Content uploaded by Vicente Lima Crisóstomo
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Vicente Lima Crisóstomo on Oct 16, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
A preview of the PDF is not available
Política de inversión, restricciones financieras y estructura de propiedad. Teoría y Evidencia empírica para Brasil
Abstract
Esta tesis investiga si la empresa brasileña sufre restricciones financieras y si la estructura de propiedad interfiere en ello. Las implicaciones empíricas son caracterizadas por un modelo dinámico de inversión basado en la Ecuación de Euler. Para una muestra de empresas no financieras cotizadas en la BOVESPA (Bolsa de Valores do Estado de São Paulo) en el período 1995-2006 los resultados han mostrado que la empresa brasileña encara restricciones financieras, tanto para invertir en activo inmovilizado material como en innovación. Además, algunos aspectos de la estructura de propiedad, notadamente, la presencia de un accionista mayoritario o la fuerte presencia de otra empresa no financiera, una familia o el gobierno, se han mostrado capaces de influir positivamente en la reducción de la intensidad con que se manifiestan las dificultades de financiación externa Departamento de Economía Financiera y Contabilidad
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
This paper argues that the slowdown in labor productivity growth that has occurred since 1968 and particularly since 1973 has probably been caused by a decline in the services of capital and labor relative to the measured quantities of these inputs. There is enough suggestive evidence of a decrease in effective labor input relative to measured labor hours to attribute about one-seventh of the productivity growth decline to this source. These effects have been concentrated outside the main manufacturing and industrial sectors. The most important cause of the growth slowdown in recent years seems to be a decline in the services of capital, caused by obsolescence and by the diversion of some part of capital spending to saving energy or product conversion. According to the model in this paper, conventional estimates based on the measured capital stock overstated the rate of total factor productivity growth through the mid-1960s, and the steady-state productivity growth rate of the US economy is lower than has been thought. Thus some part of the recent productivity slow-down is simply a return to the long-run steady-state path. An implication of this paper is that investment may do more to improve productivity growth than a coventional analysismore » predicts. There is an important qualification to this conclusion. We will gain little by adding substantially to the growth rate of gross output if we add little to output net of economic depreciation. The payoff to investment will be exceptionally large provided that new capital can avoid the problem of obsolescence that slowed productivity during the past decade. 64 references, 6 tables.« less
This paper has as its main objective to measure the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights of limited liability companies in Brazil. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 602 companies that in 2001 complied with the mandatory requirement of filing to the CVM.
This paper investigates whether the recent wave of corporate restructuring in the United States has had a negative impact on research arid development investment by industrial firms. Using a newly constructed sample of about 2500 manufacturing firms from 1974 to 1987, I examine three major classes of restructuring events: leveraged buyouts and other "going private" transactions, mergers and acquisitions in general, and substantial increases in leverage.The major conclusions are first, that leveraged buyouts do not occur in R&D-intensive sectors or firms and cannot therefore be having much of an impact on R&D spending; rather, the evidence seems consistent with an agency cost and cash flow-driven model of buyouts. Second, major increases in leverage are followed by substantial declines in the R&D intensity of the firms in question, and the effect takes at least three years to work through. Finally, although the evidence on acquisitions by publicly traded firms is mixed, the basic conclusion is that any declines in the R&D intensity of acquiring firms relative to their past history appear to be associated with the leverage structure of the transaction rather than the acquisition itself.
The growth of young, technology-based firms has received considerable attention in the literature given their importance for the generation and creation of economic wealth. Taking a strategic management perspective, we link the entrepreneurial strategy deployed by young, technology-based firms with firm growth. In line with recent research, we consider both revenue and employment growth as they reflect different underlying value creation processes. Using a unique European dataset of research-based spin-offs, we find that firms emphasizing a product and hybrid strategy are positively associated with growth in revenues. The latter strategy also has a positive influence on the creation of additional employment. Contrary to expectation, however, we find that firms pursuing a technology strategy do not grow fast in employment. Our study sheds new light on the relationship between entrepreneurial strategy and firm growth in revenues and employment.
I analyze the effect of ownership structure and bank control on performance. I employ a unique data set of 715 German takeovers to test whether group structure, large shareholders, and bank control affect their value to shareholders. First, I find that takeovers increase bidder value, but generally not that of the business group surrounding it. Second, majority owners provide no clear benefit. Third, bank control is only beneficial if it is counter-balanced by another large shareholder. Fourth, the worst takeovers are completed by firms that are majority-controlled by financial institutions.
The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
Many observers of the corporate restructuring that reached major proportions in the United States in the 1980s have believed that the market for corporate control had a serious negative impact on companies' long-term investment, which in turn contributed to the United State's decline in global competitiveness. In the following study, the author looks carefully at the effects of financial restructurings on investment, especially at expenditures on R&D, in a large set of companies categorized according to their level of technology and the length of their investment horizon. She then compares the U.S. situation with that in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. She concludes that, though many such events occasioned no change at all in investment strategies, restructuring pressures and declines in investment tended to concentrate in certain industries. She also finds that investment decisions were usually rational, given high interest rates and a tax environment that favored debt over equity.