Public support for withdrawal from international organizations: Experimental evidence from the US

Abstract

The United States has helped create and lead many international organizations (IOs). Yet in the last six years, the US announced its withdrawal from several IOs including the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Universal Postal Union. Do Americans care about US withdrawals from IOs? When do Americans support withdrawing from IOs and support candidates who propose this? We argue that Americans’ support for multilateralism tends to divide along party lines, and that IO withdrawal can activate those preferences. We also argue that framing an IO withdrawal as benefiting US national interests can make Americans more likely to favor IO exit. Data from four US survey experiments during the 2016–2020 Trump administration support these arguments. Democrats tend to oppose IO withdrawals while Republicans tend to support them. Further, results show that IO withdrawal (and how it is framed) affects candidate choice and policy support. This suggests that announcing IO withdrawal can be used to rally domestic electoral support. Still, the data also show that a large proportion of the US public values remaining in IOs, even when IOs are imperfect or challenging. In these cases, we note that sunk cost fallacies, status quo bias, and loss aversion may pose friction points for supporting withdrawal. Our findings have important implications for research on public opinion about international cooperation, backlash against IOs, and their life cycles.

Full text

Vol.:(0123456789)
The Review of International Organizations (2024) 19:809–845
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09539-2
1 3
SI: LIFE CYCLES OFINTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Public support forwithdrawal frominternational
organizations: Experimental evidence fromtheUS
InkenvonBorzyskowski1· FelicityVabulas2
Accepted: 18 February 2024 / Published online: 8 April 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Abstract
The United States has helped create and lead many international organizations (IOs).
Yet in the last six years, the US announced its withdrawal from several IOs includ-
ing the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Universal Postal Union. Do
Americans care about US withdrawals from IOs? When do Americans support with-
drawing from IOs and support candidates who propose this? We argue that Ameri-
cans’ support for multilateralism tends to divide along party lines, and that IO with-
drawal can activate those preferences. We also argue that framing an IO withdrawal
as benefiting US national interests can make Americans more likely to favor IO exit.
Data from four US survey experiments during the 2016–2020Trump administration
support these arguments. Democrats tend to oppose IO withdrawals while Republi-
cans tend to support them. Further, results show that IO withdrawal (and how it is
framed) affects candidate choice and policy support. This suggests that announcing
IO withdrawal can be used to rally domestic electoral support. Still, the data also
show that a large proportion of the US public values remaining in IOs, even when
IOs are imperfect or challenging. In these cases, we note that sunk cost fallacies, sta-
tus quo bias, and loss aversion may pose friction points for supporting withdrawal.
Our findings have important implications for research on public opinion about inter-
national cooperation, backlash against IOs, and their life cycles.
Keywords International organization· Member states· Globalization·
Multilateralism· International political economy· International relations
JEL Classification F020· F500· F530· F550
Responsible editor: Axel Dreher
Author contribution The order of authors is alphabetical.I.B. 50% conceptualization and design,
data collection, empirical analysis, writing. F.V. 50% conceptualization and design, data collection,
empirical analysis, writing.
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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Since the global order was established after World War II, the US has been an
important founder and supporter of many international organizations (IOs). US
leadership in IOs has been important – yet the US has also been the most frequent
withdrawer from IOs (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). Successive US govern-
ments have raised the possibility of withdrawing from IOs they created or joined
(Birdsall & Sanders, 2020). For example, the Carter administration withdrew from
the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1977 (ILO, 1975) and the Reagan
administration withdrew from UNESCO in 1984 (Washington Post, 1984). During
his 2016–2020 administration, President Trump announced that the US would with-
draw from several IOs including the World Health Organization (WHO), UNESCO,
and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and publicly threatened to withdraw from
NATO, NAFTA, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Davis, 2021; von Bor-
zyskowski & Vabulas, 2023).
It is therefore important to understand Americans’ preferences for IO withdrawal at a
time when the US government was announcing it would remove itself from major IOs.
While US politicians announce and justify IO membership withdrawals to the Ameri-
can public, underscoring their political salience, we know little about the conditions
under which the US public supports or opposesIO withdrawals. Current research pro-
vides limited insights for two reasons. First, much of the existing IO public opinion
scholarship focuses on what drives support for joining and participating in IOs (Bearce
& Jolliff Scott, 2019; Edwards, 2009; Inglehart, 1970). Nonetheless, public opinion
related to IO withdrawal may not simply manifest as the opposite of supporting IO
membership because withdrawal needs to overcome friction points such as sunk cost
fallacies, status quo bias, and loss aversion. We thus contend that IO withdrawal is a
separate analytical category to opposingIO membership. Second, previous scholarship
is largely limited to Brexit and Euro-skepticism (De Vries, 2018; Walter, 2021a). While
these previous studies have examined European and British public opinion related to
Brexit, we do not know whether findings generalize to US public opinion or to other IO
withdrawals beyond Brexit. Understanding the preconditions for hegemonic withdrawal
can also contribute to our understanding of the life cycles of IOs (Gray, 2024) and of
IO vitality more broadly (Gray, 2018). Because withdrawals can impact the system of
international law (Schmidt, 2024, this issue; Eilstrup & Verdier, 2024, this issue), it is
important to understand support for them among mass publics.
This paper asks: under what conditions does the US public support or oppose
IO withdrawals and what factors shape those opinions? Moreover, does IO with-
drawal policy matter for choosing political candidates? First, we argue that US pub-
lic opinion about IO withdrawal is based on Americans’ support for – or opposition
to – multilateralism, which divides along partisan lines (Milner & Tingley, 2013,
2015). Announcing an IO withdrawal can activate partisan preferences on multilat-
eralism even when voters know little about the IO itself. Thus, Republicans (rather
than Democrats) should be more likely to favor withdrawing from IOs, all else equal.
Second, we argue that voters can become more supportive of an IO withdrawal
when exit is framed as an action that supports US national interests. This includes jus-
tifying an IO withdrawal as supporting US national security, minimizing US spending
abroad, or reducing the harms of globalization. Framing an IO withdrawal as affecting
US national interests may be influential (Chaudoin etal., 2010) because it can raise
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
withdrawal to the level of a national crisis where voters may rally ‘round the flag (Evers
etal., 2019; Oneal & Bryan, 1995). This framing may also help counterbalance the fric-
tion points/perceived costs associated with withdrawal (including sunk cost fallacies,
status quo bias/loss aversion, and a sense of loyalty) and instead emphasize that gains
are possible from an IO withdrawal when it directly benefits the US. A national interest
frame has been shown to affect EU voters’ assessments of EU disintegration because
voters know and care more about national topics than EU topics (Anderson, 1998; De
Vries, 2018; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Kritzinger, 2003; Rohrschneider, 2002; Sánchez-
Cuenca, 2000), lending credibility to a similar mechanism affecting US voters. Moreo-
ver, the US national interest frame can affect voters’ choice of candidates because IO
withdrawal can act as a heuristic that retrospective voters1 recall when they are evaluat-
ing politicians at the ballot box; IO withdrawal can be touted as a foreign policy accom-
plishment, which politicians can invoke during the next election campaign.
To test our two arguments – that (1) preferences for IO withdrawal generally
divide on partisan lines but that (2) politicians can move the needle on support for
IO withdrawal by framing it related to US national interests – we fielded four pre-
registered survey experiments. Two conjoint experiments assess whether Americans
care about candidates’ IO withdrawal announcements during election campaigns
and how much IO withdrawal policy matters for their choice of candidates com-
pared to other candidate policies and characteristics. Two vignette experiments test
whether framing IO withdrawals as addressing US national interests changes public
opinion on US withdrawals.
The results support our arguments and provide the first experimental evidence on
what drives US public opinion about withdrawing from IOs. The conjoint experiments
show that voters care about IO withdrawals. Moreover, IO withdrawal policy can sub-
stantively influence respondents’ choice of political candidates. As expected, these
effects are distinctly partisan: candidates who advocate withdrawing from imperfect
IOs are likely to garner support from Republicans but lose support among Democrats.
Second, the vignette experiments show how support for IO withdrawal can change:
framing IO withdrawals as advancing US national interests can help increase Ameri-
cans’ support for IO exit. This effect is mainly driven by independents. We also find
some support that it is the US national interest frame and not just any frame by com-
paring to a placebo. Together, we show that Americans’ preferences regarding multi-
lateralism can be mobilized by invoking IO withdrawal and candidates can increase
support for IO withdrawal by framing exit as helping US national interests. Still, our
findings also show another important point: even when IOs create challenging envi-
ronments for the US, a large proportion of the US public still values remaining in
IOs. Even if the 2016–2020Trump administration advocated a “withdrawal doctrine”
(Haass, 2020), the US public was not capricious about IO withdrawal.
Our findings are important because while previous studies have shown that the
public sometimes evaluates realist foreign policy actions (i.e. the use of force) from
a US national interest perspective (Drezner, 2008), withdrawal from IOs is a dif-
ferent foreign policy action that has not previously been studied in the US context.
1 For a review on retrospective voting, see Healy & Malhotra, 2013.
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Indeed, a key takeaway is that the public can rethink the costs and benefits of with-
drawing from IOs when it is framed as being in theUS national interest. This is a
powerful finding since much of the IO literature emphasizes the cooperation gains
from membership. Our paper is also important for understanding domestic electoral
politics. While surveys have shown that many US voters do not know much about
IOs,2 that “few in the public have opinions on IOs,” (Guisinger & Saunders, 2017:
430) and that US public opinion plays little constraining role in foreign policy,3
other scholars see public opinion as playing an important role because it can limit
foreign policy actions (Aldrich etal., 1989; Baum, 2004; Campbell etal., 2003).4
We thereforebridge international relations scholarship—on when and why coun-
tries may not want to be a part of IOs—and American politics, showing the inter-
connectedness of framing, US public opinion, candidate choice, and IO withdrawal.
Our study is particularly important as many are trying to understand how US
retreats from IOs may affect international cooperation (Cooley & Nexon, 2020;
Copelovitch etal., 2020; Drezner, 2017; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Hofmann, 2020;
Lake etal., 2021; Walter, 2021c). It aligns with research showing that voters con-
sider IOs important (Jurado et al., 2022; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015; Brutger &
Clark, 2023; Council on Foreign Relations, 2019) and that how the public legiti-
mizes IOs is crucial for explaining public sentiment (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006;
Dellmuth, 2018; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2021; Dellmuth etal., 2022; Rauh & Zürn,
2020; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). While studies show that elite framing can help voters
assess IO legitimacy, we show that framing related to US national interests can also
shape public support for IO withdrawal. Our research also echoes recent scholar-
ship showing that elites can blame IOs for crises in order to gain domestic support
(Schlipphak, Meiners & Kiratli, 2022).
1 Withdrawal, public opinion, andinternational organizations
IO withdrawal occurs when a member state voluntarily removes itself from all con-
tractual obligations and legally terminates its membership. Withdrawal is not simply
the opposite of joining. Previous work has shown that only a few drivers of IO acces-
sion also influence IO withdrawal; these include a state’s preference alignment with
other members and democracy levels (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). States
withdraw by providing notice to the secretariat, then waiting an IO-specified times-
pan to execute the exit.5 While IO exits happen across time and states in different
2 For example, only 16 percent of college students said they had learned about international governmental
organizations in a college class (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). Only a slim majority of Americans
knew that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Pew Research
Center, 2022). In the same poll, only 58 percent of Americans knew that the USMCA replaced NAFTA.
3 “Conventional wisdom says that presidential elections aren’t won on foreign policy.” Smeltz etal.,
2019. See also Bearce & Cook, 2018; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017; NPR, 2019; Carpini & Keeter, 1996.
4 see also Schmidtke and Lenz, 2023, in this issue.
5 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties outlines withdrawal rules. https:// legal. un. org/ ilc/
texts/ instr uments/ engli sh/ conve ntions/ 1_1_ 1969. pdf
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
world regions, the US has been the most frequent IO withdrawer since 1945.6 Fig-
ure1 shows that Democratic administrations in the US have withdrawn almost as
often as Republican administrations (seven vs. six times) in the post-WWII era.7
Historically, leaving IOs is not a new phenomenon.
We examine US public opinion toward IO withdrawals, focusing on the
2016–2020 Trump administration, given the increased salience and discussion of
IO exit during that time (Cooley & Nexon, 2020; Drezner, 2020, 2022 (384), 2017;
Haass, 2020; Krieger, 2019). Some observers have noted thatthis Trump-era ofIO
exits and threats to withdraw signified a sea-change in commitment to multilateral
institutions after a steady march toward globalization, integration, and cooperation
(Shukla, 2020), and contrasts with long-term patterns of increasing membership in
IOs since World War II (Drezner, 2020, p. 397; Wright, 2016). While the US is only
one country, it has a unique role, status, and power in IOs, and has used this to rein-
force its hegemony.
The 2016–2020Trump administration arguably pursued a “withdrawal doctrine”
in foreign policy (Haass, 2020). During this time, the US withdrew from two formal
IOs and threatened to leave many others; it also raised the issue of withdrawal in
speeches to domestic audiences. In the autumn of 2016 alone, Presidential candidate
Trump mentioned withdrawing from IOs in at least eight campaign speeches. For
example, on 25 October 2016, Trump said “We will renegotiate NAFTA or with-
draw from the deal to get a much better one for our workers and our companies…”8
At the end of his first term, in his “Farewell Address to the Nation” on 19 January
2021 (and what some would term his first campaign speech for 2024), Trump also
discussed withdrawing from IOs, saying "We reclaimed our sovereignty by standing
up for America at the United Nations and withdrawing from the one-sided global
deals that never served our interests. And NATO countries are now paying hundreds
of billions of dollars more than when I arrived just a few years ago.”9
6 von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019: 342. The US has announced its withdrawal from IOs 14 times:
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea in 1919; INTERPOL in 1950; the Central Com-
mission for the Navigation of the Rhine in 1964; the International Labor Organization in 1975; the
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries in 1977; the International Tin Council in
1982; UNESCO in 1983; the International Coffee Organization in 1993; UNIDO and the World Tourism
Organization in 1995; the International Exhibitions Bureau in 2001; and the International Rubber Study
Group in 2011. And then again UNESCO in 2017 and International Coffee Organization in 2018.
7 Figure1 shows IO withdrawals in the year they were announced, omitting announcements that were
not executed (e.g. UPU and WHO under the2016–2020 Trump administration) and threats that were not
executed. For comparability, we follow the standard definition of international organizations from the
Correlates of War IGO project: entities between three or more states that have a formal agreement such
as a treaty and also an independent secretariat (Pevehouse etal., 2020). This excludes entities that are
not formal IOs such as emanations, treaties, and agreements: the Trump administration withdrew from
non-IO entities such as the UNHRC, the JCPOA, the UNRWA, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Global
Compact on Refugees, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the INF Treaty, the
Treaty on Open Skies, the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran.
8 Factba.se no date.
9 Ibid.
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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Despite the regular pattern of IO withdrawals over time and mentions of IO with-
drawal in candidates’ speeches, we know little about US public opinion toward IO
withdrawals. What affects public opinion on IO withdrawals, and do voters pun-
ish or support leaders who announce they will leave IOs? Thus far, many studies
have focused on a single case: the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European
Union (EU) (Walter, 2019, 2021a, b; De Vries, 2017; De Vries etal., 2021; Jurado
etal., 2022). Studies show that Euro-skepticism (Anderson, 1998; De Vries, 2018;
Kritzinger, 2003; Rohrschneider, 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000) was a key driver of
Brexit which can also affect public opinion in other EU countries through encour-
agement and deterrence effects (Hobolt etal., 2022; Walter, 2021a, b). Several stud-
ies have also used survey experiments to examine how framing the costs and bene-
fits of EU membership can affect support for EU membership (De Blok & De Vries,
2023; Goodwin etal., 2020; Hobolt etal., 2022).
Beyond Brexit, Bearce and JolliffScott (2019) show that “non-support” for IOs
has increased and that regardless of education level, less-skilled US citizens express
more negative views about IOs . Further, less than one third of the US public trusts
IOs like the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Mutz, 2020). Sur-
veys by think tanks (Smeltz etal., 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016; Council Foreign Rela-
tions, 2019; PewResearch Center, 2016) and scholars (Kiratli, 2022) assess attitudes
towards NATO, NAFTA, the UN, and the EU, but they do not ask respondents’
when and if they would support leaving these IOs nor whether certain justifications
would make withdrawal more palatable.
We contend that non-support for IOs and withdrawing from IOs are conceptu-
ally different. People (and governments) may dislike IOs but nevertheless favor
staying in them because IOsgenerate some benefitsonce states are in. Moreo-
ver, the public may perceive additional costs of IO withdrawal (beyond not join-
ing in the first place) due to friction-points they associate with leaving. These
include sunk cost fallacies (North, 1990; Williamson, 1979), status quo bias/
loss aversion (Alesina & Passarelli, 2019), and a sense of institutional loyalty
(Hirschman, 1972). Sunk cost fallacies may arise because the public may know
that their country invested significant resources before and after joining the IO
and thus they may remain tied to the IO (Copelovitch & Ohls, 2012; Epstein &
Sedelmeier, 2008; Gowa & Kim, 2005; Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Pelc,
2011; Schneider & Urpelainen, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Status quo
bias may lead the public to be skeptical of withdrawal because institutions carry
a sense of inertia once they are set in motion. Relatedly, theories of loss aver-
sion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) mean that once IO membership is the sta-
tus quo, voters may be reluctant to leave (Jervis, 1992). Loyalty, which relates
to Hirschman’s seminal work on “exit, voice, and loyalty” (Hirschman, 1972),
underscores that members may want to remain in an IO to make improvements
from within (Hirschman, 1972, p. 79). As a result, “loyalty acts as a break on the
decision to exit” (Hirschman, 1972, p. 88).
In addition, studies show that the public cares about IOs and suggest that public
opinion toward IOs can be malleable. For example, information about institutional
performance shapes confidence in the UN (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015; Tallberg
& Zürn, 2019), information about procedural and outcome quality affects citizens’
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
evaluations of international cooperation (Bernauer etal., 2020), information about
financial benefits of US leadership can increase public support for IOs (Brutger &
Clark, 2023), and information about IMF conditionality can reduce public support
for the IMF (Handlin etal., 2023), emphasizing that citizens care about what IOs do
for their nation. While these studies show that context and framing shape how and
when the public cares about IOs, we still do not know what shapes public opinion
about leaving IOs.
Perhaps the best evidence underscoring that the public may care about IOs is
that political elites regularly communicate IO strengths and weaknesses to the
public (Davis & Pratt, 2021; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2021). Politicians frequently
blame IOs for bad policies (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020) and endorse IOs if
this can help them achieve policy objectives (Chapman & Reiter, 2004).10 For
example, politicians seek UN Security Council authorization to increase the per-
ceived legitimacy of US military action (Voeten, 2005; Chapman, 2009; Grieco
et al., 2011; Thompson, 2006).11 Some governments have even posed IO with-
drawal questions as part of referendums, emphasizing the importance of public
opinion in this foreign policy realm (Walter, 2021a, b). We do not argue that poli-
cymakers make IO decisions based on public opinion, but publicizing their foreign
policies regarding IOs can help politicians gain (or lose) public support among
some groups.
Fig. 1 Withdrawal Frequency across US Administrations, 1945–2022
10 Also, see Gray & Baturo (2024), on how leaders at the UN tend to deviate from the multilateral
agenda.
11 For a counterpoint, see Kreps, 2010.
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2 IO withdrawal policy andframing
When does the US public support IO withdrawals and candidates who propose this?
We present our theoretical expectations in several steps starting with partisan base-
lines, moving to whether IO withdrawal policy matters, whether the framing of that
policy matters, and finally looking at effects on independents. All hypotheses we dis-
cuss and test are pre-registered; TableA1 in the Appendix A provides an overview.12
First, we argue that Americans’ attitudes about IO withdrawal are largely driven
by their preference towards multilateralism and that this divides along partisan lines:
Republicans nowadays should be more supportive of IO withdrawal than Demo-
crats. We base this argument on post-1995 surveys that show Republicans are less
supportive of multilateralism whereas Democrats are more likely to support multi-
lateralism and international organizations (Smeltz etal., 2022b, p. 6 & 21; Milner
& Tingley, 2013, 2015; Broz, 2011; Friedhoff, 2021). Republicans tend to be less
favorable toward multilateralism because they fear losing control over foreign policy
issues (Milner & Tingley, 2013). They prioritize preserving the country’s freedom
of action and are generally opposed to multilateral initiatives that they believe would
undermine sovereignty without delivering sound policy outcomes (Busby et al.,
2012). Democrats, on the other hand, tend to be more favorable toward multilateral-
ism because they believe that the US needs to enlist other nations and cannot solve
most problems alone (Busby etal., 2012).13
Since IOs institutionalize multilateralism, we contend that individuals may
extrapolate their general attitudes about multilateralism to their support for (or
opposition to) IO withdrawal. IO withdrawal backs the US away from multilateral-
ism. We therefore expect that baseline preferences for IO withdrawal differ between
Republicans and Democrats. Republicans should be more likely to favor withdraw-
ing from IOs (to denounce multilateralism) while Democrats should be more likely
to favor remaining in IOs (as an institution to promote multilateralism):
Hypothesis 1 (Divergent partisan baselines): Republicans should be more sup-
portive of IO withdrawal than Democrats.
Moreover, we argue that IO withdrawal policy should matter to citizens’ choice
of political candidates, not just in isolation (which is not a reasonable assumption
in the real world) but when considered in a multidimensional policy space—that is,
when potential voters weigh several attributes of political candidates. The reason IO
withdrawal might matter at the ballot box and not just as a stand-alone question is
that research shows that the public is more likely to hold their government account-
able for actions at the international level when the decisions are politicized at the
national level (Schneider, 2018). We surmise – but do not test – that IO withdrawal
12 The link to pre-registrations are in Appendix C.
13 Similarly, previous studies show that Americans who support multilateralism (as opposed to isolation-
ism) are less likely to oppose trade agreements: Mansfield & Mutz, 2009, p. 451.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
might be salient for voters because its nature (a country is either in or out) makes
it easily retrievable from memory (Aldrich etal., 1989; Ottati & Wyer, 1990). Vot-
ers retrospectively consider politicians’ past actions (Aldrich et al., 1989; Ottati &
Wyer, 1990), making this foreign policy decision easy for voters to remember, and
thus ripe for later priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). For
example, during an election campaign, voters often want to know “what have you
done for me lately” (Shepsle & Weingast, 1981). In contrast, other foreign policy
actions may be more nuanced and thus less readily retrievable when voters try to
recall politicians’ “achievements”.14
If Hypothesis 1 is true and partisan baselines indeed diverge, then IO withdrawal
policy may not affect candidate choice on average because the diverging opinions
of partisan groups may cancel each other out. Thus, the average effect across groups
may be indistinguishable from zero (as we note in the pre-registration).
Second, beyond partisan baselines, we argue that framing IO withdrawals as sup-
porting US national interests boosts public support for IO withdrawal and for the
politicians supporting it. This argument builds on research in American and compar-
ative politics15 as well as international relations (Guisinger & Saunders, 2017) about
how framing can shape people’s preferences (Druckman, 2011). Elites can strate-
gically use cues to activate certain frames that individuals hold in memory. This
provides heuristics that influence people’s preferences, aiding decision-making by
simplifying information overload (or information shortfalls). For example, research
shows that elite framing can help voters assess the legitimacy of IOs (Dellmuth,
2018; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2021; Nielson etal., 2019). These findings provide the
foundation for understanding how political leaders justify why IOmembership or its
termination might benefit the country.
We argue that framing an IO withdrawal as helping US national interests should
appeal to respondents more than no framing (pure control) or a non-US national
interests frame (such as bureaucratic reasons). This argument that a national inter-
est frame may nudge more support for IO withdrawal builds in part from research
on public support for European integration and disintegration. These surveys show
that heuristics such as perceptions of national interest drive public support for EU
membership (Anderson, 1998; De Vries, 2018; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Kritzinger,
2003; Rohrschneider, 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000).
Framing IO withdrawals around US national interests may increase public sup-
port for the policy and the candidate proposing it because it is popular, invokes a
sense of crisis, and/or because it signifies domestic benefits. We unpack each of
these arguments. First, reasoning related to US national interests is broadly popular
among the public. Surveys show that a supermajority of Americans supports poli-
cies on behalf of “US national interests” (Evers etal., 2019, p. 438) and that broad
support for topics related to US national interests, including globalization and US
national security, is stable over time (Smeltz etal., 2016, 2017, 2018a, b; 2019; Pew
14 In funding IOs, for example, governments can contribute along a continuum making it more difficult
for citizens to form an opinion and retrieve these complex choices when voting.
15 For a review on framing, see Bullock 2011.
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
1 3
Research Center, 2016). Second, the US national interest frame may invoke a sense
of crisis that can create a rally ‘round the flag effect.16 In crisis scenarios presented
to voters, Evers etal., (2019, p. 438) show that when the president “justifies his deci-
sion to back down as being ‘in America’s interest,’ he no longer incurs an approval
hit among Democrats or Republicans.” A further reason why the US national inter-
est frame might nudge more support for IO withdrawal and the candidates advo-
cating it is that the frame might highlight how IO withdrawal may be domestically
beneficial to voters. Without this frame, the public may think more about the fric-
tion-points they associate with leaving that we mentioned above (sunk cost fallacies,
status quo bias/loss aversion, andinstitutional loyalty).
Indeed, President Trump justified his withdrawal from the UN Human Rights
Council as acting “in the national interest.”17 Trump also linked withdrawal from
the Universal Postal Union (UPU) to US national interests amidst the rising power
of China (Guardian, 2018; New York Times, 2019), which garnered widespread
attention. As one indication of public interest, online search popularity for the
UPU peaked shortly after Trump threatened to exit.18 President Trump also cited a
national crisis due to China’s increasing influence and the negative ramifications on
US national interests when he announced the US would withdraw from the World
Health Organization in 2019.19
In sum, US citizens should be more likely to support IO withdrawal if it is justi-
fied as being in the US national interest. A politician may explicitly reference the
phrase “US national interests” or invoke this idea in other ways. Three manifesta-
tions of US national interests stand out as previous framings:20 justifying IO exit
with the domestic costs of multilateralism, addressing national security, or curbing
domestic problems related to globalization. Figure 2 illustrates that over the last
hundred years, more than 90 percent of the justifications for US withdrawal deci-
sions and threats have centered on US national interests: 44 percent are tied to the
costliness of international cooperation, 41 percent relate to concerns over national
security or sovereignty, and 12 percent tied withdrawal to the negative effects of
globalization.21 Nonetheless, in some cases, US politicians have announced IO with-
drawals without any justification (3 percent of cases).22 In addition, politicians can
use alternative framings not related to US national interests including focusing on
the IO not achieving its mandate or mission, but such alternatives are rarely used.
16 See for example Oneal & Bryan, 1995.
17 See https:// mille rcent er. org/ the- presi dency/ presi denti al- speec hes/ septe mber- 25- 2018- addre ss- 73rd-
sessi on- united- natio ns- gener al
18 See Appendix A FigureA1for the Google trends analysis.
19 https:// www. statn ews. com/ 2020/ 05/ 29/ trump- us- termi nate- who- relat ionsh ip/
20 Most US IO withdrawals are announced by the President, White House spokespeople, the State
Department or Secretary of State.
21 Coders categorized the justifications for withdrawal by reading withdrawal announcements, press
releases, and interviews with policymakers. Each of these framings tended to be negative in nature,
which informed the framing choices for our experiments.
22 The remaining category of “other” framing relates to Israel.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
Therefore, we expect that these three manifestations of a US national interest
frame increase public support for IO withdrawal. Because we view each of these
three frames—reducing the costs of multilateralism, increasing national security,
and reducing the challenges of globalization—as manifestations of US national
interests, we have no strong expectation that any one of these three frames would
work better (as noted in the pre-registration).
Hypothesis 2a (Average effects of framing vs control): Framing IO withdrawal as
related to US national interests (versus no framing) should generate higher public
support for IO withdrawal, the candidate’s achievements, and a higher likelihood
of voting for the candidate.
We expect that the effect is due to the “US national interest framing” rather than
offering any explanation for IO withdrawal. Research in political psychology notes
that offering any explanation can be more persuasive than no explanation (Langer
etal., 1978), so we aim to distinguish the effect of our hypothesized framing not
just from no framing (the pure control) but also from a placebo framing (Porter &
Velez, 2021). While the pure control allows comparing the effect of a treatment text
versus no treatment text, the placebo condition holds the treatment mode constant
(added text) but provides information not relevant to the outcome (like a bureau-
cratic reason instead of US national interests). Nonetheless, comparing a treatment
to a placebo instead of (or in addition to) a pure control usually leads to conservative
effect estimates because the treatment mode is identical, statistical power is lower
(due to including a third group), and because selecting a non-relevant placebo can
be challenging.
Hypothesis 2b (Average effects of framing vs placebo): Framing IO withdrawal
as related to US national interests (versus a placebo framing) should generate
higher public support for IO withdrawal, the candidate’s achievements, and a
higher likelihood of voting for the candidate.23
The counterfactual is that framing IO withdrawal around US national interests
may reduce (instead of increase) support because IOs are supposed to be venues
of international cooperation; justifying withdrawal as helping national interests may
therefore strike some as being self-centered. A US national interest framing is also
not costless. It may generate audience costs for the leader if withdrawal is justified
by national interests but then the leader does not follow through with withdrawal.
Levendusky and Horowitz (2012, p. 326–7) note that voters assess audience costs
– whether they will punish a President for backing out of a foreign policy commit-
ment – in terms of national interests. This logic is enhanced if framing makes with-
drawal sound important for the country’s survival/prosperity.
23 In more technical terms (and as noted in the pre-registration): The difference between control and US
national interest framing should be larger than the difference between control and placebo framing.
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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Finally, we hypothesize that independents24 should be more likely to be influ-
enced by IO withdrawal policy than partisans. Individuals with strong partisan affili-
ations should be less likely to be swayed because their attitudes are more entrenched
and they are also more informed. A candidate’s policy on IO withdrawal may there-
fore matter little for partisan voters beyond the candidate’s party.25 For example,
Republican voters may mostly support Republican candidates, regardless of IO
withdrawal policy, and Democratic voters may mostly support Democratic candi-
dates (Green etal., 2004). Voters may infer the candidate’s party directly from the
party label or indirectly from positions on domestic policies. In contrast to Republi-
can or Democratic respondents,independent or other respondents (whom we group
together under the label "independents") are less affected by dominant party cues
and we argue that they might thus be more affected by the IO withdrawal policy of
the candidate. Moreover, polls show that non-partisans have the least knowledge of
international affairs (PewResearch Center, 2022, p. 13–14). A frame that provides
justification for IO withdrawal may provide independents with more information
about international affairs and this may be what nudges them more than partisans.
Consequently, we expect the following:
Fig. 2 Framings of US Withdrawals and Withdrawal Threats (1919–2022)
24 By “independents” we mean respondents who do not think of themselves asRepublican or Demo-
cratic but instead independent or other.In the pre-registration, we noted that independent/other respond-
ents would be grouped into an “unaffiliated” label.
25 Lenz (2013) suggests that Americans tend to vote based on party rather than issues. For an empirical
counter, see Smeltz etal., 2017.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
Hypothesis 3a (Independents—policy): The effect of IO withdrawal policy
should be stronger for independent respondents than Republican and Democratic
respondents.
Hypothesis 3b (Independents—framing): The effect of framing related to US
national interests (versus no framing) should be stronger for independent respond-
ents than Republican and Democratic respondents.
We recognize that voters form preferences and make decisions about alternatives
in a multidimensional way. Below, we thus outline how we lean on conjoint survey
experiments to randomize information aboutdifferent candidate policies and demo-
graphic characteristics, which helps us assess whether/how much IO withdrawal
policy matters relative to other candidate characteristics, before testing the framing
effects.26
3 Testing whether/how IO withdrawal policy matters
To assess whether and how (much) the US public cares about candidates’ IO with-
drawal policies, we conducted two conjoint survey experiments using a nationally
representative sample (with quotas on age, gender, race,27 region, and partisanship
on Lucid) in the US just before the 2020 US national election. The conjoint design
explicitly mirrors previous designs related to US public opinion, candidate choice,
and foreign policy (Tomz & Weeks, 2020; Tomz etal., 2020). It allows us to disen-
tangle whether respondents care about issues like IO withdrawal or solely make can-
didate decisions based on other characteristics like domestic policy or demographics
(e.g. gender). This is useful given our theoretical interest in comparing how and if
IO withdrawal policy matters among the multiple other factors that contribute to
voters’ choices. Moreover, the conjoint design allows us to test how IO withdrawal
policy matters for candidate choice: whether it hurts or helps candidates on average,
and whether the effect depends on the partisanship of voters.
Before administering the conjoint experiment, we measured respondents’ demo-
graphics and political attitudes. We first measured respondents’ preferences toward
two domestic policies (economic and education)28 by describing what each policy
26 The IRB approvals are #2018.25580 at Florida State University (for vignette 1) and #32180 at Dart-
mouth College (for vignette 2 and the conjoint experiments). The pre-registrations are for vignette 1 at
AsPredicted #16041 (https:// aspre dicted. org/ hk5d8. pdf); for vignette 2at OSF #ERW7A (https:// osf. io/
erw7a); and for the conjoint experiments at OSF #MZNXQ (https:// osf. io/ mznxq). We did not conduct
power calculations because the expected effect sizes were unclear given that these are (to our knowledge)
the first survey experiments on US public opinion about withdrawal from IOs. To mitigate this, we inter-
polated the needed sample size based on similar research designs on different questions by Weeks and
co-authors (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Tomz and Weeks 2020; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020).
27 We use the term “race” in line with the US Census Bureau and other US surveys. See https:// www.
census. gov/ quick facts/ fact/ note/ US/ RHI62 5222
28 Since we ask questions related to IO policy, education policy, and economic policy, respondents are
unlikely to be primed by only one area. Descriptive statistics are in Appendix A Table 2. The detailed
wording of pre-treatment measures is on Appendix A pages 4–7.
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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entails, what a small or large government role would look like, and then asking
whether respondents preferred the government to take no, a small, medium, or large
role for each policy. We took a similar approach to measure attitudes about IO with-
drawal policy, explaining what international organizations are (like the media fre-
quently does when discussing IO withdrawal), giving examples of IOs so that the
notion of an IO was specific and not just hypothetical. These examples included the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Trade Organization (WTO),
and World Meteorological Organization (WMO). This cross-section of regional and
global organizations included one security, one economic, and one standards-based
entity, which represent the types of IOs from which the US announced potential
withdrawals during the 2016–2020Trump administration. We then noted that some-
times IOs fall short. This balanced information about IOs – that they are a useful
means to pursue US policy (positive) but that they sometimes fall short (negative)
– allows a measure of baseline support without priming respondents in only one
direction.
We then noted that the US can choose to withdraw from or remain in such imper-
fect organizations and asked respondents, “Which approach to such international
organizations do you prefer?” We asked the question concerning withdrawal about
IOs in general because our theory relates to voter’s broader preferences about IOs
not just one specific organization. Answer options were definitely withdraw (9%),
probably withdraw (26%), probably remain in (40%), and definitely remain in (25%).
These findings show that in the aggregate, Americans support remaining in IOs,
even when they are imperfect (65%). Only 35% of Americans leaned toward with-
drawing. This is an important finding in itself, given the salience of IO withdrawals
at this time.
After measuring respondents’ preferences and demographics, we introduced the
context of the subsequent survey questions (a hypothetical presidential election in
2028)29 and measured respondents’ attentiveness (see Appendix A). Our analyses
focus on the 1,824 respondents who passed both attention checks; Appendix A
shows analyses for all respondents (including inattentives and controlling for inatten-
tion; see Berinsky etal., 2021), with fairly similar results. The selection of 2028 as
the election year was important as no 2020 Presidential candidate had been chosen
and thus voters would not be making their own analysis of a 2021–2024 president.
3.1 Treatments – conjoint experiments
We then presented respondents withfour pairs of hypothetical candidates that varied
randomly on policy and demographic dimensions to inform them about candidate
characteristics and mitigate potential confounding of this relationship.30 We rand-
omized all attributes independently, allowing us to estimate how much weight (if
any) respondents attach to each.
29 For the benefits of this choice, see Renshon etal., 2023.
30 Again, building on previous scholarship including Tomz, Weeks & Yarhi-Milo, 2020; Tomz &
Weeks, 2020.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
In the first conjoint experiment, the policy attributes included IO withdrawal
policy which we randomized to indicate whether the candidate advocated definitely
withdrawing, probably withdrawing, probably remaining in, or definitely remain-
ing in an imperfect international organization (four categories). We also included
domestic economic and education policy (which plausibly varies across parties)
because economic and social issues are key factors driving voters’ decisions.31 For
economic and education policy, we randomly varied four categories: whether the
candidate advocated no role, a small role, medium role, or large role of government
in the economy or, respectively, in education policy (specifically related to affirma-
tive action). The second block randomized four demographic attributes of candi-
dates: gender (female, male), race (white, Black, Asian, Hispanic), years of experi-
ence in politics (4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32), and home region (Northeast, South,
Midwest, West).
We supplemented this first conjoint experiment with a second conjoint survey
experiment (on a different sample of respondents) to account for candidates’ party.
Party is a crucial factor for vote choice, especially in a two-party system like the US.
Omitting the candidate’s party would mean that estimated effects may be limited
in external validity, as they may be overcome by party effects. However, including
party means that full randomization along policy dimensions (economic and educa-
tion policy) would make some profiles unrealistic. For example, a Republican candi-
date favoring strong affirmative action and a strong government role in the economy
is possible but unlikely, as is a Democratic candidate advocating no government
role in economic and education policies. To reduce potential contradictions between
party and domestic policy, we held domestic policy positions constant at a “medium
role” for economic and education policies in the sample with the party attribute. We
then independently randomized party (instead of home region),32 gender, race, years
of experience, and IO withdrawal policy. We presented the candidate information
in a table. Tables1 and 2 show examples of conjoints which could result from ran-
dom assignment. The attributes with all possible levels/contrasts are shown in Fig.3
below.
3.2 Outcomes – conjoint experiments
After each candidate pair, we asked respondents to make a vote choice: “If you
had to choose, which candidate would you vote for?” We assigned each candidate
a score of 100 if the respondent said they would definitely or probably vote for the
candidate, and a score of 0 if the respondent said they would definitely or prob-
ably not vote for the candidate. The eight candidate profiles and choices for 1,824
respondents result in 14,592 total candidate choices.
We estimate the effect of each attribute on vote choice using Average Marginal
Component Effects (AMCEs) via linear regression (Hainmueller et al., 2014;
31 In line with Tomz & Weeks, 2020.
32 We use party as a replacement for home region to keep the number of attributes constant across both
samples, which eases comparability.
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824
I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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Bansak etal., 2020), clustering standard errors by respondent. AMCE represents the
extent to which a given level of a candidate attribute increases or decreases respond-
ents’ probability of voting for that candidate profile relative to a baseline level, aver-
aging across all other candidate profile attributes and all respondents. This allows
us to observe whether changes in preferences toward a Presidential candidate are
caused by changes in candidate attributes. Each attribute is dummied out with the
baseline value set as the omitted category. For assessing heterogeneous effects by
respondents’ partisanship, we estimate conditional AMCEs.
3.3 Results – conjoint experiments
Results from the two conjoint experiments are presented in Figs.3 and 4, indicating
estimated effects of candidates’ policy and demographic attributes on respondents’
preference for that candidate.33 Figure3 shows average effects while Fig.4 shows
effects conditional on respondents’ partisanship.
While Fig. 3 shows that the average effect of IO withdrawal policy is indistinguish-
able from zero (Fig.3a) or negative (Fig.3b), Fig.4 reveals that these average effects mask
strong partisan differences, in line with Hypothesis 1. In both versions of the conjoint exper-
iment, all else equal, Republicans were 5% more supportive of candidates advocating IO
withdrawal policies compared to candidates advocating to remain in IOs. In contrast, Demo-
crats were 6–10% less supportive of candidates pursuing IO withdrawal policies. Independ-
ents were 4–5% less supportive of such candidates. This indicates that partisan preferences
are diametrically opposed: Republicans favor and Democrats oppose IO withdrawal poli-
ciesand candidates who propose them. These results show that Americans have substan-
tively important opinions about whether the US should withdraw from imperfect IOs, and
they divide along partisan lines. Perhaps surprisingly though (and counter to Hypothesis 3a),
independents are not more influenced by IO withdrawal policy than partisan groups.
The results for IO policy are substantively similar when accounting for attentive-
ness (Appendix A FiguresA5-A8)34 and they are stronger when restricting the focus
to only voters (those who had already voted or said they were likely to vote).35 They
are also fairly robust to adjusting for multiple comparisons (Appendix TablesA3-4).
In short, results indicate that IO membership policy can matter for one’s choice of
political candidates, not just by itself but also when accounting for other common
domestic policies and candidate attributes.
33 Number of observations are 7,472 for Fig.3a and 7,360 for Fig.3b.Number of observations for Fig.4a
are 2800 Democrats, 2024 Independents, 2648 Republicans. Number of observations for Fig.4b are 2608
Democrats, 2272 Independents, 2480 Republicans.Consistent with our focus on voting, we show results
for candidate choice. We include results on our secondary outcome (candidate rating) in Appendix A Fig-
uresA3and A4. Rating results are similar to Figs.3a and 4b but in-significant compared to Figs.3b and 4a.
Detailed estimates underlying Figs.3 and 4 are in Appendix B TablesB-3a, B-3b, B-4a, B-4b.
34 For the conjoint version with party label, the coefficient on IO policy for the Republican sample
becomes smaller and loses significance. Detailed estimates underlying FiguresA5-A8 are in Appendix B
TablesB-A5 through B-A8.
35 The voters-only results are exploratory since we did not pre-register this subset; they are reported in
Appendix A FiguresA9-A10, with detailed results underlying these Figures in Appendix B TablesB-A9
and B-A10. We add this exploratory analysis since voters are key for elections.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
Table 1 Example of Conjoint with party label
Candidate A Candidate B
Gender Female Male
Race Hispanic White
Party Democrat Republican
Years in politics 20years 16years
Domestic economic policy Medium role Medium role
Domestic education policy Medium role for
affirmative action
Medium role for affirmative action
International organization policy Probably remain in an
imperfect organization
Probably withdraw from an imper-
fect organization
Table 2 Example of Conjoint with home region
Candidate A Candidate B
Domestic education policy Medium role for affirma-
tive action
Small role for affirmative action
Domestic economic policy Medium role Large role
International organization policy Probably remain in an
imperfect organization
Definitely withdraw from an
imperfect organization
Home region West Midwest
Race Asian Hispanic
Years in politics 32years 4years
Gender Male Female
(a)Version with party label (b) Version with home region
Number of observations are 7,472 for Figure 3a and 7,360 for Figure 3b.
Fig. 3 Conjoint – Aggregate Results
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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(a)Version with party label
DemocratsIndependents Republicans
−30−20 −100 10 20 30 −30−20 −100 10 20 30 −30−20 −100 10 20 30
Withdraw
Remain in
IO Policy:
32
28
24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Y
ears:
Democrat
Republican
Party:
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White
Race:
Female
Male
Gender:
Change in Probability(Pref er Candidatefor President)
(b) Version with home region
DemocratsIndependentsRepublicans
−30−20 −100 10 20 30 −30−20 −100 10 20 30 −30−20 −10010 20 30
Withdraw
Remain in
IO Policy:
Largerole
Medium role
Smallrole
No role
EducationPolicy:
Largerole
Medium role
Smallrole
No role
EconomicPolicy:
32
28
24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Y
ears:
South
Northeast
Midwest
West
Home:
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White
Race:
Female
Male
Gender:
Change in Probability (PreferCandidateforPresident)
Number of observations for Figure 4a are 2800 Democrats, 2024 Independents, 2648
Republicans. Number of observations for Figure 4b are 2608 Democrats, 2272 Independents,
2480 Republicans.
Fig. 4 Conjoint – Heterogenous Results
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
Other candidate attributes also matter. Figure3b shows that compared to candi-
dates who advocated no role for government in economic policy, candidates favor-
ing a stronger role were about 8% more likely to be preferred for President; the
same for education policy was up to 4%. Unsurprisingly, party ID and demographic
attributes of candidates matter for vote choice as well. All else equal, Figs.3 and
4 show that candidates with at least some experience performed substantially bet-
ter than otherwise comparable candidates with no experience (though there is not
a linear increase in support with years on the job). Democratic candidates receive
3% more support than Republican candidates, in line with Biden’s 4% advantage in
the actual 2020national election a few days later. Among the other demographic
attributes, the candidate’s home region does not matter for vote choice, and results
for gender and race are not consistent as they differ depending on whether party or
home region is included as an attribute.
While these results align with previous studies of public opinion on IOs, show-
ing that support for IO withdrawal divides along party line, our theory goes fur-
ther. It argues that framing the withdrawal as benefiting US national interests can
nudge increased support for IO withdrawal. We next turn to testing this framing
argument.
4 Testing whetherframing matters
To test whether framing the IO withdrawal policy matters for public support and
partisan baseline differences, we conducted two vignette survey experiments in
the US. The vignette design also allows us to test the effect of no framing ver-
sus US national interest frames on IO withdrawal policy. As explained above, we
test the overall concept of “US national interests” and more specific aspects includ-
ing “strengthening US national security,” “reducing losses from globalization,”
and “mitigating the costs of multilateralism.” Before each vignette experiment, we
measured respondents’ political attitudes, demographics, and attentiveness.36 As
above, our analyses focus on respondents who correctly answered attention checks;
Appendix A shows that effects are similar but somewhat smaller when including
inattentive respondents or controlling for inattention (Appendix Figures A11b,
A15, A17, A18).
The two vignette experiments differed in a few ways, including timing, platform,
and content. The first vignette experiment was fielded just after the 2018 US mid-
term elections and embedded in a nationally representative Cooperative Congres-
sional Election Study (CCES) survey fielded by YouGov (N = 862) (Ansolabehere
et al., 2019). We fielded the second vignette experiment just before the 2020 US
36 Descriptive statistics are in Appendix A TablesA5 and A6.
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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Presidential election on Lucid (N = 2,826). In terms of content, the two vignettes
varied in treatment texts (see below) and the particular IOs we named. They also
varied in the messenger, as we invoked an analyst in the first experiment versus
a political candidate in the second.37 These differences were purposeful and help
extend the external validity of our study. Despite the differences in IOs, frames,
messengers, timing, and platforms, our results are substantively the same.
In the first vignette, we focus on economic organizations because they are the
most frequently left IOs and they make up the largest share of IOs.38 By narrowing
to economics-related IOs, we also rule out public opinion explanations tied to issue
area variation rather than the role of framing.39 To make the concept of economic
organizations more specific and realistic, we named several organizations including
the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Whaling Commission (IWC),
and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). We chose these three economic
organizations because they vary in prominence, specificity (broad versus specific),
and geography (global versus regional).
In the second vignette, we go beyond economic organizations to understand
whether findings from the first vignette are generalizable to broader issue areas.
We thus list a security-based organization (the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion/NATO), an economic organization (the World Trade Organization/WTO), and
a standards-setting organization (the World Meteorological Organization/WMO)
which also vary in prominence.
We do not assume that respondents are familiar with these IOs; instead, by
including both well-known and lesser-known organizations, we emulate real with-
drawal cases. The inference that we make therefore comes not from knowing or not
knowing the organizations but from how framing withdrawal impacts respondents’
attitudes. Moreover, the vignettes ask about several organizations to increase the
generalizability of our claims (beyond a single IO) and to mimic reality, as coun-
tries sometimes announce withdrawals from several IOs at once (for example, as the
result of a budget review). Thus, withdrawals sometimes come in waves where vot-
ers think more about the implications of membership and multilateralism rather than
the specifics of one particular IO.
4.1 Treatments – vignette experiment 1
The first vignette survey experiment included the following text:
37 While using the term “analysts” in the first vignette experiment is useful for putting the focus on the
frame rather than the framer, one downside is that some partisan groups may not think of “analysts” as
being apolitical, particularly in an era with misinformation and media bias. In the second vignette, we
thus denote a political framer, by saying the information came from “the Presidential candidate in a cam-
paign speech for the 2028 election.”
38 About half of all IOs are economic, a third social, and the remaining political. See Pevehouse etal.
2020.
39 However, see Guisinger & Saunders (2017) for a compelling rationale to survey across issue areas
when studying cueing effects.
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“There are several hundred international organizations in the world today, such
as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Whaling Commission
(IWC), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The United States
has joined several international organizations whose core mission is to cooper-
ate on economics and trade. In one of these economic organizations, the US
has tried to improve the international trade situation for the US, but its efforts
have come up short. [insert experimental group text] Nonetheless, the US
respects international law.”
To test how framing drives citizens’ attitudes about IO withdrawal, we randomly
assigned respondents to one of four conditions regarding why the US is consider-
ing withdrawal: national security (treatment 1, N = 221), globalization (treatment
2, N = 215), costs of the IO (treatment 3, N = 228), or no reason (control group,
N = 198). We inserted these reasons as the next-to-last sentence into the vignette.
That is, the vignette is identical for all respondents except for one sentence, which
was:
[Treatment 1/security:] “Unfortunately, analysts argue that the international
organization has reduced US national security.”
[Treatment 2/globalization:] “Unfortunately, analysts argue that the international
organization has increased the negative effects of globalization.”
[Treatment 3/costs:] “Unfortunately, analysts argue that the international organi-
zation is too costly for what the US gets from it.”
The main independent variable, Framing: Any US national interest is coded 1 for
the three treatment groups combined (national security, globalization, costs) and 0
for the control group without framing. As noted above and in the pre-registration,
we do not have hypotheses about differences among national interest framings. We
use this variable to test Hypothesis 2a that withdrawal from an IO should have more
public support if it is framed around US national interests than if there is no fram-
ing. While we did not have strong expectations about any particular US national
interest treatment being stronger than others, we also code each treatment separately
to assess potential differences in exploratory analyses.
4.2 Outcome – vignette experiment 1
We then asked respondents about their support for IO withdrawal, i.e. whether “The
US should…”.40
• definitely withdraw from the international organization
• probably withdraw from the international organization
• I am undecided
• probably stay in the international organization
• definitely stay in the international organization
40 We reversed the display of these response options across respondents to ensure “stay” options were
read first as many times as “withdraw” options.
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We recorded these responses on a five-point scale (1 to 5) with higher values
indicating a stronger preference for withdrawal.
4.3 Results – vignette experiment 1
Before evaluating our main theoretical contribution about the effect of IO policy on
attitudes, we evaluate Hypothesis 1 about baseline differences between Republicans
and Democrats. Figure5a shows strong differences, with 42% of Republicans but
only 4% of Democrats saying the US should withdraw from an imperfect IO. This
difference in proportions is highly significant (p < 0.001), providing strong support
for Hypothesis 1.41 The substantive and statistically significant difference of over
30 percentage points also exists when narrowing the sample (to only the control
group without framing), broadening the sample (to include inattentive respondents;
Appendix A Figures A11a/b), and exists also for a similar pre-treatment question
in the second vignette (Appendix A FigureA12). Figure 5b provides further detail
on the distribution of partisan and non-partisan groups across response categories,
showing strong baseline partisan differences between Republicans and Democrats in
the “withdraw” and “stay in the IO” answers.
To assess framing effects, we estimated OLS models with robust standard errors,
where the unit of analysis is the individual. Our specifications are:
and
where
Yi
is an outcome for individual i. In the first equation we estimate the causal
effect (
𝛽0
) of receiving any of the US national interest treatments
Ti
. In the second
equation we separate each treatment condition. Figure6a displays coefficient esti-
mates for testing the US national interest framing versus no framing (the pure con-
trol condition, Hypothesis 2a), along with 95% confidence intervals.42
Results show that framing IO withdrawal around US national interests increases
public support for withdrawal. Figure6a indicates that the coefficient on Framing:
Any National Interest, indicated by a blue circle, is positive and highly significant
(p < 0.003).43 Compared to the control group of respondents who did not see a US
national interest frame, respondents who were provided this framing were signifi-
cantly more supportive of withdrawal. The substantive size of the effect is 0.35
points on a 5-point scale or 31% of a standard deviation change in the outcome. Fig-
ure6b shows this in terms of a bivariate difference in means with 95% confidence
Yi
=
𝛼
+
𝛽0Ti
+
𝜖i
Yi
=
𝛼
+
𝛽1T1i
+
𝛽2T2i
+
𝛽3T3i
+
𝜖i
41 To run this test, we collapse the outcome into a binary variable of (definitely/probably) withdraw ver-
sus (definitely/probably) stay or undecided.Number of observations are 479 for Figs.5a and b.
42 Number of observations are 479 for Figs.6a and b; the reference group is no framing.Applying sur-
vey weights can bias estimates of treatment effects, so we present unweighted results as recommended by
Franco etal., 2017.
43 Detailed estimates underlying Fig.6a are in Appendix B TableB-6a.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
intervals.44 Public support for IO withdrawal doubles from 12% to 25% when justi-
fied by US national interests.
As noted above, we have no strong expectations about which of the three national
interest framings is more important for public opinion. Nevertheless, in exploratory
analyses, we unpack the framing effect into the three reasons to see if the average
result is driven by a particular treatment or hides significant variation. The esti-
mated coefficients are also shown in Fig.6a and are indicated by orange squares; the
excluded reference category is again the control group of no framing. The estimates
all point in the same direction and are of similar size; they are statistically different
from zero (cost/benefit at p < 0.06) but not different from each other. In other words,
framing matters in terms of whether IO withdrawal decisions are justified in one of
the US national interest justifications but the specific type of US national interest
justification does not differentially affect public support for withdrawal.
In the Appendix we document that results are robust. Results are substantively
similar when using an ordered logit estimator (Appendix A FigureA19)45 or rand-
omization inference (Keele etal., 2012); when checking for unbalanced covariates
(Appendix A Tables A7-A8), checking and adjusting for inattentive respondents
(Appendix A TablesA10-A11 and FigureA15), and adjusting for multiple compari-
sons (Appendix A TableA15; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995).46
While these results indicate that framing IO withdrawal policy around US
national interests can increase support for the policy, they also have a few limita-
tions. The vignette did not allow us to assess whether any frame works – since no
placebo other than the pure control was included. Further, while we assume that
(a) Main Difference (b) Subgroups
Number of observations are 479 for Figures 5a and 5b.
Fig. 5 Baseline Differences between Republicans and Democrats (Vignette 1)
44 For ease of interpretation, we dichotomize the dependent variable, so that “support for withdrawal” is
1 for respondents saying probably or definitely withdraw, and 0 otherwise.
45 Detailed estimates underlying FigureA19 are in Appendix B TableB-A19.
46 Detailed estimates underlying FigureA15 are in Appendix B TableB-A15.
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I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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candidates may tout IO withdrawal as an achievement on the campaign trail, the first
vignette did not explicitly ask how this would affect respondents’ support for a can-
didate or their vote choice. Finally, it is possible that during a more polarized or
high stakes context – right before a Presidential election – we may not find the same
results. To address these limitations, we fielded a second vignette survey experiment
to include a placebo frame (testing Hypothesis 2b), to ask whether IO withdrawal
policy affects candidate assessments or voting, and to understand support during a
presidential election campaign.
a
b
Number of observations are 479 for Figures 6a and 6b.
Fig. 6 a Framing Effects on Public Support for IO Withdrawal (Vignette 1) b Substantive Effect of
Framing on Withdrawal Support (Vignette 1)
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
4.4 Treatments – vignette experiment 2
The second vignette experiment presented respondents with a hypothetical scenario
where the US presidential candidate in a future year (again 2028) discusses their
accomplishments on the campaign trail. We randomly assign one of three vignettes:
no framing (a pure control), a framing related to US national interests (treatment
text), and a non-US national interests framing (placebo text around changing IO
headquarter locations). The vignette reads:
“Now we would like to get your opinions about the policy achievements of one
of these Presidential candidates in 2028. Imagine in a campaign speech for the
2028 election, the Presidential candidate says, “In the last four years we got a
lot of things done. On the domestic front, we created many jobs, maintained
strong economic growth, and reduced the budget deficit. In foreign policy, we
pulled out of several international organizations, including the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO).”
We then randomly assigned respondents to one of three groups. The control
group saw the text above without any framing. Respondents in treatment groups 1
and 2 saw one additional sentence with different framing.
1. [Treatment/US national interests:] “These international organizations do not
advance US national interests or prioritize American goals in the world.”
2. [Placebo/headquarters:] “These international organizations have headquarters
in locations which need to be moved somewhere else.”
That is, as in the first vignette, experimental groups are identical except for
one sentence. We chose this placebo frame about headquarters location because it
addresses foreign policy and crosses issue areas but may be perceived by respond-
ents as largely bureaucratic (or at least focused mostly on IO particulars), versus
being tied to US national interests. We also wanted a placebo that would not invoke
partisan differences, which ruled out many possible frames including spending or
size because conservative voters tend to favor smaller government involvement.
4.5 Outcomes – vignette experiment 2
We then asked three questions about the candidate and one question about the with-
drawal policy to measure outcomes of interest:
• “Given this information, how much would you say this candidate has achieved
for you?”
• “Given this information, how much would you say this candidate has achieved
for the US?” Answer options for both of these questions were a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, nothing.
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834
I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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• “Given this information, how likely would you be to vote for this candidate?”
Answer options were very unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, very
likely.
• “How much would you approve or disapprove of these policies?” Answer options
were strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, strongly disap-
prove.
Since all outcomes are recorded on 4-point scales, we estimate OLS with robust
standard errors.47 To assess the framing effect, we estimate differences in means
between the control group (no framing) and treatment group (US national inter-
ests’ frame). We use the placebo condition to assess whether differences between
the control and treatment could be due to the desire to advance US national inter-
ests or because offering any framing changes attitudes (no matter how meaningful
the explanation). As in the conjoint experiment, we also investigate heterogeneous
effects by respondent partisanship with an indicator for Independents.
4.6 Results – vignette experiment 2
Results in Fig. 7 and Table 3 show that framing withdrawal around US national
interests increases public support for withdrawal on average.48 In the upper panel
of Fig.7, the coefficient estimates on the treatment are positive and statistically sig-
nificant for all four outcomes. Figure7 shows that the size of the effect is about 0.15
points on the 4-point scale across outcomes, which is about 16% of a standard devia-
tion change in the outcomes. Substantively, the increase in public support is about
6% for withdrawal, 4–6% for perceptions of candidate achievements, and 6% for the
likelihood of voting for the candidate.
Robustness checks are detailed in the Appendix. Results are substantively similar
when using an ordered logit estimator (Appendix A TableA14) or randomization
inference, and when adjusting for unbalanced covariates (Appendix A TableA9 and
FigureA13), inattentive respondents (Appendix A TablesA12-A13, FiguresA17-
A18), and multiple comparisons (Appendix A TableA15).49
Moving on to heterogeneity, we test whether the effect of framing related to US
national interests (versus no framing) is stronger for independent respondents than
Republicans and Democrats (Hypothesis 3b). As pre-specified, we test this by distin-
guishing partisan sub-samples. The lower panel of Fig.7 shows estimates separately
for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Across all four outcomes, independ-
ents are significantly affected by the US national interest framing while partisans are
not. This supports Hypothesis 3b. Interestingly, this differs from the conjoint results
(Hypothesis 3a), suggesting that shortly before elections and in the context of this
47 Descriptive statistics are in Appendix A TableA6 and balance statistics are in Appendix A TableA9.
48 Number of observations for Fig.7 is 1854, which consists of 676 Democrats, 537 Independents, 641Repub-
licans; the reference group is no framing.Detailed estimates underlying Fig.7 are in Appendix B TableB-7.
49 Detailed estimates underlying Figure A-13, A-17, A-18 are in Appendix B TableB-A13, B-A17,
B-A18.
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
experiment, framing is more effective on independents who otherwise care less than
partisans about IO withdrawal policy itself.
Using the placebo framing (moving the IO’s headquarters), we also assess
whether a different frame (placebo) works as well as the US national interest frame
(treatment). Here the results are mixed and remain suggestive, as shown in Table3.
The difference in coefficients between the treatment and placebo is significant for
only one of the four outcome variables: respondents’ perception of how much the
candidate has achieved for them. IO headquarters may not be as strong a placebo as
we had intended; studies suggest that countries can leverage IO headquarter loca-
tions for political advantage (Johnson, 2015; Sommerer & Tallberg, 2019; Clark &
Dolan, 2021; Kilby, 2013). Further, while both the treatment and placebo invoke
the idea of (unrealized or potential) benefits, US national interests may invoke val-
ues, while headquarters may invoke concerns about fairness, which may explain the
weaker placebo effect. Given these considerations, it is challenging to identify an
apolitical placebo framing.50
The results in Table3 show that relative to the placebo, the US national interests
treatment generates stronger effects in two ways. First, the treatment has consistent
Number of observations for Figure 7 is 1854, which consists of 676 Democrats, 537
Independents, 641Republicans.
Fig. 7 Framing Effects on Public Support for IO Withdrawal (Vignette 2)
50 This underscores a key finding of IO scholarship that is sympathetic to realist arguments: IOs are
inherently political (see for example Davis 2023; Davis & Pratt, 2021; Lall, 2023; Stone, 2011).
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836
I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
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Table 3 Aggregate and Placebo Framing Results (Vignette 2)
The control group is “No Framing.”OLS models with robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant omitted.*p < 0.10,**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1)
Candidate Achieved for You
(mean = 1.63, sd = 0.88)
(2)
Candidate Achieved forthe US
(mean = 1.72, sd = 0.88)
(3)
Likelihood to Vote for Candidate
(mean = 1.65, sd = 0.92)
(4)
Policy Approval
(mean = 1.67, sd = 0.86)
β1: US National Interest 0.136***
(0.050)
0.125**
(0.050)
0.162***
(0.054)
0.144***
(0.050)
β2: Headquarters 0.003
(0.050)
0.064
(0.049)
0.129**
(0.052)
0.097**
(0.049)
β1– β20.133***
(0.050)
0.061
(0.050)
0.033
(0.051)
0.047
(0.048)
Observations 1854 1854 1854 1854
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
effects across all four outcomes while the placebo is insignificant for two outcomes.
Second, the treatment generates larger effects than the placebo in terms of standard
deviation shifts in outcomes: between 14.2% and 17.6% versus the placebo’s 0.3%
to 14.0% change. Again, exploratory analyses show that results are similar when we
restrict the focus to only voters.51
Using observational data, we also explore whether respondent demograph-
icsinfluence support for IO withdrawal. Appendix TableA16 examines support for
IO withdrawal using the pre-treatment question and the relevant outcome measure
from the vignette experiment. We find that respondents who are older and more edu-
cated (which could also be a proxy for political sophistication) are less likely to sup-
port IO withdrawals, which aligns with previous research showing that these factors
may matter for Americans’ foreign policy preferences (Balestrini, 2014; Kertzer,
2021). Gender and income flip signs across the outcome measures and are thus less
consistent findings, even though some prior work has found these demographic vari-
ables to be significant in understanding some US foreign policy preferences.52
5 Conclusion
Under what conditions does the US public support withdrawal from IOs and candi-
dates who propose this? This question is significant given the US’ leadership role in
IOs and international cooperation more broadly, and because the US is the most fre-
quent withdrawer from IOs. Furthermore, during 2016–2020 observers sometimes
referred to President Trump’s IO policy as a “withdrawal doctrine” (Haass, 2020).
But to date, we know little about the conditions under which Americans support
withdrawal from IOs and what factors shape their support. Researchers have not
yet studied whether Americans care about IO withdrawal and whether it matters for
choosing political candidates.
We argue that (1) announcing IO withdrawals activates Americans’ partisan pref-
erences regarding multilateralism and that (2) the US public is more likely to favor
withdrawing from an IO when it is framed as serving US national interests. We dis-
cuss why the public might change their support for a candidate based on IO with-
drawal policy. The nature of IO membership may make withdrawal relatively easy
for voters to recall at election time when the politician can prime them to remem-
ber the IO withdrawal. This may help politicians capture “what they have done for
voters lately” as it invokes opposition toward multilateralism. This can gain sup-
port from some voters at the ballot box. The US national interests frame may also
rally voters to conceive of IO withdrawal as a crisis-related achievement (Iyengar &
51 The experiments may also be picking up some learning or informational effects (see Ladd and Lenz
2009) in addition to framing effects. Nonetheless, the conclusion remains the same: how the politician
justifies IO withdrawal can significantly affect voter support for the policy and candidate.
52 On the gender gap in the use of force and support for defense spending, see Brooks & Valentino,
2011; Eichenberg, 2016; Crawford, Lawrence & Lebovic, 2017. On US women being less supportive of
free trade than men, see Kleinberg & Fordham, 2018; Brutger & Guisinger, 2021.
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838
I.von Borzyskowski, F.Vabulas
1 3
Kinder, 1987; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). We also reason that a US national interest
frame may sway public opinion by casting withdrawal as domestically beneficial,
which can help overcome respondents’ sunk cost fallacies, status quo bias/loss aver-
sion, and loyalty (all of which may otherwise steer them to remain in the institution).
The results of four survey experiments support our arguments and provide the
first experimental evidence on what drives US public opinion about withdrawing
from IOs. These results suggest that US politicians can raise and frame IO with-
drawals relative to US national interests to gain support in future elections. These
findings also show that there is an important domestic electoral component of inter-
national cooperation and withdrawal from IOs. This extends previous work that
broadly connects IOs to domestic policy by drawing a clear theory regarding elec-
toral politics and withdrawal (Putnam, 1998). It also builds on previous work on
public opinion towards EU (dis)integration, extending research to the US context.
Do these findings generalize? We test our general theory on the specific context of
US public opinion in 2018 and 2020 (two time points during the 2016–2020Trump
administration), and we leave it to future research to extend the generalizability of our
findings to other timeframes. Politicians’ before Trump have promoted IO withdrawal
as a foreign policy accomplishment. And IO withdrawal has been framed as relating
to national interests/sovereignty in other states as well (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas,
2019, Fig.4). While we cannot be sure that the empirical findings fully generalize
to other timeframes, there is reason for confidence. Our findings are consistent with
previous research that has been conducted in different countries. This research shows
that European voters supporting Brexit focus on how membership cessation could
improve national interests such as immigration (De Vries, 2017; De Vries et al.,
2021; Jurado etal., 2022; Walter, 2019, 2021a, b). Moreover, our findings are in line
with literature on IO legitimacy that underscores how elite framing and cueing can
shape voters’ considerations on an IO’s cachet (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015; Tallberg
& Zürn, 2019). Previous scholarship shows that voters’ preferences can enhance gov-
ernments’ bargaining power in international negotiations (Caraway etal., 2012; Hug
& König, 2002). Moreover, politicians incorporate public opinion into foreign policy
decision-making (Hagemann etal., 2017; Schneider, 2018; Tomz etal., 2020), espe-
cially when international cooperation is salient to the public (Wratil, 2018). Future
research can consider how and if politicians explicitly leverage public support if they
seek to withdrawfrom IOs.
Our findings are also important for understanding what might drive some of the
different stages of IO life cycles. Like other articles in this Special Issue, we move
away from the state as the unit of analysis. We unpack the black box of the state and
start to shed light on how public opinion might affect states’ membership in IOs.
This introduces the possibility that various stages of IO life cycles are not just driven
by the IO’s effectiveness or outputs but also by domestic electoral politics.
Our findings are also crucial in expanding our understanding of the backlash
toward international institutions. Our results challenge the notion of a broad back-
lash against IOs (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2025) and the liberal international
order by highlighting the nuances of partisanship and cueing in support for IO with-
drawal. In some respects, the experimental results can inspire cautious optimism
about international cooperation (Copelovitch etal., 2020). The data show that even
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839
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Public support forwithdrawal frominternational…
when IOs create challenging environments for the US—as presented in each of the
experimental vignettes—two thirds of the public still values staying in IOs as a base-
line perspective. This emphasizes the long view of IO life cycles that is underscored
in this Special Issue. In other words, the US public is not nonchalant about IO with-
drawal and regards international cooperation as ongoing and important.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https:// doi.
org/ 10. 1007/ s11558- 024- 09539-2.
Acknowledgements We thank David Bearce, Ryan Brutger, Stephen Chaudoin, Ricky Clark, Lisa Dell-
muth, Janina Dill, Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni,Julia Gray, Brian Greenhill, Alexandra Guisinger, Ayse Kaya,
Joshua Kertzer, Lisa Martin, Jon Pevehouse, Jonathan Renshon, Duncan Snidal, Alex Thompson, Lora Anne
Viola, Stefanie Walter, Jessica Weeks, Chris Wratil, and attendees at presentations at APSA, ISA, VIPES,
UW-Madison, Oxford University, University College London, HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem, and the IO
Death and Decline workshop in Brussels for helpful comments and feedback. We are grateful to Charles
Crabtree for his advice and financial support, and Mia Caglieris for excellent research assistance.
Funding Open access funding provided by SCELC, Statewide California Electronic Library Consortium
Data availability Replication files and online appendices are available on the RIO website.
Declarations
The authors do not have financial or non-financial interests that are directly or indirectly related to the work
submitted for publication.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permis-
sion directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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Authors and Aliations
InkenvonBorzyskowski1· FelicityVabulas2
* Felicity Vabulas
felicity.vabulas@pepperdine.edu
Inken von Borzyskowski
inken.borzyskowski@politics.ox.ac.uk
1 Oxford University, Oxford, UK
2 Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, USA
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