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Constrained economic policy in Italy’s dual-hybrid economy
Abstract
This article examines recent developments in Italy's economic and fiscal policymaking. It does so by contextualising the 2023 changes in the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) within three broader aspects which have characterised the Italian political economy: (1) the country's conservative fiscal trajectory inside the monetary union (EMU); (2) the expansionary economic policies pursued in the face of both the pandemic and energy crises; (3) the peculiar characteristics of Italy's 'dual-hybrid economy'. The article posits that, since the EMU, Italy has continuously run primary budget surpluses higher than its EMU peers. Only since Covid-19, and with the relaxation of EMU constraints, has Italy's fiscal stance turned expansionary. This has allowed space for various socioeconomic policies to partially shield households and firms from the crises' fallout. However, with a return to fiscal conservatism, the NRRP now represents the only game in town to try and address Italy's dual hybridity characterised by weak state capacity and supply-side institutional inconsistencies as well as two diametrically opposed regional growth regimes in the North and the South.
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Comparative political economy scholarship struggles to categorise Italy’s model of capitalism between a mixed-market economy and a hybrid, stagnant economic system. To enhance our understanding of the Italian political economy, this article employs the analytical framework of growth regimes to study Italy’s regional economic systems. Our analysis indicates that Italy can hardly be defined as a ‘national growth regime’ due to the presence of two diametrically opposed regional growth regimes: Northern regions conform to a manufacturing-based, export-led growth regime supported by competitiveness-enhancing territorial institutions; southern regions conform to a particular variety of the consumption-led growth regime, that is, an administrative Keynesianism regime, which we theorise to typify a regime where growth and employment are systematically dependent on the state’s role of employer of last resort, the state’s consumption-enhancing social policies and economic forbearance of labour and corporate tax regulations. The article suggests that studying regional growth regimes is desirable when marked internal diversity in economic outcomes or productive structures exists across regions within (generally larger) countries, and when subnational governments have powers to develop major own institutions/policies in support of regional growth regimes.
Monetary and financial integration has been shown to increase the pressure on states to liberalize social and labor market policies. If structures do not come with instruction sheets, how do monetary regime pressures translate into policy? Through a case study of the euro area, we show that central banks play an underappreciated role in this process. Using mixed methods to analyze a large amount of data, including the complete corpus of speeches, we trace the evolution of the European Central Bank's advocacy for structural reforms between 1999 and 2019. To explain the ECB's activism in a policy area beyond its mandate, we theorize the ECB as navigating a dilemma between governability and legitimacy. Handed a monetary regime under which flexible labor markets were seen as a condition for governability, the ECB saw no alternative but to push governments toward structural reforms, despite the reputational risks. The ECB ended its advocacy when increasing political backlash coincided with a structural regime shift from an inflationary to a deflationary environment.
This special issue (SI) brings the industrial relations scholarship on the public sector into dialogue with the comparative political economy (CPE) literature on growth models/regimes. While the former has paid great attention to the public sector, in CPE the public sector has been analysed less, and mostly as subaltern to the export-sector’s actors, interests and institutions. We posit that the public sector matters for CPE in its own right for three reasons. First, the state remains today the single largest employer in virtually every European economy, providing incomes to a large segment of the middle class. Second, public employers’ wage bill – one of the largest items of governments’ current expenditures – is funded by the taxpayers. Hence, public sector wage policy is fiscal policy, ultimately pursued by public/political employers. Third, public employers are simultaneously public managers and political sovereigns acting in the shadow of hierarchy. Case-study contributions to the SI detail how these insights matter within different European growth regimes: (1) the Mediterranean demand-led growth regime (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal), (2) the German export-led growth regime, (3) the Nordic balanced growth regime (Denmark and Sweden) and (4) the FDI-led Eastern European growth regime (Czechia and Slovakia).
This paper analyzes how Italy’s decades-long decline turned the country into the Eurozone’s Achilles heel, the most vulnerable spot of the common currency. We use a new structuralist framework to synthesize different (competing) supply-side and demand-side explanations. We argue that structural domestic factors that were already present in the decades after World War II (‘original sins’) – low-cost competition and labour fragmentation, many small firms linked to low innovation, and a deep territorial divide – interacted with the policy constraints brought about by globalization and European integration to exacerbate Italy’s decline vis-à-vis its large Eurozone peers.
Despite being one of the world's major internationally traded services, tourism remains neglected within debates on European integration and growth models. We highlight the rise of tourism-led growth in Southern Europe. We argue that the process of European integration has been a double-edged sword, simultaneously incentivizing and forcing Southern European economies to reap their comparative advantage in tourism. While European integration has created the preconditions for the expansion of intra-European tourism, monetary integration pre-empts macroeconomic management. Since the Eurozone crisis, internal devaluation and fiscal austerity have suppressed the domestic growth drivers, inducing these governments towards an export-led growth strategy. We document the emergence of unprecedented tourism-related current account surpluses in Southern Europe, driven strongly by tourism imports from the EMU-core countries and the UK. Thus, while different types of export-led growth strategies now coexist in the EMU, Southern Europe's excessive reliance on international tourism for growth comes with severe pitfalls.
Public investment spending declined steadily in advanced economies during the last three decades. Germany is a case in point where the aggregate decline coincided with growing inequality in investments across districts. What explains the variation in local investment spending? We assembled a novel data set to investigate the effects of structural constraints and partisanship on German districts’ investment spending from 1995 to 2018. We find that the lack of fiscal and administrative capacity significantly influences local investment patterns. Yet, within these constraints, partisanship matters. Conservative politicians tend to prioritize public investment more than the left. This is especially the case when revenues from local taxes are low. As the fiscal conditions improve, left-wing politicians increase investment more strongly and hence the difference between the left and the right disappears. Our findings are indicative of how regional economic divergence can emerge even within cooperative federal systems and show that, even when decision-makers operate under various institutional and structural constraints, partisanship matters for how these actors allocate discretionary spending.
Italy was the first European democracy to be hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. The government’s response, especially in the first wave, was confused, dilatory and inadequate, and the country found itself in an unprecedented public health crisis, leading to a national lockdown between March and May. The easing of restrictions in May and an improved situation in the summer did not prevent cases rising again from the autumn onwards, and Italy finished the year in a series of mini-lockdowns. The government was confronted with a debate over Italy’s high death toll and the role of the executive’s own failings in it. Yet, the pandemic did not prompt a political crisis. Rather, it had the effect of blunting the frontal opposition of the League and strengthening the standing of the government with the public. This especially applied to the Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, whose personal ratings soared, as the public rallied behind a leader facing the greatest challenge of any peacetime Italian prime minister.
Housing and mortgage markets sit at the intersection of growth regimes and the welfare state, as they are engines for economic growth and fulfill important social functions. This chapter shows how the different linkages between housing finance, the welfare state, and growth regimes shape the ways in which policy-makers utilize housing finance policies as growth strategies. In demand-led economies relying on credit and consumption, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, policy-makers can utilize fiscal, off-budget, and monetary policies as “financialized” growth strategies to stimulate housing demand, credit, and consumption. Countries based on export manufacturing, such as Germany, are complementary to conservative housing finance policies that restrain housing and domestic demand to secure cost competitiveness. To illustrate these arguments, the chapter details the contrasting political developments of housing finance policies as growth strategies in the United States and Germany since the 1970s.
The economic decline of Italy between the mid-1990s and the outset of the financial crisis is a critical case in European political economy because its model of capitalism was deeply reformed at the time when its decline commenced. This paper argues that the Italian economic stagnation cannot be attributed to the lack of market-friendly reforms in a globalized economic context, as argued by previous literature. Instead, Italian economic decline is a consequence of institutional change which on the one hand has destroyed previous institutional complementarities, and on the other hand has led to an incoherent, or ‘hybrid,’ capitalist setting. Under the lenses of the Varieties of Capitalism approach, this paper reviews the main reforms in the fields of corporate governance and finance as well as in the labor market. It shows that such reforms established new institutions alternatively apt to support both strategic coordination and market coordination, resulting in institutional incoherence, and mixed incentives. In the short-run, incoherent reforms have reduced the availability of capital to SMEs; in the longer-run, they failed to give actors incentives to pursue innovation. This paper contributes theories of economic growth/decline focused on the supply-side of the economy and it is compatible with other – non-rival – explanations focused on the demand-side.
With the reforms of the so-called ‘Jobs Act’ (JA), Italy aimed to structurally reform its labour market and income-support system, through recalibration (i.e. a mix of both expansionary and retrenching measures) for old social policy risks, and some expansionary measures to face new social risks. The JA also became the symbol of opposite views about the Italian welfare state, being itself a reason for ideological conflict and coalition reshuffling in the Italian left. Ultimately, its increasing personalization around Renzi’s divisive figure detracted from its functional and substantive matter. Hence, the JA reform provides an unparalleled vantage point to investigate the role of narrative stories in shaping policy contents and reforms. The paper aims to contribute to the literature on social policy reforms by combining a focus on narrative stories with the analytical perspective of the Multiple Stream Framework. Through qualitative analysis of official documents, of more than 500 newspaper articles and of selected in-depth interviews to key informants, this paper reconstructs the narratives about the JA reform, considering both the supporters and the challengers. Building on the Multiple Stream Framework, the paper focuses in particular on whether and how policy entrepreneurs took advantage of windows of opportunity by shaping the narrative stories. Results are twofold. First, the paper shows the variations of social policy reform narratives across actors. Second, it demonstrates the crucial role of policy entrepreneurs in shaping narrative stories as a strategy to couple the streams of problem, policy and politics.
This paper develops an analytical approach to comparative political economy that focuses on the relative importance of different components of aggregate demand—in the first instance, exports and household consumption—and dynamic relations among the “demand drivers” of growth. We illustrate this approach by comparing patterns of economic growth in Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom over the period 1994–2007. Our discussion emphasizes that export-led growth and consumption-led growth have different implications for distributive conflict.
This article shows the relevance of implicit conditionality in the eurozone crisis, that is, conditionality based on an implicit understanding of the stakes and sanctions involved, underlain by some measure of power asymmetry. The concept of implicit conditionality is applied to the reconstruction of Italy’s sovereign debt crisis, and the structural – pension and labour market – reforms introduced by the Monti government, following requests from the European Union (EU). Actual or potential access to EU financial support – carried out through purchase of Italy’s bonds to alleviate market tensions on its debt – was the carrot. The threat of having to enter formalized, explicit conditional lending programmes with the International Monetary Fund in order to avoid default was the stick. Market discipline was the operating mechanism that made implicit conditionality effective, and the role of monitoring by the EU was pervasive. Developments described in this article seem to support a revitalization of the fusion hypothesis between EU and member states – at least in the eurozone.
The article has two objectives. First, it explores whether the Italian model of capitalism has been transformed in recent decades. This involves trying to place the Italian case in the framework established by the varieties of capitalism literature. It argues that while Italian capitalism has undergone significant changes, it has not become a form of either market or co-ordinated capitalism. As a form of 'dysfunctional' state capitalism, it has adopted and mimicked elements of both without becoming either. This is because many of the political and economic factors that were at the heart of the model in the post-war era remain in place. Second, it will argue that the role of European integration in this process of change has been, at best, indirect and that broader global and economic pressures may be responsible for change.
This chapter holds that in Mediterranean countries, the state is considered to play an active interventionist role to compensate for the weaknesses of institutional arrangements or complementarities. As a result, the state is a significant driver of the development of capitalism. The chapter highlights that Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece underwent different trajectories of administrative reform that have produced different outcomes in terms of improvement of the state policy capacities. It examines the states' performance and policy capacity across Southern Europe and presents data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators to show the diachronic evolution of the four countries with respect to two relevant indicators: quality of governance and governance effectiveness. Then it compares the driving factors and performance of administrative reforms in the region. By focusing on the differences in the paths followed by these economies, the chapter aims to push the reasoning a step forward toward a deeper analysis of the destiny of the four states as well as their dividing in terms of varieties of capitalism.
This chapter investigates the political dynamics that hinder social investment reform in Southern Europe. It does that by providing an in-depth analysis of the Italian case. Between 2013 and 2018, a window of opportunity for social investment opened up in Italy, when center-left governments sought to garner support among upper-middle classes. However, the final reform output was a mix of non–social investment strategies: market liberalism (labor market deregulation) and social protectionism (compensatory cash transfers took priority over policies to enhance human capital or work–family reconciliation). The turn away from a social investment strategy was driven by two political supply-side factors: EU pressures for internal devaluation and national party competition favoring compensatory measures for lower-middle classes in the presence of a divided center-left and rising challenger parties. After the 2018 elections, the League and the Five Star Movement formed a government that promoted full-blown social protectionism.
As one of the greatest beneficiaries of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) recovery package, and given its low past absorption capacity of European Structural and Investment Funds and lacklustre implementation rates of Country-Specific Recommendations within the European Semester, in 2022, Italy is at the centre of the attention of its European partners. What are the chances of success of the Mediterranean country, which has disproportionately suffered from the fallouts of the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 pan-demic? The article tries to assess the odds by looking at the Italian case from two perspectives. First, it evaluates Italy's past performance in light of the several modifications to the conditionality that underpins the NGEU's Recovery and Resilience Facility. Second, it elaborates on the implications of the governance structure introduced by Mario Draghi's government to implement Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan. The evaluation yields mixed results. Considering that several-but not all-aspects of EU conditionality have been strengthened, this may force Italy, as much as other member states, more closely to follow supranational recommendations. Yet, the risk that path-dependent shortcomings in the reform and absorption capacity of the country may prevail is great. Moreover, the new, very centralized governance structure may generate implementation problems, as sub-national actors have been somehow side-lined, against European advice.
Southern European countries have always been a problem in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework. In particular, the Old Southern Fours (OSFs), together with France and Turkey, have been characterized by a hybrid type of capitalism. According to Hall and Soskice (2001, 21), “they may constitute another type of capitalism, sometimes described as 'Mediterranean', marked by a large agrarian sector and recent histories of extensive state intervention that have left them with specific kinds of capacities for nonmarket coordination in the sphere of corporate finance but more liberal arrangements in the sphere of labor relations”. Thus, these four countries appear to be different from liberal market economies (LMEs), in which there is arm's-length interaction among market actors and the State behaves as a distant regulator, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), in which the State matters greatly since it plays the role of active promoter. In the four Mediterranean countries, the State is considered to play an active interventionist role to compensate for the weaknesses of institutional arrangements/complementarities. As a result, the State is a significant driver of the development of capitalism.
Thus, economies embodying this third type of capitalism have been variously called mixed market economies (MMEs) (Molina & Rhodes, 2008; Featherstone, 2008; Hopkin and Blyth, 2012; Paraskevopoulos 2017) or state-influenced market economies (SMEs) (Schmidt 2007). This hybrid type of capitalism is characterized by a high level of “statism” in the political economy due to the weaknesses of institutional conditions. At the same time, the high grade of statism does not guarantee effective policies that compensate for institutional weaknesses. From this point of view, then, statism has not been capable of ensuring some form of coordination to ensure the needed institutional complementarities. The State has been particularly weak in guaranteeing three pivotal drivers when the quality of government is assessed: (i) government effectiveness; (ii) bureaucratic efficiency; and (iii) regulatory quality (Rothstein, 2012; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). It could be said, then, that the hybrid type of capitalism is characterized by a paradox: the need for active statism in the presence of a weak state is clearly represented by the inefficient and often ineffective performance of the related public administration. Thus, exactly where there is the need for dense and deep intervention by the State, the State has been as weak, ineffective, inefficient, and often characterized by particularistic, rather than universalistic, actions. As is well known, a full Weberian state did not develop before the beginning of the democratization process, and this fact has been the cause of porosity and a lack of resistance with respect to the invasion of new democratic political élites (Morlino 1998). Thus, as described by some seminal studies (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Kickert, 2007 and 2011; Ongaro, 2010a), in Southern Europe, the State has been characterized by recurrent evidence of (i) centralism; (ii) political control over bureaucracy; (iii) lack of reputable administrative elites; (iv) party patronage and clientelism in personnel recruitment (including a conservative role played by public sector unions); (v) legalism rooted in the Napoleonic tradition, complemented by informal shadow governance structures; (vi) uneven distribution of resources; (vii) institutional fragmentation; and (viii) insufficient mechanisms for policy coordination (Barzelay and Gallego, 2010). These common characteristics had driven us to emphasize the trajectories and the results of the common efforts toward pursuing administrative reforms as very similar. However, as we will see, not necessarily similar conditions of departure lead to common results.
It is not a case, for example, that even if they are very similar with respect to the role of the State and the characteristics of public administration (as well other social, cultural and economic aspects), the OSFs also experienced relevant differences in the timing of democratization and in their political systems and decentralization. Thus, we could expect that some differences should have developed over time in the role and characteristics of the State and its contribution to expediting the modernization and development of these countries.
Furthermore, inefficient state action is a common problem that has often appeared in the policy and political agendas of these countries. The idea that the State, its bureaucracy and the features of policy making should be reformed has always been very high on the agendas of all four countries. Thus, these countries’ public administrations have been targets of repeated attempts at reform. For instance, since 2010, all four countries have shared the commonality of external pressures promoting State reforms in light of fiscal crises (Ongaro, 2010a). While regarding Greece, this fact has been documented by a steep path of provisions enacted by the central government to adjust the public sector to financial needs (Featherstone, 2015:301), similar evidence is not available for all remaining three. However, in general, the prevalent and diffused poor performing that induced the fiscal crisis is well displayed by financial indicators and the subsequent recommendations provided by the EU and the World Bank. As a result, reforms have been adopted in light of different contingencies and with different intensities but are uniformly associated with financial indicators (e.g., the spread).
These attempts at reform have obviously tried to remove the obstacles to a more strongly performing role for the State in the related socioeconomic systems and thus to render it more coherent and congruent with respect to the need for systemic coordination. Overall, the comparative literature has substantially agreed on the OSFs not only having a common Napoleonic tradition but also having modernized in very similar ways with very similar results (Sotiropoulos 2004; Ongaro 2010b; Kickert 2011). Thus, the contribution of public administrations to the socioeconomic development of these countries and to the transformation of the forms of national capitalism have been very poor or negative. However, is this statement completely true? Have these countries developed similar administrative reforms with similar timing and similar targets? Have these four states changed in very similar ways in terms of centralization/decentralization and roles in public policies? Are the national bureaucracies so politicized that they impede the effective neutrality/proactivity of state intervention? Finally, are the results of the diachronic evolution of the four states truly as similar as argued by the literature?
As we will show in this chapter, the response to these questions will not confirm, unlike the literature that has underlined and emphasized the similarities among the OSFs, that they underwent different trajectories of administrative reform that have produced different outcomes in terms of improvement of the state policy capacities. Portugal emerges to have developed a very deliberate and effective trajectory that has allowed the country to significantly improve its State policy capacity. Spain has reached some improvement despite institutional resilience and conflictual intergovernmental relations, while Italy has not been capable of improving its weak policy capacity due to the schizophrenic oscillation of the reforms (Italy). Finally, Greece has not been capable at all of improving its original very weak State policy capacity due to a substantial lack of real attempts to improve administration performance.
Growth and Welfare in Advanced Capitalist Economies takes stock of the major economic challenges that advanced industrial democracies have faced since the early 1990s and the responses by governments to them. It has three goals: firstly, to further our understanding of how political economies have transformed over the past decades; secondly, to analyse the contribution of governments to these changes, by looking at their growth strategies and thirdly, to highlight and analyse the role of the reforms of welfare systems in this transformative change.In a nutshell, this book maps and provides general understanding of the evolution of growth regimes in advanced capitalist countries. It identifies five main growth regimes in contemporary advanced capitalist economies (three export-led and two domestic demand-led ones). To do so the book combines a supply side approach to economic growth as advocated by the Varieties of Capitalism Literature (OUP, 2001) with a demand side perspective as the recent discussion on growth models has exemplified. It argues that all political economies consist of growth regimes, which are based on a set of institutions that shape the supply side of the economy as well as on demand drivers such as government spending and private consumption. Both supply and demand are heavily shaped by the welfare state which provides for skills through education systems and stimulates demand through high social spending and private pension funds. The book focuses on the analysis of welfare reforms as growth strategies pursued by governments in an era characterised by financialization and the rise of the knowledge economy.
This book offers an interpretation of Italy’s decline, which began two decades before the Great Recession. It argues that its deeper roots lie in the political economy of growth. This interpretation is illustrated through a discussion of Italy’s political and economic history since its unification, in 1861. The emphasis is placed on the country’s convergence to the productivity frontier and TFP performance, and on the evolution of its social order and institutions. The lens through which its history is reviewed, to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, is drawn from institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory. It is exemplified by analysing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: An opportunistic one-employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods-and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The book follows the gradual setting in of this spiral, despite an ambitious attempt at institutional reform, in 1962-4, and its resumption after a severe endogenous shock, in 1992-4. It concludes that innovative ideas can overcome the constraints posed by that spiral, and ease the country’s shift onto a fairer and more efficient equilibrium.
Applying the new economics of organization and relational theories of the firm to the problem of understanding cross‐national variation in the political economy, this volume elaborates a new understanding of the institutional differences that characterize the ‘varieties of capitalism’ found among the developed economies. Building on a distinction between ‘liberal market economies’ and ‘coordinated market economies’, it explores the impact of these variations on economic performance and many spheres of policy‐making, including macroeconomic policy, social policy, vocational training, legal decision‐making, and international economic negotiations. The volume examines the institutional complementarities across spheres of the political economy, including labour markets, markets for corporate finance, the system of skill formation, and inter‐firm collaboration on research and development that reinforce national equilibria and give rise to comparative institutional advantages, notably in the sphere of innovation where LMEs are better placed to sponsor radical innovation and CMEs to sponsor incremental innovation. By linking managerial strategy to national institutions, the volume builds a firm‐centred comparative political economy that can be used to assess the response of firms and governments to the pressures associated with globalization. Its new perspectives on the welfare state emphasize the role of business interests and of economic systems built on general or specific skills in the development of social policy. It explores the relationship between national legal systems, as well as systems of standards setting, and the political economy. The analysis has many implications for economic policy‐making, at national and international levels, in the global age.
VoC theory seems to be caught in a trade-off between parsimony and explanatory capacity. It provides high heuristic value-added for analysing countries where performance-enhancing complementarities rely on clearly different patterns of actor interaction and forms of coordination. It appears more difficult to extend to 'deviant' cases where there is a mix of logics, a high degree of institutional incoherence and an apparent absence of complementarities. This chapter uses the tools of VoC to explain how mechanisms of market and non-market coordination work and change over time in two 'mixed market economies' (MMEs) - Italy and Spain. It focuses on the relationship between production regimes and welfare systems, and specifically the wage-labour nexus and employment protection. In contrast to arguments for a distinctive form of state capitalism alongside 'market' and 'managed' varieties, this chapter argues that the state's role is distinctive but not unique in the Mediterranean countries, and has also undergone considerable change in recent years. It also argues that two different trends can be perceived in these countries: the growth of 'autonomous coordination' in which actors seek to manage the economy via new kinds of non-market governance; and 'market colonization', a process whereby market modes of coordination emerge and prevail.
The Italian economy is often said to be on a declining path. In this paper, we document that: (i) Italy’s current decline is a labor productivity problem (ii) the labor productivity slowdown stems from declining productivity growth in all industries but utilities (with manufacturing contributing for about one half of the reduction) and diminished inter-industry reallocation of workers from agriculture to market services; (iii) the labor productivity slowdown has been mostly driven by declining TFP, with roughly unchanged capital deepening. The only mild decline of capital deepening is due to the rise in the value added share of capital that counteracted declining capital accumulation.
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