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The culminating point of the Russian army: The Importance of the shift of strategy in Ukraine

Authors:
  • Independent Researcher

Abstract

This comprehensive analysis, authored by Adib Enayati, Ph.D., Director of GDSIWSU, explores the critical juncture in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, emphasizing the strategic necessity for Ukraine to adopt a new approach to counter the Russian military effectively. The document underscores Russia's resilience and adaptability in the face of losses, bolstered by continuous support from its defense industrial base and international allies such as North Korea and Iran. It presents a detailed examination of the dynamics at play, advocating for a strategic pivot that would enable Ukraine, with the support of its international partners, to reclaim air and ground superiority and push back the Russian forces. The analysis delves into the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of the conflict, offering insights into the current state of the Russian military, including its structure, capabilities, and weaknesses, particularly in the context of precision munitions and electronic warfare. It critically assesses the failures of the Russian high command and the implications of these on the battlefield, highlighting the strategic and intelligence missteps that have characterized the Russian approach. A significant focus is placed on the concept of bringing the Russian army to its culminating point by targeting its logistical backbone and exploiting the vulnerabilities within the Russian defense industrial base. The paper argues for a concerted effort to disrupt Russia's supply chains and degrade its operational capabilities, thereby tilting the balance in favor of Ukrainian forces. The document also touches on the broader geopolitical implications of the conflict, including the role of US security assistance to Ukraine within the framework of the lend-lease model and the strategic benefits of degrading Russian military capabilities from a US national security perspective. In conclusion, the analysis calls for a unified international response to bolster Ukraine's military capabilities, emphasizing the urgency of providing Ukraine with the necessary tools to conduct effective offensive operations and disrupt Russian logistical and support networks. It posits that a decisive shift in strategy and increased international support are imperative for Ukraine to gain a strategic advantage and potentially secure a favorable position in any future diplomatic negotiations with Russia. This abstract encapsulates the critical arguments and proposals laid out in the document, highlighting the importance of a strategic shift and international collaboration in altering the course of the conflict in Ukraine's favor.
The culminating point of the Russian army:
The Importance of the shift of strategy in Ukraine
By
Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Director, GDSIWSU
Disclaimer:
This documen t is based on the Open-source observations of the conflict since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine
alongside an active BT, gathered OSINT and expert opinions. The opinions expressed in this paper does not indicate a permanent and fixed
situation. The opinions expressed in this paper does not represent the official views of any United States Government, Entity or Agency
as the content of this document is solely written by the author and the author is not affiliated with any government entity or agency.
Executive Summary
The Conflict in Ukraine has reached a decisive point. Russia, despite its losses, has been adapting to the theater and
has been receiving steady supplies and support from its defense industrial base and supporters such as North Korea
and Iran. This document outlines the core concept of bringing the Russian Army to its culminating point while
emphasizing the importance of supporting Ukraine with adequate and steady backing. Ukraine needs a brand-new
strategy to be able to push the Russian Army back and establish air and ground dominance over Russia. Russia’s war
of aggression against Ukraine has entered a very important phase that can result in the culminating point of either
side if the conditions are met. This paper suggests the strategy that Ukraine needs to follow with the aid of its
international partners in order to achieve this objective.
The Ukrainian high command has an excellent understanding of the Russian army and the way that they have to
contain them. However, their perception needs to be refined to a point that it is no longer just about increasing the
cost of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and stopping the Russian army. Ukraine requires to push the Russian
army back and that would require a shift of targets and strategy as this paper would suggest.
The current pace of the conflict is favorable to the Russian side mainly due to the lack of adequate and steady support
for Ukraine. If Ukraine is adequately supplied in accordance to the theater needs and requirements; Ukraine
will have the chance to target the Russian “logistics” components as well as tier one targets present in its
occupied territories. As stated in this document. The components of the Russian logistics are well dispersed across
the Russian territory; while Russia is capable of producing the ammunition it needs, it still lacks
precision strike capabilities and therefore it is relying on its international partners for the support. This situation
is not permanent. Iran and North Korea are actively supporting the Russian aggression. It is also important to
understand the Russia-Iran Dynamics since before the conflict in order to have a better grasp of the depth of their
cooperations. Ukraine’s international partners must apply a unified pressure on the supporters of the
Russian federation in order to disrupt or stop the flow of the supplies to Russia to fuel the Russian war of
aggression against Ukraine while Ukraine shifting tactics with the aid of its partners.
The threat of the use of strategic weapons are present yet Russia understands the consequences of the use of strategic
options for a possible counter-force or counter-value. While so, I cannot make any statements with any level of
confidence in regards to this specific threat except the indication of the existence of the threat.
Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Director, GDSIWSU
Wednesday, February 7, 2024
Ukraine in the United States National Defense Strategy
The majority of the security assistance to Ukraine is based on a lend-lease contract. The concept of lend-lease goes
as far back as World War II. The concept implies that the United States can lend or lease weapon systems to any
country whose defense is paramount to the United States national security. The majority of the hardware and
munitions sent to Ukraine were produced back in the 1990s. Some of the weapons must be replaced eventually, so
sending them to Ukraine was a two-pronged strategy. One was to enable Ukrainians to fight, and the second was to
get rid of the old munitions and replace them with more up-to-date ones that will also last for many more decades.
Now, nothing that Ukraine gets is absolutely free, and therefore Ukraine has to pay back (of course with interest)
after the war is ended. The payment can be in the form of money or the use of United States contractors and service
providers to rebuild Ukraine over time which will guarantee opportunities for the American contractors of any
caliber.
Supporting Ukraine is important to the United States interests. The degradation of the Russian army has a direct
effect on the United States national security posture. The more the Russians lose in hardware and personnel
(especially senior leadership), the better it is for the United States. They have to put more effort into the war and
deploy additional forces, hardware, and equipment on the battlefield, the chances for them to lose them are high as
Russian high command exercised absolute incompetency since the start of the war, and make no mistake, they have
lost a considerable amount of hardware.
While so, the Russians have to train soldiers without senior and seasoned leadership, which has a direct effect on
the overall readiness of the Russian army. Remember that having an inexperienced foe is a blessing and opportunity
on the battlefield. This also puts extra strain on the defense industrial base of all sides, but the difference is that the
DIB (Defense Industrial Base) of the Russian Federation is going under a far heavier load than the United States and
its Allies. Funds and personnel have to be redirected from active research and developments to cover additional
scheduled working hours; working hours will increase, which will degrade equipment (precision equipment that
needs to be replaced at great costs, and sometimes they have to procure them [or parts of them] from a third-party
country, which can be sanctioned or targeted via supply-chain attacks) and personnel. Research and development
will fall short and behind schedule because they support active war efforts and compensate for the losses of the
Russian army.
Last but not least, Understanding the battle damage is important. It is considered a great success to be able to take
out a single Advanced Air Defense Battery with a cruise missile or artillery rather than an entire squadron of fighter
jets and different types of anti-radiation missiles and munitions. Russia has lost considerable equipment due to the
style of fighting that the Ukrainians have had to adapt to support their efforts. Ukrainians have learned to fight smart
and adopted this quickly and efficiently. Russia still counts on its wide arsenal of SHORAD (Short-Range Air
Defense) and HIMAD (High to medium Air Defense) systems in order to be able to deter the air superiority of the
United States. It is true that until this day, The United States has provided considerable support for Ukraine but the
citizens must understand that this is a long-term investment for the National Security of the United States to keep
the country and troops safe and permits a better shift of focus towards the malign Chinese influence.
Compare the equipment and ammunition given to Ukraine by the United States, to the Russian losses and you will
have a perfectly balanced equation and nothing short of great success and long-term investment in the defense and
security of the nation. Personally, at the end of the day, all that matters to me is the interests of the United States
and its National Security. So, funding the Ukrainian efforts is in the best interest of the United States and its national
security. If you wish to see a proper, updated and well-sourced data sheet about the U.S. Security Aid to Ukraine you
may find the aforementioned resource under the Department of Defense’s Website at Defense.gov.
Understanding the Russian Army (Crash Course)
The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) was designed to support a rapid production for fast-paced combat as the
fast-paced combat is an important part of the Russian war doctrine. The unguided systems were cheap and quick to
produce; they never really fully adopted the need to have precision munitions in large quantities. The composition
of the Russian ground Forces is largely motorized infantry units. They have been designed to quickly traverse the
land and conduct rapid operations. This composition demands protection, so they developed all forms of artillery,
AMDS and light and heavy armor as well as air units to be able to support their troops, they also learned the value
of the air superiority which led them to develop fighter jets for this purpose. To understand this better, let us expand
on this subject a bit, as the majority of the constituents of the Russian armed forces are motorized infantry units;
they do expect to meet with heavy resistance and fortification across a theater. The air support capabilities can only
be combat effective as the defending force loses its air defense support. The ground support elements are tasked with
clearing the way for the motorized units and heavy armor to advance, capture and fortify.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia did inherit the majority of the military hardware. Russia, at the time,
it did not have the financial capacity to maintain existing structures. Russia, while having a well-established heavy
and defense industry, did not have the capacity to manufacture fighter jets that were a technological match with
their Western counterparts. Russia, to be able to deter the air superiority of the U.S. and any other foreign threat,
began the development of anti-air defense systems while slowly recovering and developing its aerial power with a
unique focus towards force multipliers such as the electronic warfare, design enhancements such as speed,
maneuverability, stealth and enhanced sensory systems. The use of the force multipliers is a concept that has been
embedded in the mindset of the Russian high command. It has been incorporated into their weapon system designs
and it is the core concept to establish or achieve superiority while facing a technologically advanced adversary. It is
also notable to mention that AMD capabilities are particularly important to the Russian federation due to the facts
such as the components of the Russian DIB are well spread across Russia and as the Russian forces are stretched
across its different military districts, they would have to be capable of independently support themselves as every
Russian military district has full combat capacity; another aspect of it is that the PVO has to be able to support the
advancement of Russian motorized units as well as the fortification of the ADZ (Air Defense Zones); therefore the
compact mobile systems are of vale to the Russian armed forces.
Motorized infantry units are the largest constituent of its armed forces as the Russian army has been more focused
on ground combat. It has a variety of armored personnel carriers, tanks, and light transport vehicles, along with
artillery, mortar, and mobile SHORAD and HIMAD systems. The PVO (Russian Air Defense Forces) is tasked to
support the troop maneuvers on the ground to enable them to conduct fast-paced combat and quickly transport
their infantry on the ground and protects them from any aerial threats. The Russian army thrives on momentum.
It is designed for rapid deployment and movements on the ground and quick fortification. Unguided Munitions
for the artillery systems and the fixed and rotary wing was the most logical way to do it as they are cheap, far less
complex and quick to manufacture. This does not mean that they never have invested in the guided forms of these
munitions. They were neglected in a sense. Unguided munitions were the most economical and suitable way to
support the large motorized constituents of the Russian armed forces.
The reality hit the Russian Army and its DIB as they began to face the high precision western munitions in Ukraine.
Granted, Russian artillery can fire across a large area with less precision to create a firewall for their troops to
advance behind it while providing fire support when needed but it has never had the accuracy to target with an
acceptable kill ratio to target a single position with high precision. The Russian artillery units could also act as an
area denial system when they are deployed in number. However, when the reality of precision-guided munitions hit
the Russian army during their war of aggression against Ukraine, the Russian high command began to understand
the need to shift towards precision munitions. The term “High Command” refers to the supreme headquarters of a
military force. Albeit The Russian high command is having trouble balancing the production of their current needs
versus the development of the technologies which are required to modernize their entire arsenal. This resulted in a
series of directives, visits and close monitoring of the constituents of the Russian DIB under the direct supervision
of the Russian high command which implies their adaptation to the modern and versatile theaters. The latest
directives of the Russian defense ministry include the focus towards the development of the PGMs (Precision Guided
Munitions) as well as the enhancement of the existing guidance capabilities with a unique approach towards drones
and loitering munitions.
Another subject is the importance of observing the Russian armed forces as they understand and value the use of
suicide drones and ballistic missiles. A tactic that has been used by the Islamic republic of Iran to balance the scales
of its inadequacies not to mention creating a vast arsenal of cheap yet effective offensive capabilities which can inflict
heavy damage and costs to the defender. Russia is aiming towards the incorporation of such capabilities in its
existing architecture.
The Collapse of the Russian Electronic Warfare capacities and the failures of the Russian PVO
Prior to the current war, Russia had a large arsenal of Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. Russia invested heavily
in their offensive and defensive EW capabilities, and, as a result, they became one of the most advanced countries in
the field. However, regardless of any form of advanced engineering, these systems were never combat tested. Those
familiar with the defense industry understand that any new weapon system, along with every single one of its
components, must undergo rigorous testing and pass certain standards multiple times in different conditions to be
considered for mass production and integration into the armed forces. Also, in the early stages of the war, the
Russian army deployed several of their advanced systems, which they ended up losing to the Ukrainian forces as
they failed to protect their assets on the ground due to the incompetency of the Russian high command. Failure to
commit to the battle support requirements did put the Russian troops in the position of absolute disadvantage. Many
would suggest the failure of the incorporation of the force protection into the Russian IAMD (Integrated Air and
Missile Defense), especially the Electronic Warfare Capabilities while I oppose this statement to a degree, I cannot
expand this subject as it is beyond the scope of this document as it would require a careful and detailed analysis on
this subject.
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the current conflict is the use of different variants of unmanned aerial
systems. The Russian Army, despite its advancement to investment ratio in EW, failed to provide support for its
troops against the most basic electronic threats. This mainly intertwines with the inability and incompetency of the
Russian commanders in understanding the force allocation with respect to the theater’s requirements such as
short-range mobile electronic warfare support for their armor and infantry. Mobile systems can be utilized for
quick deployment and formation shifts as theater requirements and threats evolve and emerge. The idea of having
a large number and variants of the mobile SHORAD and HIMAD systems is to be able to cover a large area for
protection, not to mention being able to rapidly deploy them as needed on the battlefield with minimal logistical
support. The other reason is that Russia is a big country with a lot of highs and lows to cover. The military
installations and components of the Russian defensive industrial base are well spread across the Russian
Federation. While HIMAD systems are one of the core components of air defense operations, they rely on
SHORAD systems for their protection against low-altitude threats. Which is why both the SHORAD and the HIMAD
systems formation complete an air defense strategy in an effective ADP (Air Defense plan).
The main and largest component of the Russian Armed Forces is its ground forces (largely motorized). SHORAD
systems are used to cover the maneuvers of the ground forces and protect them against incoming low-flying threats.
SHORAD systems are also used to protect against low- and medium-altitude threats such as cruise missiles and low-
flying air-to-ground airframes. For a country such as Russia, the ballistic and cruise missile threats against their
installations, command and control, and ground troops are the most important threat that they wish to thwart, and
mobile systems are needed for this purpose.
There is a concept used in air defense operations and it is called the concept of parity, which means utilizing
SHORAD systems in tandem to protect the intended sector or designated area while the systems are able to defend
themselves as well. The idea, which may vary based on the threats, is to have one system covers 3060 degrees of
elevation while the other pair protects 6090 degrees of elevation in order to cover low-altitude and high-altitude
threats.
Russian forces have been losing a considerable number of SHORAD systems recently, either by Ukrainian artillery
attacks or by the utilization of HIMARS systems. Russia has failed to employ the concept of parity in the protection
of their FOBs, installations, and troops. Part of this might be due to the shortage of such systems or the lack of
understanding of the Russian high command with respect to the battle threats and support requirements, which we
are going to discuss in the next section.
The Russian high command cannot protect its troops and mobile command Centers in the Ukrainian front against
the incoming threats and especially against advanced systems such as the HIMARS. Some modern Russian air
defense systems have higher survivability compared to the older versions but that is not enough to guarantee battle
survivability especially if the core principles of the operation planning are ignored.
Dissecting the Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric
I wish to discuss the nuclear doctrine of the Russian federation. There are in fact two reasons which have been
specified as the justified reasons for the Russian federation to be able to use the nuclear option. Number one is an
attack on the Russian soil that threatens the existence of Russia (such as a nuclear strike and if at any capacity will
prompt a full nuclear response) and number two any conventional attack using conventional force that threatens the
existence of Russia.
General Principles
I. Using a nuclear weapon system has direct and indirect consequences which are circumstantial. The yield of the weapon
system, the weather conditions, the detonation type (Airburst, Ground Burst) and the very type of the weapon system
itself (salted, regular) contribute to the consequences of such a strike.
II. There are primary and secondary casualties whenever a nuclear weapon is used. The primary casualties are at the
ground zero and the secondary casualties are considered to be as a part of its secondary sided effects and depends on
the yield of the weapon system.
III. In the recent years, the idea of developing and possible use of the low yield nuclear weapon systems has become a part
of the doctrine of some nuclear capable countries such as the United States. The idea is that the use of such weapons
will in fact increases the nuclear threshold of the adversaries and does not force them to commit to a full retaliatory
strike and therefore doesn’t warrant the execution of the MAD (which is open to debate). There are two concepts that
you should understand before we get to Russia, The concept of counter-value and Counter-Force. The first warrants the
use of the nuclear weapons on the enemy civilian population to balance the military loss and the latter warrants the
nuclear attack on the enemy forces to serve the same purpose.
Now, back on the subject of Russia. The Russian federation as of this day does not feel an existential threat and that
is according to Vladimir Putin (October 5, 2023, -In SochiRussia). Now, we would not take Putin’s word at face
value but we will resort to reason to decompress this, unleashing a nuclear strike on the European soil warrants a
response from the NATO (even as a secondary effect). Russia simply does not have the capacity to go to war with the
entire NATO collective (At this time) and if they resort to the use of nuclear weapons, it warrants a response in which
hundreds of thousands will die by the primary strike and millions more will die by the aftermath (Globally) which
many will be Russians. The dynamics of the use of the nuclear weapons on the planet is overrated by the media and
the propaganda. The Russian high command despite being incompetent, understands the very concepts and
consequences of this action. Part of this really depends on the west to ensure it has a battle plan as a deterrent in
order to deter Russia to consider such option.
Understanding the Failure of the Russian High Command
Underestimating the enemy solely based on their failures is a mistake. The Russian high command has been adapting
to the theater’s needs and conditions and getting steady support from its supporters. Meanwhile Ukraine has been
struggling to get the weapons it needed to push the Russian army back.
Strategic Intelligence Failure
The Russian military intelligence as well as the other constituents of its intelligence system have failed to conduct a
correct assessment of their targets and therefore it undermined the validity and reliability of the battle plans. Russia
did not have a correct understanding of the theater and the defender (Ukraine). Russia also severely miscalculated
the world response to its aggression towards Ukraine. The overwhelming support for Ukraine was a shock to the
Russian Federation.
Incompetency of the Russian High Command
Understanding your own forces and capabilities alongside the defender’s, is something that any commander is a
must. The Russian high command thought that they are going to fight a post-Soviet Ukrainian military, their
experience in Crimea back in 2014 when they caught the Ukrainians with surprise the Ukrainian soldiers were not
ready, they had rifles in their positions that were dated back to 1967. Things rapidly changed for Ukraine after that.
The Russian high command got a false sense of confidence. As they started their war of aggression against Ukraine,
that false sense of confidence and the improper battle planning caused them to lose a lot of resources and logistics
which further led to their command disruption. The incompetency of the Russian high command did start a butterfly
effect.
Breakdown of the Russian High Command (Command Disruption)
As the Russian army began to lose their high-ranking senior members of their armed forces in combat; This
destabilized the chain of command for the Russian troops on the ground and sent a signal to the Kremlin for a change
of leadership that happened multiple times. These sudden changes of leadership sent a signal of weakness and
distrust among the Russian army. Instead of doing proper battle damage assessment, the Russian high command
kept going without understanding the long-term consequences of their decisions. This further contributed to the
distrust of the Russian combatants (official and private) which further increased mutiny and desertion and also
became one of the factors for the Prigozhin’s “March of justicetowards Moscow.
Internal Power play of the Russian High Command.
The unity of command is paramount to the success of the mission and the combatants on the battlefield. The conduct
and the success of the combatants on the ground reflect the leadership. Combatants look up to the leadership
regardless of their grith. The Russian high command’s internal power plays disrupted their unity of command and
degraded the morale of the combatants on the ground. The Russian high command’s “stalinian” approach towards
its components, commanders and combatants further contributed to the command disruption.
Misconduct of the Russian Combatants
The command disruption and the incompetency of the Russian high command led to the disarray among the Russian
combatants and their ranks. They were permitted to commit war crimes out of desperation and sometimes to incite
fear. Soon, the Russian high command had trouble keeping their combatants in check. (The political aspects of this
subject have been ignored.)
Lack of Proper Support
The Russian high command’s “Failure to commit to the Theater’s Demand” did cause the Russian combatants to
lack adequate support to achieve their assigned objectives. The lack of CAS (Close Air Support), SHORAD and proper
employment of the electronic defense systems to cover their advances and maneuvers as well as lack of long-range
artillery and finally the lack of equipment supplies due to the loss of logistics was the basic result of the incompetency
of the Russian high command and improper battle planning which led to the inevitable eventuality of the heavy loss
of armor and personnel. Albeit, the Russian high command’s strategy was to just throw as many bodies as it can to
the frontlines without correcting its course of actions as a result of its absolute failure and incompetency.
Failure to Commit to the Theater’s Demands
The Russian high command failed to commit proper resources to the ongoing battles in time which further led to
the loss of the armor and personnel. The Russian high command failed to take the Ukrainian capabilities into account
and failed to commit to create a battle symmetry which further caused the heavy loss of armor and personnel. All
while Ukraine was being properly supplied with the needs to degrade the Russian forces on the ground. They failed
to foresee and update the theater requirements and chose to commit marginally and gradually which further, led to
the loss of the employed hardware.
Failure to Define Exit Strategies
The Russian high command started its war of aggression against Ukraine with the assumption of achieving certain
unconditional victory. The lack of vision and overconfidence of their high command resulted in their lack of planning
for the nightmare scenario and exit strategies. The Russian army has failed to secure their preliminary objectives
and fully secure the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine alongside the Crimean Peninsula. Russia Further failed
to foresee the current outcome in their preliminary assessments and they still fail to understand the gravity of the
situations that they are in. The Russian elastic defense strategy stalled the Ukrainian counteroffensive but it is Russia
that is in a position of disadvantage given the massive losses of the hardware and personnel.
Understanding the Culminating Point of the Russian Army
The essence of any military operation is to bring the opponent to the culminating point. In military terms, the
culminating point refers to a point at which the enemy exhausts all of its resources, capabilities, and the will to fight;
therefore, it is the point at which the opponent can now longer. Effectively conduct its operations. However, bringing
down a modern army to its culminating point would require exploiting its center of gravity which most of the modern
armies have several. Pushing the Russian armed forces to the culminating point would force them back as they can
no longer remain combat effective on the ground as this paper would suggest in the next sections, by eliminating the
Russian “Logistics” and pushing for the control of the key components of the Russian armed forces, such an objective
is achievable. While so, it is also important to take the threat of a possible counter-force and counter-value into
consideration as Russia possesses the strategic strike capability which.
The Russian Defense Industrial Base was built to support fast-paced manufacturing and the adoption of wartime
conditions (at least it was the way it was meant to operate as a whole). The Russian military doctrine regards logistics
as a key component of supporting a fast-paced battlefield. The Russian Armed forces thrive on momentum because
of the way it is structured. The SHORAD and HIMAD systems aside, the Russian armed forces also rely on its air
force (Rotary Wing and fixed wings) for CAS (close air support) to protect its troops against ground threats and to
soften the fortified positions that are designed to slow the advancement of its troops. Russia has also kept an eye on
its air superiority on the battlefield because losing its air superiority would practically make its ground troops sitting
ducks. The Russian air force should never be allowed to establish air superiority of any kind.
The Russian army has been trying to establish their logistics in the occupied territories of Ukraine while attempting
to regain air superiority as there has been an increase in Russian D.E.A.D (destructions of the enemy air defenses)
and S.E.A.D (Suppression of the Enemy Air Defenses) missions. Since April 2023, I have been warning about the
fact that Ukraine needed to strengthen its air defense capabilities, and it has done so, to a level, thanks to global
efforts to fight the Russian aggression. Thankfully, warnings were heeded and the Russian air force could not
establish air superiority thus far. However, the Russian logistics must be targeted in order to bring the Russian army
near the culmination point. Any target that is part of Russian logistics must be targeted to ensure that the Russian
army cannot pursue its offensive goals and slowly breaks apart on the frontlines. This will force them back to a full
defensive posture with a broken COC (Chain of Command).
While I talk about the “Logistics.” It does not mean supply lines at all. The logistics in the Russian war doctrine are
the components that enables Russia to conduct its military operations and supports a fast-paced military operation.
The Russian military doctrine has a very specific definition for the term “Logistics”; Ukraine must attack the
components of the Russian DIB (defense industrial base) and the heavy industries which are enabling their products
and subsequently the established logistic within the occupied territories of Ukraine which are facilitating the quick
upgrades, repair and redeployment of the equipment of the Russian armed forces. Eliminating the Russian airborne
and sea-based force projection capabilities are equally important in order to disrupt the Russian “logistics” and
therefore taking away the momentum from the Russian army. These efforts alongside keeping the components of
the VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) grounded will take away readiness, protection and the momentum force the
Russian army components on the ground and therefore give Ukraine the chance to strike those components and
push them back.
This is also notable to understand that this has shifted to a broader concept. The supports of the Russian war of
aggression against Ukraine are now a part of the Russian logistics. While a kinetic method does not seem to be an
option against the North Korea and Iran, it is required for the international community to maintain a high pressure
on the supporters of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
It is also important to acknowledge that the Russian DIB is catching up with the theater with the aid of its partners.
Targeting the Russian DIB alone is not enough to break Russian logistics. The Russian army has multiple centers of
gravity, which must be targeted accordingly and with precision. The momentum is no longer just on the frontlines.
The Approach Towards Bringing the Russian Army to Its Culminating Point
While this has become conditional at the time, still giving the Russian Army the chance to gain the momentum is a
mistake. The Russian army has begun establishing their logistics within the occupied territories of Ukraine to regain
the ability to conduct operations and began bringing in more advanced artillery and weapon systems, loitering
munitions and also adopted the use of small drones and short-range multipurpose missiles. This is all indicative of
Russia trying to lay the foundation for a slow-layered offensive against Ukraine therefore giving them any chance to
gain the momentum puts Ukraine in a position of disadvantage.
Ukraine is very much dependent on the international support and supplies and Russia has been banking on its
disruption. We have seen the directives given to the collective of the Russian intelligence in order to use all its
available tools to push for the disruption of the support for Ukraine which involves psychological operations
targeting the general population of the western counties in order to change their perception of the war and the
support for Ukraine This campaign includes supporting the elections, politicians and public figures which have an
agenda towards pushing for peace in Ukraine. While this is not something new, such tactics have always been a part
of the Russian war doctrine and it must be paid attention to.
War efforts require steady supplies, resources, and a wide range of other factors and logistics. While fighting a large
army with a well-established logistics; The first rational thing is to go after their supply lines to weaken their efforts
to support their troops and their war efforts. The worst thing that you can endure during wartime (or peacetime) is
absolute dependency. That would be something that you have no control over, and it will affect everything from
mission planning to offensive and defensive efforts to even the way you have to support your troops’ basic needs.
From the strategic perspective, Russia never needed the support for Ukraine to fully stop. The disruption of support
and supplies that Ukraine had endured despite the efforts of the United States and several European countries was
enough for Ukraine to lose the momentum of its counteroffensive. This was precisely what the Russian high
command was talking about. The support for Ukraine will not stop; however, this does not mean it was never
disrupted. I cannot emphasize the importance of understanding how difficult it is for the Ukrainian armed forces to
be forced to constantly shift their tactics and strategies to be able to support their efforts while having to constantly
try to gather the required support for their defensive and offensive operational planning. Any disruption of the
supplies to Ukraine will affect the Ukraine economy of force and battle planning as resources and assets must be
managed accordingly and it will give the Russian Army the momentum that they do not deserve.
Ukraine was never given the full support that it needed to have a full offensive capability. It is still struggling to
procure the offensive equipment that it needs. The one-foot-in and one-foot-out strategy of the key members of the
EU put Ukraine in a position of disadvantage. It will only hurt the Ukrainian war efforts, and it will give the Russian
army the chance to seize the momentum while prolonging the conflict and risk a full escalation and possible strategic
complications.
The EU members such as France and Sweden could have provided Ukraine with European-made fighter jets
(RAFAEL and JAS 39) and Germany could have provided long-range missiles (TARUS) to give Ukraine a decent
offensive capability. I accept that certain conditions for the use of such weapons must have been accepted by
Ukraine; however, by not providing Ukraine with the ability to mount a full offensive, you are only giving them
enough to survive and not to make a tangible difference in pushing towards victory.
While the Russian army is getting a steady supply from their supporters and adapting to the theater’s needs. The
procurement of the SLBMs from North Korea (and Iran, soon to be) is a testament to this. The only thing that is
stopping Iran from providing Russia with ballistic missile capabilities is the fear of firm international response.
Ukraine must be given offensive capabilities to strike the Russian logistics, while international pressure should be
present against the Russian supporters to prevent them from arming Russia and supplying the Russian war of
aggression against Ukraine. Russia must not be allowed to establish a battle symmetry and push towards creating
an asymmetric theater in its favor. The Russian army should be hit fast and hard.
Albeit, The Russian supporters such as North Korea and Iran will keep supplying Russian war of aggression against
Ukraine and the only way is to ensure a full disruption of the Russian logistics while increasing the cost of the Russian
aggression in Ukraine. The Ukrainian high command understands its enemy and the way it needs to handle them
but it cannot do it if there are constant disruptions and inadequate support. Inadequate support for Ukraine will
only result in maintaining the status quo and will only help the Russian army to acquire more advanced weapons
from their supporters (such as Ballistic Missiles) and increase the mixture of their assets and begin targeting the
Ukrainian positions and gain the momentum.
The Russian high command has also learned the value of drones and ballistic missiles of different calibers and it will
integrate them into its war doctrine in the long run. This is something that the NATO should be concerned about as
Utilizing them would give the future Russian army the perfect mixture to conduct rapid ground operations, this,
however, will take some time for Russia to adopt but the potential danger can be seen as Russia has begun deploying
short-range ballistic missiles in combat against Ukraine. It is my suggestion that NATO member states should invest
in direct energy weapon systems (such as LASER and microwave powered systems) and enhance their current air
defense posture in order to be able to counter the future use of such systems from Russia.
The components of the Russian VKS (Aerospace Forces) are still combat effective and therefore they must be
targeted alongside the Russian naval capacities. We will expand on this subject in the following section.
The Russian PVO (Air Defense Units) Formation
The inner layer ADF (Air Defense Formation) of the Russian PVO is still capable of repelling the attacks. This layer
protects critical infrastructure, administrative and command centers deep inside the occupied territories of Ukraine.
It is still combat effective and has been able to maintain parity unlike the majority of the PVO units that we have
seen in the frontlines being targeted by long-range artillery, missiles and even drones.
The Russian high command intends to create a tighter Air Defense Zone in order to protect their established logistics
infrastructure in the occupied territories of Ukraine. As a note on the subject of the Russian logistics, I must add that
this will give the Russian army the ability to repair, upgrade and redeploy their recovered and damaged armor
instead of having to transfer them back to Russia. They have limited capacity, but they are effective. They have been
mainly used to upgrade anti drone technology alongside quick repairs thus far.
The Russian AADP (Area Air Defense Plan) has been ineffective in the Frontlines as we have discussed before. They
have failed to incorporate their own concepts in order to protect their troop maneuvers and the units themselves.
The long-range HIMARS has been very combat effective against the Russian Mobile air defense units due to their
lack of parity and inability to detect the incoming threats and respond in time. They failed to establish a multiplayer
air defense formation in an offensive manner. The understanding of the battle commitment and requirements is
something that the Russian high command has been struggling since the start of its war of aggression. Their lack of
understanding of the threats, concepts and failure to commit to the theater needs resulted in heavy loss of air defense
systems. While so, their multilayered AADP is still effective as you go deeper towards the east and penetrating the
Russian airspace. But they are still vulnerable to drone and loitering munitions (situational). This can be exploited
to take out as many units as possible and poke a hole into the PVO’s formation.
The Russian PVO is still a critical part of the Russian armed forces and is active in the occupied territories of Ukraine
enabling the Russian army to establish their logistics and command centers with impunity. The PVO units are
extremely important to the Russian armed forces as they have the necessary mixture, speed and capabilities to
support their movements and maneuvers not just to support the ground units. They can create a safe zone for the
Russian VVS (Russian Air Force) should the components of the Russian army push towards a massive aerial
campaign in order to establish full air superiority. Targeting them should be a top priority while keeping the VVS
grounded. The Russian AMD is still combat effective and must be paid attention to.
Long-range weapon systems, ARMs and drones can aid Ukraine in dealing with the Russian PVO much more
efficiently.
The importance of Keeping the VVS grounded
While the Ukrainian Air Defense came to be very effective against the Russian aerial campaigns, it still lacks the
capacity to fully deter the Russian aerospace forces. The Russian army should not be able to establish any form of
CAS (close air support) or CAP (Close Air Protection) or performing sorties with impunity. The VVS should be
grounded, and it should not be permitted to conduct any of its missions over the Ukrainian Air space. The Ukrainian
AADP (Area Air Defense Plan) should not suffer due to lack of ammunition in fact Ukraine should be able to expand
its ADAP (Air Defense Area of Protection) with a proper mixture of systems in order to stop the components of the
Russian VKS from conducting aerial operations. Every time Ukrainian Air Defense systems are targeted by a massive
drone and missile barrage of the Russian forces; the VKS (Russian Aerospace forces) immediately start to perform
sorties in an attempt to gain advantage.
The Russian attacked Ukraine with a mixture of drones, cruise and hypersonic missiles. Aside from an attempt to
overwhelm the Ukrainian Air Defense Capabilities, they gain information such as depth, mixture, composition and
readiness of Ukraine and their AADP. Of course, a decent and active AADP is fluid and shifting as the threats evolve
to ensure maximum coverage and readiness. This is precisely the reason that Ukrainian Air Defense Systems should
not face any ammunition shortage and must have the correct mixture to ensure it can defend against high and low
speed/altitude threats with the correct parity. If the VVS were able to establish full CAS support for their troops, it
will give them the momentum that they need to move quickly on the ground and launch a counteroffensive (Slow-
Layered or Rapid) they possess the composition to do both as they have steady support from their supporters and as
the composition of their troops enables them to do so.
Russia has access to thousands of cheap drones supplied by the Islamic republic and it is getting SRBMs from North
Korea as well as receiving loitering munitions and small drones from its own DIB. These compositions are
dangerous, they can be used to develop a new battle plan against Ukraine, one can utilize Air defense suppression
followed by a rapid D.E.A.D operation and a quick attempt to establish air superiority. The key is to stop it is to keep
the Russian air force grounded at all times and is only achievable if Ukraine is supplied properly. Russia should not
be given the freedom to expand its capabilities. I have said it many times that the Russian army is built on
momentum, small chances for them can have big consequences for the defender.
Ukraine should redefine its AADP and must have enough support and supplies to incorporate it with a proper
mixture of systems in order to ground or punish the Russian air force while hitting the Russian positions with long-
range artillery leaving their infantry and armor isolated and without support or the ability to move on the battlefield.
The role of the Russian Naval Forces in establishing the air superiority over Ukraine
Russia has been conducting active patrol and routine sorties over the Black Sea to protect its naval assets from the
incoming attacks. The Russian ВМФ (Read VMFShort for Navy) has a number of active assets in the black sea.
They are kept combat ready. These ships previously have been used to launch missile attacks against Ukraine.
The combination of the use of the Russian naval assets and air and missile forces can launch a massive aerial
campaign against Ukraine and its infrastructure. Russia has not been able to establish air superiority yet largely due
to the fact that Ukrainian AADP is actively shifting to maintain coverage and it has had a decent mixture and has
been combated effective. Still, as we have seen Several times so far, every time the Russian army have expanded the
strength of their attacks. Russia has not expressed air superiority yet as the conditions for it has not been ideal at all.
With every aerial campaign, the Russian high command gains information about the depth, mixture and
composition of the Ukrainian AADP. keeping Ukrainian AMD well supplied is a two-pronged strategy, it will enable
Ukraine to repel the Russian attacks while maintaining an active and effective AADP to support its troop maneuvers
and to keep the Russian VVS (AF) Grounded and stopping Russia from establishing any form of air superiority over
Ukraine. The Russian navy can launch a barrage of missiles in an effort to degrade the Ukrainian HIMAD capabilities
and use the vast arsenal of drones and ballistic missiles provided to it by its supporters to target strategic sites and
the SHORAD systems in Ukraine in an effort to pave a way for a massive air superiority campaign. The Russian naval
units in the black sea must be targeted to ensure Russia cannot put all the piece for this specific strategy in place.
This emphasizes the importance of continuous and adequate support for Ukraine. This includes keeping the
Ukrainian AMD supplied in order for Ukraine to be able to maintain and extend its AADP and providing long-range
weapon systems to Ukraine to be able to target the components of the Russian logistics and their logistics within its
occupied territories alongside fighter jets so that Ukraine can be able to establish air superiority with the protection
of its HIMAD coverage. Let us also not forget the Ukrainian ground forces would require light and heavy armor
together with long-range precision artillery to conduct rapid operations. It is paramount for Ukraine to understand
the Russian strategy and preparations.
Conclusion
While the Russian army has multiple centers of gravity; It is important to choose the right pressure point in order to force it to
the culminating point in this theater. A unified approach towards the disruption of the Russian logistics is required from the
international community to force the supporters of the Russian federation to halt their current efforts while providing adequate
and steady support for Ukraine with the weapons it needs to conduct operation deep in the occupied territories of Ukraine and
enabling Ukraine to be able to target the Russian logistics components as needed. Providing air defense and aerial capabilities
such as fighter jets would give Ukraine the chance to establish its offensive air capabilities as well as to support its ground
operations in order to push the Russians back. In the event that Ukraine chooses to sit behind a negotiation table with Russia,
Ukraine must have the upper hand in order to give a minimum number of concessions to the Russian federation. It is also
important to understand that the world is a dynamic place and the past failures of the Russian federation does not warrant their
future failures as Russia is adapting to the theater, it is important to seize the momentum and do not permit Russia to gain any
advantage on the battlefield. If the EU does not wish to end up with a frozen conflict in Ukraine, it requires to commit to the
theaters actual needs and demands and give Ukraine the opportunity to push the Russians back.
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