Drawing the line: public attitudes towards warranted and unwarranted government surveillance in European countries

Abstract

This article investigates public attitudes towards government surveillance for law enforcement and national security in different European countries, considering the broader context of citizens' security concerns. These concerns encompass crime within individual countries, potential terrorist attacks, activities of foreign agents, and even inter-state conflicts, such as the Russian Federation's military aggression against Ukraine. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we examine opinions about various types of government surveillance. Regression analysis is employed to determine which variables influence these opinions. Notably, there is a tangible hesitation among citizens regarding such surveillance, stemming from fears of privacy invasion and potential misuse of collected data. Our findings indicate greater support for government surveillance in Western and Nordic countries compared to post-Communist countries. Respondents with a comprehensive understanding of political issues and those advocating for government spending on security generally held a more positive view of government surveillance rights. On the other hand, perceptions of higher corruption were linked to negative views on surveillance.

Full text

Vol.:(0123456789)
Security Journal (2024) 37:1447–1462
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-024-00426-4
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted
andunwarranted government surveillance inEuropean
countries
MilanŠkolník1 · MichaelHaman1
Accepted: 25 February 2024 / Published online: 16 April 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Abstract
This article investigates public attitudes towards government surveillance for law
enforcement and national security in different European countries, considering the
broader context of citizens’ security concerns. These concerns encompass crime
within individual countries, potential terrorist attacks, activities of foreign agents,
and even inter-state conflicts, such as the Russian Federation’s military aggression
against Ukraine. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we
examine opinions about various types of government surveillance. Regression anal-
ysis is employed to determine which variables influence these opinions. Notably,
there is a tangible hesitation among citizens regarding such surveillance, stemming
from fears of privacy invasion and potential misuse of collected data. Our findings
indicate greater support for government surveillance in Western and Nordic coun-
tries compared to post-Communist countries. Respondents with a comprehensive
understanding of political issues and those advocating for government spending on
security generally held a more positive view of government surveillance rights. On
the other hand, perceptions of higher corruption were linked to negative views on
surveillance.
Keywords Surveillance· Government· Public· Survey data· Security
Introduction
Issues of government surveillance are becoming at the forefront of academic interest
(Muir 2015; Rajamaki etal. 2015; Tryfonas etal. 2016; Cropf and Bagwell 2016;
Ryan 2018; Rider 2018; Kim and Atkin 2019; Gstrein 2020). This surge in interest
is primarily due to three trends. First, there is an emphasis on e-government, where
* Milan Školník
skolnikm@pef.czu.cz
1 Department ofHumanities, Faculty ofEconomics andManagement, Czech University ofLife
Sciences Prague, Kamýcká 129, 16500Prague, CzechRepublic
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1448
M.Školník, M.Haman
citizen–government transactions are carried out online (Lips etal. 2009). Second,
there is the increasing use of smart cards and other portable information and trans-
action devices issued by the government. Thirdly, the government’s intensified fight
against terrorism, particularly post-9/11, contributes to this focus (Lim etal. 2009).
In addition, some authors argue that government surveillance is much more wide-
spread than many realize (McKee 2011).1
The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018
impacted the landscape of surveillance within the European Union. The GDPR is
a key regulation in Europe that aims to protect the privacy rights of its citizens and
regulate how organizations handle their personal data. It also harmonizes the data
protection laws across the EU and influences how the public perceives surveillance
practices. However, the GDPR does not cover all types of data processing, such as
those for national security or law enforcement purposes, which are subject to other
legal instruments and national rules. These rules must still respect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of individuals and follow the general principles and objectives
of the GDPR. The GDPR also sets strict guidelines and safeguards for law enforce-
ment agencies to process personal data for surveillance purposes, ensuring that they
are necessary, proportionate, and transparent.
This article explores public attitudes in various European countries towards two
specific categories of government surveillance: warranted and unwarranted. War-
ranted surveillance is legally justified for reasons such as law enforcement and
national security, while unwarranted surveillance pertains to surveillance activities
that may infringe upon personal privacy rights and freedoms. Our primary focus is
on government surveillance in the context of law enforcement and national secu-
rity. These two sectors represent critical areas where the balance between security
needs and privacy rights is continually negotiated and contested. Utilizing data from
the International Social Survey Programme, this study examines public attitudes
towards different types of government surveillance, utilizing regression analysis to
reveal influential variables on these attitudes. The study finds notable differences in
support for government surveillance between Western and Nordic countries com-
pared to post-Communist countries.
This paper aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on government
surveillance by offering an analysis that takes into account different categories of
surveillance, and regional differences within Europe. Ultimately, it seeks to answer
the question: “Where does the European public draw the line between warranted and
unwarranted government use of surveillance technologies?”
The paper’s structure is as follows: the first section reviews the literature on gov-
ernment surveillance. The second section explains the methodology, including the
data sources, variables, and statistical methods used. The third section presents and
1 Surveillance can certainly be an effective government tool for increasing the security of citizens, but it
can also be counterproductive for the government itself. Surveys from North Korea have shown that gov-
ernment surveillance concerns of citizens tend to increase cyber-rumor sharing on the Internet, especially
in times of homeland security threat (Hazel Kwon and Raghav Rao 2017).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1449
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
interprets the results, and the final section offers a conclusion and implications for
policy and future research.
Government surveillance inliterature
A number of scientific studies have addressed the issue of surveillance, from many
perspectives. It is possible to mention the legal aspect when discussing the issue of
protection of personal rights, in which government surveillance intervenes (Bern-
stein 1996; Henderson 2002; Slobogin 2017). For example, some studies have con-
cluded that while there are exceptions at the municipal level that prioritize the public
interest over the protection of privacy, there is a growing interest at the international
level in the protection of personal rights (Robis 2014).2
The researchers also looked at the relationship between surveillance and policy
activity. Research from the United States through survey data shows that those who
oppose government policies and perceive government is monitoring their activity
on the Internet are more involved in online politics (Krueger 2005), as well as in
offline political participation (Krueger 2008). In the United States, academics also
examined individual beliefs and concerns about government surveillance on the
Internet and compared it with users in Italy. They concluded that Italians have less
Internet privacy concerns than Americans, lower perceived need for government
surveillance but higher concerns about government intrusion (Dinev etal. 2006).
Researchers using individual-level data from US are also interested in what influ-
ences attitudes to government surveillance. Social awareness positively influences
the perceived need for government surveillance, while Internet literacy has a nega-
tive impact. In addition, Internet literacy has a positive effect on government intru-
sion concerns (Dinev 2008), and these concerns are positively related to privacy
concerns (Dinev etal. 2008). That social awareness and Internet self-efficacy are
what affects the perceived need for government surveillance and government intru-
sion concerns, the same author proposes in another study (Xu and Dinev 2012).
Privacy concerns also influence the acceptance of surveillance, as revealed by an
Australian survey (Kininmonth etal. 2018; Thompson etal. 2020). Further research
from the United States with the help of a panel survey added that the acceptability
of government surveillance is influenced by the already-mentioned surveillance con-
cerns, as well as the perceived transparency, regulatory needs, and ideology of the
respondent (Nam 2019).
Research from the United States, using two embedded experiments in a national
survey, revealed that political activities related to violence and legitimate activi-
ties in opposition to the president have the greatest impact on surveillance percep-
tions (Best and Krueger 2008). As for the United States, after 9/11, the attention of
intelligence services focused on monitoring American Muslims. Research on this
issue has revealed that one-fifth of American Muslim participants have personal
2 The subject of academic interest is not only the effects of surveillance on citizens, but also on the non-
profit (Walden 2006) or religious sector (Dumsday 2008; Montalbano 2018).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1450
M.Školník, M.Haman
experience with government surveillance and have expressed concern. At the same
time, these Muslims also adjusted their behavior to avoid suspicion and future gov-
ernment surveillance (O’Connor and Jahan 2014).
The issue of government surveillance is also examined in an international con-
text.3 Some studies also address the issue of surveillance at the local level.4 Gov-
ernment surveillance is viewed in the literature not only from a security or public
opinion points of view, but also, for example, due to the issue of gambling (Miller
etal. 2016) or how government surveillance impacts the automotive industry (Cava-
zos etal. 2018). The enumeration can continue how media inform about exposing
government intrusion (Johnson 2017; Connor and Doan 2021), as well as what are
the philosophical aspects of privacy into which government surveillance penetrates
(Macnish 2018). The issue of government surveillance was also discussed in the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially with regard to the use of cell phone
applications developed to control the pandemic (Bernard etal. 2020).
A review of the literature shows that most research has been geographically
focused on the United States and there are only a minimal number of studies that
have addressed the issue of government surveillance in Europe. Although a num-
ber of studies have relied on individual-level data, there is an absence of studies
that have looked at how different political and socioeconomic variables affect the
government’s right to conduct surveillance. For these reasons, the research is thus
focused on the European area while choosing a design using data from opinion polls
and statistical methods.
Methodology
Data
For the purposes of this article, data from The International Social Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) are used. This is an international programme that conducts annual
individual-level surveys on social science topics. The surveys have been conducted
since 1984. Research organizations, universities, and public opinion agencies have
been involved. All data and related documentation are freely available for profes-
sional use. Social inequality, citizenship, religion, health, or the role of government
are just a few examples of the areas on which opinion polls focus. The 2016 data
module on the role of government is utilized (ISSP Research Group 2018). This
module provides specific insights into public opinion on the government’s right to
implement surveillance, as well as a range of political and socioeconomic data about
3 For example, an analysis of Twitter data that revealed that disclosures on Australia’s secret surveillance
of Indonesian political elites had negative political implications for bilateral relations (Chatfield etal.
2015).
4 Mention may be made of a study which found that federal funding for 18 local in Australia to install
CCTV systems causes populism and political pressure rather than objective reasons (Carr 2016) or a UK
local authority case study that reveals how the performance management systems are transformed into a
surveillance system (Kayas etal. 2019).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1451
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
respondents. It is important to note that this dataset was collected in 2016, predat-
ing the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018.
However, the implications of the GDPR have been taken into account during the
interpretation of the results.
Models
Five regression models were constructed. The individual dependent variables repre-
sent the respondents’ opinion on the government’s right to tap the telephone, video
surveillance, Internet monitoring, collect information about anyone in the country
and collect information about anyone abroad without their knowledge. The depend-
ent variables were recoded to be dichotomous (taking only two values), with 1 mean-
ing government should have right and 2 meaning government should not have right.
As a result, logistic regression analysis was used. All selected European countries
offered by the ISSP in the 2016 module The Role of Government are included in the
models. The effect of each country was therefore controlled by including dummy
variables and using a fixed effects model. Hierarchical models were not used, both
because individual-level data were worked with and because hierarchical models
can be methodologically problematic. This is particularly the case when there are
not enough cases for effective analysis at a higher level. Some authors therefore rec-
ommend a 30/30 rule, i.e., 30 cases per level (Kreft 1996; Hox 2010; Maas and Hox
2005; Snijders and Bosker 1996). However, this research covers only 19 countries.
The models test whether and to what extent different political variables influence
the view of the government’s right to implement different forms of surveillance. The
political variables chosen are perceptions of corruption, government spending on
policing and law enforcement, and respondent’s political issue understanding. Sev-
eral socioeconomic variables are also included in the models. See “Appendix” for
a more detailed specification of all variables (Table3). In the “Appendix,” we have
provided descriptive statistics on the respondents and data representativeness to
enhance transparency and comprehension of our dataset (Table4). It is worth noting
that while the dataset comprises 20,153 cases, the regression models used fewer due
to missing values in the dependent variable for certain cases.
Results
Table1 provides insights into public attitudes across European countries regarding
various government surveillance rights. Each entry represents a combination of the
responses ‘definitely should have right’ and ’probably should have right.’ When ana-
lyzing the data based on average scores, distinct patterns become evident. Phone
tapping, with an average approval rating of 69.5%, and video surveillance at 68.4%,
emerge as the most accepted forms of surveillance across the surveyed countries.
This contrasts starkly with the acceptance of Internet monitoring, which sits at a
considerably lower average of 33.5%. However, even within these broad averages,
considerable variance is seen between countries.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1452
M.Školník, M.Haman
Delving deeper into country-specific data, our analysis reveals a nuanced land-
scape of public support for surveillance rights across Europe. Specifically, countries
like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia exhibit a consistent below-average
endorsement across all surveillance rights, positioning them as 5/5 in terms of skep-
ticism towards these measures. In contrast, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, and
Lithuania present a slightly varied stance, with below-average support in four out
of five rights, categorizing them as 4/5. This distinction underscores the complex-
ity of public sentiment towards surveillance, suggesting that while there is a gen-
eral trend of skepticism, the degree and nuances of this skepticism vary significantly
across countries. Also, in the case of Iceland, Russia, and Switzerland, it is found
that these countries register support levels below the overall average in exactly
three out of the five surveillance categories evaluated. This 3/5 pattern underlines
a nuanced approach to government surveillance, indicating a selective acceptance
or skepticism towards these measures. This nuanced stance reflects the countries’
complex balancing of privacy concerns with security needs, suggesting a thoughtful
consideration of the extent and implications of surveillance practices. It is important
to interpret these scores with caution, as this comparative data may reflect deeper
socio-cultural or political nuances unique to each country.
Table 1 Public attitudes towards government rights
Country Tap the
telephone
Video sur-
veillance
Internet moni-
toring
Collect information
in country
Collect
information
abroad
Belgium 92.3 79.8 53.9 74.7 71.8
Croatia 68.9 40.9 23.3 46.1 27.3
Czech Republic 63.7 57 23 38.8 34.6
Denmark 85.9 84.4 37.9 48 40.1
Finland 83.3 92.2 35.9 59.4 58.4
France 91 77.5 49 60.7 50
Germany 77.5 61.3 33 26.9 24.7
Hungary 40.6 63.8 41.1 29.2 30.3
Iceland 72.2 88.6 15.1 28.7 17.9
Latvia 51.6 75.1 29.5 29.9 23.4
Lithuania 56.6 69.8 20.9 36.4 29.7
Norway 85.1 67.9 35.2 73.4 66.4
Russia 46.9 66.2 36.4 45.1 45.1
Slovakia 40.4 55.3 16.8 24 21.4
Slovenia 50.7 38.8 15.4 34.8 22.9
Spain 61 54.1 36.8 47.4 40.6
Sweden 88 86.1 42.2 66.1 59.4
Switzerland 81.5 56.2 36.7 35.9 28.9
Great Britain 83.1 84.7 53.5 64.8 53.7
Average 69.5 68.4 33.5 45.8 39.3
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1453
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
On the flip side, countries including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Swe-
den, and Great Britain stand out for their pronounced endorsement of surveillance
rights, consistently scoring above the average across all categories. This broad
acceptance is particularly noteworthy in the current global context, signifying a
potential trust in governmental measures or perhaps cultural factors at play. When
we consider overall support for surveillance rights, Belgium, Great Britain, and
Sweden distinguish themselves as top scorers, highlighting a general public inclina-
tion towards approval of such measures. Conversely, Slovakia, Slovenia, Germany,
Latvia, and Iceland are characterized by their relatively low scores, suggesting
more restrained public sentiment regarding government surveillance rights in these
countries.
While these findings provide valuable insights, it is crucial to contextualize them
within each country’s unique socio-political landscape. Moreover, public acceptance
of a right does not necessarily equate to approval of its implementation or lack of
concerns about potential abuses. This study aims at a comparative analysis, spot-
lighting both the similarities and differences as well as the scoring margins, without
delving into the specific socio-political dynamics of each country.
Table2 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis. For each dependent
variable, we employed a distinct regression model that consolidated data from all
19 countries. To address country-specific nuances and variations, we incorporated
country dummies into our models. This methodological decision enables us to gauge
the comprehensive influence of policy variables on governmental rights associated
with citizen surveillance. Simultaneously, it ensures that we adequately control for
any divergences that are unique to individual countries. How selected policy vari-
ables affect individual government rights related to surveillance or monitoring of
citizens was tested. Several standard socioeconomic variables were also included in
the regression models. However, before the regression analysis was performed, the
degree of correlation between the variables was examined. The highest correlation
was between the Work status variable and the Age variable, at 0.327 according to
the Pearson correlation coefficient. All other variables had less than this correlation
value. Therefore, it was possible to include all the selected variables in the regres-
sion analysis.
The regression models show that the selected political variables are statistically
significant in almost all cases and thus affect the selected dependent variables in the
form of opinion on government rights. Statistical significance is only absent for the
effect of corruption on the government’s right to collect information about anyone
abroad and for the effect of political issues understanding on the government’s right
to monitor the Internet. However, even so, these variables have the same direction of
the predictor.
The first political variable operates in the direction of the more politicians
involved in corruption, the greater the respondents’ disapproval of the government
being able to tap phones, conduct surveillance, monitor, or generally collect infor-
mation about people. This may imply some fear on the part of the respondents about
the misuse of public power for private purposes, namely that politicians will misuse
the information obtained from wiretapping and monitoring citizens for their private
benefit, for example, in the context of political struggle.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1454
M.Školník, M.Haman
Table 2 Effects of political and socioeconomic variables on opinion regarding government rights
Standard errors in parentheses. The table shows β coefficient values. Dataset is weighted by WEIGHT provided by ISSP
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Source Author’s calculations
Variables Tap telephone Video surveillance Internet monitoring Collect information in country Collect information abroad
Corruption 0.139*** (0.019) 0.159*** (0.019) 0.1*** (0.018) 0.109*** (0.017) 0.022 (0.018)
Spending 0.207*** (0.02) 0.297*** (0.02) 0.301*** (0.02) 0.237*** (0.019) 0.216*** (0.019)
Political issues
understanding
0.085*** (0.017) 0.054*** (0.016) 0.021 (0.016) 0.036* (0.016) 0.076*** (0.016)
Age − 0.002* (0.001) − 0.006*** (0.001) − 0.017*** (0.001) − 0.008*** (0.001) − 0.009*** (0.001)
Gender 0.034 (0.035) 0.095** (0.033) 0.123*** (0.033) − 0.114*** (0.031) − 0.096** (0.032)
Education − 0.016 (0.013) − 0.017 (0.012) 0.065*** (0.012) 0.012 (0.012) 0.035** (0.012)
Place of living − 0.027 (0.014) 0.005 (0.014) − 0.012 (0.014) 0.013 (0.013) − 0.01 (0.013)
Work status 0.188*** (0.037) 0.057 (0.036) 0.071* (0.036) 0.16*** (0.034) 0.2*** (0.035)
Constant − 2.586*** (0.147) − 2.788*** (0.145) − 0.667*** (0.131) − 1.31*** (0.128) − 0.592*** (0.129)
N19,540 19,510 19,048 19,409 19,084
Nagelkerke’s R20.2 0.168 0.135 0.164 0.167
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1455
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
The second policy variable related to views on government spending works in
the direction of the more respondents believe that the government should invest in
police forces and law enforcement, the more they also think that the government
should have the right to phone tapping, surveillance, monitoring, or information
gathering. Government surveillance in general is one of the tools used by security
forces such as the police and intelligence services, so it is evident that at the indi-
vidual respondent level there is a link between the view of government spending in
this area and the view of the government’s right to implement it.
The third political variable related to political issues understanding of the
respondent also works in the same direction. The more the respondent believes that
he or she understands the political issues facing the country, the more he or she
believes that the government should have the right to tap telephone, surveillance,
and other information gathering rights. In a broader sense, it can be concluded that
politically aware respondents are more aware of potential security threats compared
to less politically aware respondents, and thus are generally in favor of government
surveillance rights that have the potential to enhance security.
In terms of socioeconomic variables, the likelihood of having a positive opinion
of all rights included in the models increases as the age of the respondent increases.
For the variable representing gender, it is important to distinguish between the
rights. While men are much more likely to think that the government should have
the right to video surveillance and Internet monitoring, the opposite is true for the
government’s rights to gather information either at home or abroad. That the govern-
ment should have the right to Internet monitoring or to collect information on any-
one abroad is especially the view of less educated respondents. However, the varia-
ble representing education is not statistically significant in relation to the other three
rights of the government. Place of living was not statistically significant in either
case. In contrast, the Work status variable was statistically significant in four regres-
sion models except for the video surveillance model, showing that it is people in
paid work who are much more likely to think that the government should have these
selected security rights compared to respondents who are not economically active.
Discussion
The results reveal several compelling insights into public attitudes towards govern-
ment surveillance across European countries. Most pronouncedly, the acceptance
of surveillance rights diverges between Western and Nordic countries compared
to their post-Communist counterparts. Countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Sweden, and Great Britain consistently demonstrate above-average endorse-
ment of the various surveillance rights. In contrast, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania routinely register
below-average support.
As the regression analysis confirms, countries with a Communist legacy tend to
be more suspicious of government surveillance programs. This suggests that lived
experiences under authoritarian regimes can breed enduring wariness towards state
powers of surveillance. However, it is imperative to approach this finding with
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1456
M.Školník, M.Haman
nuance. The relationship between historical–political legacies and public attitudes
towards surveillance is complex and multifaceted. Other factors, such as recent
political transformations, evolving societal values, and global trends in governance
and privacy rights, also play a significant role. Hence, while the Communist–capi-
talist dichotomy offers a useful lens, it is but one of many factors that shape public
perceptions of surveillance. Our findings validate the view that this sense of skepti-
cism remains perceptible in post-Communist countries decades after the dissolution
of the Eastern bloc. Conversely, the elevated acceptance of surveillance rights in
Western and Nordic countries may reflect greater public trust in governmental insti-
tutions and security initiatives. However, high scores on abstract rights do not neces-
sarily mean citizens enthusiastically welcome real-world surveillance measures. The
complex interplay between security priorities, privacy concerns, and public trust
underpins these variations between regions. As the literature explores, factors like
perceived transparency, regulatory oversight, and potential for abuse all shape atti-
tudes on state surveillance (Nam 2019).
Drilling down into the five categories, phone tapping and video surveillance draw
the most consensus across countries as acceptable rights. Though still contentious,
these conventional forms of surveillance tend to align with public notions of war-
ranted state powers for law enforcement and national security purposes. However,
Internet monitoring emerges as the least approved category overall. In the digital
age, technological advancements may be outpacing civic readiness to confer unbri-
dled surveillance powers upon governments. Finally, domestic and foreign informa-
tion gathering hover uneasily in the middle, neither garnering sweeping endorsement
nor outright censure across diverse countries. These results illuminate the nuanced
fault lines in public attitudes, underscoring the need for an evidence-based approach
as governments negotiate the boundaries between security imperatives and civil lib-
erties. While no uniform consensus exists across the European landscape, our find-
ings contribute valuable insights on where citizens may draw the line between war-
ranted and unwarranted state surveillance.
Conclusion
This study sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of public attitudes
towards both warranted and unwarranted government surveillance in European
countries and to discern the variables shaping these perspectives. Utilizing data
from the International Social Survey Programme, there was a clear divergence in the
endorsement of government surveillance between Western and Nordic countries as
opposed to their post-Communist counterparts.
Our research indicated that respondents with a heightened grasp of politi-
cal matters and those in favor of government spending on security usually held a
more favorable view of government surveillance rights. On the contrary, a pro-
nounced perception of corruption adversely influenced their perspective on these
rights. Within the vast spectrum of surveillance types, there was a significant public
endorsement for government rights to tap phones and undertake video surveillance.
However, the rights pertaining to Internet monitoring and information collection
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1457
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
domestically and internationally witnessed comparatively diminished support. This
variation in public sentiment underscores the intricate equilibrium between the
imperatives of security and the preservation of privacy rights.
Therefore, the response to the main question of the study is that the line between
warranted and unwarranted government surveillance is largely influenced by the
type of surveillance, regional differences, and political variables. Traditional forms
of surveillance, such as phone tapping and video surveillance, were generally
accepted as warranted, whereas Internet monitoring was less favored, potentially
seen as an unwarranted breach of digital privacy. There were notable regional dis-
parities, with Western and Nordic countries showing higher acceptance compared to
post-Communist countries, reflecting their distinct historical experiences and politi-
cal cultures. Political factors, including the level of perceived corruption and grasp
of political matters, notably shape public sentiment, indicating that confidence in
governmental institutions plays a crucial role in the reception of surveillance meas-
ures. To summarize, the line drawn by the public between warranted and unwar-
ranted government surveillance represents a complex, shifting boundary contingent
on an array of societal, technological, and political dynamics.
When viewed through the prism of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), these findings acquire an amplified significance. The GDPR, by reshap-
ing the parameters of data protection and privacy in Europe, also indirectly casts its
shadow on the public’s perception of government surveillance, warranting further
scholarly examination.
Delving deeper into the granular details, it was discerned that the public’s accept-
ance of specific surveillance rights is not just shaped by political variables but also
influenced by certain sociodemographic aspects. The prevailing sentiments in the
Western and Nordic regions contrasted starkly with those in Eastern European coun-
tries, especially concerning the rights related to Internet monitoring and informa-
tion collection. A practical takeaway from these observations suggests that to gain
broader public consensus on surveillance measures, governments, especially in
post-Communist countries, should fortify public understanding of political affairs
and security threats. Simultaneously, addressing and minimizing corruption is para-
mount to instill public trust in the judicious use of surveillance data.
Given the evolving geopolitical landscape, exemplified by instances like the Rus-
sian Federation’s expansion into Ukrainian territories, these insights become espe-
cially pertinent for the national security strategies of Eastern European countries.
This study, therefore, not only augments the existing literature on government sur-
veillance but also offers directional insights for policy-makers. It underscores the
need for future research to keep pace with the dynamically changing interplay of
legislation, technology, and public sentiment, as the world grapples with reconciling
security imperatives and privacy concerns in an increasingly digital epoch.
Appendix
See Tables3 and 4.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1458
M.Školník, M.Haman
Table 3 Variables in the models
Variables Description
Dependent variables
Tap telephone Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to
happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to… tap
people’s telephone conversations?
Variable adjusted to: 1 Should have right, 2 Should not have right
Video surveillance Do you think that the [COUNTRY] government should or should not
have the right to do the following:
Keep people under video surveillance in public areas?
Variable adjusted to: 1 Should have right, 2 Should not have right
Internet monitoring Do you think that the [COUNTRY] government should or should not
have the right to do the following:
Monitor e-mails and any other information exchanged on the Internet?
Variable adjusted to: 1 Should have right, 2 Should not have right
Collect information in country Some people think that governments should have the right to take
certain measures in the name of national security. Others disagree.
Do you think that the [COUNTRY] government should or should not
have the right to do the following:
Collect information about anyone living in (COUNTRY) without their
knowledge
Variable adjusted to: 1 Should have right, 2 Should not have right
Collect information abroad Some people think that governments should have the right to take
certain measures in the name of national security. Others disagree.
Do you think that the [COUNTRY] government should or should not
have the right to do the following:
Collect information about anyone living in other countries without
their knowledge
Variable adjusted to: 1 Should have right, 2 Should not have right
Political variables
Corruption In your opinion, about how many politicians in (selected country) are
involved in corruption?
1 Almost none, 2 A few, 3 Some, 4 Quite a lot, 5 Almost all
Spending Listed below are various areas of government spending
The police and law enforcement
Please show whether you would like to see more or less government
spending in each area
1 Spend much more, 2 Spend more, 3 Spend the same as now, 4 Spend
less, 5 Spend much less
Understanding political issues I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political
issues facing our country
1 Strongly agree, 2 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor disagree, 4 Disagree, 5
Strongly disagree
Sociodemographic variables
Age Range between 18 and 93
Gender Male 1. Female 2
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1459
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
Funding Open access publishing supported by the National Technical Library in Prague.
Data availability The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in ISSP at Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme at http://w. issp. org/ menu- top/ home/.
Declarations
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Ethical approval This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed
by the authors.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
Source International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government V: questionnaire
Table 3 (continued)
Variables Description
Education 0 No formal education, 1 Primary school (elementary education), 2
Lower secondary (secondary completed that does not allow entry to
university: end of obligatory school), 3 Upper secondary (programs
that allows entry to university), 4 Post secondary, non-tertiary (other
upper secondary programs toward the labor market or technical for-
mation), 5 Lower level tertiary, first stage (also technical schools at a
tertiary level), 6 Upper level tertiary (Master, Doctor)
Place of living 1 A big city, 2 The suburbs or outskirts of a big city, 3 A town or a
small city, 4 A country village, 5 A farm or home in the country
Work status Variable adjusted to: 0 In paid work, 1 Unemployed and looking for a
job, In education, Apprentice or trainee, Permanently sick or disa-
bled, Retired, Domestic work
Table 4 Descriptive statistics NMinimum Maximum Mean Standard
deviation
Corruption 20,153 1 5 3.4 1.1
Age 20,153 15 97 48.0 17.1
Education 20,153 0 6 3.6 1.5
Place of living 20,153 1 7 2.8 1.2
Work status 20,153 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5
Spending 20,153 1 5 2.5 0.9
Understand-
ing political
issues
20,153 1 5 2.7 1.1
Gender 20,153 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1460
M.Školník, M.Haman
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Bernard, Rose, Gemma Bowsher, and Richard Sullivan. 2020. COVID-19 and the Rise of Participatory
SIGINT: An Examination of the Rise in Government Surveillance Through Mobile Applications.
American Journal of Public Health 110 (12): 1780–1785. https:// doi. org/ 10. 2105/ AJPH. 2020.
305912.
Bernstein, Merrick D. 1996. ‘Intimate Details’: A Troubling New Fourth Amendment Standard for Gov-
ernment Surveillance Techniques. Duke Law Journal 46 (3): 575–610. https:// doi. org/ 10. 2307/
13729 42.
Best, Samuel J., and Brian S. Krueger. 2008. Political Conflict and Public Perceptions of Government
Surveillance on the Internet: An Experiment of Online Search Terms. Journal of Information Tech-
nology and Politics 5 (2): 191–212. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 19331 68080 22944 79.
Carr, Robert. 2016. Surveillance Politics and Local Government: A National Survey of Federal Funding
for CCTV in Australia. Security Journal 29 (4): 683–709. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1057/ sj. 2014. 12.
Cavazos, David E., Matthew Rutherford, and Shawn L. Berman. 2018. Assessing the Effect of Govern-
ment Surveillance on Firm Supererogation: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry. Business
Ethics: A European Review 27 (2): 156–163. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1111/ beer. 12179.
Chatfield, Akemi Takeoka, Christopher G. Reddick, and Uuf Brajawidagda. 2015. Government Surveil-
lance Disclosures, Bilateral Trust and Indonesia-Australia Cross-Border Security Cooperation:
Social Network Analysis of Twitter Data. Government Information Quarterly 32 (2): 118–128.
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. giq. 2015. 01. 002.
Connor, Brian T., and Long Doan. 2021. Government and Corporate Surveillance: Moral Discourse on
Privacy in the Civil Sphere. Information, Communication and Society 24 (1): 52–68. https:// doi. org/
10. 1080/ 13691 18X. 2019. 16296 93.
Cropf, R.A., and T.C. Bagwell. 2016. Ethical Issues and Citizen Rights in the Era of Digital Government
Surveillance. In Ethical Issues and Citizen Rights in the Era of Digital Government Surveillance.
Advances in Public Policy and Administration, ed. Robert A. Cropf and Timothy C. Bagwell. IGI
Global. https:// doi. org/ 10. 4018/ 978-1- 4666- 9905-2.
Dinev, Tamara. 2008. Internet Users’ Beliefs About Government Surveillance the Role of Social Aware-
ness and Internet Literacy. In Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences (HICSS 2008), 2008, 275–275. IEEE. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1109/ HICSS. 2008. 216.
Dinev, Tamara, Massimo Bellotto, Paul Hart, Vincenzo Russo, and Ilaria Serra. 2006. Internet Users’ Pri-
vacy Concerns and Beliefs About Government Surveillance. Journal of Global Information Man-
agement 14 (4): 57–93. https:// doi. org/ 10. 4018/ jgim. 20061 00103.
Dinev, Tamara, Paul Hart, and Michael R. Mullen. 2008. Internet Privacy Concerns and Beliefs About
Government Surveillance—An Empirical Investigation. The Journal of Strategic Information Sys-
tems 17 (3): 214–233. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. jsis. 2007. 09. 002.
Dumsday, Travis. 2008. Group Privacy and Government Surveillance of Religious Services. The Monist
91 (1): 170–186. https:// doi. org/ 10. 5840/ monis t2008 91118.
Gstrein, Oskar Josef. 2020. Mapping Power and Jurisdiction on the Internet Through the Lens of Govern-
ment-Led Surveillance. Internet Policy Review 9 (3): 1–17. https:// doi. org/ 10. 14763/ 2020.3. 1497.
Hazel Kwon, K., and H. Raghav Rao. 2017. Cyber-Rumor Sharing Under a Homeland Security Threat in
the Context of Government Internet Surveillance: The Case of South-North Korea Conflict. Govern-
ment Information Quarterly 34 (2): 307–316. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. giq. 2017. 04. 002.
Henderson, Nathan C. 2002. The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic
Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications. Duke Law Journal 52 (1): 179–209. https://
doi. org/ 10. 2307/ 13731 34.
Hox, Joop J. 2010. Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
ISSP Research Group. 2018. International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government V—ISSP
2016. ZA6900 Data File Version 2.0.0. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. https:// doi. org/ 10. 4232/1.
13052.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1461
Drawing theline: public attitudes towardswarranted and…
Johnson, Courtney N. 2017. A ‘Massive and Unprecedented Intrusion.’ Digital Journalism 5 (3): 318–
333. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 21670 811. 2016. 12513 30.
Kayas, Oliver G., Tony Hines, Rachel McLean, and Gillian H. Wright. 2019. Resisting Government Ren-
dered Surveillance in a Local Authority. Public Management Review 21 (8): 1170–1190. https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1080/ 14719 037. 2018. 15446 61.
Kim, T., and D.J. Atkin. 2019. How Government Surveillance Policies Modify SNS Use in South Korea.
Journal of Information Policy 9: 214–237. https:// doi. org/ 10. 5325/ jinfo poli.9. 2019. 0214.
Kininmonth, Joel, Nik Thompson, Tanya McGill, and Anna Bunn. 2018. Privacy Concerns and Accept-
ance of Government Surveillance in Australia. In Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2018, 2018. Sydney: University of Technology Sydney ePress. https:// doi. org/ 10. 5130/ acis2 018. cn.
Kreft, Ita G.G. 1996. Are Multilevel Techniques Necessary? An Overview, Including Simulation Studies.
Unpublished Manuscript. Los Angeles: California State University.
Krueger, Brian S. 2005. Government Surveillance and Political Participation on the Internet. Social Sci-
ence Computer Review 23 (4): 439–452. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 08944 39305 278871.
Krueger, Brian S. 2008. Resisting Government Internet Surveillance by Participating in Politics Online
and Offline. In Patriotic Information Systems, ed. Todd Loendorf and G. David Garson, 129–152.
Hershey: IGI Global. https:// doi. org/ 10. 4018/ 978-1- 59904- 594-8. ch006.
Lim, Sun Sun, Hichang Cho, and Milagros Rivera Sanchez. 2009. Online Privacy, Government Surveil-
lance and National ID Cards. Communications of the ACM 52 (12): 116–120. https:// doi. org/ 10.
1145/ 16102 52. 16102 83.
Lips, Miriam, John A. Taylor, and Joe Organ. 2009. Managing Citizen Identity Information in E-Govern-
ment Service Relationships in the UK. Public Management Review 11 (6): 833–856. https:// doi. org/
10. 1080/ 14719 03090 33189 88.
Maas, Cora J. M., and Joop J. Hox. 2005. Sufficient Sample Sizes for Multilevel Modeling. Methodology
1 (3): 85–91. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1027/ 1614- 2241.1. 3. 85.
Macnish, Kevin. 2018. Government Surveillance and Why Defining Privacy Matters in a Post-Snowden
World. Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (2): 417–432. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1111/ japp. 12219.
McKee, Heidi A. 2011. Policy Matters Now and in the Future: Net Neutrality, Corporate Data Mining,
and Government Surveillance. Computers and Composition 28 (4): 276–291. https:// doi. org/ 10.
1016/j. compc om. 2011. 09. 001.
Miller, Helen E., Samantha L. Thomas, Kylie M. Smith, and Priscilla Robinson. 2016. Surveillance,
Responsibility and Control: An Analysis of Government and Industry Discourses About ‘Problem’
and ‘Responsible’ Gambling. Addiction Research and Theory 24 (2): 163–176. https:// doi. org/ 10.
3109/ 16066 359. 2015. 10940 60.
Montalbano, Kathryn. 2018. Government Surveillance of Religious Expression. Government Surveillance
of Religious Expression: Mormons, Quakers, and Muslims in the United States. Routledge Studies
in Religion. New York : Routledge. https:// doi. org/ 10. 4324/ 97813 15141 961.
Muir, Lorna. 2015. Transparent Fictions: Big Data, Information and the Changing Mise-En-Scène of
(Government and) Surveillance. Surveillance and Society 13 (3/4): 354–369. https:// doi. org/ 10.
24908/ ss. v13i3/4. 5378.
Nam, Taewoo. 2019. What Determines the Acceptance of Government Surveillance? Examining the
Influence of Information Privacy Correlates. The Social Science Journal 56 (4): 530–544. https://
doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. soscij. 2018. 10. 001.
O’Connor, Alexander J., and Farhana Jahan. 2014. Under Surveillance and Overwrought: American Mus-
lims’ Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Government Surveillance. Journal of Muslim Mental
Health 8 (1): 95–106. https:// doi. org/ 10. 3998/ jmmh. 10381 607. 0008. 106.
Rajamaki, Jyri, Juha Knuuttila, Harri Ruoslahti, Jouni Viitanen, and Pasi Patama. 2015. Transparent Sur-
veillance of Suspects for Building Trust Between Citizens and Their Governments. In 2015 Euro-
pean Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, 2015, 181–181. IEEE. https:// doi. org/ 10.
1109/ EISIC. 2015. 31.
Rider, Karina. 2018. The Privacy Paradox: How Market Privacy Facilitates Government Surveillance.
Information, Communication and Society 21 (10): 1369–1385. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 13691 18X.
2017. 13145 31.
Robis, Leah Angela. 2014. When Does Public Interest Justify Government Interference and Surveillance?
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 15 (1–2): 203–218. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1163/
15718 158- 15010 209.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1462
M.Školník, M.Haman
Ryan, Mary K. 2018. Government Surveillance: Racism and Civic Virtue in the United States. In Surveil-
lance, Race, Culture, ed. Susan Flynn and Antonia Mackay, 43–59. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ 978-3- 319- 77938-6_3.
Slobogin, Christopher. 2017. Legislative Regulation of Government Surveillance. In The Cambridge
Handbook of Surveillance Law, ed. David Gray and Stephen E. Henderson, 597–622. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1017/ 97813 16481 127. 026.
Snijders, Tom A B., and Roel J. Bosker. 1996. Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and
Advanced Multilevel Modeling. London: SAGE.
Thompson, Nik, Tanya McGill, Anna Bunn, and Rukshan Alexander. 2020. Cultural Factors and the Role
of Privacy Concerns in Acceptance of Government Surveillance. Journal of the Association for
Information Science and Technology 71 (9): 1129–1142. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1002/ asi. 24372.
Tryfonas, Theo, Michael Carter, Tom Crick, and Panagiotis Andriotis. 2016. Mass Surveillance in Cyber-
space and the Lost Art of Keeping a Secret. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Sub-
series Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9750),
174–185. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ 978-3- 319- 39381-0_ 16.
Walden, Gwen I. 2006. Who’s Watching Us Now? The Nonprofit Sector and the New Government by
Surveillance. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 35 (4): 715–720. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/
08997 64006 289767.
Xu, Heng, and Tamara Dinev. 2012. The Security-Liberty Balance: Individuals’ Attitudes Towards
Internet Government Surveillance. Electronic Government, an International Journal 9 (1): 46–63.
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1504/ EG. 2012. 044778.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Terms and Conditions
Springer Nature journal content, brought to you courtesy of Springer Nature Customer Service Center
GmbH (“Springer Nature”).
Springer Nature supports a reasonable amount of sharing of research papers by authors, subscribers
and authorised users (“Users”), for small-scale personal, non-commercial use provided that all
copyright, trade and service marks and other proprietary notices are maintained. By accessing,
sharing, receiving or otherwise using the Springer Nature journal content you agree to these terms of
use (“Terms”). For these purposes, Springer Nature considers academic use (by researchers and
students) to be non-commercial.
These Terms are supplementary and will apply in addition to any applicable website terms and
conditions, a relevant site licence or a personal subscription. These Terms will prevail over any
conflict or ambiguity with regards to the relevant terms, a site licence or a personal subscription (to
the extent of the conflict or ambiguity only). For Creative Commons-licensed articles, the terms of
the Creative Commons license used will apply.
We collect and use personal data to provide access to the Springer Nature journal content. We may
also use these personal data internally within ResearchGate and Springer Nature and as agreed share
it, in an anonymised way, for purposes of tracking, analysis and reporting. We will not otherwise
disclose your personal data outside the ResearchGate or the Springer Nature group of companies
unless we have your permission as detailed in the Privacy Policy.
While Users may use the Springer Nature journal content for small scale, personal non-commercial
use, it is important to note that Users may not:
use such content for the purpose of providing other users with access on a regular or large scale
basis or as a means to circumvent access control;
use such content where to do so would be considered a criminal or statutory offence in any
jurisdiction, or gives rise to civil liability, or is otherwise unlawful;
falsely or misleadingly imply or suggest endorsement, approval , sponsorship, or association
unless explicitly agreed to by Springer Nature in writing;
use bots or other automated methods to access the content or redirect messages
override any security feature or exclusionary protocol; or
share the content in order to create substitute for Springer Nature products or services or a
systematic database of Springer Nature journal content.
In line with the restriction against commercial use, Springer Nature does not permit the creation of a
product or service that creates revenue, royalties, rent or income from our content or its inclusion as
part of a paid for service or for other commercial gain. Springer Nature journal content cannot be
used for inter-library loans and librarians may not upload Springer Nature journal content on a large
scale into their, or any other, institutional repository.
These terms of use are reviewed regularly and may be amended at any time. Springer Nature is not
obligated to publish any information or content on this website and may remove it or features or
functionality at our sole discretion, at any time with or without notice. Springer Nature may revoke
this licence to you at any time and remove access to any copies of the Springer Nature journal content
which have been saved.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, Springer Nature makes no warranties, representations or
guarantees to Users, either express or implied with respect to the Springer nature journal content and
all parties disclaim and waive any implied warranties or warranties imposed by law, including
merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose.
Please note that these rights do not automatically extend to content, data or other material published
by Springer Nature that may be licensed from third parties.
If you would like to use or distribute our Springer Nature journal content to a wider audience or on a
regular basis or in any other manner not expressly permitted by these Terms, please contact Springer
Nature at
onlineservice@springernature.com