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The Empire of Western Xia and the Tangut Economy

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©    , |:./_
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
The Empire of Western Xia and the
Tangut Economy
Contemporary to the Song Empire, a dynastic regime of mighty power and
lasting inuence emerged in what is today the northwest of China. The inhab-
itants of the land named their regime the ‘Great Xia Kingdom White and High,
or simply the Kingdom of Great Xia. And since it was located to the west of the
Song, it is by convention referred to in the Chinese historiographical tradition
as Western Xia (1038–1227 ). The imperial dynasty was ruled by a total of ten
emperors, spanning a history of 190 years. The Tanguts stood of against the
Northern Song and Khitan Liao in its early history, and later against Southern
Song and Jurchen Jin. In each of the two ‘three-kingdom’ periods, it constituted
a major force and played a critical role in a delicate balance of power in medi-
eval China. Further adding to the complexity of imperial diplomacies in this
period was the presence of the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic groups with
overlapping territories, mutual goals, and conicting interests. The majority of
the population in Western Xia was the prominent Tangut tribe of Dangxiang
Qiang. During their rule, the Tanguts excelled in military power, steered a large
economy, and prospered in all aspects of cultural life.
Although the Tanguts built an empire not inferior to the Song, Liao, and
Jin Dynasties, imperial historians of the Yuan Dynasty left the history of Xixia
unchronicled. As a result, unlike the History of Song, History of Liao, and History
of Jin, the vast number of Tangut historical records have not survived in the
form of imperial chronicles. Furthermore, when the Mongol army breached
the walls of Xia, a sizeable portion of Tangut publications and cultural arte-
facts were destructed in war. Whilst some precious materials have luckily sur-
vived, they have been buried deep in the dust of history over many centuries.
All of these misfortunes have added to the aura of mystery around the Tangut
Empire. Nevertheless, the main contour of the history of Xia has remained
accessible to those who consult the brief and cursory portrayals of the Tanguts
within the pages of the Histories of Song, Liao, and Jin.
The geography and natural environment of a historical regime is a key factor
in its socio-economic experiences. Therefore, it is tting and proper to rst
investigate the natural conditions of Western Xia before proceeding to discuss
the state of its economy.
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     
1 Natural Conditions of Western Xia
The Tanguts inhabited a territory that encompassed a diverse range of geo-
graphic features, which are the main factors in the formation of the Tangut
society. Especially noteworthy are the landscape, waters, and climates.
The territories of the Tangut empire encompassed a wide range of land-
scapes and diverse geographic features: plains, steppes, mountains, and deserts.
After the Dangxiang tribe migrated north from the medieval Songzhou (pre-
fecture of Song, Songpan of Sichuan province) in the Tang Dynasty, they scat-
tered and settled on the Loess plateaus of the Shaanxi and Gansu areas. By the
time the Tangut empire was proclaimed in the early 11th century, the Tanguts
had signicantly expanded their territory. The east and south were the Loess
plateau, with the Liupan mountains as its southernmost barrier. To the north
were the Ordos and Alashan areas of the Mongolian Plateau, featured by its
long-stretching deserts dotted by pastures, including the Mu Us Sandyland,
the Tengger Desert, and the Badain Jaran Desert. To the west are the northern
borders of the Tibetan plateau, where the Qilian mountains stand as a shield
to the Hexi corridor. The Helan Mountains are embedded in this landscape
like a piece of beautiful Sapphire. Here are the fertile Hetao plain and the thin
stretch of oasis across the otherwise sandy Hexi corridor.
A broad sketch of the Tangut landscape reveals the predominance of high
mountains, bleak deserts, and limited arable land. In a sharp contrast to the
  The Helan mountains
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  
Central Plains covered with a higher proportion of hills and plains suitable for
agriculture, Western Xia sufered obvious geographical disadvantages in the
production of grains. Chronicles from the Song Dynasty record that “The Xia
relied on the fertile land south of the River, bound by the Heng mountains on
the right, and by the Tiandu and Maxian mountains on the west. The rest of its
land is insucient for cultivation or animal-husbandry.”
Not only does the Yellow River ow across the entire Tangut territories,
but some of its branches upstream and midstream also fall within the Tangut
realm, such as the Rivers Huangshui, Tao, Qingshui, Kuye, and Wuding. Since
time immemorial, the Yellow River has been exploited for the purpose of
irrigation and remained a lifeline for local agriculture throughout the life of
Western Xia. Irrigation by river was especially important for Tangut peasants
dealing with persistent draught, who could aford to count much less on nat-
ural precipitation as a reliable water supply. The Hetao area “enriched the
ve grains, especially in the growing of rice and wheat. Between Gan (zhou)
and Liang (zhou), however, irrigation relied on the many rivers nearby. As for
Xing (zhou) and Ling (zhou), there are ancient waterways: the Tanglai and
Hanyuan canals, both diverted from the Yellow River. With the benet of irri-
gation enjoyed, there is less risk of ood, or peril of draught.” Although the
Yellow River has earned for what is present-day Ningxia the reputation of the
“Prosperous Jiangnan beyond the Northern Frontiers,” it also furnishes the area
with natural catastrophes. With an unexpectedly heavy rainfall, dams break,
unleashing oods upon the humans and livestock of the farmlands.
There are also endorheic rivers within the Tangut territory, which form an
area of inland waters in the Hexi-Alashan and another near Ordos. The most
renowned is the ‘Black Water’ from the melting snow of the Qilian mountains,
which ows into the Juyan Lake (Mongolian: Gashuun Nuur), nourishing a
trail of oases along its way, thus providing an ideal base for Tangut agricul-
ture. By “between Gan and Liang, however, irrigation relied on the many rivers
nearby,” the chronicle refers to rivers formed by the convergence of meltwa-
ters from the Qilian mountains. One of the oases was Shazhou (modern-day
Dunhuang, Gansu) where “residents relied on locally-produced wheat as their
Li, Tao (Song Dynasty). Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian [續資治通鑒長編], hereafter The
Extended Zizhi Tongjian. Book 466, Sixth Year of Yuanyou (1091), Ninth Month, Renchen.
Emended Critical Edition. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1979.
Tuo Tuo, et al. (Yuan Dynasty). Songshi [宋史], hereafter History of Song. Book 486. “The
State of Xia” Part . Emended Critical Edition. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1977.
History of Song, Book 486, “The State of Xia” Part .
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     
  The Yellow river near Yinchuan, Ningxia
  The Yellow river near Zhongwei, Ningxia
principle source of nourishment.” This demonstrates beyond doubt the exist-
ence of developed agricultural zones along the Hexi corridor. The very city of
Khara-Khoto, where the largest corpus of Tangut manuscripts was discovered,
was one of the oases along the downstream of the ‘Black Water.
The climate in Western Xia is typically continental, with long winters of low
temperature and dry air that allow a short time for crops to grow. Some areas
are plagued by chronic draught and negligible rainfall, which cause enormous
challenges to farming lands and raising livestock. The Tanguts did, however,
enjoy nature’s gift of ample sunlight, since adequate heat, strong solar radi-
ation, and high diurnal temperature variation are all favourable conditions
for agriculture. With that said, in those areas farther away from the natural
waters, draught alone is able to cripple the economy. Thus, where rainfall
in the spring and autumn are indispensable for sowing and harvesting, the
Tanguts depended solely on the mercy of heaven and their own fortune for
their livelihood.
A.J.H. Charignon, Le Livre de Marco Polo. Pékin: Albert Nachbaur, Vol. 1. 1924, Vol. 2. 1926,
Vol. 3. 1928. Ch. 57.
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  
  Juyan Lake Basin, Ejin Banner, Inner Mongolia (near Khara-Khoto)
  Badain Jaran Desert, Inner Mongolia Jinbo Shi - 9789004461321
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     
In sum, the natural condition of Western Xia is inferior to that of the Central
Plains. Lands naturally favourable for habitation such as the Hetao area are
extremely rare. Although in more than a few regions, it may be said that veg-
etation used to be more plentiful than now, it should also be observed that
water and land resources had already been overly exploited under the Tanguts.
The frequency of war and the forced exile of the people further exacerbated
the deterioration of the natural environment.
2 Dangxiang People and Their Economy before the Tangut Empire
The early Dangxiang Tanguts, a branch of the Western Qiang ethnics—as they
were known in the Han Dynasty—lived between expansive steppes and hills
in what are modern-day south-eastern Qinghai and north-western Sichuan.
According to the Old Book of Tang, “as the Western Qiang weakened after the
Wei and Jin dynasties, its tribes either succumbed to the central power, or
ed to the elds and mountains. It is only after Zhou destroyed Tanchang and
Dengzhi, that the Dangxiang gained strength. Their territory sets its eastern
boundary near Songzhou, borders Yabghu to the west, reaches the Chongsang,
Misang and other Qiangtic tribes in the south, and connects with the Tuyuhun
in the north. They are situated in the middle of hills and valleys, and stretches
across three thousand li of land. To the west of the Dangxiang ethnics were
the Tibetans, and to its northwest lied the regime of Tuyuhun. At the time,
Dangxiang was comprised of multiple clans by their unique family names, of
which the most powerful was Tuoba. In the early Tang period, Tuoba Chici,
the Dangxiang chief of the Tuoba clan, paid tribute to the Empire. Honoured
by the bestowment of the Tang imperial name, Li, the leader was named the
Xirongzhou Dudu, or Commander of the Prefecture of Western Rong.
Originally, the Dangxiang were a people of herdsmen. And up to the times
of Sui and Tang, they knew only how to raise livestock and engaged in no agri-
culture. The Book of Sui states plainly that the Dangxiang “herded yaks, sheep
and swine for food, and knew not how to sow and reap.” Even during the Tang
: Tanchang (Chinese: 宕昌), a Qiangic regime based in southern Gansu, near modern-day
Tanchang county; Dengzhi (Chinese: 鄧至), a Qiangic power established in present-day
northern Sichuan, to the west of Jiuzhaigou.
Liu, Xu, et al. Jiu Tang Shu [舊唐書]: Old Book of Tang. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company,
1975, Book 198, “Dangxiang Qiang”; see also, Li, Yanshou, et al. Bei Shi [北史]: History of the
Northern Dynasties. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1974, Book 96, “Dangxiang”; Wei,
Zheng et al. Sui Shu [隋書]: Book of Sui. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1977. Book 83,
“Dangxiang.”
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  
Dynasty, the Dangxiang “raised yaks, horses, donkeys and sheep as a source of
nourishment. But they knew not how to sow and reap, and grew not the Five
Crops in their elds.” At that time, all that the Dangxiang relied on for food,
clothing, and other utilities came directly from animal husbandry: they con-
sumed meat and milk, and fabricated clothes using the fur and skin of their
livestock. Even their internal chambers were “covered with woven wool of
sheep and hairs from Yak tails.”
However, with the rise of the neighbouring Tibetan power, the Dangxiang
tribes came increasingly under pressure. Scattered around present-day north-
ern Sichuan, southern Gansu, and Qinghai, they nally migrated closer to
the Central Plains in the early 8th century. The Tang Empire moved the
Commandership of the Jingbian Prefecture, originally established in the Longxi
area, to the Qing Prefecture (modern-day Qingyang, Gansu), and appointed the
Dangxiang chief, Tuoba Sitai, as the Commander in efective control of twelve
prefectures. In mid-8th century, the Tibetans seized the moment of the Anshi
Rebellion (755–763 ) to invade the poorly-guarded Hexi and Longyou, forc-
ing the Dangxiang tribes in these areas to once again move eastward, to an area
north to Yinzhou (modern-day Mizhi county of Shaanxi), and east to Xiazhou
(today’s Baichengzi, north of Jingbian county, Shaanxi). The Commandership
of Jingbian Prefecture relocated to Yinzhou. Over time, a large number of
Dangxiang clans arrived in Suizhou (present-day Suide county of Shaanxi)
and Yanzhou (Yan’an, Shaanxi). Some of the tribes aided the Tibetans in their
assault on Tang cities, culminating in the fall of Chang’an. In the second wave
of Dangxiang migrations, the clans dwelling near the Qing prefecture were
commonly referred to as the “Tribes of the Eastern Mountains” (Dongshan-bu)
whereas those that entered the Xia prefecture were called the “Tribes of the
Plain Xia” (Pingxia-bu). The southern borders of Pingxia are marked by the
Heng mountains, which was known to the Tang as the Southern Mountains,
hence the name for the Dangxiang clans that settled down in this area, “The
Tribes of the Southern Mount” (Nanshan-bu). The Dangxiang tribes that
migrated inland still maintained their habitual practice of herding. As their
wealth accumulated and population bloomed, a process of social stratication
based on ownership and proprietorship gradually took shape within the clans.
In the First Year of Guangming during the Tang Dynasty (880 ), Huang
Chao’s peasant rebels captured the imperial capital, Chang’an (Xi’an, Shaanxi).
In the First Year of Zhonghe (881 ), the Dangxiang chief Tuoba Sigong,
then Regional Inspector (Cishi) of the You Prefecture, joined other Regional
Commanders (Jiedushi) in answering Xizong Emperor’s call to suppress
Old Book of Tang. Book 198, “Dangxiang Qiang.
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     
the Huangchao rebels. After Chang’an was recovered in the Third Year of
Zhonghe (883 ), Tuoba was awarded the title of Dingnan Jiedushi (Regional
Commander of the Dingnan Circuit), and once more conferred the imperial
name of Li, ruling ve prefectures from his government in Xiazhou. The place
was, a few centuries ago, the capital of the Xiongnu Xia state (407–431) founded
by Helian Bobo during the Sixteen Kingdoms period of Eastern Jin Dynasty.
The other four prefectures were Yin, Sui, You (Jingbian county, Shaanxi), and
Jing (Mizhi county, Shaanxi). Since then, Tuoba exercised de facto autono-
mous rule in the region. Throughout the Five Dynasties period (907–960), the
Dangxiang regime based in Xiazhou attached itself to Liang, Tang, Jin, Han, and
Zhou, assorted dynasties that rose and fell in rapid succession in the Central
Plains. At the same time, it fought a series of wars with neighbouring cities and
emerged from these struggles an even greater power than before.
Xue, Juzheng, et al. Jiu Wu Dai Shi [舊五代史]: Old History of the Five Dynasties. Beijing:
Zhonghua Book Company, 1976. Book 138, “Dangxiang”; History of Song. Book 485–486.
“State of Xia” (Parts  & ); Tuotuo, et al. Liao Shi [遼史]: History of Liao. Beijing: Zhonghua
Book Company, 1974. Book 115, “Extra Sources on Western Xia”; Tuo Tuo, et al. Jin Shi [金史]:
History of Jin. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1975. Book 134. “Western Xia.” See also Wu,
Guangcheng (Qing Dynasty). Xixia Shushi [西夏書事]: Book of Western Xia. Fifth Year of
Daoguang (1835) printed edition (: see also Beijing: Wenkuitang, 1935; Taipei: Guangwen,
1968).
  Site of Tongwan city, prefecture of Xia
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  
The great migration in the Tang Dynasty did not signicantly alter the Dang-
xiang reliance on herding as the main pillar of its economy. The Dangxiang
Tanguts traded their animal products for grains, cloths, and other commod-
ities from the Central Plains. A main Tangut export was the famed breed of
Dangxiang steeds, favoured by the inlanders and traded at extravagant prices.
A sizable number of Dangxiang Tanguts, however, did resort to farming once
they settled on cultivated lands. These families thus began a historical pro-
cess of transitioning from nomadic herding to settled agriculture, eventually
becoming farmers. This change in economic production greatly enriched the
Dangxiang social life. Historically, many areas which came under Dangxiang
rule had already preserved a base of agriculture with a high speed of devel-
opment and economic production. The joint cultivation eforts by both
Dangxiang and Han Chinese peasants in the area unleashed a long-lasting
impact on the shape of the Tangut society.
The Anxi Yulin Cave No. 3, west of Dunhuang, Gansu, is a reservoir of Tangut
art. In its mural portraying the Fifty-one-faced, Thousand-armed Bodhisattva
Avalokiteśvara, is an image of ploughing: two oxen bear a horizontal frame
connected to the plough shaft—the so-called ‘two oxen drawing the plough’
method—whilst the peasant lays one hand on the plough and has the other
clutch the whip, a vivid depiction of the ploughing eld in Western Xia.
  Tangut mural of ploughing oxen, in Yulin cave, No. 3
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     
3 Founding of Western Xia and Its Economy
In the early years of Northern Song, the Dangxiang ethnarchs were tributary
kings to the Song Empire. Li Jipeng’s succession to his elder brother in 980 ,
however, catalysed conicts within the tribes. In the end, he resorted to sur-
rendering the ve prefectures to direct rule by Song ocials. In the seventh
year of Song Taiping Xingguo (982 ), Song bestowed on Li Jipeng the title of
Regional Commander of Zhangde Circuit (Zhangdejun Jiedushi) and sent an
army to Xiazhou to take control over the Tangut prefectures. The imperial edict
required not only the settlement of Jipeng in Kaifeng but also the presence of
all Tangut Li royalties within the Sima range of family relatives in Bianjing. Li
Jiqian, a younger cousin of Li Jipeng and at the time in charge of Dangxiang
internal afairs within the Dingnan Jiedushi (Duzhi Fanluoshi), vehemently
opposed the transfer of the ve prefectures and the Song demand for the Li
family as virtual hostages. He led a cohort to ee to Dijinze, in modern-day
Ordos, Inner Mongolia, where he proclaimed autonomous rule from the
Song Dynasty.
Li Jiqian stood fast against Song summons of surrender and ofers of recruit-
ment, to which he responded with more looting. In the First Year of Yongxi
(984 ), Jiqian reached the Xiazhou area, where he sufered a major defeat by
Yin Xian (932–994), the Song prefect of Xiazhou (Zhizhou), and Cao Guangshi
(931–985), the inspector-commissioner (Duxunjianshi) whose thousand-strong
cavalry dashed into the Tangut camps in Dijinze. The Song army prevailed
decidedly against Jiqian’s force, captured the chief’s mother and wives, and
forced him into dormancy, waiting for fortune to turn her tide. In the fol-
lowing year, however, Jiqian maneuvered a deceptive surrender, where he
surprised Cao Guangshi in an ambush, killing the general and his followers
before capturing Yinzhou. Now with a prefecture, Jiqian assumed the posi-
tion of Dingnan Liuhou, giving him temporary command of afairs within the
Jiedushi, and appointed ocials who formed a new bureaucracy around him.
Enraged, Emperor Taizong of Song dispatched four armies to besiege Jiqian,
but although serious damages were inicted, the expedition was not able to
uproot the foundation of the new Dangxiang regime in Xiazhou, due to the
lack of efective military coordination on the frontiers.
 : Zhangdejun (彰德軍) was a circuit near present-day An’yang, established by the
Later Liang as a strategic post, and abandoned after mid-10th century. It was an empty
title recycled as an honorary status for Li Jipeng.
 : Sima (缌麻): the funerary costumes worn for the deaths of cousins, grandparents and
children, married aunts, and in-laws. Here, it species the range of family relatives.
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  
Jiqian, fully aware that his emerging power was far from a full-edged king-
dom, came to the strategic decision to submit to Khitan rule in a diplomatic
efort to leverage support against the Song Dynasty. He was subsequently
dubbed the King of Xia by the Liao emperor, the archenemy of Song, and
was given a Khitan princess as wife. The deal was within his reach: in a erce
rivalry between Liao and Song, the rise of a Dangxiang power within Song’s
western gates was all benet and no menace to Liao. For the court in Bianjing,
which sees itself as the only orthodox and legitimate heir of the Central Plains,
the Dangxiang lands had been former Song territories. For the Song Empire
to recognise Tangut independence, therefore, was as painful as cutting of its
own esh and bones. Even worse was the prospect of an alliance between the
Dangxiang and the Khitan, which would have placed Song between two for-
midable enemies. For these reasons, the Song court resolved to forestall the
growth of Tangut power. So, whilst Jiqian was exploiting Song-Liao hostilities to
carve out a space for his ambitions in the west, Song tried to leverage Jipeng to
check and undermine Jiqian by re-appointing the elder cousin as the Dingnan
Jiedushi in the First Year of Duangong (988 ), with a new imperial name
of Zhao Baozhong, to prepare for a campaign against Jiqian. Jipeng, however,
compliant overtly but, considerate of his own interests covertly, wavered in his
thoughts and oscillated back and forth between the two sides. Furthermore,
Liao again crowned Jiqian as King of Xia, pressing him to launch an ofensive
against Song.
Amongst all Chinese dynasties, Song is known for its suboptimal military
power. The inadequacy of its army was aggravated by the lack of prudent com-
mand. These are the reasons that there are many more losses than victories in
Song’s war records. In the Third Year of Zhidao (997 ), Li Jiqian forced the
Song Dynasty to recognise his status as Dingnan Jiedushi based in Xiazhou. All
the ve prefectures were recovered to Dangxiang rule.
Li Jiqian then set his eyes on Lingzhou, modern-day Wuzhong, as his new
strategic focus. Through repeated interceptions of Song deliveries of supplies
and munitions, he reduced the prefecture to isolation. By this time, years of
attrition had witnessed the rise and fall of Li Jiqian’s fortune. His Dangxiang
regime nally emerged from a succession of surrenders and revolts, and proved
itself a major threat to the Song Dynasty. After another disappointing campaign
ve contingents strong, Song ocials sank into a quagmire of hesitations and
debates over the cost of giving up Lingzhou. Those who opposed the abandon-
ment considered the prefecture “a strategic location for herding, farming and
campaigning,” a barrier against barbarians from across the borders. Indeed, as
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     
the Central Plains’ gateway to purchase horses from the Hexi areas, Lingzhou
was important for not only military but also economic reasons.
In the Third Year of Xianping (1000), Li Jiqian again seized grains and pro-
visions from a Song division, and besieged Lingzhou with a cavalry force of
50,000 in the following year. With key outposts and strategic locations occu-
pied, he ordered soldiers to cultivate more fertile lands around the outskirt
of the city, showing determination for a long-term siege. As large towns near
Lingzhou fell to Jiqian one after another, the lifeline between Lingzhou and
the rest of the Song Empire was cut of completely. It was only a matter of time
before the entire city collapsed. In the spring of the Fifth Year (1002 ), Jiqian
concentrated his picked troops in a swift assault on Lingzhou. Prefect Pei Ji,
desperate for aid, fell together with the wall.
After capturing Lingzhou, Jiqian immediately reported the victory to Liao.
For the rst time, there was a large, central city within Tangut territory. The
next year, he renamed the Ling prefecture ‘Xipingfu,’ transforming it into a
new centre of Dangxiang rule. This is followed by the capture of Xiliangfu, in
present-day Wuwei, Gansu.
Immediately after the victory at Lingzhou, the coupled efect of political
instability and a severe draught convinced Li Jiqian of the importance of agri-
culture in consolidating Tangut power. For a long-term politico-economic
policy, he promoted water conservation and irrigation projects in support of
agricultural production.
Just as the Dangxiang leader’s ambition grew in the ames of two conquered
imperial cities, the Tibetan chief Pan Luozhi, who recently received a commis-
sion from Song in the Sixth Year of Xianping (1002 ), devised a stratagem
against the Tanguts. In a feigned surrender, he surprised the Dangxiang army
in a sudden attack, leaving Li Jiqian fatally wounded. As a result, Song’s emer-
gent threat from the northwest was temporarily alleviated. In the ninth month
of the same year, the Khitans sent a massive army against Song, but meeting
tenacious resistance, they settled for peace in the famous ‘Chanyuan Treaty.
Song thus gained relief in both the Midwest and most of the North within the
same year. This relative stability laid the foundation for a period of successful
development.
After Li Jiqian died in battle, his son Li Deming succeeded the kingship. In
a general state of amity between Liao and Song, he continued the Pro-Khitan
 Zizhi Tongjian Book 44. Second Year of Xianping in Zhenzong’s Reign (999), Sixth Month,
Wuwu.
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  
policy of his father, but also tried to amend ties with the Song Dynasty, result-
ing in rather cordial diplomatic relations between the two regimes. The Song
emperor honoured Deming as the Dingnan Jiedushi and King of Xiping, in
addition to annual gifts of silver, silk, and tea: the imperial award bestowed
reached as much as 40,000 in silver, cloth, and coins, as well as 20,000 jin of tea
leaves. A further testament to the bilateral friendship was the establishment
of trading markets in Bao’an jun, an area in modern-day Zhidan county of
Shaanxi province. The Song empire traded economic benets in return for qui-
etness on the western front, whilst the Tanguts further secured and strength-
ened their power.
The Deming regime, rather isolated on the periphery of trade and pro-
duction hubs in the Central Plains, still fell short of a well-rounded economy.
Indeed, it still remained in need of exchanges, subsidies, and complements
from the Song Dynasty. Through markets established along the frontiers, the
Tanguts were able to trade a wide array of livestock and other local produces
for goods such as silk and handicraft merchandises:
Since the Fourth Year of Jingde, Western Xia trading markets are set up in
Bao’an jun, where silk clothes and fabrics are exchanged for camels and
horses, cattle and sheep, jade, fur-felt carpets, and gancao herbs; perfume
and spices, porcelains and lacquerwares, ginger and cinnamon, etc. are
traded for mila amber, sheqi musk, fur and hemp shirts, goat-antelope
horns, the mineral sal ammoniac, bupleurum herbs, cistanche, saower,
and plume. Those outside the ocial markets are free to trade with each
other, and so are those paying tributes in the imperial capital allowed to
trade their goods.
Given the many and mutual economic benets of commerce, there also arose
private initiatives of cross-border trade. Song ocials in those prefectures
reported these incidents to the emperor, who nonetheless showed a spirit of
magnanimity and reconciliation:
The Hedong border-pacication commission (Yuanbian Anfusi) reports:
“Civilians in the Prefectures of Lin and Fu engage in frequent transac-
tions of goods on their own initiatives and set up unauthorised markets
near the borders of Xia prefecture. It is hereby hoped that the Imperial
Majesty grants a permission to arrest the miscreants, and to establish a
system of prize and punishment in order to dissuade them from further
 History of Song. Book 186, Eighth Chapter on Food and Goods, On Mutual Trade.
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     
pursuing such activities.” The emperor replies, “I have heard that the
roads in yonder lands are rugged and hazardous. As for those who trade
amongst themselves, so long as the quantity is not large, it is sucient to
apply the previous edict, with an additional, reasonable amount of alert
and attention into this matter.”
Deming’s territory covers stretches of lakes and lands teeming with the famed
‘dark and white salt’ (qingbaiyan). Both of high quality and at low prices,
Tangut salt threatens the sales and prots of Xiechi salt (Yuncheng, Shanxi)
in the Song Dynasty. Whether to tighten or to relax imperial sanctions against
Tangut salt was the subject of numerous debates within the Song court. It
was also true that sometimes, Deming’s envoy tasked with paying tributes vis-
ited Song cities to purchase contraband goods and weapons to make up for his
own needs.
When natural disasters befell the Tanguts, Deming requested a large sum
of grains for famine alleviation, both out of economic concerns and intention
to force the Song emperor into a dicult decision. Wang Dan, then premier of
Song, ofered his counsel:
Zhao Deming once requested grains in the number of millions under the
pretext of a famine. The emperor circulated the memorial to the ocials.
All are enraged, “Deming has just agreed to his share of the treaty, and
now he breaks his oath by such an outrageous request. We humbly entreat
Your Majesty to issue an edict to scold him.” Wang Dan alone remains
silent. The emperor asks him, “What then is your opinion?” Dan replies,
“It is my wish that an edict be issued to Deming, saying that in such a cri-
sis of famine on your territories, the imperial court which always pacies
and defends faraway lands would as a matter of course grant aids to those
in need. And yet, since grains stored in border cities as provisions for the
army are the source on which too many imperial guards depend, they
cannot be easily appropriated for other purposes. Therefore, the Emperor
has demanded that the three main Bureaus hoard grain, in the number
of a million, in the imperial capital Bianjing, and that Deming dispatch
his own men to come in order to fetch them.” The emperor, delighted,
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 72. Second Year of Dazhong Xiangfu in Emperor Zhenzong’s Reign
(1009). November, Yimao.
 Zizhi Tongjian, Book 73. Third Year of Dazhong Xiangfu in Emperor Zhenzong’s Reign,
(1010), Fifth Month, Renwu.
 Zizhi Tongjian, Book 79. Fifth Year of Dazhong Xiangfu in Emperor Zhenzong’s Reign
(1012) Eleventh Month, Bingwu.
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  
adopts the advice. When Deming received the imperial edict, he paid his
worship on bended knees, “There is real talent in the Imperial Court, and
it is not appropriate for me to act in this manner.”
Over time, Deming moved his base from Lingzhou near the Song border farther
north. In the Fourth Year of Tianchi in Northern Song (1020 ), Li Deming
ocially designated the town of Huaiyuan by the Helan mountains as his
new capital, which he then renames Xingzhou (today the city of Yinchuan, in
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region). The new ‘Prefecture of Prosperity’ gradually
grew into the magnitude of a grand metropolis in the northwest, and the fertile
land around this area formed the base and lifeline of the Tangut economy.
With the increase of his power over the years of rest and restoration, Deming
shifted from his father’s policy of eastward expansion into Song territories to
focus instead on the western frontiers, scheming against the weaker Tibetans
and Uyghurs along the Hexi corridor. In fact, Li Jiqian himself arranged an army
to take over Liangzhou, an efort that was quickly lost. Deming’s own cam-
paigns against the Uyghur regime in Ganzhou was thwarted and relaunched
several times without much progress. By this time, however, the Tangut king-
dom had eclipsed the Uyghurs with respect to both their military and economy.
In the Sixth Year of Tiansheng (1028), Deming placed his son, Yuanhao, at the
head of an army sent to once more test the strength of Ganzhou (modern-day
Zhangye, Gansu). In horror and haste, the Uyghur Khan ed the city at night,
handing Yuanhao an achievement which earned him the ocial title of the
Crown Prince.
During Deming’s reign in Western Xia, the Prefecture of Liang (present-day
Wuwei, Gansu) came under the occupation of the Tibetans, Dangxiang, and
the Uyghurs. Dispatched there in September of the First Year of Mingdao
(1032), Yuanhao rst lulled the Uyghurs to rest by the delusive appearance of
engaging the Song army in Huanqing but then attacked Liangzhou in a sudden
strike. After capturing this strategic post in the Hexi area, the Tanguts received
the surrender of Guazhou (today’s Guazhou county, Gansu) and Shazhou.
In this way, Dangxiang power under the leadership of Li Deming claimed
the entire Hexi corridor, efectively replacing the Tibetan and Uyghur suprema-
cies in the region. The dramatic expansion of Tangut territory not only laid
the blueprint for the foundation of Western Xia but also invigorated its econ-
omy in the long run by claiming the rich and moist Hexi lands suitable for
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 68. First Year of Dazhong Xiangfu in Emperor Zhenzong’s Reign
(1008), First Month, Renshen.
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     
both pasturing and harvesting. Indeed, given the double-edged legacy of the
Yellow River as the source of both irrigation and inundation throughout the
history of imperial China, it is worth noting that the Hetao region between
Ling, Xia, and other prefectures alone enjoys all benets and little harm from
the “Mother River.” Naturally, this plain proved to be the lifeline of the Tangut
economy. Overall, during this period, both Fan and Han populations dwelled
and ourished on Tangut lands with general stability, where they produced
and traded in large quantities, building an economic and military backbone
for the future empire.
As king, Li Deming showed moderate ambitions. Mindful of the cost and
futility of excessive military campaigns, he hoped instead to leverage Song’s
economy to improve Tangut livelihood. Historical archives have passed down
an interesting conversation between Deming and his heir, Yuanhao:
[Yuanhao] many times remonstrated Deming against submission to the
Central Empire. Deming then admonished him, “We have been in wars
for too long, which is ultimately counterproductive. In vain, we exhaust
ourselves. Our tribes have for thirty years received ne silk clothes thanks
to the benevolence of the divine Song emperor, a grace we shall not
betray.” Yuanhao replies, “To herd in fur clothes is the nature of the Fan
people. The destiny for such heroes is kingly hegemony, so what use is
there for ne silk?”
This conversation vividly contrasts the distinct characters and ambitions of
Deming and Yuanhao, as well as the diferent emphases in their economic pol-
icies: whereas the father aimed to invigorate trade and receive benets from
Song, the son preferred to revitalise the traditional economy based on raising
livestock. Indeed, this conversation was a symbolic prelude to the eventual sep-
aration of Western Xia and its resistance against Song under Yuanhao’s reign.
4 Tangut Politics and Economy in the Early Period of Western Xia
Ever mightier than before, the Western Xia after Yuanhao’s succession saw
ripening conditions to proclaim an independent empire. With a far-reaching
vision and an unrelenting spirit of innovation, the new King enacted a series
 History of Song. Book 486. “Western Xia” Part .
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 111, First Year of Mingdao in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1032),
Eleventh Month, Renchen.
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  
of political, military, and cultural policies in preparation for the establishment
of a new regime.
With respect to titles, Yuanhao replaced the Tang and Song imperial sur-
names of Li and Zhao with Weiming (𗼨𗆟 [ŋwe mji]), meaning ‘the close
family of Dangxiang.’ He altered his own title to ‘Wuzu,’ the Tangut word for
‘emperor.’ Regarding literacy and literature, the king ordered his reliable adviser,
Yeli Renrong, to create an entirely new script to record the Tangut language.
The Fan and Han Academies were established and placed in charge of printing
texts in the Tangut and Chinese languages. Buddhist in faith, the Dangxiang
royalty set up translation bureaus that interpreted and printed sutras.
Yuanhao’s institutional reforms integrated ethnic customs with the impe-
rial model of the Central Plains. The emperor established an elaborate bureau-
cracy, where ocials were assorted into the Departments of Literary and
Military afairs, respectively. Below the ranks of the Central Secretariat (zhong-
shu), Grand Chancellery (zaixiang), Council of Military Afairs (Shu[mi]shi),
Grandees (dafu), Palace Commanders (shizhong), and Grand Commandants
(taiwei), both Fan and Han ocials held a variety of positions. The city of
Xingzhou was elevated to the status of a great metropolis, Xingqingfu: The
Capital of Prosperity and Festivity.
Culturally, however, Tangut customs and mores prevailed in the new empire.
A new edict was passed, requiring all Dangxiang adults to shave their heads to
match the Tangut hairstyle. Administrators and generals wore diferent cos-
tumes both on duty and in private, leaving the commoners in blue and green
dress in order to distinguish the noble from the vulgar.
Yuanhao launched ambitious reforms in the military. Within the Tangut ter-
ritories, the emperor established a number of military districts with their own
supervisory commissions:
[The Emperor] established twelve supervisory military districts under
the commands of appointed aristocrats: 70,000 strong from the North
of the Yellow River to the Wularuo mountains, on guard against the
Khitans; an army of around 50,000 is on duty south of the Yellow River
 Shi, Jinbo. “Xixia Minghao Zakao” [西夏名號雜考] (Miscellaneous Studies on Tangut
Titles). Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao [中央民族學院學報]: Academic Journal of
the Minzu College (University) of China, issue 4, 1986.
 : Wula or Moni mountains is a part of the Yin Mountains in present-day Inner Mongolia.
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     
in Hong, Baibao, An and Yan Prefectures, Luoluo, Tiandu and
Weijing Mountains, on alert against Huan, Qing, Zhenrong and Yuan
prefectures; The left-wing Youzhou district boasts 50,000 men,
in defence against Lin, Yan, Lin, and Fu Prefectures; The right-wing
Ganzhou district deploys 30,000 men to keep a watchful eye on the
Tibetans and Uyghurs; Helan is protected by a legion of 50,000 in size,
Lingzhou by another force of 50,000, and nally, 70,000 more are sta-
tioned in the Xingqing city of Xingzhou. The total number amounts to
more than 500,000.
Yuanhao launched a series of military campaigns against Northern Song, Tibet,
and the Uyghur Khanate to expand the Tangut territory. At his time, the map of
Western Xia encompassed present-day Ningxia, most of Gansu province, north-
ern Shaanxi, western Inner Mongolia, as well as vast lands in eastern Qinghai.
Western Xia emerged a third major force in the game of great powers, compet-
ing on equal terms with Song and Liao empires. And although Tangut-owned
lands were generally on the more barren peripheries of the Central Plains not
known for the best environmental conditions, there were still plenty of arable
lands for agriculture and livestock to ourish.
On the 11th day of the 10th month in the rst year of Song Baoyuan (1038 ),
Yuanhao ascended the throne and claimed the heavenly mandate for imperial
rule. After he ocially proclaimed the founding of the Great Xia and himself
as its emperor, Yuanhao submitted a public memorandum to the Song to notify
 : Hongzhou (洪州) is a Tangut prefecture in an area southwest to modern-day Jingbian
county, Shaanxi province.
 : Baibao (白豹), a strategic fort along the Song-Xia frontier, near present-day Baibao
town of Wuqi, Shaanxi.
 : Anzhou and Yanzhou (安鹽州), near modern-day counties of Dingbian, Shaanxi and
Yanchi, Ningxia. Two cities south of the Yellow River.
 : Luoluo (羅洛), an area.
 : Prefectures under Song control: Huanzhou (環州), modern-day Huan county, Gansu;
Qingzhou (慶州), today’s Qingyang and other parts of southern Ningxia; Zhenrong (
), the site of a major Xia victory over Song, designated as a post-war trading city, near
present-day Guyuan, Ningxia; Yuanzhou (原州), today’s Zhenyuan and Pingliang.
 : Youzhou (宥州), in the time of Western Xia, was an area named Changze to the north-
west of Xiazhou, along the modern-day border between the south of Inner Mongolia and
Shaanxi province.
 : Linzhou (鄜州), Shaanxi District under Song control, encompasses modern-day
Ganquan, Fu and Luochuan counties; Yanzhou (延州), near Yan’an; Linzhou (麟州) and
Fuzhou (府州), today’s Shenmu, and Fugu counties of Shaanxi, respectively, would both
be conquered and annexed by the Tanguts around 1148 .
 History of Song. Book 485. “State of Xia” Part .
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  
his former patron of his independence. The new kingdom would stand rm
in the northwest and prove a erce rival in a two-century standof against the
empires of the Central Plains. With de facto imperial status along with new
modes and orders modelled after the example of the celestial empire, the
Tanguts efectually moved into a ‘feudal’ order characterised by the system of
‘lordship’ and ‘efdom:’ the royalty, nobility, and upper stratum of the clergy
constituted the three major pillars of the ruling estates, with a vast base popu-
lation composed of common peasants and herdsmen and an additional class
of serfs and semi-slaves regularly traded as ‘shijun’ and ‘nupu’ in the market.
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 122, First Year of Baoyuan in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1038). Tenth
Year, Jiaxu.
 Wu Tianchi, 1983, pp. 151–159; Shi, Jinbo. Xixia Shehui [西夏社會]: Tangut Society (vol. 1).
Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press. Aug. 2007, pp. 211–229; Shi, Jinbo. “Heishuicheng Chutu
Xixiawen Mai Renkou Qi Yanjiu” [黑水城出土西夏文賣人口契研究]: “A Study of the
Tangut Contracts of Human Transaction Excavated in Khara-Khoto” in Zhongguoshe-
huikexueyuan Yanjiushengyuan Xuebao [中國社會科學院研究生院學報]: Academic
Journal of the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Issue 4, 2014.
  Geography of Western Xia in the era of Northern Song
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     
At his ascension to the imperial throne, Yuanhao recognised and endorsed
new modes of economic productions. With equal emphasis on herding and
farming, he enacted a dual policy of maintaining traditional animal-husbandry
whilst advancing agriculture. Moreover, the emperor resorted to and relied on
benets from the neighbouring Song Empire, especially to compensate for the
weaknesses of the Tangut economy.
Due to its chronic dearth of grain, Western Xia cultivated its agricultural
economy with care and eagerness. The Tanguts not only fully exploited the
expediency of the Yellow River for the purpose of irrigation, but also took over
the Qin (qinjia), Han (hanyan), and Tang (tanglai) canals, in addition to projects
of their own. The “Canal of King Hao” (haowangqu), a site that remains to this
day in Yinchuan, Ningxia, is reputed to have been built during Yuanhao’s reign.
As one of Xia’s patron states, the Liao empire often acted as the mediator
between Song and Xia. However, the founding of the Tangut Empire, signi-
cant as it must have been, did not nd itself into the “Annals” (Benji) and the
“Book of Xixia” in the History of Liao. What is certain is that Yuanhao’s corona-
tion exacerbated an already imsy ground for diplomatic relations between
the states, adding more tension to their frigid relations. As expected, the Song
Court, in a spur of fury, lashed out against Yuanhao, depriving him of titles and
imposing a sanction against all cross-border markets. Announcements were
posted on walls near the border, declaring anyone who captures or beheads
Yuanhao to be the next Dingnan Jiedushi, at which point the frozen bilat-
eral relation dipped to its nadir. The Song government rst adopted a policy of
yanking exchange markets (hushi) and removing trading posts (quechang) in
an attempt to choke the Tanguts into submission.
At the time of Yuanhao’s revolt, the Emperor ordered the Shaanxi and
Hedong to cease their trade activities and abolish the Bao’an district mar-
kets; later, military authorities in Bingbian, Shaanxi were also prohibited from
exchanging with the Qiangic people. After a long period of time, Yuanhao vol-
untarily submitted himself again as a subject, and dispatched several emissar-
ies to request the restoration of the markets.
But before that, the begrudged Song, eager to punish the ungrateful client,
and the ambitious Xia, intent on marching into the Central Plains, contended
in three successive battles near Sanchuankou (to the northwest of modern-day
Yan’an), Haoshuichuan (to the north of Longde county, or at the town of
Xinglong in Xiji county, Ningxia), and Dingchuanzhai (to the northwest of
today’s Guyuan, Ningxia). In 1040 , the third year of Jingzong’s new reign,
 History of Song. Book 485. “State of Xia” Part  .
 History of Song. Book 186. Eighth Section on Food and Goods, Laws on Mutual Trade.
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  
some of Song’s most eminent generals were captured, leaving Yanzhou in a
precarious condition. The next year, numerous military leaders including Ren
Fu, the Song general in command of the camp, along with soldiers in the tens
of thousands fell in the Battle of Haoshuichuan. The catastrophe shook Song
cities in the Guanyou area—to the east of Hangu and Tong fort—and left the
Renzong emperor with hardship. The next year was marked by another dis-
aster for Song, this time in Dingchuanzhai, where Ge Huaimin, the associate
general of Jingyuan district, and another forty high-ranking ocers died in
battle, with nearly ten thousand soldiers also captured alive by the Tanguts.
Pursuing the rout deep into the enemy’s territory, Yuanhao’s legions looted
Weizhou (present-day Pingliang, Gansu), terrorising a large number of Guanfu
populations into the mountains. All three campaigns ended with resounding
Song defeat. Ever more hubristic, Yuanhao posted public notices to the people
announcing his imperial majesty’s desire “to arrive myself at the Wei River, and
 : Jingyuanlu (涇原路): a politico-military district under Song and Jin rule, which lasted
from 1041–1142 . The territory included modern-day Longde, Guyuan, Jingyuan and Xiji.
 : Guanfu: Guanzhong and Sanfu, refers to the area surrounding Chang’an.
  Territories of Western Xia
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     
march straight into Chang’an.” Moreover, inscription fragments unearthed
in the Tangut Mausoleum provide corroborating evidence with such lines as
“…could launch straight into the Central Plains.”
The ensuing years were punctuated by intermittent ofensive and defen-
sive moves, as well as bargains and negotiations. Wars and diplomatic con-
tentions revealed the weaknesses of Song armies, from their overly stretched
supply lines to suboptimal military leadership. Losses on the battleeld also
led to repercussions in the Chinese economy, “trapping the impoverished and
inrm in tax and debt.” The imperial exchequer, emptied over time, proved
the root cause of rampant peasant rebellions, which shook the foundation
of the Song Empire. The Tanguts, however, beneted less than expected from
the Song-Xia wars. Farmlands lied in waste, agriculture sufered losses, tea
evaporated from the market, and cattle and sheep were sold en masse at low
prices to the Khitans in exchange for cash to fund the war efort. Adding to
the plight of the poor peasants was the compulsory military draft, which gave
rise to public complaints against the imperial policy. This is evident in the folk
ballad chanted in protest of the war: Shi Buru, or The Ten Ways it is Worse.
A slightly subdued Yuanhao eventually agreed to come back to the negotiat-
ing table. Besides the principle issues of title and territory, most of the eleven
items of memoranda raised by the Tangut envoys to the Song emperor concern
economic interests. The most important ones are a proposed increase in Song’s
annual monetary reward to the Tanguts, an expansion of trade zones, and an
additional Tangut export of ‘dark and white salt’ to the Central Plains. Both
sides reached an agreement in the fourth year of Song’s Qingli reign (1044), by
which “Yuanhao nally submitted himself to Song as an imperial subject, and
entitled himself the king of his regime. With an annual gift of 255,000 liang,
pi and jin of silver, ne silk, and tea lavished on the Tanguts, the Song Dynasty
recognised the de facto independent status of the Tangut Empire. This peace
settlement, commonly referred to as the Qingli Treaty, proved yet another
 Wang, Gong (Song Dynasty). Wen Jian Jin Lu [聞見近錄]. Beijing: Zhonghua Book
Company, 1984.
 Li, Fanwen and Museum of Ningxia (eds.). Xixia Lingmu Chutu Canbei Suibian [西夏陵墓
出土殘碑粹編]: Inscription Fragments Excavated in the Tangut Tombs. Beijing: Cultural
Relics Publishing House, 1984. See image 98, M108H:145.
 : Fan Zhongyan, “Da Shou Zhao Tiao Chen Shi Shi” (答手詔條陳十事): “Statement of
Ten Afairs in Response to the Emperor’s Hand-written Edict.
 History of Song. Book 486. “State of Xia” Part  .
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 163. Eighth Year of Qingli in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1048). Second
Month, Xinhai. History of Song, Book 330. “Biography of Renzhuan.”
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 149. Fourth Year of Qingli in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1044). Fifth
Month, Jiashen.
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  
monumental diplomatic feat some 40 years after the Liao-Song Chanyuan
Treaty of 1005 . Thereafter, the extended Song-Xia frontiers nally breathed
the air of peace, and in the midst of recuperated bilateral relations, ourished
in trade at least for a period of time. Two years after the treaty was signed, Song
and Xia reached the decision to re-establish trade posts out of their own eco-
nomic interests and considerations.
In the sixth year of Qingli, trade markets were restored in the two districts
of Bao’an and Zhenrong. Since there was a lack of pasture land for horses
and sheep driven to the area near the markets, an additional trade post
was established at the Shunning fort.
Historically, Tangut rulers placed great emphasis on economic production
within their realm. With a solid base of the livestock industry, the Tanguts prof-
ited mainly from exporting extra animal products to Song merchants in the
trade markets. The Song Dynasty, on the other hand, relied heavily on Tangut
horses and sheep, to the point that the court would designate specic quotas
at which local markets should import them. For example, in December of the
sixth year of Renzong’s Qingli reign (1046):
In the Jiyou month, [the emperor] issued an edict, by which he orders the
markets at Bao’an and Zhenrong to each exchange for 2,000 horses and to
purchase 10,000 sheep.
Although in name, Western Xia was a tributary state of the Khitan Liao Empire,
serious conicts emerged between the two sides over time as Yuanhao pains-
takingly maneuvered to pit the two other empires against each other in a
strategy of self-protection. He even rallied the support of ethnic Tangut tribes
living within the Khitan border, inciting them to resist the Liao order and
providing them with critical aid in their rebellion. Consequently, in the thir-
teenth year of Chongxi (1044 ), not long after Song and Xia reached a peace
treaty, the Xingzong Emperor of Liao, Yelü Zongzhen (personal name: Zhigu)
(1016–1055 ) himself led an army 100,000 strong and divided into three
legions, crossed the Yellow River, and invaded the newly founded Western
Xia. In response, Yuanhao applied a mixed strategy: he deceived the enemy
with feigned signs of weaknesses, fortied the walls, cleared the elds of any
 History of Song. Book 186. Eighth Section on Food and Goods, Laws of Mutual Trade.
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 159. Sixth Year of Qingli in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1046). Twelfth
Month, Jiyou.
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     
resources, and surprised the Khitan camps with strikes at night. The Liao army
sufered inestimable casualties and a complete rout. The Tanguts captured
dozens of illustrious Khitan ocials, including the escort-commandant ( fuma
duwei) Xiao Hudu. In a frenzied hurry, Zongzhen managed to escape the bat-
tleeld. However, as soon as Yuanhao turned the initial defeat into an ultimate
victory, he pressured Liao into a peace agreement on the best terms. Because
the main battle was fought in Hequ (within the modern-day city of Ordos,
Inner Mongolia), it is also known as the Battle of Hequ.
Yuanhao spent almost the entirety of his life in the midst of wars. For this
reason, he won a great name for himself in written history. In his late years of
indulgence in pleasure, he was assassinated in a palace coup. His reign lasted
for a total of 11 years. He is known as the Jingzong Emperor of Western Xia.
After the death of Yuanhao, his young son inherited the throne while literally
still ‘in swaddling,’ at the age of only one. Western Xia at the time found itself
in a precarious situation. With the emperor infantile and inefectual, politi-
cal power fell into the hands of the maternal clan. The Mozang family, with
lady empress Mozang and her brother Mozang Epang in command, tended
to both administrative and military afairs. The duo of the Empress and the
‘imperial maternal uncle’ calmed and coordinated the numerous Dangxiang
tribes, amassed soldiers and trained the forces regularly in preparation for war.
During this period of regency, the Tanguts embarked on a series of campaigns
against both the Liao and Song with advances and setbacks on all sides.
Within two years of Yuanhao’s death and in the rst year of Yansi Ningguo
(1049 ), Xingzong Emperor of Liao seized the moment to dispatch three
armies against Xia. The southern and middle crusades proved unavailing,
whereas the northern campaign sent to the Helan mountains successfully
trounced a cavalry force of three thousand led by Mozang Epang himself and
thus captured the wives of Yuanhao, families of Tangut nobles, as well as a
large sum of livestock.
Fully aware of the strategic and economic importance of farmlands, the
imperial minister Mozang Epang launched repeated incursions into heavily
cultivated agricultural zones on the other side of the border. Territorial disputes
over the fertile elds of Quyehe caused major rifts between the two sides,
and bilateral relations steadily deteriorated. According to the Zizhi Tongjian:
 Zizhi Tongjian. Book 162. Eighth Year of Qingli in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1048). First
Month in the Spring, Xinwei.
 : Quyehe (屈野河), historically known as a fertile territory near present-day Shenmu,
Shaanxi. Its ownership was the cause of much dispute within Song and between Song
and Xia.
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  
The Regulatory Commission ( jingluesi) then reported to the emperor,
that the palace-attendant ocer (dianzhi) Zhang Anshi and Jia En be
appointed as special inspectors, in order to thwart [the incursion].
However, by then the enemies had occupied and cultivated the lands
for an extended period of time, pretending as if the territory were their
own. Furthermore, all the economic benets of agricultural production
were reaped by their chief, Mozang Epang. As a result, the invaders would
resort to ghting if Anshi and others forced their case, but when the
ocers adopted a softer approach, they would simply refuse to leave. The
Regulatory Commission repeatedly demonstrated records of past terri-
torial boundaries and ordered the Tanguts to return the farmlands. The
sister of Mozang Epang sent her condant Buqu Jiayike to inspect the
elds, who returned and reported [to the Empress] that the concerned
territories were originally owned by the Han. [She] then ordered Epang
to return, with the intention to give the encroached lands back [to their
proper owners]. But it fell upon the occasion that the Empress died in
a civil strife of Jiayike. And thereafter, Epang indulged even more in his
misdeeds.
The Song court, on its part, adopted the policy of economic sanctions to curb
Tangut encroachments:
The Regulatory Commissioner Pang Ji commented, “For the westerners
(Tanguts) to trespass on Quyehe and to cultivate the elds illegally was
originally the scheme of Mozang Epang. Unless the markets are closed
down [in retaliation], I fear that the incursion into our interior lands shall
never end. [I therefore] beseech [your Imperial Majesty] to temporarily
halt the trade posts along the Shaanxi borders, in order that the Tanguts
lay blame on Epang. If so, then negotiation may be again on the table
within years.” [The Emperor] thus issued an edict whereby he orders
punishment to all in the four districts of Shaanxi who dare to engage in
private trade with the westerners.
 Zizhi Tong jian, Book 185. Second Year of Jiayou in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1057). Second
Month, Renxu.
 Zizhi Tongjian, Book 185, Second year of Jiayou in Emperor Renzong’s Reign (1057),
Second Month, Jiaxu. See also History of Song. Book 186, On Food and Goods, Laws on
Mutual Trade.
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     
When at last the two sides opted for peace, they established the border line,
restored the markets, and resumed trade. At that time, the Tanguts vied with
the Tibetans for control over Qingtang (Xining, Qinghai), and successfully sub-
dued the areas encompassing the cities of Xishi (Dingxi county, Gansu) and
Qingtang. As a result, Tangut power extended all the way to Hezhou (today the
city of Linxia, Gansu).
At the impressive age of fourteen, Liangzuo rallied support from his court
ocials to quell the rebellion of Mozang Epang, whose execution marked
the beginning of the young emperor’s sovereign rule. However, he was fatally
wounded in the Fourth Year of Gonghua (1066 ) during a siege of Song’s
Qingzhou. Pining away in anguish in the following year, Liangzuo ended his
nineteen years of reign as the Emperor Yizong.
As the economy of Western Xia grew over time, the role of currency proved
more salient in the hustles of trade activities. Ever since Deming’s reign, coins
had been on the list of annual imperial gifts from the Song Dynasty. Song coins
were the most highly circulated currency within the territories of Western Xia.
According to the author’s own eld research, Song coins are unearthed on a
massive scale, not only along the Song-Xia frontiers in northern Shaanxi and
southern Ningxia, but also in the Tangut hinterlands and even remote areas of
the Hexi corridor never reached by Song power. Most of these excavations date
to Northern Song, representing nearly every reign period of the dynasty. It is
worth mentioning that in the discovery of depositories of coin hoards, the vast
majority were Song coins, whereas Tangut mints only constituted a minority.
Such a proportion further illustrates the wide circulation and employment of
Song currency in Western Xia. For a while, when copper coins were temporarily
placed on prohibition in Wang Anshi’s economic reforms, they ooded on an
even greater scale and sped into western territories of the Tanguts. Although
the Tanguts also regularly exchanged goods with their own currency, exactly
when they minted coins is nowhere to be found in written records available
today. Amongst excavations dated to the early imperial period, archaeologists
have found coins with the inscription, “Treasured Coins of Divine Fortune,”
(Fusheng Baoqian) which echoes the reign title, “the legacy of the true way
by divine fortune” (Fusheng Chengdao) in the time of Yizong (1053–1056 ).
In context, the signicance of claiming a separate coinage unable to replace
the Song currency was perhaps more political and economic. For the Tanguts
 Su Shi. Dongpo Quanji [東坡全集]: Complete Works of Su Dongpo. Shanghai: Shanghai
Ancient Books Publishing House, 1987. Book 88. Memorial Inscription for Sir Zhang
Wending (: canonized name of Zhang Fangping, 1007–1091).
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  
to mint their own coins was a symbol of imperial independence more than a
spontaneous sign of economic expansion.
At the demise of Yizong, his son Bingchang inherited the throne, again at
an infantile age. This time, Empress Liang and her own brother Liang Yimai
assumed the highest command of the empire. They devised a policy of rap-
prochement with the Khitans and contended with the Song over the border
towns of Suide and Luowu (to the west of modern-day Mizhi, Shaanxi), where
the Tanguts erected new boundary stones to mark the border. At the time, the
Tibetan Qingtang regime fell into factions. Empress Liang took the opportu-
nity to revise her foreign policy by entertaining a new diplomatic alliance with
Tibet. In the third year of Tianci Lisheng (‘Divinely Endowed Prosperity of
Customs’: 1072 ), the regentess married her own daughter to Lin Bibu, son
of the Tibetan chief Dong Zhan. With Tibetan-Tangut relations improved,
the Empress imprisoned Bingchang when the sixteen-year-old young emperor
assumed the throne and proceeded immediately to sue for peace with Song.
Under the pretext of succouring the Tangut emperor unjustly detained, Song
launched ve large legions to Western Xia, none of which won a decisive bat-
tle due to inefective command and defective coordination. The Tanguts again
resorted to fortifying their strongholds and razing the eld so that no provision
was left to the enemies. For this reason, the Song army was unable to retain
cities in preparation for further advances.
Along the seven to eight hundred li of lands in the Hengshan area, in at
least more than two hundred, peasants feared too much to farm. As the
annual gifts ceased, trade also came to an end. Silk and cloth amongst
the barbarians dwindle to little more than fty thousand. The elderly
and inrm are relocated, cattle and sheep ruined, and the total losses are
innumerable.
The text shows that the Song-Xia wars wreaked havoc on the economy of the
Hengshan areas. Commodity prices ared up, and local residents had no
choice but to leave their homeland. Then in the eighth year of Xia’s Da’an reign
(1081 ), the battle of Yongle (to the west of Mizhi, Shaanxi) witnessed yet
another miserable defeat of Song at the hands of the Tangut army.
 : Dong Zhan (1032–1083), son of Gusiluo (997–1065), second Khotan Tsenpo of the
Tibetan Tsongkha regime (997–1099).
 Su Shi. Dongpo Quanji, vol. 54. “Eighteen Verses of expostulation” [奏議十八首],
“Comments on the Afairs concerning the Xia People of Western Qiang on the Occasion
of the Capturing of Guizhang” (因擒鬼章論西羌夏人事宜劄子).
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     
There is no doubt, however, that decades of settled cultivation furnished
Western Xia with a booming agriculture. Some areas of the Tangut empire
even managed to maintain large storages of grains. The prosperity of Tangut
agriculture nds its most convincing record in Song archives that document
the seizure of Tangut provisions. In the eighth month of 1081, the Song general
Li Xian conquered Kangu.
Our great army passed by the valley of Kangu, which Bingchang unduly
refers to as the ‘imperial manor.’ It houses an exceedingly large storage…
[I have] already dispatched my lieutenants to each lead a force to seize
the grains, as well as bows and arrows for the defence of the city.
In the tenth month of the same year, “In the tenth month of the year bingyin,
the [surrendered] Fan (Tangut) ocial Maye Eshang and others seized more
than a hundred of the westerners’ (Tanguts’) large and small granaries on a
hill seven li from the town of Jingde along the western borders. The 80,000
or so dan of grains are transferred to the Commission of Transport and the
Commission in Hedong.” When Chong E captured Mizhi, “he also claimed
that he seized more than 19,500 dan of grains.” Indeed, as Tangut food sup-
plies accumulated over time, the more fertile lands were able to bring relief to
the more barren in events of natural disasters. In the eleventh year of Da’an
(1084), for example, when Yinzhou and Xiazhou sufered severe droughts,
Emperor Huizong ordered the transportation of grains from the western areas
of Ganzhou and Lingzhou to the east in order to manage the crisis.
In terms of coinage, archaeological nds reveal that the Tanguts minted
coins inscribed in both Tangut and Chinese characters. The Tangut reads,
“Treasured coins of Great Peace” (which corresponds to the Chinese Da’an
Baoqian), and the Chinese reads, “Circulated Treasure of Great Peace” (Da’an
Tongbao). Bingchang reigned as Emperor Huizong for a total of 18 years.
The story seems to repeat itself. Bingchang’s son Qianshun assumed the
throne at the age of three. His own mother, Empress Liang—the niece of
 : Kangu (龛谷), a fortress south of present-day Yuzhong county, Gansu, near the city of
Lanzhou.
 Zizhi Tong jian Book 316, Fourth Year of Yuanfeng in Shenzong’s Reign (1082), Yiwei in the
Ninth Month.
 : Chong E (种諤, 1017–1083), a major general of Northern Song, known for his 1081
victory in Mizhi.
 Zizhi Tongjian Book 318, Fourth Year of Yuanfeng in Emperor Shenzong’s Reign (1082),
Bingzi & Yimao, Tenth Month.
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 27.
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  
the elder Empress Liang—and her brother Liang Qibu—son of the afore-
mentioned Liang Yimai—proclaimed themselves as regents. It is no surprise
that the maternal clan continued the policy that favoured the Tangut-Khitan
alliance. And as in the time of the elder Liangs, the imperial minister Liang
Qibu arranged a marriage for his son with the family of Aligu, then chief of the
Tibetans. The fth Tsenpo, Longzan, arranged another marriage with the
Tanguts. It may be said that towards the middle and later periods of Western
Xia, Tibetan-Tangut relations improved slowly and steadily. In the tenth year of
1092 , the third year of Tianyou Min’an (“Divinely-blessed peace for the peo-
ple”) period, Empress Liang herself led 100,000 men to besiege Huanzhou for
seven days without success. She then turned to the Hongde fort and sufered
tremendous losses at the erce resistance of the ethnic-Tangut Song general,
Zhe Keshi. When friction arose between Empress Liang and Liang Qibu, the
lady ordered royal ocials to arrest and execute the minister in 1094, the fti-
eth year of Tianyou Min’an. Since then, she presided over both civil and mil-
itary afairs of the state. Remembered as a heroine gure, Empress Liang not
only held the supreme command of a formidable army but also presented her-
self at the front lines of the battleeld. In the seventh year of Tianyou Min’an
(1096), Qianshun and his mother led an alleged army of 500,000 to the walls
of Yanzhou, battered through the Jinming fort, and seized 50,000 dan of grains
stored in the city and tens of thousands bundles of forage. Then in the rst year
of Yong’an (1098), she again spearheaded a campaign of supposedly 400,000
men to contest domination in Pingxia. Song and Xia armies red missiles
against each other’s fortresses in a war of attrition until a strong wind blew in
the unfavourable direction and disbanded the Tanguts.
The empress died in the second year of Yongan (1099), paving the way for
Emperor Qianshun to nally assume ocial duties of the crown. Three dynas-
ties of regency and hegemony left the Tangut elites embattled in a civil strife
between the aristocracies and the maternal clans. Conicts within the rul-
ing class between the two camps at times translated into a struggle between
Fan (Tangut) and Han (Chinese) customs. During the same time, the Tangut
economy was further entangled with its surrounding neighbours. For one,
the exchange of goods and cultures was booming along the Song-Xia borders.
 : Aligu (1040–1096), foster son of Dong Zhan, third Khotan Tsenpo of the Tibetan
Tsongkha regime.
 : Longzan, son of Xibawen, fth Tsenpo. After a rebellion of Tibetan nobilities, he suc-
ceeded Xiazheng (or Bangbiaojian) as Tsenpo in 1099 .
 Zizhi Tongjian Book 478, Seventh Year of Yuanyou in Emperor Zhezong’s Reign (1092),
Tenth Month, Xinyou in the Winter.
 Zizhi Tongjian Book 503, First Year of Yuanfu, Emperor Zhezong’s Reign (1098), Tenth
Month, Yihai in the Winter. Jinbo Shi - 9789004461321
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     
Whenever the Tanguts initiated military conicts, Song always countered with
various measures of economic sanctions, ranging from cutting the supply of
coins to the halting of markets, which invariably afected the quotidian lives
of local residents. Insofar as this is true, the ecacy of such punitive sanctions
speaks to imbalances of economic productions in Western Xia, hence its reli-
ance on the Song economy.
5 Tangut Politics and Economy in the Middle Period of Western Xia
When Qianshun assumed imperial command at the age of fteen, Liao sent
a delegation to Song to request peace on behalf of the Tanguts. Xia emis-
saries also arrived in the imperial capital to report public mourning for the
deceased empress and to express gratitude for the Song emperor’s generosity.
The Tangut emperor also appointed his trusted ocial, Weiming Jijin, as an
envoy, to explain the tyranny of the maternal clans and to apologise for border
conicts:
Our country, your client state, has sufered misfortunes for too long.
While it endured through the two tyrannies of maternal clans, and that
treacherous ocials usurp power regularly from the crown, the kingdom
has met many dangers and atrocities. During this time, the border areas
often plunged into perils, which further exacerbated our hot temper. As a
result, the discord between us has run so deep, that my words of plea and
argument appear insucient. Fortunately, the vicious clan has died out,
and my humble and youthful self has been able to restore justice.
The Song Emperor, on his part, also assumed a tone of reconciliation:
It is due to the conspiracies of vicious factions, that your country has
repeatedly disturbed our borders. Fortunately, you now regret the past,
apologise for the harm, and restore our previous oath of alliance. Consid-
ering that all your people are also my good-natured subjects, your settle-
ment in peace accords best with my intention. I commend your efort to
correct yourselves and to turn over a new leaf. Let us follow our faithful
purpose: so long as you do not violate the terms, I shall never renege my
words. From now on, the annual imperial gifts shall resume.
 Zizhi Tongjian Book 519, Second Year of Yuanfu in Emperor Zhezong’s Reign (1099),
Renyin Twelfth Month; History of Song Book 485. “On the State of Xia” Part .
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  
The new foreign policy placed equal emphasis on Tangut-Khitan ties, for
after all, the Tanguts often counted on Liao deterrence, if not interventions,
in its conicts with Song. As mentioned, Liao envoys proposed a truce on
behalf of the Tanguts. Qianshun followed up the friendly gesture with a pro-
posal of marital alliance. In the third year of Zhenguan (1103), the Liao princess
Cheng’an married the young Tangut emperor, an arrangement which further
bonded the two peoples.
But when Cai Jing dominated Song politics, he lured the Tangut general
and then supervisory commander of the right-wing Zhuoluo army, Renduo
Baozhong, into defection. Tong Guan, the Hedong Jiedushi of the Song Dynasty
at that time, intruded several times into Tangut territories, which caused ten-
sions to are again along the frontiers. In the rst year of Yuande (1119), Tong
Guan again forced Liu Fa, regulatory commander of Xihe, to invade Western
Xia. Unable to refuse the order, Liu Fa assembled an army and marched to the
Tong’an city (to the west of Yongdeng county, Gansu), where he met a combined
force of infantry and cavalry at the command of Chage Langjun, brother of the
Chongzong emperor of Xia. As the two armies clashed, an elite Tangut cavalry
mounted the hills, blocked the Song army, and attacked from behind. In the
span of an entire horrid day, many men and horses in the Song army starved
and thirsted to death. Song casualties are calculated to have reached 100,000.
In the beginning of the 12th century, the Jurchens in the far north rose to
establish the Jin Empire. As Liao and Jin doubly plunged into war, Western
Xia rst threw its weight behind its Khitan patrons. When the Liao Empire
spiralled into the abyss of destruction, the Khitan emperor hurried to bestow
Qianshun with an imperial title. In the sixth year of Yuande (1124), however,
as it became clear that Liao was on the verge of nal collapse, the Tangut
emperor abandoned his old patron and submitted instead to the Jin Empire.
By expanding its territories further to the northwest, the Tanguts also schemed
and laboured to prot from the Jin-Liao wars. A new tripartite balance of
power of Jin, Song, and Xia gradually emerged, took shape, and consolidated.
At rst, when Southern Song still actively sought to recover northern China,
Wu Jie, then associate Commissioner of Pacication (Xuanfushi) of Sichuan
and Shaanxi, was regularly in touch with the Tanguts to coordinate a joint cam-
paign against the Jin Dynasty.
Emperor Qianshun appointed his half-brother Chage as the commander-
in-chief, honoured him as the King of the Jin estate, and stationed him in
the empire’s general headquarter (yatou). Chage’s proposal to collect elite
conscripts trained in both high-range crossbows and rattan shield won the
approval of the Emperor.
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 31. Jinbo Shi - 9789004461321
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     
The Tangut economy progressed in the reign of Chongzong. Archaeological
nds show that Tangut coins Zhenguan Baoqian were circulated alongside
the Chinese Yuande Zhongbao and Yuande Tongbao. Tangut mints increased
in number. The government also undertook a project to renovate the capital
city Zhongxing. According to Chinese inscriptions excavated in the Tangut
Mausoleum, “Chongzong ascended the throne and ruled the world… capital
Zhongxing… changed the reign title to Zhenguan, in the fourth year…” Such
a large project speaks to the economic prowess of the empire.
Highly reverential of literary education, Chongzong established in the rst
year of Zhenguan (1101) an imperial academy that hosted three hundred stu-
dents and a state-sponsored bureau of civil service in support of the talented.
‘State academies’ had existed long ago in Chinese dynastic empires, where
the highest academic institutions of the country were known as the ‘School
 Shi, Jinbo and Chen, Yuning (eds.). Centre for Tangut Studies at Ningxia University,
National Library of China & Gansu-Wuliang Centre for the Compilation of Historical
Manuscripts (五涼古籍整理研究中心). Zhongguo cang Xixia Wenxian (中國藏西
夏文獻), hereafter Chinese Collection of Tangut Manuscripts vol. 19. Lanzhou: Gansu
People’s Press & Dunhuang Wenyi Press, 2005, p. 321.
  Western Xia in the era of Southern Song
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  
of the Greatest Studies’ (Taixue) or ‘Imperial College of the State’ (Guozijian).
Both spaces were designated for the preservation and promotion of Confucian
teachings. Founded in western territories under ethnic Tanguts, Western Xia’s
‘national’ academy devoted to Sinology was by all measures a revolutionary
event in the cultural history of Western Xia. Politically, it represented a pol-
icy change aimed at reordering Fan-Han relations within the bounds of the
empire. Thereafter, prospective state ocials prepared for civil duties by train-
ings in both Tangut and Chinese traditions. At the same time, it is worth noting
that Qianshun did not neglect Buddhism, either. In the third year of Zhenguan
(1103), he ordered the construction of a new Temple of the Recumbent Buddha
in the western prefecture of Ganzhou.
Because the eastern and southern borders of Western Xia were enveloped by
Jurchen territories, the Tangut-Song frontiers were barely existent. The Tanguts
had no choice but to depend on the Jurchen economy for trade. At the request
of the Xia emperor, Jin opened markets along the frontiers and relaxed the
prohibition of iron sales to Western Xia. During the twelfth year of Dading
(1172), the Shizong emperor of Jin had a conversation with his minister that
had lasting impact on Jurchen-Tangut trade:
Twelfth year (of Dading), the Emperor speaks to his minister, “Xia
exchanges its jewels and jade for our silk and cloth: this is to trade their
useless for our useful.” He thus reduced and abolished the trade markets
in Bao’an and Lanzhou.
However, the Tangut economy gained considerable strength over the years
despite the vicissitudes of imperial geopolitics. When natural disasters ruined
the crops, for example, the Tanguts relied mainly on themselves. In the tenth
year of Zhenguan (1110), when large Tangut populations dispersed in exile to
escape severe draughts in Guazhou and Shazhou, Chongzong ordered disaster
relief from Lingzhou and Xiazhou:
Historically, lands in prefectures such as Guazhou and Shazhou are rarely
cultivated for agriculture, but are mainly used for raising livestock. Since
March, there has been no rain. Till this present month, the pasture has
withered away, and barren lands now stretch to hundreds of li. Cattle and
sheep are left with nothing to feed on, and a vast number of the Tanguts
are forced into exile. When the news reaches the supervisory military
 History of Jin, Book 4. “Biography of Xizong Emperor.”
 History of Jin, Book 134, “Western Xia.”
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     
commission, Qianshun issues an edict requiring that ocials release
grains from Ling and Xia prefectures to alleviate the famine.
Qianshun’s 54 years on the throne were passed down as the reign of
Chongzong. The early phase of this reign is marked by the supreme command
of the empress’s regency, followed by nearly 40 years of Qianshun’s own impe-
rial rule. Although these years were not free of wars, military operations were
not so frequent. Moreover, the emperor placed literature and education as his
priorities, and his promotion of Chinese classical culture laid the foundation
for the extensive development of Tangut Confucianism in the reign of his
son Renxiao.
Renxiao’s reign was marred, however, by the internal chaos in a succession
of political incidents. The Khitan defect, Xiao Heda, roused an insurrection
within Tangut territories. As the economy sufered losses, a severe famine
plagued the empire. Rice prices skyrocketed to hundreds per sheng, further
straining the destitute lives of the common folk. Even worse was the earth-
quake in capital Xingqing; the loss of human and animal lives was in the tens
of thousands. In the fourth year of Daqing (1143), Renzong issued the following
edict after the earthquake in Xiazhou,
In the two prefectures, in cases where lives are lost to the earthquake,
two are compensated with exemption of taxes for three years, and one
with waiver of taxes for two years; the injured are exempt from taxes
for two years; let collapsed houses and walls be repaired by the relevant
commission.
Tax exemptions alone, however, could not have reversed the dire situation of
food shortage. Starvation was one of the root causes of the large-scale peasant
uprising led by Duo’e. In quelling the rebellion, the maternal-clansman Ren
Dejing seized political power and rose to the position of imperial minister.
Notwithstanding economic downturns and social unrests, Renxiao’s reign
witnessed improved means of production in both pasturing and farming.
Renxiao followed his father’s legacy to advocate for classical education. He pro-
moted the system of civil examination, oversaw the revision of imperial laws
by able ocers, and patronised the printing of emended sutras in Buddhist
temples. During this period, scholars enjoyed a high rate of publication,
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Vol. 32.
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 35.
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  
and the cultural industry reached its greatest height in the imperial ages of
Western Xia.
Renxiao’s achievements lied more in the cultural sphere than in the mili-
tary realm. Unobservant of the unfolding crises, Renxiao was late to check the
hubris of his once trusted ocer. Honoured as the king of Chu and Qin-Jin,
Ren Dejing schemed to secede from Western Xia to establish an independent
kingdom. With support from the Jurchens, Renxiao executed Ren and his clans,
temporarily reining back a simmering calamity. The emperor then appointed
the renowned scholar Wo Daochong as minister, who led the empire onto the
course of recovery.
Although ocial archives record that the Tanguts “rst established the
Commission of Exchange (Tongjijian) to mint coins” in the tenth year of
Tiansheng (1158) during Renzong’s reign, archaeologists have discovered
Tanguts coins that date back to the second emperor Yizong, which precedes the
Tiansheng period by almost a century. Evidence then points to long-time estab-
lishment of governmental institutions in charge of minting and regulating the
circulation of coins. The Tangut legal codex, the Laws of Heavenly Prosperity (or
the Tiansheng Laws), mentions a ‘Supervisory House of Currency’ which could
have been another name for the Commission of Exchange. Since Southern
Song and Western Xia territories barely shared a border during the reign of
Renzong, being cut of by the vast Jin Empire, it was impossible to obtain large
quantities of Song coins. It is also worth noting that, with the Jurchen occu-
pation of the Guanyou area and establishment of markets in Lanzhou and
other cities, the Tanguts would have sufered to pay higher real prices, had they
insisted on trading goods with Song currency. As a result, the Tanguts casted
cash coins at a signicantly larger scale. For a while, the Tangut “Tiansheng”
was circulated simultaneously as the Jurchen “Zhenglong” coins. At rst, the Jin
emperor grudged the Tangut currency. But at the repeated entreaty of Renxiao,
he at last granted permission. Recent archaeological discoveries of Tangut
coin hoards, some of them containing more than a hundred thousand (around
600 jin) of coins, reveal that Song, Jin, and Tangut coins circulated at the same
time. However, it is also right to point out that the Tanguts rst relied on
 History of Song vol. 486, On the State of Xia, Part .
 Revised Laws of Heavenly Prosperity. No. 5: “On the Supply of Weaponries,p. 224.
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 36.
 Niu, Dasheng. “Yizuo Zhongyao de Xixia Qianbi Jiaocang—Neimenggu Wushenqi Taoli
Jiaocang” [一座重要的西夏錢幣窖藏內蒙古烏審旗陶利窖藏]: “An Important
Tangut Coin Hoard: Depository of Tangut Coins in Uxin Banner, Inner Mongolia” in
Gansu Jinrong Qianbi Zhuanji (甘肅金融錢幣專輯), 1989. See also, Niu, Dasheng. “Xixia
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     
Song coins, and then depended on Jurchen cash. Therefore, the Tanguts lacked
real autonomy in currency.
Although the diplomacy of Western Xia in this period was largely dened by
a foreign policy of self-protection, the Tanguts fell short of faithful allies and
subjects. Although nominally, the Tanguts submitted to Jin paramountcy, send-
ing one delegation after another to proclaim friendship and alliance, Renxiao
responded positively and enthusiastically to Song requests of an anti-Jurchen
alliance by writing a letter featuring the gravest insults to the Jin Empire and
vows to ‘dutifully follow the heavenly order to combat the indels.’ And yet,
before the ink had barely dried, he ordered skirmishes against Song territories.
Two months later, when a new Jin emperor succeeded the throne, Renxiao rst
attacked Jin and then pledged the most solemn oath to pronounce Jin and Xia
as brotherly kingdoms. The ckle emperor’s inconstant geopolitical strategy
served particular interests. Although the illustrious minister Wo Daochong
remained in command of administrative duties, the empire by that time had
for too long neglected its defence capability. Signs of a spent force appeared
increasingly evident. Renxiao remained in throne for 54 years, known as the
Emperor Renzong of Xia.
6 Tangut Politics and Economy in the Late Period of Western Xia
After Renxiao’s decease, the once mighty empire of Western Xia was plagued by
both internal crises and external threats. In the late period of Xia, the Mongols
rose as a formidable foe from the north of the Gobi Desert and repeatedly
raided into Tangut territories. In the last thirty years of Western Xia, the impe-
rial authority also weakened signicantly. Five emperors ascended the throne
in rapid succession: Emperor Huanzong, Chunyou ruled for 13 years; Emperor
Xiangzong, Anquan, 4 years; Emperor Shenzong, Zunxu, 13 years; Emperor
Xianzong, Dewang, 3 years; and Emperor Mo, Xian, for only one year. The entire
length of this time was enveloped by the smokes of war amidst six Mongol
invasions. Although the Mongols assailed both Tangut and Jurchen walls, Xia
and Jin squandered their resources and energy in a war of attrition against
each other. In the fourth year of Yingtian (1209), when capital Zhongxing fell
under siege, Emperor Xiangzong nally arranged to marry his daughter away
in exchange for peace and alliance with the Jurchens.
Qianbi Lunji” [西夏錢幣論集]: Collected Essays on Tangut Coins. Ningxia Jinrong [宁夏
金融]: Ningxia Finance, Supplementary Issue, 2007.
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 36.
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  
Both the political unrests at home and the wars abroad exacerbated the
economic decline of Western Xia. According to the narrative of then imperial
censor-in-chief Liang Deyi,
The country has plunged in war for more than a decade, the elds are
bleak and desolate, human lives are ruined and lost, even women and
maidens know that the fate of the country is in grave peril, but the o-
cials in the Court sing light-hearted songs, feast joyfully at night, and have
nothing to say.
In the second year of Qianding (1225), imperial censor-in-chief Zhang Gongfu
submitted a proposal to revitalise the country in seven ways. His economic
policy states the following,
In the ames the war, human lives are reduced to destitution. In the
absence of farming and weaving, wealth and resources are in dire short-
age. With regard to wasteful practices in the palaces and oces, let mer-
itorious statesmen and royal clansmen be rewarded justly so that they
abandon luxury in favour of simplicity, and wait to be assigned their
duties. In these ways, the grains will be sucient, and the army will
regain its strengths.
The emperor himself testies to the depletion of imperial treasury and the gen-
eral paucity of resources across the empire. In an illustrated Tangut edition of the
Supreme Sovereign Sutra of Golden Light (Suvarṇaprabhāsa-uttamarāja-sūtra)
curated in the Institute of Cultural Relics in Xi’an, the sutra ends with the
prayer of Emperor Shenzong dated to the fourth year of Guangding (1214), thir-
teen years prior to the fall of the empire. The text mentions that the emperor
felt “as if standing on the brink of an abyss, and as if walking on a thin layer of
ice,” and prays that “the people and the state may enjoy peace and prosperity.”
Although the late period of Western Xia proved short-lived, Tangut cur-
rency still enjoyed a steady rate of production and circulation. Excavated coins
dating back to this period include the Chinese Tianqing Yuanbao, Huangjian
Yuanbao, and Guangding Yuanbao, minted during the reigns of Huanzong,
Xiangzong, and Shenzong, respectively.
When nally, Jin and Xia were on the verge of mortal danger, the two sides
arranged for a détente, reaching a peace agreement in the rst year of Xia’s
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 41.
 Wu, Xixia Shushi, Ch. 42.
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     
Qianding (1224). By this treaty, the Tanguts and Jurchens vowed (again) to be
brothers, in coordinated defence against the Mongols. The alliance, however,
came only too late.
The last Mongol campaign against the Tanguts took place in 1226, when
Genghis Khan himself led the army south to conquer Western Xia. With a dual
strategy of launching siege operations and inciting defections, the Mongols
quickly captured a number of cities and prefectures, from Khara-Khoto to
Shazhou, Suzhou (present-day Jiuquan city, Gansu), Ganzhou, and Xiliangfu,
efectively bringing the entire Hexi corridor under their control. By this time,
vast territories of Western Xia had been lost. The Mongol army then besieged
the imperial capital Zhongxing. Seeing that his fortune had come to an end,
Emperor Mo, Li Xian, surrendered to the Mongols. Although Genghis Khan
passed away on the eve of the nal victory, the Mongols followed his will to
execute the Tangut emperor. The once great power of Western Xia came to
its end.
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An Important Tangut Coin Hoard: Depository of Tangut Coins in Uxin Banner, Inner Mongolia
  • Dasheng Niu
Niu, Dasheng. "Yizuo Zhongyao de Xixia Qianbi Jiaocang-Neimenggu Wushenqi Taoli Jiaocang" [一座重要的西夏錢幣窖藏-內蒙古烏審旗陶利窖藏]: "An Important Tangut Coin Hoard: Depository of Tangut Coins in Uxin Banner, Inner Mongolia" in Gansu Jinrong Qianbi Zhuanji (甘肅金融錢幣專輯), 1989. See also, Niu, Dasheng. "Xixia Jinbo Shi -9789004461321