied members of populations’ but constituents of organ‑
isms, and the fate of the genes is tied to the fate of the organisms whose genes
they are. Moreover, the process of adaptive evolution is precisely the process
whereby populations come to comprise well–adapted organisms. Knowledge of
whether a population has evolved requires knowledge of whether adaptive traits
have arisen within individual organisms. For evolution to occur, harmful muta‑
tions must be suciently rare or ineectual within individuals, and tness must
be fairly constant across genetically similar individuals. Population thinking is
simply not possible without individualistic thinking. (Oderberg 2007, p. 208)
Recent evolutionary developmental biology shows that one cannot understand
how natural selection operating over a population of genes can lead to increased
and diversied adaptation of organisms unless one understands the role of indi‑
vidual natures (essences) in the process of evolution. (Walsh 2006, p. 426)
Consequently, acknowledging the fact that biological speciation takes place in popu‑
lations of living organisms and depends on the principles characterizing their functioning
(formulated in population genetics), we should add that it is possible for us to speak about
the emergence of a population of a new species only because it contains organisms that be‑
long to (exemplify) a new natural kind. In my model of speciation, concentrating more on
the typological than population thinking, I pay aention precisely to the way in which the
rst organism(s) belonging to a new (metaphysical) natural kind come into existence. That
their emergence may not be equivalent to the notion of the origin of a new species from
the biological (empirical) point of view need not be detrimental to my approach, once we
remember that the hylomorphically grounded essentialist (and thus metaphysical) de‑
nition of species and the notion(s) of species used in the practice of biological (and thus
scientic) taxonomy are related, although certainly not straightforwardly coextensive (as
already stated in Section 2.4).
In other words, since the change at the population level is not possible without a co‑
variant change at the level of individual organisms, the speciation at the level of population
must be the function of a number of rst organisms belonging to a new natural kind coming
into existence and functioning in their natural habitat.
3.5. Levels of Similarity of Adjacent Species
Moreover, speaking about transformations of the biological material, we need to ac‑
knowledge that substantial changes accompanying the conception of ospring are of a
special kind. They result in the coming into existence of new organisms whose SF is of
the same type as that of their parental organisms. This is even more obvious in cases of
asexual reproduction (e.g., by ssion), yet unusual when compared with much more prim‑
itive chemical or biochemical substantial changes, which typically lead to the emergence
of substances that are radically dierent from the reagents. Consequently, in the case of
speciation, the last substantial change (conception) that crowns the entire process of an evo‑
lutionary transition is abnormal. The result is an organism whose SF belongs to a natural
kind that diers from that of its parental organisms.
Understood in this way, speciation seems to violate the classical principle of similarity,
which says that “[E]very agent produces its like” (SCG II, 21, no. 9). In other words, in
the reproductive process, the agent cause of a given type gives origin to ospring that
are similar to it. In response to this diculty, it should be noted that according to the
theory of biological evolution, the newborn rst representative of the species S2is in most
aspects and dispositions similar to the organisms of the preceding species S1from which
it originates.
Nevertheless, the fact that the parents and their descendants do belong to dierent
species requires some modications in the interpretation of the classical principle in ques‑
Religions 2024,15, 524 8 of 32
tion. We need to agree that the similarity between parents and their ospring should not
be understood as an absolute, strict, and nonexceptional qualitative identity of their SFs.
Rather, it can be dened in terms of a proportional proximity to the SF of the ospring,
when compared with SFs of its parents. It is worth noting that Aquinas himself admits
departure from the strict interpretation of the principle of similarity. In ST I, 104, 1, co.
we read:
Sometimes, however, the eect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of
its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all
agents which do not produce an eect of the same species as themselves: thus the
heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which dier from them
in species.19
Gloria Frost rightly notes that a certain level of dissimilitude between a cause and its
eect can be the outcome of the fact that many eects are caused by the joined operation of
a number of agents that have various active powers. She claims that, according to Aquinas,
“In these cases, the eect will bear some similarity to each agent which produced it, and
thus, it will resemble none of the individual agents perfectly” (Frost 2022, p. 101).
3.6. The Principle of Proportionate Causation and Evolution
The classical principle of similarity mentioned in the previous section—stating that
“[E]very agent produces its like” (SCG II, 21, no. 9)—is, in fact, a particular variant of the
more general principle of proportionate causation (PPC), which states that the eect cannot
exceed in perfection its cause. The laer nds a variety of formulations in the writings of
both Aristotle and Aquinas:
“[T]he begeer is of the same kind as the begoen” (Meta. VII, 8 [1033b 30]).
“[W]hatever perfection exists in an eect must be found in the eective cause”
(ST I, 4, 2, co.). “[N]o eect exceeds its cause” (ST II–II, 32, 4, obj. 1). “[N]othing
acts beyond its species” (Super II Sent. 18, 2, 3). “[T]he order of causes necessarily
corresponds to the order of eects, since eects are commensurate with their
causes” (SCG II, 15, no. 4). “[E]very agent acts according as it is in act” (SCG II, 6,
no. 4). “No eect can be more powerful than its agent cause” (Super II Sent. 18,
2, 3, obj. 3).20
One of the critical questions concerning the proposed metaphysical grounding of the
evolutionary transitions is whether it violates the PPC, for what is postulated by the the‑
ory of evolution is a number of fundamental transitions leading to increased complexity
and perfection of things.21 These include transitions from abiotic to biotic; from replicat‑
ing molecules to populations of molecules in protocells; from independent replicators to
chromosomes; from RNA to DNA; from asexual clones to sexual populations; from single–
celled forms to multicell and organic forms; from individual organisms to colonies; and
from primates to humans (see Smith and Szathmary 2000, p. 17). It may seem that all
these crucial changes go against the PPC.22
A number of possible responses have recently been oered and discussed, of which I
will mention here but two.23 The rst departs from the question about the proper interpre‑
tation of the PPC, for when considered outside of the context of the medieval philosophy
of nature and referred to the framework of contemporary science, this principle renders
(ontologically) implausible not only causal dependencies and processes of speciation de‑
scribed in evolutionary biology but also a vast number, if not the majority of, substantial
changes observed in nature and methodically investigated in physics, chemistry, biology,
and other sciences. These are the changes where we observe new substance(s) coming into
existence, which have new irreducible properties and perfections that are not observed in
the substances they originated from (the reagents that entered the reaction, which eected
a given substantial change).24
Hence, notes Brian Carl, the PPC needs to be interpreted in view of the complexity
of levels contained in the causal hierarchy in Aquinas. This fact is often ignored by many
Religions 2024,15, 524 9 of 32
thinkers who pay aention primarily to proximate causes in their analysis of causal de‑
pendencies. For Thomas, all causal relationships in the subsolar reality take place within
God’s providence, where God is conceived as the rst and principal cause, working in
nature through secondary and instrumental causes. However, between the causation of
God and of mundane creatures, Aquinas sees the mediating causality of angels and celes‑
tial spheres, especially the sun, which provides heat. Concerning the generation of ani‑
mals, gametes (ovum and sperm—as we know today) are instrumental causes in relation
to parental organisms, which are secondary (or instrumental) causes in relation to celestial
spheres (in particular, the sun), which are secondary (or instrumental) causes in relation
to angels, who are secondary (or instrumental) causes in relation to God.
Consequently, Carl claims that for Aquinas, all changes (including all cases of gener‑
ation and corruption) engage the entire hierarchy of causes, since—paradoxically—higher
causes (separated substances) may not be able to bring about changes in mundane (physi‑
cal) reality directly. He concludes by saying that
… the only general metaphysical principle that St. Thomas invokes in order to
argue for the need for the instrumental contribution of a univocal generator is
not the principle of proportionate causality, but instead the principle that a re‑
mote created universal cause needs the instrumental contribution of mediating
instruments to produce more powerful eects. This principle seems reconcilable
with evolution as well—although to articulate this reconciliation would require
much further work. (Carl 2020, pp. 244–45)
The second possible response to the challenge of confronting PPC and evolution pays
aention to the causal complexity of species transformations and rephrases the principle
saying that whatever perfection is present in the eect must be present in its “total cause”.
Indeed, one of the major faults of the debate on metaphysical aspects of evolutionary tran‑
sitions and PPC as applied to them is a blatant oversimplication of their causal analysis.
What is being taken into account is usually the last step (usually an act of fertilization
or conception) of a causal process that is highly complex, multifaceted, and extended in
both space and time. We might speak here about an evolutionary causal matrix (or causal
polygeny), where relevant contributors to a given species transition are incredibly many.
Their number might be, in fact, virtually impossible to estimate.25
In addition to genetic mutations, we may name a number of other accidental changes
that are relevant to speciation, such as genetic recombination, gene transfer, genetic drift,
and changes classied as epigenetic (i.e., permanent, nongenetic, yet heritable changes that
aect DNA expression). Moreover, as already mentioned in the introduction, according to
the extended evolutionary synthesis, we currently learn more about the synergy of evolu‑
tion and development (evo–devo), as well as the importance of cultural, behavioral, physi‑
ological, and ecological inheritance (biological niche construction). Among additional fac‑
tors, having causal inuence on speciation, we nd geographic, ecological, and reproduc‑
tive barriers, as well as natural selection, which—strictly speaking—is not so much a cause
but rather an explanation (a descriptive principle), turning our aention toward the fact
of greater reproductive success of organisms that are beer adapted to the environment in
which the principle of struggle for existence applies. All these factors have an inuence on
living organisms which, by nature, seek to preserve life (maintain homeostasis) and pro‑
duce ospring (reproduce). Furthermore, the organisms in question are closely linked in
ancestral–descendant relations within populations in a given evolutionary lineage, which
extends over extremely long periods of time, counted in hundreds of thousands or millions
of years. See Figure 2.
Hence, the proportionate cause of a species transformation is not a single law or force
but the concurrence of a highly complex set of causal agents, contributing to a speciation
event or rather a multifaceted history of an evolutionary transition. The causal input of
such an array of causes is stored and transmied from generation to generation, up to the
point in which a given organism is able to educe a new kind of SF from the potentiality of
PM. This does not contradict the PPC.26
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beer adapted to the environment in which the principle of struggle for existence applies.
All these factors have an influence on living organisms which, by nature, seek to preserve
life (maintain homeostasis) and produce offspring (reproduce). Furthermore, the
organisms in question are closely linked in ancestral–descendant relations within
populations in a given evolutionary lineage, which extends over extremely long periods
of time, counted in hundreds of thousands or millions of years. See Figure 2.
Hence, the proportionate cause of a species transformation is not a single law or force
but the concurrence of a highly complex set of causal agents, contributing to a speciation
event or rather a multifaceted history of an evolutionary transition. The causal input of
such an array of causes is stored and transmied from generation to generation, up to the
point in which a given organism is able to educe a new kind of SF from the potentiality of
PM. This does not contradict the PPC.
26
Figure 2. Speciation mechanisms.
3.7. Teleology and Chance in Evolution
One more philosophical controversy related to the theory of evolution concerns the
role of teleology and chance in speciation. The debate on this topic has a long history,
beginning from Darwin’s ambiguity concerning the notion of purpose, through the
molecular revolution inspiring a strongly reductionist line of reasoning typical of neo–
Darwinism, to the more recent renewed interest in and conversation about the role of
goal–directedness in biological explanation. For the purpose of this article, I will limit
myself to signaling the relevance of the classical Aristotelian–Thomistic notion of
teleology and chance in the context of the theory of evolution.
Error! Reference source not found.
Aristotle defines final cause as “that for the sake of which” something is done, or a
good that can be achieved and that is relevant to a given nature (entity).
28
It takes its
alternative name, “teleology”, from the Greek τέλος (telos), which translates as “end” or
“goal”. Although he invokes necessity as an explanation of the availability of suitable
maer, Aristotle acknowledges the importance of the category of purpose as a function of
nature to explain the fact that a given portion of maer acquires the particular shape and
structure it does.
29
Aquinas notes that teleology may refer to both the immanent (intrinsic)
and transeunt (extrinsic) agency of a given thing (see, e.g., Q. de ver. 14, 3). He speaks about
a natural inclination, i.e., a natural impetus that each substance has for engaging in
determinate actions that produce determinate goals: “In natural beings there is a desire for
or an inclination toward some end or goal, to which the will of a rational nature corresponds;
and for this reason a natural inclination is itself called an appetite” (In Meta. V, lect. 6 [§ 829]).
Figure 2. Speciation mechanisms.
3.7. Teleology and Chance in Evolution
One more philosophical controversy related to the theory of evolution concerns the
role of teleology and chance in speciation. The debate on this topic has a long history, begin‑
ning from Darwin’s ambiguity concerning the notion of purpose, through the molecular
revolution inspiring a strongly reductionist line of reasoning typical of neo–Darwinism, to
the more recent renewed interest in and conversation about the role of goal–directedness
in biological explanation. For the purpose of this article, I will limit myself to signaling
the relevance of the classical Aristotelian–Thomistic notion of teleology and chance in the
context of the theory of evolution.27
Aristotle denes nal cause as “that for the sake of which” something is done, or a
good that can be achieved and that is relevant to a given nature (entity).28 It takes its al‑
ternative name, “teleology”, from the Greek τέλoς(telos), which translates as “end” or
“goal”. Although he invokes necessity as an explanation of the availability of suitable mat‑
ter, Aristotle acknowledges the importance of the category of purpose as a function of
nature to explain the fact that a given portion of maer acquires the particular shape and
structure it does.29 Aquinas notes that teleology may refer to both the immanent (intrinsic)
and transeunt (extrinsic) agency of a given thing (see, e.g., Q. de ver. 14, 3). He speaks
about a natural inclination, i.e., a natural impetus that each substance has for engaging in
determinate actions that produce determinate goals: “In natural beings there is a desire
for or an inclination toward some end or goal, to which the will of a rational nature cor‑
responds; and for this reason a natural inclination is itself called an appetite” (In Meta. V,
lect. 6 [§ 829]).
It is important to note that both Aristotle and Aquinas extend teleology (goal–directed‑
ness)—which many tend to associate with/limit to conscious human decisions—to other
living and nonliving entities. Indeed, as notes Bostock, in Meteo. IV, 12 (389b 25–390a
21) “Aristotle does explicitly say that the elements, and the inorganic compounds that are
formed from them, are ‘for the sake of something’, equating this with the view that they
have a ‘function’ (ἔργoν[ergon]) which in turn is a power (δύναµις[dynamis]) to act or
be acted upon” (Bostock 2006, p. 71). Moreover, Aristotle and Aquinas help us under‑
stand that when predicated of inanimate and animate yet unconscious nature, teleology
must not be thought of as a mysterious—quasi–ecient—cause, directing and organizing
things according to a pre–established harmony.30 Quite the contrary, they think it should
be perceived as a natural tendency of things to realize (actualize) what is proper to their
nature (e.g., a tree blossoming and bearing fruit)—a tendency that does not need to be
known, reected about, or intended by a conscious agent.31 That is why Aristotle delin‑
eates in Phys. II, 8 (199b 26–27) that “it is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present
because we do not observe the agent deliberating”.32
As a source of regularity and order in observed reality, teleology is often opposed
to chance. However, the classical approach helps us realize that the relationship between
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these two fundamental categories is more nuanced. With regard to chance, Aristotle con‑
siders it to be, rst of all, an ontological aspect of reality and not merely an epistemological
unexpectedness of certain occurrences due to the limitations of human understanding.33
To explain the nature of chance, Aristotle refers to the distinction between per se (καθ᾿
αὑτὸαἴτιoν,kath’ hauto aition) and incidental (κατὰσυµβεβηκὸς,kata symbebēkos), or per
accidens causes. He sees per se causes as fundamental and relevant—in a given causal
situation—ecient causes that are grounded in nature (φύσις,physis) or intellect (νoῦς,
nous). As such, they should be related to the formal and nal causality of a given agent or
a set of agents. In other words, an ecient cause is acting per se when its activity is per‑
formed by an agent, in accord with the agent’s SF, to produce its proper eect (see Phys. II,
7, [198a 23–26]). The character of the second per accidens (accidental) type of causes, on the
other hand, can be explained in reference to Aristotle’s metaphysical account of substance.
Just as an accident (accidental formal feature) of an entity has no existence of its own but
is rooted in its substantial formal features, an accidental cause must be related to a per se
cause (see Phys. II, 3 [195a 26–34]; II, 5 [196b 24–29]).
An example taken from Aristotle’s own writings might be in place here. Thinking
about the origin of a statue, we may consider its sculptor to be its essential (per se) ecient
cause. If the sculptor happens to be fair–skinned and have musical skills as well, we may
be justied to claim that a musician or a fair–skinned man made a statue. Nevertheless,
his musical talent and the fact that he is fair–skinned are only incidental (coincidental, per
accidens) causes with respect to the per se causality of him being a sculptor.
In light of this distinction, Aristotle suggests classifying chance as an unusual inciden‑
tal (per accidens) cause, which—although inherently unpredictable—nonetheless falls in the
category of things that “happen for the sake of something” (since it refers and is related to
such occurrences). Thus, chance occurrences are in a way posterior, since their manifesta‑
tion and subsequent analysis require a reference to per se causes relevant to a given causal
situation. Consequently, trying to specify its ultimate nature, Aristotle states that “chance
is an incidental cause. But strictly it is not the cause—without qualication—of anything”
(Phys. II, 5 [197 a 12–14]). And yet, since chance is distinguished as a unique type of occur‑
rence that is not primary and yet is inherently related to nature (φύσις,physis) and intellect
(νoῦς,nous), it needs to be dened in reference to per se formal and nal causality rather
than blind material necessity. This tells us that delineating it in stark opposition to these
causes is an unjustied simplication.34
The suppositional character of the Aristotelian–Thomistic notion of teleology and the
postulate of an intrinsic relation of chance to regularity and order can be applied to our
description of evolutionary changes. I claim that although mutations are truly random
(they occur by chance) and the nality of their causes is unrelated to the adaptiveness of the
resulting biological trait, they have a per accidens character with respect to the per se causes
of living beings that strive to survive and produce ospring. In other words, mutations
are meaningful for the homeostasis and tness of an organism in virtue of the per accidens
relevance of their eciency for the functioning and well–being of an organism, grounded
in and dened by its per se causes. The acceptance of the plural notion of causality helps us
understand that the chance character of mutations can be properly understood and seen
as relevant to evolutionary transitions only in reference to a broader causal framework
describing the nature and agency of entities involved in those changes. Consequently, it
seems to me that Darwin would be uerly surprised by the famous uerance of Jacques
Monod, saying that:
It necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, and
of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the
very root of the stupendous edice of evolution: this central concept of modern
biology is no longer one among many other possible or even conceivable hy‑
potheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one that squares
with observed and tested fact. And nothing warrants the supposition—or the
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hope—that on this score our position is ever likely to be revised. (Monod 1970,
p. 112)
In light of what has been said here about teleology and chance, it becomes apparent
that evolution must not be aributed to blind chance, which would actually mean giving
up the possibility of explaining reality.35
4. Thomistic School of Theology and Evolution
The constructive proposal of the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics of evolutionary
transitions—grounded in biological essentialism—developed in the preceding sections,
raises an important question. Reecting on the repercussions of the evolutionary theory in
the theology of creation and in our understanding of divine action in the universe, the pro‑
ponents of theistic evolution state that Christian theology is compatible with the modern
scientic understanding of cosmological, geological, chemical, biochemical, and biologi‑
cal evolution.36 However, a question needs to be asked as to whether the Thomistic school
of theology is ready to side with theistic evolution and what its contribution to the main
premises of this theological position might be. To answer these queries, we need to begin
with a brief presentation of the classical Thomistic account of the creation dogma.
4.1. Aquinas’s Account of Creation
Following the approach of Aquinas, in which philosophical theology precedes an in‑
terpretation of the biblical account oered in the book of Genesis, we may say that the
creative act of God—distinct from any movement and change (as they require some pre‑
existing material)—has two principal and intrinsically related aspects: (I) creation under‑
stood as active divine agency on the part of God and (II) creation understood as the pas‑
sive reception of divine agency on the part of creatures. Concerning (I), Aquinas further
distinguishes between (Ia) the primordial creative act, dened as bringing all beings into
existence out of nothing (ex nihilo), without any preexisting maer, and (Ib) sustaining and
preserving (upholding) all things both in the fact that they are (their existence—esse) and in
what they are (their essence—essentia). As a consequence of (Ia) and (Ib), all contingent en‑
tities depend entirely on God—again, both in the fact that they are (their existence) and in
what they are (their essence). This dependency explains the passive aspect of creation (II).37
Moving to Aquinas’s Treatise on the Work of the Six Days (see ST I, 65–74), we should
emphasize that Thomas understands creation ex nihilo as the coming into being out of noth‑
ing (i.e., not from a preceding being of any kind) of the most primitive types of contingent
entities: the four elements (and possibly the fth element—ether, from which celestial bod‑
ies are made). He thus sees it as an act that was instantaneous, rather than extended in time.
We infer this based on Aquinas’s dierentiation between the work of creation (opus creatio‑
nis) and those of distinction (opus distinctionis) and adornment (opus ornatus) in his analysis
of the work of the six days in the rst part of the Summa theologiae.38
The outcome of the work of creation (opus creationis) was the coming into existence
of the most primitive maer (materia secunda), which was, in fact, inseparable from the
rst three stages of distinction (opus distinctionis), the second of which was the distinction
“of the elements according to their forms”.39 The outcome of the work of distinction (opus
distinctionis) was the separation of land from the sea, accompanied by the preliminary stage
of the work of adornment (opus ornatus), the production of plants.40 The outcome of the
work of adornment (opus ornatus) was the production of celestial bodies and animals and
the creation of man.41 See Figure 3.
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extended in time. We infer this based on Aquinas’s differentiation between the work of
creation (opus creationis) and those of distinction (opus distinctionis) and adornment (opus
ornatus) in his analysis of the work of the six days in the first part of the Summa theologiae.38
The outcome of the work of creation (opus creationis) was the coming into existence
of the most primitive maer (materia secunda), which was, in fact, inseparable from the first
three stages of distinction (opus distinctionis), the second of which was the distinction “of
the elements according to their forms”.39 The outcome of the work of distinction (opus
distinctionis) was the separation of land from the sea, accompanied by the preliminary
stage of the work of adornment (opus ornatus), the production of plants.40 The outcome of
the work of adornment (opus ornatus) was the production of celestial bodies and animals
and the creation of man.41 See Figure 3.
Figure 3. Graphic depiction of the sequence of the work of the six days in the account of Genesis 1.
Following the biblical account, Aquinas sees the first steps of the opus distinctionis as taking place on
the first day (the day of creatio ex nihilo). This includes the introduction of the distinction between
heaven and earth and the distinction between the elements, similar to the first steps of the opus
ornatus, which take place on the third day. They include the production of plants (which in antiquity
were often treated as inanimate due to their immobility).
4.2. Aquinas’s Use of Augustine’s Notion of Rationes Seminales
Following Aquinas’s distinction, we should acknowledge that the subsequent
production (productio) of more complex contingent beings was, in a way, mediated
through the most basic forms of material stuff—the origin of which was the outcome of
the work/act of creation (opus creationis). In other words, more complex entities, in some
respect, came “from” them.
Indeed, Aquinas realizes that even a literal interpretation of Genesis suggests that (1)
it was earth that brought forth (gave origin to) plants, the green herbs, and fruit trees; (2)
it was water that brought forth (gave origin to) an abundance of swimming creatures and
birds (Aquinas suggests it despite the fact that Genesis does not say explicitly where they
came from); (3) it was earth that brought forth (gave origin to) all kinds of living creatures,
such as cale, creeping things, and wild animals of all kinds. Hence, following Augustine’s
concept of rationes seminales,42 Aquinas states that plants and trees might have been
produced “in their origin or causes”; that is, the earth “received … the power to produce
them”. They were subsequently brought into existence in “the work of propagation”.43
Similarly with fishes and birds, which Augustine saw as produced by “the nature of
waters on that [fifth] day potentially” (ST I, 71, 1, corp.), and animals, whose “production
was potential” as well (ST I, 72,1, corp.).44
4.3. From Gradualism to Evolutionism
As mentioned above (Section 3.1, footnote 12), Augustine’s interpretation of the
creation account in Genesis became an aractive point of reference in the advent of the
Figure 3. Graphic depiction of the sequence of the work of the six days in the account of Genesis 1.
Following the biblical account, Aquinas sees the rst steps of the opus distinctionis as taking place on
the rst day (the day of creatio ex nihilo). This includes the introduction of the distinction between
heaven and earth and the distinction between the elements, similar to the rst steps of the opus ornatus,
which take place on the third day. They include the production of plants (which in antiquity were
often treated as inanimate due to their immobility).
4.2. Aquinas’s Use of Augustine’s Notion of Rationes Seminales
Following Aquinas’s distinction, we should acknowledge that the subsequent produc‑
tion (productio) of more complex contingent beings was, in a way, mediated through the
most basic forms of material stu—the origin of which was the outcome of the work/act
of creation (opus creationis). In other words, more complex entities, in some respect, came
“from” them.
Indeed, Aquinas realizes that even a literal interpretation of Genesis suggests that (1) it
was earth that brought forth (gave origin to) plants, the green herbs, and fruit trees; (2) it
was water that brought forth (gave origin to) an abundance of swimming creatures and
birds (Aquinas suggests it despite the fact that Genesis does not say explicitly where they
came from); (3) it was earth that brought forth (gave origin to) all kinds of living creatures,
such as cale, creeping things, and wild animals of all kinds. Hence, following Augus‑
tine’s concept of rationes seminales,42 Aquinas states that plants and trees might have been
produced “in their origin or causes”; that is, the earth “received … the power to produce
them”. They were subsequently brought into existence in “the work of propagation”.43
Similarly with shes and birds, which Augustine saw as produced by “the nature of wa‑
ters on that [fth] day potentially” (ST I, 71, 1, corp.), and animals, whose “production was
potential” as well (ST I, 72,1, corp.).44
4.3. From Gradualism to Evolutionism
As mentioned above (Section 3.1, footnote 12), Augustine’s interpretation of the cre‑
ation account in Genesis became an aractive point of reference in the advent of the debate
concerning Darwin’s theory of evolution. It was in this context that an aempt was made to
describe Augustine’s theory as “evolutionary”. However, it must be emphasized that his
notion of the actualization of the limited and xed number of the hidden “latent forms” (ra‑
tiones seminales)—followed by Aquinas—introduces gradualism within a pre–established
harmony of the universe rather than anticipating the modern evolutionary theory. How‑
ever, in light of Aristotelian hylomorphism and his metaphysics of stability and change,
Augustinian rationes seminales may be seen not so much as organisms virtually present in
their dormant forms, hidden forces, or potencies (xed and limited in number)—that are
inherent to the most primitive maer created at the origin of the universe—but rather as a
category depicting the two levels of metaphysically interpreted potentiality, also specied
Religions 2024,15, 524 14 of 32
in Section 3.1. I believe this allows for introducing the idea of evolutionary changes and
transitions not only within the framework of the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics but
also in reference to Aquinas’s philosophical theology.
A reader familiar with Thomistic theology might object, saying that according to
Aquinas, (1) the origin of the rst exemplars of all higher forms of life, including human
beings, required his direct divine intervention;45 (2) the number of species in the universe
is prey much xed (the counterexamples of new species emerging from putrefaction and
crossbreeding are rare exceptions rather than proofs for an ongoing natural process of the
production of new species);46 and (3) opus ornatus is accomplished and current processes
of generation and corruption do not give origin to new species—rather, they eect the
emergence of new exemplars of already existing natural kinds.47
However, we should not ignore some other passages in Aquinas’s corpus where he
states that (1) the universe, in the beginning, was perfect with respect to the causes present
in it but not as regards all of their eects;48 (2) the description of the way in which things
emerged as an outcome of divine creation does not directly pertain to the substance of the
faith;49 (3) God can still make the universe beer by introducing new species;50 and (4) if
new species, in fact, do emerge, they were in the potency of primordial maer that came
into existence as an outcome of creation.51
I claim that in light of all that has been stated so far, it is possible to propose a consis‑
tent and relevant Thomistic version of theistic evolution, where God can be seen as work‑
ing in nature through secondary and instrumental causes, bringing thus into existence new
natural kinds of living (and nonliving) beings. While such an assumption might require in‑
troducing some adjustments to Aquinas’s theological system (I will specify them below, in
Section 4.7), these are rather minor changes that do not contradict nor radically transform
its most fundamental doctrinal aspects. Quite to the contrary, they go with it smoothly,
proving once again its exibility and openness to everchanging scientic knowledge about
the universe we live in. The following three sections will highlight some crucial aspects of
the proposed Thomistic version of theistic evolution.
4.4. Does God Create through Evolution?
Once we agree that evolutionary transitions and the emergence of new biological
species can be seen as one of the crucial aspects of divine agency, we face a question con‑
cerning the kind of divine action that is at work in those changes. The received opinion of
the vast majority of contemporary proponents of theistic evolution—who strive to prove
that the scientic notion of evolution does not contradict the theological belief in divine
creation—is that divine action in and through evolutionary processes is creative. They
commonly emphasize that creatio divina is not limited to the original bringing of the uni‑
verse into existence out of nothing (ex nihilo). Rather, they see it as being extended in time.
To make their case, they turn toward the category of continuous creation (creatio continua),
which is perceived by many theologians as a modern expression of the classical doctrine
of divine conservation (conservatio). Reinterpreting it in the context of the theory of evolu‑
tion, they suggest that creatio continua should be seen as accommodating the idea of God’s
bringing into existence new natural types of inanimate and animate entities in the course
of the history of the universe.52
In addition, based on this model of relating evolution and creation, theistic evolu‑
tionists often conclude that through their causal ecacy in evolutionary processes, contin‑
gent agents participate in God’s creative activity. Moreover, according to some of them,
the notion of God creating through the agency of secondary causes engaged in evolution‑
ary transitions supports the kenotic strain of contemporary theology, which assumes that
“God empowers and fullls nite beings by negating Godself” (Peterson 2013, p. 453). In
other words, “By creating the world out of love, God kenotically refrains from the exercise of
detailed predetermination in order to give room for creaturely self–development” (Gregersen
2013, p. 257).
Religions 2024,15, 524 15 of 32
This approach to the relation between creation and evolution inspires a signicant
terminological shift proposed by Denis Lamoureux, who claims that the word arrange‑
ment in the term “theistic evolution” is rather ill–fated as it places “the process of evolu‑
tion as the primary term, and makes the Creator (creation) secondary as merely a qualify‑
ing adjective”. He thus prefers to speak about “evolutionary creation” or “evolutionary
creationism”—making “creation” the primary term and “evolutionary” a qualifying one.
He states, “Evolutionary creation claims that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit created the
universe and life through an ordained, sustained, and design–reecting evolutionary pro‑
cess” (Lamoureux 2009, pp. 28–30).
I believe that in light of what was said so far in this article, it becomes apparent
that, from the Aristotelian–Thomistic perspective, the concept of “evolutionary creation”
is rather problematic, if not altogether ill–conceived. The notion of the creative act of God
as extended in time and including or taking place through natural and created agents’
contribution to evolutionary processes and transformations does not seem to agree with
Aquinas’s denition of creation in terms of (I) and (II), delineated in Section 4.1. Still more
controversial is the claim that God bestows on his creatures a power to co–create with him,
i.e., that he shares with created entities his divine power to create. This suggestion contra‑
dicts the view of Aquinas who clearly states that “It is impossible for any creature to create,
either by its own power or instrumentally—that is, ministerially”. For if “to create” means
“to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being … it is manifest that creation is the
proper act of God alone” (ST I, 45, 5, co.). In the same treatise on creation in his Summa
theologiae, answering the question comparing creation to the works of art—performed by
creatures—Aquinas adds that “in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is pre‑
supposed to the work of nature” (ST I, 45, 8, co.; see also ST I, 45, 8, ad 1, ad 4).
Consequently, assuming that evolutionary processes and transformations do occur
throughout the history of the created universe (and we have vast scientic evidence in sup‑
port of the claim that they do), we should not consider them as an aspect of divine creation.
This claim, paradoxically, diminishes the ultimate distinctiveness of the divine act of cre‑
ation from all phenomena and all types of causal agency observed in the universe. Rather,
we should see evolutionary processes as one of the integral parts of the divine governance
of the created universe, directing it to its eschatological consummation and fulllment. In
other words, we can state that in the course of the complex matrix of the processes that
eect particular cases of species transitions, God acts as the primary and principal cause
of novelty, working through the secondary and instrumental agency of natural contingent
beings. Consequently, what he shares with his creatures (if such language is appropriate
at all) is not so much his divine innite power to create but rather his power to providen‑
tially guide and direct the contingent reality to its nal end, along the path that abounds
in the astonishing beauty of new types of inanimate and animate creatures.
Accordingly, related to this critical evaluation of theistic evolution is a strong con‑
viction that the apparent novelty of entities, their structural and dispositional properties,
and the processes that they enter does not require a creative activity of God, understood in
terms of (Ia) (Section 4.1), to occur. As such, these new forms of life emerge in already exist‑
ing maer, in the course of continuous transformations, which bring the actualization of its
potentiality—a potentiality which God himself endowed it with. Hence, I suggest we must
leave behind the somewhat confusing concept of “continual creation” (creatio continua) and
go back to the classical categories, namely, Aquinas’s distinction of the intrinsically inter‑
related (Ia) divine creation out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) and (Ib) divine conservation
(conservatio) of created beings.53 Sustained by God in their essentia and esse, they should
be seen as caught up in an incessant dynamics of processes of generation and corruption,
which, in turn, eect the coming into existence of new entities. As such, they may belong
to already existing natural kinds or give origin to new natural kinds of contingent beings.
These entities naturally and necessarily depend on God for their existence and essence,
which Aquinas grasps and expresses in the passive aspect of his denition of creation (II).
Religions 2024,15, 524 16 of 32
4.5. Concurrence of Divine and Created Causes in Evolutionary Transitions
Having said that divine action in evolution is not creative but belongs to God’s prov‑
idential governance of the created universe on the path to its nal perfection and beauty,
we are still left with the question concerning the exact character of this particular aspect of
God’s agency. In other words, we may ask what exactly God does in an evolutionary tran‑
sition and whether his causal power in speciation is entirely delegated to the secondary
and instrumental causation of creatures.
The distinction between the primary and principal causation of God and the sec‑
ondary and instrumental agency of creatures is willingly applied by many theistic evo‑
lutionists to their theological explanation of cases of the origin of new species, in which
parental organisms of species S1bring into existence the rst organisms that belong to
the new species S2. They claim that the parental organisms in question can be seen as
acting—in some respect—both in accordance with and beyond their own causal dispo‑
sitions, i.e., as both secondary and instrumental causes in the hands of God. However,
neither non–Thomistic nor Thomistic proponents of theistic evolution seem to engage in a
more detailed analysis of divine agency in the processes that lead to the emergence of new
species. On the Thomistic side of the conversation, the modeling of divine action in evolu‑
tion is usually limited to a careful presentation of Aquinas’s understanding of creation and
his aforementioned distinction between the primary (and principal) causation of God and
the secondary (and instrumental) causation of his creatures, followed by a general appli‑
cation of these principles to evolutionary transformism and the emphasis on the fact that
God works in nature both through per se causal agency of his creatures and the per acci‑
dens quasi–causality of chance (see, e.g., Luyten 1954, p. 30 [after Donceel 1965, pp. 301–2];
Maritain 1952, p. 38; Carroll 2006;Dodds 2012, pp. 205–28).
I suggest that one way to ll this lacuna can be grounded in Aquinas’s distinction
between existence (esse) and essence (essentia) applied to the processes of generation and
corruption. Concerning esse, I propose to distinguish its three fundamental aspects: (ee1)
coming into existence (at t0); (ee2) continuing existence in time (t1,t2,t3, …); and (ee3) the
perfection of existence taken as such (per se). Concerning essentia, I propose to distinguish
its two fundamental aspects: (ea1) educing (educere) SF from the potentiality of PM (at t0);
and (ea2)essentia (constituted by PM and SF) taken as such (per se).54 In addition, I suggest
that we can assign particular dimensions/competences of divine and natural causal agents
with respect to these aspects of esse and essentia in the following manner:
1. God is always (and in each case) the ultimate primary cause of (ee3) and (ea2) and the
ultimate principal cause of (ee1) and (ee2), as well as of (ea1) of all created entities.
2. Creatures can act as secondary causes (dependent on the primary causation of God)
of (ee1) and (ee2), as well as (ea1)—with respect to contingent entities other than them‑
selves.55
3. Creatures can also act as instrumental causes (dependent on the principal causation of
God) of (ee3), as well as (ea2)—with respect to contingent entities other than
themselves.
The distinction between secondary and instrumental causes is based on the assump‑
tion that the former are capable of bringing about eects that match their natural ontolog‑
ical dispositions (though being dependent on the agency of a primary cause), while the
laer bring about eects that go beyond their natural dispositions, on account of their ca‑
pacities being augmented (elevated) by a principal cause (as an instrument in the hands of
an artist).56 See Figure 4.
I suggest that these distinctions allow us to specify further and assign particular types/
aspects of causal agency to God and to creatures in natural changes, particularly in the
generation of new ospring—including those cases in which it leads to the emergence of
the rst representative(s) of a new species. The proposed model is grounded within a more
general framework distinguishing between the two related yet distinct orders of causation:
the immanent and the transcendent.
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Religions 2024, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 33
ontological dispositions (though being dependent on the agency of a primary cause),
while the laer bring about effects that go beyond their natural dispositions, on account
of their capacities being augmented (elevated) by a principal cause (as an instrument in
the hands of an artist).
56
See Figure 4.
I suggest that these distinctions allow us to specify further and assign particular
types/aspects of causal agency to God and to creatures in natural changes, particularly in
the generation of new offspring—including those cases in which it leads to the emergence
of the first representative of a new species. The proposed model is grounded within a
more general framework distinguishing between the two related yet distinct orders of
causation: the immanent and the transcendent.
Figure 4. Specification of divine and natural causal competences with respect to particular aspects
of esse and essentia.
Concerning the scenario in which parental organisms give birth to a new exemplar
of the species they themselves belong to, we may say that they are:
1. Proper causes of their offspring’s coming into being (in a most basic and pre–
philosophical causal explanation).
2. Secondary causes of (ea
1
), i.e., the instantiation of their offspring’s essence (defined as
the eduction of the appropriate SF from the potentiality of PM) and of its (ee
1
), i.e.,
coming into existence, as well as its (ee
2
), i.e., continuing in existence (permanence in
time)—the laer by removing causes of corruption and engaging in nurturing their
offspring, which is necessary for its survival and growth.
3. Instrumental causes of (ea
2
), i.e., their offspring’s essence (essentia) and (ee
3
), i.e., its
existence (esse) taken as such (per se).
As secondary causes of (ea
1
), (ee
1
), and (ee
2
), the parental organisms depend on the
primary causality of God, who is the origin and source of all efficient causality effecting
the actualization of PM by the variety of SFs and the ultimate end of natural goal–
directedness in creatures. As instrumental causes of (ea
2
) and (ee
3
), they depend on the
principal causation of God, the Creator of PM and all SFs and the first and only source of
esse. Note that while creaturely esse has its primary and direct source in God (being de facto
a participation in divine esse), is not equivalent to God’s esse. It is esse that comes from God
and yet is not identical to a contingent creature’s essence (essentia) but proportionate to it.
Hence, we must emphasize that it is predicated of creatures analogously (using both an
analogy of aribution and of proper proportionality).
In other words, the same agency of parental organisms, which are rightly conceived
as proper causes of their own offspring within the immanent order of causation, should
Figure 4. Specication of divine and natural causal competences with respect to particular aspects
of esse and essentia.
Concerning the scenario in which parental organisms give birth to a new exemplar of
the species they themselves belong to, we may say that they are:
1. Proper causes of their ospring’s coming into being (in a most basic and pre–
philosophical causal explanation).
2. Secondary causes of (ea1), i.e., the instantiation of their ospring’s essence (dened
as the eduction of the appropriate SF from the potentiality of PM) and of its (ee1), i.e.,
coming into existence, as well as its (ee2), i.e., continuing in existence (permanence in
time)—the laer by removing causes of corruption and engaging in nurturing their
ospring, which is necessary for its survival and growth.
3. Instrumental causes of (ea2), i.e., their ospring’s essence (essentia) and (ee3), i.e., its
existence (esse) taken as such (per se).
As secondary causes of (ea1), (ee1), and (ee2), the parental organisms depend on the pri‑
mary causality of God, who is the origin and source of all ecient causality eecting the
actualization of PM by the variety of SFs and the ultimate end of natural goal–directedness
in creatures. As instrumental causes of (ea2) and (ee3), they depend on the principal causa‑
tion of God, the Creator of PM and all SFs and the rst and only source of esse. Note that
while creaturely esse has its primary and direct source in God (being de facto a participation
in divine esse), it is not equivalent to God’s esse. It is esse that comes from God and yet is
not identical to a contingent creature’s essence (essentia) but proportionate to it. Hence, we
must emphasize that it is predicated of creatures analogously (using both an analogy of
aribution and of proper proportionality).
In other words, the same agency of parental organisms, which are rightly conceived
as proper causes of their own ospring within the immanent order of causation, should be
classied as secondary and instrumental causation from the point of view of the transcen‑
dent order of causation, in which God is the rst, principal, and ultimate cause of both the
essence (essentia) and existence (esse) of every contingent being.
If this reasoning is sound, then—as in the case of a regular begeing of an ospring
that belongs to the same species—our causal description of the emergence of the rst rep‑
resentative of the new species S2allows us to distinguish and specify:
1. The proper cause of its origin in the immanent order of causation (in a most basic
and pre–philosophical causal explanation), i.e., the agency of the parental organisms
belonging to the species S1, within the complex dynamic system of immanent causes,
involved in the causally polygenic evolutionary change leading to the coming–to–be
of the rst exemplar of the species S2.
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2. The secondary cause of (ea1), understood as the eduction of its proper SF from the po‑
tentiality of PM, i.e., the agency of the parental organisms, within the complex system
of immanent causal factors, involved in the polygenic process of the instantiation of
the rst exemplar of the SF of the new species S2in a given “portion” of a designated
mater, which is its principle of individuation.
3. The instrumental cause of (ea2), i.e., its essence (essentia), taken as such, dened in
terms of the agency of the parental organisms, within the complex system of imma‑
nent causes, which is accompanied by the instantiation of the rst exemplar of the
new species S2(the actualization of PM by a new kind of SF of the species S2).
4. The secondary cause of its (ee1), i.e., coming into existence (esse), dened in terms
of the agency of ecient causes (parental organisms acting within the evolutionary
matrix of causes), which is accompanied or followed by the coming into existence
(esse) of their ospring, which happens to be the rst exemplar of the new species
S2. If parental organisms engage in nurturing their ospring, which is necessary for
its survival and growth, they are also considered secondary causes of (ee2), i.e., their
ospring’s continuing existence (permanence in time).
5. The instrumental cause of (ee3), i.e., its existence (esse), taken as such, dened in terms
of the agency of parental organisms (within the evolutionary matrix of causes), which
brings or is followed by an instantiation of the rst exemplar of the new species S2.
In other words, similar to the case of begeing ospring belonging to the same species,
parental organisms of the species S1, considered as parts of the dynamic polygenic causal
matrix of an evolutionary transition, can be regarded as proper causes of the prototype
organism of the new species S2within the immanent order of causation. The same causal
agency that brings to a conclusion the process of speciation in question has the nature of
secondary and instrumental causation from the point of view of the transcendent order of
causation, in which God himself is the rst, principal, and ultimate cause of the essence
and existence of every contingent being. See Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Concurrence of divine and natural causes in an evolutionary transition.
It is worth noting that, according to the proposed model of the concurrence of divine
and natural causes in evolutionary transitions, direct divine intervention is not needed for
new natural kinds of plants and animals to emerge. However, the situation differs with
respect to the origin of the human species.
4.6. Theological Anthropogenesis and Evolution
The encounter of theological and biological views on anthropogenesis inspired the
most emotional reactions to evolutionary theory and posed a considerable challenge to
both biblical exegesis and theological anthropology. The history of the conversation
between scientific and religious worldviews on the topic of hominization is thus long and
complicated. However, what interests me the most—in the context of the material
presented in this article—is the received view of human speciation in the age of evolution,
expressed in the official statements of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. Accepting
its logic, I will offer a correction to its dualistic overtones, in light of the Aristotelian–
Thomistic system of thought.
The received view in question assumes that God gave spiritual and immortal souls
(created directly ex nihilo) to one or to a pair of animals whose bodies were properly
prepared by evolution. It was first formulated in the nineteenth century and promoted,
among others, by St. George Jackson Mivart, John Augustine Zahm, and Filippo De
Filippi. The first one of them states:
Scripture … says that “God made man from the dust of the earth, and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life”. This is a plain and direct statement that man’s
body … was evolved from preexisting material (symbolized by the term “dust
of the earth”), and was therefore [formed] by the operation of secondary laws.
The soul of every individual man is … created … produced by a direct or
supernatural act, and, of course, … by such an act the soul of the first man was
similarly created. (Mivart 1871, pp. 300, 295)
SF = substantial form
PM = primary matter
S1 S2 = species 1 and 2
principal causation of God working through instrumental causation of creatures
primary causation of God working through secondary causation of creatures
Figure 5. Concurrence of divine and natural causes in an evolutionary transition.
It is worth noting that, according to the proposed model of the concurrence of divine
and natural causes in evolutionary transitions, direct divine intervention is not needed for
new natural kinds of plants and animals to emerge. However, the situation diers with
respect to the origin of the human species.
Religions 2024,15, 524 19 of 32
4.6. Theological Anthropogenesis and Evolution
The encounter of theological and biological views on anthropogenesis inspired the
most emotional reactions to evolutionary theory and posed a considerable challenge to
both biblical exegesis and theological anthropology. The history of the conversation be‑
tween scientic and religious worldviews on the topic of hominization is thus long and
complicated. However, what interests me the most—in the context of the material pre‑
sented in this article—is the received view of human speciation in the age of evolution, ex‑
pressed in the ocial statements of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. Accepting its
logic, I will oer a correction to its dualistic overtones, in light of the Aristotelian–Thomistic
system of thought.
The received view in question assumes that God gave spiritual and immortal souls
(created directly ex nihilo) to one or to a pair of animals whose bodies were properly pre‑
pared by evolution. It was rst formulated in the nineteenth century and promoted, among
others, by St. George Jackson Mivart, John Augustine Zahm, and Filippo De Filippi. The
rst one of them states:
Scripture … says that “God made man from the dust of the earth, and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life”. This is a plain and direct statement that man’s
body … was evolved from preexisting material (symbolized by the term “dust
of the earth”), and was therefore [formed] by the operation of secondary laws.
The soul of every individual man is … created … produced by a direct or super‑
natural act, and, of course, … by such an act the soul of the rst man was similarly
created. (Mivart 1871, pp. 295, 300)
More recently, this view found support in ocial documents of the Magisterium
of the Catholic Church (Humani generis, no. 36) and in the ocial address to the Papal
Academy of Sciences by John Paul II (issued in 1985). However, the proponents of this
opinion do not specify exactly whether the union of the human soul with the body oc‑
curred in the embryonic stage or after birth, which makes many think about the infusion
of the human soul into an already existing human body.
In response to this opinion, and following Aristotle and Aquinas, I want to emphasize
that there cannot be a human body without a human soul, nor a human body that can
receive a human soul. Neither can a humanoid body receive a human soul, unless it is
corrupted. In other words, no already informed (actualized) entity (secondary maer)
can receive another SF (it can only receive AFs), unless it is corrupted. Hence, I suggest
that the rst human soul(s) was/were created ex nihilo at the moment of the conception of
the rst human being(s). It/they actualized PM, underlying gametes produced by male
and female hominins at the moment of the substantial change accompanying fertilization.
The designated PM in question was properly disposed to be actualized by the rst human
soul(s) within the complex evolutionary process that is vastly extended in space and time.
The rst scholar who suggested a proper interpretation of evolutionary theory from
the point of view of the Aristotelian–Thomistic school of philosophy and theology, along
the line proposed here, was French Dominican Marie–Dalmace Leroy. In his 1891 book,
he corrected the dualistic overtones of the proposal made by Mivart and Zahm, saying
that “It is only after the infusion of the soul, and because of the infusion itself, that man is
constituted a living being. Before infusing the spirit, there was nothing human, not even
the body, inasmuch as human esh cannot exist without the soul, which is its substantial
form” (Leroy 1891, p. 261 [after Artigas et al. 2006, p. 59]).57
Consequently, based on the Aristotelian–Thomistic understanding of human nature
and the model of the concurrence of divine and creaturely causal agency in evolutionary
transitions oered in the preceding section, we can now try to adapt the same model to
depict the evolutionary origin of the human species. Once again, we need to remember
that for Aquinas, God creates a new human soul (SF proper for a human being) ex nihilo at
the moment of conception (our coming into existence). Consequently, each human soul is
not and cannot be educed from the potentiality of PM, as in the case of the SFs of all other
Religions 2024,15, 524 20 of 32
natural beings (both inanimate and animate). It is directly created by God. At the same
time, it is correct to view parental organisms (together with other agents in an evolutionary
matrix of causes) as properly disposing PM to receive it.
Accordingly, although parental organisms can be still regarded as secondary causes
of the coming into existence (esse) as well as instrumental causes of the existence (esse) of
the rst human being(s), taken as such, when it comes to its/their essence (essentia), they
can only be called secondary causes of the proper disposition of PM to be actualized by the
rst human soul(s), which is/are not educed from the potentiality of PM but is/are directly
created by God ex nihilo. This applies to each subsequent begeing of a new human person.
At the same time, it is worth noticing that the direct divine action of God in the creation of
human souls is not miraculous. It belongs to the natural order of the universe he created,
that human souls are not educed from the potentiality of PM but created by God ex nihilo.58
Moreover, as notes James Madden, the fact that the human soul(s) was (were) created
ex nihilo does not introduce (or is an outcome of) an empirical gap. Quite the contrary, due
to the proper disposition of PM, biological material in the hominins’ ovum (ova) and sperm
is ready to go through a substantial change that will give origin to the rst exemplar(s) of
the human species. In other words, if there is a gap, it is ontological, not empirical.59
Hence, the variation of my model of causation in the evolution of man will look as
depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Concurrence of divine and natural causes in the evolution of man.
4.7. Thomistic Version of Theistic Evolution
Summing up my reflection, I would like to propose a list of ten fundamental
postulates of the contemporary Thomistic version of theistic evolution (TVTE) presented
in this article.
60
It includes the following propositions:
1. TVTE pays aention to natural science and accepts the biological notion of evolution.
It carefully follows the research and critical debate concerning the mechanisms of
speciation. It also actively engages in the analysis of philosophical aspects and
interpretations of the past and current versions of evolutionary theory.
2. TVTE is grounded in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s hylomorphism and ontology of living
beings, emphasizing their unity, in reference to the principles of their stability and
changeability (see Section 2.1). It also assumes and defends biological essentialism
(see Section 2.2).
3. TVTE is also grounded in the metaphysical model of evolutionary transitions as
delineated in Section 3, with a special emphasis on the categories of the disposition
of maer, levels of potentiality, and the notion of maer understood as directed
toward perfection. Another crucial aspect of the same model is its application of the
notion of the interplay of teleology and chance offered in classical metaphysics (see
Section 3.7). (This foundation safeguards TVTE from the pitfalls of materialist
reductionism and causal monism.)
4. Theologically speaking, TVTE emphasizes, after Aquinas, that the initial act of
creation is restricted to the creatio ex nihilo of the most basic physical maer of the
elements and keeping the ever-transforming and changing universe in existence
(conservatio rerum). Hence, it clearly distinguishes between creation and the processes
of the emergence of new things from the already existing secondary maer of the
universe.
SF = substantial form
PM = primary matter
S1 S2 = species 1 (humanoid) and 2 (human)
primary causation of God (direct intervention)
principal causation of God working through instrumental causation of creatures
primary causation of God working through secondary causation of creatures
Figure 6. Concurrence of divine and natural causes in the evolution of man.
4.7. Thomistic Version of Theistic Evolution
Summing up my reection, I would like to propose a list of ten fundamental postu‑
lates of the contemporary Thomistic version of theistic evolution (TVTE) presented in this
article.60 It includes the following propositions:
1. TVTE pays aention to natural science and accepts the biological notion of evolu‑
tion. It carefully follows the research and critical debate concerning the mechanisms
of speciation. It also actively engages in the analysis of philosophical aspects and
interpretations of the past and current versions of evolutionary theory.
2. TVTE is grounded in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s hylomorphism and ontology of living
beings, emphasizing their unity, in reference to the principles of their stability and
changeability (see Section 2.1). It also assumes and defends biological essentialism
(see Section 2.2).
Religions 2024,15, 524 21 of 32
3. TVTE is also grounded in the metaphysical model of evolutionary transitions as de‑
lineated in Section 3, with a special emphasis on the categories of the disposition of
maer, levels of potentiality, and the notion of maer understood as directed toward
perfection. Another crucial aspect of the same model is its application of the notion of
the interplay of teleology and chance oered in classical metaphysics (see Section 3.7).
(This foundation safeguards TVTE from the pitfalls of materialist reductionism and
causal monism.)
4. Theologically speaking, TVTE emphasizes, after Aquinas, that the initial act of cre‑
ation is restricted to the creatio ex nihilo of the most basic physical maer of the ele‑
ments and keeping the ever–transforming and changing universe in existence (conser‑
vatio rerum). Hence, it clearly distinguishes between creation and the processes of the
emergence of new things from the already existing secondary maer of the universe.
5. TVTE interprets the continual and ongoing processes of micro– and macro–evolution
as belonging to the work of adornment (opus ornatus), whose subsequent stages are
not limited to the closed and past time interval but extend through the entire history
of the universe.
6. TVTE acknowledges that the perfection of the universe can grow daily not only with
regard to the number of individuals but also with regard to the number of species.
7. TVTE assumes that (with the exception of humans) SFs of the rst exemplars of new
species are educed from the potentiality of PM. It also states that the similarity be‑
tween parents and their ospring (including ospring belonging to a new species)
should not be understood as an absolute, strict, and nonexceptional qualitative iden‑
tity of their SFs. Rather, it can be dened in terms of a proportional proximity to the
SF of the ospring, when compared with the SFs of its parents (see Section 3.5).
8. TVTE holds that the origin of species occurs through “production” (productio) from
pre–existing maer with ancestry in a process of universal common descent, in
which God’s agency concurs with the secondary and instrumental causation of
creatures. This proposal is grounded in the reinterpreted version of Augustine’s con‑
cept of rationes seminales, which Aquinas introduces in his theology of creation (see
Sections 4.2–4.5).
9. TVTE does not require direct divine intervention in the origin of a new plant or animal
species. The exception is the human species, where the rst human soul(s) was/were
created ex nihilo at the nal step of the speciation process, and all subsequent human
souls are created ex nihilo at the moment of the conception of each new human be‑
ing. The rst human soul(s) actualized PM properly disposed within evolutionary
processes.
10. (TVTE remains open–minded in the debate on mono– versus polygenism.)61
It is worth noting that even if points (5–9) might be considered as going beyond the
way Aquinas understood and explained creation, their introduction seems to be neces‑
sary, taking into account contemporary science, the current status of evolutionary biology
in particular, and the most recent scientic and philosophical analysis of causation and
causal relationships in nature. At the same time, they certainly do not contradict any of
the core principles of Aristotelian–Thomistic philosophy and theology. Quite the contrary,
the possibility of harmonizing them with the main objectives of classical thought proves
the exibility of the laer and its relevance within the context of contemporary science.62
5. Conclusions
The aim of this article was to present a concise version of the contemporary
Aristotelian–Thomistic perspective on evolution and theistic evolution that I discuss at
length in my recently published book (Tabaczek 2024). In my treatment of evolutionary
theory, I do not aim to verify its validity or determine the adequacy of its extrapolation
to other areas of scientic research. This remains the task of those who engage in the sci‑
entic endeavor. Rather, aware of the particular status of the theory of evolution at the
current stage of the development of the science of biology, I strive to show that, if true,
Religions 2024,15, 524 22 of 32
evolution does not oppose or contradict the classical Aristotelian–Thomistic philosophical
and theological view of reality.
Speaking of philosophy, I believe that my research shows that the reection on the
metaphysical and ontological aspects of biological evolution provides a new opportunity
for the retrieval of some of the most fundamental categories of classical philosophy, in‑
cluding hylomorphic essentialism, the notion of act and potency, the disposition of maer,
and the interplay of teleology (regularity) and chance in dynamic transformations of liv‑
ing beings. This proves that the longstanding legacy of the Aristotelian–Thomistic school
of thought is not only coherent and consistent but also exible and open to new data and
current ways of understanding the universe, its structures, and its processes.63
Most importantly, the Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysics applied in the context of
biological evolution presents itself not as an aged doctrine that is limited to humble listen‑
ing and adjusting of its principles to the new scientic theories, but, quite to the contrary,
as a voice that has much to oer. In the complex debates on (1) the denition of species,
(2) the character of natural selection, (3) the relevance and role of teleology, and (4) the role
of chance in evolutionary processes, the classical philosophical tradition brings an essen‑
tial contribution to the results achieved by science—a contribution that has considerable
explanatory power, which must not be neglected.
With respect to (1), the contemporary Aristotelian–Thomistic school of thought sup‑
ports the retrieval of and oers a metaphysical grounding for the typological/essentialist/
individualistic aspect of the category of species, helping thus to overcome decades of the
overemphasis on the populational thinking in biology and the extreme of a purely rela‑
tional and historical approach to dening species (best expressed in biological and cladistic
species concepts). Concerning (2), the same school of philosophy—in reference to its care‑
ful reection on the ontology of the laws of nature—protects biologists and philosophers
of biology from treating natural selection as a teleological agent cause. It reminds them
that natural selection merely describes the phenomenon of dierential survival and repro‑
duction of individuals due to dierences in phenotype.64 At the same time, moving to (3),
the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition helps us realize that evolutionary theory presupposes
teleology at the level of individual organisms that strive to survive (maintain homeostasis)
and produce fertile ospring—i.e., in reference to fundamental tendencies characteristic of
living beings (tendencies taken for granted by most evolutionary biologists) that are indis‑
pensable for any dierentiation within evolutionary lineages.65 Finally, addressing (4), the
classical school of thought—paying aention to and metaphysically grounding the notion
of the interplay of regularity/goal–directedness and chance/fortune in nature—helps us
overcome the ideological and extreme view of the evolving reality as run by pure chance.
A similar point can be made in reference to Aquinas’s theology, including his long‑
standing, carefully developed, and cautiously nuanced denition of creation and God’s
providential governance of the universe, as well as his understanding of divine action.
These categories prove to serve as remarkably precise and useful conceptual tools, helpful
in delineating the contemporary framework of theistic evolution. They enable us to answer
the question of whether God creates through evolution and to build a constructive model
of the concurrence of divine and natural causes in evolutionary transformations, including
the origin of the human species.
At the same time, in the theological part of my work, I have pointed toward some
necessary changes that need to be introduced in Aquinas’s reasoning for it to be relevant
with respect to evolutionary theory. I believe that this allows us to move beyond a certain
dose of skepticism toward classical theology and appreciate the longstanding legacy of the
Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition, which remains vigorous and ready to enter a vivid and
fruitful conversation with contemporary philosophy and science.
Having said this, I acknowledge that both the theory of evolution and its philosophical
and theological interpretations are subject to ongoing critical verication and actualization,
which is a regular part of the progress of all academic disciplines and the theories and
Religions 2024,15, 524 23 of 32
hypotheses they oer. Concerning the theological side of the conversation, we might think
about a number of further challenging questions that need to be addressed. They include:
1. The question concerning the amount of pain, suering, and death in evolutionary
processes.66
2. The question about mono– and polygenetic views of human speciation, with refer‑
ence to the notion of original sin and its transmission.67
3. The question concerning the confrontation of the classical understanding of the orig‑
inal state of human nature (original justice/righteousness), including the notion of
praeternatural gifts (especially impassibility and physical immortality), with the evo‑
lutionary view of the origin of the human species.68
4. The notion of the human species as the crown and pinnacle of biological evolution in
confrontation with the notion of the continuing human evolution, trans– and posthu‑
manism, and the possibility of an emergence of new (higher) intelligent species on
Earth or somewhere else in the cosmos.69
These and other questions are the subject of ongoing interdisciplinary research engag‑
ing science, philosophy, and theology. It remains my hope that this article and my recently
published book oer a useful contribution to this conversation.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Data Availability Statement: No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is
not applicable to this article.
Conicts of Interest: The author declares no conicts of interest.
Notes
1Among more signicant contributors we should mention Mortimer J. Adler, Benedict Ashley, Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, F.
F. Centore, William E. Carroll, Michael Chaberek, John N. Deely, Charles DeKoninck, Joseph Donceel, Ryan Fáinche, Réginald
Garrigou–Lagrange, Étienne Gilson, James R. Hofmann, Édouard Hugon, Marie–Dalmace Leroy, Norbert Luyten, Jacques Mar‑
itain, Ernan McMullin, Désiré–Joseph Mercier, Antonio Moreno, Raymond J. Nogar, Fran O’Rourke, Edward T. Oakes, R. P.
Phillips, Gerard M. Verschuuren, and William Wallace.
2I am thinking here in particular about comments made by Ivan Colagèand Simon Maria Kopf, in their critical response to the
book at the promotional event organized in December of 2023 at the Pontical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome. I
am also grateful for the critical remarks and suggestions shared by both anonymous reviewers of this article. They helped me
clarify some of its fundamental assertions.
3The nominalist position in the debate on biological species inspires the denition of units of speciation at the level of popula‑
tions (less often at the level of individual organisms). In other words, what explains the abundance of living forms is genetic
variation and the distribution of traits among organisms within populations. As David Oderberg notes (in reference to Margaret
Morrison’s reection on the importance of the contribution of R. A. Fisher to the development of population genetics [Morrison
2000, pp. 214–24]), “The idea is that individual organisms, and hence their putative essences, play no explanatory role in evolu‑
tionary theory. The aim of that theory is to explain biological diversity, but to do this all one needs is an account of the genetic
variation in populations, each member of which is unique and not a representative of some essential type. This variation can
be encapsulated by general statistical laws that do not refer to the causal powers of individual organisms, so one does not need
‘specic knowledge of the individuals themselves’ in order to understand evolutionary mechanisms”. (Oderberg 2007, p. 207).
4“The species problem is one of the oldest controversies in natural history” (O’Hara 1993, p. 231). It is “one of the thorniest
issues in theoretical biology” (Kitcher 2003, p. xii). What indicates the scale of the controversy is certainly the fact that we have
around two dozen species concepts in the philosophy of biology and, as claims Ereshefsky, “at least seven well–accepted ones”
(Ereshefsky 1998, p. 103). See also (Richards 2008, pp. 161–88) (he denes at least 16 species concepts).
5Genetic dispositions–based essentialism was proposed by Kis and Kis (1979) and Rieppel (2010). Dispositional–based essen‑
tialism is favored by Wallace (2002) and Austin (2017). Related to it, a developmental programs–based version of biological
essentialism was developed by Austin (2017) and Boulter (2012). The mixed approach, dening essences in reference to both ge‑
netic and/or phenetic properties and relational/historical aspects of organisms, was developed by Devi (2023) and Elder (2008).
Origin essentialism, introduced by Saul Kripke (1980), is advocated by Ellio Sober (2024, pp. 178–79). I discuss contemporary
versions of essentialism in greater length in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 74–81).
Religions 2024,15, 524 24 of 32
6Note that the reference to ecient causes in the causal description of an organism introduces a historical aspect to the hylomor‑
phic variant/aspect of biological essentialism. Yet, as notes Oderberg, “It does not follow from the fact that a substance or species
has a certain historical origin that its essence is to have that origin, even if it has its origin necessarily” (Oderberg 2007, p. 101).
7On this interpretation of essentialism, variation, being a result of the action of “interfering forces”, takes an organism away
from its “natural stage”, making it thus “the result of imperfect manifestations of the idea implicit in each species” (Mayr 1963,
p. 11). Paul Griths says variation makes an organism belonging to an intrinsically dened species a “deviation” from an “ideal”
(Griths 2001, pp. 78–79). Sober nds this view to contrast Darwin’s, for whom “[i]ndividual dierences are not the eects of
interfering forces confounding the expression of a prototype; rather they are the causes of events that are absolutely central to the
history of evolution”. He adds that “the Natural State Model presupposes that there is some phenotype which is the natural one
which is independent of a choice of environment” (Sober 1980, pp. 371, 374). Jody Hey brings this line of criticism to its logical
conclusion and says: “that variation among organisms is the crucial stu of changing life and of life’s progress” is thought to be
“devastating to essentialism” (Hey 2001, p. 62).
8An expert in Aristotle’s biology, James Lennox, says that “Aristotle’s essentialism is not typological, nor is it in any way ‘anti–
evolutionary’. Whatever it is Darwin was up against, it was not Aristotelian essentialism” (Lennox 2001, p. 162). I claim that
the typological approach remains plausible when understood in line of the denition of natural kinds provided in the main text
(Section 2.1).
9In Tabaczek (2024, pp. 57–91, 170–74) I oer an extended analysis of all major species concepts and distinguish between the
categories of metaphysical and biological species, natural kinds, and biblical kinds.
10 Commenting on this topic in the Metaphysics, Aristotle states what follows: “Regarding material substance we must not forget
that even if all things come from the same rst cause or have the same things for their rst causes, and if the same maer serves
as starting–point for their generation, yet there is a maer proper [i.e., properly disposed] to each, e.g., for phlegm the sweet or
the fat, and for bile the bier, or something else; though perhaps these come from the same original maer” (Meta. VIII, 4 [1044a
15–20]). Aquinas, in turn, comments on this passage thus: “From the things which are said here then it is evident that there is
one rst maer for all generable and corruptible things, but dierent proper [i.e., properly disposed] maers for dierent things”
(In Meta. VIII, lect. 4 [§ 1730]).
11 One could object that PM cannot be disposed as this would lead to it losing its metaphysical status of pure potentiality. Hence,
what can be disposed is only secondary (physical) maer. Still, I claim that the fact that the scope of possible actualizations of
PM—when informed by a given SF and AFs—is limited allows us to say (at least analogically) that it is disposed. Especially
when we emphasize that it is not disposed as such (per se) but as informed (actualized) by the given SF and a particular set
of AFs. Another possible response to this question was proposed by Simon Maria Kopf, who suggests that the “proximate”
potentiality of prime maer is nothing other than the disposition of “designated maer”, which through the substance’s AFs
is not only extended under determinate dimensions but might also be argued to have determinate dispositions, which can be
changed through new AFs.
12 Such a notion of potency is, for example, characteristic of the thought of Augustine. In his mature commentary on Genesis,
he implements the Stoic notion of rationes seminales (λóγoι σπερµατικoὶ, “seed–principles”) and states that “[God] created all
[creatures] together … whose visible forms He produces through the ages, working even until now” (De Gen. ad li. V, 20).
He adds that “there is in nature some hidden force by which latent forms are brought into view” (De Gen. ad li. VI, 16).
While providing an important point of reference for the reection on the philosophical and theological repercussions of the
theory of evolution, Augustine’s notion of the actualization of the limited and xed number of the hidden “latent forms” must
be classied as introducing gradualism within a pre–established harmony of the universe rather than anticipating the modern
evolutionary theory (the laer was suggested, among others, by St. George Jackson Mivart, John Augustine Zahm, and Henry de
Dorlodot—see Tabaczek [2024, pp. 135–37]). To give justice to Augustine, we should acknowledge that apart from the category
of rationes seminales, he introduces the notion of unformed maer (materia informis), which he sees as neither actualized maer
nor nothingness: “Something midway between form and nothingness” (quiddam inter formam et nihil)” (Conf. XII, 6, 6). Important
for the interpretation of the “formless void” in Genesis 1 as a non–temporal absolute potentiality at the initial founding of the
world, materia informis becomes for Augustine a principle of mutability: “The mutability of mutable things itself gives them their
potential to receive all those forms into which mutable things can be changed. And what is this mutability? … I would call it ‘a
nothing–something’ [nihil aliquid] or ‘an–is–that–is–not’ [est non est] if such expressions were allowed” (Conf. XII, 6, 6). However,
while this description of materia informis might be seen as resembling Aristotle’s materia prima, we must confront it with a set of
passages in which Augustine seems to suggest it is a kind of basic stu (i.e., secondary maer). In his unnished commentary
on Genesis, he states materia informis is “a kind of mixed–up material [materies erat confuse quaedam] out of which the world …
would be fashioned, by the sorting out of its elements and the bestowal on them of shape and form”. (De Gen. ad li. imp. lib.
IV, 11). In Conf. XII, 7 we read it was created ex nihilo in two kinds: spiritual and bodily: “Two realities [duo quaedam], one near
to yourself, the other bordering on nothingness”. Similar is his view shared in De Gen. ad li., where he also speculates about
the third, spiritual kind of materia informis—one that gave origin to the rst human soul(s). See (Nordlander 2019).
13 On another occasion, Aristotle presents us with a similar reection concerning transitions between various forms of life: “[N]ature
passes from lifeless objects to animals in such unbroken sequence, interposing between them beings which live and yet are not
Religions 2024,15, 524 25 of 32
animals, that scarcely any dierence seems to exist between two neighbouring groups owing to their close proximity” (De part.
an. IV, 5 [681a 12–15]).
14 See also In De an. II, lect. 7, (§ 315); Q. de pot. 5, 1, co. and ad 5; SCG III, 22, no. 7.
15 Consequently, it should be stated that Aquinas’s belief in the “tendency” of properly disposed maer to be actualized (informed)—
in a line of consecutive accidental and substantial changes—by various new types of AFs and SFs (including SFs of increasingly
higher natural kinds) does not concern only his views on human embryology (see SCG III, 22, no. 7) but can be regarded as a
generally binding principle in his metaphysical system.
16 Similar metaphysical analysis may be developed with reference to organisms reproducing asexually.
17 Some thinkers argue that biological essentialism is not sustainable as it requires clear, nonbridgeable boundaries between species,
which—in turn—suggests evolution is saltational and not incremental. I present this argument and respond to it in Tabaczek
(2024, pp. 84, 86–88).
18 My concept of the metaphysics of evolutionary transitions is inspired by the works of a number of Thomistic philosophers and
theologians. Among them, I would like to mention in particular Carroll (2006), Gilson (1984), Moreno (1973), and O’Rourke (2004).
19 Following Aristotle, Aquinas was convinced that the energy of the sun was necessary for substantial changes to occur on Earth. In
reference to the example of celestial bodies causing the generation of lower bodies, one can argue that for Aquinas, eects that do
not resemble their causes are always ranked ontologically “lower” than their causes, while speciation, as dened above, entails
the possibility of originating an organism that is ontologically “higher”; that is, one that has new and metaphysically “more
perfect” dispositions in respect to its direct ecient cause. This issue will be addressed in the following section of this article.
20 See also Q. de pot. 3, 8, obj. 13; ST I–II, 112, 1; Comp. theo. 1, 93. At the advent of modernity, Descartes upheld this principle
(often called a causal adequacy principle). In his “Third Meditation”, he states that “there must be at least as much reality in the
ecient and total cause as in the eect of that cause” (Descartes 1984, p. 28).
21 The notion of the increased complexity and perfection of things mentioned here is not conceived teleologically. Rather, it simply
acknowledges the fact that evolution produces things that can be classied at various levels of structural complexity and are
characterized by dierent sets of dispositional properties. Moreover, speaking about perfection, we should not forget about “a
fundamental dierence between the metaphysical order of various degrees of perfection of dierent ‘essences,’ and the biological
order of dierent forms of life which is based on a historical and phenomenological analysis. Metaphysical categories of ‘higher’
and ‘lower’ should not be equated with biological concepts describing organisms as ‘more complex’ and ‘beer adapted.’ In
other words, ‘more complex’ and ‘beer adapted’ do not presuppose a higher perfection of ‘essence.’ Insects, for instance, are
certainly not the highest organisms in terms of the metaphysical perfection of their ‘essence,’ but they can be regarded as a
culmination of an evolutionary line in terms of adaptation to their environmental niche. That is why, when biology speaks
of dierent species, it does not mean to speak of dierent ‘essences,’ as it is not interested in levels of ontological perfection”
(Tabaczek 2014, p. 60).
22 Michael Chaberek claims that an evolutionary framework is incompatible with the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas. In his
argumentation, he points to the principles that “no being can convey more act than it possesses”, that “no eect can exceed the
power of its cause”, and that “the perfection of the cause cannot be lesser than the perfection of the eect” as incompatible with
the evolutionary emergence of novel genera of living things. See Chaberek (2017, p. 48) and Chaberek (2019, p. 56).
23 The relevance of the rst strategy described here (important for the proper understanding of the medieval formulation and
interpretation(s) of PPC) might be limited to a certain form of Thomism. The second strategy is relevant in the context of the
contemporary philosophical debate on the causal aspects of evolutionary transitions. Apart from the two strategies delineated
in the main text, we may list other approaches to this problem, based on (1) a metaphysical dierentiation of types of perfection;
(2) the virtual and eminent presence of perfections; and (3) the conservation of the overall perfection of the universe. I discuss
them in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 42–55). Another meaningful response to the challenge of PPC and evolution was suggested by
Simon Maria Kopf, in reference to the notion of God’s governing primary causation in, with, and through secondary causation
executing his providence. If God’s involvement in the agency of secondary causes includes creation, conservation, application,
and instrumental causation, a divine application and especially an instrumental use of creaturely powers may explain an increase
in the actuality or perfection of the rst exemplar(s) of a given new species. I believe this suggestion goes hand in hand with
my analysis of yet another possible response to the problem of PPC and evolution oered by Feser, i.e., the eminent presence
of higher perfections in causes (see Feser 2014, p. 155): “The idea goes back to the medieval concept of a passive obediential
capacity (potentia obedientialis) whereby the nature of a given cause can be ‘elevated’ such that it is capable to give what by nature
it does not have. … Hence, the ‘elevation’ of such agents is caused by the supernatural concursus of the First Cause, which
enables them to bring about eects of an entirely higher order than those within the ambit of their natural powers” (Tabaczek
2023a, pp. 51–52).
24 Paying aention to the same problem of the popular interpretation of the PPC, Peter Coey states: “The mediaeval scholastics
embodied this truth in the formula: Nemo dat quod non habet—a formula which we must not interpret in the more restricted and
literal sense of the words giving and having, lest we be met with the obvious objection that it is by no means necessary for a boy
to have a black eye himself in order to give one to his neighbour!” (Coey 1970, p. 60).
Religions 2024,15, 524 26 of 32
25 The idea of causal polygeny of events was introduced in the analytic philosophy of biology by John Dupré(1993, pp. 123–24),
who, in turn, takes it from genetics, which acknowledges that many genes typically contribute to the production of one trait.
Following Dupré, George Molnar (2003, p. 195) notes not only that events are polygenic, but also that causal powers, conversely,
are pleiotropic and exible and can make a contribution to many dierent eects.
26 This view was previously articulated by Luyten (1951), Ashley (1972), and Elders (1984). Interestingly, it nds grounding in
Aquinas who, following Avicenna, distinguishes four types of ecient causes, including preparing and perfecting causes (see In
Meta. V, lect. 2 [§ 766–69]; In Phys. II, lect. 5 [§ 766–69]). I claim that the former—preparing maer for form (In Meta. V, lect. 2 [§
767])—can be extended to numerous causal agents contributing to the same complex evolutionary transition, while the laer—
causing the ultimate perfection of a thing (In Meta. V, lect. 2 [§ 766])—might be referred to the cause that brings about (directly)
the nal step of an evolutionary transformation. See also Frost (2022, pp. 192–98). Both Ivan Colagèand Simon Maria Kopf
suggest that the contribution of various factors emphasized in the extended evolutionary synthesis requires a closer examination
on my side. I nd their comment justied and will take it into account in my further reection on the topic of evolution.
27 My extended analysis of teleology and chance in evolution can be found in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 92–126). There I address a number
of important issues, including (1) an observation made by Aristotle in Physics and commented on by Aquinas in In Phys., which
might be interpreted as a preliminary formulation of the principle of natural selection; (2) a recent argument in the philosophy
of biology portraying Darwin as reinventing (Aristotelian) teleology; (3) the debate on teleology among the founding fathers of
the twentieth–century evolutionary synthesis; (4) the current status of teleology in philosophy of biology, and (5) the question
of whether natural selection should be understood as teleological.
28 See Phys. II, 3 (194b 29–195a 2) and Meta. V, lect. 2 (1013a 29–1013b 2). See also Phys. II, 7 (198a 18–20); Meta. I, 2 (983a 30–32).
29 See, for instance, De part. an. III, 2 (663b 12–14); IV, 5 (679a 25–30); De gen. an. II, 4 (739b 27–31); III, 4 (755a 17–30).
30 Aristotle is careful to note that the nal cause is not acting sensu stricto: “The active power is a ‘cause’ in the sense of that
from which the process originates: but the end, for the sake of which it takes place, is not ‘active’. (That is why health is not
‘active,’ except metaphorically.) For when the agent is there, the patient becomes something: but when ‘states’ [ἕξεων,hexeōn,
dispositions] are there, the patient no longer becomes but already is—and ‘forms’ [εἴδη,eidē] (i.e., ‘ends’) [καὶτὰτέλη,kai ta telē]
are a kind of ‘state’ [ἕξεις,hexeis]” (De gen. et corr. I, 7 [342b 14–18]).
31 In response to the objection that the end—existing upon the completion of the agent’s action—cannot be its cause, Aquinas says
that “Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is rst in the order of the agent’s intention. And it is this way
that it is a cause” (ST I–II, 1, 1, ad 1). Concerning natural causes that do not have cognition, Aquinas thinks their “intention” is
expressed in their natural inclinations: “to intend … is nothing else than to have a natural inclination to something” (De prin.
nat. 19).
32 Aquinas has something similar to say in De prin. nat. 19: “we should notice that, although every agent, both natural and
voluntary, intends an end, still it does not follow that every agent knows the end or deliberates about the end. To know the end
is necessary in those whose actions are not determined, but which may act for opposed ends as, for example, voluntary agents.
Therefore it is necessary that these know the end by which they determine their actions. But in natural agents the actions are
determined, hence it is not necessary to choose those things which are for the end”. See also Bostock (2006, pp. 48–78), Gohelf
(1976), and Guthrie (1981, pp. 114–18).
33 Aquinas’s teaching on nal causation follows—for the most part—the position of Aristotle. See In Meta. V, lect. 2 (§ 775); V, 3 (§
781–82); In Phys. V, lect. 11 (§ 246); De prin. nat. 19, 34–36.
34 “No incidental cause can be prior to a cause per se. Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to intelligence and nature.
Hence, however true it may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity, it will still be true that intelligence and nature will be
prior causes of this all and of many things in it besides” (Phys. II, 6 [198a 8–13]).
35 In his On the Origin of Species, we nd Darwin saying: “Mere chance, as we may call it, might cause one variety to dier in some
character from its parents, and the ospring of this variety again to dier from its parent in the very same character and in a
greater degree; but this alone would never account for so habitual and large an amount of dierence as that between varieties of
the same species and species of the same genus” (Darwin 1859, p. 111). I think this shows that Darwin was aware of the fact that
ontologically real chance events that produce minor variations remain in synergy with the regularity and teleological character
of life cycles and the transmission of features between generations. This allows for the accumulation of accidental changes that
may lead, in extended periods of time, to speciation.
36 I treat this statement as a working denition of theistic evolution. It is commonly known that the theory of evolution was and still
is perceived by many as challenging the more literal interpretation of the Bible and the creation story found in Genesis. The more
than 160 years that have passed since the publication of Darwin’s book On the Origin of Species (1859) abound in both supportive
theological interpretations as well as erce theologically motivated refutations of his theory. Peters and Hewle (2003) oer a
helpful map of various theological responses to evolutionary theory. Another overview can be found in Fowler and Kuebler
(2007). A list of important works related to (1) the historical account of the debate on evolution, (2) a general introduction to the
encounter of theology and evolutionary biology, and (3) the debate on the theory of Intelligent Design, can be found in Tabaczek
(2024, p. 12n25).
Religions 2024,15, 524 27 of 32
37 See ST I, 45, 1–3. Each of the points listed here can be unpacked and further analyzed. I oer such an analysis in Tabaczek (2024,
pp. 142–47). My use of the qualication “contingent” in this context refers to the fact that all things created are transient and not
necessary. It does not reect Aquinas’s other use of contingency in the sense of a given thing being not fully determined in its
nature to one end.
38 See Aquinas’s introduction to ST I, q. 65. Kremann notes that this distinction, present also in Super II Sent. 13, 1, 1; 14, 1, 5; 15, 1,
1; 15, 2, 2 and 17, 2, 2, is not fully developed in SCG II, 39–45, where opus distinctionis covers also opus ornatus: “[F]urnishing [opus
ornatus] is never even mentioned in SCG II or, for that maer, anywhere else in SCG. So, if ‘distinguishing’ in II.39–45 designates
Aquinas’s explanation of the origin of all species … then in SCG ‘distinguishing’ covers also what is carefully separated o as the
work of furnishing not only in ST, wrien after SCG, but also in Aquinas’s earlier Commentary on the Sentences” (Kremann
1998, p. 186).
39 And even if only earth and water are named, adds Thomas, the author of Gen 1:2 had in mind air and re as well. The reason he
does not mention them is that “the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant
people” to whom he spoke (see ST I, 66, 1, ad 3 and reply to sc 2 of obj. 3).
40 We must remember that in antiquity, many thought plants were not living organisms because they do not move and allocate
themselves. Hence, the production of plants in the account of Genesis preceded the actual opus ornatus.
41 Aquinas’s distinction between creatio and productio seems to correspond with the distinction between the Hebrew “to create”
(bara [א ָר ָ]) and “to make” (asah [ה ָ ָ]). It is important to acknowledge that Aquinas is not always consistent in his use of these
terms. See Tabaczek (2024, pp. 189–90).
42 Although Aquinas uses the term rationes seminales explicitly on numerous occasions in his commentary on the Sentences, in other
parts of ST, in De veritate,De potentia, and De malo, and in some biblical commentaries, he paradoxically does not use it in his
analysis of the works of the six days (ST I, qq. 65–74). At the same time, however, he does refer in these questions directly to
the authority of Augustine and his concept of all types of creatures existing in statu potentiae in the earth (the primitive elements)
and unfolding at the proper time, contrasting his view with the one held by “other holy writers”.
43 ST I, 69, 2, corp.: “In these rst days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently
rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, ‘He worketh until now’. Now the production
of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their
causes only”.
44 See also Q. de pot. 4, 2, ad 28: “Before the plants were produced causally, nothing was produced, but they were produced
together with the heaven and the earth. In like manner the shes, birds and animals were produced in those six days causally
and not actually”.
45 “[T]he rst members of the species were immediately created by God, such as the rst man, the rst lion, and so forth” (Super II
Sent., 1, 1, 4, co.). See also ST I, 65, 4, co.
46 “In its beginning the universe was perfect with regard to its species (quantum ad species)” (Q. de pot. 4, 2, ad 22).
47 “To the perfection of the universe there can be added something daily with regard to the number of individuals, not, however,
with regard to the number of species”. (ST I, 118, 3, ad 2).
48 “The universe in its beginning was perfect (…) as regards nature’s causes from which afterwards other things could be propa‑
gated, but not as regards all their eects” (Q. de pot. 3, 10, ad 2). See also Q. de pot. 4, 1, co., Q. de pot. 5, 5, ad 13.
49 “[W]ith respect to the beginning of the world something pertains to the substance of faith, namely that the world began to be by
creation, and all the saints agree in this. But how and in what order this was done pertains to faith only incidentally insofar as it
is treated in scripture, the truth of which the saints save in the dierent explanations they oer” (Super II Sent. 12, 1, 2, co.). See
also Q. de pot. 5, 1, co.
50 “[T]he universe can be made beer, either through the addition of many parts, that is to say, so that many other species would
be created, and that many degrees of goodness that can exist would be complete, since the distance between the highest creature
and God is still innite; and thus God could have made [in this way] the universe beer and can still do it” (Super I Sent. 44, 1,
2, co.). See also ST I, 25, 6, ad 3.
51 “Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers … [i.e., they] existed previously in
their causes, in the works of the six days” (ST I, 73, 1, ad 3).
52 The view delineated here is shared by a substantial group of theologians coming from dierent traditions and denominations.
It includes the contributors to the 2009 edited volume of the Pontical Academy of Sciences concerning cosmic and biological
evolution, John Paul II, Benedict XVI, Pope Francis, Christoph Schönborn, Denis Alexander, Philip Clayton, Arthur Peacocke,
Philip Hefner, Paul Davies, and Robert John Russell. Interestingly, the same view—although not without qualications—is
expressed by some Thomistic philosophers and theologians, including Benedict Ashley, Joseph Donceel, and Nicanor Austriaco.
A more detailed presentation of the “creationist” strain of theistic evolution can be found in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 180–87).
53 Even if he emphasizes that “The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence” (ST I,
104, 1, ad 4), Aquinas never uses the term “continual creation” (creatio continua), which gained much popularity in a more recent
philosophy of religion and creation theology. Fabien Revol (2020) traces its origin back to one of the metaphysical meditations
Religions 2024,15, 524 28 of 32
of Francisco Suarez wrien in 1597, in which he (wrongly) aributes it to Aquinas saying “That is why S. Thomas claims that
conservation is, as it were, a continual creation” (Et ideo saepe dicit divus Thomas, conservationem esse quasi continuatam creationem)
(Suarez 1861, D. 21, 2, 4 [791]).
54 The phrase “as such” (per se) is thought of, in this context, as a way of a more static and synchronic description of the metaphysical
categories of esse and essentia. It is contrasted with the complementary dynamic and diachronic side of these metaphysical
categories, expressed in terms such as “coming into existence (into being)”, “existence in time”, and “educing (eduction of) SF
from the potentiality of PM”.
55 Having said that divine conservatio of created things belongs to/is an intrinsic aspect of divine creatio, creaturely secondary cau‑
sation with respect to (ee2) should be dened in terms of providing conditions for the ourishing, i.e., a proper actualization of
dispositions proper to a given natural kind to which the entity/the organism in question belongs.
56 See SCG III, 70, no. 8 and ST I, 45, 5, co. Ignacio Silva (2022, pp. 98–102) analyzes Aquinas’s further distinction of the four ways
of being the cause of action of something else, introduced in Q. de pot. 3, 7, co.
57 This view nds support in In De an. II, lect. 1 (§ 225–226) and SCG II, 72, no. 3. More recently, an anti–dualistic concern with
respect to the received notion of anthropogenesis was expressed by Rainger: “Can we divide up man in this way between
theologians and scientists—the soul for the former, the body for the laer?” (Rainger 2011, p. 135).
58 This nds conrmation in Aquinas’s general conviction that creation is not miraculous simply because—being ex nihilo—it does
not include or presuppose any pre–existing substance or order of nature. Unlike creation, miracles do presuppose and pertain to
the order of nature. In other words, they are special ways in which God brings about changes in the created order. As Aquinas
notes in ST I, 105, 7, ad 1: “Creation, and the justication of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly
speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of
nature, since they do not belong to that order”.
59 “[W]hen I assert that the human soul has not evolved, I do not claim that there is some empirical gap that we expect to nd in
natural history” (Madden 2013, p. 273).
60 This is an updated version of the list oered in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 167–68).
61 This topic is not discussed in the present article. I analyze it in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 244–77).
62 My position is inspired by Kremann, who states: “Aquinas, of course, had no inkling of any scientic evidence that might
prompt an aempt to provide a non–literal interpretation of the biblical account. But the very wording of the rst chapter
of Genesis, and his idea of the level of sophistication in the audience for whom it was originally intended, led him to join
Augustine in taking a remarkably enlightened view of the way to read the story of the six days—a view that would, I think, have
equipped Augustine and Aquinas to appreciate judiciously, rather than denounce, scientic accounts of evolution” (Kremann
1998, p. 190).
63 It is important to notice that the suggested return to the classical categories of hylomorphism, essentialism, and formal and
nal causation subscribes to a wider revival of Aristotelianism observed in most recent analytic philosophy, particularly in
analytic metaphysics. The dynamic aspects of Aristotle’s view of reality—framed within his notion of intertwined categories of
potentiality and actuality—are rediscovered in the contemporary metaphysics of dispositions and their manifestations, which
also oer an important (dispositional) view of causation that both challenges and contributes to the number of post–Humean
notions of causation discussed in analytic metaphysics (see my critical introduction to dispositionalism and dispositional view of
causation in Tabaczek 2019a, chp. 5,6, pp. 181–245). Moreover, the recognition of dispositions as “pointing” or being “directed”
toward their characteristic manifestations brings back the notion of teleology. Hence, the proponents of dispositionalism talk
about “physical” and “natural intentionality”, characteristic of inanimate objects as well as nonsentient, sentient, and conscious
forms of living organisms. Finally, an important and heated debate is ongoing with regard to various contemporary analytic
notions of hylomorphism. This denitely proves the renewed interest in this crucial conceptual tool of Aristotle, which further
translates into the contemporary retrieval of essentialism and the debate over natural kinds (see Tabaczek 2019a, pp. 216–41 and
Tabaczek Forthcoming).
64 I discuss this issue in greater detail in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 118–23). Leaving aside a complex question concerning the status
of general laws in biology (as compared with those formulated in physics and chemistry), my view builds on an important
contribution coming from William Stoeger who states: “Although the laws of nature reveal and describe fundamental paerns
of behavior and regularities in the world, we cannot consider them the source of those regularities, much less aribute them the
physical necessity these regularities seem to manifest. Nor can we ascribe to them an existence independent of the reality whose
behavior they describe. Instead I claim that they are imperfect abstract descriptions of physical phenomena, not prescriptions
dictating or enforcing behavior. Thus, a Platonic interpretation of these laws is unjustied” (Stoeger 1993, p. 208). Consequently,
we must admit that the law (principle) of natural selection reveals and describes the regularity of a greater reproduction success
of organisms that are beer ed in their environment. Yet, it does not causally make them to be such or reach reproduction
success. It is thus—contrary to what was suggested by Francisco Ayala (see my critical evaluation of his position in Tabaczek
2024, pp. 111–14)—not teleological.
65 Alvaro Moreno and Maeo Mossio note that “[E]volutionary mechanisms operate because they are embodied in the complex
organization of organisms. Thus, if we look for the roots of the impressive capacity of life to proliferate, to create an enormous
Religions 2024,15, 524 29 of 32
variety of forms, to adapt to completely dierent environments, and particularly, to increase its complexity, we shall focus on
individual living entities, namely on organisms, because evolution as an explanatory mechanism actually presupposes the exis‑
tence of organisms” (Moreno and Mossio 2015, pp. xxi–xxii). Earlier on, in 1979, Francisco J. Varela argued that “evolutionary
thought, through its emphasis on diversity, reproduction, and the species in order to explain the dynamics of change, has ob‑
scured the necessity of looking at the autonomous nature of living units for the understanding of biological phenomenology”
(Varela 1979, p. 5).
66 A meaningful aempt at a Thomistic response to this aspect of the theodicy question can be found in a number of articles and a
monograph authored by Kel (2020). Beyond the Thomistic circle, this question was addressed by many, including Southgate
(2008) and Sollereder (2019).
67 As already mentioned, I discuss this debate at length in Tabaczek (2024, pp. 244–77). The conversation on this topic is open and
requires further analysis and conceptual work.
68 A balanced yet critical evaluation of the traditional approach represented by Karl Rahner (1961a,1961b) and Piet Schoonenberg
(1965, pp. 181–85), has more recently found a response on the side of Roszak (2020) and Vanzini (2023), who strive to defend the
classical notion of praeternaturalia in the age of science. Again, the topic requires further analysis and study.
69 An aempt at a Catholic/Thomistic response to some of these questions can be found in George (2005), Green (2015), and
Tabaczek (2023b). Beyond the Thomistic circle, see Gouw et al. (2022), Peters et al. (2018), and Davison (2023).
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