China’s Assertive Foreign Policy and Global Visions Under Xi Jinping

Abstract

China, which has made a major economic breakthrough, has become one of the most important actors in international politics by increasing its military power in recent years. China's increasing power and influence in the international arena arouses increasing curiosity about the country's foreign policy. With Xi Jinping becoming president, China began to display a more assertive attitude or behavior on many issues. This study basically seeks an answer to the question of what differences Xi Jinping brought to Chinese foreign policy. What kind of changes do these differences lead to in Chinese foreign policy? In this study, the general tendencies and directions of Chinese foreign policy during the Xi Jinping period are discussed. The assertive foreign policy approach that Xi Jinping is trying to implement is analyzed. In this context, the visions of "Chinese dream", "new type of great power relations", "new type of international relations", “Belt and Road Initiative" and "a community with a common future for humanity", which reflect Xi's assertive foreign policy approach, are examined. At the same time, challenges to the assertive foreign policy implemented under Xi Jinping are discussed. The study mainly questions the extent to which Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy approach is successful. The study concludes that Xi Jinping's active foreign policy approach has not increased China's sphere of influence in the international arena to the extent expected. As China becomes more visible in the international arena, the country's foreign policy challenges seem to be increasing.

Full text

1. Introduction
Since the late 1970s, China has integrated with the global economy and has shown a great economic
development. By the second decade of the 21st century, it became the world's largest economy in
some economic measurements. In addition to its economic development, it also showed great
military development. The increase in its material power also increases the uncertainty about
Chinese foreign policy. It is wondered which direction China will take in foreign policy in the future.
The change in Chinese foreign policy has become more visible with Xi Jinping administration. Unlike
previous leaders, President Xi has taken more active and self-confident initiatives in foreign policy.
The Xi administration began to pursue an assertive foreign policy that did not shy away from
showcasing China's growing power. Under Xi, China has taken ambitious initiatives to reshape its
immediate neighbourhood and the international environment. However, during the Xi
administration, there was also a noticeable increase in the challenges China faced in foreign policy.
The increase in the number of countries wary of China's growing material power is one of these
challenges.
This study seeks to answer the question of how China's foreign policy stance has changed under Xi
Jinping. What are the foreign policy orientations and goals of China's new administration? How do
China's new orientations affect the country's foreign relations? This study first analyses the general
Zekeriyya Akdağ
İnönü University, Faculty of Economics
and Administrative Sciences,
Department of Political Science and
International Relations, Malatya,
Türkiye, zekeriyya.akdag@inonu.edu.tr
Abstract: China, which has made a major economic breakthrough, has become one of the
most important actors in international politics by increasing its military power in recent
years. China's increasing power and influence in the international arena arouses
increasing curiosity about the country's foreign policy. With Xi Jinping becoming
president, China began to display a more assertive attitude or behavior on many issues.
This study basically seeks an answer to the question of what differences Xi Jinping brought
to Chinese foreign policy. What kind of changes do these differences lead to in Chinese
foreign policy? In this study, the general tendencies and directions of Chinese foreign
policy during the Xi Jinping period are discussed. The assertive foreign policy approach
that Xi Jinping is trying to implement is analyzed. In this context, the visions of "Chinese
dream", "new type of great power relations", "new type of international relations", “Belt
and Road Initiative" and "a community with a common future for humanity", which reflect
Xi's assertive foreign policy approach, are examined. At the same time, challenges to the
assertive foreign policy implemented under Xi Jinping are discussed. The study mainly
questions the extent to which Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy approach is successful.
The study concludes that Xi Jinping's active foreign policy approach has not increased
China's sphere of influence in the international arena to the extent expected. As China
becomes more visible in the international arena, the country's foreign policy challenges
seem to be increasing.
Keywords: Xi Jinping, Chinese Foreign Policy, Assertive Foreign Policy, New Global
Visions
Received: 21.01.2024
Accepted: 22.03.2024
Available Online: 07.04.2024
Research Article
Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi
Journal of Academic Inquiries
ISSN: 1306-7885 E-ISSN: 2602-3016
Publisher: Sakarya University
Vol. 19, No. 1, 204-221, 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17550/akademikincelemeler/1423366
Cite as(APA 7): Akdağ Z. (2024). China’s assertive foreign policy and global visions Under Xi Jinping, Journal of Academic Inquiries, 19(1), 204-221.
https://doi.org/10.17550/akademikincelemeler/1423366
This is an open access paper distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
China’s Assertive Foreign Policy and Global Visions Under Xi Jinping

Zekeriyya Akdağ
205
trends and orientations of Chinese foreign policy under the Xi Jinping presidency. New trends and
orientations in China's foreign policy are analyzed in the context of social constructivism.
Constructivism offers a nuanced perspective for understanding and explaining Chinese foreign
policy under Xi Jinping.
This study consists of three main parts: Firstly, the conceptualisation of assertive foreign policy is
examined. Policies and discourses reflecting assertive foreign policy will be emphasised. Assertive
foreign policy visions and initiatives will be discussed. Finally, the challenges faced by the Xi Jinping
administration in foreign policy will be discussed.
2. Theoretical Framework
Social Constructivism focuses on the role of ideas, norms, and identity in shaping state behavior. It
provides valuable insights into the ideational factors shaping Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping,
highlighting the role of cultural identity, norms, and diplomatic initiatives in shaping China's
approach to international affairs.
Constructivists think the structures in international politics consist of social relations as well as the
distribution of material capabilities. Three components make up social structures: practices,
material resources, and shared knowledge. Constructivists focus on the aspect of social structures
defined as shared expectations, understandings, or knowledge (Wendt, 1995: 73).
Constructivists push us to consider the social construction of actors (Wendt, 2003: 7). According to
them, one of the main things that shape the functioning of international relations is actors' beliefs
and expectations about each other. These are primarily constituted by social rather than material
structures (Wendt, 2003: 20). States continuously adopt identities and reconstruct their identities
in relation to one another in the context of international politics (Wendt, 2003: 21).
International politics is based on social structures rather than purely material ones (Wendt, 1995:
71). Material forces produce effects at the end of their interaction with ideas (Wendt, 2003: 112).
States behave based on the notions they have created about themselves within the international
arena (Hudson and Day, 2020: 10). Ideas construct state preferences and interests in international
politics (Hudson and Day, 2020: 10). Actors behave according to their perceptions of others and
their surroundings (Wendt, 2003: 108).
Constructivists think ideas play a major role in shaping the definition of power and the nature of
interests (Wendt, 2003: 96). Cultural formations of shared ideas create norms and institutions at the
systemic level. Cultural formations make sense of the distribution of power either by shaping states'
perceptions of the distribution of power or by shaping their identities and interests (Wendt, 2003:
104).
Social Constructivism offers a good perspective to explain China's efforts to build alternative
international institutions and diplomatic initiatives that reflect its worldview. By formulating its
visions of global governance in the context of China's cultural heritage and historical contributions
to civilization, the Xi administration seeks to legitimize the country's role as a leading actor in
shaping the world of the future. This approach resonates with constructivist ideas about the role of
identity and historical memory in shaping state behavior and international relations.
3. Assertive and Self-Confident Foreign Policy
With the 2008 financial crisis, China became one of the most important actors in the global economy,
especially as the American and Western European economies were seen to be more fragile
(Lanteigne, 2020: 11). The rapid growth of China's economic power has grown even more significant
in the aftermath of the post-2008 global financial crisis, which has accompanied President Xi

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Jinping's expansion of the country's foreign policy. China became the second-largest economy in the
world in 2010, surpassing Japan. In terms of economic output, China surpassed the US in 2014
according to some economic metrics, such as purchasing power parity (PPP) (Lanteigne, 2020: 2-3).
China had become the second-biggest economy and the largest trading nation in the world when Xi
Jinping came to power (Bader, 2016: 6). China serves as the hub of a regional manufacturing network
that connected the nations of the Asia-Pacific. China has long been the world's largest manufacturing
nation and is the largest trading partner of many countries in many regions of the world (Bader,
2016: 6).
In PPP terms, China's share of world GDP rose from 4% in 1990 to over 19% in 2021, while the
United States' share fell from 22% to less than 16%. Meanwhile, China became the world's largest
exporter and largest importer in the 2010s. China became the largest trading partner of more than
120 countries, including other major economies (Tome, 2021: 111).
Despite the emergence of so-called “trade war” tensions with the United States in 2018 and 2019,
China recorded economic growth rates of 6.6% and 6.1%, respectively. Continued economic growth
makes it possible for China to compete as a great power (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 4). The new ideas of
the Xi era reflect China's growing importance in the international system and the great leap in its
economic, political and military power (Bader, 2016: 5).
China's dramatic economic growth has enabled it to greatly increase its defence spending. In 2001,
its defence budget was estimated at around US$ 50 billion. By 2017, this figure had risen to US$ 228
billion. This corresponds to an increase of more than 350 per cent (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 5).
China's military spending increased by 76% between 2011 and 2020. China is rapidly increasing its
share in total global military spending. In 2020, China's share of global military spending was 13%.
Although far from catching up with the US, China is rapidly overtaking other powers (Tome, 2021:
112). China seeks to be at the top of Asia's security hierarchy. Thus, it believes that it can overcome
US strategies to balance or contain China in the Indo-Pacific region (Song and Ai, 2023: 24).
China, which has managed to modernize its military rapidly, had 1,146 fourth and fifth generation
fighter jets and 71 modern submarines in 2021. In the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, these
figures were almost zero (Tome, 2021: 112). With two decades of double-digit budget growth, the
Chinese military has begun to change the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region. China has
managed to develop a huge fleet of ships capable of patrolling the South and East China Seas (Bader,
2016: 6). The huge transformation in the military capacity of the Chinese military paved the way for
the ruling elite to become more confident and pursue more assertive foreign policies. The rise in
China's economic and military power forms the material basis for the country to become an assertive
actor on a global scale.
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has become more active on the world stage with
increasing confidence. President Xi began to pursue policies centred on the more activist motto of
"strive for success" instead of the "bide your time, hide your shine, don't be in the forefront"
principles that underpinned Deng Xiaoping's passive diplomacy strategy (Shambaugh, 2020: 17).
The Xi administration has become more confident and proactive in using the country's increasing
power and influence to safeguard and achieve China's national interests (Zhang, 2015: 6-7). Under
Xi, China has become a more active actor in international relations than in previous decades.
China's behaviours and statements that seem to threaten the interests of Western countries and/or
their allies, especially the US, or are perceived as somehow against the status quo are called assertive
foreign policy (Turcsanyi, 2018: 4). While trying to protect its interests and position in the
international arena, China continues its long-standing strategy of avoiding conflict. China has an

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increasing willingness and ability to validate its claims and support them in new ways, both through
material power elements and at the discursive level (Turcsanyi, 2018: 4).
Since China now has global economic interests, it wants to act as a global power. Having significantly
improved its power capabilities, China seems willing to assert its interests openly, even at some
costs. China seeks a status that would be recognised as an equal by other great powers. It seeks to
achieve such a power status primarily through persuasion and peaceful means. However, if it fails
to do so, it retains more coercive forms of diplomacy as an option (Baviera, 2016: 73).
Under Xi Jinping, the traditional low-profile foreign policy has been replaced by a policy of "striving
for success". According to Yan Xuetong, one of China's leading international relations experts, the
new Chinese foreign policy no longer focuses on keeping a low profile. It is based on demonstrating
its capabilities, especially at the regional level (Yan, 2014: 153). According to Yan, the new Chinese
foreign policy centred on "striving for success" is guided by a political orientation, assumption of
responsibility and political virtue. Under President Xi, China's main goal is "national rejuvenation".
The "strive for success" strategy is a means to maximise China's power (Yan, 2014: 164-170).
Although Xi's foreign policy approach seems more assertive at times, it cannot be said to be
belligerent. Like its predecessors, the Xi administration does not envisage the use of force as the first
option in solving problems (Keith, 2018: 249). While China's greater assertiveness in foreign policy
is perceived negatively, especially in Western countries, it has the opposite perception within China.
Chinese analysts see China's increasing assertiveness as a natural reaction of a stronger country
seeking to be more influential in the international arena (Turcsanyi, 2018: 11).
The perception of some of China's foreign policy orientations as anti-Western is one of the reasons
fuelling assertive foreign policy discourses (Turcsanyi, 2018: 2). China's increasing material
capacity, increasing public pressure on Chinese leaders, and other countries' more active stance
towards China in related fields are among the factors that feed assertive foreign policy (Turcsanyi,
2018: 4).
The failure of Western economies to recover for a long time from the global financial crisis in 2008
seriously affected the global prestige of the West. In contrast, China, which managed to overcome
the crisis quickly. China's hosting of the 2008 Olympics boosted confidence in the country and
inspired nationalist sentiments. Expectations have arisen in the Chinese public that their country,
which has become richer and more powerful, will pursue a more effective foreign policy. After more
than three decades of rapid economic growth, China had made a significant leap in the hierarchy of
power and wealth. For Chinese policymakers, the goals of modernisation and the acquisition of
wealth finally seemed attainable. It was believed that the time had come for China to expand its
influence and achieve greater status in the international arena (Baviera, 2016: 60). Chinese decision-
makers believed that their increasingly powerful country was ready to take its place among the
world's great powers.
The perception that the 2008 crisis changed the global balance of power in favor of China has been
one of the main factor fueling the assertive foreign policy. Chinese nationalism, which has continued
to grow steadily in the post-Cold War period, is another factor supporting assertive foreign policy.
The feeling of internal insecurity caused by the growing instability in certain regions of China
(Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong) is another factor (Turcsanyi, 2018: 3).
The sense of insecurity created in China by the US' strategic prioritisation of the Asia-Pacific region
in international politics and its orientation towards balancing China is one of the factors that
triggered the new assertive foreign policy (Turcsanyi, 2018: 5). The "pivot to Asia" policy announced
by the US in 2011 aimed to revitalise US alliances in the region. Chinese policymakers feared that
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the economic component of this US rebalancing towards Asia, would

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encircle China. In response to this policy, China sought new strategic initiatives, including policies to
enhance its maritime power (Baviera, 2016: 61).
Chinese foreign policy has been undergoing changes as a result of the greater political, military or
economic capabilities the country has attained. It has also undergone a notable shift due to the
accumulation of power in the hands of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Since 2012, Xi has sought to
centralise power in his hands (Cuesta, 2021: 5). Personally very active in diplomacy, Xi has visited
all continents and many countries. Xi emphasises that China should play a more prominent role,
especially in global governance and multilateral diplomacy (Shambaugh, 2020: 17).
The Xi administration has been very active, assertive and action-oriented in foreign policy. With
China's growing economic power and ambitions in recent years, its diplomacy has become
increasingly "proactive". Key components of Chinese foreign policy under Xi have included
resolutely upholding China's maritime interests, increasing self-assurance in its capacity to take the
lead in international fora, and initiatives to create networks that will bolster China's standing in the
East Asia area. (Panda and Ding, 2021: 8).
China's bolder and more confident stance in foreign policy can be seen in its foreign policy rhetoric
signalling its growing power, its increasing willingness to use threats of force in various fields, and
its stronger responses to problems in US-China relations (Turcsanyi, 2018: 249). China's behavior
in geopolitically important maritime areas, especially in the South China Sea, is important example
of its assertive foreign policy approach (Turcsanyi, 2018: 24). In the South China and East China
Seas, China has not hesitated to use its armed forces as a threat to support its claims over disputed
maritime areas. Since 2013, Chinese military actions in the Senkaku islands region have been a factor
fuelling tensions in Sino-Japan relations (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 5). Claiming a large part of the
maritime area in the South China Sea is under its sovereignty, China has established new military
zones to defend its claims (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 5).
The effort to fulfil growing nationalist desires and expectations for China to reclaim its rightful
position in the region and the world also triggered a hardening of rhetoric (Benvenuti et al. 2022:
6). According to the Xi administration, regaining the status of a true great power is a natural
consequence of "standing up". China's effort to demonstrate its strength explains the aggressive
"wolf warrior" diplomacy that has characterised China's foreign policy since 2019 (Benvenuti et al.
2022: 6). In the midst of the Covid-19 outbreak and in order to counter criticism of China over the
way it fought the outbreak, Chinese diplomats used highly aggressive language. The term "wolf
warrior" was used for these diplomats, who used harsh rhetoric to protect China's interests. This
"wolf warrior" diplomacy led by senior Chinese officials further increased the division between
China and the West (Deng, 2022: 217).
China has gained strong international visibility in recent years. Chinese diplomats no longer hesitate
to loudly voice China's claims in foreign affairs (Lincot, 2019: 9). Under Xi, China's diplomatic
spokespersons have responded to criticism from other countries with increasingly harsh
statements. Therefore, the language and style adopted by China during the Xi administration have
been diametrically opposed to those of its previous periods (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 5). In addition to
the hardening of rhetoric, Chinese foreign policymakers have launched ambitious initiatives aimed
at reshaping the international order.
4. China’s New Global Visions
China's assertive attitudes and discourses in foreign policy in the new period are clearly seen in some
of the visions put forward by the Xi administration. These visions are largely vague and undefined
ideas (Zeng, 2020: 2). Even when they lack specific strategic plans, they are not purely rhetorical or

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vacuous (Zeng, 2020: 2). Vagueness leaves room for other international actors to adopt these visions
and interpret them to their own interests (Zeng, 2020: 14).
One of the main function of these foreign policy concepts is to act as a catchphrase to express
intention in order to draw attention and motivate action (Zeng, 2020: 2). China’s new visions are a
kind of power assertion and gauging support both domestically and internationally. The global
discussion of these visions is perceived as an acknowledgment of China's rising status as one of the
great powers setting the global agenda (Zeng, 2020: 3).
China's global visions are ideas that reflect its desire to peacefully change and transform the regional
and the global order to its advantage (Song and Ai, 2023: 24; Tome, 2021: 108). They seek to
emphasize that the country's growing economic and military power does not pose a threat to other
countries; on the contrary, China's rise will continue to benefit everyone (Goldstein, 2020:178).
These visions play a major role in creating a positive image for Chinese government at home and
abroad.
4.1. Chinese dream
After taking office, Xi Jinping set the vision of the "Chinese dream" as one of the main goals. The term
was used to imply national rejuvenation, economic prosperity and the building of a better society. It
refers to the goal of becoming a "moderately well-off society" in the medium term and a "modern
socialist country" in the long term (Baviera, 2016: 61).
In a speech in 2012, Xi stated that the struggles since the Opium War have created bright prospects
for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Achieving rejuvenation, he said, "has been the greatest
dream of the Chinese people since the dawn of modern times". Xi sloganised the rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation as the Chinese dream. The Chinese dream or China's rejuvenation implies the
building of a prosperous, strong and harmonious socialist country (Xi, 2017: 63-64). China's revival
is aimed to be realised by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.
According to Xi, the main goal of China's domestic and foreign policy is to emerge from the quagmire
of the century of humiliation and achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Xi analyses
this process in three stages: Mao's stage of rising up, Deng's stage of prosperity, and the stage of
strength that Xi promises to realise. This last stage aims to realise socialist modernisation,
transforming China into a "great modern socialist country" and a "global leader in terms of combined
national power and international power" (Feng, 2019: 13-14). The Chinese dream of national
rejuvenation reflects nationalist aspirations of wealth, power and prestige (Deng, 2022: 9).
The Chinese dream aims to unite the country around a common identity and regain the glorious past
(Kırımlı, 2023: 133). It aims for the country to collectively reach a bright future. It implies that
individuals will also receive their share of the prosperity and glory that the country will achieve. The
main emphasis is on the country's achievement of a prosperous and bright future (Kırımlı, 2023:
134).
In addition to greater confidence in the country's economic future, the Chinese Dream reflected the
idea of revitalising China as a major economic power. The extension of these concepts to the regional
level came to be explored later, when Xi began describing a "Asia-Pacific Dream" that would bring
China and other regions of Asia together in mutual progress and prosperity (Lanteigne, 2020: 12).
In a speech in 2014, Xi said that he expected other countries to understand and support the Chinese
dream. He stated that the Chinese dream aims to ensure the prosperity of not only the Chinese
people but also all other peoples. He emphasised that the Chinese dream seeks to achieve peace,
development and cooperation in the international arena within the framework of the win-win
principle (Global Times, 2014).

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Xi has consistently claimed that China has made major new contributions to global peace and
development. In this respect, Xi attributes to China the role of a country that "builds world peace",
"protects international order" and "contributes to global development". Among these roles, he sees
"making new and greater contributions to humanity" as the most important mission for China (Feng,
2019: 20). These objectives serve as a crucial point of reference for China's diplomacy and
international standing (Panda and Ding, 2021: 3). Such ambitious foreign policy discourses, even if
they do not fully reflect the current situation, gain importance in terms of setting an important
agenda at home and abroad.
4.2. A new type of great power relations
One of the policies proposed by the more confident and assertive foreign policy approach of the Xi
administration was a "new type of great power relations". This conceptualisation, which aims to
shape the international environment in China's favour, focuses on relations with great powers.
With this strategy, the Xi administration proposed that Sino-US relations should be "away from
conflict or escalation", based on "mutual respect" and "win-win co-operation". It was implied that
the relations between the two countries should not be based on the competition between the rising
power and the current hegemonic power, that both countries should respect each other's
fundamental interests, and that both sides would gain from the cooperation between the two
countries (Baviera, 2016: 66).
This conceptualization was put forward in the hope of elevating China's role in bilateral relations,
and therefore the US taking China more seriously (Zeng, 2020: 16). With this strategy, China seeks
to be treated on an equal footing with the US and to have its core interests recognised by the US
(Baviera, 2016: 66). In his meeting with Obama in 2013, Xi stated that the Pacific Ocean has enough
space for China and the US. These statements implied strategic equality between China and the US
(Godement, 2013: 6).
Since the US remains the only power capable of limiting China's future development after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Sino-American relationship is of particular importance (Dittmer,
2017: xii). In this respect, the new type of great power relations was essentially envisaged to make
US-China relations work. Because managing the highly complex Sino-US relations is of great
importance for China. Chinese policymakers recognise that a stable and cooperative relationship
with the United States is vital to sustaining China's economic development. Nevertheless, the
bilateral relationship is extremely unclear and difficult due to the enormous contrasts in the two
countries' objectives. Therefore, the Xi administration has introduced this strategy to keep the
relationship on a manageable course. Chinese decision-makers aim to avoid conflict and
confrontation with the conceptualization. They also imply mutual respect for each other's
fundamental interests and cooperation within the framework of the win-win principle (Zhang, 2015:
13-14).
By proposing this new model of relations, President Xi sought to emphasize that cooperation
between the two great powers would be beneficial both bilaterally and globally (Deng, 2022: 38). He
prioritises the abandonment of any zero-sum approach in Sino-American relations and instead the
development of a relationship based on mutual respect for each side's fundamental national
interests (Freeman, 2020: 51-52). Aiming to avoid a high-level US-China confrontation, this strategy
emphasises cooperation over competition.
This conceptualisation is important for the new Chinese administration to take the initiative to
define and control the bilateral relationship. In the past, attempts to describe the nature of the
bilateral relationship have generally originated from the United States. In 2005, the concept of
'responsible stakeholder' proposed by US officials was the most prominent. The conceptualisation

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is a Chinese attempt to define the nature of China-US relations on a more equal footing. This policy
proposal also reflects a demand for the United States to change its approach towards China, with
greater respect for China's core interests (Zhang, 2015: 14).
Unlike its predecessors, the Xi administration has the confidence not to shy away from confrontation
with the United States. The new administration has not hesitated to challenge the US wherever
necessary. It did not prioritise pleasing the US (Singh, 2023: 84). The essence of China's new foreign
policy is that it is perceived as a superpower on an equal footing with the US (Pradt, 2016: 201).
The goals motivating China's great power diplomacy are: Managing rivalry with the US; preventing
the emergence of a US-led security architecture in East Asia; promoting multipolarity; preventing
the West from acting as a whole to exert pressure; building a foundation for China's regional and
global leadership; transforming its immediate neighbourhood into a strategic area of growth and
influence; and creating a favourable international environment to sustain its economic development
(Deng, 2022: 16).
The great power diplomacy aims to soften the rivalry between China and other great powers. Xi
called for a new model of great power diplomacy with the US and described Russia as China's "most
important strategic partner" (Godement, 2013: 6). The then Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasised
that China would build a new model of diplomacy with great powers and take a more active role in
international affairs (Godement, 2013: 6).
China's interests and fields of activity have gained a global dimension in recent years. In this context,
Xi talked about building a new great power diplomacy for overall stability and balanced growth. He
aims to develop relations within the framework of a new type of relations with the US, a
comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, a partnership of peace, growth and prosperity
with Europe, a partnership of unity and cooperation with the BRICS countries, a common
development with African countries, and a high-level comprehensive cooperation partnership with
Latin American countries (Singh, 2023: 88). The search for new types of great power relations is a
reflection of China's endeavour to take its place among the great powers. On the one hand, China
declares that it is a global great power, on the other hand, it expresses that it has a different vision
of great power relations.
4.3. New type of international relations
In addition to aiming to redesign relations with major powers, the Xi administration also seeks to
redesign international relations in general. At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping stated that
they would promote a "new kind of international relations". He stressed that China would help other
developing countries and expand the influence of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO). They will seek to strengthen the influence of developing countries in global affairs (Gyu, 2022:
2).
In a 2014 speech, Xi Jinping proposed the development of "neighbourhood diplomacy" to expand
China's diplomatic strategy under new conditions. He emphasised the need to transform China's
neighbouring regions into a community of common destiny for mutual benefit (Global Times, 2014).
Xi called for further enhancing cooperation with other developing countries and closely integrating
China's development with the destiny of other developing countries (Global Times, 2014). In this
respect, developing countries are seen as China's natural allies.
Another notable outward-looking initiative of the Xi administration has been the conceptualisation
of "unity of common destiny". This conceptualisation was put forward to improve China's relations
with a variety of nations in general and with its neighbors in particular (Zhang, 2015: 14). Although
the Xi administration has global ambitions, its main priority area has always been its immediate

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neighbourhood. The ideal of unity of common destiny is expected to start from the immediate
neighbourhood and spread to other regions.
Xi Jinping conceptualises another foreign policy vision as "the community of the common future for
humanity". This concept expresses the desire to avoid a zero-sum understanding of international
relations. By building a community of a common future based on communication, mutual respect
and sincerity, it implies avoiding a competition between countries that could lead to destruction
(Singh, 2023: 78).
Xi envisages this vision as "a network of partnership linking all regions of the world" (Singh, 2023:
78). He states that principles such as peace, development, justice, democracy and freedom, which
are common values of humanity, will be seen as guiding principles (Singh, 2023: 79). Chinese leaders
consistently emphasize peace and development at international meetings. They present peace and
development as a global shared value (Song and Ai, 2023: 22). Since the international community is
considered to have intertwined interests, the construction of a common future is seen as a
fundamental need.
The "community of the common future" seeks to define common goals for all humanity, regardless
of any differences (Song and Ai, 2023: 14). It represents China's understanding of international
relations and its solution to global issues (Zeng, 2020: 17). This vision also reflects the desire for a
world order in which China can play a greater role on a global scale (Zeng, 2020: 17).
Chinese politicians envision that the understanding of harmony enshrined in China's traditional
philosophical texts will be an alternative for solving global problems and will lead to peace and
prosperity on a global scale (Song and Ai, 2023: 22). The effort to adapt the values of harmony, virtue
and benevolence found in classical Chinese culture to contemporary international relations also
aims to prevent a strong China from being perceived as an aggressive and revisionist actor (Rolland,
2020: 50).
The new model of international relations is targeted at the international community and aims to
project a positive image of China's growth. It tries to convey the idea that China's economic
development is not only compatible with economic growth in its neighbourhood, but also necessary
for its neighbours. Thus, the message is given that both China and its neighbours benefit within the
framework of a win-win relationship. Behind this new understanding of international relations is
China's intention to avoid being seen as a revisionist power and to prevent its actions from being
perceived as a threat by its neighbours (Cuesta, 2021: 8). Although many of these visions remain at
the level of rhetoric, they are important for China's global ambitions. As China grows stronger, it is
trying to both strengthen the country's global image and shape the international arena within the
framework of its own ambitions by introducing new initiatives towards the international
community.
4.4. Rising assertiveness in international governance
The Xi administration's new diplomacy approach aims to create new platforms that China can
influence to a great extent without directly challenging the existing international structure. Creating
a new international environment that can limit strategic pressures from the US is of great
importance for the new administration. Another point is to create an environment more favourable
to China's interests (Singh, 2023: 73).
In international meetings, Xi has consistently stated that they will open the country to the world
more and more, taking care to present China as the leader of the liberal economic order. China has
so far been a major beneficiary of the liberal and open economic order. Thanks to its integration into
the liberal economic order, it has grown from a poor and backward economy to one of the world's

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213
largest economies. As China's economic power has grown, protectionist sentiments have started to
rise in countries such as the US, the defender of the liberal economic order. The protectionist
economic policies of the Trump administration have brought the two countries face to face. While
Trump implemented protectionist policies against China, China started to advocate liberal free trade
(Singh, 2023: 85). Although China's economy is not a full-market economy, Xi's statements at the
2017 World Economic Forum was significant in its advocacy for a liberalised economic order. At the
Forum, Xi stated that China would be determined to promote the liberalisation and facilitation of
international trade and investment. He also stated that there would be no winner in any trade war
(Singh, 2023: 86).
China calls for a new global trade agreement that better reflects the interests of developing
countries. At the same time, China is actively involved in regional initiatives to promote free trade.
However, China remains wary of international organisations in which it does not participate and
which seek to balance it. In this respect, China has been sensitive to American attempts to forge a
security order in the Asia-Pacific by assembling all of its regional partners into a coalition that would
aim to counterbalance China's power. For example, China has been sceptical of US attempts to bring
together Australia, Canada, Japan and Southeast Asian countries through the Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP). China, which was excluded from TPP meetings despite being a major economic
power, was concerned that the TPP would be used as a tool to control its regional economic power.
However, following the US withdrawal from the TPP in 2017, China found itself in a stronger position
to suggest alternative international initiatives (Lanteigne, 2020: 14).
At a conference in 2014, President Xi stated that Asian countries should solve Asian problems. Xi
declared that he would do more to protect the security of Asians and sought alternatives to the
American "strategic axis" (Keith, 2018: 249). With the entry into force of the RCEP, the largest trade
bloc has come to life. Bringing together 15 Asian countries, this agreement became an indispensable
factor in bringing the East Asian economies closer together. This economic partnership was an
important step in bringing many Asian economies closer to China and creating an economic bloc
with China at the centre (Cuesta, 2021: 8). China's spearheading of the RCEP signalled its desire to
assume a leading role in the Asia-Pacific (Singh, 2023: 74).
President Xi has also taken a more active role since taking office in creating new international
regimes that more accurately represent China's foreign policy objectives. China, a key BRICS
influencer, provided assistance to the New Development Bank's establishment as a BRICS financial
organization in 2014. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which will promote
infrastructure development in developing countries, was also established by China in 2014
(Lanteigne, 2020: 14). This bank was established to meet the infrastructure needs of developing
Asian countries and help implement China's Belt and Road Initiative projects (Baviera, 2016: 63).
The Belt and Road Initiative, AIIB and the New Development Bank are the most prominent strategies
of assertive foreign policy. The emerging global strategies aim to increase China's influence at the
regional and international levels by centring on China's economic power (Wang, 2017: 42). Western
countries are generally concerned that China will use these global initiatives to gain geostrategic
influence over its neighbours (Baviera, 2016: 64). These Chinese-led financial institutions are
gaining importance as an alternative to Western-backed organisations such as the IMF and the
World Bank.
China's growing diplomatic and "structural" power is manifested in its ability to get what it wants
through skilful engagement across international organisations and norms. Besides actively
participating in international organisations, China plays a central role in the development of some
initiatives such as the AIIB, SCO and BRICS (Lanteigne, 2020: 15).

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China's partnership portfolio has increased significantly under the Xi administration. Between 2013
and 2019, China formed strategic alliances with 103 countries, up from 65 in 2013. The expansion
of China's partnerships under the Xi administration is important for the realization of the active
diplomacy model. In the new era, China has sought to develop a unique diplomatic approach in line
with its great power role (Liu, Wu and Wu, 2021: 192).
China was labeled a "norm shaker" during the Mao era because it openly contested the rules and
regulations imposed by Western powers. It was considerably easier to be a "norm taker" in the post-
Mao era, accepting and even embracing interaction with international regimes and institutions,
especially the West. However, under Xi, China has shown a marked increase in its willingness to
"make norms" (and/or "shape norms") by creating new organizations, institutions, and policies
(Lanteigne, 2020: 15). China now aims to be a norm-making as well as a norm-receiving actor.
4.5. Belt and road initiative
The ambitious global ambitions of the Xi Jinping administration have begun to manifest themselves
most concretely with the development of the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) strategy. The BRI was
proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013. The economic and strategic effects of this multi-billion dollar mega-
initiative, which has increased China's influence in the world under Xi, are still emerging. The
initiative, which has made China an important stakeholder in global development, is the most
important evidence of China's growing international power (Singh, 2023: 84).
The initiative aims to create an expanding network of railways, energy pipelines and motorways
connecting China to the rest of Central, South and Southeast Asia; the construction of around 50
special economic zones; and the creation of port networks linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans to
Europe and Africa (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 5). In addition, China envisaged developing a "Arctic Silk
Road" in 2018. This project aims to reach Northern Europe from China via Siberia and the Arctic
Ocean. Due to climate change and global warming, this route is becoming increasingly inaccessible
for shipping in summer (Lanteigne, 2020: 15).
The initiative has the vision of establishing a link between the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.
It aims to build infrastructure links and strengthen existing ones, promote cross-border
coordination of development strategies and the opening of new markets (Baviera, 2016: 62). BRI is
a long-term and ambitious regional and interregional development program (Song and Ai, 2023: 24).
With the BRI, China is trying to convince other countries that it will increase world prosperity by
realizing the infrastructure investments and reforms needed in the global economy (Goldstein,
2020:187).
The initiative is vital to fulfil some basic needs, such as securing China's access to energy resources,
creating a secure zone in its neighbourhood and providing new markets for Chinese products
(Baviera, 2016: 63). In order to counter to the anti-China coalition and break free from diplomatic
isolation, China is forming a coalition with developing nations in response to pressure from
developed nations like the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia (Gyu, 2022: 2). In this sense, China is
trying to strengthen its economic relations with developing countries through this initiative.
The BRI is an important tool to realise Xi's "China Dream". The initiative is expected to make a major
contribution to creating a China-centred order by reviving the country's historical central role
(Singh, 2023: 73; Panda and Ding, 2021: 3). This ambitious project envisages the creation of a
massive network of transnational infrastructure programmes, energy pipelines, power plants, ports,
railways and highways to connect China with Asia, Africa and Europe. With this project, China seeks
to diversify its energy supply during a period of economic slowdown, export surplus labour and
construction materials, create a network of economic interdependencies that will consolidate its
regional leadership and counterbalance the US alliance structure in Asia. However, unfavourable

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215
trade balances and debt burdens with some countries may reduce the expected benefits for these
countries (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 12). Such a situation may trigger reactions against the progress of
infrastructure investments. Although not fully implemented, the initiative is an indicator of China's
growing global economic power and status.
5. Foreign Policy Challenges Faced by the Xi Jinping Administration
Despite its more assertive and proactive stance, the Xi Jinping administration confronts more
difficulties than its predecessors in handling China's foreign relations (Zhang, 2015: 15). In the
second decade of the 21st century, the international environment facing China has become much
more turbulent. Although China's material power continues to increase, the challenges it faces in
foreign policy have also begun to increase.
China faces an increasingly unfavourable regional environment, especially in the Asia Pacific region.
One reason for this is the apparent contradictions in China's various diplomatic agendas. China faces
an increasing challenge in reconciling the contradictions between its interest in maintaining regional
peace and its desire to protect its fundamental national interests (Zhang, 2015: 15).
China's new leadership has adopted a more proactive attitude to defend its national interests in
maritime territorial conflicts for a number of reasons, including the sensitivity of national
sovereignty, growing rivalry over ocean resources, and domestic nationalist pressure. However, this
tough diplomatic stance has negative effects on China's broader strategic interests and position, such
as maintaining regional stability. Chinese leaders have to maintain regional stability without
harming China's national interests and protect national interests without causing conflicts (Zhang,
2015: 15-16). It is becoming increasingly difficult for them to maintain the delicate balance between
long-term interests and short-term interests.
China's ability to influence the East Asia region in its favor is still constrained, despite its expanding
economic and geopolitical power (Zhang, 2015: 7). Another major challenge is the growing concern
of neighbouring and regional countries in East Asia about the geopolitical ambitions of an
increasingly agressive China (Zhang, 2015: 7). Increasing tensions between China and other
claimants in the South and East China Sea conflicts are creating more space for the United States. It
puts China at a disadvantage in the region where a new order is being sought with the US's strategic
balancing initiatives. The Xi administration will have a far harder time than its predecessors
establishing and preserving the kind of stable regional environment that is essential to China's
economic development. (Zhang, 2015: 17).
Although China is a major economic power, economic incentives do not seem to be effective beyond
a certain level in relations with Europe and many other countries. China's actions towards many of
its neighbours hardly match President Xi's visions. While China under Xi is fighting for a status equal
to that of the United States and demanding a "just" international order, its behaviour, especially in
the Asia-Pacific, is perceived as aspiring to hegemony. The Xi administration displays a sharp
unilateralism in its aggressive assertion of its core interests, contrary to its vision of a common
future community. "Wolf warrior" diplomats aggressively defending China's interests can also be
perceived as a sign of diplomatic corruption. These wolf-warrior diplomats create an image that is
the opposite of the peaceful country image that China has been trying to build for years (Singh, 2023:
105).
The US rebalancing policy with its "pivot to Asia" strategy has further strained China's relations with
the countries with which it has disagreements (Zhang, 2015: 7). This "rebalancing" strategy of the
US endeavours to maintain US supremacy in the Asia Pacific even if it does not contain China's
growing influence. Therefore, unlike previous periods, the new Chinese administration is facing
increasing geopolitical pressures from the US (Zhang, 2015: 16). Since 2010, the US's increasingly

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hardening policies, which started with the strategic prioritisation of the Asia-Pacific region within
the framework of the "pivot to Asia" policy, have significantly changed the international
environment that China faces. Starting with the "pivot to Asia" strategy, continuing with the "trade
wars" and considering China as the most important competitor, the US started to adopt an
increasingly harsh attitude towards China.
With the Trump administration, the US has positioned itself as China's global rival. The cooperative
interaction in US-China relations was quickly replaced by competition and antagonism (Freeman,
2020: 52). During Trump's presidency, the US Indo-Pacific strategy entailed full competition with
China. With the Trump administration, the US-China rivalry has reached a hostile role and intensity.
The Covid-19 pandemic, on the other hand, led to the further escalation of the trade wars. Economic
divergence and mutual hostile statements have strained bilateral relations (Deng, 2022: 28). The
pandemic accelerated great power rivalry, with the US and China entering a more challenging cycle
of competition (Deng, 2022: 218).
One of the biggest challenge to China's global image was the Corona Virus outbreak that began in
2019 (Panda and Ding, 2021: 4). The outbreak was first seen in Wuhan, China in December 2019.
The outbreak spread from China, affecting millions worldwide and causing thousands of deaths.
China's method of combating the outbreak led to various criticisms at home and abroad. The then
US president Donald Trump openly blamed China, calling the coronavirus a "Chinese virus" (Panda
and Ding, 2021: 4). Since the Covid-19 outbreak first emerged in Wuhan, China, being labelled as a
disease of Chinese origin damaged China's international image (Kobierecka, 2022: 7).
The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the dangers of China's development model, which seeks to
improve trade, communication and connectivity between countries, but relies on controlling
people's voices, news and information (Panda and Ding, 2021: 4). The pandemic has led to further
questioning of China's global leadership role, leading to a loss of confidence in Chinese-backed
initiatives. Even after the spread of the coronavirus slowed down, many countries were wary of any
rapprochement with China. A more questioning attitude towards China's governance model and its
approach to the international community began to emerge. At the same time, the pandemic has
brought the growing dependence of many Asian and emerging economies on China to the fore
(Panda and Ding, 2021: 5). Following the adoption of strict quarantine and lockdown measures
against the coronavirus pandemic, China recorded a growth of 2.3 per cent in 2020 (Benvenuti et al.
2022: 4). This was an unprecedentedly low growth in the country's economy for a long time.
There were reports of significant delays in infrastructure projects under the BRI in Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Nepal and Sri Lanka due to the coronavirus pandemic. Restrictive travel bans have
hampered the progress of existing projects. The pandemic has also caused economic stagnation in
China, as in most countries. Chinese authorities have become increasingly concerned about Covid-
19 causing lasting damage to the Chinese economy and the country's important role in global supply
chains. The pandemic has heightened the concerns of multinational companies with China-based
supply chains. Companies considering diversifying their supply chains due to the US-China trade war
accelerated their plans in this direction (Haenle, 2020). With the uncertainty caused by the
pandemic, some multinational companies shifted some of their production to countries such as
Vietnam, Indonesia and India (Kırımlı, 2023: 163).
China's increasing influence in international organisations further deepened the fears of countries
worried about China's growing global influence. Especially during the Covid outbreak, China's power
in the World Health Organisation was clearly visible, leading to criticism from many countries,
especially the US (Haenle, 2020).

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China's military rise also creates a security dilemma among states that are already concerned about
China's growing power, which could lead to counterbalancing coalitions against China. This, in turn,
leads to increased regional tensions (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 11-12). In his speech at the 19th Party
Congress in 2017, Xi tried to reassure the world that China's development does not pose a threat to
any other country and will never seek hegemony (Shambaugh, 2020: 18). Despite the reassurances
about China's good intentions and "peaceful rise", the more powerful China becomes, the more
scepticism about its power grows (Shambaugh, 2020: 18). China is therefore forced to conduct its
foreign relations in an increasingly hostile environment globally (Lincot, 2019: 9).
Another thing that puts China in a difficult situation in the international arena is the increased
visibility of the country. China's growing international influence leads to the easy transformation of
domestic issues into international ones. Many security activities shaped according to domestic needs
attract international attention and even cause significant international impacts. Particularly when
sensitive issues have an international impact, they become a major problem in China's foreign
relations (Zhang, 2015: 158).
In the post-2012 Xi Jinping era, the issues of Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan, which the
Chinese leadership characterised as domestic issues, have returned as a topic of discussion in foreign
policy. The pressure of domestic and foreign public opinion on these issues, which easily become
foreign issues, is felt very seriously. Public opinion in China is unlikely to compromise on anything
other than full Chinese sovereignty over each of these regions. The administration, which is under a
very serious domestic public opinion pressure, draws the arrows of criticism from the international
community when it takes a tough stance on these issues. When it adopts an uncompromising stance
on these issues for fear of appearing weak both internally and externally, the entire responsibility
for failing to solve the problems remains with the Xi administration (Benvenuti et al. 2022: 44).
The policies pursued by the Xi administration in Xinjian Uyghur Autonomous Region and Hong Kong
are perceived as frightening practices by the international community. The policy towards Taiwan
escalates regional and global tensions (Lincot, 2019: 9). With the mismanagement of Sino-US
relations, a hasty decision on Taiwan could put an end to peace and development and ruin the
strategic opportunity for China's national revitalisation (Deng, 2022: 11). Similarly, China's refusal
to respect international and maritime rights principles in maritime disputes with Vietnam and the
Philippines poses major obstacles to the establishment of a climate of trust (Lincot, 2019: 10).
China is trying to produce policies in line with its increasingly globalised economy. However, China
is not yet ready to make the sacrifices and compromises that global or regional leadership requires
(Baviera, 2016: 58). China is constantly having to respond to new developments and recalibrate its
policies, even as it exerts increasing influence in Asia and beyond. Under Xi, scepticism and mistrust
of China in the West has only increased. Unexpected events such as trade wars and the coronavirus
pandemic have severely tested China's strategic planning (Deng, 2022: 10).
6. Conclusion
Since Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued "low-profile" foreign policy. This policy saw a peaceful
international environment as the top priority for China's economic development. With Xi Jinping,
China replaced the traditional low-profile foreign policy with a more assertive and self-confident
policy based on the motto of "striving for success".
China's behaviours and attitudes that seem to threaten the interests of Western countries or are
perceived as somehow against the status quo are perceived as assertive foreign policy. Although Xi's
foreign policy approach seems more assertive at times, it cannot be said to be belligerent. The Xi
administration, like previous administrations, maintains the strategy of avoiding conflict while
trying to protect China's interests in the international arena. Under the Xi administration, China does

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218
not hesitate to assert its claims in the international arena more openly both with material power
elements and at the discursive level.
The Xi administration started to emphasise new strategies such as "China's rejuvenation", "Chinese
Dream" and "a common future for mankind". Giving greater priority to foreign policy, Xi claims that
China should practice "great power diplomacy" and advocates a "new type of great power relations".
Great power diplomacy aims to shape the international environment, which directly affects China's
core interests and status goals.
The project that most concretely demonstrates the Xi administration's global ambitions is the BRI
launched in 2013. The initiative is China's most important tool to shape the international arena in
its favour. It is hoped that the initiative will revitalise China's historical central role and contribute
greatly to the creation of a China-centred order. The Xi administration views multilateral institutions
and multilateral initiatives as a means to implement China's agenda and expand its space and
influence in the international community.
The Xi administration faces greater challenges in managing China's foreign relations than in
previous eras. Although he took office as a transformer, Xi Jinping is also likely to be the leader who
stalls China's rise. The Xi administration's active foreign policy attitudes and behaviours have not
necessarily increased China's sphere of influence. Especially in some of its neighbours and Western
countries, the new administration's ambitious foreign policy strategies have had the opposite effect.
In this respect, the Xi administration has further increased the concerns of countries worried about
China's rise.

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219
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