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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Synthese (2024) 203:132
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04560-9
Abstract
Episodic memory gives us the ability to mentally travel back in time to revisit and
relive past experiences. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the
function of episodic memory. According to the orthodox view, episodic memory
should be considered a part of a constructive system that simulates the future for
sophisticated foresight and exible planning. In this paper, I oer a novel alterna-
tive view. I argue that episodic memory provides invaluable information about the
past behavior of others, allowing us to identify reliable and trustworthy partners
while avoiding dealing with cheaters. Theoretical models demonstrate that coop-
eration in groups can be maintained if potential partners use information about an
individual’s past behavior to guide their behavior toward that individual. In these
reputation-based models of human cooperation, individuals with a history of cheat-
ing are ostracized, whereas those with a history of cooperative behavior ourish.
Against this theoretical background, it is possible to see a function of episodic
memory in facilitating information exchange about others, helping group members
make eective partner choices, and avoiding the risk of interacting with cheaters.
If correct, episodic memory may have played a signicant role in the evolution of
human cooperation.
Keywords Cooperation · Altruism · Indirect reciprocity · Gossip · Reputation ·
Memory sharing · Vicarious learning · Vicarious memory
Received: 14 April 2023 / Accepted: 11 March 2024 / Published online: 18 April 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote
altruism?
NazimKeven1
Nazim Keven
nazimkeven@bilkent.edu.tr
1 Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara 06800, Turkey
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
1 Introduction
Episodic memory is the conscious recollection of specic personal experiences in par-
ticular places and times, such as a conversation with a boss at work or a vacation with
friends in Las Vegas. Episodic memory system enables us to mentally travel back in
time to revisit and relive past experiences (Tulving, 1983). Episodic memory is often
contrasted with semantic memory, which is knowledge about the world, such as the
fact that there are many casinos in Las Vegas. Although there is some debate about
precisely dening the distinction between episodic and semantic memory (McKoon
et al., 1986), it is generally agreed that episodic memory is involved in the conscious
recall of personal experiences, whereas semantic memory is concerned with factual
knowledge. For example, one can semantically know that there are many casinos in
Las Vegas without ever having been there, but episodically remember walking down
the Strip at night and seeing the glamorous casinos rsthand.
But why do we remember? In recent years, there has been an increased interest
in this question from various elds (Boyer, 2008; Schacter et al., 2011; De Brigard,
2013; Michaelian, 2016; Mahr & Csibra, 2018, 2020; Boyle, 2019). According to
the orthodox answer, episodic memory is not for remembering the past as it has
traditionally been thought; instead, it allows one to simulate the future (Schacter
& Addis, 2007a; Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; De Brigard,
2013; Michaelian, 2016). Simulationists argue that to understand what an episodic
memory system does for an individual, we need to consider it as part of a constructive
simulation process. Schacter and Addis (2007b) suggest that constructive episodic
simulation uses bits and pieces from past experiences to construct possible future, c-
tional, or even counterfactual scenarios to guide decision-making. In a similar vein,
Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) argue that past episodes provide a store of possible
scenarios whose combination allows sophisticated foresight and, therefore, exible
planning. De Brigard (2013) goes as far as to claim that the function of episodic
memory is not retrospective, but rather prospective.
However, it is possible to approach the function of episodic memory from a dif-
ferent perspective by asking what it does for a group rather than for an individual. I
argue that this innocuous move makes it possible to develop compelling theoretical
possibilities that have not yet been considered. When viewed from a higher vantage
point, the social nature of episodic memory becomes apparent. People do not just
remember the past; they also share what they remember with others (see Hirst &
Echterho, 2012, for a review). This ubiquitous memory sharing1 activity is highly
likely to have functional signicance.
1 I employ the term ‘memory sharing’ as an umbrella term for the complex phenomenon of recounting
past experiences to others. This complex act necessitates the coordinated interplay of numerous cogni-
tive capacities, extending beyond episodic memory retrieval. Narrative construction, comprehension,
linguistic prociency, imaginative faculties, and social-communicative abilities all play critical roles in
successful memory transmission. However, it is the transmitted memory content itself that holds the pri-
mary functional signicance for my investigation. Consequently, I focus my inquiry on the act of sharing
memories, rather than on the broader spectrum of cognitive processes involved. However, a complete evo-
lutionary account of memory sharing must ultimately consider the broader spectrum of cognitive processes
involved, including these extended capacities.
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
Evolutionary psychologists and biologists have long been puzzled by the remark-
able altruistic tendency toward non-relatives in human societies. Altruistic acts are
costly to perform but confer benets to another individual. In all other eusocial spe-
cies, such as bees, ants, and termites, well-organized societies are based on close
kinship among individuals. Kin selection, however, cannot explain human altruistic
behavior among unrelated individuals. According to a compelling line of research,
groups can successfully cooperate if potential partners make decisions about future
interactions based on information about a person’s past behavior (Alexander, 1987;
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004;
Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). In these indirect reciprocity models, you help me,
and I will help someone else in the future. At rst, indirect reciprocity seems suscep-
tible to exploitation by cheaters. However, indirect reciprocity has a critical feature
that discourages exploitation from the outset. According to this model, I return the
favor because I will not get any help if it becomes known that I do not help anyone.
Therefore, I return the favor to avoid incurring a reputation cost. In these types of
models, cheaters are ostracized and therefore pay a long-term cost for their behavior,
whereas individuals with a history of cooperative behaviors, reap the benets of their
altruistic behavior. Against this theoretical backdrop, I argue that it is possible to see
a social function of episodic memory in facilitating information exchange about other
individuals. Episodic memories carry invaluable information about the past deeds of
other individuals, which can be used to anticipate their future behaviors.
It would be helpful to clarify the term “function” before proceeding. The phil-
osophical literature on the concept of function in scientic theorizing is vast and
diverse, and there is no universally agreed-upon denition. However, to simplify
matters, I will focus on two dierent senses of the concept of function. The rst is the
causal-role approach to functions pioneered by Robert Cummins (1975, 1983). This
approach suggests that functional ascriptions to a capacity are closely tied to the sys-
tem in which they occur. The functional analysis of capacities is based on their causal
role within the containing system, and the performance of a capacity is explained
in terms of the capacities of its component processes and the manner in which they
are organized. The second is the etiological approach to functions based on natural
selection (Millikan, 1989; Neander, 1991). Although there are dierences between
these etiological accounts, they generally share the common idea that the function of
a capacity should be explained by its occurrence in a particular population through
the process of natural selection.
The etiological function of memory remains a captivating and complex question
that has engaged researchers for decades. However, an exhaustive exploration of the
evolutionary history of episodic memory falls outside the scope of this paper. Such
an endeavor would necessitate delving into limited historical evidence regarding the
origin of episodic recollection and assessing the interplay of numerous relevant cog-
nitive capacities, including narrative construction, comprehension, linguistic pro-
ciency, and social-communicative skills, each playing a crucial role in successful
memory transmission. Therefore, I focus on a more modest aim: a functional analysis
of memory sharing, with a focus on its potential adaptive roles. This analysis primar-
ily aims to elevate understudied and underrepresented memory sharing phenomenon
to its rightful place as an important causal role function of episodic memory. Addi-
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
tionally, it seeks to reassess standard evolutionary scenarios proposed for episodic
memory by considering the implications of this previously neglected causal role
function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins a functional analysis of mem-
ory sharing, considering the individual as the unit of analysis. I argue that memory
sharing allows individuals to learn from the experiences of others at low cost and high
reward. This is because memory sharing allows individuals to avoid the need to expe-
rience events rsthand, which can be risky and costly. In addition, memory sharing
can provide individuals with information that they would not otherwise have access
to. In Sect. 3, I focus on groups as a unit of analysis. I show how vicarious learning
through memory sharing can inform eective partner choices and thereby encourage
norm-abiding behaviors at the group level. This is because memory sharing allows
individuals to learn about the norm violations of potential partners. Additionally,
memory sharing can help to build trust and cooperation within groups. Finally, I
will consider various evolutionary scenarios to discuss why episodic memory might
be adaptive, given the causal role that memory sharing plays. I argue that episodic
memory may have evolved to allow individuals to learn from the experiences of oth-
ers and to make better decisions about whom to trust and cooperate with.
2 Vicarious learning: extension of personal experience
Humans rely on frequent and varied cooperation with others for survival and welfare.
Although cooperation is benecial in the long run, cheating can provide short-term
advantages. Therefore, individuals should be vigilant in their partner selection. It has
been hypothesized that the increasing importance of cooperation in human evolu-
tion has created pressure to select eective collaborative partners and avoid cheaters
(Baumard et al., 2013; Tomasello et al., 2012; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, 2005). We
must be cautious about cheaters who exploited us in the past while remembering
those who are helpful and can be counted on in future times of need. Therefore, learn-
ing about other group members’ past behavior must have had a signicant payo in
our ancestral past.
People obtain information about other individuals’ past deeds through various
sources, some direct and some hearsay. The more time you spend with someone, the
better you get to know that person. Therefore, personal observations, particularly
those based on rsthand experience, oer a reliable way to get to know an individ-
ual (Frith & Frith, 2006). Over time, if you witness a person displaying cooperative
behaviors, such as fairly sharing resources or helping a weak family member, you
can expect that engaging with such an individual would be benecial in the long run.
However, if you notice an individual who acts in an exploitative and non-cooperative
manner, such as stealing resources or breaking an agreement, it would be best to
avoid or be cautious in dealing with that person. As many researchers have pointed
out, remembering those with a history of cheating can be adaptive in social groups
(Mealey et al., 1996; Bell & Buchner, 2009; Oda & Nakajima, 2010).
Although personal observations oer a reliable way to get to know an individual,
they are severely limited by time and circumstance. It is not possible to stay updated
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
about others solely through rst-hand experience. Two or more people cannot be
in each other’s sight for all 24 h of the day, and there are many instances where we
remain unaware of what others are doing. Instead, direct observations of an acquain-
tance are typically eeting, fragmentary, and intermittent. To compensate for the
limitations of direct observation, people can rely on the past experiences of acquain-
tances who have been in a position to gain direct or indirect knowledge about others.
Indeed, people seem to spend a signicant amount of time doing just that: sharing
their memories with others every day (Hirst & Echterho, 2012). Recounting past
events is an everyday human activity. For example, a diary study found that 62% of
the events recorded by participants had already been shared with others by the end
of the day they occurred (Pasupathi et al., 2009). People not only share their own
experiences but also pass on information about others’ experiences’. In one study,
33 college students visited a hospital morgue as part of a class, and within ten days,
almost 900 people had heard about the visit through cascading levels of sharing.
This included the people the morgue visitors told (primary sharing), the people their
friends told (secondary sharing), and the people their friends’ friends told (tertiary
sharing) (Harber & Cohen, 2005).
Vicarious memories, referring to recollections of specic past episodes recounted
by another individual (Pillemer et al., 2015), exhibit striking similarities to episodic
memories in both psychological and neurological domains. Although vicarious mem-
ories involve the recollection of events not personally experienced, they share key
characteristics with episodic memories, including vivid imagery, strong emotional
and physical responses, and lasting inuence (Pillemer et al., 2015).
It seems that humans not only can reconstruct their own experiences, but they can
also co-construct others’ experiences. In fact, the brain network used to construct epi-
sodic memories is also used to construct vicarious memories (Chen et al., 2017; Zad-
bood et al., 2017). The neural patterns elicited by the mental construction of vicarious
memories based on the recounting of past events resemble those found in the brain
of the individual who experienced the actual events. It seems that neurologically,
whether constructed memory is self-initiated or other-initiated, does not make much
dierence. Or, to put it in simulationist terms, we can simulate others’ experiences as
much as we can simulate our own.
Simulating others’ experiences can be useful for selecting cooperative partners
and avoiding cheaters because it allows one to learn from others’ experiences. First-
hand monitoring of an individual’s actions has a limited scope. However, vicarious
memories oer a powerful alternative for learning about the past deeds of others that
can help individuals ll in gaps in their observations. Through recounting past expe-
riences, the eyes and memories of other group members are mobilized to comple-
ment our observations and memories. Vicarious memories provide an indirect route
to learning about signicant social events in one’s group. Vicarious memories make
it possible to learn about the actions of another individual, even in situations where
you were not present.
Although there is good evidence that memory sharing is a prevalent human activity,
this is not enough to show that sharing memories oers an indirect route to signicant
social events in one’s group. If memories are used to learn about the past deeds of
others, memory sharing should be particularly about events concerning other people,
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
rather than any ordinary past event. In other words, memory sharing cannot inform
partner choices unless these shared memories are about potential partners.
And this is, in fact, what we nd: Human communities are awash with constant
chatter about the past deeds of other people. This ubiquitous phenomenon has been
studied under the notorious heading of ‘gossip.’ Unsurprisingly, gossip has always
been a pervasive feature of human societies across dierent times and places. Anthro-
pologists and other researchers have documented its practice all over the world, from
the !Kung Bushmen of West Africa (Lee, 1969) to the Kabana people of Papua New
Guinea (McPherson, 1991) to students in a London university (Dunbar et al., 1997).
Various analyses of daily speech show that as much as two-thirds of general speaking
time is devoted to gossip (Dunbar, 1993; Haviland, 1977). People are obsessed with
talking about the private dealings of other people. But this obsession makes evo-
lutionary sense, given the importance of predicting the behavior of others to select
eective collaborative partners.
Gossip is often considered unreliable for partner choices because it can be mali-
cious. However, research suggests that malicious gossip may be more of a stereo-
type than a common occurrence. Robbins and Karan (2020) recently conducted a
large-scale study of social interactions in real-world settings using a portable device
worn by participants to automatically record sound from their surroundings at regular
intervals. This allowed them to create a detailed record of what people were talking
about and observe gossip naturalistically. Their ndings suggest that malicious gos-
sip is far less common than commonly believed. Instead, most gossip is relatively
benign and involves sharing social information about shared acquaintances.
In addition, the spread of false or misleading gossip is limited by several mech-
anisms, including triangulation and deterrence. Triangulation refers to the process
of collecting information from multiple sources to improve its reliability. As Emler
(2001) suggests, triangulation allows people to compare news reports, rene their
assessments, and identify dishonest informants. Deterrence refers to the risk of being
punished for spreading false information. As Giardini (2012) argues, people are less
likely to spread false information if they fear losing credibility or being retaliated
against by the receiver of the information or the person about whom the gossip is
spread. Therefore, triangulation and deterrence mechanisms jointly work to curtail
the spread of false or misleading gossip.
A peculiar feature of gossip lies in the abundance of rst-hand testimony. Although
gossip can be based on dierent sources, the exchange is especially fruitful when it
refers to the rst-hand testimony of one of the participants, what happened to them,
what they saw or heard, and so forth. This is an essential dierence between gossip
and rumor. Gossip tends to be based on rst-hand testimony, whereas no rst-hand
account of an event can be a rumor, but it may later turn into a rumor if it spreads
through many informants (Coady, 2012). People gossip about past events that they
have epistemic authority over, whereas rumors lack such authority. It is episodic
memory that provides gossip with that epistemic authority.
Several researchers have emphasized that a sense of ownership is part and parcel
of episodic memory. Dokic (2014) takes the sense that a memory is “rst-hand” as
a crucial component of the distinctive phenomenology of episodic recollection. In
his view, when we remember an experience, we have an autonoetic sense that this
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
memory originates directly from our experience. Michaelian (2016) suggests that this
autonoetic sense of ownership might arise from a process monitoring mechanism.
Mahr and Csibra (2018) propose that autonoesis acts as a marker between infor-
mation with rst-hand experience instead of some other source in communicative
exchanges.
There are dierences between these views, but they all share the idea that the sense
of ownership is an integral aspect of episodic recollection that allows one to dis-
criminate between rst-hand and second-hand information. However, they dier in
why distinguishing rst- and second-hand information is essential. For Michaelian,
this allows one to determine whether remembered events occurred and distinguish
memory from imagination. For Mahr and Csibra, the autonoetic sense of ownership
enables us to distinguish cases in which we can assert epistemic authority for our
testimony from instances in which we cannot. I agree with Mahr and Csibra that
distinguishing rst-hand and second-hand information is especially valuable in social
contexts, given that we acquire information about others from both of these sources.
Autonoesis acts as a “witness trump card” (Henry & Craver, 2018) in communicative
exchanges. It signals to others that the speaker has a rst-hand testimony of what
happened. And gossip proliferates on precisely these kinds of rst-hand testimonies.
While Mahr and Csibra (2020) and my perspectives on episodic memory in social
life converge in some respects, a crucial divergence lies in the distinct causal roles we
attribute to it. Mahr and Csibra emphasize its role in testimony, arguing that it enables
us to communicate past experiences and negotiate crucial social facts such as who
owes what to whom, who has wronged whom, who owns what, and so forth. These
social facts are often intangible, and leave no physical traces; therefore, testimony is
essential for communicating and sharing knowledge about them. This process allows
us to coordinate our own and others’ commitments, entitlements, and accountabili-
ties. In other words, testimony functions primarily to track and justify claims to the
structure of our social relationships.
Mahr and Csibra (2020) take the existence of social facts for granted and focus on
explaining how these social facts can be transmitted and maintained. However, it is
essential to consider how cooperation originates in the rst place so that individuals
are able to form stable social relationships that give rise to these social facts. Group
living is a necessary condition for the development of social facts and institutions.
Promises, agreements, and marriages cannot exist without cooperation among group
members already in place. While Mahr and Csibra argue that testimony may play an
important role in social life, I argue that memory sharing actually plays a more fun-
damental role in determining who to cooperate with and who to avoid, and ensuring
that the rules of cooperation are not violated. As I argue in more detail in Sect. 4, all
of these factors contribute to the development of group living. Once group living is
established, memory sharing might acquire new roles in transmitting and maintaining
social facts, as Mahr and Csibra suggest.
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3 Partner choice: evaluation based on social norms
In the previous section, I began my functional analysis to identify the causal roles of
memory sharing by focusing on the individual as my unit of analysis. This investiga-
tion revealed that memory sharing oers a low-cost, high-reward vicarious learning
process for individuals. It is benecial for everyone, other things being equal, to share
what they remember about the past deeds of others as a substitute for direct obser-
vation. This extension of personal experience allows individuals to learn about the
misdeeds, misdemeanors, or deviant behaviors of others, even in contexts where they
were absent. In this section, I will widen my scope and consider groups as my unit
of analysis. I will investigate what happens at the group level when individuals can
vicariously learn from each other by taking an epidemiological approach (Sperber,
1996) to memory sharing. I will argue that vicarious learning fuels eective partner
choices at the group level.
Prior to embarking on the epidemiological investigation of memory transmission,
it is essential to provide historical context by contrasting the contemporary frame-
work of partner choice models with the earlier dominant paradigm of partner control
models, as outlined by Baumard et al. (2013). Traditionally, models focused on the
challenge of controlling partners and ensuring fair exchanges. This partner control
approach assumes individuals have assigned partners and must develop punishment
mechanisms to incentivize cooperation. Early models, like the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, exemplify this perspective by focusing on strategies like tit-for-tat to pun-
ish defectors and encourage cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
However, a paradigm shift has emerged with the development of partner choice
models. These models recognize that individuals often have the agency to select their
partners, and this choice plays a crucial role in promoting cooperation. Instead of
solely focusing on preventing cheating through punishment or other control mecha-
nisms, partner choice models emphasize the importance of choosing and being cho-
sen as the right partner for a successful and mutually benecial relationship (Bull &
Rice, 1991; Noë et al., 1991; Roberts, 1998). This shift signals a critical change in
perspective: individuals are no longer passive recipients of partnerships but rather
autonomous decision-makers who can select collaborators based on their individual
needs, preferences, and prior knowledge about potential partners. This choice-based
approach oers a more nuanced understanding of cooperation, highlighting the role
of individual agency, mutual benet, and the dynamic nature of partnership forma-
tion and dissolution.
The epidemiological approach to studying memory transmission among group
members involves documenting and clarifying the spread of memories. One of its
fundamental principles is that merely examining the transferred items is insucient
to comprehend social transmission mechanisms. According to Sperber (1996), it
is crucial to consider both psychological and ecological factors when determining
which options are most likely to be successful. Both of these factors also play a role
in the transmission of memories. While the psychology of human beings plays a
signicant role in determining which memories are likely to appeal to an individual,
social ecology is also an essential factor in determining which memories are likely
to appeal to a group. Memories can be shared and transmitted from one person to
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
another, and some memories can spread rapidly and extensively, potentially impact-
ing entire groups. As we shall see, the type of memories that are most shared by indi-
viduals with our specic psychology diers signicantly from the type of memories
that are commonly observed at the group level.
The psychological examination of memory sharing suggests that emotional mem-
ories are more likely to be transmitted because of several factors. First, emotional
memories are salient, a well-established phenomenon in the literature. It has been
demonstrated that emotions play a crucial role in all stages of the memory process,
from encoding to consolidation and retrieval (as reviewed in Holland & Kensinger,
2010). There is a vast and comprehensive body of literature on emotional memories
that highlights the impact of emotion on all aspects of memory, including its low-
level neurological mechanisms. As a result, when individuals recall a past experi-
ence, it is more likely to be an emotional experience.
Another factor appears to contribute to the higher likelihood of sharing these
salient emotional memories. Research has shown that when individuals experience
emotions, they tend to share them in most cases (80-95%) (as reviewed by Rimé
et al., 1992, Rimé et al., 1998, and Rimé, 2009). At its essence, the act of sharing
memories appears to be driven by emotional arousal, which creates a desire to com-
municate the source of the experience. This widespread phenomenon can occur in
the hours, days, weeks, and even months following an emotional episode. The act of
sharing emotions usually begins shortly after experiencing them and tends to occur
repeatedly, with more intense emotions being shared more frequently and for longer
durations. Various events can trigger dierent emotions in individuals. For instance,
one may experience negative emotions after receiving a parking ticket, or positive
emotions after receiving a promotion. Rimé and his colleagues’ extensive research
suggests that people share most events they experience, regardless of whether they
evoke positive or negative emotions. As a result, past experiences that are shared with
others are often emotional in nature.
Overall, the psychological factors involved in memory sharing suggest that emo-
tions play a signicant role in determining which memories are likely to be shared
with others. Individuals share memories emotionally because they are salient or
because emotional arousal creates an urge to share. However, it is striking that these
mundane emotional events are not reshared by their listeners. Ecological factors paint
a dierent picture of memory sharing at the group level. In other words, memory shar-
ing does not correlate with emotional sharing at the group level. Instead, groups tend
to transmit a particular subset of episodes in which social expectations are breached.
What fuels retelling is not just the goodness or badness of events or mere emotion-
ality but instead their rightness or wrongness. For instance, Mesoudi et al. (2006)
found that a story about a student’s aair with a married professor is more likely to
be retained in communication chains than a story about a student oversleeping and
missing a lecture. Oversleeping, while potentially detrimental to the individual, does
not necessarily violate established ethical codes or societal norms. Conversely, an
aair between a married professor and a student constitutes a violation of profes-
sional ethics and potentially legal codes. This violation carries signicant social and
professional ramications, making the story more noteworthy and thus more likely
to be shared and remembered. Therefore, it is not mere emotional arousal per se but
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
emotions arising from violations of social expectations that actually compel listeners
to retell (Harber & Cohen, 2005). These kinds of past events that violate expectations
are not only retold but, are also better remembered (Bell et al., 2012). While individu-
als might be content to share their good and bad memories indiscriminately, group
members are more concerned about the rightness or wrongness of actions, which
leads to cascading levels of sharing. This selective sharing process allows a student’s
oversleeping rant to end with his condants while a married professor’s relationship
with his student is retold and thereby becomes social news.
An epidemiological approach to memory sharing reveals that people do not share
memories haphazardly. On the contrary, sharing memories about others appears to
be quite systematic: groups collectively remember and share past episodes when a
member violates a social norm. Norms are rules that govern the behavior of indi-
viduals based on social expectations about how to act in a particular situation (Bic-
chieri, 2005). They commonly conict with self-centered interests, such as situations
in which cooperation, reciprocity, fairness, or actions that require foregoing personal
benets are expected. Social norms can encompass several areas, including social
interactions, communication, etiquette, values, and beliefs. For our purposes, the
most relevant aspect of social norms pertains to their evaluative nature. Social norms
provide rules that guide behavior, but they are also used as a standard against which
behaviors are evaluated. They provide a framework against which behavior is judged
as appropriate or inappropriate, acceptable or unacceptable.
When individuals violate social norms, their behavior is evaluated according to
the expectations set by the norms of their social group. In this regard, vicarious mem-
ories are particularly suited to evaluate the actions of absent others. Imagining what
happened is like an experience replay for those who were not present to visualize
how the events unfolded. Vicarious memories allow spectators to analyze what had
taken place, similar to post-game analysis by sports commentators. Individuals can
systematically inspect events using collaborative simulations, reviewing and advanc-
ing through them scene-by-scene. This allows for the interpretation and evaluation
of why certain actions were inappropriate based on what is expected in a particular
situation. To comprehend the motives behind a specic action, onlookers make infer-
ences about the mental state of the person who committed the act. The transgressions
are often juxtaposed with counterfactual scenarios, in which the perpetrator is evalu-
ated on the basis of what they should have said or done dierently. The process can
be quite intricate and serves as a way to assess the actions of individuals who are not
present, with the goal of uncovering the motives behind those actions. Therefore, the
act of sharing memories includes an evaluative component that enables individuals to
create psychological proles of their fellow group members. These proles contrib-
ute to the overall reputation of each group member.
In this section, I argued that vicarious learning leads to eective partner choices
at the group level. This claim might seem dicult to justify, given that more ecient
alternatives exist for learning about others. For instance, it is also possible to learn
about others’ character traits through trait descriptions. Why do we need to simulate
experiences about others when we can learn about their personality traits more eas-
ily? Why do we need vicarious learning when we can learn about others through per-
sonality traits or other generic means? This is an essential question that any account
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proposing an adaptive function for episodic memory should be able to answer: What
can episodic memory do that cannot be done by semantic memory?
Episodic and semantic memory should be considered complementary rather than
competing with each other. Personality traits describe an individual’s typical pattern
of behavior across dierent situations and over time. Klein et al. (2009) provide evi-
dence and argue that episodic memories are used to form, update, and constrain these
trait summaries. In their study, only one encounter with an unfamiliar person was
sucient to form a trait summary of that person. Therefore, even though personality
traits oer an ecient way to learn about others, individual episodes are still required
to extract these trait summaries. Klein et al. (2009) also argue that past experiences
are essential for maintaining the accuracy of trait summaries. Trait summaries should
be constantly updated as new information becomes available; otherwise, they would
become obsolete. In addition, episodes that contradict a trait summary can restrict its
scope of generalization. Klein et al. suggest that combining semantic and episodic
memory in this way provides the best of both worlds. Semantic trait summaries allow
us to make quick judgments, but specic past episodes about that person provide
more accurate information and insights into exceptions to the rule.
In addition to the arguments presented by Klein et al. (2009), I think past episodes
provide invaluable information about a person’s norm compliance across dierent
contexts as well. The epidemiological approach to memory sharing suggests that
newsworthy episodes in which a social norm is breached can spread within a group.
These memories are newsworthy in the sense that they inform others about a breach
of social norms, letting them know when someone does something they should not
have done. Vicarious learning precisely furnishes such memories about others’ right
or wrong actions. Moreover, simulating past events plays a vital role in evaluating
newsworthy memories. In these types of exchanges, compliance or noncompliance
with social norms is evaluated by assessing the perpetrator’s mental state in that
particular situation. Hence, vicarious learning concerns how individuals’ compliance
with norms uctuates across dierent circumstances.
Personality traits are generally considered as stable and enduring qualities that
shape an individual’s behavior and personality over time. In contrast, norm compli-
ance is highly variable and can easily change depending on an individual’s mental
state and the specic situations in which they nd themselves. The mental state of an
individual is a critical determinant of their degree of adherence to social norms. Emo-
tions such as anger, resentment, envy, or particular desires can increase the likelihood
of violating norms, whereas fear, guilt, and pride can reinforce an individual’s adher-
ence to norms. An individual’s adherence to social norms in a given situation can be
signicantly inuenced by their values and beliefs as well. However, other factors,
such as the situation in which the individual nds themselves, can also considerably
impact their level of norm compliance. For example, in public settings, individuals
may be more likely to adhere to social norms because of the fear of social disapproval
or punishment. On the other hand, in private settings, individuals may feel more
comfortable disregarding certain norms since they are not subject to public scrutiny.
Similarly, in work settings, the norms and rules governing behavior may dier from
those in other settings. Therefore, many critical variables aect an individual’s norm
compliance (Morris & Cushman, 2018). As a result, to predict an individual’s future
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
norm compliance, it is essential to consider the complex interplay between their men-
tal states and the various settings in which they operate.
Personality traits and vicarious learning are complementary approaches to learning
about others rather than competing with each other. Personality traits oer insights
into a person’s typical behaviors and tendencies, providing valuable information
about what one can generally expect from them. Nonetheless, personality traits are
limited in their ability to encompass the vast range of individual dierences in adher-
ence to social norms. Therefore, an alternative approach that relies on prior actions
is more viable. Through sharing memories and past experiences, group members
acquire valuable insights into how individuals conform to social norms across vari-
ous mental states and situations. Consequently, vicarious learning is a more eective
approach for selecting collaborative partners and avoiding the risk of interacting with
cheaters.
4 Why is episodic memory adaptive?
So far, I have provided a functional analysis to identify a causal role of memory shar-
ing. First, I focused on the individual as a containing system. Viewed from an indi-
vidualistic perspective, memory sharing oers individuals a low-cost, high-reward
vicarious learning process. A rst-hand experience with a cheater can be costly,
whether it is a betrayal, a broken promise, an unpaid debt, or something else. How-
ever, sharing memories provides the benets of often hard-won information about
others’ actions without incurring the costs of obtaining this information rsthand.
Second, I adopted an epidemiological approach to memory sharing and focused on
groups as a containing system. This investigation reveals how memory sharing can
inform eective partner choices. Groups share memories about norm compliance and
evaluate how individuals adhere to social norms by analyzing the mental states of the
person who acted in that situation. Partners known for conforming to norms are more
likely to receive cooperation from individuals, and such reputations can be estab-
lished and sustained through shared memories and evaluation of others’ conduct.
We are now in a position to address the evolutionary function of episodic memory,
which is a much more challenging task. While addressing the evolutionary function
of episodic memory presents a fascinating and complex challenge, its exploration
would require delving into limited historical evidence and evaluating numerous cog-
nitive capacities, including narrative construction, comprehension, linguistic pro-
ciency, and social-communicative skills, each of which plays a vital role in successful
memory transmission. Given the scope of this paper, I will instead focus on a more
modest aim: briey assessing the merits of potential evolutionary scenarios in light
of the previously identied causal role function of memory sharing.
Schulz and Robins (2022) review four possible evolutionary scenarios for simu-
lationist views. In the rst scenario, episodic memory and future simulations can
have distinct evolutionary histories as distinct traits. In the second and third sce-
narios, one of them can be a by-product of the other. In the last scenario, both could
be non-selected aspects of another trait. According to Schultz and Robins, the sec-
ond scenario, in which episodic memory is a byproduct of selectively advantageous
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
future simulation, is the most likely evolutionary scenario. This is based on two main
reasons. First, navigating social environments requires a suite of social cognitive
abilities that consider other people’s perspectives and evaluate the consequences of
dierent actions. Second, emotional reactions to future simulations can serve as a
valuable guide to advantageous ways of acting in those scenarios.
Note that all of the scenarios that Schultz and Robins consider involve natural
selection occurring at the individual level. Obviously, this is a plausible assumption,
as most psychological traits are thought to be selected for the tness benets they
confer on individuals. However, if episodic memory played a role in the evolution of
human cooperation, perhaps we should also consider scenarios involving multilevel
selection (Wilson & Sober, 1994). Group selection remains a contentious topic, with
ongoing research and debate persisting since Darwin’s time (Okasha, 2006, provides
a balanced review of the controversy). However, modernized multilevel selection
theory has renewed interest in this area, highlighting its potential inuence in specic
evolutionary scenarios, such as the evolution of altruism.
The evolution of altruism is paradoxical. Altruistic behaviors cannot be selected
according to the principles of natural selection because, by denition, they do not
confer benets on an individual. In “The Origin of Species,” Darwin identied this
paradox as the most formidable challenge to his theory. In a famous passage from
“The Descent of Man,” he notes that while virtuous individuals may not have a
noticeable advantage over those who are less virtuous within their own social group,
tribes consisting of virtuous individuals would strongly outcompete other tribes. Dar-
win believed that this would amount to natural selection.
Even if Schultz and Robins are correct that episodic memory evolved as a byprod-
uct of our ability to simulate future actions to navigate social groups, its role could
shift to an exaptation when group-level selection forces begin to operate. Once
episodic memory is in place, groups that share their memories will have a distinct
advantage over more private groups. In groups where memories are shared, group
members would be able to make better-informed partner choices based on past repu-
tation. Thus, everyone would be compelled to act more generously and less selshly
to avoid incurring reputation costs.
I think there is a more likely coevolution scenario than the byproduct scenario. For
one, I am not convinced that episodic memory does not have any tness-enhancing
benets. As mentioned earlier, Mahr and Csibra (2018, 2020) argue that episodic
memory allows speakers to assert epistemic authority on past events to support rea-
son-giving practices in communicative exchanges. Boyle (2019) argues that episodic
memory is epistemically generative and includes information about currently irrel-
evant features of a situation that may subsequently become relevant. Schultz and
Robins are not convinced that either of these views oers a viable tness-enhanc-
ing benet. I argue that episodic memory fuels vicarious learning, which allows us
to gain insights into the past actions of others. Such a function is compatible with
Schultz and Robins’ suggestion that simulating the future is selectively advantageous
for navigating complex social environments. It is dicult to fathom that any of these
roles, whether employed individually or in combination, would not contribute to
improving tness.
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
It is more likely that episodic memory and future simulation co-evolved as part
of a suite of social cognitive capacities. A growing body of evidence suggests that a
group of brain regions, referred to as the default mode network, that is active in epi-
sodic recollection is also involved in other forms of future-oriented thinking, imagi-
nation, and theory of mind tasks (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Buckner & Carroll,
2007; Spreng et al., 2008). These types of evidence point toward a core cognitive
system that underlies many higher social cognitive capacities, such as remembering,
future thinking, imagination, mind-reading, and so on. It might be more fruitful to
focus on the evolution of this core cognitive system rather than focusing on the evo-
lution of individual capacities realized by it. Individual capacities, such as episodic
memory, future simulation, mind-reading, imagination, and so forth, might co-evolve
as part of the suite of capacities of this core cognitive system.
What might explain the evolution of the core cognitive system? Theorizing the
function and evolution of the core cognitive system is in its infancy in cognitive sci-
ences (see Addis, 2020 for a recent example), and the default network itself remains
an enigma in neuroscience (Braga & Buckner, 2017). Therefore, I can only provide a
preliminary sketch at this point. A growing body of work stresses the role of sociality
in the evolution of unique cognitive capacities of humans that enable us to navigate
the complex social environments that we inhabit and to build cooperative relation-
ships with others in our group (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne & Whiten, 1989; Dunbar,
1998; Tomasello et al., 2005). The signicance of sociality underscores the co-evolu-
tion of various cognitive capacities such as memory, prospective thinking, imagina-
tion, and mind-reading abilities, which likely evolved to enhance the tness benets
associated with group living and cooperation. To establish cooperative relationships,
one needs to possess a set of social cognitive abilities that enable us to recognize
cooperative individuals and steer clear of individuals who are prone to deceitful
behavior (Baumard et al., 2013). As I argued above, the actions of others in the past
can provide insight into future behavior. In fact, predicting others based on their
past behavior might be more reliable than using a generic folk psychological theory
(Newen, 2015). However, relying solely on episodic memory cannot serve this pur-
pose, because recollecting past events is not helpful unless coupled with an imagina-
tive capacity to envision future possibilities. Moreover, memories based on direct
observation are not enough either and need to be supplemented with second-hand
observations and shared memories. As we have also seen, memory sharing creates
incentives to perform norm-abiding acts to build a positive reputation and be seen as
a cooperative partner. Therefore, in a group where memories are shared, norm-abid-
ing behavior is encouraged, and cheaters are agged. As Darwin noted, groups that
encourage norm-abiding behaviors outcompete groups where cheaters are rampant.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that a causal-role function of episodic memory is to facili-
tate information exchange about the past deeds of other individuals, thereby helping
group members to make eective partner choices and enforce norms. This causal-
role function of episodic memory may also underlie its evolutionary function. Within
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Synthese (2024) 203:132
a group, memories serve as a means of revealing crucial reputation information con-
cerning the past behavior of others. Memory sharing is often overlooked in psycho-
logical research, but it may underlie the etiological function of episodic memory. By
acquiring knowledge of other individuals’ past behavior, one can use such informa-
tion to predict their future conduct. These informed partner choices have a cumu-
lative impact, underscoring the importance of maintaining a positive reputation. A
reputation for being cooperative can lead to tness advantages such as acquiring
resources and attracting mates, whereas a reputation for being selsh can yield the
opposite outcomes.
Acknowledgements This work was supported by the BAGEP Award from the Science Academy in Tur-
key. The initial ideas for this paper emerged from a term paper I wrote for Carl Craver’s graduate seminar
in 2010 at Washington University in St.Louis. I am grateful for his continued encouragement and sup-
port for these ideas over the years. I am also grateful to the audiences at the Bochum/Grenoble Memory
Colloquium, Issues in Philosophy of Memory 3, the 3rd Joint Meeting of the Society for Philosophy
and Psychology, and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology for their insightful questions
and comments. These ideas further beneted from discussions with colleagues, including Felipe Romero,
Charlie Kurth, Pascal Boyer, and Johannes Mahr. I would like to express my sincere thanks to the guest
editors of this special issue, James Openshaw, Kourken Michaelian, Denis Perrin, and the four anonymous
reviewers, for their invaluable comments and suggestions. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Monica Solo-
mon, who not only read and provided feedback on multiple drafts of this paper but also oered unwavering
encouragement and support throughout the years.
Funding Open access funding provided by the Scientic and Technological Research Council of Türkiye
(TÜBİTAK).
Declarations
Conict of interest The author declares that he has no conict of interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use
is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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