The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of Russian Aggression on Ukraine, and Their Judicial Control

Abstract

In 2014, the Russian aggression against Ukraine began and it escalated even greater in February 2022. The Western states, including the Member States of the European Union, reacted and introduced a wide variety of sanctions, first in 2014, then in 2022, yet until now they have not led to the termination of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict and to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Ukraine. The aim of this article is to analyse these sanctions and their development as well as the judicial control that was effectuated in relation to these measures by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Full text

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS LODZIENSIS
FOLIA IURIDICA 106, 2024
[165 ]
Universit y of Lodz – Lodz Unive rsity Pre ss, Lodz , Poland.
Received: 3.11.2023. Veried: 7.11.2023. Revised: 21.11.2023. Accepted: 24.11.2023.
(https://creativecommons.org/lice nses/by-nc-nd/4.0)
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6736-8008
https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6069.106.10
Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak*
THE EU’S SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
ON UKRAINE, AND THEIR JUDICIAL CONTROL
Abstract. In 2014, the Russian aggression against Ukraine began and it escalated even greater
in February 2022. The Western states, including the Member States of the European Union, reacted
and introduced a wide variety of sanctions, rst in 2014, then in 2022, yet until now they have not
led to the termination of the Russian–Ukrainian conict and to the withdrawal of the Russian troops
from Ukraine. The aim of this article is to analyse these sanctions and their development as well as
the judicial control that was eectuated in relation to these measures by the Court of Justice of the
European Union.
Keywords: sanctions, restrictive measures, aggression, Russia, Ukraine, judicial control
SANKCJE UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ PRZECIWKO ROSJI
W ŚWIETLE AGRESJI ROSJI WOBEC UKRAINY
ORAZ ICH KONTROLA SĄDOWA
Streszczenie. W 2014 r. rozpoczęła się Rosyjska agresja przeciwko Ukrainie, która znacznie
eskalowała w lutym 2022 r. Państwa Zachodu, w tym państwa członkowskie Unii Europejskiej,
zareagowały na nią i wprowadziły szeroki wachlarz sankcji, najpierw w 2014 r., a następnie
w 2022 r., jednakże do tej pory środki te nie doprowadziły do zakończenia koniktu rosyjsko-
-ukraińskiego i do wycofania oddziałów rosyjskich z Ukrainy. Celem artykułu jest analiza sankcji
oraz ich rozwoju, jak również kontroli sądowej wykonywanej przez Trybunał Sprawiedliwości Unii
Europejskiej nad tymi środkami.
Słowa kluczowe: sankcje, środki ograniczające, agresja, Rosja, Ukraina, kontrola sądowa
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of the article is to analyse the issue of the sanctions applied by
the European Union as a reaction to the Russian aggression on Ukraine. As the
conict is dated back to 2014, the deliberations will be divided into two parts.
*University of Lodz, mfracczak@wpia.uni.lodz.pl

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
166
First the article will focus on the EU measures adopted after the illegal annexation
of Crimea in 2014. The second part of the paper will concentrate on sanctions
imposed after 24th February, 2022. Both parts will contain an overview of
restrictive measures, consideration on their legal basis, and the scope of judicial
review, which will make it possible to form conclusions on the legality of those
sanctions. For this reason, the article will focus mainly on those measures that
were subjected to judicial review.
2. THE EU’S SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA AFTER
THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA
In February 2014, due to the impeachment procedure applied against the
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, clashes between pro-Ukrainian and pro-
Russian protesters broke out. The pro-Russian protesters demanded the secession
from Ukraine and a help from the Russian Federation. Government buildings in
Crimea, including one of the Supreme Council, were seized and locked by armed
and masked individuals. After that, the Supreme Council decided on a referendum
on the status of Crimea (Bebler 2015, 40; Bilková 2015, 34; Olson 2014, 19; Yue
2016, 182).
The Crimean referendum took place on 16th March, 2014. 96,77% voters
out of 81.36% registered voters that took part in the referendum chose the
separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation to Russia. However,
the results were not veried by impartial international observers. Ukraine did not
recognise the outcome. Moreover, it was not accepted by many of the EU and the
NATO member states. On 17th March, 2014, Crimea declared its independence,
and on 11th April, 2014, it adopted a new constitution of the Republic of Crimea.
A treaty on annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation was
signed on 18th March, 2014, in Moscow. Nevertheless, on 11th April, 2014, the
Ukrainian Parliament declared Crimea and Sevastopol “occupied territories”
(Bebler 2015, 42–43, 53; Olson 2014, 20).
As a result, pro-Russian protests and actions took place in other Ukrainian
cities such as Donetsk or Lugansk. On 17th July, 2014, a civilian aircraft on an
international ight, Malaysian Airlines ight MH17, was shot down in the Donetsk
Oblast, probably by Russian rebels, causing death of 298 passengers and crew
on board.1 On 5th September, 2014, the NATO leaders called upon Russia to restore
previous Ukrainian borders (Bebler 2015, 47, 51). Despite this, the situation did not
change and in July 2015, the Russian Prime Minister Medvedev declared the full
annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation (McHugh 2015).
1 UN Security Council resolution 2166 (2014).

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 167
The European Union declared that Russian activities in the territory of
Ukraine constituted a gross violation of international public law because of the
prohibited use of force and coercion, which was in breach with the Helsinki
process.2 The prohibition of the use of force is considered to be jus cogens
(a peremptory norm of international law), as well as a customary law and one
of the fundamental principles of international law (Bilková 2015, 28; Gilder
2015, 26; Mik 2013, 43–44).3 The activities of the Russian Federation constituted
a prohibited act of aggression. As V. Bílková rightly points out, the Russian forces
were within the territory of another state (Ukraine), and although they were there
with the primary agreement on the part of Ukraine, they were nally used in
contravention of the conditions provided for in this agreement. Moreover, they
engaged and supported actions that violated the internal law of Ukraine and there
was on the part of Russia a hostile intention for the use of these armed forces.
There appeared also a certain degree of gravity, conrmed by the eects of the
use of force and the presence of the Russian military troops in Ukraine, namely
the illegal annexation by Russia of Crimea and Sevastopol, constituting the breach
of territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as an invasion and a military occupation
resulting from such an invasion. According to the mentioned author, the Russian
activities could be even qualified as an armed attack (Bilková 2015, 33–37),
triggering Ukraine’s right to self-defence.4 As such, Russia’s war of aggression
endangers the security of the European region and for this reason, the EU’s
sanctions are justied as collective countermeasures (Kokott 2023, 5).
An overview
In relation to the Russian Federation, the European Union introduced
prohibitions concerning nancial transactions, including the ones with the ve
major Russian banks as well as embargo on the import and export of arms,
related materials, and military goods and technology to and from Russia.5 As
to the territories of Crimea and Sevastopol, the EU imposed an import embargo
on all goods coming to the EU from these territories with the exception of goods
examined and controlled by the Ukrainian authorities and which have been
2 European Council Conclusions, 20–21 March 2014, EUCO 7/1/14, Rev 1.
3 See also: Inter national Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Acti-
vities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), judgment of
27th June, 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, at 191–193.
4 Article 51 UN Charter.
5 Council decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31st July, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in view
of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 229 31.07.2014, p. 13. Council de-
cision 2014/659/CFSP of 8th September, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s
actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 271 12.09.2014, p. 54. Council regulation (EU)
No 833/2014 of 31st July, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabi-
lising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 229 31.07.2014, p. 1.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
168
granted a certicate of origin by the Ukrainian government, an export embargo
on all goods, technology, services (including technical assistance, brokering,
construction, engineering or tourism services) to Crimea and Sevastopol, and the
prohibition of any type of investments on these territories. The Council ordered
the EU Member States to implement these measures and provide for eective,
proportionate, and dissuasive penalties for breach of any of the above-mentioned
prohibitions.6
Finally, the European Union introduced restrictive measures against
individuals (natural or legal persons, entities, or bodies) responsible for the
misappropriation of the Ukrainian State funds, for human rights violations in
Ukraine7 and for the destabilisation of the situation in Ukraine, and against
individuals associated with them.8 This means that these persons do not have
to individually or directly threaten or undermine the territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine, but it is enough that they materially or
nancially support the actions taken to that eect.9 These measures include: travel
ban, freezing of funds, and other economic resources. The individuals targeted
by the sanctions are listed and the listing should also include the grounds for it as
well as information necessary to identify the individual concerned. The EU law
provided also for exemptions on humanitarian grounds or due to attending an
intergovernmental meeting. The exemptions are authorised by the Member States
and require to inform other EU Member States and the Commission. The Member
States are also obliged to implement the prohibitions in their national laws and
provide for the penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of the EU
sanctions.10
6 Council decision 2014/286/CFSP of 23rd June, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in
response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, OJ L 183 24.06.2014, p. 70. Council
regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23rd June, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in response to the
illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, OJ L 183 24.06.2014, p. 9.
7 Council decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5th March, 2014, concerning restrictive measures directed
against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 66 6.03.2014,
p. 26. Council regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5th March, 2014, concerning restrictive measures
directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 66
6.03.2014, p. 1.
8 Council decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17th March, 2014, concerning restrictive measures in re-
spect of actions undermining or th reatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, OJ L 78 17.03.2014, p. 16. Council regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive
measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine, OJ L 78 17.03.2014, p. 6.
9 General Court, case T-255/15 ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp. v. the Council,
judgment of 25 January 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:25, p. 97–98, 117.
10 Council decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5th March, 2014, concerning restrictive measures di-
rected against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 66
6.03.2014, p. 26. Council regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5th March, 2014, concerning restr ictive
measures directed against cer tain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine,

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 169
It results thereof that the European Union decided to apply sanctions of a mixed
character. These are economic measures of general application against a state or
region and, on the other hand, targeted sanctions. This diversication was intended
to positively inuence the eectiveness of the EU’s reaction to the Crimean conict.
On the other hand, these measures were regarded as low-intensity sanctions with
diminishing eect every year, permitting Russia to minimise the real impact of
sanctions, which nally led to the escalation of the Russian aggression in 2022
(Shangina 2022, 4).
Legal basis
Being an international organisation, the European Union can act only within
the powers conferred to it by its Member States.11 Promoting and contributing
to international peace and security as well as to the strict observance and the
development of international law in accordance with the principles enshrined in
the UN Charter is one of the Union’s main objectives, also within the scope of
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).12 The decisions relating to the CFSP
are issued unanimously by the European Council and the adoption of legislative
acts, in the meaning of Article 289 TFEU, is excluded.13 The Council’s decisions
can dene the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or
thematic nature.14 On the basis of a decision taken within the CFSP, the Council,
acting by a qualied majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Aairs and Security Policy and the Commission, can
adopt economic sanctions in relation to one or more third countries, or restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities.15 The
European Union makes use of these provisions and often uptake actions, including
targeted measures, that prove the EU’s intent to be a European leader in the peace
and security policy.16
OJ L 66 6.03.2014, p. 1. Council decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17th March, 2014, concerning restrictive
measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence of Ukraine, OJ L 78 17.03.2014, p. 16. Council regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concer-
ning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, OJ L 78 17.03.2014, p. 6.
11 Article 5 (1) TEU.
12 Article 3 (1) and (5) TEU, Article 21 (1), 2 (a)(b)(c) TEU, Article 23 TEU.
13 Article 24 (1) TEU.
14 Article 29 TEU.
15 Article 215 (1) and (2) TFEU.
16 As an example the European Union’s activities in the eld of combatting terrorism can be
pointed out: Council Common Position 2001/930/CFSP of 27th December, 2001, on combating ter-
rorism, OJ L 344, p. 90, 28.12.2001; Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27th December,
2001, on the application of specic measures to combat terrorism, OJ L 344, p. 93, 28.12.2001;
Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27th December, 2001, on specic restrictive measures
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, OJ L 377, p. 70,

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
170
The Union’s competence to adopt measures in relation to the Crimean
conict, as well as their scope and the procedures used, were disputed before the
CJEU. The Attorney General Wathelet suggested17 to the Court that the Union’s
authorities had legal basis for their action as well as respected the division of
powers and procedures provided for by the Treaties. The Attorney General
underlined the specicity of the CFSP and concluded that the decision 2014/512/
CFSP and the regulation 833/2014 are not legislative acts and could be issued
within the frame of the CFSP.18
The General Court was of an opinion that the European Union could
impose targeted sanctions and apply Article 215 TFEU in relation to the
Crimean crisis, as this action falls within the scope of the EU competence
in the CFSP area. The individual measures can be directed solely against
individuals identied as being responsible for the misappropriation of public
funds and to persons, entities, or bodies associated with them, whose actions
are liable to have threatened the proper functioning of public institutions and
bodies linked to them, undermining the rule of law in the state concerned.19
In its judgment of 28th March, 2017, in the case of Rosneft, the Court of Justice
conrmed that Article 215 TFEU can serve as a legal basis for the adoption of
targeted measures in relations to the Crimean conict. Moreover, it stressed that
Article 29 TEU can be used by the Council to describe in detail the persons
and entities that are to be the subject of the restrictive measures provided for
subsequently in the regulation issued on the basis of Article 215 TFEU.20 This
is consistent with the hitherto jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, according
to which once the Council uses its competences under the CFSP to react
to a given situation constituting a threat to international peace and security,
Article 215 TFEU can be a legal basis for the individual targeted measures.21
Taking into consideration the Union’s objectives, its tasks under the CFSP,
and the competence to adopt sanctions enshrined in Article 215 TFEU, it cannot
28.12.2001; Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1963 of 20th September, 2016, concerning restrictive
measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities as-
sociated with them and repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, OJ L 255, p. 25, 21.09.2016;
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20th September, 2016, imposing additional restrictive mea-
sures directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies
associated with them, OJ L 255, p. 1, 21.09.2016.
17 Attor ney General Wathelet, case C-72/15 Rosneft Oil Company OJSC v. Her Majest y’s Tre-
asury and others, opinion of 31st May, 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:381.
18 Attor ney General Wathelet, case C-72/15 Rosneft , p. 96–99.
19 General Court, case T-340/14 Kluyev v. the Council, judgment of 15th September, 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:496, p. 83, 85, 89–91.
20 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, judgment of 28th Mar ch, 2017; ECLI:EU:C:2017:236,
p. 86 –93.
21 Court of Justice, case C-130/10 European Parliament v. the Council, judgment of 19th July,
2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, p. 49–66, 82–84.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 171
be reasonably argued that the Union acted ultra vires. In that state of aairs, the
only possible conclusion is that there was an illegal intervention of the Russian
Federation in Ukraine and there are no legally valid reasons justifying this
interference. That is why the EU decided on the application of a wide range of
measures which aim at the stabilisation of the situation in Ukraine and had legal
basis to adopt them.22 These measures were taken with regard to the Russian
Federation, to the territories of Crimea and Sevastopol, and to the individuals
responsible for the misappropriation of the Ukrainian State funds or for the
destabilisation of the situation in the part of the Ukrainian territory.
Judicial review
The listed persons sought to challenge the imposed targeted sanctions
before the Court of Justice of the European Union.23 The individuals’ arguments
concerned the factual and legal background justifying the imposition of the
restrictive measures, as well as the breach of their fundamental rights. Although
some of the acts in question fall in the scope of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, the CJEU has a competence to verify the legality of these acts on the
basis of Art. 275 TFEU, including the Court’s power to control the legality of
general provisions. Otherwise, as the Court states, the lack of judicial control
would undermine the fundamental right of access to justice.24
The allegations of individuals concern mostly the right of the defence, as
enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the
right to eective judicial remedy armed by Article 47 of the Charter. These
rights include the right to be heard and the right to have access to the le, with the
reservation of maintaining condentiality of some part of the le if the issues of
security are at stake. In the rst place, it has to be pointed out that the Council is
not required to hear the individual before the rst listing takes place, so that the
imposed sanctions would have a surprise eect, but, as a principle, the individual
should be heard by the authority before they make a decision on maintaining
22 European Council Conclusions, 20/21 March 2014, EUCO 7/1/14, Rev 1. European Council
Conclusions, 19/20 March 2015, EUCO 11/15.
23 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft. General Court, case T-290/14 Portnov v. the Coun-
cil, judgment of 26th October, 2015. ECLI:EU:T:2015:806. General Court, case T-340/14 Kluyev v.
the Council. General Cour t, case T-341/14 Kluyev v. the Council, judgment of 28th January, 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:47. General Court, case T-348/14 Yanukovych v. the Council, judgment of 15th Sep-
tember, 2016, ECLI:EU:T:2016:508. General Court, case T-434/14 Arbuzov v. the Council, judgment
of 28th Januar y, 2016, ECLI:EU:T:2016:46. General Court, case T-486/14 Stavytski v. the Council,
judgment of 28th Januar y, 2016, ECLI:EU:T:2016:45. General Court, case T-720/14 Rotenberg v.
the Council, judgment of 30th November, 2016, ECLI:EU:T:2016:689. General Court, case T-255/15
‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp.
24 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, p. 51–57, 60–81. General Cour t, case T-348/14 Yanu -
kovych v. the Council, p. 58.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
172
them on the list at issue. This obligation of hearing does not, however, cover the
situations in which the measures are maintained on the same grounds as those
that justied the initial listing. The requirement of hearing is also fullled if
the Council communicates with the individual’s representatives. Moreover, the
authority does not have to spontaneously grant the individual an access to all
the non-condential les, but the request from the party concerned is necessary.
The mere infringement of these rights does not suce in itself to annul the act;
it must be demonstrated that, had it not been for that breach, the outcome of the
procedure might have been dierent.25
While discussing the legality of the smart sanctions, it has to be borne in
mind that the Council has a broad margin of appreciation as to what to take into
consideration for the purpose of adopting economic and nancial sanctions. It
has to be especially remembered while assessing the compatibility of the act
in question with the right to eective judicial review. In the case of restrictive
measures, the Courts’ review is limited to checking the rules governing procedure
and the statement of reasons, and also to verifying if the facts are materially
accurate and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or
misuse of power. At least one of the reasons given by the EU institution should be
substantiated by suciently specic and concrete evidence, and it is the task of
the EU authority to establish that these reasons are well-founded, as it is not the
obligation of the individual concerned to prove that they are not (eius incumbit
probatio qui dicit non qui negat).26
Moreover, the Court underlined the signicance of the proper statement of
reasons to the decision on listing. On the one hand, it should provide the individual
concerned with sucient information to make it possible to determine whether
the act is well-founded, and on the other hand, it should enable the EU Courts
to review the lawfulness of the act. Although the specication of all the relevant
matters is not necessary, the statement of reasons cannot consist merely of
a general, stereotypical formulation, and it should include matters of fact and law
which constitute the legal basis for the adoption of the targeted sanctions, as well
as the considerations which led to the imposition of those measures. The failure
to state reasons by the EU institution cannot be remedied during the proceedings
25 General Court, case T-340/14 Kluyev v. the Council, p. 55–56. General Court, case
T-348/14 Yanukovych v. the Council, p. 68– 69. General Court, case T-720/14 Rotenberg v. the Co-
uncil, p. 143–145, 150, 158–159. General Court, case T-255/15 ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence
Corp., p. 66–67, 69–72, 80, 83, 95.
26 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, p. 146. Attorney General Wathelet, case C-72/15 Ros-
neft , p. 105. General Court, case T-290/14 Portnov v. the Council, p. 38, 45. General Court, case
T-340/14 Kluyev v. the Council, p. 36, 41–44. General Court, case T-341/14 Kluyev v. the Council,
p. 38, 47–51. General Court, case T-348/14 Yanukovych v. the Council, p. 41, 49, 101. General Court,
case T-434/14 Arbuzov v. the Council, p. 31. General Court, case T-486/14 Stavytski v. the Council,
p. 37. General Court, case T-720/14 Rotenberg v. the Council, p. 70–72, 116. General Court, case
T-255/15 ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp., p. 84, 127–128.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 173
before the Court. In the cases concerning the sanctions imposed in connection
to the situation in Ukraine, the Court acknowledged that the mere reference
to connections of an individual to some unspecied ‘Russian decision-makers’,
without further details, is too vague and not sufficient to justify the listing.
Moreover, these should be precisely those decision-makers that are responsible for
the destabilisation of the situation in Ukraine, as the sanctions concern the conduct
of the Russian authorities in relation to Ukraine and not their conduct in general.27
In the case of Rosneft, the Russian company claimed that the restrictive
measures breached the principle of equal treatment. The Court of Justice overthrew
this argument by underlining the broad margin of appreciation that is granted
to the Council in the area at issue. Therefore the choice of targeted undertakings or
sectors is consistent with the objective of ensuring the eectiveness of the adopted
sanctions.28
Finally, the individuals alleged that the targeted sanctions violated their
right to property, the right to privacy, and the freedom to conduct a business.
The Court noticed that the applied measures are not penalties but prospective
pecuniary measures and that they do not constitute a deprivation of these rights,
but only their restriction. As these rights are not absolute, some limitations are
permissible, if they satisfy the requirements of the principle of proportionality.
The restrictions should be provided for by law, refer to an objective of general
interest (the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and
independence), and may not be excessive, meaning they should be proportional
to the aim sought, and the substance of the limited right should not be impaired.
According to the Court, these conditions were fulfilled by the sanctions in
question, taking into consideration the specicity and the aims of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, especially the objective of preventing conicts and
strengthening international security.29
These judgments stay in accordance with other CJEU’s judgments on targeted
sanctions applied in other instances, e.g. the ght against terrorism. The Union’s
Courts always seek balance between the aim pursued by the restrictive measures
and the fundamental rights of the targeted individuals. The proper statement of
reasons as well as guarantees of the right to a fair trial, including right to be heard,
27 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, p. 120–125. General Cour t, case T-340/14 Kluyev v.
the Council, p. 65–70. General Court, case T-348/14 Yanukovych v. the Council, p. 47–48, 78–80.
General Court, case T-720/14 Rotenberg v. the Council, p. 47–49, 90–92. General Court, case
T-255/15 ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp., p. 54–56, 68.
28 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, p. 132.
29 Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, p. 147–151. Attor ney General Wathelet, case
C-72/15 Rosneft, p. 201–202. General Court, case T-340/14 Kluyev v. the Council, p. 130–135. Ge-
neral Court, case T-348/14 Yanukovych v. the Council, p. 164–170. General Court, case T-434/14 Ar-
buzov v. the Council, p. 32. General Court, case T-720/14 Rotenberg v. the Council, p. 164, 166–180.
General Court, case T-255/15 ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp., p. 99–110.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
174
and the scope of limitations to economic and property rights of the persons are
always under Court’s detailed scrutiny.30 Therefore, it needs to be concluded that
the limitations of the rights of individuals caused by the sanctions are not arbitrary
and disproportionate to the aim sought.
To sum up the deliberations on the judicial control of the EU sanctions
relating to the Crimean conflict, it has to be pointed out that the review
is effective. The CJEU analyses legal and factual background for the imposition
of the measures. In consequence, the Council decisions as well as the proced-
ure of their adoption should meet certain conditions relating to the protection of
human rights, including guarantees of a fair trial. Even when facing a threat to
peace and security in the region, the EU institutions are obliged to respect the
fundamental values of the EU law.
3. THE EU’S SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA AFTER 24TH FEBRUARY, 2022
The aggression of Russia against Ukraine received a new impetus in 2022.
On 15th February, 2022, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation voted in favour of asking President Vladimir Putin to recognise
as independent States the parts of eastern Ukraine claimed by separatists.
On 21st February, 2022, the President of the Russian Federation acknowledged the
independence and sovereignty of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic”
and the “Luhansk People’s Republic”, and ordered that Russian military forces
be deployed in those areas. On 24th February, 2022, Vladimir Putin announced
a special military operation in Ukraine and on the same day Russian armed forces
attacked Ukraine.
The international community reacted to the aggression and condemned the
Russian attack on Ukraine. The UN General Assembly in its resolution decided
that the Russian aggression was in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and
demanded Russia to immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of
its military forces from the territory of Ukraine.31 The Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe rst suspended the Russian Federation from its rights of
representation in the Council of Europe,32 and then ceased the membership of Russia
30 Court of First Instance, case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d’Iran
v. the Council, judgment of 12th December, 2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:384, p. 91–99, 119–129, 138–
140, 152–155. Court of First Instance, case T-47/03 Sison v. the Council, judgment of 11 July
2007, ECLI:EU:T:2007:207, p. 139–147, 166–176, 185–187, 199–202. Court of Justice, case
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al-Barakaat v. the Council, judgment of 3rd September,
2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, p. 334–370.
31 UNGA, resolution of 2nd March, 2022, on Agg ression against Ukraine, A/R ES/ES-11/1.
32 CM CoE, decision of 25th February, 2022, on Situation in Ukraine, CM/Del/
Dec(2022)1426ter/2.3.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 175
to the CoE.33 The attack of 24th February, 2022, was a very strong indication that
the hitherto applied sanctions were not sucient and new measures needed to be
adopted by international community, including the European Union.
An overview of the new sanctions
In the rst place, it has to be emphasised that the sanctions imposed after
the annexation of Crimea did not cease to have eect. The European Union
continues to apply these measures and broadened their scope. Not only did new
individuals get listed for the purposes of targeted sanctions, but also the EU
introduced new types of measures in the regulation 833/2014, such as: the
prohibition to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use
goods and technology; the prohibition to provide public nancing or nancial
assistance for trade with, or investment in, Russia; the prohibition to sell, supply,
transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods or technology and to provide
technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to these goods.
The new sanctions include a variety of prohibitions related to investing in Russia:
to acquire any new or extend any existing participation in any legal person,
entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of Russia or any other
third country and operating in the energy sector in Russia; to grant or be part of
any arrangement to grant any new loan or credit or otherwise provide nancing,
including equity capital, to any legal person, entity or body incorporated or
constituted under the law of Russia or any other third country and operating in
the energy sector in Russia, or for the documented purpose of nancing such
a legal person, entity or body; to create any new joint venture with any legal
person, entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of Russia or any
other third country and operating in the energy sector in Russia; and to provide
investment services directly related to the above mentioned activities. The EU
territory is closed for aircraft and sea vessels registered in Russia or owned by
Russian entities. Luxury goods cannot be anymore sold and exported to any
natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia.
A very interesting set of sanctions is regulated by Art. 2f of the regulation
833/2014. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate,
or otherwise contribute to broadcast any content by the legal persons, entities or
bodies listed in Annex XV, including through transmission or distribution by any
means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, Internet service providers, Internet video-
sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. Any broadcasting
licence or authorisation, transmission, and distribution arrangement with the
legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV shall be suspended. Lastly,
it shall be prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or
33 CM CoE, resolution of 16th March, 2022, on the cessation of the membership of the Russian
Federation to the Council of Europe, CM/Res(2022)2.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
176
broadcast by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV. On the basis
of this provision, the EU suspended the broadcasting activities and licences of the
following outlets: Sputnik and subsidiaries including Sputnik Arabic, Russia Today
and subsidiaries, Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Russia 24, Rossiya 1, TV
Centre International, NTV/NTV Mir, REN TV, Per vyi Kanal, Oriental Review,
Tsargrad, New Eastern Outlook, Katehon.
Finally, the Council decided on the suspension of the application of the
Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation
on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union
and the Russian Federation.34 Moreover, Russian banks were disconnected from
SWIFT (Shangina 2022, 5).
By now, the European Union has blocked 300 billion EUR of the Russian
Central Bank and has frozen 19 billion EUR belonging to Russian oligarchs.
This would not suce to cover damage suered by Ukraine that is estimated
at 600 billion EUR. Moreover, the assets of the Russian Central Bank cannot
be conscated, as it would be contrary to the rules on state immunity, whereas
the assets of private actors could be conscated, but only as a result of penal
proceedings (Kokott 2023, 4–9). Nevertheless, it does not mean that the sanctions
are deprived of any eect. One of the results of the fund freezing and of other
economic sanctions is that these funds and other economic assets are not being
used to nance the Russian aggression on Ukraine. The restrictions imposed
on Russian citizens, such as the suspension of the issuance of visas, may decrease
the support of Russians towards their government and the aggression on Ukraine.
Legal basis
The issue of the legal basis for the analysed measures has already been largely
discussed, and the reasoning applied to sanctions imposed after the annexation of
Crimea applies equally to the sanctions being in force after 24th February, 2022.
However, the European Union broadened the scope of the restrictive measures,
which led to questioning the legal basis de novo regarding the new types of
sanctions.
That was the case of measures consisting of the prohibition of broadcasting, as
described by art. 2f of the regulation 833/2014 regarding RT France.35 On 1st March,
34 Council Decision (EU) 2022/333 of 25th February, 2022, on the partial suspension of the
application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation
on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian
Federation, OJ L 54, p.1, 25.02.2022. Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9th September, 2022,
on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Commu-
nity and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the
European Union and the Russian Federation, OJ L 234l, p. 1, 9.09.2022.
35 RT France is a single-shareholder simplied limited company established in France, who-
se activity consists in the publication of specialised television channels. RT France’s entire share

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 177
2022, the Council, on the basis of Art. 29 TEU, adopted the contested decision36
and on the basis of Article 215 TFUE – the contested regulation37 in order
to prohibit continuous and concerted propaganda actions in support of military
aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation, targeted at civil society in
the European Union and neighbouring countries, channelled through a number of
media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of
the Russian Federation, since such actions constituted a threat to the EU’s public
order and security.38 As it is stated in recitals (6) to (9) of the regulation 2022/350,
the Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of
media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of the
destabilisation of its neighbouring countries and of the Union and its Member
States. In particular, the propaganda has repeatedly and consistently targeted
European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as targeting
civil society, asylum seekers, Russian ethnic minorities, gender minorities, and the
functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States. In order
to justify and support its aggression against Ukraine, the Russian Federation has
engaged in continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeted at civil society
in the Union and neighbouring countries, gravely distorting and manipulating
facts. Those propaganda actions have been channelled through a number of
media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership
of the Russian Federation. Such actions constitute a signicant and direct threat
to the Union’s public order and security. Those media outlets are essential and
instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the aggression against Ukraine.
The General Court agreed with the Council that the European Union had
a legal basis to adopt the contested measures on the prohibition of broadcasting.
The Court noticed that since the propaganda and disinformation campaigns
are capable of undermining the foundations of democratic societies and are an
integral part of the arsenal of modern warfare, the restrictive measures at issue
also form part of the pursuit by the European Union of the objectives assigned
to it in Article 3(1) and (5) TEU. By adopting the contested decision, the Council
therefore exercised the competence attributed to the European Union by the
Treaties under the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy,
capital is held by the association ANO ‘TV Novosti’, an autonomous not-for-prot association in
the Russian Federation, without share capital, having its headquarters in Moscow (Russia), which
is almost entirely funded by the budget of the Russian State – General Court, case T-125/22 RT
France, judgment of 27th July, 2022, ECLI:EU:T:2022:483, p. 2.
36 Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1st March, 2022, amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine,
OJ L 65, p. 5, 2.03.2022.
37 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1st March, 2022, amending Regulation (EU)
No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation
in Ukraine, OJ L 65, p. 1, 2.03.2022.
38 General Court, case T-125/22 RT France, p . 21.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
178
and the adoption of the contested regulation on the basis of Article 215 TFEU
was a natural consequence of the decision, as the uniform implementation of the
temporary prohibition of the broadcasting of the applicant’s content throughout
the territory of the European Union could be better achieved at the EU level than
at the national level.39
It has to be pointed out that Article 215 TFEU is formulated in a general
and broad manner, leaving the EU institutions a wide margin of appreciation as
to what restrictive measures against natural or legal persons and groups should
be taken in reaction to a specic threat. It is not limited to sanctions of purely
nancial or economic nature. The suspension of the broadcasting licence falls
within the limits set up by this Treaty provision.
Judicial review
The standard of review of targeted sanctions is already settled, which is why
the applications of individuals to annul individual measures are subjected to rules
already described in this paper. They were applied by the General Court in the
judgment in Pšonka40 concerning the sanctions adopted after 24th February, 2022,
and there is no need to discuss these standards de novo here. That is why this part
of the paper will focus on the new measures introduced after 24th February, 2022,
namely the suspension of the broadcasting activities and licences of the selected
media outlets.
In the case of RT France, the applicant raised that the adoption of the
contested measures violated numerous fundamental rights, such as the rights of
the defence including the right to be heard and the inadequacy of the statement
of reasons. The Court emphasised that the restrictive measures were adopted
in an extraordinary context of extreme urgency, as the rapid escalation of the
situation and the gravity of the violations made any form of the modulation
of the restrictive measures designed to prevent the conict from spreading
dicult. The adoption of the restrictive measures at issue immediately after
the military aggression began, in order to ensure their full eectiveness, also
met the requirement to put in place multiple forms of rapid response to that
aggression. Restrictive measures against media outlets funded by the Russian
State budget and directly or indirectly controlled by the leadership of that
39 General Court, case T-125/22 RT France, p. 56 –63.
40 General Court, case T-244/22 Pšonka, judgment of 26th July, 2023, ECLI:EU:T:2023:425.
The Cour t annulled the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/376 of 3rd March, 2022, amending Decision
2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bo-
dies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/375 of
3rd March, 2022, implementing Council Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restr ictive me-
asures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, in
so far as the name of Viktor Pavlovyč Pšonka was maintained on the list of persons, entities and
bodies subject to those restrictive measures.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 179
country, which is the aggressor country, in that they were considered to be at the
root of a continuous and concerted activity of disinformation and manipulation
of the facts, became, following the launch of the armed conict, overriding and
urgent in order to preserve the integrity of democratic debate in the European
society. RT France and other listed media outlets engaged in propaganda actions
in support of the military aggression against Ukraine, which was proven by
numerous articles published on RT France’s website. The statement of reasons
was comprehensible and suciently precise, thus it permitted the applicant
to know the exact reasons for its listing. That is why the Court concluded
that there was no violation of the rights of the defence regarding RT France.41
This reasoning is in line with the case-law of the CJEU on targeted sanctions
mentioned in the previous parts of the paper.
However, as RT France is a media outlet, the legal questions in the case
RT France concerned also the freedom of expression, as enshrined in Art-
icle 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and being a general prin-
ciple of the EU law (Woods 2021, 344), and enshrined in Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. This issue had not been discussed
before, therefore it is necessary to analyse it in this part of the paper. It
can be indicated that before 24th February, 2022, participation in the Russian
propaganda could justify the listing of an individual on the targeted sanctions
list, yet the Court did not asses the compliance of such listing with the
freedom of expression.42 It can be also noticed that the measure consisting of
suspending media outlets had been applied before by some EU Member States,
such as Lithuania and Latvia, on the basis of Article 6 of the AVMS Directive43
against Russian-language television programmes (Baade 2023, 168).
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential freedoms of
a democratic society based on the rule of law. It covers not only “information”
or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoensive or as a matter
of indierence, but also those that oend, shock or disturb, in accordance with
the demands of that pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness, without which
there is no “democratic society”.44 Freedom of expression is not an absolute right
and there are legitimate exceptions thereto provided that interference is necessary
41 General Court, case T-125/22 RT France, p. 75 –115.
42 General Court, case T-262/15 Kiselev, judgment of 15th June, 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:392.
43 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10th March, 2010,
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Servi-
ces Directive) (Codied version) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 95, p. 1, 15.04.2010.
44 ECtHR, case Handyside v. the United Kingdom (App. no. 5493/72), judgment of 7th Decem-
ber, 1976, p. 49.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
180
in a democratic society, meaning it corresponds to a pressing social need.45 The
protection of the right of journalists to impart information on issues of general
interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate
factual basis, and provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with
the ethics of journalism.46 These considerations play a particularly important role
nowadays, given the inuence wielded by the media in contemporary society:
not only do they inform, they can also suggest by way in which they present the
information.47 The views of the ECtHR regarding the freedom of expression were
generally adopted by the CJEU, which decided that the scope and the meaning of
Article 11 EU Charter should be the same as the one of Article 10 ECHR (Woods
2021, 343–344).48
In its judgment in RT France, the General Court indicated that the limitation
of the freedom of expression was provided by law. As the imposed measures
are temporary in their nature, they comply with the essence of the freedom
of expression and do not undermine this freedom, as such and they pursue an
objective of general interest. The Court emphasised that the evidence gathered in
the case les proved that RT France engaged in activities in support of the Russian
Government’s actions and policies to destabilise Ukraine, during the period
preceding the military aggression against that country, through articles published
on its website and interviews seeking, in particular, to present the deployment
of the Russian armed forces as a preventive action to defend the self-proclaimed
republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Moreover, once the military aggression
had been launched, the applicant continued to adopt the ocial position of the
authorities of the Russian Federation that the oensive was a “special operation”,
a preventive, defensive, and limited action, caused by Western countries and by
the aggressive attitude of the NATO and also by Ukrainian provocation, aimed
at defending the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Therefore, it
was also of the utmost importance for the European Union temporarily to suspend
the applicant’s propaganda activity in support of the military aggression against
Ukraine from the rst days when that aggression was launched. Such exercise
of the freedom of expression, which covers propaganda activity to justify and
support the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked, and unjustied military
45 ECtHR, case Kràcsony and Others v. Hungary (App. no. 42461/13), judgment of
16th September, 2014, p. 54.
46 ECtHR, case NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (App. no. 28470/12), judgment of
5th April, 2022, p. 180. ECtHR, case Fressoz and Roire v. France (App. no. 29183/95), judgment
of 21st January, 1999, p. 54. ECtHR, case McVicar v. the United Kingdom (App. no. 46311/99), jud-
gment of 7th May, 2002, p. 73.
47 ECtHR, case NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (App. no. 28470/12), judgment of
5th April, 2022, p. 181. ECtHR, case Stoll v. Switzerland (App. no. 69698/01), judgment of 10th De-
cember, 2007, p. 104.
48 See also: Court of Justice, case C-345/17 Buivids, judgment of 14th Feb rua ry, 2019,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:122, p. 65.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 181
aggression against Ukraine, cannot be said to have been of a kind calling for the
enhanced protection aorded to press freedom under Article 11 of the Charter.
The propaganda activity put in place by RT France forms part of the context of
an ongoing war, provoked by an act committed by a State and characterised as
‘aggression’ by the international community, in breach of the prohibition on the
use of force laid down in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.49
It has to be pointed out that freedom of expression, which is so essential
to democratic societies, does not cover propaganda, which is in its nature
a negation of the very essence of the freedom of expression. Article 11(2) of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights obliges every state to safeguard media
pluralism, and the discussed sanctions denitely restrict this pluralism within the
European Union. Nevertheless, taking into consideration their goal, they are not
disproportionate to the aim sought.
A propaganda against peace or designed to provoke or encourage threats
to peace was long ago condemned by the UN General Assembly.50 Art. 20(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that
any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. History knows examples
in which propaganda incited to violence and genocide, such as the Rwandan
conict between Tutsis and Hutus. Tutsis were shown as traitors and a threat,
and propaganda created among Hutus a sense of ‘urgency’ in response to the
alleged danger caused by Tutsis. Mass killings were largely presented as a way
of defence, and extermination was displayed as a measure against the cruelty of
Tutsis and as a result for which around 130,000 people took actively part in the
killings. The propaganda even led to forming a belief among French troops that
the Hutus were, in fact, victims of the conict (Lower, Hauschildt 2014, 1, 4–5).
Addressing the Russian propaganda shows that the European Union
learnt a lesson from the Rwandan conict. In 2016, the European Parliament
observed that disinformation and propaganda are part of hybrid warfare. It
recognised that the Russian Government was employing a wide range of tools
and instruments, such as think tanks and special foundations (e.g. Russkiy
Mir), special authorities (Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV stations (e.g.
RT), pseudo news agencies and multimedia services (e.g. Sputnik), or cross-
border social and religious groups, as the regime wanted to present itself as
the only defender of traditional Christian values. The role of social media
and Internet trolls was to challenge democratic values, divide Europe, gather
domestic support, and create the perception of failed states in the EU’s eastern
neighbourhood. Moreover, Russia invested relevant financial resources
in its disinformation and propaganda instruments engaged either directly
49 General Court, case T-125/22 RT France, p . 142–215.
50 UNGA, resolution 381 (V) of 17th November, 1950, Condemnation of propaganda against
peace. UNGA, resolution 110 (II) of 3rd November, 1947, Measures to be taken against propaganda
and the inciters of a new war.

Magdalena Matusiak-Frącczak
182
by the state or through Kremlin-controlled companies and organisations.
According to the Parliament, Russian strategic communication is part of
a larger subversive campaign to weaken EU cooperation and the sovereignty,
political independence, and territorial integrity of the Union and its Member
States.51 This conrms that the measures against the Russian propaganda were
necessary, but they should have been taken even before 24th February, 2022, as
it could be considered to be a propaganda for war and not one-sided reporting
(Baade 2023, 273–275).
Combatting media propaganda is an appropriate measure, but not the only one
that could be applied in the case of Russian aggression against Ukraine. At the
moment, only the biggest pro-Russian TV channels are targeted and at the same
time, propaganda is spread by minor actors, especially on the Internet and social
media. In 2021, the European Union introduced the regulation 2021/784,52 aimed
at the dissemination of terrorist content online. On the basis of this regulation,
service providers are obliged to remove or disable access to terrorist content online
within one hour of receipt of a removal order from a competent national authority.
A similar approach could be applied by the European Union with regards to the
content encompassing Russian propaganda.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Economic restrictions imposed due to the Russian invasion on Ukraine
strongly aected the EU trade with Russia. Imports fell from 9,6% in February
2022 to 1,7% in June 2023, whereas exports decreased from 3,8% to 1,4% in the
same period (Eurostat 2023). The sanctions had thus their negative eect on the
Russian economy. In time and combined with sanctions applied by other states,53
51 European Parliament resolution of 23rd November, 2016, on EU strategic communication
to counteract propaganda against it by third parties (2016/2030(INI)) (2018/C 224/08), OJ C 224,
p. 58, 27.06.2018.
52 Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29th April,
2021, on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L
172, p. 79, 17.05.2021.
53 For example, a wide variety of sanctions, similarly to the European Union, is applied by
the United States since 2014: Executive Order 13660 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Con-
tributing to the Situation in Ukraine, 6th March, 2014. Executive Order 13662 Blocking Property
of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine, 20th March, 2014. H.R.4152 – Su-
pport for the Sovereignty, Integrit y, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act 2014,
3rd April, 2014. 31 Code of Federal Regulations Part 589. Executive Order 13661 Blocking Pro-
perty of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine, 16th March, 2014. Executive
Order 13662 Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine,
20th March, 2014. H.R.4152 – Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic
Stability of Ukraine Act 2014, 3rd April, 2014. 31 Code of Federal Regulations Part 589. Execu-
tive Order 13685 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 183
they can decrease the Russian ability to nance its aggression and make them
retract from Ukraine. At the time of writing this paper, Ukraine managed to regain
control over some of its territories attacked by the Russian troops. Nevertheless,
sanctions themselves are not linked to any particular conditions for their repeal,
such as ceasefire or unconditional Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian
territory, which hampers the evaluation of their eectiveness (Shagina 2022, 6–7).
Moreover, Russia is trying to circumvent restrictive measures by entering into
a closer economic cooperation with states that do not apply sanctions, such as
China, with the increase of Russian imports from China by 27%.54
Turning the attention to the EU’s sanctions against Russia due to its aggression
on Ukraine, it can be concluded that the EU’s measures have an adequate legal
basis both in international and EU law; they are necessary and proportionate. In
the application of these sanctions, human rights are safeguarded by the scrutiny
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which elaborated a satisfactory
standard of judicial review. The opposite suppositions are made only by Russian
scholars (Voynikov 2022, S636–S642). The measures are not discriminatory and
they safeguard the rights of the defence. Individuals are granted access to non-
classied parts of the case-les, decisions on listing are reasoned, and the CJEU
exercises full judicial review of the contested measures. Taking into consideration
the threat that the Russian aggression causes for the European region, the applied
sanctions are not disproportionate to the aim sought.
Measures targeting the Russian propaganda, namely the suspension
of broadcasting licences of selected media outlets, do not violate freedom of
expression. Propaganda, and especially war propaganda, is an abuse of freedom
of expression and thus should not be protected.
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CM CoE, decision of 25 February 2022 on Situation in Ukraine, CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426ter/2.3.
CM CoE, resolution of 16 March 2022 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation
to the Council of Europe, CM/Res(2022)2.
Council Common Position 2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism, OJ L 344,
p. 90, 28.12.2001.
Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specic
measures to combat terrorism, OJ L 344, p. 93, 28.12.2001.
Council decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against
certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 66 6.03.2014,
p. 26.
Council decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of
actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine, OJ L 78 17.03.2014, p. 16.
Council decision 2014/286/CFSP of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictive measures in response to the
illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, OJ L 183 24.06.2014, p. 70.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 185
Council decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of
Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 229 31.07.2014, p. 13.
Council decision 2014/659/CFSP of 8 September 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of
Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 271 12.09.2014, p. 54.
Council decision (CFSP) 2016/1963 of 20 September 2016 concerning restrictive measures against
ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with
them and repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, OJ L 255, p. 25, 21.09.2016.
Council decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning
restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 65,
p. 5, 2.03.2022.
Council decision (CFSP) 2022/376 of 3 March 2022, amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning
restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation
in Ukraine, OJ L 70, p. 7, 4.03.2022.
Council decision (EU) 2022/333 of 25 February 2022 on the partial suspension of the application
of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian
Federation, OJ L 54, p.1, 25.02.2022.
Council decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application
of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the
facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian
Federation, OJ L 234l, p. 1, 9.09.2022.
Council implementing regulation (EU) 2022/375 of 3 March 2022 implementing Council Regulation
(EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities
and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 70, p. 1, 4.03.2022.
Council regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specic restrictive measures
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, OJ L 377,
p. 70, 28.12.2001.
Council regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed
against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 66
6.03.2014, p. 1.
Council regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions
undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,
OJ L 78 17.03.2014, p. 6.
Council regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014 concerning restrictive measures in response
to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, OJ L 183 24.06.2014, p. 9.
Council regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of
Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 229 31.07.2014, p. 1.
Council regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20 September 2016 imposing additional restrictive measures
directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies
associated with them, OJ L 255, p. 1, 21.09.2016.
Council regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in
Ukraine, OJ L 65, p. 1, 2.03.2022.
Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media
Services Directive) (Codied version) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 95, p. 1, 15.04.2010.
European Council Conclusions, 20–21 March 2014, EUCO 7/1/14, Rev 1.
European Council Conclusions, 19–20 March 2015, EUCO 11/15.

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186
European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract
propaganda against it by third parties (2016/2030(INI)) (2018/C 224/08), OJ C 224, p. 58,
27.06.2018.
Executive Order 13660 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Ukraine, 6 March 2014.
Executive Order 13661 Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Ukraine, 16 March 2014.
Executive Order 13662 Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in
Ukraine, 20 March 2014.
Executive Order 13685 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions
with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine, 19 December 2014.
Executive Order 14024 Blocking Property With Respect To Specied Harmful Foreign Activities of
the Government of the Russian Federation, 15 April 2021, 86 Code of Federal Regulations
20249.
Executive Order 14071 Prohibiting New Investment in and Certain Services to the Russian
Federation in Response to Continued Russian Federation Aggression, 87 Code of Federal
Regulations 20999.
H.R.4152 – Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine
Act 2014, 3 April 2014, 31 Code of Federal Regulations Part 589.
Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2021 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (Text with EEA relevance),
OJ L 172, p. 79, 17.05.2021.
Treaty on European Union.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
UN Charter.
UN Security Council resolution 2166 (2014).
UNGA, resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, Measures to be taken against propaganda and the
inciters of a new war.
UNGA, resolution 381 (V) of 17 November 1950, Condemnation of propaganda against peace.
UNGA, resolution of 2 March 2022 on Aggression against Ukraine, A/RES/ES-11/1.
Case law
Attorney General Wathelet, case C-72/15 Rosneft Oil Company OJSC v. Her Majesty’s Treasury and
others, opinion of 31 May 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:381.
Court of First Instance, case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d’Iran v. the
Council, judgment of 12 December 2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:384.
Court of First Instance, case T-47/03 Sison v. the Council, judgment of 11 July 2007,
ECLI:EU:T:2007:207.
Court of Justice, case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al-Barakaat v. the Council, judgment of
3 September 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.
Court of Justice, case C-130/10 European Parliament v. the Council, judgment of 19 July 2012,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:472.
Court of Justice, case C-72/15 Rosneft, judgment of 28 March 2017; ECLI:EU:C:2017:236.
Court of Justice, case C-345/17 Buivids, judgment of 14 February 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:122.
ECtHR, case Handyside v. the United Kingdom (App. no. 5493/72), judgment of 7 December 1976.
ECtHR, case Fressoz and Roire v. France (App. no. 29183/95), judgment of 21 January 1999.
ECtHR, case McVicar v. the United Kingdom (App. no. 46311/99), judgment of 7 May 2002.
ECtHR, case Stoll v. Switzerland (App. no. 69698/01), judgment of 10 December 2007.

The EU’s Sanctions Against Russia in the Context of the Russian Aggression… 187
ECtHR, case Kràcsony and Others v. Hungary (App. no. 42461/13), judgment of 16 September
2014.
ECtHR, case NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (App. no. 28470/12), judgment of 5 April 2022.
General Court, case T-290/14 Portnov v. the Council, judgment of 26 October 2015.
ECLI:EU:T:2015:806.
General Court, case T-340/14 Kluyev v. the Council, judgment of 15 September 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:496.
General Court, case T-341/14 Kluyev v. the Council, judgment of 28 January 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:47.
General Court, case T-348/14 Yanukovych v. the Council, judgment of 15 September 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:508.
General Court, case T-434/14 Arbuzov v. the Council, judgment of 28 January 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:46.
General Court, case T-486/14 Stavytski v. the Council, judgment of 28 January 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:45.
General Court, case T-720/14 Rotenberg v. the Council, judgment of 30 November 2016,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:689.
General Court, case T-255/15 ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp. v. the Council, judgment
of 25 January 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:25.
General Court, case T-262/15 Kiselev, judgment of 15 June 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:392
General Court, case T-125/22 RT France, judgment of 27 July 2022, ECLI:EU:T:2022:483.
General Court, case T-244/22 Pšonka, judgment of 26 July 2023, ECLI:EU:T:2023:425.
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), judgment of 27 June 1986,
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.