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“Sticking together
while standing one’s
own ground”: The
meanings of solidarity
in humanitarian action
Marnie Lloydd*
Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of New Zealand Centre
for Public Law, Te Herenga Waka –Victoria University
of Wellington, New Zealand
Email: marnie.lloydd@vuw.ac.nz
Abstract
The notion of solidarity, although not new to the humanitarian sector, has re-emerged
in recent discussions about effective and ethical humanitarian action, particularly
in contexts such as Ukraine and Myanmar where the traditional humanitarian
principles have been facing certain pressures. Because solidarity appears as a good
but can also involve selectivity and privilege, and because it risks continued
militarism and normalization of civilians participating within that militarism, the
notion of solidarity merits rich and rigorous thinking. This article explores how the
notion of solidarity is being utilized by those currently re-emphasizing its importance
©The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of ICRC. This is an Open
Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-
commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
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obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work. 1
* The author wishes to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of this article. She also wishes to thank
Christine Schwöbel-Patel, Serena Natile and participants of the University of Warwick’s Rosa Luxemburg
and International Law project for their engagement with an initial stage of her research which has enriched
this article.
The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of
any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.
International Review of the Red Cross, Page 1 of 32.
doi:10.1017/S1816383124000109
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383124000109 Published online by Cambridge University Press
and what it might mean in practice in today’s humanitarian contexts. The article
argues that if solidary action involves not only a political stance but solidary working
methods, the recent calls for solidarity demand respect for the variety of principles
and practices within the humanitarian ecosystem, while nevertheless upholding
mutual obligations owed within that professional community –that is, within careful
limits as to what is considered humanitarian action.
Keywords: humanitarian action, humanitarian principles, solidarity, political humanitarianism,
impartiality, neutrality, localization, resilience, anti-bureaucratization, militarism, humanitarian
ecosystem, grassroots humanitarianism, resistance humanitarianism, civilians, armed conflict.
Introduction
The notion of solidarity has re-emerged in recent discussions about effective
and ethical humanitarian action,
1
reflecting oft-made critiques that the principle
of neutrality ignores moral rights and wrongs and leaves the root causes of
humanitarian needs unaddressed.
2
As Hugo Slim explains in relation to the
armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the work of certain organizations
will be characterized by solidarity anyway in certain circumstances.
3
Similar calls
for solidarity to replace neutrality as a guiding principle for humanitarian action
have been expressed regarding the situation in Myanmar because of the moral
and practical challenges for international humanitarian organizations working in
traditional ways through the military junta.
4
The notion of solidarity is not new to the humanitarian sector;
5
indeed, many humanitarians would presumably consider it inherent within
1 See details in the below section on “The Recent Re-emphasis on Solidarity”.
2 See, for example, the discussion in Kurt Mills, “Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International
Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict”,Global Governance, Vol. 11, No.
2, 2005; Peter Redfield, “The Impossible Problem of Neutrality”, in Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield
(eds), Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics, SAR Press, Santa Fe, NM,
2011; Barbara Anne Rieffer-Flanagan, “Is Neutral Humanitarianism Dead? Red Cross Neutrality:
Walking the Tightrope of Neutral Humanitarianism”,Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2009;
Carsten Wieland, Syria and the Neutrality Trap: The Dilemmas of Delivering Humanitarian Aid
through Violent Regimes, Bloomsbury, New York, 2021.
3 Hugo Slim, “Solidarity, Not Neutrality, Will Characterize Western Aid to Ukraine”,Ethics and
International Affairs, 3 October 2022, available at: www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/online-
exclusives/solidarity-not-neutrality-will-characterize-western-aid-to-ukraine (all internet references were
accessed in February 2024).
4 Anne Décobert, “Myanmar’s Human Rights Crisis Justifies Foregoing Neutrality for a Solidarity-Based
Approach to Humanitarianism”,Melbourne Asia Review, 4 August 2021, available at: https://
melbourneasiareview.edu.au/myanmars-human-rights-crisis-justifies-foregoing-neutrality-for-a-solidarity-
based-approach-to-humanitarianism/; Adelina Kamal, Beyond the “Egosystem”: A Case for Locally Led
Humanitarian Resistance, The Humanitarian Leader Working Paper No. 041, Centre for Humanitarian
Leadership, Deakin University, Burwood, November 2023.
5 See e.g. Hugo Slim, “Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality,
Impartiality and Solidarity”,Development in Practice, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1997; Richard Ashby Wilson and
Richard D. Brown, “Introduction”, in Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown (eds),
Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy, Cambridge University Press,
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humanitarianism’s foremost principle of humanity. Yet, it actually holds multiple
meanings which are sometimes conflated. In everyday use, the term stands in for
a range of ideas, including friendship, compassion, and joining civil protests or
otherwise showing support for selected causes. When it comes to the specifics of
a humanitarian organization’s operational principles and approach, what does the
shift towards solidarity in these recent calls mean? Does it suggest (merely)
sympathy with those affected by armed conflict or injustice as fellow humans, unity
through shared hardship, or something that involves taking sides –political solidarity
with a cause, or even with a party to a conflict? Are neutrality and solidarity in
absolute tension, or can some common ground be found, with neutrality not being
“the opposite of solidarity, but a way to render this noble sentiment actionable”?
6
Does solidarity nevertheless require impartiality, or can action be partial, even
revolutionary, and still be humanitarian? Conversely, can humanitarian aid –even if
neutral –be an important part of solidary resistance against violence and
discrimination? If the recent calls in favour of solidarity indicate its importance to
humanitarian action, what are its ethics and methods today? What resources does it
need? Perhaps most importantly given the ongoing push for increased localization of
aid, can solidarist and more traditional humanitarian organizations partner and
support one another in their humanitarian responses or are their approaches
incompatible, with solidarist approaches also standing as an alternative to the large
bureaucracies of the international humanitarian system?
Solidarity is a concept receiving rich scholarly attention in many subject
areas and disciplines, and given specialized meanings in some.
7
There is thus a
vast literature reaching beyond the scope of this article. This article considers
solidarity only regarding humanitarian action, particularly in situations of armed
conflict.
8
Even within that narrower confine, this article cannot attempt to answer
Cambridge, 2009, p. 2; David Chandler, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights
NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda”,Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001, p. 683;
African Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multimandate Relief Operations
in Political Emergencies, discussion paper, London, 1994. See also the discussion about humanitarian
typologies below.
6 Fiona Terry, “Taking Action, Not Sides: The Benefits of Humanitarian Neutrality in War”,Humanitarian
Law and Policy Blog, 21 June 2022, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2022/06/21/taking-
action-not-sides-humanitarian-neutrality/.
7 See e.g. Theodoros Rakopoulos, “Solidarity: The Egalitarian Tensions of a Bridge-Concept”,Social
Anthropology, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2016; Karel Wellens, “Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-)Emerging
Constitutional Principle: Some Further Reflections”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (eds),
Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law, Springer, Heidelberg, 2010; Eva Kassoti and
Narin Idriz (eds), The Principle of Solidarity: International and EU Law Perspectives, Asser Press, The
Hague, 2023; Kurt Bayertz (ed.), Solidarity, Springer, Dordrecht, 1999; Avery Kolers, A Moral Theory
of Solidarity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. Amongst other specialist meanings, the term
“solidarity”has a specific history related to the European Union, to trade unions and to socialist
thinking more generally regarding international solidarity of the proletariat, including against
militarism: see e.g. Sally J. Scholz, Political Solidarity, Penn State University Press, University Park, PA,
2008, pp. 8–9; Rosa Luxemburg, “War and the Working Class”, January 1916, available at: https://ghdi.
ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=952.
8 Within the humanitarian sector, solidarity is also relevant to disaster relief and, more broadly, is an
important concept regarding the protection offered to refugees. However, this article focuses primarily
on humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict.
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“Sticking together while standing one’s own ground”: The meanings of solidarity in
humanitarian action
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all the above questions. Rather, it seeks to provide useful background to ongoing
critical reflection about humanitarian principles by exploring how the notion of
solidarity is being utilized by those currently re-emphasizing its importance. It
considers if and how this differs from earlier understandings of solidarity in
humanitarian action, and what its framing suggests about the application of the
humanitarian principles in today’s humanitarian contexts.
The first section steps back to outline the three primary meanings of
solidarity most relevant to humanitarian action –the particular example of
“fraternal”solidarity within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (the Movement), and then the more commonly cited human or
universal solidarity on the one hand, and political solidarity on the other. The
second section describes selected recent calls for increased solidarity in
humanitarian action. The third section further unpacks these calls, pulling out
certain “threads”to help examine how they are framed and their relationship
with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and
independence. This helps to situate the calls within ongoing debates around
“traditional”and solidary humanitarianism, localization and resilience, anti-
bureaucratization, and key critiques of solidarity. The final section tries to tie
these threads together by suggesting what the recent calls for solidarity might
offer, but also discussing their limits.
Solidarity sounds like an intrinsic good –it can generate valuable shared
community and provides a compelling ethical driver for actions of care,
compassion and seeking necessary change. However, experience reveals that
greater solidarity has been shown towards some groups than others, based, for
example, on social linkages and race. This article therefore also discusses
important critiques which argue that solidarity can risk being selective,
discriminatory, privileged and polarizing. While often put into action in support
of the oppressed, solidarity can sometimes support already privileged voices and
silence others, and can align with political interests or exceptionalist legal
arguments even if described in the language of universal concerns such as human
rights. Where identities are mobilized during armed conflict, solidarity can risk
supporting continued militarism and normalization of civilians participating
within that militarism. Solidarity therefore always depends on other contexts, and
this article tries to show how the language of solidarity requires careful reflection.
This is especially so if the scope and meaning of solidarity remains insufficiently
defined by those calling for greater solidarity as a mode of operational
humanitarian action.
This general note of caution notwithstanding, this article suggests that
taking seriously the recent calls for solidarity demands greater inclusion of –and
in turn greater transparency and grounded familiarity with –the variation of
principles and practices within the sector, while still upholding mutual obligations
owed within that professional community. Standing in solidarity in humanitarian
action does not equate to doing away with the traditional humanitarian
principles; rather, it entails respecting differences in approach within careful
limits as to what is considered humanitarian action.
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In this sense, this article takes the idea from Darryl Li that if the term
“solidarity”comes etymologically from Latin roots meaning “solid”(solidum) but
also “soil”(solum), “we can think of solidarity as a way of sticking together while
standing one’s own ground”.
9
The multiple meanings of solidarity in humanitarian action
The scholarship of philosopher Sally J. Scholz describes solidarity at its most general
level as involving some form of unity between people and some form of positive
moral duties.
10
Scholz then differentiates between two key forms of solidarity:
social and political.
11
Social solidarity involves a community bond based on
shared experiences or characteristics such as between a targeted minority ethnic
group, persons with disabilities, women and so forth. In contrast, Scholz’s
political solidarity involves coming together for a common purpose –a choice to
support the oppressed in opposition to injustice. In that choice, individuals
commit to certain positive duties in response to a perceived injustice faced by the
identified group. There is some collective responsibility because of the social
movement created, which gives political solidarity important distinctions from
other forms of solidarity such as social solidarity.
12
Still, social solidarity can be
active and “political”, and there can be overlap amongst the members of
the social and political solidarity groups.
13
Scott-Smith describes these differences
as exclusive solidarity (within an oppressed group) and inclusive solidarity (where
the privileged stand in solidarity with the oppressed).
14
Scholz’s work goes on to
enquire into what authentic participation in solidarity looks like.
15
Humanitarian action can feature aspects of both social and political
solidarity, and the question of the possibilities and possible limits of authentic
participation in collective obligations is also key, as this article discusses.
Despite its underlying centrality to humanitarian action, the term
“solidarity”tends not to be included in humanitarian glossaries and
encyclopaedias, except the most recent.
16
Within international humanitarian law
9 Darryl Li, “The Universal Enemy: A Reply”,The Immanent Frame, 8 July 2020, available at: https://tif.ssrc.
org/2020/07/08/the-universal-enemy-a-reply/.
10 S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 5.
11 Ibid., pp. 5, 11. A third variant, civic solidarity, relates to duties between a civic group such as taxpayers
within a welfare State and is not discussed further here.
12 Ibid., pp. 5–6, 10, 12–13; Sally J. Scholz, “Seeking Solidarity”,Philosophy Compass, Vol. 10, No. 10, 2015,
pp. 728–729; Sally J. Scholz, “Political Solidarity and Violent Resistance”,Journal of Social Philosophy,
Vol. 38, No. 1, 2007, p. 39.
13 S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 14.
14 Tom Scott-Smith, “Humanitarian Dilemmas in a Mobile World”,Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2,
2016, p. 19 fn. 54.
15 S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 6.
16 For example, while works cannot necessarily cover everything, solidarity does not appear in “ReliefWeb
Glossary of Humanitarian Terms”,ReliefWeb, 2008, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/
reliefweb-glossary-humanitarian-terms-enko; Tim Allen, Anna McDonald and Henry Radice (eds),
Humanitarianism: A Dictionary of Concepts, Routledge, London and New York, 2018; or Pietro Verri,
Dictionary of the International Law of Armed Conflict, ICRC, Geneva, 1992. There is, however, an
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“Sticking together while standing one’s own ground”: The meanings of solidarity in
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(IHL), the term is not used explicitly in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols, nor does it appear in Henry Dunant’sA Memory of
Solferino, although a solidary spirit is argued to be presented within that book’s
ideas.
17
In that sense, States’participation in the development of IHL has been
described as an example of solidarity.
18
Finally, solidarity is not generally a listed
principle of most actors and instruments of the humanitarian sector, which have
tended to focus on the traditional humanitarian principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence.
19
Despite the lack of formal definition and rare explicit use, as mentioned
above, solidarity is not a new notion in humanitarianism. Indeed, it is often
considered central, despite holding multiple meanings. Solidarity can refer to
sentiments and actions at multiple levels, both governmental and non-
governmental: global, regional, national, local and individual.
20
On the
international level, solidarity is commonly understood to refer to support and
cooperation among States, as well as expressions of empathy between
populations/civil society, via a cosmopolitan commitment to moral principles that
are considered universal, such as human rights. For instance, the United Nations
(UN) Secretary-General’s report Our Common Agenda talks of the need to “re-
embrace global solidarity and find new ways to work together for the common
good”,
21
and many countries have taken an overt position of solidarity with
Ukraine in the armed conflict with Russia, which also impacts on donorship
policies and narratives.
22
entry on solidarity in the more recent Antonio De Lauri (ed.), Humanitarianism: Keywords, Brill, Leiden
and Boston, MA, 2020. Also, the Geneva Centre of Humanitarian Studies’Humanitarian Encyclopedia,a
collaborative online project, has an entry on solidarity in progress; see Geneva Centre of Humanitarian
Studies, “Solidarity”,inHumanitarian Encyclopedia, available at: https://humanitarianencyclopedia.org/
concept/solidarity.
17 Henrik Beer, “Red Cross Solidarity”,International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 12, No. 130, 1972, p. 4;
Henry Dunant, Fraternité et charité internationales en temps de Guerre, Paris, 1866; Jean Pictet, Red Cross
Principles, ICRC, Geneva, 1956, p. 141 fn. 1.
18 See Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 3240.
19 See the article by Marina Sharpe in this issue of the Review: Marina Sharpe, “It’s All Relative: The Origins,
Legal Character and Normative Content of the Humanitarian Principles”,International Review of the Red
Cross, Vol. 106, No. 925, 2024, Annex 1. See also Miriam Bradley, The Politics and Everyday Practice of
International Humanitarianism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023, p. 241. Over 500 organizations
have adopted the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief, which includes the principles of humanity,
impartiality and independence. See generally, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Fundamental Principles of
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Ethics and Tools for Humanitarian Action,
Geneva, 2015, p. 7; IFRC, “Signatories of the Code of Conduct”, available at: www.ifrc.org/code-
conduct-signatories.
20 Geneva Centre of Humanitarian Studies, above note 16.
21 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General, United
Nations, New York, 2021, p. 3.
22 Zainab Moallin, Karen Hargrave and Patrick Saez, Navigating Narratives in Ukraine: Humanitarian
Response Amid Solidarity and Resistance, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas
Development Institute, London, September 2023.
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More specifically regarding operational humanitarian action, three broad
understandings of solidarity appear, partly reflecting Scholz’s distinctions: a
specific meaning of “fraternal”solidarity expressed within the Movement, and
then the more commonly cited human or universal solidarity on the one hand,
and political solidarity on the other. The remainder of this section sets out these
understandings in order to provide background to the recent calls for increased
solidarity, which are then described in the following section.
Fraternity within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement
Solidarity was included as one of four working principles by Red Cross co-founder
Gustave Moynier in 1875, alongside foresight, centrality and mutuality.
23
Solidarity
referred to the mutual ties and support –fraternity –between the various National
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies).
24
The term “fellowship”
was sometimes used in place of “solidarity”.
25
Operationally, while a National
Society primarily works within its own country, when the scale of conflict or
disaster surpasses its capacities, other National Societies, and likewise the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), may be able to support or
partner with it.
26
This unique structure allows the component parts to work both
nationally and internationally.
27
In this regard, Jean Pictet described this kind of
professional solidarity as an “organic”aspect of the Red Cross’s Fundamental
Principles –that is, functioning as a means of their execution.
28
The term “solidarity”was dropped from the Fundamental Principles that were
subsequently adopted by the Movement. However, this fraternity understanding
of solidarity continues to be embodied in the Movement’s principle of universality
29
and thus continues to appear in discussions of how National Societies should work
as “sister societies”within the larger “family”of the Movement.
30
23 Gustave Moynier, Ce que c’est que la Croix-Rouge, Geneva, 1874, p. 6. As well as solidarity as explained in
the text, the National Societies were to observe “foresight, which means that preparations should be made
in advance, in peacetime, to provide assistance should war break out; …centralization, which implies that
there is only one Society in each country, but whose activities extend throughout the entire national
territory; and mutuality, in the sense that care is given to all wounded and sick people irrespective of
their nationality”. Quoted in IFRC and ICRC, above note 19, p. 12.
24 See, generally, H. Beer, above note 17; Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: A
Commentary, IFRC, Geneva, 1979, pp. 90–92; J. Pictet, above note 17, pp. 140, 153.
25 Compare Jean G. Lossier, Fellowship: The Moral Significance of the Red Cross, La Baconnière, Geneva,
1948; and Jean G. Lossier, Solidarité: Signification morale de la Croix-Rouge, Editions de la Baconnière,
Neuchatel, 1947.
26 J. Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, above note 24, p. 91.
27 H. Beer, above note 17, p. 15.
28 J. Pictet, above note 17, pp. 3, 93, 153–154. See also discussion in H. Beer, above note 17, p. 12 fn. 8.
29 Universality is understood to mean that the “International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in
which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other,
is worldwide”: IFRC and ICRC, above note 19, pp. 10, 12, 80–82.
30 See J. Pictet, above note 17, p. 142, regarding sharing in the fellowship which unites the members of the
Movement as a condition for recognition of National Societies; Katrien Beeckman, “From Fundamental
Principles to Individual Action: Making the Principles Come Alive to Promote a Culture of Non-Violence
and Peace”,International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2016, pp. 273 (Table 1), 276.
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“Sticking together while standing one’s own ground”: The meanings of solidarity in
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While this meaning of solidarity is particular to the Movement and its
structures and histories, it retains potential broader relevance to a possible
solidarity within the humanitarian sector and will be returned to towards the end
of the article.
A universal sense of solidarity with those affected by conflict and
disaster
A second and more common understanding of solidarity in humanitarian action is a
compassion for all people suffering during armed conflict or other emergencies. This
understanding represents a sense of shared interest and duty among the large moral
community of the human race
31
and has also been referred to as “universal
solidarity”.
32
In this light, universal human solidarity can be understood as a type
of exclusive social solidarity as per Scholz’s schema (albeit a very broad one)
since it perceives a connection uniting human beings by the very characteristic of
being human.
33
While the word “solidarity”is often used in statements expressing
sympathy for people suffering conflict,
34
concern for fellow humans represents a
fundamental moral concern and driver of the humanitarian impulse and thus is
generally understood as requiring action. Solidarity has therefore been described
as something more than (mere) feelings of sociality, sympathy or shared
humanity, and involving active support for those in need.
35
That is to say,
humans, touched by the suffering of other humans, might feel a moral impulse to
“do something”to ease that suffering. Scott-Smith sets out a useful selection of
quotes from humanitarian actors and scholars describing humanitarian relief as a
demonstration of human solidarity.
36
31 Kurt Bayertz, “Four Uses of ‘Solidarity’”, in K. Bayertz (ed.), above note 7, p. 5.
32 Ken Reshaur, “Concepts of Solidarity in the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt”,Canadian Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1992, cited in T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, p. 16.
33 S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 15.
34 For example, the Institute of International Law’s November 2023 declaration concerning the Israel–
Hamas conflict expresses the Institute’s“solidarity and compassion with all the victims and their
bereaved families”. Institute of International Law, “Declaration of the Institute of International Law on
the Present Situation in the Middle East”, 19 November 2023, available at: www.idi-iil.org/en/
declaration-de-linstitut-de-droit-international-sur-la-situation-presente-au-moyen-orient/.
35 Roger Mac Ginty, Everyday Peace, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, pp. 67, 136 (and see p. 70
regarding the various depths of solidarity); S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 2. See also Matthew Clarke
and Brett W. Parris, Vale the Humanitarian Principles: New Principles for a New Environment, The
Humanitarian Leader Working Paper No. 001, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, Deakin
University, Burwood, 2019, pp. 9–10.
36 T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, pp. 15–16. See also Stuart Gordon and Antonio Donini, “Romancing
Principles and Human Rights: Are Humanitarian Principles Salvageable?”,International Review of the
Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015, p. 92, describing Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) as solidarist
under this framing. See also Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
adopted by the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in October 1986 and
amended by the 26th International Conference at Geneva in December 1995 and by the 29th
International Conference at Geneva in June 2006, Preamble, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/
files/other/statutes-en-a5.pdf.
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Universal human solidarity can certainly be acted upon in line with the
traditional humanitarian principles. First and foremost, it is reflected in
humanitarianism’s leading principle of humanity. Indeed, reliance on this
understanding of solidarity could be described as simply repackaging
considerations of care for others that are already present in the concept and spirit
of the principle of humanity. Impartiality is also especially relevant, since this
form of solidarity insists on the equal value of all humans.
37
Finally, solidarity is
also important in arguments in favour of neutrality, which is in turn argued by
some organizations as necessary to ensure impartial action in practice.
38
As Pictet
wrote about neutrality, “I am always with all those who suffer, and that is
sufficient”.
39
More recently, in May 2023, the ICRC president wrote that “[w]hen
the world takes sides, we side with humanity”.
40
This meaning of solidarity is
indeed most closely associated with so-called classical or Dunantist approaches,
but political or rights-based actions could also come within this notion of human
solidarity provided they respect impartiality and non-discrimination.
Political solidarity with a community and cause
A third broad understanding of solidarity refers to political solidarity –that is,
identifying a particular group or community as needing support, taking their side
and advocating for them as required.
41
Like universal solidarity, political
solidarity cares about people, but it is differentiated precisely by its moral
identification of an oppressed group. In the 1990s, the non-governmental
organization (NGO) African Rights described solidary operations as having a
political goal shared with the affected people, and as involving a rights-based
agenda and concrete action in support of those people and their cause.
42
As such, this understanding of solidarity is typically –but not
necessarily –aligned with an approach which works on underlying causes, such
as by advocating for rights and social justice, in the aim of legal or political
change to improve the situation. It could, however, in principle “only”respond to
direct humanitarian needs because of a political solidarity with the identified group.
It is this third understanding that presents the least clarity as to its
operationalization in practice, its relationship to the traditional humanitarian
37 Impartiality has been defined as making no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or
political opinions, endeavouring to relieve the suffering of individuals guided solely by their needs, and
giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress. See ICRC, “The Fundamental Principles of the
International Red Cross ad Red Crescent Movement”, library/research guide, 4 May 2001, available at:
https://blogs.icrc.org/cross-files/the-fundamental-principles-of-the-international-red-cross-and-red-
crescent-movement/.
38 Neutrality has been defined as not taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in controversies of a
political, racial, religious or ideological nature, in order to continue toenjoy the confidence of all. See ibid.
39 J. Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, above note 24, p. 57.
40 Mirjana Spoljaric, “The World Needs Neutrals”,New York Times, 30 May 2023, available at: www.
nytimes.com/2023/05/30/opinion/red-cross-ukraine-russia.html.
41 T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, p. 16; Larissa Fast, Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of
Humanitarianism, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2014, p. 98.
42 African Rights, above note 5, p. 27. See also discussion in H. Slim, above note 5, p. 349.
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principles, and what this means in turn for claims to the label “humanitarian”. For a
start, as Miriam Bradley has pointed out, organizations working on underlying
social justice issues or rights operate with a great diversity of values and methods
which are often conflated, making “political”humanitarianism insufficiently
nuanced as a descriptor.
43
Moreover, it has long been clear that organizations
speaking out about human rights or IHL violations are not necessarily non-
neutral –the speaking out can also be done in line with impartiality, neutrality
and independence.
44
Further, neutral, independent, impartial humanitarian action
(NIIHA) can, in its own way, also contribute to addressing some of the root
causes of humanitarian needs.
While all humanitarian action is political in that it interacts in a political
context in a particular way, an argument of solidarity is a specific prism through
which humanitarianism can be politicized. Thus, although some commentators
have seemed to use solidarity as a shorthand to refer rather broadly to any
movement or actor considered “political”or working on social justice issues,
45
political solidarity must have a more specific meaning. Yet its scope and meaning
prove somewhat difficult to pin down in practice. For example, an organization
undertaking rights-based work in solidarity with a group might support those
rights being respected universally but may have identified the particular group as
being most in need of support; or, due to resources/effectiveness, might have
chosen to work in a particular area/community; or, while wishing to assist or
protect all civilians, may refuse to work through a particular authority that it
finds problematic. Thus, absent of an explicit political statement of solidarity by
the humanitarian actor in question, the factual reality of an organization’s
operations does not necessarily imply that it is driven by political solidarity or a
lack of neutrality and impartiality –these operations could be explained by other
factors. The debates around solidarist actors in humanitarian typologies reflect
some of the questions around these differences in practice.
Typologies of humanitarian actors offered in the late 1990s by key
commentators did depict solidarists as a separate category and echoed aspects of
the description given by African Rights above. They categorized humanitarian
actors not only into so-called classicists/Dunantists/purists doing strictly
principled, exclusively humanitarian emergency relief (“acts of mercy”, charity,
“compassion tradition”) on the one hand, and political or Wilsonian actors doing
“new humanitarianism”(“acts of justice”,“change tradition”) on the other.
46
43 Miriam Bradley, “Five Shades of Grey: Variants of ‘Political’Humanitarianism”,Disasters, Vol. 46, No. 4,
2022. See also HERE-Geneva, Unpacking Humanitarianism, 2020, p. 1, available at: https://reliefweb.int/
report/world/unpacking-humanitarianism-april-2020, explaining that labels such as single-, dual- and
multi-mandate organizations are limited in their meaningfulness.
44 M. Bradley, above note 43, p. 1038; M. Bradley, above note 19, p. 237. But see also T. Scott-Smith, above
note 14, pp. 6–9, discussing the “enduring tension between advocacy and neutrality”.
45 See e.g. S. Gordon and A. Donini, above note 35, pp. 82–83; D. Chandler, above note 5, pp. 3–4.
46 With the political actors being maximalists or minimalists as per Thomas G. Weiss, “Principles, Politics,
and Humanitarian Action”,Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1999, pp. 2–4. But see also the
published responses to Weiss’s article clarifying certain aspects, particularly Joelle Tanguy and Fiona
Terry, “Humanitarian Responsibility and Committed Action”,Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 13,
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Thomas Weiss described another category, solidarists, as those “who choose sides
and abandon neutrality and impartiality as well as reject [State] consent as a
prerequisite for intervention”.
47
In those early debates, Slim likewise depicted
solidarity as a replacement for both neutral and impartial approaches. He wrote
that solidarity “obviously involves taking sides”and is therefore “in opposition to
classical humanitarian principles”. Slim also referred to other traditions, such as
Christian moral theology, in which taking sides is sometimes considered the
ethical approach. Yet, he noted that a lack of clarity between the just and unjust
sides in many conflicts, and the fact that even the side perceived as “right”might
carry out atrocities, can make such solidarity hard to apply. He warned in
particular about related approaches which show solidarity with those perceived as
being “innocent”.
48
In 2005, Dijkzeul and Moke offered a typology of humanitarian
organizations likewise based partly on the actor’s relationship to the people
affected by conflict, but in this case on a spectrum running from impartiality to
solidarity.
49
Under this typology, impartiality would see an organization assisting
people on both sides of a front line, even if the party under whose control
those people lived was criticized. In comparison, solidarity represents an
“explicit choice to side with a group of people and their political cause”. It thus
implies working in favour of some communities and not others, and is not
impartial.
50
One concrete example departing from the usual notions of impartiality and
neutrality, and described as “solidarity humanitarianism”by multiple authors, is
that of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the humanitarian organization of the
Norwegian Labour Movement. NPA has explicitly stated that while it is
independent, it is not neutral and impartial but political, with “its work …
grounded in the idea of solidarity with the people it helps”, and that it “wanted
to play a role that was different from most other humanitarian organisations,
and wanted to contribute to political change”.
51
NPA worked in (then) southern
Sudan with the humanitarian wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
rather than joining UN-led humanitarian efforts, reportedly also politically
No. 1, 1999. See also L. Fast, above note 41, pp. 92–95; Michael Barnett, “Humanitarianism Transformed”,
Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2005, p. 728; ICRC, Connecting with the Past: The Fundamental
Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: A Critical Historical Perspective,
ICRC Conference Report, Geneva, 2015, p. 11, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/cross-files/wp-content/
uploads/sites/106/2017/08/Connecting-with-the-Past-REPORT-updated-01.-2016.pdf:“There has always
been a dual motivation behind the humanitarian impulse, encapsulated in the Principle of humanity:
one inspired by a spirit of ‘charity’and compassion, and one driven by a more militant thirst for justice.”
47 T. G. Weiss, above note 46, p. 3. On the consent issue being in fact a separate question, see discussion in
M. Bradley, above note 43, p. 1029.
48 H. Slim, above note 5, pp. 349–350. See also below note 126 and associated text.
49 For the purposes of examining organizations’public communication strategies. Dennis Dijkzeul and
Markus Moke, “Public Communication Strategies of International Humanitarian Organizations”,
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 860, 2005.
50 Ibid., pp. 677–678.
51 Eva Bjøreng, “Taking a Stand: Solidarity and Neutrality in Humanitarian Action”,Humanitarian
Exchange, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2003, pp. 9–10. See also the NPA website, available at: www.npaid.org/about-us.
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supporting the independence movement.
52
In the mid-1990s, NPA similarly chose
to support the Kurdish cause in its work in Iraq by actively advocating for that cause
and supporting the Kurds’advocacy efforts through bottom-up approaches, albeit
within a vision of a “free and democratic Iraq where Kurds enjoyed their rights
as a people”.
53
NPA’s clearly stated position was made known to all NPA
partners and local authorities, preventing it from being able to undertake
humanitarian action elsewhere in Iraq due to the risks that might pose.
54
The relationship between solidarity and impartiality in particular remains
a subject of debate. In 2008, for example, Maxwell and Walker described the
decisions of NPA to provide aid only for people in areas controlled by the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army as “fairly extreme”and argued that groups describing
themselves as solidarist would and could still commonly profess to being
impartial in terms of aid.
55
Since impartiality is generally held as fundamental to
action being labelled humanitarian, commentators have indeed described it as
rare to see international organizations explicitly invoke such a politically solidary
approach.
56
As mentioned above, in practice, the question of whether an
organization’s approach is impartial or not might prove somewhat opaque
without clear invocations of political solidarity. This is because, as noted above,
even if the ambition is to be truly inclusive, the carrying out of humanitarian aid
takes place in a situated context (where people are considered to be in need, or in
the most need, or in the type of need fitting the mandate and resources of the
organization in question).
57
There is a certain inbuilt leniency within the
principle of impartiality in terms of factoring in limited scopes of operation due
to aspects such as restrictions from the parties, location and geographic areas of
coverage, or limits of resources of the organization.
58
Additional points made by commentators about such typologies of
humanitarian organizations are also well taken –namely, that organizations do
not always fit squarely into such typologies
59
and that it can be overly crude to
52 See e.g. D. Dijkzeul and M. Moke, above note 49; T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, p. 17; Hugo Slim,
Humanitarian Resistance: Its Ethical and Operational Importance, Humanitarian Practice Network
Paper No. 87, Overseas Development Institute, September 2022, pp. 8–9; L. Fast, above note 41, p. 98;
Daniel G. Maxwell and Peter Walker, Shaping the Humanitarian World, Taylor & Francis, Oxford,
2008, p. 122.
53 E. Bjøreng, above note 51, p. 10.
54 Ibid.
55 D. G. Maxwell and P. Walker, above note 52, pp. 122–123.
56 L. Fast, above note 41, p. 98; T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, p. 14.
57 See Didier Fassin, “Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity: Moral Commitments and Ethical
Dilemmas of Humanitarianism”, in Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin (eds), In the Name of
Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care, Duke University Press, Durham NC, 2010, p. 239. See
also Sophia Hoffman, “Impartiality”, in A. De Lauri (ed.), above note 16; M. Bradley, above note 19, p. 16.
58 See Frits Kalshoven, “Impartiality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Law and Practice”,International
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273, 1989, pp. 524–525; Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and
Waldermar Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague and Boston, MA, 1982,
p. 486. See also the discussion in Hugo Slim, Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in
War and Disaster, Hurst & Co., London, 2015, pp. 57–64.
59 Jérémie Labbé, “How Do Humanitarian Principles Support Humanitarian Effectiveness?”, in CHS
Alliance, Humanitarian Accountability Report, 2015, p. 22.
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describe solidarist approaches as simply “taking sides”since many different
considerations regarding use of resources and appropriate response are involved.
60
Interim conclusion on the meanings of solidarity
In sum, solidarity most commonly refers to universal (human) solidarity or political
solidarity. These ideas can become confusing or conflated regarding humanitarian
responses since they involve social solidarity from local affected people as well as
the privileged/non-oppressed coming to the aid of the harmed/oppressed.
Relatedly, although solidarity has often been thought about in terms of shared
suffering and a commitment to collective obligations,
61
traditional international
humanitarianism is underlined by an idea of giving altruistically.
62
As discussed
further below, the recent calls for solidarity, linked as they are with localization
efforts, might give us a way to bridge these notions around mutual obligations.
Such conflation is also shown through subtle differences in language.
For example, a statement of solidarity with Ukraine “in the face of unlawful
aggression”appears political, while a statement of solidarity “with the people of
Ukraine”is ambiguous but might imply universal human social solidarity with all
Ukrainians.
63
State humanitarian donorship policies which are also described
by the notion of inter-State solidarity
64
can be similarly ambiguous in that
regard –some donors may follow a traditional, neutral model while others use
humanitarian aid also for other political purposes, desiring an effective alignment
between aid and foreign policy objectives, “covered”by an argument of solidarity.
This article returns to such critiques and why one must pay careful attention to
the language of solidarity below.
In turn, these multiple meanings and conflation affect how the relationship
of solidarity to the humanitarian principles is understood –the very nature of
solidarist humanitarianism. Universal human solidarity aligns most closely with
the traditional principles and at the highest level, traditional humanitarian action
and political solidarity sit in opposition. However, as shown, political solidarity
does not have a settled meaning in terms of its operationalization, and it might
still be independent, deeply impartial and clearly caring about humanity while
being non-neutral.
The reality is how Hugo Slim describes it –namely, that solidarity remains an
attitude only until specific action is taken. That is to say, solidarity expresses a
60 T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, p. 17.
61 See e.g. Alessandro Volpe, “Doing Justice to Solidarity: On the Moral Role of Mutual Support”,
Phenomenology and Mind, Vol. 24, 2023, pp. 259–260; K. Bayertz, above note 31, p. 19.
62 See also Irène Herrmann, “L’humanitaire est-il une forme de solidarité?”, in Michel Wieviorka (ed.), Les
solidarités: Les entretiens d’Auxerre, Éditions Sciences Humaines, Auxerre, 2017, p. 233; Lilie Chouliaraki,
“Post-Humanitarianism”, in T. Allen, A. Macdonald and H. Radice (eds), above note 16, p. 265.
63 See also discussion in Z. Moallin, K. Hargrave and P. Saez, above note 22, p. 23.
64 See e.g. Carl Marklund, Nordic Specificity in the Contemporary Humanitarian Landscape, Humanitarian
Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, London, January 2016, pp. 21–24;
Z. Moallin, K. Hargrave and P. Saez, above note 22, pp. 7, 12–13.
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commitment to an identified cause but does not take a definitive position on how that
commitment might be operationalized.
65
Understanding solidarity requires context.
The next section considers the recent calls for increased solidarity within
these ongoing debates and existing descriptions of political solidarity. In what
context have they been made, and how is the notion of solidarity framed? What
type of solidarity is envisaged?
The recent re-emphasis on solidarity
Recent commentary reinvigorating suggestions that the humanitarian sector should
shift from the traditional humanitarian principles –particularly neutrality –
towards a posture of solidarity have been made both in general terms and in
relation to specific contexts, primarily Myanmar and Ukraine.
66
This section sets
out five examples of such calls for solidarity from the last five years. The
following section then continues the discussion by focusing on the relationship of
solidarity in these calls with the traditional humanitarian principles.
The first example comes from Clarke and Parris, who argued in 2019 that
the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence –necessary
and appropriate at the time of their adoption in these authors’view –were no
longer fit for purpose given the changing humanitarian landscape and what they
describe as the increasing complexity and intensity of humanitarian events.
Although one might argue that these ideas are already covered within the existing
principles and therefore not mutually exclusive of them, Clarke and Parris
proposed the principles of equity, solidarity, compassion and diversity to entirely
replace the four traditional principles.
67
For Clarke and Parris, solidarity refers to a collective obligation to address
others’needs –one that requires action, ideally action addressing the causes and not
only the consequences of the humanitarian needs.
68
They argue that responses to
events that are based on judgements as to the causes of the events, especially human-
induced events such as conflict, are “more able to be critical and therefore more able
to address causation factors”.
69
Those public and active responses could then, in the
authors’view, contribute to greater holding to account of responsible parties.
70
65 H. Slim, above note 52, p. 7.
66 Neutral approaches have also been questioned in relation to Syria, amongst other armed conflicts, without
an explicit focus on solidarity per se. See C. Wieland, above note 2.
67 M. Clarke and B. W. Parris, above note 35, p. 4. The changing humanitarian landscape was described
largely in terms of current forced displacement and statelessness, alongside estimations of further
displacement due to the effects of climate change, rather than armed conflict: see pp. 4–5. In an
accompanying piece, wealth disparity is also mentioned: Matthew Clarke, “Opinion: The Humanitarian
Sector Needs New Principles”,Devex, 19 August 2019, available at: www.devex.com/news/opinion-the-
humanitarian-sector-needs-new-principles-95493.
68 Ibid., pp. 9–10. Focusing on the issue of forced displacement, the authors also consider “solidarity”in the
sense of mutual solidarity between populations of host countries and resettled refugees and asylum-
seekers. See p. 10.
69 Ibid.,p.9.
70 Ibid., p. 10.
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The solidarity promoted in Clarke and Parris’s paper is contrasted mostly
with impartiality –albeit an impartiality that the authors, incorrectly in my view,
consider as a principle which provides “a signal to those transgressing the rights
of others that they will not be held accountable for their actions”.
71
At first
glance, this appears more like a critique more commonly made of neutrality
given that many actors advocate for rights and accountability while respecting the
principle of impartiality. Clarke and Parris do, however, seem to be envisaging
something more active than “mere”speaking out, and reference also the
responsibility to protect as part of solidarity, although not expressly mentioning
military intervention per se.
72
In any event, as mentioned, these authors propose
the replacement of impartiality as a humanitarian principle. They suggest that
“being freed from conscious impartiality allows a greater range of styles and
modes of response”and that “[t]his freedom is further intensified by being
consciously responsible for others”–that is, via solidarity.
73
Clarke and Parris describe another of their proposed new principles,
compassion, in relatively similar terms as human or at least social solidarity but
on the individual level. Compassion is described as a personal emotion, based in
love, that moves one to action, connecting humans and protecting one from
disinterest or fatigue. While not eschewing professionalism, compassion is felt to
reassert human-to-human connection, such as when local people act as first
responders immediately following a disaster or other event, assisting their
neighbours and community. While for most humanitarians, compassion might be
understood already as a key emotional driver underlying the principle of
humanity, for Clarke and Parris, “[c]ompassion lays bare the myth of neutrality”
since neutrality, they claim, requires judgement to be suspended and denies an
emotive response.
74
As the inaugural working paper of the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership
at Deakin University, Australia, it appears as if the Clarke and Parris paper aimed to
provoke debate rather than to compellingly convince. Indeed, the authors
subsequently published an updated version in which the argument was
significantly softened.
75
This is touched upon again in the following section.
In a more roundly argued presentation in April 2021, the then director of
The New Humanitarian (formerly IRIN News), journalist Heba Aly, reflected on
complex questions including the extent to which humanitarians are equipped to
deal with the kinds of deeply rooted injustices in the world, whether it is even the
role of humanitarians to relieve such suffering, and to what extent the sector
might be part of or propping up the current world order that concentrates power
and resources in the hands or some and not others. Ultimately, Aly posed the
confronting question of whether humanitarian action remains “the right solution
71 Ibid.,p.9.
72 Ibid.,p.9.
73 Ibid.,p.9.
74 Ibid., p. 10.
75 Matthew Clarke and Brett W. Parris, “Do Humanitarian Principles Still Fit Their Purpose? Suggested
Values for a New Global Environment”,TRC Journal of Humanitarian Action, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2022.
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to the problems the world faces today”, commenting on the magnitude of need
around the world and asking how to focus the energy required in the most
effective way.
76
Aly’s conclusion was that humanitarianism in its current form has reached
its limits (financially, operationally, structurally, ethically), or it soon will, and that
the sector needs to be more imaginative about what the future of aid should look
like.
77
As a way of contributing to “rethinking humanitarianism”,
78
Aly argued
for the importance of moving from neutrality to solidarity, with a vision of
effective future humanitarianism as pluralistic and networked activism and
mutual aid, anticipating and preventing human suffering rather than responding
to it, and necessarily grounded and more humble in its vision.
79
One might
counter-argue that such plural forms of humanitarianism have long existed and
that this vision is therefore not of the future but also of the past and present.
Aly’s perceived need for “rethinking humanitarianism”was, however, also linked
to her observation of humanitarian professionals’nostalgic despair at the rise of
bureaucracy and the decay of passionately inspired volunteer activism –“that’s
where our pulsing heart was”, she quotes an aid worker as saying.
80
A third example comes from a 2021 scholarly article discussing
humanitarian advocacy, in particular Médecins Sans Frontières’(MSF) concept of
témoignage. Arjun Claire proposes that a re-pivoting towards solidarity with
affected populations can help humanitarians reconcile the tensions between,
on the one hand, the technical, rational aspects of advocacy, evidenced by the
turn to data- and evidence-based advocacy, which Claire finds can lack emotion
and be morally depleted, and, on the other, the human emotion involved in
understanding people’s stories for activism purposes, which risks paternalism.
Claire suggests that an approach to humanitarian advocacy underpinned by
solidarity with affected populations can help bridge reason and emotion,
evidence-based advocacy and activism, taking the needs and aspirations of the
population as a starting point for action.
81
Fourth, regarding engagement by humanitarian actors with the military
junta following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, several commentators have
argued that the political situation and human rights violations cannot be ignored
by humanitarians,
82
or at the very least that the situation asks hard ethical
76 Heba Aly, “Today’s Humanitarianism Has Reached Its Limits. What Will Take Its Place?”, presentation
given at the Humanitarian Leadership Conference, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, Deakin
University, Burwood, 28–29 April 2021, available at: http://tinyurl.com/jw6tszvn.
77 Ibid.
78 See e.g. “Rethinking Humanitarianism Podcast”,The New Humanitarian, available at: www.thenew
humanitarian.org/podcast/rethinking-humanitarianism.
79 H. Aly, above note 76.
80 Ibid.
81 Arjun Claire, “Reason, Emotion and Solidarity in Humanitarian Advocacy”,Journal of Humanitarian
Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2021.
82 Adelina Kamal and Daniel Benowitz, “Supporting the People of Myanmar: It’s about Political Will”,
Humanitarian Practice Network, 19 October 2022, available at: https://odihpn.org/publication/
supporting-the-people-of-myanmar-its-about-political-will/; Adelina Kamal, Naw Hser Hser and Khin
Ohmar, “Myanmar’s Neglected Crisis Demands a Different Response”,The New Humanitarian,1
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questions of the traditional humanitarian aid model that works through State
consent.
83
For some commentators, framing the situation as an ethnic conflict in
which both sides are at equal fault would deny the responsibility of the military-
run State Administration Council and ignore the population’s rejection of the
military regime.
84
Anne Découbert argues that “pretences at neutrality would do
more harm than good and a solidarity-based approach to aid will have far more
positive humanitarian and human rights impacts”.
85
While acknowledging that
international humanitarian organizations will likely need to engage with the State
Administration Council in order to be able to operate in Myanmar in the first
place, Découbert worries about the associated recognition of the regime, the
principled nature of such operations being unacceptably impacted by the regime’s
restrictions on aid (such as not being able to act impartially in practice), and local
people perceiving humanitarian actors as siding with the regime, putting local
staff members in uncomfortable positions.
86
Adelina Kamal and Daniel Benowitz
likewise advocate for humanitarian actors to leave Myanmar entirely in
preference to working through the State Administration Council for both moral
and practical reasons linked also to respect for the humanitarian principles.
87
Kamal’s arguments in support of front-line humanitarian workers in
Myanmar build explicitly on Hugo Slim’s terminology of “humanitarian
resistance”.
88
Resistance humanitarianism is described by Slim as actions of
rescue, relief and protection of people suffering under an unjust enemy regime,
organized by individuals or groups politically opposed to that regime. Thus, it
includes civil resistance to authoritarianism and aggressive inter-State war.
89
The
fifth and final example, then, is the solidarity felt by many people and States
around the world with Ukraine’s situation.
90
Since the escalation of the Russia–
Ukraine conflict, the principle of neutrality has been placed under immense
pressure –indeed, neutrality has been described as being under grave threat.
91
Classical approaches of engaging with both sides to the conflict to ensure
access to all affected populations are no longer always accepted by the
relevant authorities, national NGOs or donors, nor always by the general public
February 2023, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/02/01/Myanmar-coup-Ukraine-
cross-border-aid.
83 Hugo Slim, “Humanitarian Resistance and Military Dictatorship”, Humanitarian Practice Network,
14 April 2021, available at: https://odihpn.org/publication/humanitarian-resistance-and-military-
dictatorship/.
84 A. Décobert, above note 4.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 A. Kamal and D. Benowitz, above note 82.
88 H. Slim, above note 52.
89 Ibid., pp. 7, 20.
90 See e.g. Patrick Saez and John Bryant, “Two Ways the Humanitarian System Should Harness Global
Solidarity with Ukraine”, Overseas Development Institute, 3 March 2022, available at: https://odi.org/
en/insights/two-ways-the-humanitarian-system-should-harness-global-solidarity-with-ukraine/; Z. Moallin,
K. Hargrave and P. Saez, above note 22.
91 M. Spoljaric, above note 40.
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in Ukraine.
92
Slim predicted significant changes in humanitarianism,
precisely towards approaches in political solidarity with Ukraine, building upon
earlier arguments about non-neutral forms of humanitarianism in opposition-
held areas of Syria such as the Syria Civil Defence organization (the White
Helmets) and in support of ethnic armed organizations and civil movements in
Myanmar, and seeing such responses as part of resistance against aggression.
93
As
Slim explains, contemporary humanitarian action is certainly already not always
neutral.
94
Is so-called resistance humanitarianism the same as solidarity
humanitarianism? While Slim acknowledges that the principle of solidarity has
traditionally been used for humanitarian action which takes sides, he
differentiates what he labels resistance from solidarity. However this is
seemingly primarily because the term “solidarity”holds multiple meanings
and, as noted above, does not make definitive its operationalization; that is to
say, it is seemingly a difference in choice of language rather than meaning. In
Slim’s resistance humanitarianism, once one acts on this motivating solidarity,
therewillbeaninevitablepowerdynamicinvolved–that is, a resistance
against an opponent and the expectation of resistance from that opponent in
return.
95
In a slightly earlier opinion, Slim used the term “activist
humanitarianism”to describe humanitarian action that takes sides and is thus
non-neutral.
96
The described side-taking and enmity certainly looks like a
solidary approach once acted upon, and at the risk of itself conflating
meanings of solidarity, this article has thus included this example as one of the
recent calls for solidarity.
Identifying the various “threads”of solidarity emphasized in
recent calls
These recent calls for solidarity continue the tradition of posing challenges or
alternatives to the classical humanitarian principles through arguing for multiple
92 See e.g. Tiara Ataii, “Why Ukraine Is Moving the Needle on Old Debates about Humanitarian Neutrality’,
The New Humanitarian, 16 May 2023, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/
05/16/ukraine-debates-humanitarian-neutrality-debates; Hajer Naili, “Neutrality in Humanitarian
Actions Means Talking to All Parties to a Conflict”,Just Security, 28 March 2022, available at: www.
justsecurity.org/80882/neutrality-in-humanitarian-actions-means-talking-to-all-parties-to-a-conflict/;
“Rethinking Humanitarianism Podcast: Weapons as Aid?”,The New Humanitarian, 12 July 2022,
available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/podcast/2022/07/12/Weapons-aid-ukraine; H. Slim, above
note 3; Z. Moallin, K. Hargrave and P. Saez, above note 22.
93 H. Slim, above note 3; Hugo Slim, Solferino 21: Warfare, Civilians and Humanitarians in the Twenty-First
Century, Hurst, London, 2022, pp. 116, 127. See also Jessica Alexander, “Is Ukraine the Next Tipping Point
for Humanitarian Aid Reform?”,The New Humanitarian, 25 July 2022, available at: www.
thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/07/25/Ukraine-aid-reform-local-donors-neutrality.
94 H. Slim, above note 3.
95 H. Slim, above note 52, pp. 7–8.
96 Hugo Slim, “You Don’t Have to Be Neutral to Be a Good Humanitarian”,The New Humanitarian,27
August 2020, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2020/08/27/humanitarian-principles-
neutrality.
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and diverse humanitarianisms. Indeed, as mentioned, solidarity is not new to
humanitarianism. However, the conversation has re-emerged in the broader
current global context of increased polarization and certain crises in
multilateralism.
97
This links these calls also to the demands for greater
localization of aid. These calls for solidarity are meaningful and can arguably be
seen as an indicator or vector of such broader trends.
This section considers the calls within this contextual framing by drawing
out certain “threads”related to the humanitarian principles and the calls’framing of
solidarity over and above any individual counter-arguments. These threads are
discussed in this section, and an attempt to draw them together is then made in
the concluding reflections.
Neutrality and solidarity
First, solidarity continues to be understood and promoted generally as a counterpoint
to neutral approaches, in line with long-standing debates about the effectiveness and
ethics of neutral and non-neutral humanitarian action, and related questions about
emergency relief versus social justice and peace action. The first call (Clarke and
Parris) would do away with the classical humanitarian principles altogether and
support greater freedom of action driven by partial judgement, insisting on a
collective responsibility for advocacy and direct action. The second (Aly) also
expresses concern about traditional ways of doing things not working or soon not
coping in the current context. The fourth and fifth examples regarding aggression
and authoritarian regimes are concerned about neutral approaches in the particular
circumstances and thus push back against neutrality more gently in a global sense,
although more robustly in the embedded contexts.
In the face of practical challenges precisely in contexts such as the Russia–
Ukraine conflict, senior figures from MSF and the ICRC in particular have sought to
re-emphasize the value and effectiveness of a neutral, impartial humanitarian actor
in any type of armed conflict, and regardless of the reasons argued by the parties for
resorting to the use of force.
98
It is acknowledged, of course, that this depends on
97 Regarding debate about the humanitarian principles going through cycles of dormancy and hyperactivity,
and currently being reawakened, see Sophia Swithern, “The Principles Debate Just Woke Up: Now
Where’s the Evidence about the Practice?”, Humanitarian Practice Network, 2 February 2023, available
at: https://odihpn.org/publication/the-principles-debate-just-woke-up-now-wheres-the-evidence-about-
the-practice/.
98 Ulrike von Pilar, “Humanitäre Hilfe als Kampfmittel?”, Centre for Humanitarian Action, 12 July 2022,
available at: https://www.chaberlin.org/blog/humanitaere-hilfe-als-kampfmittel/; M. Spoljaric, above
note 40; Robert Mardini, “Back to Basics: Humanitarian Principles in Contemporary Armed Conflict”,
Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 16 June 2022, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/
2022/06/16/back-to-basics-humanitarian-principles/; Nils Melzer and Elizabeth Rushing,
“Humanitarian Neutrality in Contemporary Armed Conflict: A Conversation with Nils Melzer”,
Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 26 January 2023, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/
2023/01/26/humanitarian-neutrality-in-contemporary-armed-conflict-a-conversation-with-nils-melzer/.
See also Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, “Coming Clean on Neutrality and Independence: The Need to
Assess the Application of Humanitarian Principles”,International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No
897–898, 2016, pp. 300, 311; Fiona Terry, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in
Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of Humanitarian Action”,International Review of the Red
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what one understands as “effectiveness”.
99
It is clear, though, that the ongoing role
for neutral and impartial humanitarian action has been reaffirmed recently, for
example, in actions of the ICRC as a neutral intermediary through its Central
Tracing Agency between Russia and Ukraine, or facilitating hostage and detainee
releases in Gaza and Israel.
100
The humanitarian sector has also strongly
campaigned for exemptions from anti-terrorism and other sanctions which would
otherwise impact its neutral engagement with illegitimized groups and
authorities. Thus, neutral organizations will certainly continue their neutral
working methods despite challenges in practice.
Relatedly, the argument that the humanitarian principles were suitable in
the past but are no longer fit for purpose would seem to ignore the decades-long
tensions between “apolitical”and “political”(and indeed solidarist) humanitarian
action and related debates that have existed from the outset of modern
international humanitarianism about restraints on warfighting in IHL versus
peace activism.
101
In this regard, as noted above, Clarke and Parris subsequently
published an updated version of their above-mentioned working paper in which
the argument regarding the need to replace the existing principles was softened.
Rather than calling for their replacement, the authors asked whether the
principles may require re-evaluation and opened a conversation on guiding
humanitarian values that could support, augment or revise the current principles,
still suggesting equity, solidarity, compassion and diversity.
102
As is often said, a variety of approaches can create a stronger humanitarian
ecosystem.
103
Where one organization publicly condemns a party’s actions and has
its access blocked, another organization relying only on confidential, bilateral
dialogue might retain access. Similarly, local or solidary organizations might have
reach in a particular region, where others do not. The division of labour helps to
ensure that more bases are covered; that as a broader system, we attempt,
somehow, to achieve both social justice and to cover emergency humanitarian
needs, even if we know that both, alone, can be critiqued.
104
While the recent
Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011, p. 187; Pierre Krähenbühl, “The Neutral Intermediary Role of the ICRC: At
the Heart of Humanitarian Action”, 7 July 2008, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/
interview/neutral-intermediary-interview-070708.htm; S. Gordon and A. Donini, above note 36, pp. 106,
109.
99 J. Labbé, above note 59, p. 19.
100 ICRC, “ICRC’s Central Tracing Agency Bureau for the International Armed Conflict between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine: Providing Answers to Families”, 2 June 2022, available at: www.icrc.org/en/
document/central-tracing-agency-missing-persons-ukraine; Imogen Foulkes, “Israel–Gaza War: The
Red Cross’s Delicate Role in Hostage Crises”,BBC News, 27 November 2023, available at: www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-67520263.
101 Marnie Lloydd, “‘A Few Not Too Troublesome Restrictions’: Humanitarianism, Solidarity, Anti-
Militarism, Peace”,Critical Legal Thinking, 22 November 2022, available at: https://criticallegalthinking.
com/2022/11/22/a-few-not-too-troublesome-restrictions-humanitarianism-solidarity-anti-militarism-
peace/.
102 M. Clarke and B. W. Parris, above note 75.
103 See e.g. S. Gordon and A. Donini, above note 36, pp. 95–98.
104 See also Jenny Edkins, “Humanitarianism, Humanity, Human”,Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2,
2003, p. 256, discussing David Rieff; M. Lloydd, above note 101, discussing Michael Sfard’s work on the
dilemma between the “wall”and the “gate”in human rights efforts.
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calls for solidarity involve a strong critique of neutrality (amongst other things,
discussed below) and need to be taken seriously, they are also not fatal to
neutrality. As argued further below, the demanded openness to solidarity, despite
its critique of neutrality, requires a reciprocal openness to the fact that some
organizations will continue to practice neutrality as a key operating principle.
Similarly, committing to the ongoing value of neutral, impartial action is not to
deny the possibility or legitimacy of non-neutral, solidary approaches, nor to
suggest that different approaches necessarily have better ethics. Even the ICRC
has acknowledged that not everyone needs to be neutral.
105
There can be virtue
in walking away and virtue in sticking it out precisely because of the bad
company of the particular authorities. Jérémie Labbé puts it well when he says
that “[t]he underlying question …is not whether humanitarian principles are
still relevant today, but whether they are equally relevant in all situations”.
106
We
need to envisage, ultimately, a plurality of humanitarian approaches, neutral and
non-neutral, in a diverse and potentially complementary ecosystem of actors,
which can operate, differently, alongside each other.
Localization and solidarity
Second, in terms of that diverse and complementary ecosystem of actors, the
recent calls are notable in their linking of the notion of solidarity with the
ongoing broader demands for increased localization of aid. The calls for
solidarity regarding Ukraine and Myanmar focus squarely on the responses
already being provided by local actors. Commentators point out that depending
on context, local humanitarian actors may have access to areas that
international, including neutral, actors do not because of limitations placed on
them by the authorities or another party to the conflict, or for security reasons
(e.g. if international staff leave and conduct operations “remotely”through local
staff or organizations). The trust of the local population in local actors is also
mentioned as important in these calls.
The localization agenda is broader than the solidarity agenda. In other
words, while it is entirely understandable that local humanitarians might choose
not to operate neutrally in a given situation, it should certainly not be assumed
that all local responses are of the political solidarity variant.
107
It is true, though,
105 M. Spoljaric, above note 40; Pierre Krähenbühl, “The ICRC’s Approach to Contemporary Security
Challenges: A Future for Independent and Neutral Humanitarian Action”,International Review of the
Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, 2004, p. 513. See also arguments made in H. Slim, above note 96.
106 Jérémie Labbé, “Rethinking Humanitarianism: Adapting to 21st Century Challenges”, International Peace
Institute, November 2012, p. 21, available at: www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_pub_
rethinking_humanitarianism.pdf.
107 For example, members of local volunteer committees in Khartoum have expressed an effort to detach their
humanitarian volunteering from any political activities: Ela Yokes, “‘I See It as My Duty to Help for as
Long as I Can’: Sudanese Volunteers on Supporting Hospitals and Opposing the War”,The New
Humanitarian, 2 June 2023, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/authors/ela-yokes. The US- and
Yemeni-run Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation, for instance, is described as operating with
a policy of neutrality and impartiality concerning the conflict which is credited with providing its
network of local volunteers with critical trust and access across the country: Ann Marie Kimball and
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that local actors may also face greater challenges in applying the humanitarian
principles because of their close connection to the local situation and often the
impossibility of leaving. In particular, they might not be able to engage with all
parties, and sensitive issues involved in protection work may prove risky for local
actors.
108
The need for secrecy and bravery in some contexts is remarked upon in
these recent calls.
109
Regardless of their working principles, other facets of unity
within a community mean that local responses might anyway be perceived as
politically solidary precisely because of their local, associative connections.
Where appropriate, international humanitarian actors might also support
local/national actors in their application of the humanitarian principles. Yet care
is required, since within the linking of solidarity and localization in the recent
calls is also the thread of anti-bureaucratization, reminding us that these
questions are not only about a critique of neutrality and a demand for greater
localization in the sense of effectiveness or ethics. Rather, the critique relates to
the entire way of doing business; to the interrelation between people as a working
methodology. This becomes the third thread.
Solidarity as an important way of working
Solidarity being a political stance both about a situation and about a way of working
is not a new idea –the report from the NGO African Rights in the 1990s cited above
also talked of solidarity requiring shared risk and suffering, and consultation with
and accountability to the people with whom solidarity is expressed.
110
The recent
calls seem to re-emphasize these modalities, referring not only to political
alignment but rather, as part of the broader localization as well as resilience
111
and nexus
112
agendas, a particular method of operational interrelating with others
that is inclusive, egalitarian, collaborative and decolonizing. This is sometimes
coupled with an ethos pushing back against over-bureaucratization and to some
extent professionalization of the sector. Aly’s call, for example, focused on the
sector itself –the vision sought to reclaim grounded, pluralistic, networked and
less bureaucratic volunteer activism involving mutual aid. In a similar vein, in
slightly earlier examples from the mid-2010s, the term “solidarity”was used to
describe grassroots, informal and voluntary-based humanitarian responses to
Aisha Jumaan, “Yemen: The Challenge of Delivering Aid in an Active Conflict Zone”,Global Security:
Health, Science and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2020.
108 ICRC, International Development Committee Inquiry: The Global Humanitarian System: Submission by
the International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016, p. 3, available at: http://data.parliament.uk/
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/the-
global-humanitarian-system/written/28996.pdf.
109 A. Kamal, above note 4; H. Slim, above note 52.
110 African Rights, above note 5, p. 27. See also discussion in H. Slim, above note 5, p. 349.
111 Dorothea Hilhorst, “Classical Humanitarianism and Resilience Humanitarianism: Making Sense of Two
Brands of Humanitarian Action”,International Journal of Humanitarian Action, Vol. 3, 2018.
112 Meaning the so-called triple nexus of relief, development and peace. See M. Bradley, above note 19,
pp. 281 ff.
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migrants and displaced persons crossing the Mediterranean to Europe.
113
Rozakou
describes such “solidarity humanitarianism”as recognizable by being more
horizontal, anti-bureaucratic and political in its form of assistance.
114
The importance of affected populations defining for themselves the
concerns that they wish to tackle as well as being able to lead decisions about
humanitarian assistance, the recognition of affected people’s privileged
knowledge, and the need for consultation, deep listening and strategic
amplification continue to be stressed:
115
“the voice that matters most in the
communication of solidarity [is] the voice of vulnerable others”.
116
An openness
to diversity and listening also helps include other cultural and philosophical
traditions and understandings, including those that might not have been involved
in the development of the current international system of humanitarian laws and
principles.
117
The second and third threads also help us consider the different layers of
solidarity –with whom is the solidarity, and how is it to be authentically carried
out? Solidarity is primarily conceived of in terms of solidarity with the people in
need. Kamal and Benowitz’s call regarding Myanmar, for instance, concerns a
solidarity of international humanitarian actors towards the local population. At
the same time, these authors champion the solidarity evident between the local
humanitarian actors, as part of the community, who are refugees themselves or
are suffering abuse from the authorities. It is their shared hardships with the
community that helps these humanitarian actors nurture trust. Kamal and
Benowitz speak also of a resilience that these humanitarians have had to
develop.
118
However, the recent calls also remind us that such solidary working
methods should apply also to relationships between international and local
components of the humanitarian ecosystem who are often also part of the
affected community; a professional solidarity, if you will.
119
So there are at least
three layers of solidarity relationships to consider, albeit interrelated, and they
113 Katerina Rozakou, “Solidarity #Humanitarianism: The Blurred Boundaries of Humanitarianism in
Greece”,Etnofoor, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2017; Hanne Haaland and Hege Wallevik, “Beyond Crisis
Management? The Role of Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity in Humanitarian Aid: The Case of
Lesvos’,Third World Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 10, 2019. The terms “amateur humanitarianism”and
“volunteer tourism”have also been used: see Jane Freedman, “Amateur Humanitarianism, Social
Solidarity and ‘Volunteer Tourism’in the EU Refugee ‘Crisis’”, in Ayesha Ahmad and James Smith
(eds), Humanitarian Action and Ethics, Zed Books, London 2018; Elisa Sandri, “‘Volunteer
Humanitarianism’: Volunteers and Humanitarian Aid in the Jungle Refugee Camp of Calais”,Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2018.
114 Katerina Rozakou, “Solidarity”, in A. De Lauri (ed.), above note 16, pp. 198–199.
115 A. Claire, above note 81, p. 51; A. Décobert, above note 4; African Rights, above note 5, p. 27; S. J. Scholz,
above note 7, p. 15.
116 L. Chouliaraki, above note 62, p. 264.
117 J. Labbé, above note 106, p. 19. See also Emma Mawdsley, “‘Non-DAC’Humanitarian Actors”, in Roger
Mac Ginty and Jenny H. Peterson (eds), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, Routledge,
London and New York, 2015, p. 213.
118 A. Kamal and D. Benowitz, above note 82.
119 Noting discussion about the conceptualization of the local: Kristina Roepstorff, “A Call for Critical
Reflection on the Localisation Agenda in Humanitarian Action”,Third World Quarterly, Vol. 41,
No. 2, 2020.
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can be social or political, inclusive or exclusive, with different forms of
commitments and obligations.
It is here that the very particular concept of solidarity from the history and
structure of the Movement might be re-invoked to reconsider by analogy, and
amend as required, its underlying idea of different organizations offering mutual
support where possible –that is, as professionals working alongside each other,
albeit differently, in the same ecosystem as members of a solidary social group.
In this regard, given that the components of the Movement subscribe to the
same Fundamental Principles, the question arises that if solidarity also concerns a
solidarity between the diverse actors of the broader humanitarian ecosystem, and
a way of approaching relationships that is more inclusive and egalitarian, should
everything be embraced so as to allow the necessary authentic working together
in solidarity, or if not, what limits are there within that ecosystem’s ethics and
methods today? These questions form the final thread pulled from the issues
raised by the recent calls.
Limits to solidarity as humanitarianism?
Scott-Smith describes solidarity, “without doubt, [as] a solidly intrinsic good:
valuable as an end in itself”.
120
Similarly, all of the recent calls for solidarity
depict solidarity as a good, either generally or, at the very least, in the
circumstances being described. Solidarity sounds positive and appears
unobjectionable, especially because, as stated, many humanitarians would
consider it already a key element underlying NIIHA. Solidarity offers great
potential, hopeful idealism, courage and moral weight. As such, it holds an allure
for humanitarianism, especially as the sector grapples with alarming
humanitarian situations and an often shrinking humanitarian space, as well as
increased localization demands.
Yet, there are key critiques of solidarity which show that except in its
important aspect of approaching relationships in a way that treats people justly as
mentioned immediately above,
121
solidarity is not an inherent good but always
depends on other contexts,
122
and thus requires ongoing critical reflection when
it is invoked. This section will address these critiques.
If solidarity involves a sense of identification of someone with others, such
identities can also be mobilized and strengthened during conflict.
123
“Intra-group”
solidarity is therefore, in principle, exclusive and in opposition to a perceived
enemy.
124
Of course, although it is not always possible, non-members of any
particular exclusive group may be allies with those within the group, and the
“cross-line”solidarity shown to those outside of one’s identified group might
require true courage and certain risk-taking during armed conflict, creating
120 T. Scott-Smith, above note 14, p. 18.
121 See also A. Kolers, above note 7.
122 A. Volpe, above note 61, p. 260.
123 R. Mac Ginty, above note 35, p. 54; A. Volpe, above note 61, p. 260; K. Bayertz, above note 31, p. 16.
124 K. Bayertz, above note 31, pp. 4, 17.
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powerful examples of what Roger Mac Ginty calls “everyday peace”.
125
Still, an
important critique of solidarist approaches relates precisely to narratives which
support sympathy being given to a certain group or category (e.g. deserving,
innocent victims) while denying it to others (e.g. undeserving, aggressors,
terrorism supporters).
126
Such favouring of certain groups over others would
clearly not be in conformity with the principle of impartiality, nor the notion of
universal (human) solidarity described above.
127
Indeed, because solidarity makes
judgements, it remains laden with ideology. It is often relied upon conceptually to
indicate shared, even universal, values. Some circumstances, such as inter-State
aggression or a discriminatory and violent regime, fit easily into such shared
concerns and common interests as noted above. As Slim points out, a solidary
approach is more comfortable when one can easily identify the wrongdoing and
the wronged parties, even if in practice, such distinctions can rarely be identified
with confidence.
128
Yet, even narratives based on seemingly clear and universally applicable
international law will represent a particular position regarding a concrete political
context or the law itself.
129
Solidarity can in this way support already powerful
voices and silence more diverse ones.
130
It is important, then, to also always think
of the hard cases, where right and wrong, moral or legal, might not appear so
clear-cut, and to constantly remind ourselves that the values and interests claimed
in the common good are unlikely to be universally held or at the very least will
represent a particular position. This involves also paying attention to who is
determining the common good.
131
Experience shows the constant risk of discrimination and selectivity within
solidarity, whereby greater solidarity is shown towards some groups than others.
132
Certain conflicts and populations are often given priority and attention based on
social linkages, closer geography, political alignment, historical memory and/or
exposure/media attention.
133
For example, while there has been a great
125 R. Mac Ginty, above note 35, pp. 54, 68, 70, 79, 137–138, 152.
126 On such narratives, see Andrew Thompson, “Humanitarian Principles Put to the Test: Challenges to
Humanitarian Action during Decolonization”,International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–
898, 2016, pp. 75–76; M. Bradley, above note 43, p. 1036; H. Slim, above note 5, p. 350; D. Chandler,
above note 5, p. 14; R. A. Wilson and R. D. Brown, above note 5, pp. 23–25. See also David
P. Forsythe, “Contemporary Humanitarianism: The Global and the Local”, in R. A. Wilson and
R. D. Brown (eds), above note 5, p. 59; Laura Suski, “Children, Suffering, and the Humanitarian
Appeal”, in R. A. Wilson and R. D. Brown (eds), above note 5, p. 216.
127 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman, above note 18, para. 2802.
128 H. Slim, above note 5, pp. 349–350.
129 See e.g. Marnie Lloydd, “Persistent Tensions? International Legal Perspectives on ‘Other’Foreign
Fighters”,German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 60, 2017, pp. 563–564.
130 Sally J. Scholz, “Solidarity as a Human Right”,Archiv des Völkerrechts, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014, p. 65.
131 See Anne Orford, “Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect”,European Journal of
International Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2013, p. 104; Anne Orford, International Authority and the
Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 193.
132 Alexandre Afonso and Samir Negash, “Selective European Solidarity: How Recipient Country
Characteristics Shape Support for International Redistribution in Europe”,Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2023.
133 M. Lloydd, above note 129, p. 563.
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outpouring of solidarity with people in Ukraine following the 2022 escalation in
fighting, some public responses were rightly criticized as racist for expressing
shock at war happening to white, “civilized”populations so close to Europe and
in a place different to countries like Iraq or Afghanistan.
134
Moreover, the
response to the flow of refugees from Ukraine demonstrated clear differences in
treatment of people originally from Africa, South Asia and the Middle East.
135
Funding of humanitarian operations in different countries is also diverse. This is
not to suggest that there cannot be differences in the urgency or scale of needs in
different contexts, nor that these populations should not be shown solidarity, but
simply that others should too, according to need. Again, it remains important to
pay critical attention to how, when, why and by whom solidarity arguments are
made.
Experience also shows that commonly held values can result in
exceptionalist arguments regarding the application of the law or morals, such as
in relation to countering terrorism or in recent debates about cluster munitions
being provided to Ukraine as part of its defence. In their 2005 typology, Dijkzeul
and Moke also discussed actors with very little independence who acted in
solidarity with specific groups in line with, for example, a State policy, whether
because they were funded by that State or by a private company. This was
observed in particular in relation to the US-led so-called “war on terror”.
136
These experiences demonstrated that the connection of humanitarian action with
political, often liberal interests has also involved risks of instrumentalization and
elements of militarization.
137
Indeed, solidarity in resistance or struggle can be
actioned through many possible methods, and so also raises the difficult question
of the potential use of or support for physical violence as part of the response to
an unjust or oppressive situation or otherwise to effect change.
138
Even outside of direct participation in hostilities, from a protection point of
view, one broad concern is the lowering of the bar for civilians to become
increasingly involved in militarization, rather than being able to remain “neutral”,
because of narratives of solidarity. For some commentators, neutral and impartial
approaches based on universal human solidarity de-politicize and even
134 See e.g. Moustafa Bayoumi, “They Are ‘Civilised’and ‘Look Like Us’: The Racist Coverage of Ukraine”,
The Guardian, 2 March 2022, available at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/civilised-
european-look-like-us-racist-coverage-ukraine; Eva Połońska-Kimunguyi, “War, Resistance and Refuge:
Racism and Double Standards in Western Media Coverage of Ukraine”,LSE Blog, 10 May 2022,
available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2022/05/10/war-resistance-and-refuge-racism-and-double-
standards-in-western-media-coverage-of-ukraine/;
135 See e.g. Philip S. S. Howard, Bryan Chan Yen Johnson and Kevin Ah-Sen, “Ukraine Refugee Crisis Exposes
Racism and Contradictions in the Definition of Human”,The Conversation, 22 March 2022, available at:
https://theconversation.com/ukraine-refugee-crisis-exposes-racism-and-contradictions-in-the-definition-
of-human-179150.
136 D. Dijkzeul and M. Moke, above note 49, pp. 685–686.
137 Daniela Nascimento, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Humanitarian Challenges and Dilemmas in
Crisis Settings”,Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 18 February 2015. See also Joost Herman and
Dennis Dijkzeul, “A Matter of Principles: Humanitarian Challenges”,The Broker, 9 February 2011,
available at: www.thebrokeronline.eu/a-matter-of-principles/; L. Fast, above note 41, p. 97; M. Barnett,
above note 46, p. 731; S. Gordon and A. Donini, above note 36, pp. 104–105.
138 S. J. Scholz, “Political Solidarity and Violent Resistance”, above note 12, p. 46.
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de-humanize a population by not recognizing their agency, while meanwhile
becoming intertwined with the State or other governance.
139
To be clear,
discussing the limits of solidarity for humanitarianism is not to expect people
under attack from a hostile State or from their own government to feel neutral
about that violence, nor to deny people agency in their own resilience or
resistance. Rather, it is to insist on civilians remaining a category of person
protected from attack should they so choose and remaining able to be assisted in
order to have their humanitarian needs met regardless of their political opinion
or the power under whose control they find themselves. As the ICRC has
explained, for humanitarians, the notion of building resilience of the civilian
population should never mean resilience against violations of IHL.
140
As argued
by Joelle Tanguy and Fiona Terry, certain solidarist actions risk shifting
responsibility for conflict resolution and respect for legal protections and rights
from the responsible political institutions even further to the private sphere.
141
Moreover, experience shows that civilians, even those in other countries than
where the conflict is occurring, have been increasingly invited to join militarized
efforts such as fundraising and donating to a country’s military actions, or
supporting foreign fighters in their “self-crafted missions”to join the fight against
a particular enemy through crowdfunding websites or corporate sponsorship
providing free military equipment to be displayed in war footage on the fighter’s
social media profile.
142
In another example, the ICRC has recently expressed
concern regarding the increasing involvement of civilians –both individuals and
companies –in digital hacking as part of military operations, noting the increased
risks that such involvement poses for respect for the principle of distinction.
143
Nicole Sunday Grove describes how such invitations to help by taking sides make
these individuals “both producers and consumers of security in ways that further
distort distinctions between civilians and combatants”and authorize “individuals
to determine their own singular forms of enmity”.
144
These actions can of course
contribute to our multi-polarized times.
145
In the face of such critiques, and although competent and thoughtful
humanitarians will disagree on the morals and effectiveness of different
approaches, the above discussion makes clear that narratives of solidarity, as well
139 See e.g. J. Edkins, above note 104, p. 256, discussing the perils of narratives around universal human
solidarity. See also M. Bradley, above note 19, p. 11.
140 ICRC, above note 108.
141 J. Tanguy and F. Terry, above note 46, p. 34.
142 Nicole Sunday Grove, “Weapons of Mass Participation: Social Media, Violence Entrepreneurs, and the
Politics of Crowdfunding for War”,European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2017;
Henry Tuck, Tanya Silverman and Candace Smalley, Shooting in the Right Direction: Anti-ISIS Foreign
Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Horizons Series No. 1, London, 2016,
pp. 37–39; T. Ataii, above note 92.
143 ICRC, “We Call on States to Stop Turning a Blind Eye to the Participation of Civilian Hackers in Armed
Conflict”, ICRC statement given at the Open-Ended Working Group on Information and
Communication Technology, New York, 13 December 2023, available at: www.icrc.org/en/statement-
cyber-oewg-sixth-session.
144 N. S. Grove, above note 142, pp. 86, 89.
145 See ICRC, ICRC Strategy 2024–2027, Geneva, 2023, pp. 5–6.
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as demanding greater inclusion of diversity, also require critical reflection about the
limits of what is considered humanitarian.
146
What are the relevant frameworks and limits? At least one is clear: aid that
provides a definite advantage to military efforts becomes military rather than
humanitarian assistance.
147
Regarding Ukraine, for example, in April 2022, the
Estonian prime minister said during a visit to Berlin that “the best humanitarian
aid these days is military aid for Kiev”.
148
In that instance, MSF objected to the
use of the label “humanitarian”.
149
Certain Ukrainian organizations also directly
help the war effort, for example, by delivering armour, shells and drones to the
Ukrainian military as well as providing basic relief to civilians.
150
Support for the
military makes sense to many local people as military success might prevent
greater harm to the civilian population in the first place, rather than only
responding to its consequences. However, many donors and international
humanitarian organizations cannot work with local organizations that support
military forces as well as civilian populations precisely because of needing to
remain neutral or to maintain a perception of neutrality,
151
and/or out of concern
for respect for the principle of distinction as just mentioned. Alternatively, donors
wanting to fund national NGOs might need to forego strict demands of neutrality
while still insisting on non-militarization.
152
This is not to pronounce any
particular position about such resort to force in the face of aggression or
oppression
153
but relates only to the label “humanitarian”. The battle is surely
lost in everyday language in which military intervention is described,
inappropriately, as humanitarian,
154
and some seemingly humanitarian action has
military purposes. Yet, this remains an important question because the label
“humanitarian”provides a certain moral legitimacy to an activity, as does the
term “solidarity”.
155
146 See also, on broadening the actors considered to be part of the humanitarian sector but remaining within
certain frameworks, the recommendations in Chas Morrison, Civilian Protection in Urban Sieges:
Capacities and Practices of First Responders in Syria, IIED Working Paper, International Institute for
Environment and Development, London, September 2017, p. 57.
147 See e.g. H. Slim, above note 52, p. 15; “Weapons as Aid”, above note 92.
148 Peter Carstens, “Estnische Regierungschefin erwartet von Deutschland ‘starke Führung’”,Frankfurter
Allgemeine, 24 April 2022, available at: www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/ukraine-krieg-estland-
erwartet-von-deutschland-starke-fuehrung-17982106.html.
149 U. von Pilar, above note 98.
150 T. Ataii, above note 92.
151 Hanna Miedviedieva, “Neutrality in the Humanitarian Response in Ukraine”,Voice Out Loud Magazine,
Vol. 35, June 2023, pp. 15–16.
152 T. Ataii, above note 92.
153 See also H. Slim, above note 58, p. 68, discussing “partisan politics”compared to the “politics of
humanity”(engaging with political power only for a humanitarian goal, not a specific political outcome).
154 See e.g. Anne Ryniker, “The ICRC’s Position on ‘Humanitarian Intervention’”,International Review of
the Red Cross, Vol. 83, No. 482, 2001. This article argues that the term “humanitarian”“should be
reserved to describe action intended to alleviate the suffering of the victims”; for military intervention,
it promotes instead the term “armed intervention in response to grave violations of human rights and
of international humanitarian law”. See also S. Gordon and A. Donini, above note 36, p. 105.
155 Jenny H. Peterson, “Introduction”, in Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny H. Peterson (eds), The Routledge
Companion to Humanitarian Action, Routledge, London and New York, 2015, p. 3.
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Other limits that would make solidarist action no longer humanitarian are
unsettled. To set out just some of the discussion in the literature, Slim suggests a limit
by which humanitarian resistance becomes “anti-humanitarian resistance”when it is
carried out for a cause contravening humanity and impartiality, such as being too
closely connected with a party committing atrocities.
156
Given that parties fighting
for causes we might support can also commit war crimes, this formulation
involves a judgement about the degree of unlawful conduct in context, whereas
some would prefer for humanitarians to entirely avoid any determination of
acceptable or unacceptable militarism or violence. Indeed, Jeremy Moses demands
much more, arguing that genuine humanitarianism must necessarily be premised
upon a pacifist ethos. Moses explains that this means using pacifism as a guiding
principle but still recognizing the material challenges posed by the very real
violence of the arenas in which humanitarians operate. In this sense, even neutral
humanitarian action can in itself be understood as political resistance to
violence.
157
Finally, amongst other arguments, B. S. Chimni promotes “a politics
of solidarity that makes a distinction between political humanitarianism and
politics after humanitarianism”.
158
This solidarity is a solidarity with the subaltern
peoples.
159
For Chimni, this means that the classical humanitarian principles
should be adhered to by those providing assistance, leaving the underlying causes
and the rebuilding of peace as a separate question for the people themselves.
160
If we set aside neutrality, could the remaining humanitarian principles of
independence, impartiality and humanity provide the careful limits required of
solidarity? Given the critiques outlined above, independence of humanitarian
action seems immediately crucial. Solidarity might offer that –Edkins describes,
for example, a “coming together of the governed in the face of the inequities of
governance”
161
–but it might not; the solidarity might indeed be with the efforts
of a State or other governing authority.
At least in relation to so-called resistance humanitarianism, the principle of
impartiality has been strongly put back on the table as a necessary condition for the
humanitarian action being described.
162
This differs from certain depictions of
solidarity in the earlier typologies mentioned above, which were differentiated
precisely by these operations’lack of impartiality. The renewed insistence on
impartiality makes sense in calls for solidarity made within the general framing of
the localization agenda, since as mentioned, in certain circumstances, it is entirely
156 H. Slim, above note 52, p. 18. See, likewise, S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 207, and K. Bayertz,above note 31,
p. 18, on how, even outside of humanitarian contexts, seeking to do violence to another group violates the
rubric of solidarity of any group claiming justice as an end.
157 Jeremy Moses, “Why Humanitarianism Needs a Pacifist Ethos”,Global Society, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2020,
pp. 80–81.
158 B. S. Chimni, “Justification and Critique: Humanitarianism and Imperialism over Time”, in Lothar Brock
and Hendrik Simon (eds), The Justification of War and International Order, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2021, p. 485 (citation omitted).
159 Ibid., p. 487 (citation omitted).
160 Ibid., p. 485 (citation omitted). See also M. Bradley, above note 19, p. 232.
161 J. Edkins, above note 104, p. 256.
162 H. Slim, above note 52, pp. 18–19; H. Slim, Solferino 21, above note 93, p. 127.
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understandable that local humanitarians cannot or choose not to operate neutrally.
Without dismissing the cautions about solidarity narratives previously set out, being
in solidarity with Ukraine (against Russia) or the people of Myanmar (against the
military junta) also softens the perceived “politicalness”of the solidary position
because the unlawfulness of the actions of the powers in question is widely
recognized and sanctioned by the international community. Indeed, aside from a
criticism of neutral action, concerns voiced about humanitarian actors continuing
to engage with powers that have lost their legitimacy and restrict humanitarian
access describe local and solidary approaches as a way of ensuring better
compliance with the remaining humanitarian principles (independence,
impartiality, humanity) rather than seeking to replace those principles.
163
Insisting
on a form of solidarity that still respects impartiality goes a long way towards
remedying the key critique of solidarity as selective outlined above. The third call
described above about MSF’s humanitarian advocacy sees solidarity likewise as
offering a middle ground, able to bridge the extremes of the cold rationality of the
traditional principle of neutrality and the potentially patronizing emotions that
arise when one relies too much on the affected people. The fourth and fifth
examples regarding aggressors and authoritarian regimes, with the “softened”
solidarity through insistence on impartiality, could likewise be understood as
seeking some middle ground in which humanitarian action can still be achieved,
effectively and morally, while also taking a political stand against the “opponent”,
making this revised form of solidarist humanitarianism possibly more palatable for
more traditional actors and donors.
The final section of this article tries to tie together the threads discussed
above in order to explain how solidarity amongst members of the humanitarian
system itself demands certain careful limits regarding the understanding of
humanitarianism, and how the recent calls offer an invitation at least for a
procedural way, through dialogue and solidary working methods, to undertake
the necessary ongoing reflection and dialogue.
Concluding reflections: Localization as an invitation for “sticking
together while standing one’s own ground”
164
In 2023, Alessandro Volpe described solidarity as a “re-emerging concept …as
widespread as it is nebulous”.
165
Is solidarity an emerging principle of
humanitarian action? No. In its various meanings, it has always underlaid the
humanitarian impulse. Yet, solidarity has certainly been re-emphasized in recent
commentary by practitioners and scholars of humanitarian action.
Since solidarity only makes sense in context, and its moral and political
value and impact also have a social and historical background and a future, it
163 See e.g. A. Kamal and D. Benowitz, above note 82.
164 D. Li, above note 9.
165 A. Volpe, above note 61, p. 259.
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requires vigorous dialogue.
166
Moreover, that dialogue needs to be ongoing. This is
because the inherent tensions that solidarity presents have always existed but play
out differently in different political framings. Over time and in different settings,
the operationalization of moral commitments can put pressure on the application
of the traditional humanitarian principles or more closely embrace them
depending on the political context and what is perceived to be at stake. More
important than establishing an agreed definition of solidarity in humanitarian
action is recognizing the changing “seasons”of the relationship between solidarity
and the humanitarian principles, and that the current re-emphasizing of solidarity
linked with localization relates precisely to questions of diversity and
egalitarianism in the existing structures and practices of the humanitarian system,
while also demonstrating the current multi-polarized global context.
Despite key critiques of solidarity, the calls discussed in this article must be
taken seriously, situated as they are as a counterpoint not only to neutrality but to the
humanitarian system’s operation more broadly. At the same time, this article has
argued that while generally considered a compelling moral driver underlying the
humanitarian impulse and therefore a good, solidarity can generate harmful
division as well as valuable shared community. It can risk increased militarism and
continued normalization of civilians participating within that militarism. As such,
solidarist and traditional principled approaches have been described as being
largely contradictory.
167
Indeed, while solidarity continues to hold multiple and
somewhat fluid meanings, in its non-neutral rather than universal human form,
solidarityand traditional humanitarian action must be understood as different things.
Yet, the linking of the recent calls for solidarity with broader demands for
increased localization reminds us that solidary action not only involves taking a
political position towards a cause but also entails certain solidary working
methods.
168
Thinking of a solidarity amongst members of the humanitarian
ecosystem and not only between a humanitarian actor and the people it seeks to
support or protect invites a freeing-up of our thinking about the possibilities and
limits of solidarity as part of humanitarianism. The linking of the calls for
solidarity with the localization agenda and the current global political context
produces a “season”in which the humanitarian principles come under more
pressure and, paradoxically, in which the notion of solidarity is slightly softened
for the same reasons –conflated, if you will –so as to bring it closer, at least in
principle if not always in practice, to the humanitarian principle of impartiality,
offering to the humanitarian sector the opportunity for greater solidarity.
If “the humanitarian ecosystem needs to work towards finding a balance
between organisational diversity and collective direction”,
169
then reflecting more
fully on how solidarity is understood, and its relationship, in context, with the
166 S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 10. See also L. Chouliaraki, above note 62, pp. 264–265, regarding “agonistic
solidarity”. Regarding historical and cultural contingency, see K. Bayertz, above note 31, p. 26.
167 Charlotte Dany, “Solidarity through Localization? Humanitarian Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic”,
Perspective, Vol. 3, 2021.
168 See, similarly, ibid.
169 HERE-Geneva, above note 43, p. 29.
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humanitarian principles, appears a necessary part of that ongoing work, and can be
one of the keys that can help the aid sector define what a shift to localization will
require in practice, and how to appropriately operationalize this in a non-dogmatic
and responsive, but still principled, way. Such critical reflection might offer
additional layers to the richer and more rigorous thinking about humanitarianism,
solidarity and ongoing violence that this article is suggesting are always needed.
Specifically, this article suggests that taking seriously the recent calls for
solidarity demands greater inclusion of –and in turn, greater transparency of and
grounded familiarity with –the variation of principles and practices within the
humanitarian sector, while still upholding the mutual obligations owed within
that professional community. It has argued that there cannot be solidarity
between diverse members of the humanitarian ecosystem unless there are also
careful limits. This is because a solidary commitment creates some kind of
mutual obligations between members of the humanitarian ecosystem and in turn,
members of that solidarity should not do things that would breach those mutual
obligations. More specifically, if solidarity opposes oppression and injustice, to
remain solidary (as opposed to embodying another type of commitment), it must
not act in a way that adopts the values it is opposing. In other words, it must
maintain its “oppositional relationship to oppression and injustice that is itself
violent”and must use means that represent the end it wishes to see.
170
One difficult question about solidarity remains the dilemma of whether social
solidarity requires one to join in political solidarity
171
and if so, what that should look
like. What this article has suggested is that if part of the social solidarity we are
envisaging is that between members of the humanitarian ecosystem, then the
political solidarity required might be to fight for that principled humanitarian
space –to fight against its instrumentalization. This also involves some exclusion in
the sense of some limits to what is considered humanitarian and welcomed into
the fold. That humanitarian space might indeed insist on impartiality, but the
greater embrace of solidarity also needs the confidence to protect itself from
militarism and violence, and to pay careful attention to arguments described as
universal or made in the common good. Standing in solidarity in humanitarian
action therefore does not equate to doing away with the traditional humanitarian
principles, but respecting differences in approach within careful limits as to what is
considered humanitarian action. It is only in this way that humanitarians can stick
together in solidarity while also standing their own ground by remaining true to
their own principles.
170 S. J. Scholz, above note 7, p. 13. See also K. Bayertz, above note 31, p. 20; J. Moses, above note 157, p. 82.
171 Darren R. Walhof, “Review: Political Solidarity by Sally J. Scholz”,Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3,
2009, p. 653.
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