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International Journal of Information Security (2024) 23:2043–2061
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-024-00834-y
REGULAR CONTRIBUTION
Deceiving supervised machine learning models via adversarial data
poisoning attacks: a case study with USB keyboards
Anil Kumar Chillara1·Paresh Saxena1·Rajib Ranjan Maiti1·Manik Gupta1·Raghu Kondapalli2·
Zhichao Zhang2·Krishnakumar Kesavan2
Published online: 14 March 2024
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE 2024
Abstract
Due to its plug-and-play functionality and wide device support, the universal serial bus (USB) protocol has become one of
the most widely used protocols. However, this widespread adoption has introduced a significant security concern: the implicit
trust provided to USB devices, which has created a vast array of attack vectors. Malicious USB devices exploit this trust
by disguising themselves as benign peripherals and covertly implanting malicious commands into connected host devices.
Existing research employs supervised learning models to identify such malicious devices, but our study reveals a weakness
in these models when faced with sophisticated data poisoning attacks. We propose, design and implement a sophisticated
adversarial data poisoning attack to demonstrate how these models can be manipulated to misclassify an attack device as a
benign device. Our method entails generating keystroke data using a microprogrammable keystroke attack device. We develop
adversarial attacker by meticulously analyzing the data distribution of data features generated via USB keyboards from benign
users. The initial training data is modified by exploiting firmware-level modifications within the attack device. Upon evaluating
the models, our findings reveal a significant decrease from 99 to 53% in detection accuracy when an adversarial attacker is
employed. This work highlights the critical need to reevaluate the dependability of machine learning-based USB threat
detection mechanisms in the face of increasingly sophisticated attack methods. The vulnerabilities demonstrated highlight
the importance of developing more robust and resilient detection strategies to protect against the evolution of malicious USB
devices.
Keywords USB ·Adversarial learning ·Data poisoning attacks ·Keystroke injection attacks ·Supervised learning
1 Introduction
The use of universal serial bus (USB) devices will increase
by approximately 86.36% by 2028 [1]. In addition, the USB
market share is anticipated to reach 46.08 billion USD, with
a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.9% by the
end of 2027 [2]. The rapid expansion of USB devices in
different segments like consumer electronics, automobiles,
healthcare, and medical devices is a contributing factor to this
growth. USB has become the standard interface for connect-
ing peripheral devices to a host system for both information
BAnil Kumar Chillara
p20190422@hyderabad.bits-pilani.ac.in
1CSIS Department, BITS-Pilani, Hyderabad, Telangana
500078, India
2Axiado Corporation, 2610 Orchard Pkwy, 3rd fl., San Jose,
CA 95134, USA
transfer and power supply [3]. However, one major concern
with the growing usage of USB devices is the associated
security risks due to increasing attack vectors [4]. Honey-
well’s cybersecurity research report [5] suggests that 79% of
cyber threats using USB devices could seriously impact the
operational technology environment. It also finds that 37%
of the cyber threats are designed to be launched using USB
flash drives, a class of USB mass storage devices. In terms
of security, tracking USB flash drives is very difficult as they
can be carried in bags, laptop cases, pockets, or sometimes
in unsuspecting form factors. The firmware of some USB
devices can also be modified and it can be used to take con-
trol of critical systems [6].
Various malicious activities are feasible on the connected
host system using different categories of USB hardware, as
shown in Fig.1. Hardware Trojans, for instance, are imple-
mented via programmable microcontrollers [8]. Another
possibility of malicious activity includes the use of standard
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