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Courage is one of the most significant psychological constructs for society, but not one of the most frequently studied. This paper presents a process model of courage consisting of decision-based pathways by which one comes to enact a courageous action. We argue the process of courage begins with a trigger involving an actor(s) and a situation(s). The actor(s) then engage(s) in four key assessments concerning (a) immediacy of the situation, (b) meaningfulness, value, and relevance to the actor, (c) adequacy of efficacy to act, and (d) decision to act with courage. The central component of this process entails an approach-avoidance conflict involving assessments of perceived risks and potential noble outcomes of acting with courage. The decision to act may result in courageous actions assuming it satisfies the four elements: intentionality, objective and substantial risk, a noble purpose, and meaning in time and place. Courageous actions have consequences. Finally, the consequences shape the actors’ experience, which feeds into the trigger, closing the loop. Potential moderators of the courage process as well as potential tests of the model have been discussed.
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Frontiers in Psychology 01 frontiersin.org
Dual-process model of courage
AakashA.Chowkase
1
*, FabioAndrésParra-Martínez
2,
MehdiGhahremani
3, ZoeBernstein
4, GabrielleFinora
5 and
RobertJ.Sternberg
4
1 Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States,
2 Department of Education Reform, College of Education and Health Professions, University of
Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, United States, 3 Department of Counseling, Higher Education Leadership,
Educational Psychology, and Foundations, Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS, United States,
4 Department of Psychology, College of Human Ecology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States,
5 Division of Nutritional Sciences, College of Human Ecology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United
States
Courage is one of the most significant psychological constructs for society, but
not one of the most frequently studied. This paper presents a process model of
courage consisting of decision-based pathways by which one comes to enact
a courageous action. We argue the process of courage begins with a trigger
involving an actor(s) and a situation(s). The actor(s) then engage(s) in four key
assessments concerning (a) immediacy of the situation, (b) meaningfulness, value,
and relevance to the actor, (c) adequacy of ecacy to act, and (d) decision to
act with courage. The central component of this process entails an approach-
avoidance conflict involving assessments of perceived risks and potential noble
outcomes of acting with courage. The decision to act may result in courageous
actions assuming it satisfies the four elements: intentionality, objective and
substantial risk, a noble purpose, and meaning in time and place. Courageous
actions have consequences. Finally, the consequences shape the actors’
experience, which feeds into the trigger, closing the loop. Potential moderators of
the courage process as well as potential tests of the model have been discussed.
KEYWORDS
courage, dual-system theory, type Ithinking, type II thinking, noble purpose,
approach-avoidance conflict, expectancy-value theory, risk assessment
OPEN ACCESS
EDITED BY
Cristina Torrelles-Nadal,
University of Lleida, Spain
REVIEWED BY
Mohammad Khodayarifard,
University of Tehran, Iran
Cynthia Pury,
Clemson University, UnitedStates
*CORRESPONDENCE
Aakash A. Chowkase
chowkase@berkeley.edu
RECEIVED 25 January 2024
ACCEPTED 11 March 2024
PUBLISHED 22 March 2024
CITATION
Chowkase AA, Parra-Martínez FA,
Ghahremani M, Bernstein Z, Finora G and
Sternberg RJ (2024) Dual-process model of
courage.
Front. Psychol. 15:1376195.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
COPYRIGHT
© 2024 Chowkase, Parra-Martínez,
Ghahremani, Bernstein, Finora and Sternberg.
This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is
permitted, provided the original author(s) and
the copyright owner(s) are credited and that
the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction
is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
TYPE Hypothesis and Theory
PUBLISHED 22 March 2024
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
1 Introduction
“Courage is not the absence of fear, but rather the assessment that something else is more
important than fear” – Roosevelt (1932).
Courage is oen a deliberate assessment of a trigger and an analyzed decision on how to
proceed toward a noble purpose in the face of personal risks (Rate etal., 2007). Courage is one
of the most signicant psychological constructs for society, but not one of the most frequently
studied. Sternberg (2022b) has suggested that, for humanity, courage is the most important
gi of all. For over a year now (March 2024), people in Iran have been protesting against the
theocratic regime for wider freedoms and women’s rights (Alkhaldi and Ebrahim, 2022;
Reuters, 2022a). Similarly, despite the rising number of killings of activists in Colombia,
courageous social leaders resist threats in their quest to defend people’s basic human rights
aer ve decades of armed conict (Prem etal., 2018; Llanes etal., 2022). Another similar case
is that of the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, in which Ukrainian citizens and the
Ukrainian army are ghting not just for their country’s sovereignty, but also for survival
(Hook, 2022). On another note, today, many countries, including the UnitedStates, are faced
with threats to their democracies (Albright, 2018; Mounk, 2018; Ziblatt and Levitsky, 2018;
Chowkase et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
Frontiers in Psychology 02 frontiersin.org
Applebaum, 2021; Ben-Ghiat, 2021). Without the courage of the
citizens in these countries, those democracies may well belost.
Not only is courage important at the level of a country. It also is
important in one’s daily life. Examples are voicing opinions or standing
up for oneself or one’s colleagues who might befacing injustice in the
workplace (Schilpzand etal., 2015).
But what, exactly, is courage? What are the steps leading to
courageous actions, and what kinds of factors lead people to bemore
or less likely to display courage? In this article, webuild on existing
scholarship on courage and propose a novel dual-process model that
describes courage as a deliberate, multi-stage process involving
numerous decision-based pathways by which one comes to enact a
courageous action–or not.
2 What is courage?
2.1 The courageous actor
Oentimes, courage is understood in terms of courageous
people–individuals who are labeled either as courageous or not (Pury
and Starkey, 2010; Rate, 2010). However, courage is not just a trait, but
also a virtue, a skill, and an attitude toward a given situation (Comte-
Sponville, 2002; Jacobson, 2005). It can also be a trait or a state
(Sternberg, 2022a). Courage is considered to beone of the six core
virtues contributing to goodness among humans across nations,
cultures, and religious beliefs (Peterson and Seligman, 2004). It is also
one of the most universally respected virtues, as it is essential in
practicing all other virtues (Comte-Sponville, 2002). Understanding
courage as a virtue implies that people with noble intentions can
perform courageous acts. Similarly, when courage is understood as a
skill as well as an attitude, one can learn and practice courage.
Moreover, one who repeatedly performs courageous behaviors is
typically perceived as possessing the trait of courage (Rate etal., 2007;
Pury and Starkey, 2010; Rate, 2010). e Iranian protests’ growth over
time indicates that courage is a virtue as well as a learned behavior that
many can practice by transforming their noble intentions into actions.
2.2 The courageous act
Courage is also oen understood through its enacted aspect–the
courageous act. Courage can bemanifested in a variety of ways and
situations, from local and possibly daily instances to large-scale,
possibly once-in-a-lifetime global actions (Pury and Lopez, 2010;
Koerner, 2014). Perhaps the prototypical instance of courage would
beresisting the abuse of power. One can see this resistance in daily life
as well as on a larger scale. On a local level, deance of abuse of power
can be exemplied by an individual confronting a bully at the
workplace (workplace courage; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007; Schilpzand
etal., 2015). On a larger, more international scale, deance of abuse of
power can be seen in civil unrest against governments perceived
as unjust.
Speculations in the Western world on the nature of courage date
back at least to ancient Greece. Of particular relevance would
bephilosophical accounts by Epictetus (1983), Aristotle (1985), Plato
(1987), Aquinas (1960), and Sartre (1967). In the Eastern world,
Confucius (1992) also wrote about courage. A comprehensive
philosophical review of the concept of courage can befound in
Putman (2010).
Pury and Lopez (2010) compiled the reections of modern
psychologists on the notion of courage. Lopez etal. (2010) examined
folk conceptions of courage and concluded that an essential element
of courage is the presence of personal risk. Perhaps the most accepted
denition of courage was devised by Rate etal. (2007), Rate (2010);
see also Rate and Sternberg (2007). By examining implicit theories
(folk conceptions) of courage, they characterized courage (a) as
representing an act that is willful and intentional; (b) that is executed
aer reective and mindful deliberation; (c) that presents an objective,
substantial risk to the individual; (d) that is motivated primarily,
although not necessarily exclusively, in the service of a worthy purpose
or a noble good; and (e) that is enacted despite the challenge of feeling
fearful. Rate (2010), in subsequent research presenting an explicit
theory based on the collection of empirical data, suggested as
necessary elements: intentionality, objective and substantial risk, and
a noble purpose. Wenow discuss each of these three aspects in greater
detail below.
2.2.1 Courageous acts are intentional and
deliberate
Consistent with Rate and colleagues’ denition (Rate etal., 2007;
Rate, 2010), wemaintain that courageous acts are intentional and
deliberate. Although some courageous acts may occur almost
instantaneously, for example, saving someone from drowning in a
pool, many courageous acts are pursued intentionally but emerge out
of deliberate thinking (Shelp, 1984; Rate etal., 2007; Pury and Starkey,
2010; Rate, 2010). A dual-system theory (Kahneman, 2011) can
beused to explain these two types of responses. In urgent situations,
time is a critical factor, as it can drastically aect the outcome. Such
situations may initiate a Type Ior intuitive response (e.g., immediately
jumping into a pool to save a drowning person). Other situations that
aord deliberation may invoke a slower and more analytic Type II
response. In this article, wefocus primarily on Type II thinking,
conceptualizing courage as an intentional and deliberate process.
2.2.2 Courageous acts require risk management
Most denitions and theoretical models of courage view courage
as a goal-directed process that involves weighing potential personal
risks and noble or morally worthy outcomes before taking action
(MacIntyre, 1981; Shelp, 1984; Worline, 2004, 2012; Hannah etal.,
2007; Rate etal., 2007; Quinn and Worline, 2008; Lopez etal., 2010;
Rate, 2010; Koerner, 2014; Schilpzand et al., 2015). Research has
consistently shown that perceptions of the potential risks versus
benets of a particular action inuence the decision to take risks
(Moore and Gullone, 1996; Foster etal., 2009; Zhang etal., 2016). is
risk–benet analysis can be explained through the concept of
approach-avoidance conict (Lewin, 1931; Miller, 1944; Dollard and
Miller, 1950), as discussed later in the description of the proposed
dual-process model of courage.
2.2.3 Courageous acts promote a noble purpose
A courageous act involves risk management, but courage cannot
bereduced to calculating risks and benets (Shelp, 1984; Rate etal.,
2007; Rate, 2010). Courage is primarily motivated by a desire to bring
about a worthy or noble purpose (Shelp, 1984; Walton, 1986;
Woodard, 2004; Rate etal., 2007; Woodard and Pury, 2007; Rate,
Chowkase et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
Frontiers in Psychology 03 frontiersin.org
2010). Courage entails at least as much interest in the welfare of others
and of society as it does interest in one’s own welfare. In other words,
courage cannot primarily originate in the pursuit of self-interest or
fame. Rather, truly courageous actors act out of noble motivations
(Shelp, 1984; Walton, 1986; Woodard, 2004; Rate etal., 2007; Woodard
and Pury, 2007; Rate, 2010). Although “noble” can mean several
things, researchers oen use it to mean prosocial, moral, or virtuous
(Shelp, 1984; Rate, 2010; Howard and Alipour, 2014; Howard
etal., 2017).
However, it is worth noting that many people consider actions
they have taken only for their own benet but not directly for others
welfare (e.g., going on a roller coaster) as courageous (Finfgeld, 1999;
Pury et al., 2007; Muris, 2009; Pury and Saylors, 2017). Pury and
Starkey (2010) have observed that, at times, individuals can exhibit
what might becharacterized as bad courage, or the courage to pursue
an action that may seem noble to oneself, but that is morally misguided
and possibly reprehensible. at is, the person convinces themselves
that they are acting for a good cause when they are actually acting for
a bad cause. For example, terrorist attacks are sometimes justied as
serving a noble purpose, when, in fact, they tragically result in the
disruption, ruination, and oen, loss of innocent lives (Silke, 2004).
Similarly, “bad courage” can beseen through state terrorism, which is
oen rationalized as a necessary evil in order to protect the state, yet,
most oen amounts to giving dictators unrestricted power. However,
wefocus on courage that is essentially directed at achieving a noble
goal. Leaving out the pursuit of a noble goal from the construal of
courage allows for validating and even justifying evil acts as
courageous and, therefore, societally accepted.
2.2.4 Courageous acts are viewed in context
In addition to intentionality, objective and substantial risk, and a
noble purpose, weposit that courage is contextual and the designation
of an act as “courageous” can vary, depending on the time, culture, and
place (Shelp, 1984; Pury etal., 2007; Howard and Cogswell, 2019;
Sternberg, 2022b). What is considered courageous by some may not
beseen the same way by others. For example, Rosa Parks’s refusal to
give up her seat to a White man on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama in
1955, is now widely accepted as a courageous action. It served the
noble cause of standing up to racism; it was an intentional, deliberate,
and risky action; and it was radical in a time when people of color
were expected to give up their seats to White persons and were not
permitted to sit near White persons. However, Rosa Parks’s act was not
seen by all as courageous when it took place in 1955. At that time,
some people almost certainly viewed Rosa Parks as foolish in her
ability to manage risk and even as wrong or evil because they went
against the “natural” order of society. In today’s world, it is not as
surprising to see women taking a political stance. Many of them are
leading various political movements, such as the ongoing protests by
women in Iran (Alkhaldi and Ebrahim, 2022). Modern day examples
that demonstrate courage is contextual include Caitlyn Jenner’s public
gender transition and, on the other hand, Kim Davis’s refusal to issue
same-gender marriage licenses. eir actions are contextually
perceived as courageous by some, but not by others. e perception
of courage is signicantly based on the value the perceiver sees of the
goal and, not just, the risk of the action (Pury etal., 2024).
e courageousness of an act also depends on the comparison
group. Pury etal. (2007) provided empirical evidence distinguishing
general courage (actions that would becourageous for anyone to take)
and personal courage (actions that are courageous only in the context
of an individual’s life). On the one hand, actions displaying high levels
of general courage are oen perceived as courageous by others. On the
other hand, actions demonstrating high levels of personal courage
may beregarded as particularly noble by individuals familiar with the
person but not necessarily by others.
In summary, wepropose that courageous acts are intentional and
deliberate endeavors that involve signicant risk management, serve
a noble purpose, and whose outcomes have an impact on the context,
given the time and place. is denition may help to assess courageous
acts as an overlap of all of the above-mentioned elements. However,
this understanding is not prescriptive; rather, it is only descriptive.
Webelieve it is impossible to evaluate the long-term outcomes of a
courageous action in the immediate present. Nevertheless, examples
from the past can inform our understanding of courage. By looking at
past examples, wecan identify and describe whether an action was
courageous in terms of intentionality, deliberation, risk management,
a noble purpose, and impact in the context of time and place.
Pury and Starkey (2010) proposed two ways of studying courage:
as an accolade and as a process. As an accolade, courage is typically
viewed as rare, loy, and worthy of societal acknowledgment. On the
other hand, courage is seen as a process by which people overcome
subjectively felt risks for compelling reasons. Pury and Starkey (2010)
further argue that the accolade perspective on courage oers
information about people who have performed exceptionally well and
how they are dierent from the rest. However, courage when studied
as a process oers information about ways in which people come to
act courageously.
Although in this section wehave described courage as an act, the
account presented above makes it clear that courage is also oen
believed to bethe result of a deliberate process (Rate etal., 2007; Pury
and Starkey, 2010; Rate, 2010), thereby allowing courage to
beinvestigated as a psychological process involving several connected
steps and decisions. However, few scholars have proposed and
validated detailed process models of courage (but see, e.g., Hannah
et al., 2007; Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007; Schilpzand etal., 2015).
Although there is ample scholarship that focuses on the elements of
courage, there is still a dearth of studies that clarify and organize the
complex concept of courage into a structured framework of processes.
erefore, in this article, wepropose a dual-process model of courage.
By delineating the process into various stages and assessments, our
model aims to provide clarity on how courage unfolds and what
factors inuence courageous behavior. Moreover, understanding the
process of courage can have practical applications in various domains,
including psychology, education, organizational behavior, and
leadership development. Our model oers insights into how
individuals evaluate and navigate challenging situations, make
decisions under uncertainty, and manage risk in pursuit of noble
goals. is understanding can inform interventions, training
programs, and organizational policies aimed at fostering courage. By
identifying critical assessment points and exit paths, the model oers
insights into factors that may facilitate or inhibit courageous behavior.
is predictive aspect may enable researchers and practitioners to
anticipate when and how individuals are likely to act courageously, as
well as to develop strategies for cultivating courage in individuals and
organizations. In proposing this new model, weintegrate insights
from various disciplines, including psychology, ethics, and decision
theory, into a unied framework. is interdisciplinary approach
Chowkase et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
Frontiers in Psychology 04 frontiersin.org
allows for a comprehensive understanding of courage that goes
beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries. By synthesizing existing
research ndings and theories, our model potentially contributes to a
more holistic understanding of courage and its determinants.
Although our denition of courage focuses on the pursuit of a noble
goal, the process model wepropose can possibly apply to other types
of courage (e.g., bad courage, personal courage) where the focus on
pursuing a noble goal is not considered essential.
To facilitate a detailed explanation of the model, throughout the
article, weuse the example of ongoing protests in Iran against the
brutalities of the autocratic regime. For context, a series of protests
and civil unrest against the Iranian regime was sparked in September
2022 aer the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested
and beaten by the ironically labeled “morality police” for violating
Iran’s mandatory dress code for women (Alkhaldi and Ebrahim,
2022; Reuters, 2022a). In response to the protests, the Iranian
government has been using brutal and utterly cruel security forces
to curb the protests. By April 2023, more than 530 protestors had lost
their lives, including about 70 minors; and 22,000 have been jailed
(Karimi and Gambrell, 2023). Despite the brutal repression and the
enormous risk to their lives, resistance has been growing in Iran,
with the hope, on the part of the resistors, of seeing a positive
change. e courage demonstrated by many Iranians, especially
women and students, is evident in this example. erefore, werefer
to this example throughout this article to elaborate on the proposed
process model of courage.
3 Courage as a process
We are not the rst to present a process model of courage.
However, our contribution is novel in that it draws on modern
conceptions of Type I(fast and intuitive) and Type II (reective,
deliberative) thinking. Hannah etal. (2007) devised a Subjective
Experience of Courage model, in which they set forth the notion
that a courageous mindset promotes an individual’s skills and
systems to combat fear and replaces that fear with a courageous act.
Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007) devised a process-orientation theory
for conceptualizing moral courage. eir theory highlights personal
choice as an indispensable component, as well as the presence of an
ethical dilemma that serves as the impetus for courageous action.
Schilpzand et al. (2015) evaluated courage from a workplace
perspective and set forth a two-pronged model, beginning with an
assessment of individual responsibility in relation to a challenge and
subsequently factoring in the potential social consequences
of acting.
Our model expands upon its predecessors and broadens the scope
of the situations viewed as potentially eliciting courageous acts. It
further takes into account how one deliberately engages in moral
considerations and risk assessment to approach or avoid situations
needing courage. Our model aims to emphasize the role of individual
agency as well as the recursive nature of the process of courage to
represent the dynamic decision-making process applicable to a variety
of situations. In this regard, our model is dierent from models that
focus only on workplace dynamics (e.g., Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007;
Schilpzand etal., 2015) and from models that focus only on some
attributes of courage, such as risk-taking and goal value (e.g., Pury
etal., 2024).
4 A dual-process model view of
courage
Courage has traditionally been thought to be the result of
attributes such as integrity, honor, valor, independence, a sense of
duty, selessness, loyalty (Park etal., 2004), bravery, persistence, and
vitality (Pury and Kowalski, 2007). However, wenow view courage as
a multi-stage process that involves assessing a situation, as driven by
both prosocial emotions and cognitive recognition of an opportunity
to right a wrong or potential wrong.
In this article, weaim to extend current understandings of the
psychological construct of courage. In Figure1, wepropose a dual-
process model consisting of various decision-based pathways by
which individuals come to enact a courageous action, or not. is
model can beused to examine and inuence the decision-making
process underlying courageous actions. It also can help to understand
how and why an individual in a particular challenging situation
proceeded with their chosen action.
According to our dual-process model of courage, courage
commences with a trigger that involves an actor or actors and a
particular situation. is actor is tasked with making four critical
assessments, encompassing (a) the immediacy of the situation; (b) its
meaningfulness, relevance, and value to the actor; (c) one’s self-
ecacy to act; and (d) the decision to act with courage.
Courage entails an approach-avoidance conict, guided by moral
considerations in pursuit of a noble goal, that necessitates deliberate
assessments of perceived risks and potential morally commendable
outcomes. e decision to act may lead to courageous actions,
provided the decision aligns with the elements of courage in the
previously mentioned denition: intentionality, deliberation, risk
management, noble intent, and impact in a specic time and place.
ese actions can yield various outcomes or consequences, and these
outcomes, in turn, can shape the actors’ experiences, thus completing
a feedback loop. Notably, the dual-process model encompasses four
exit paths, one corresponding to each assessment point.
4.1 Trigger
Like many behavioral models, we propose that the process of
displaying courage commences with a trigger. Courage emerges in
response to situations characterized by signicant personal risks, threats,
and obstacles, as noted in previous studies (Cavanagh and Moberg, 1999;
Harris, 2001; Lopez etal., 2010). is courage-inducing trigger can take
various forms, including the actors current circumstances (e.g., poverty),
their emotional state (e.g., a sense of outrage at injustice), or a specic
event (e.g., a re out of control). It is essential to emphasize that the
trigger need not necessarily belife-threatening; it also can berooted in
the actor’s worldview, oen inuenced by their previous experiences,
personal histories, and societal norms. In our example of the Iranian
protests, Mahsa Aminis death served as the trigger that motivated
Iranian citizens to confront the injustices committed by their
government, and then to resist police brutality.
A trigger can besituational and have the potential to elicit a wide
range of emotions, including fear, anger, disgust, and compassion.
Many scholars in the eld of courage, such as Shelp (1984), Peterson
and Seligman (2004), Rachman (2004), Woodard (2004), Woodard
and Pury (2007), Rate etal. (2007), and Kilmann etal. (2013), have
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Frontiers in Psychology 05 frontiersin.org
suggested a close link between courage and fear. Pury etal. (2007)
have demonstrated that fear and condence (self-ecacy) are
distinctively related to general courage (actions considered courageous
for anyone) and personal courage (actions courageous within the
context of an individual’s life).
eir research reveals that actions demonstrating high levels of
general courage are characterized by substantial condence and
minimal fear. Conversely, actions displaying high levels of personal
courage involve acting despite fear, adversity, and individual
limitations. Although there is some evidence suggesting that a small
group of people may not experience fear, even in high-risk situations
(Rachman, 2004), empirical support for fear as a typical, though not
essential, component of courage appears relatively weak. Nonetheless,
it is important to note that fear can bediminished through repeated
acts of risk-taking, as seen in contexts such as military training and
practice (Walk, 1956), or when individuals have adequate resources to
cope with adversity (Rachman, 2004). erefore, further research is
required to gain a deeper understanding of the intricacies of the
relationship between fear and courage.
4.2 The first assessment: urgency of the
situation
Once triggered, the initial assessment in the courage process may
not necessarily bewell-thought-out. Instead, it oen represents an
FIGURE1
The dual-process model of courage.
Chowkase et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
Frontiers in Psychology 06 frontiersin.org
intuitive and immediate assessment of the situation to determine if an
urgent response is required. For instance, individuals faced with dire
circumstances, like a house re or a child drowning, may not have the
luxury of time to reect on the situation or to consider the
consequences of their actions. In such cases, they must rely on instinct
and act without much deliberation. However, in less immediately
challenging situations, individuals may have the opportunity to take
some time to process the situation and act more deliberately.
In the dual-system theory (dual-process theory) proposed by
Kahneman (2011), human cognition is regulated by two distinct
systems or modes: System Ifor fast, intuitive, and eortless thinking,
and System II for slower, analytic, and eortful thinking. Although
some acts of courage may indeed arise intuitively due to the urgency
of the situation, most courageous acts involve deliberation and
reection. In other words, although some intuitive courageous
responses might result from the automatic and oen unconscious
operations of System I, such as rescuing someone from a burning
building, the majority of acts of courage entail the controlled
operations of System II. ese controlled operations demand more
signicant cognitive eort (Kahneman, 2011), particularly in
situations requiring courage, such as the ongoing situation in Iran.
erefore, our model primarily focuses on the controlled operations
of System II. Nevertheless, this focus is not to downplay the role of
intuitive courage in everyday life, especially in emergencies where
Type II thinking would betoo time-consuming. However, when the
situation permits time for deliberation, wepropose that the actor
typically deploys Type II thinking.
4.3 Type II thinking: risk assessment, moral
considerations, and approach-avoidance
conflict
Arguably, the most important component of this model is Type II
thinking (Kahneman, 2011) – that is, slower, analytic, and eortful
thinking potentially involving several moral and risk considerations.
On one hand, courageous actors show a willingness to assume
substantial personal risk to pursue a noble goal (approach motivation),
but on the other hand, they also consider the risks involved in such a
pursuit (avoidance motivation). In this primarily cognitive process,
the actors identify the courageous actions that potentially can help
achieve the noble goal and the risks associated with potentially taking
those actions; they then engage in deliberate moral reasoning, and
perhaps a moral dilemma as to whether to engage with the situation.
e actor experiences approach-avoidance conict and may
deliberately engage in a personally satisfying resolution (Dollard and
Miller, 1950). Here, the actor engages in three major systems: (a) a
behavioral activation system, prompted by morally rewarding
stimuli, such as the pursuit of a noble goal (approach motivation);
(b) a ght-ight-freeze system, prompted by harmful or threatening
stimuli, such as the risks involved (avoidance motivation); and (c) a
behavioral inhibition system, prompted by negotiation between
potential noble outcomes and perceived risks (approach-avoidance
conict) (McNaughton and Gray, 2000; Corr, 2013).
An approach-avoidance conict arises when an actor is both
drawn to and repulsed by the same trigger (Lewin, 1931; Miller,
1944; Dollard and Miller, 1950). Consequently, the System II
decision the actor makes about approaching or avoiding the situation
results from reaching a point of negotiation between the relative
valences of perceived risks and potential noble outcomes that may
arise out of acting courageously. For example, in the Iranian protests,
approach-avoidance conict involves conict between potential
risks to life and safety (avoidance) and the pursuit of a positive
change in the lives of Iranian women (approach). e Iranian regime
has repeatedly used various brutal and, indeed, savage methods to
curb the protests, such as shutting down Internet and cellphone
service, arresting journalists, performing mass detentions, and
torturing captured protestors (France 24, 2022; Reuters, 2022a,b).
Evidently, the risks of participating in the ongoing protests can
begrave. However, the pursuit of a positive change in women’s lives
seems at least as strong, at least for some Iranians, as the protests are
still active.
A situation involving a greater perceived risk will involve a
greater approach-avoidance conict and will, therefore, demand
greater courage. e anterior hippocampus area appears to becentral
in the processing of approach-avoidance conict (Bach etal., 2014;
O'Neil etal., 2015; see Ito and Lee, 2016, for a review). Bach etal.
(2014) gave neurologically healthy participants a computerized task
involving approach-avoidance conict, as administered under three
dierent levels of threat. When the likelihood of threat increased and
so did the level of approach-avoidance conict, the participants
displayed greater avoidance behavior and behavioral inhibition.
ese changes in avoidance behavior were accompanied by changes
in hippocampal activity. When the threat level increased,
hippocampal activity also increased, suggesting the hippocampal
area of the human brain played an important role in approach-
avoidance conict processing.
As is typical of System II thinking, the actors can beexpected to
engage in serial, conscious, and consequential decision-making
(Kahneman, 2011). For example, approach-avoidance conict may
involve carefully assessing the relative values of available options and
ascertaining, as well as one can, the price, probability, and magnitude
of the consequences associated with various outcomes (Rolls and
Grabenhorst, 2008; Quartz, 2009; Aupperle Robin and Paulus Martin,
2010). From a motivational perspective, two key determinants of
choice are the relative values of various options and the expectancies
of success (Eccles and Wigeld, 2002). e value component depicts
the desirability of a particular goal (i.e., “Why would Iengage in such
an activity?”), whereas the expectancy component represents an
individual’s beliefs about how well they will do in an activity (i.e., “Can
Ibesuccessful in doing this activity?”). Wediscuss these two key
considerations in the next two subsections.
4.4 The second assessment: value,
meaningfulness, and relevance
When confronted with a situational trigger, individuals may face
yet another assessment regarding whether or not the situation presents
an adequately personally valuable and meaningful goal. An individual
would possibly consider engaging with the situation as personally
meaningful because it might help them get closer to a valued goal. A
situation requiring courage can hold signicance for individuals
because it is closely intertwined with their own lives, falls within their
circle of concern, and is morally commendable. For example,
employees feel motivated to act courageously when the cause is
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Frontiers in Psychology 07 frontiersin.org
meaningful to them and they feel a sense of personal responsibility
(Schilpzand etal., 2015).
Individuals are more inclined to engage in a risky situation when
it involves people, ideas, or moral principles about which they care
deeply (Shelp, 1984). For example, many advocates for LGBTQ+ rights
are members of the LGBTQ+ community themselves and draw upon
their personal experiences of discrimination as motivation to
champion this cause. e same principle applies to Iranian citizens
and members of the diaspora who have taken to the streets to advocate
for Iranian women’s rights because the issue directly aects their
daily lives.
Actors can also attribute personal meaning to a situation even if it
does not directly involve them or anyone in their immediate social
circle. is sense of meaning may arise from their ability to expand
their circle of concern. Driven by an elevated sense of
interconnectedness, compassion, and empathy, actors can form
connections with strangers, including members of outgroups,
motivated by a focus on a superordinate identity and a recognition of
common humanity (Chowkase, 2022, 2023; Chowkase and
Watve, 2022).
From a virtue perspective, considerations of moral principles can
also guide the decision-making process (Peterson and Seligman,
2004). On perceiving a challenging situation, an individual may
recognize its moral and ethical importance. ey may view the
situation as an opportunity to act in accordance with their core moral
ideals (Bredemeier and Shields, 2006; Schwartz etal., 2012). In doing
so, the actor may reect on their fundamental moral values, such as
integrity, equity, and fairness, and consider how their potential acts in
a given situation can exemplify these virtues and put their moral
character into action (Peterson and Seligman, 2004; Lapsley and
Carlo, 2014). Moreover, the individual may recognize that their
actions can positively impact themselves, others, or the greater good.
ey then may feel that it is incumbent upon them to act accordingly
(Brown and Treviño, 2014). Such a sense of duty and perceived ethical
responsibility may motivate an individual to approach a
challenging situation.
e extent to which an individual musters the courage to act may
depend, in part, on the values the situation holds for them. In other
words, if the actor perceives the challenging situation, their action in
response, and its potential consequences as promoting personally
valued goals, they are more likely to engage with the situation.
Conversely, if they do not nd the situation personally meaningful,
they may opt to disengage from it, as indicated in Figure1 with a
stop symbol.
e greater the degree of meaningfulness the situation holds for
the actor, the more likely they are to engage with it and exhibit
courageous behavior. However, it is crucial to note that meaningfulness
alone is not sucient; the actors’ willingness to act courageously may
also beinuenced by their expectancy regarding the likely outcome
and by their self-ecacy beliefs.
4.5 The third assessment: ecacy
In the process of displaying courage, the next assessment concerns
beliefs about an individual’s ability to perform a courageous action
and to achieve success in that action. Bandura (1977) dened outcome
expectancy as a person’s estimate that a given behavior will lead to
certain outcomes. If an actor does not believe in the possibility of a
successful outcome, then the behavior leading to that outcome is
unlikely to occur. Additionally, actors need self-ecacy or condence
in their ability to perform the action (Bandura, 1982). In this
assessment, actors evaluate whether or not they believe they have the
resources or skills needed to execute the action successfully. For
instance, do they have condence in their skills to act courageously?
Do they think they have enough information, strategies, and tools to
eectively engage in a protest? Considering the potential repercussions
of joining the protest, are they still condent they can achieve success
by joining?
Although specic beliefs about ones ability and one’s likelihood of
success are predictive of one’s behaviors, one specic form of self-
ecacy belief may bemost relevant to courage. Moral self-ecacy is
one’s condence in one’s ability to handle ethical problems (May etal.,
2014). For courage to beenacted, the actors display high condence
in their ability to act morally in the situation and that they have a
chance to succeed with their action(s). However, if actors lack
sucient moral self-ecacy in a situation, despite possessing strong
approach motivation, they are likely to exit the situation. Cognitively,
they may know what is moral in the situation, perceive the risks and
potential noble outcomes well, and want to approach the situation. Yet,
they may decide to leave the situation because they lack the condence
to act morally. is situation is indicated with a “stop” symbol in
Figure1. However, when the actors feel suciently self-ecacious
about handling the situation and especially feel suciently condent
to take a moral stand, they are likely to proceed to the next step.
In the case of protests in Iran, many Iranian people have shown
exemplary self-ecacy–the condence that they can win their
fundamental rights. us, they have continued to resist the abusive
power structure, regardless of violent threats from the regime
(Rajvanshi, 2022).
4.6 The fourth assessment: decision to
engage
Aer consolidating information from all the previous assessments,
the actor arrives at the nal assessment regarding whether to engage
in the courage-demanding situation or not. When the actors
suciently value engaging with the situation and have enough self-
ecacy, and therefore, have the motivation to engage, they are likely
to decide to engage in the situation and perform a courageous act.
When avoidance motivation or the ght-ight-freeze system
dominates the processing of a conict, the actors are more likely to
cave in and avoid the situation, regardless of their desire to confront
the situation. Importantly, avoidance is an active decision made to
avoid potential adverse outcomes, such as getting arrested while
protesting against the government.
In contrast, when approach motivation or the behavioral-
activation system dominates the processing of the conict, actors can
beexpected to engage with the situation, despite impending risks.
Strong approach motivation may emerge in a situation such as the one
in which Rosa Parks found herself on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama;
despite her knowing that refusing to give up her seat most likely would
lead to adverse outcomes, she remained seated. Her will to ght for
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her rights and the rights of people of color all across the UnitedStates
trumped her fear of any impending consequences. She was red from
her job following the bus boycott and received death threats for
years aerward.
In more recent times, heroic individuals such as Alexei
Navalny, a prominent anti-corruption activist in Russia, and
Narges Mohammadi, an Iranian human rights activist and Nobel
laureate, have demonstrated courage similar to that of Rosa Parks
and are facing brutal consequences for their courageous actions.
Navalny’s actions are recognized as modern examples of
unwavering courage against corruption, with some suggesting his
name become synonymous with resilience and courage (Bazargan,
2024). He was recognized most distinctly for publishing
corruption-exposing investigations against Putin’s regime
(Chappell, 2024). e world mourns his passing on February 16th,
2024, with thousands of supporters attending his funeral in Russia
on March 1st, 2024 (Hopkins, 2024). As evident in these examples,
approach, like avoidance, is also an active decision and may involve
sacricing, possibly forever, personal safety, pleasures, or
self-interest.
Most oen, courage requires possessing and demonstrating
strong approach motivation. For example, in the case of the
ongoing protests in Iran, people’s courage lies in confronting the
unjust and powerful system, despite risks and other impediments
to action. In this case, approach motivation thrives on the potential
noble outcomes the protests may yield, namely, gaining human
rights for Iranian women. Other motivators are attaining better
visibility for the women’s poor condition, gaining peoples support
within and outside Iran, and possibly bringing about systemic
change in the oppressive regime. When the actors lack the
necessary level of relevant motivation, they are most likely to exit
the situation without engaging with it any further. is situation is
indicated in Figure1 with a “stop” symbol.
is decision to engage also involves strategizing about how
the courageous act will be deployed. In this decision, actors
identify clear goals and design a strategic plan to carry out the
courageous act. However, at this point, it is also possible that they
decide to exit the situation. ey might understand the urgency,
see the value, have ecacy, and feel motivated, but ultimately fail
to identify clear goals or execute an adequate plan to attain a
successful outcome. ey therefore exit the situation. is exit is
indicated with a stop symbol in Figure1.
e decision to engage also requires a strategy as to when to
act. Imagine a risky situation in which acting with patience may
be more benecial for the sought-aer noble cause than
immediately acting with courage. For example, in situations that
make one wonder “if that is the hill they want to die on,” in the
context of a more important goal, the actor may choose not to
engage immediately, despite the urge to act courageously. is
choice can beexemplied by the idea of “losing a battle to win a
war.” In situations like these, although the actor is not avoiding the
situation, they are not immediately approaching it either. Instead,
they are looking for a more appropriate time to act, despite having
the necessary courage and motivation to act. Consequently, the
actor may decide to wait until a later time, despite checking all
the prerequisites of the process of acting courageously listed in the
previous steps.
4.7 Action
Once the actor has decided to engage, they commit to the situation
and perform the courageous act. eir act may include multiple
sub-actions. For example, if, aer witnessing bullying in class, a
student decides to respond to the situation, they may speak up
immediately, intervene in the situation, gather help, record the
incident, reach out to the authorities, and/or inform parents. Aer the
incident, they may follow up on the case, write about it in the school’s
magazine, become an explicit ally of the victim, or even start a school-
wide anti-bullying campaign. All of these actions are courageous ones
that were triggered by witnessing the bullying behavior.
Similarly, in the case of the protests in Iran, the protestors have
chosen a variety of relevant actions. ese actions include arranging
ash mobs, chanting slogans demanding basic human rights, blocking
streets to slow down security forces, organizing sit-down strikes,
symbolically burning and tearing o hijabs (womens headscarves),
dismantling public “security” cameras, chanting from rooops and
windows, dyeing fountains in blood-red colors, women symbolically
cutting their hair, students boycotting classes, and professors resigning
from their government jobs (Alkhaldi and Ebrahim, 2022; France 24,
2022; Luo and Umar, 2022; Reuters, 2022a,b).
Courageous actions can take a wide range of forms. ey can
be episodic (one-time) or frequent; simple or elaborate; mild or
intense; overt or covert; subtle or explicit; and commonplace or heroic.
e courageous actions can manifest through thoughts and emotions;
expressed as words and visuals; and as physical acts involving gestures
and steps. ere can bemultiple courageous actions for a particular
situation, but the eectiveness of an action cannot befully predicted
in advance. Navigating such uncertainty is inherent to acting
courageously (Shelp, 1984). Acting courageously oen does not yield
the hoped-for result. In fact, it may even yield the opposite, undesirable
result, which invites a discussion on the outcomes of courage.
4.8 Outcomes
Courageous actions have consequences, and each action may
result in a dierent outcome. ese outcomes can begood or bad, or
a little of each; positive and negative, or a little of each; desirable and
undesirable, or a little of each. For example, in our previous example
of Iranian protests, each individual action can result in dierent
outcomes. Protestors’ immediate decisions have invited brutal
retaliation from the government (France 24, 2022; Rajvanshi, 2022).
Participating in sit-down strikes or public marches has resulted in
mass arrests and detentions. Even worse, at least seven protestors have
been judicially executed for disturbing public order (Fassihi and
Engelbrecht, 2023). Moreover, hundreds of protestors, including
children, have died while resisting the security forces (Reuters, 2022b).
Regardless, the nal and collective outcome of these protests might
bemore positive and desirable than the abovementioned deaths and
arrests, where Iranian women may see a systemic change in their life
circumstances through a dramatic change in Iran’s regime and
legislation. However, the nal outcome cannot bepredicted at the
moment. Analysts are seeing the unrest as an intermediate possible
step toward long-term political change (Reuters, 2022b). In that sense,
the current protests may serve only as an intermediate outcome and
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may not achieve the ultimate goals. is, in no way, undermines the
courage currently demonstrated by Iranian protestors. Today’s
courageous actions can serve as a stepping stone for the next actions.
4.9 Experience
e outcomes of one’s courageous action can shape the actors’
experience, and that experience in turn can shape their knowledge
about the situation, the actions they undertook, and the results to
which those actions led. is knowledge can then feed into the actors
memory, shape their worldview, and serve as a trigger in a similar
situation in the future. Additionally, as actors take opportunities to
express courage, they can gain wisdom about the situation through the
process, which in turn can inuence further experiences (Glück and
Bluck, 2013). e experience component and its allied processes thus
close the loop of the processes of courage that started with a trigger. For
example, as predicted by some analysts (Reuters, 2022b), the current
protests in Iran may not result in an immediate dramatic change in the
country’s political leadership. However, the experience of this ongoing
resistance may set the Iranian people up for future ghts for their
rights. Courage, especially in the context of a major systemic change,
can be seen as an iterative process of trigger-deliberation-action-
outcome-experience. In this process, the experience gained from the
previous iteration may feed into the next cycle, and the loop may
continue. Eventually, it may even end in success.
5 Potential moderators of the process
of courage
Several factors, such as personality traits, wisdom, prior
experience with sociocultural norms, and demographics can inuence
the processes of courage.
5.1 Personality traits
An individual’s dominant personality traits can bepredictive of
how they will respond to a situation that invites courageous action.
Howard and Cogswell (2019) provided evidence of the relationship
between behavioral social courage and personality traits. In their
study, among personal and contextual variables, grit and proactive
personality were signicant predictors of courageous behavior in the
workplace. On the one hand, if an actor is accustomed to defying the
Zeitgeist or, perhaps, is open to new experiences, they may bemore
inclined to take the courageous route (Sternberg, 2018). On the other
hand, someone who is timid and less tolerant of adverse experiences,
which can beassumed to follow courageous acts, would beless likely
to act courageously. Furthermore, perceptions of risk and outcomes
of risk-taking are important facets of courage. Several personality
traits can inuence these facets. To that end, narcissistic personality
has been linked with elevated risk-taking, which has further been
found to befueled by heightened perceptions of benets stemming
from risky behaviors (Foster etal., 2009). Such risk-taking, however,
is not necessarily courageous but rather may bedirected solely toward
self-interest.
e enlisted personality traits are only representative and not
exhaustive. A detailed review of courage-relevant personality traits is
out of the scope of this article. However, it would be prudent to
examine dierent personality characteristics--dispositional,
situational, and interactive--in relation to their inuence on the
courage process.
5.2 Wisdom
Wisdom is relevant to courage, as actors engaging in courage-
demanding situations employ tacit knowledge in balancing their own
and others’ interests, all in favor of pursuing a noble goal (Sternberg,
2024). Baltes and Staudinger (2000) dened wisdom as an expert
knowledge system concerning the fundamental pragmatics of life,
which include knowledge and judgment about the meaning of life and
humankind’s progression toward excellence while attending to
personal and collective well-being. is denition has been expanded
upon by other scholars to include more specic characteristics,
including intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change,
consideration and integration of dierent perspectives, self-regulation,
altruism and moral maturity, openness and tolerance, concern for
others, reective attitude, cognitive ability, insight, and real-world
skills (Sternberg, 1998, 2019, 2024; Bluck and Glück, 2005; Grossman,
2017; Karami et al., 2020). A comprehensive review of wisdom
research is beyond the scope of this article (see Sternberg and Glück,
2021, for a review). However, it is crucial to acknowledge the aspect
of integration and dynamic balance cuts across the various wisdom
models mentioned above.
An act would not bedeemed courageous if it did not achieve the
integration of the various aspects of wisdom. For example, someone
could use their creativity and knowledge, but not their common sense
and lack of concern for others to produce an action that might
bemore reckless and irresponsible than courageous. Imagine if the
Civil Rights Movement in the USA of the 1960s resorted to violence
and burning down public property. Such a rash and heedless act
would have enabled the government and opposing civilians to crush
the resistance, using brute force. Violence would jeopardize the safety
of the protestors and undermine the entire movement as well. Using
wisdom, therefore, becomes important as actors plan their
courageous actions.
5.3 Experience with sociocultural norms
An actor’s personal experience with social and cultural norms
can also have an impact on their willingness to act courageously in
the face of such norms. Protests in Iran are a prime example of how
people act courageously when socio-cultural norms act against a
subgroup of people. Women in Iran are protesting against the
norm that women should bedisciplined for not wearing the Hijab
(headscarf) that is mandated by the state. e protesting women
are opposing this patriarchal and fundamentalist norm, which
deprives them of freedom of choice. Mahsa Amini’s death,
therefore, has triggered the women in Iran to embrace their
womanhood and ght against the regime. Women are burning
head scarves and cutting their hair in public as a symbol of an
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attack on their identity and resistance to unreasonable social
norms (Luo and Umar, 2022).
Courage may berelated to other cultural dimensions (Howard
and Cogswell, 2019), such as (a) power distance, or the extent to
which less powerful members of groups accept and expect unequal
power distributions; (b) uncertainty avoidance, or people’s level of
comfort with unstructured situations; (c) collectivism–
individualism, or the extent to which people in a society are
integrated into groups for which they bear a sense of responsibility;
(d) humane orientation, or the extent to which people in society
value the prosocial treatment of others; and (e) assertiveness, or
the extent to which people in a society are assertive
(Hofstede, 2011).
5.4 Demographics
Demographic factors such as gender and age also can inuence
the processes of courage (Howard and Cogswell, 2019). In
particular, courage has been traditionally treated, to some extent,
as a gendered concept--men are expected to exhibit courageous
actions more than women (Pury and Lopez, 2010). Although there
may beno real gender dierences in courage, gender may still
inuence the decision-making involved in courageous action
through social conditioning. Similarly, age can signicantly
inuence courage. Specically, in workplace settings, employees
may become more courageous as they spend more time in an
organization (Howard and Cogswell, 2019).
6 Discussion
In this article, we have argued that courage is often a
deliberate process. Wehave proposed a conceptual model that
describes what steps may beinvolved in courage, what kinds of
factors might lead people to bemore or less likely to display
courage, and what assessments people are likely to make when
they choose to act courageously or not. In this section, wediscuss
the potential empirical tests of our model and describe the future
directions that can emerge from our proposed process model
of courage.
6.1 Potential tests of the model and future
directions
Our article introduces a dual-process model of courage, aimed at
understanding courage as a process. Empirical research is necessary
to validate and rene this conceptual model. is research would
involve validation, exploration and measurement, and application of
the proposed process and its components. Below, we present only
preliminary directions, and actual research could take numerous other
forms. e objective of presenting these directions is to initiate a
discussion on future research on this model.
6.1.1 Direction 1: validation
Validation is an essential step in establishing the credibility
and utility of our model. A first assessment to yield evidence of
the validity of our model might consist of testing the alignment
of our model with real-world behaviors and outcomes related to
courage. To assess the content validity of the proposed model, for
example, researchers could create checklists and scales with items
outlining behaviors associated with each step of our model. A
panel of experts in the study of courage, decision-making, and
related areas could be asked to judge the relevance and
representativeness of each of the items and the components. Then
researchers can examine the factor structure of the instrument.
To gather validity evidence about the utility of the model,
researchers could conduct interviews regarding courageous
actions that key participants have witnessed or undertaken.
Researchers could use the think-aloud strategy to ask participants
to verbally recreate the perceived sequence of events. Similar to a
study by Schilpzand et al. (2015), the collected data could
beanalyzed following the proposed model. The researchers asked
participants to recount an event in which courage was displayed.
Then, participant stories were used to assess components of
courage in the researchers’ proposed model (Schilpzand et al.,
2015). Results from the think-aloud could help researchers
evaluate the salience or non-salience of the assessment points in
our model. By comparing participants’ responses to the models
expected outcomes; a closer match would indicate higher
model accuracy.
6.1.2 Direction 2: exploration and measurement
Exploration involves further investigating and examining the
relationships among factors that influence the processes of
courage. Our model proposes that personality traits, wisdom,
social norms, and demographics moderate the courage process. In
essence, courage is a personality x task x situation interaction, as
are many other psychological phenomena (Sternberg etal., 2023).
Whether a given person will becourageous will depend on the
task they confront (e.g., saving a cat in a burning building vs.
protesting for civil rights) and the situation in which they confront
that task (e.g., the result might bedisapproval of friends vs. life
imprisonment). Courage always depends on intrapersonal
variables, but also on the tasks at hand and the context in which
they are presented.
Studies such as Howard and Cogswell’s (2019) have explored
some of these factors as predictors of courage in the context of
social courage. Researchers could measure the extent to which
motivation, wisdom, personality traits, and demographic variables
influence courageous behaviors. Specifically, exploration efforts
could lead to identifying the characteristics and contexts in which
people are more likely to engage in courageous action.
Another future direction of this research would include
developing a scale to better understand situated courageous
actions and how people approach challenging situations.
Participants can be asked to select the extent to which they
engaged in behaviors and thought processes related to our model.
For example, using a Likert-type scale, to what extent they acted
instinctively and instantaneously; assessed the situation as to
whether it required an immediate response; weighed to what
extent the situation was personally meaningful and how high the
stakes were for the individual; engaged in moral considerations
and risk assessment involved in the approach-avoidance conflict;
analyzed potential outcomes and perceived likelihood to succeed;
Chowkase et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
Frontiers in Psychology 11 frontiersin.org
balanced interests of self and others; and reflected on the action
and the whole situation. Our process model may beapplied as a
theoretical framework for this scale-development study.
6.1.3 Direction 3: application
e test of application consists of identifying the extent of the
model’s usefulness. Our model aims to be a model of general
courage beyond existing models, which focus primarily on the
workplace (e.g., Schilpzand etal., 2015). Researchers could apply
the process model of courage to dierent contexts and domains to
elicit behaviors related to courage. According to our proposed
model, a courage process involves four assessments, namely, (a)
immediacy of the situation; (b) meaningfulness, relevance, and
value to the actor; (c) adequacy of ecacy to act; and (d) decision
to act with courage. Participants would begiven a set of open-
ended problems that require courageous action. Some examples
might include (a) saving someone in a building on re, (b) saving
someone on a battleeld, (c) speaking the truth when one’s job is
at risk, (d) speaking out publicly against a demagogue, and so on.
Participants would be asked to elaborate on their proposed
solution. Researchers can examine the extent to which the
participant solution (a) identies the morally right thing to do in
the situation, (b) realizes that one is taking an enormous personal
risk, (c) realizes that one may not succeed, and so on. e
prediction is that plausible solutions will match the assessment
points and thought processes outlined in our model.
Finally, the model could beassessed against existing models of
courage. For example, researchers could evaluate the conceptual
clarity, empirical evidence, and predictive power, as well as the
scope and applicability of our model compared to existing models.
Researchers could assess courageous acts (actual or vignette
examples) using multiple models, contrasting the strengths and
weaknesses of each model in explaining the courageous acts. e
goal of this assessment would beto further strengthen our model
by pointing out opportunities to reduce conceptual overlaps,
rening strategies to gather new data, or suggesting applications to
enhance the courage process.
Overall, future research on this model should aim to extend the
current understanding of the multidimensional construct of
courage and rene our search for the processes involved in
courageous behavior. is model can beseen as a framework for
understanding the nature and underlying decision-making
processes of courageous behavior. Using this process model, people
could beasked to respond and reect on each step of the owchart.
Perhaps this model could be used to understand a variety of
outcomes, such as people’s perceptions of courage, to identify
triggers or situations that require courage, to illustrate processes
and strategies by which courage can beelicited, and to ascertain
what it takes to act courageously.
7 Conclusion
Courage is oen part of the way wemake choices about what is
important, what to do, and how to go on in life in ways weview as
worthwhile. Maintaining a view that courage is oen a deliberate
process, wehave proposed a model that describes what steps may
beinvolved in courage, what kinds of factors might lead people to
bemore or less likely to display courage, and what kinds of assessments
people are likely to make when they choose to act courageously or not.
Wehave shown how courage depends not only on the person but also
on the particular tasks the person confronts and the situational
context in which they are presented. e proposed dual-process
model of courage can, thus, serve as a stepping-stone to understanding
how to navigate decision-making in the face of dicult situations
demanding courageous responses. Ultimately, navigating this process
of courage is key to meeting many of the demands and challenges of
our troubled world.
Data availability statement
e original contributions presented in the study are included in
the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can bedirected
to the corresponding author.
Author contributions
AC: Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology, Project
administration, Supervision, Writing – original dra, Writing – review
& editing, Visualization. FP-M: Conceptualization, Writing – original
dra, Writing – review & editing. MG: Conceptualization, Writing –
original dra, Writing – review & editing. ZB: Writing – original dra,
Writing – review & editing. GF: Writing – original dra, Writing –
review & editing. RS: Conceptualization, Supervision, Writing –
original dra, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
e author(s) declare nancial support was received for the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Publication
made possible in part by support from the Berkeley Research Impact
Initiative (BRII) sponsored by the UC Berkeley Library.
Conflict of interest
e authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or nancial relationships that could
beconstrued as a potential conict of interest.
Publisher’s note
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated
organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the
reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or
claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or
endorsed by the publisher.
Chowkase et al. 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1376195
Frontiers in Psychology 12 frontiersin.org
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The current study examined the combined effects of sleep deprivation and anxiety on participants' willingness to act courageously in both heroic and everyday situations. Participants consisted of 256 undergraduate students between the ages of 18 to 25 years old seeking regular and extra credit for their psychology classes through SONA. Following informed consent, participants completed demographic questionnaires through Qualtrics, as well as the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, and a version of the Woodard Pury Courage Scale-23 (WPCS-23). The Woodard Pury Courage Scale-23 measures participants’ willingness to engage in challenging tasks that require either heroic or everyday courage and the fear they would experience when engaging in these tasks. The 6 measures of courage included willingness to engage in everyday, heroic, and both acts, as well as fear when engaging in these actions. Fear/anxiety by sleep interactions predicted every courage measure with the exception of fear when engaging in daily courageous actions. The results supported the hypothesis that fear/anxiety and poor sleep would combine to predict courage, and their implications are discussed.
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