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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Population Research and Policy Review (2024) 43:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11113-024-09876-5
Abstract
This paper focuses on the consequences of the implementation of a bilateral agree-
ment between Israel and Thailand for migrant workers in the agricultural sector.
Its purpose is to shed light on the key mechanisms of the transition from the mar-
ketization to demarketization of recruiting migrant workers, and to show how this
transition aects the forms of labor recruitment and its consequences for the la-
bor migrants. The study is based on three face-to-face surveys conducted among
180 agricultural workers from Thailand. Fifty-ve were surveyed in 2011 before
the implementation of the bilateral agreement, and 125 were interviewed after the
agreement was implemented. Relying on a “before” and “after design, we rst
highlight the ways in which the private recruitment industry operated in Israel in
the context of a state-sponsored temporary labor migration program, identifying
the actors involved in the process and explaining how they proted from the labor
recruitment. Second, we shed light on the importance of bilateral agreements in
eliminating illicit practices for recruiting foreign workers in Israel and its practical
consequences for the Thai migrants arriving under the new arrangement. We discuss
our ndings in light of the theories presented in the paper.
Keywords Migration industry · Marketization · Demarketization · Israel ·
Thailand
Introduction
Labor migration is on the rise in a number of receiving countries in North Amer-
ica, Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East (Castles, 2006; Weiler et al., 2020).
Responding to the increasing demand for low-skilled workers in the secondary sec-
tors of host societies’ economies, millions of people cross borders to nd better eco-
Received: 23 August 2023 / Accepted: 15 March 2024 / Published online: 5 April 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Between Marketization and Demarketization:
Reconguration of the Migration Industry in the
Agricultural Sector in Israel
RebecaRaijman1· NonnaKushnirovich2· YahelKurlander3
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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R. Raijman et al.
nomic opportunities. In 2021, the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimated
the number of international migrants at 272 million, of whom 169 million, about
62%, were migrant workers. Migrant workers accounted for approximately 4.9% of
the labor force in the receiving countries (ILO, 2021).
The formats for recruiting migrant workers for host societies have changed over
time, shifting from a predominantly state-driven system through bilateral agreements
to a largely market-driven system dominated by private recruitment and manpower
agencies. The 1950s and the 1960s were the height of bilateral labor agreements
when ocial employment services in Western countries played a major role in the
recruitment of foreign workers. After the global economic crisis in the 1970s, many
countries placed restrictions on migratory ows, gradually reducing the signing
of bilateral agreements. However, there was also the concomitant development of
a market-driven system of recruitment (Wickramasekara, 2012; Chilton & Woda,
2022).
This new trend has led to the emergence of the “migration industry,” which con-
sists of private actors such as recruitment and manpower agencies, informal bro-
kers, and employers who prot from the commodication of labor migration (Salt &
Stein, 1997; Hernandez-Leon, 2005, Hernández-León, 2013, Gammeltoft-Hansen &
Sorensen, 2013). The development of the migration industry has caused the cost of
migration to escalate, leaving migrants vulnerable to exploitation and abuse of their
rights by the intermediaries on whom they depend to get a job in the destination coun-
try (see e.g., Agunias, 2009; Fernandez, 2013; Xiang & Lindquist, 2014; Groutsis et
al., 2015; Anderson & Franck, 2017; Kushnirovich, Raijman & Barak-Bianco, 2019).
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed a signicant increase in the number of coun-
tries engaging in bilateral agreements (hereafter BLAs) and a new peak in the num-
ber of agreements signed per year (Chilton & Woda, 2022; Livnat & Shamir, 2022).
Bilateral labor agreements are usually developed in response to labor shortages.
Their goals are regulating migratory ows, ghting illicit employment, protecting
the rights of employees, reducing unemployment in the countries of origin, making
labor mobility easier, and selecting migrant temporary workers based on labor market
demands. Bilateral agreements may encompass the involvement not only of employ-
ers, migrant laborers, and government agencies but also a growing number of private
and nongovernmental organizations (Bobeva & Garson, 2004; Cholewinski, 2015;
Pittman, 2016). Sometimes BLAs cover only certain sectors of the economy in the
host country such as construction or agriculture. Even within a specic sector, only
migrants from specic countries are covered. Thus, in many countries both market
and non-market (public) forms of recruitment coexist.
In this paper, we focus on the recruitment of labor migrants from Thailand who
have been ocially hired to work in the agricultural sector in Israel since the 1990s.
From the beginning, the state delegated the recruitment of migrants to private agen-
cies, which over time became part of a well-developed migration industry character-
ized by fraud and abuse of prospective migrant workers (Raijman & Kushnirovich,
2012; Kemp & Raijman, 2014). However, in 2012, the recruitment process switched
to a public non-market system when the rst bilateral agreement was signed between
Israel and Thailand (signed in 2011 and implemented in 2012). It was followed by
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
the signing of bilateral agreements with other countries.1 Thus, labor migration to
the agriculture sector in Israel is an interesting case study for probing the positive
consequences of switching from the marketization to the demarketization of migrant
labor recruitment.
This study contributes to the literature by providing several valuable insights into
the intricate mechanisms involved in the transition from marketization to demar-
ketization in the recruitment of temporary migrant workers in agriculture. First, we
highlight the ways in which the private recruitment industry operated in Israel in the
context of a state-sponsored temporary labor migration program in the agricultural
sector, identifying the actors involved and explaining the ways by which they prof-
ited from labor recruitment. Second, we shed light on the importance of bilateral
agreements in eliminating illicit practices in the process of labor recruitment and
promoting fairer recruitment procedures. Finally, we explain how the transition from
marketization to demarketization aects the situation of Thai migrants who come to
Israel to work in the agriculture sector under the new arrangement.
There is a vast literature from international organizations such as the International
Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
dealing with bilateral and multilateral labor agreements (see e.g., Bobeva & Garson,
2004; Battistella & Khadria, 2011; Wickramasekara, 2012; Pittman, 2016; Livnat,
2019). However, until recently there has been little investigation into how these agree-
ments impact illegal recruitment practices and their potential to improve the vulner-
able position of migrants in the host country’s labor market (Chilton & Wada, 2022;
Livnat & Shamir, 2022). One reason for the limited research is the lack of appropri-
ate data to measure the eects of the new regulations on recruitment outcomes. In
this paper we aim to ll this gap in the literature by using a unique data set collected
before and after the implementation of a bilateral agreement between Thailand and
Israel regarding the recruitment of Thai workers for the Israeli agricultural sector.
Using this approach, we can assess the extent of the impact of the agreement on
the recruitment process. This study not only enriches the existing literature on labor
migration but also provides practical insights into creating more ethical and ecient
labor recruitment systems. The ndings are relevant not only to Israel but also to
other countries facing similar challenges in managing temporary migrant workers.
We begin by presenting a description of labor migration to Israel in general and to
the agriculture sector in particular, followed by the study’s theoretical background.
After describing the methodology of the research, we present the ndings and discuss
them in light of the theories in the literature.
1 Bilateral agreements were signed with Bulgaria (2011), Moldova (2012), Romania (2014), Ukraine
(2016), and China (2017) to recruit workers for the construction sector. In the caregiving sector, bilateral
agreements were signed in 2019 with the Philippines and in 2020 with Nepal.
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R. Raijman et al.
Labor Migration in Israel
The catalyst for the beginning of the massive recruitment of overseas labor migration
to Israel in the 1990s was the rst Intifada (the 1987 Palestinian uprising), which
worsened the political and security conditions in the country. The systematic border
closure imposed by the Israeli government to deal with the terrorist attacks resulted
in a serious labor shortage in the agricultural and construction industries where Pal-
estinian workers were employed after the 1967 Six-Day War. The increasing demand
of employers for cheap labor to replace the Palestinian workers was the main engine
driving the massive ocial recruitment of overseas labor migrants since 1993 (Raij-
man & Kemp, 2007).
Labor migration in Israel is temporary in nature and based on contractual labor,
with no path to permanent settlement or citizenship. Work permits are granted to
employers, not to the migrants, thereby maximizing the control of both the employers
and the state over the labor migrants. Migrant workers may stay and work in Israel
for only up to 63 months. The state does not allow residence without a work permit
and imposes a strict deportation policy permitting the arrest and expulsion of undocu-
mented migrants at any time by a simple administrative decree.
According to Israel’s Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA, 2022), the total
number of temporary migrant workers in Israel as of the end of 2021 was 123,214.
Only 16% of them were residing in the country without a work permit (PIBA, 2022).
60% of the migrants were employed in the caregiving sector (mainly from the Phil-
ippines, India, Sri-Lanka and Nepal), whereas construction workers (mainly from
China, Ukraine, and Moldova) and agriculture workers (from Thailand) comprised
13% and 24%, respectively. Thus, Thai agriculture workers were the second largest
group of temporary migrant workers in Israel.
From the outset, the ocial recruitment of foreign workers in Israel in the three
sectors– agriculture, construction and caregiving–was entirely privatized and con-
ducted through recruiting agencies in Israel and in the countries of origin. These
agencies charged exorbitant and illegal fees to come to work in Israel. Israeli govern-
ments have been reluctant to sign bilateral agreements with the countries of origin
to regulate recruitment and employment conditions, thereby enabling prot-seeking
private agents to dominate this eld (Kushnirovich, 2010; Kemp & Raijman, 2014).
However, a turning point regarding labor migration recruitment practices occurred in
2012 with the implementation of the rst bilateral agreement signed with the govern-
ment of Thailand (in 2010) for the recruitment of migrants in the agricultural sector.
Labor Migration from Thailand
For more than two decades Israel has been one of the most popular destinations for
Thai labor migrants in the Middle East (Rainwater & Williams, 2019). Since the
beginning of the formal recruitment in the agricultural sector, the state granted the
Moshavim Movement (the non-prot organization that represents the diverse inter-
ests of agricultural cooperatives in Israel) a quasi-monopoly over the eld of recruit-
ment (Cohen, 1999 Kurlander, 2022). At this stage, recruitment fees were prohibited
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
altogether.2 The Moshavim Movement maintained its near-exclusive control over the
migrant labor market in the agricultural industry up until 1998, when private recruit-
ment companies who wanted to benet from recruiting Thai workers pressured the
government to open the recruitment market to other companies in Israel.3
The entry of many new private recruitment agencies in 1998 led to growing
attempts to reap the benets from the mediation fees. Although the state granted work
permits to the employers, they were obliged by law to ask local recruitment agencies
to recruit the labor migrants for them. These local agencies contacted private com-
panies in Thailand that took care of the actual recruitment of the migrants. Up until
2006 there were rules prohibiting agencies from charging workers recruitment fees.
However, the majority of the prots made by the recruitment agencies came from
fees paid by the labor migrants. In an eort to curb this malpractice, in 2006 new
regulations permitted agencies to charge workers a fee of no more than NIS 3,479
(about $1,000; this amount is revised annually) (Employment Service Regulations,
2006). Nevertheless, in reality, recruitment agencies charged migrants signicantly
higher commissions, amounting to thousands of US dollars (State Comptroller’s
Report, 2010).
In July 2005, the government announced that, to put an end to the corrupt prac-
tices of the private agencies, the recruitment of migrant workers would be conducted
solely under the supervision of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
or another public organization (Israel Government, 2005, Government Decision
#4024). Despite the government decision, the implementation of the BLA in the agri-
culture sector was repeatedly postponed mainly due to the political pressure exerted
by the employers and private recruitment agencies in the agricultural lobbying sec-
tor in Israel because they did not want to give up their lucrative prots (Kemp &
Raijman, 2014). In Thailand, the period before the signing of the BLA was a time of
political instability, and frequent changes in the government postponed their signing
(Kurlander, 2019).
However, there were also demands, both at the international and the local level,
to sign the BLA with Thailand. First, in 2003 the US State Department published the
annual Tracking in Persons Report (TIP) in which Israel was listed in Tier 2. This
ranking prompted the desire to intensify the ght against the manpower and broker-
age rms involved in labor tracking activities. Second, non-governmental human
rights organizations (NGOs) were gaining strength. They opposed the labor migra-
tion policy in Israel, and demanded that it sign bilateral agreements with countries
sending workers to Israel to avoid illicit activities in the process of their recruitment
(Kemp & Raijman, 2014).
2 During this period the recruited migrants paid $770 for airfare and payments to the local manpower
companies that provided services to the workers throughout their stay in Israel (Cohen, 1999; Kurlander,
2022).
3 The cancellation of the exclusive monopoly that the Moshavim Movement had on recruitment was also
related to a lawsuit submitted to the Tel Aviv Regional Labor Court in May 2000 via the Workers Hotline.
The suit claimed that the Movement was illegally holding money that the workers had deposited in trust,
and was refusing to give them back a sum that had reached $10 million dating back to 1996 (Kemp &
Raijman, 2008).
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R. Raijman et al.
The bilateral agreement with Thailand was signed in 2010 and implemented in
2012 by the Population and Immigration Authority in Israel (PIBA) and the Thai
Ministry of Labor. The governmental agencies were assisted by two non-prot orga-
nizations: IOM (International Organization for Migration) in Thailand and the Center
for International Migration and Integration (CIMI) in Israel.4 The Israeli government
is responsible for the management of the labor migration scheme, while the Thai
government and the IOM undertake the recruitment and selection of the candidates
and their transportation to Israel. Prospective Thai migrants interested in coming to
work in Israel contact the Department of Employment at the Ministry of Labour
(Thailand) or the Thailand-Israel Cooperation on the Placement of Workers (TIC).
They ll out forms and undergo medical exams. To prevent corruption, migrants are
selected through a computerized lottery, so that no one could assure the registered
participants a work permit. Most importantly, the bilateral agreement eliminated the
role of private agencies and their brokers in the recruitment process.5 The agreement
contained a general clause regarding the “promotion of the protection of rights of
Thai nationals throughout the process of recruitment and employment” (THA Labor,
2020). While the agreement provided specic mechanisms to enforce and ensure a
“legal, fair and well-informed recruitment process,” it did not make any specic pro-
visions for the protection of the migrants’ rights (Livnat, 2019; Cohen & Kurlander,
2023). Given this limitation, we focus only on the impact of the BLA on the recruit-
ment practices of Thai migrant workers.
Theoretical Background
Receiving states deal with issues of labor recruitment and management. They usu-
ally set the conditions for other non-state actors (for-prot and non-prot) to be a
part of the process. To understand the forms by which receiving states engage with
non-state actors to facilitate cross-border mobility, Surak (2018:5) proposed a typol-
ogy based on two key components involved in the relationship between the state and
the actors in charge of the recruitment: (a) the type of actor (private or civic/public)
and (b) the nature of the delegation (formal or informal). The four outcomes of the
typology are: (1) the state ocially outsources responsibility to for-prot agents (pri-
vate companies); (2) the state, de facto, delegates responsibility to for-prot actors;
(3) the state ocially outsources responsibility to non-prot actors; (4) the state, de
facto, delegates responsibility to non-prot actors. The rst two categories represent
market-managed systems that develop into migration industries, whereas the last two
categories represent non-market systems in which the state retains control over the
4 CIMI is an independent non-prot organization assisting the State of Israel in a wide range of migration
management issues. It “helps the Israeli government meet its obligations under international law and
apply international standards and best practices in the eld of migration” (CIMI, 2022).
5 In 2020 a new bilateral agreement for recruiting Thai workers for temporary work in the Israeli agricul-
tural sector was signed. According to the new agreement, the two governments took over the handling,
selection and training of applicants from the IOM, but the recruiting is still carried out via governmental
institutions.
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
recruitment process and delegates some functions of the recruitment process to non-
prot actors.6
It is important to note that market and non-market forms of state delegation can vary
within countries according to the sectors of employment and types of labor migrants
working within the same sector of employment (Surak, 2018:28). Furthermore, mar-
ket and non-market forms of the delegation are not static but can change over time
due to economic and political reasons. Thus, for example, private systems of labor
migrants’ recruitment can switch to public managed systems (e.g., South Korea, see
Surak, 2018: 27–28; in Israel, see Kushnirovich & Raijman, 2022). Changes might
also occur in the opposite direction: from delegation to non-prot agents and public
institutions to the privatization of the recruitment (e.g., South Africa’s guest-worker
program for miners and the Bracero Program in the US (Surak, 2018:27–28).
Market Delegation of Labor Migration Recruitment: The Emergence of the
Migration Industry
The development of a migration industry in recruitment is part of a much larger trend
toward the outsourcing of state operations representing the marketization process.
Marketization, usually referred to as “commercialization and/or commodication,
is a process through which the market sphere continually penetrates and slowly dis-
places non-market activities” (Vujnovic, 2012: 160). The emergence of private labor
migration recruitment in the form of a migration industry is a result of such marketi-
zation in which migrants’ labor is regarded as a commodity (Burawoy, 2010).
The migration industry is dened as “the ensemble of entrepreneurs, rms, and
services which, chiey motivated by nancial gains, facilitate international mobil-
ity, settlement and adaptation, as well as communication and resource transfers of
migrants and their families across borders” (Hernandez-Leon, 2005: 26, Hernán-
dez-León, 2013, Gammeltoft-Hansen & Sorensen, 2013). Restrictive immigration
policies and neo-liberal congurations of migration governance usually lead to the
involvement and empowerment of formal and informal market actors (mainly private
companies, sub-agents, and employers) in the recruitment and management of migra-
tion ows (Menz, 2013; Kemp & Raijman, 2014; Hoang, 2017; Surak, 2018).
At the start of the marketization process, state regulations establish the recruitment
mechanisms for the private companies operating on its behalf. However, over time
a conict of interests may develop as regulatory and commercial structures compete
to protect their respective primary interests: “order for the former and prot for the
latter” (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014:16). To maximize economic gains, legal private
agencies may sometimes adopt illicit ways of operating such as charging illegal fees
or using informal recruiters operating in both the sending and destination countries
(Fernandez, 2013). Thus, recruitment practices frequently take place in a hazy nor-
mative space where clear-cut distinctions between (il)legal and il(licit) are impos-
sible to achieve (Lindquist, 2010; Kemp & Raijman, 2014). As a result, regulatory
6 In these cases, if non-prot agents are paid for their services, the purpose is to cover expenses, not to
turn to prot.
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R. Raijman et al.
frameworks are not always able to achieve their goals of controlling the commercial
actors who engage in illicit practices to recruit labor migrants.7
To investigate how state and commercial actors interact in the emergence and
reproduction of the migration industry, we rely on the decentered approach to regula-
tion (Black, 2002), which posits that regulation occurs not only within the state but
also through interdependencies with other non-state actors. Based on this approach,
Fernandez (2013) proposed ve core concepts for analyzing the relationships
between state and non-state actors in the process of recruitment: (1) complexity, (2)
fragmentation, (3) interdependencies, (4) ungovernability, and (5) the rejection of a
clear distinction between public and private.
Complexity refers to the multiplicity of parties involved in the management of
the recruitment of labor migrants. State delegation to private actors (employers and
manpower agencies, and informal intermediaries) created a complex, multifaceted
policy environment in which the actors may have dierent and even contradictory
goals. They also vary in the power they have, but they all function in an environment
of uncertainty (Menz, 2013; Xiang & Lindquist, 2014; Anderson & Franck, 2017;
Anderson, 2019).
The complexity and multiplicity of social actors involved in the recruitment pro-
cess result in the fragmentation of knowledge or information and power, which are
dispersed among the social actors involved in the recruitment of labor migrants.
There is an asymmetry of knowledge about job opportunities and work conditions
in the host country. Indeed, the private actors manage access to this information as a
means of exercising power over the migrant workers (Mieres, 2014). The asymmetry
of knowledge also creates asymmetrical power between the private agencies and pro-
spective migrants, as the former act as “gatekeepers who decide who and under what
conditions migrants may obtain working abroad” (Pittman, 2016: 270). The lack of
transparent information pushes prospective migrants to rely on private intermediaries
to navigate the complex bureaucracy of the recruitment process and to pay exorbitant
amounts of money to get a work permit (Lindquist, 2010: 132; Anderson, 2019).8
Fragmentation of power and control is in turn related to the autonomy and ungov-
ernability of the actors involved in the process of recruitment. Although regulations
try to manage and control the behavior of all parties involved, their eects depend
on the relative power of the various actors, how susceptible they are to regulatory
intervention, and how compliant they are with the law (Fernandez, 2013: 816). Fur-
thermore, given that interactions and interdependencies between the dierent private
actors such as the recruiting agencies in the countries of origin and countries of des-
tination may extend beyond national borders, it becomes dicult for the receiving
state to enforce rules or to prosecute fraud that takes place outside its borders (Pitt-
man, 2016; Anderson & Franck, 2017). Thus, the recruitment practices of state-man-
7 However, it should be noted that the picture emerging from the Israeli case is not one of state weak-
ness and loss of control, but rather one in which neo-liberal governance congurations intersect with
the.commodication of migration to facilitate trade in human labor (see for example, Kemp & Raijman,
2014).
8 The fragmentation and asymmetry in bargaining power is evident not only in the relationships between
the migrant workers and intermediaries but also between migrant-sending countries and receiving coun-
tries (Shamir, 2017: 473; Livnat & Shamir, 2022).
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
aged temporary work programs under the auspices of commercial actors often take
place in a blurry normative space where clear distinctions between the public/private
and legal/illegal disappear (Kemp & Raijman, 2014).
The consequences of ungovernability are critical for labor migrants. By demand-
ing high (and illegal) recruitment fees from the migrants, the cost of migration is
shifted to the migrants and their families, negatively aecting not only their earnings
and remitting power but also their already precarious employment status in the host
country (Bélanger, 2014; Malit & Naufal, 2016; Platt et al., 2017; Shamir, 2017;
Cruz-Del Rosario & Rigg, 2019). The need to repay the money invested in migration
may prevent migrant workers from claiming their rights in the host society’s labor
market because they are afraid of losing their jobs. Consequently, migrant work-
ers become more vulnerable to exploitation (Tierney, 2011; Kushnirovich, 2012;
Bélanger, 2014; Kemp & Raijman, 2014; Basok & López-Sala, 2016).
Non-market Delegation of Recruitment
As noted earlier, market and non-market forms of the delegation of recruitment
can change over time due to economic and political reasons. Marketization may be
reversed and switch from private forms of recruitment to a publicly managed system
of labor migration. The process of shifting activity from the market to the non-market
public sector is called demarketization (Glyn, 1989). It involves the de-commodi-
cation of excessively marketized spheres (Burawoy, 2010; Shachar, 2018). We use
the term demarketization to dene a situation in which the deliberate decisions of the
state lead to the transition of the management of labor migration recruitment from the
private to the public sector (Surak, 2018).
A legal tool that has proliferated in recent decades to enable collaboration between
countries in the recruitment of temporary labor migration is the bilateral labor agree-
ment (Chilton & Posner, 2018; Livnat & Shamir, 2022). Such agreements manage
and regulate the ow of labor migration between countries (Chilton & Woda, 2022:
Cholewinski, 2015) and have been recognized as a good practice in the governance
of labor migration ows (Pittman, 2016; Wickramasekara, 2015). Usually, BLAs
establish a government-to-government recruitment mechanism by eliminating the
role of commercial actors in order “to gain control over migrants and the migration
industry” (Livnat & Sahmir, 2022:67). BLAs can improve the governance of labor
migration by dening the responsibilities of the sending and receiving countries,
specifying the agents for recruitment in both countries, increasing the transparency of
the recruitment process by providing relevant information to the migrants (contracts,
labor laws), preventing recruitment malpractice, controlling the costs of migration
and recruitment fees, mobilizing workers through legal channels, and monitoring
employment practices in the host labor market by sharing responsibilities between
the country of origin and the host country (Battistella & Khadria, 2011; Livnat, 2019;
Livnat & Shamir, 2022).
Note that although regulations related to the recruitment process are clearly stated
and implemented, provisions for the protection of migrant workers’ rights are less
common. Some have argued that sometimes the sending countries agree to forgo the
protection of migrants’ rights in the agreements for the sake of the country’s interest
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R. Raijman et al.
to increase migration and the related remittances associated with it (Livnat & Shamir,
2022:83). Over time, the share of BLAs addressing provisions for migrant workers’
rights has declined (Chilton & Woda, 2022). Furthermore, even if they contain a
general statement about the equal treatment of labor migrants, they usually do not
provide specic mechanisms to ensure its compliance (Livnat & Shamir, 2022:81).
In general, scholars have overlooked the eects of switching between market and
non-market forms of recruiting temporary labor migrants through bilateral agree-
ments. Very little research (Chilton & Wada, 2022; Kurlander & Cohen, 2022; Livnat
& Shamir, 2022) has explored whether the implementation of BLAs is an adequate
framework for ensuring fair, legal labor recruitment, eliminating illegal practices,
and improving the precarious position of migrants during the recruitment process. To
ll this gap in the literature, we conducted a study of the consequences of the imple-
mentation of a bilateral agreement between Israel and Thailand for migrant workers
in the agricultural sector. Its purpose was to explain the key mechanism of the transi-
tion from the marketization to the demarketization of the recruitment of temporary
migrant workers. In addition, we showed how the shift from the delegation of the
recruitment from the market to non-market institutions aected the forms of labor
recruitment as well as its consequences for the labor migrants.
Methodology
The study is based on three surveys conducted in Israel among 180 agricultural work-
ers from Thailand who had a work permit at the time of the survey. Fifty-ve were
surveyed in 2011 before the implementation of the BLA, and 125 were interviewed
after the agreement was implemented: 50 workers were interviewed in 2014, 25 in
2016, and 50 in 2017. The “before” and “after” design allowed us to assess the eec-
tiveness of the BLA in eliminating malpractice in the recruitment process.
Data were collected through a face-to-face survey that included questions about
demographic characteristics, pre-migration background, motives for migration, rea-
sons for choosing Israel as a destination, the migration process, the actors involved
in recruitment, recruitment fees, and sources of funding, and employment and living
conditions.
Gathering data from migrant workers is inherently challenging because it is
impossible to create a representative sample; therefore, we combined convenient and
snowball samples. In addition, to ensure the sample’s representativeness, quotas for
geographical location were imposed, so that Thai workers from all geographical areas
(North, South, Center, and Jerusalem) were included. Each respondent was asked to
suggest names and phone numbers of their Thai friends and acquaintances working
in Israel. Some migrants were approached through internet groups of migrants from
Thailand in Israel (WhatsApp, Facebook, etc.). No more than 3 interviews at one
workplace were conducted. Surveys were anonymous and were conducted in Thai by
interviewers uent in the language.
Table 1 lists the socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants in the sample.
The majority of respondents were young men (on average 32–33 years old) with
relatively low levels of education (10 years of schooling). Most of them (over 90%)
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
were employed before leaving Thailand and earned an average monthly income of
about $360 per month. These reported levels of income are far below their possible
wages in Israel, where migrant workers in agriculture might anticipate seeing triple
the income ($1,365 on average). The income disparity is a powerful magnet that
attracts workers to Israel. It explains why migrants are willing to uproot from their
families, face signicant material and emotional hardships, and take on hard work in
the agricultural sector of the Israeli labor market.
Findings
Evaluating the Impact of the Bilateral Agreement
To evaluate how the implementation of the bilateral agreement changed the process
of recruitment, we organize our analysis along four main themes. The rst describes
how the agreement changed the complexity of the recruitment infrastructure and led
to its attening. The second-dimension centers on the switch from fragmentation
to the transparency of knowledge. The third dimension focuses on the switch from
the ungovernability of the private actors and institutions involved in the recruitment
process to the governability and control of the process. The fourth dimension summa-
rizes the consequences of the implementation of the bilateral agreement for migrant
workers.
Table 1 Socio-demographic characteristics of Thai labor migrants in agriculture in Israel
Characteristics Before Bilateral Agreement,
2011
After Bilateral Agreement,
2014–2017
Percent male 94.5 97.0
Age (years)
Average
(s.d.)
31.8
(5.2)
32.9
(4.9)
Marital Status (%)
Single 45.5 19.2
Married 43.7 68.0
Divorced or widowed 10.8 12.8
Years of Schooling
Average
(s.d.)
9.9
(3.3)
9.7
(4.0)
Labor Force Activity before Departure
Employed (%) 98.1 92.8
Income in Thailand ($)
Average
(s.d.)
343.3
(312.2)
368.1
(166.6)
Income in Israel
Average 1,331 1,399
(s.d.) (216.8) (193.3)
N55 125
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R. Raijman et al.
From the Complexity of the Infrastructure of the Recruitment to its Flattening
To identify all actors involved in the recruitment process before and after the BLA,
we asked our respondents whether anyone contacted them to oer a job, who took
care of the recruitment process, and the fees paid by the migrants. Our ndings
reveal that before the bilateral agreement’s implementation, the process of recruiting
Thai workers to Israel involved several intermediaries in Israel and Thailand such
as recruitment agencies, formal and informal brokers, migrants’ social networks,
and employers. This multiplicity of actors illustrates the complexity involved in the
recruitment process.9
We identied three main recruitment patterns (see Table 2; Fig. 1). The rst form
of recruitment was through the active recruitment of agencies and their sub-agents
(brokers) in Thailand. About 44% of our interviewees reported using this form.
Although most local recruiting rms had their headquarters in Bangkok, the coun-
try’s capital, local rms relied on the services of unocial sub-agents or brokers to
reach prospective migrants in peripheral areas. These brokers were usually former
Thai migrants in Israel who demand a mediation fee for their services in addition to
9 As noted earlier, before the BLA, employers had to contact private agencies in Israel that then contacted
private companies in Thailand. It was these private companies that took care of the actual recruitment
of the migrants.
Table 2 The process of migration before and after Bilateral Agreement
Before Bilateral
Agreement,
2011
After
Bilateral
Agreement,
2014–2017
Finding out about Job Opportunities in Israel (%)
Media 3.1 34.7
Social networks 82.3 48. 3
Private agencies 14.6 -
Government oces -17.0
Forms of Recruitment (%)
Applied to a government oce in Thailand - 100
Social networks associated with specic recruiting agencies 36.4 -
Employers (“fax” system) 20.0 -
Recruiting agencies in Thailand and brokers 43.6 -
Cost of Migration (in dollars)
Average
(s.d.)
9,149
(2,064)
2,191
(133.0)
Financing Sources (%)
Personal capital 12.0 34.6
Family gifts and loans 34.0 35.6
Bank loans 7.6 19.2
Mortgage 34.8 9.0
Black market loan 11.6 2.0
Time to repay debt (in months)
Mean
(s.d.)
17.4
(8.5 )
6.8
(3.9 )
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
the recruitment fees paid to the recruiting agency. Thai migrants’ perceptions about
the diculty and complexity of the regulations were an incentive for them to seek the
services of brokers to navigate the complex bureaucracy of getting a work permit for
the agricultural sector in Israel.10
The second form of recruitment involved social networks, both in Israel and Thai-
land, which directed potential candidates to the recruitment agencies to begin the
process of applying for a job in Israel. About one-third of the Thai migrants reported
using this form. In this way, friends and family assisted prospective migrants in rec-
ommending the agencies to apply to when they came to Israel. Sometimes, these
recommenders were working covertly as agents of the recruitment rms.
10 See Lindquist (2010) and Anderson (2019) for similar experiences of migrants in Asian sending coun-
tries.
Fig. 1 Patterns of recruitment before and after the bilateral agreement
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R. Raijman et al.
The third form of recruitment was through Israeli agricultural employers who
sought employees through ethnic networks of migrant workers. About 20% of our
participants reported using this form. This type of recruitment typically started when:
(1) a potential immigrant asked friends in Israel to speak with their employer on their
behalf; or (2) a migrant who was already in Israel was asked by his/her employer to
get in touch with a friend and oer them the chance to come to Israel and work for
the same employer.11 In any case, the prospective migrant had to apply for a visa
through the recruitment agency in Thailand, and had to pay the recruitment fees.
Given that hiring new employees who are friends or relatives of current employees
made it easier for the employers to manage the social dynamics of the workplace,
many Israeli companies in the agricultural industry appeared to prefer this method
of recruitment. Migrant workers also preferred this form of recruitment because it
reduced uncertainty about their prospective employer and the work and living con-
ditions. In sum, the three forms of recruitment underscore the multiplicity of com-
mercial actors (social networks, employers, private agencies and sub-agents/brokers)
operating in the migration industry. The number of players created a very complex
social infrastructure, which changed with the implementation of the BLA.
The data in Table 2 show that, since 2012, all Thai migrants arriving in Israel
arranged their trip to Israel through government oces such as local labor oces
in their provinces, the Thai Ministry of Labor, and the IOM (see pattern 4 in Fig. 1).
Private agencies and their brokers both in Israel and Thailand were completely elimi-
nated from the recruitment process.12 The Israeli agencies are now responsible for the
workers after they arrive, a service for which they are allowed to charge a fee xed
by government authorities. Currently, it is $1,113 (Employment Service Regulations,
2006).13 Thus, the implementation of the BLA dramatically reduced the complexity
of the system and attened the recruitment infrastructure by changing the number and
types of actors involved in the process: it switched from a business-to-business model
to a government-to-government model (Livnat & Shamir, 2022: 87).
From Fragmentation to Transparency of Knowledge
Another way to assess the impact of the BLA on the recruitment process is to look
into the methods through which prospective Thai migrant workers learned about work
opportunities in Israel before and after the implementation of the bilateral agreement
(see Table 2). Before the BLA, migrants gathered information mainly from social
11 This method was known as the “fax system” among Thai employees because it was typical for appli-
cants to fax copies of their documentation such as passports directly to the company.
12 Although in most BLAs signed in Israel, the role of manpower agencies was eliminated in the recruit-
ment process, in some cases they still have a prominent role. One example is the BLA signed in 2017 with
China for bringing migrants to work in the construction sector. Some of the recruitment activities are car-
ried out by four authorized Chinese companies under government supervision that control the authorized
fees charged to the migrants. See, https://www.cimi-eng.org/_les/ugd/5d35de_16d441738d06413184ba
6dfa94cb0135.pdf.
13 Private agencies in Israel are responsible for bringing the workers from the airport, helping them open
a bank account in their name, extending passports and visas, resolving issues between the employees and
their employers, organizing medical insurance, changing employees and employers, submitting applica-
tions for permits and extending the validity of permits, and transferring workers between employers.
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
networks (82.3%) and private agencies (14.6%). This asymmetry in relevant knowl-
edge made the migrants completely dependent on social networks and recruitment
companies for information about coming to Israel to work and reected the fragmen-
tation of the information.
After the BLA was implemented, the rst step was to ensure that Thai workers
received extensive public information about how to apply for employment in Israel,
providing clear information about the costs of moving, wages, working conditions,
and so forth. This stage is important to make the process transparent and to provide
information for all those interested in coming to work in Israel, not just to the man-
power companies and brokers as it was before the BLA.
The new forms of providing relevant information to potential migrants imple-
mented by the BLA have markedly changed the typical ways of learning about job
opportunities. The proportion of migrant workers who learned about job openings
through the media—including radio, television, newspapers, and ocial bulletin
boards—increased from 3.1 to 34.7%. In addition, 17% of the respondents said they
had learned about job openings in Israel from government oces in their home coun-
tries —in contrast to none before the bilateral agreement’s implementation. Further-
more, before departure, workers receive a comprehensive orientation to inform them
about their rights and obligations as well as general information about Israeli culture
and society. Attendance at this orientation day is compulsory, because at this orienta-
tion the worker receives a contract signed by his/her future employer.14
These results suggest that the new arrangements resulted in making the recruiting
process more transparent. Information regarding jobs, maximum fees, and steps for
the selection of workers was shared through the media and public actors, not only
social networks and private recruitment agencies (and their sub-contractors) who
controlled the information before the BLA. These changes in the diusion of relevant
knowledge to the migrant workers helped reduce the fragmentation of knowledge
and power prevalent before the BLA.
From Ungovernability to Governability
The state’s delegation of the recruitment to private agencies in 1998 led to growing
attempts to reap the benets from the mediation fees. Since the beginning of the
recruitment of Thai workers, there were rules prohibiting agencies from collecting
recruitment fees from employees, but the agencies ignored the law because their
revenues came directly from the fees paid by the labor migrants. Even in 2006, when
agencies were allowed to collect fees of no more than NIS 3,479 per worker (about
$1,000; this sum is updated annually) the agencies charged migrants signicantly
higher commissions, amounting to thousands of US dollars (Nathan, 2007; State
Comptroller’s Report, 2010).
14 Once in Israel, as a part of the BLA, CIMI in collaboration with the Population and Immigration Author-
ity operates a hotline for migrant workers in Israel where they can complain about violations of their rights
and contracts and receive other relevant information. The service is provided in the native languages of the
migrant workers in all sectors.
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R. Raijman et al.
Thai migrants had to pay recruitment fee to the central agency in Bangkok that
took care of the legal procedures (on average $9,000).15 Those who applied to the
sub-agents paid to them additional fee ranging from $990 to $2,600 (Raijman &
Kushnirovich, 2012). The money paid by the migrant to the agency was divided
between the recruitment agencies in Israel and Thailand (see Workers’ Hotline,
2008a, 2008b). Money transfer methods (from Thailand to Israel) included transfer
accounts, cash transferred by sub-agents traveling to Israel from the country of ori-
gin, payments made in-person by migrants in Israel, together with sealed envelopes
from the agencies in the country of origin (Knesset Committee for the Examination
of the Problem of Foreign Workers, 2009).16 Thus, the multiplicity of actors not only
increased the complexity of the recruitment infrastructure but also increased the costs
of migration.
Despite being aware of the recruitment system’s abnormalities and malpractice,
Israeli authorities were unable to counteract them, due to the diculty of proving
transactions involving illegal fees that occurred outside Israel’s borders. These prac-
tices reveal the relative ungovernability of the actors involved in the recruitment
process. Although there was an Israeli regulation prohibiting Israeli businesses from
collecting recruiting fees from foreign job searchers, there were no mechanisms in
place to prevent this regulation from being circumvented by charging labor migrants
fees outside of Israel. Given that these activities took place in Thailand, it was dif-
cult for Israel to combat them.
Data in Table 2 show that, after the implementation of the BLA the cost of migra-
tion, or the overall expenses associated with the migrants’ move (in US dollars),
dramatically decreased, falling from an average of $9,149 to an average of $2,191.17
The dierence between the cost of migration “before” and “after” clearly shows the
impact of the implementation of the BLA. The continuity and stability of the costs of
migration over time (2014–2017) attest to the success of the BLA and the switch to a
governable process monitored by state actors and non-prot actors.
Consequences of the Implementation of Bilateral Agreement for the Migrants’
Situation
The drastic reduction in recruitment fees had a major impact on the patterns of nanc-
ing the costs of migration as well as the length of time required to repay the debt.
The average cost of migration before the BLA was very high — about 27 times the
migrants’ income in Thailand. Therefore, migrants had to rely on loans to be able to
pay the high recruitment fees. The data in Table 2 indicate the percentage of each
funding source out of the overall sum paid to the recruitment agencies. Before the
15 The maximum fee paid was about $12,000 for migrants arriving during the last years before the imple-
mentation of the bilateral agreement.
16 Only a portion of the brokerage fees that Israeli manpower agencies get from manpower agencies in
Thailand are reported to Israel’s tax authorities.
17 The actual fee for the recruitment services is currently $450. For additional services rendered to the
employee throughout his stay in Israel, the manpower agency in Israel charges NIS 2,715 + VAT, or roughly
$889 (Employment Service Regulations, 2006). About $852 is for an airline ticket, medical examinations,
translations of documents etc.
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
BLA, Thai immigrants mainly relied on loans from friends, family, or banks (often
by mortgaging their homes or property), or they went to the black market. Personal
savings accounted for only 12% of the funding sources.
Since the implementation of the BLA, and due to the dramatic reduction in migra-
tion costs, more migrants have been able to pay for their migration through per-
sonal savings (34.6%) or loans from social networks (mostly family, but also friends)
(35.6%). In 92% of these cases, these loans were interest-free. In 8% of cases, the
migrants were charged a 1-3% interest rate. The percentage of mortgages provided
as collateral has dropped from 35 to 9%, whereas the percentage of bank loans has
increased from 8 to 19%. These modications imply that Thais can now apply for
bank loans without having to pledge their property as collateral due to the lower
costs of migrating. Finally, after the BLA, only 2% of the loans came from the black
market, in which the average interest rate was 30%.
One signicant issue is how long it takes migrant workers to pay back their debts.
This issue is important, because migrants in debt and afraid of losing their jobs and
being deported tend not to report legal violations and cases of fraud (Bélanger, 2014).
In other words, the precarious position of labor migrants may be further exacerbated
when temporary labor is underpinned by debt contracted to cover the costs of migra-
tion (Platt et al., 2017; Shamir, 2017). Table 2 demonstrates the sharp decline in the
typical repayment duration, which went from 17 months before the BLA to 7 months
after its implementation. In other words, before the BLA, debt repayment required a
third of the ve-year stay in Israel; now, only a few months are required. This change
eectively abolishes the debt bondage of migrants and enhances their autonomy.18
We now discuss the relevance of the ndings in light of existing theories.
Discussion
The recruitment practices of migrant workers in Israel have been a contested issue
on both the political and economic levels. Accordingly, a systematic analysis of the
impact of the BLA on the Israeli agricultural sector provides a unique opportunity
to evaluate the eects of policies on migration outcomes. Table 3 summarizes the
key mechanisms explaining how the change in recruiting from for-prot actors to
state actors aected the process and its practical consequences for Thai migrants. By
utilizing the information provided in it, we can evaluate the ecacy of the bilateral
agreement in eliminating the migration industry and its illegal practices.
Before the BLA, neo-liberal congurations of governance that relied on the mar-
ketization of labor recruitment were the main reason for the emergence and develop-
ment of a large for-prot migration industry in which several actors were involved.
18 Previous studies, however, showed that bilateral agreements did not lead to improvement of employ-
ment conditions of migrant workers. For example, in a study conducted in 2018, 68% of the respondents
reported longer working hours than indicated in the contract; 55% reported a smaller number of monthly
rest days than they were entitled to according to the contract; 32% reported wage withholding; 32%
reported they did not receive payment for sick days; 28% reported poor living conditions; 26% reported
they did not receive payment for overtime; and 17% reported that they were employed by a dierent
employer than the one indicated in the contract (Raijman & Kushnirovich, 2019).
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R. Raijman et al.
Our study shed light on the complexity of the commercial infrastructure with its
multiplicity of actors (employers, private recruiting agencies, brokers, and migrants’
social networks, both in Israel and in Thailand) that sustained migration ows from
Thailand to Israel until the implementation of the BLA.
This multiplicity of actors brought about a fragmentation of knowledge and conse-
quently a fragmentation of power that resulted in the asymmetry of knowledge about
job opportunities and work conditions in the host country. The recruitment process
was not transparent, involving only agencies that had connections with Israeli private
actors. The information was concentrated among actors linked to social networks or
through sub-agents and agents of private recruitment companies.
The asymmetry of power was expressed in the lack of knowledge about employ-
ment opportunities for migrant workers and the unjust demand to pay exorbitant
fees for work permits, despite being aware that such demands were illegal. This lack
of knowledge and power made the migrant workers vulnerable. They feared being
denied a work permit if they did not comply with the recruitment agency’s demands.
Thus, the migrants’ desire to obtain a work permit generated large prots for the
intermediaries who controlled the access to temporary jobs and perpetuated the pre-
carious status of the labor migrants.
Table 3 Mechanisms explaining the change from marketization to de-marketization of the recruitment
process
Before the BLA
MARKETIZATION
After the BLA
DE-MARKETIZATION
Complexity Multiplicity of actors (manpower agencies, bro-
kers, social networks). State delegates to for-prot
actors
State actors and non-prot
organizations
(IOM and CIMI) are in charge
of the recruitment process
Fragmentation of
knowledge and
power
Knowledge dispersion between several actors
brings to asymmetry in knowledge.
Lack of transparency of the process leads to reli-
ance on private actors in search of information.
The asymmetry of knowledge brings to disparity
in bargaining power (between migrants and private
actors, migrants and employers, and sending coun-
tries and receiving countries)
Information is widely avail-
able and accessible.
Transparency of the whole
process
The asymmetry of power still
exists
Un-governability/
Governability
It is dicult to enforce rules outside of Israel.
It brings to exorbitant cost of migration: large rents
for private actors charging illegal fees.
Governability
Decreasing the cost of
migration
Interdependen-
cies and interac-
tions between
state and non-
state actors
Blurry space where a clear-cut distinction between
private and public and legal-illegal is unattainable
Interactions and interdepen-
dencies between state and
non-prot organization
Consequences for
the migrants
High levels of debts-
Financial burden shifted to the migrants.
Time to repay debts: 1.5 years
Negative eects on their earnings and remitting
power
Exacerbation of migrant workers’ already precari-
ous position
Low levels of debt
Time to repay debts: a few
months
The status of workers
remained precarious; right
violations still exist. No
mechanisms to protect work-
ers’ rights
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Between Marketization and Demarketization: Reconguration of the…
Under the auspices of the migration industry, work permits became “marketable
commodities” whose prices were controlled by employment agencies that exploited
prospective migrants. The migration industry developed into hierarchically linked
chains of recruitment (agencies and informal brokers in Israel and Thailand) and
interdependencies that pushed up the costs of recruitment for potential migrants. The
practice of charging high illegal fees was pervasive, even though according to Israeli
regulations, charging recruitment fees from foreign workers was prohibited, and after
2006 maximum amount of fees was allowed.
These illegal practices illustrate the relative ungovernability of the commercial
organizations involved in the recruitment, because some of their operations contra-
vened the regulatory frameworks in both countries (Thailand and Israel). Although
the Israeli authorities were aware of these illegal practices, they faced diculties
in putting a stop to them. The challenges stemmed from the complexity of proving
criminal transactions conducted in other countries and the lack of determination to
enforce existing regulations eectively (Kemp & Raijman, 2014).
These illegal practices conducted by legal intermediaries blurred the distinc-
tion between licit and illicit practices within the framework of the temporary labor
migration programs initiated by the state. The long-standing lack of law enforcement
regarding the actions of Israeli and Thai recruiting organizations abroad resulted in a
sprawling migration industry that at times served as the basis for human tracking in
Israel (Kemp & Raijman, 2014; Shamir, 2017).
The migration industry had signicant consequences for the labor migrants’ status
in the labor market. Migrants who were heavily indebted upon arrival were afraid
to leave abusive employment relationships and/or return to Thailand before they
had settled their debt. Thus, the debt bondage not only had a negative eect on the
migrants’ earning power but also exacerbated their precarious status in Israel.
The implementation of the BLA demarketized the recruitment process, which is
now managed by national oces (such as the Ministry of Labor in Thailand and
PIBA in Israel), international organizations (such as the IOM in Thailand until 2020),
and non-prot organizations at each of its dierent stages (CIMI in Israel). Private
companies in Israel and Thailand are no longer involved in the process of recruitment,
eliminating the previous complexity of the recruitment infrastructure. The new form
of recruitment gives potential migrants more access to information about employ-
ment opportunities in Israel. The result is evident in the transparent and controlled
mechanisms that broaden access to information, thus reducing the previous asym-
metry in knowledge and power between the commercial actors and the migrants.
The implementation of the BLA also drastically reduced the cost of migration and
established the fee rates in law. The results were an increase in the governability of
the recruitment process that also reduced the amount of debt that the migrants had to
incur to nance their move, as well as the time needed to repay the loans.
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R. Raijman et al.
Conclusions
The implementation of the BLA with Thailand was successful in dismantling the
migration industry prevalent in Israel since the 1990s, which was the main objective
of the agreement. The BLA was designed to increase workers’ awareness of their
rights, to give them more in-depth information about employment conditions and
rights before they arrived in Israel, to let them know where they could le complaints
about violations of their rights, and who they could turn to for support and assistance.
While one might expect that increased information and awareness of rights would
indirectly aect working conditions by motivating migrants to assert their rights and
speak out against unfair treatment, this was not the case. One explanation might be
the fact that the asymmetry of power between migrants and employers has narrowed
but still exists. Previous studies revealed that the implementation of the bilateral
agreement did not signicantly alter the precarious status of labor migrants in the
Israeli labor market. Although the BLA rectied certain injustices in the recruitment
process, it did not directly address violations of the migrant workers’ rights. There-
fore, it only partially reduced the migrant workers’ precariousness and vulnerability
(Kushnirovich & Raijman, 2022).
Another explanation for the lack of eective change in employment conditions
is the dierent logics governing the two dimensions: recruitment and employment
conditions. While changes in recruitment methods relate to the logic of combating
human tracking through the cooperation of both the receiving and sending country,
the employment conditions of the workers remain an internal matter of the receiving
country - Israel. In addition, the distinct structural and institutional characteristics of
the agriculture sector such as its geographical dispersion, peripherality, and the mul-
tiplicity of authorities responsible for various interests hinder eective governance
in the sector and contribute to the fragmentation of institutional knowledge. Due
to migrants’ limited bargaining power and the lack of ecient enforcement proce-
dures, even existing general labor laws cannot be translated into eective protection
in the labor market (Livnat & Shamir, 2022:69; Cohen & Kurlander, 2023). Thus,
the potential of BLAs to protect workers’ rights is undermined by the interests of the
states, which focus only on the control of the recruitment process rather than protect-
ing the migrants’ rights in the labor market.
Funding This research was supported by the Center for International Migration and Integration (CIMI),
Israel.
Open access funding provided by University of Haifa.
Declarations
Conict of Interest There is no conict of interest to disclose.
Ethical Approval The questionnaire and methodology for this study was approved by the Human Research
Ethics committee of the University of Haifa (Ethics.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
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as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use
is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
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Authors and Aliations
RebecaRaijman1· NonnaKushnirovich2· YahelKurlander3
Rebeca Raijman
raijman@soc.haifa.ac.il
Nonna Kushnirovich
nonna@ruppin.ac.il
Yahel Kurlander
yahelak@gmail.com
1 Department of Sociology, University of Haifa, 199 Aba-Hushi Avenue Mount Carmel,
Haifa, Israel
2 Department of Economics and Administration, Ruppin Academic Center,
Emek Hefer 40250, Israel
3 Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities, Tel-Hai College, Qiryat Shemona, Israel
1 3
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