Content uploaded by Rahul Lad
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Rahul Lad on Mar 14, 2024
Content may be subject to copyright.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 211
VIEW
China’s Weaponization of
Water in Tibet
A Lesson for the Lower Riparian States
Neeraj SiNgh MaNhaS
Dr. rahul M. laD
Abstract
Tibet, dubbed “Asia’s water tower,” boasts eight major transboundary river systems, including
the Brahmaputra, Indus, and Mekong rivers, vital to three billion people in South and Southeast
Asia. As an upper riparian state, China has contemplated dam construction and river diversion
since 1989. Driven by internal economic motives and aspirations for regional dominance, China
seeks to control water flow, impacting lower riparian states such as India, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Bhutan, Myanmar, ailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. With approximately 87,000 dams
built, China poses a historic threat, having already dammed most internal rivers. is article
examines China’s potential weaponization of Tibetan water, offering insights for lower riparian
states to prepare for contingencies and devise long- term strategies.
***
Water, an essential resource sustaining life, plays a crucial role in the
economic development of nations. e management and control of
water resources have often sparked contention among riparian states,
fueling diplomatic tensions and conflicts. In recent years, China’s strategic ma-
neuvers in Tibet, particularly its weaponization of water resources, have height-
ened concerns among lower riparian states in South Asia and Southeast Asia.
China’s Tibet Autonomous Region harbors the largest reserve of fresh water
outside the North and South Polar Regions, supplying water for approximately
20 percent of the world’s population. Because of this, it is often referred to as
the ird Pole of the planet.1
e most critical river basins, formed by rivers originating from the Tibetan pla-
teau and the Himalayas, include the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna basin, the Indus
basin, and the Mekong basin. Almost all these basins, including the Brahmaputra,
the Indus, and the Mekong, are transboundary in nature. e exceptions are the
Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers, which flow entirely within the borders of China itself.
1 “e Earth Is on Fire: Tibet Is Melting,” Tibet 3rd Pole, 29 November 2019, https://tibet3rdpole.org/.
212 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
Figure 1. Map of rivers flowing out of Tibet. (Source: Thincat, Creative Commons, 20
August 2014, https://commons.wikimedia.org/.)
Tibet fell under the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party following
the region’s invasion in 1950. It was forcibly incorporated into the People’s Repub-
lic the following year through the signing of the Seventeen- Point Agreement
between the Beijing- based Central People’s Government and the Lhasa- based
Tibetan Government.2 It is estimated that more than 700 billion cubic meters of
water flow out of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia to neighboring countries
each year, with about 48 percent of that water flowing into India.3 More than 50
transboundary rivers feed into Bangladesh, constituting the second largest river
basin in the world. According to Brahma Chellaney, in his 2012 book Water: Asia’s
New Battleground, China may assume the role of “Asia’s water hegemon” in the
2 Tsewang Gyalpo Arya, “e 17-Point Agreement—What China Promised, What It Really Delivered
and the Future?,” Central Tibetan Administration, 23 May 2019. https://tibet.net/.
3
Ameya Pratap Singh and Urvi Tembey, “India- China Relations and the Geopolitics of Water,” e
Interpreter, 29 October 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 213
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
near future, driven largely by its favorable geopolitical position.4 Economic im-
peratives and Beijing’s global and regional hegemonistic ambitions would largely
shape China’s foreign policy calculations in this century.
e transboundary river systems originating in Tibet play a crucial role in the
countries they traverse. ese rivers provide irrigation, potable, and industrial wa-
ter, as well as contribute to climate regulation and flood prevention. ey are vital
to the economies and ways of life of the inhabitants of the countries they pass
through, and essential for the preservation of ecosystems and biological diversity.
As the demand for water increases and the effects of climate change become more
pronounced, the significance of these transboundary river systems is likely to grow
even further in the future.5
China boasts a rich history of dam construction and river diversion projects,
which have significantly influenced the country’s water resource management, flood
control, and hydroelectric power generation. One of the oldest and most remark-
able examples is the Dujiangyan Irrigation System, constructed over 2,000 years
ago during the Qin dynasty.6 In the twentieth century, China’s dam- building
program accelerated. e ree Gorges Dam, completed in 2006, stands as the
largest dam in the world. It serves as a hydroelectric power plant, aids in flood
control, and enhances navigation on the Yangtze River. In a 1952 speech, Mao
Zedong also declared, “Dams are the key to the development of our country. ey
will help us to control floods, generate electricity, and irrigate our fields. ey will
also help us to improve transportation and communication. We must build dams
on all of our major rivers.”7
China’s control over water flow presents a substantial concern for lower riparian
states, as it holds the potential to affect water security, economic development,
environmental stability, and geopolitical relations. Such control could adversely
impact the water security of these states. is article endeavors to illuminate
China’s weaponization of water in Tibet by examining its motivations and actions,
identifying potential threats to lower riparian states, elucidating lessons that can
be gleaned by these states, and proposing long- term strategies to safeguard their
water security. It concludes with a summary of findings.
4 Medha Bisht, “Water: Asia’s New Battleground by Brahma Chellaney,” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 4 (July
2012): 690–92. https://doi.org/.
5 Bisht, “Water.”
6 “Go West, Young Han,” e Economist, 21 December 2000, https://www.economist.com/.
7
Narendra Sisodia et al., Water Security for India: e External Dynamics, IDSA Task Force Report, MP- IDSA,
2010 (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, September 2010), http://www.india
environmentportal.org.in/.
214 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
China’s Motivations and Actions
e motives and drivers behind Chinese- linked hydropower investments abroad
are varied and complex. Economic, political, geopolitical, and reputational consid-
erations all contribute to these investments. Chinese companies and banks pursue
overseas hydropower investments to further their economic interests, access new
markets, or secure advantageous trade agreements. Such investments may also align
with broader political strategies, such as the “going- out strategy,” which encourages
Chinese businesses to expand their global presence and influence.8 From a geopo-
litical perspective, numerous factors, particularly in Southeast Asia, contribute to
Chinese- linked hydropower investments. Factors such as geographic proximity,
political ties, and cultural affinities between China and host countries significantly
influence Chinese investment decisions in the hydropower sector.9
China’s ambition for a dominant position over lower riparian states, especially
concerning water resources, has sparked concern and debate in international rela-
tions. is geographical advantage has granted China perceived leverage and influ
-
ence over water resources, eliciting apprehension among lower riparian states.
Jayantha Dhanapala, a former UN undersecretary- general, contends that China’s
“water diplomacy” is often viewed as coercive and raises suspicions about China’s
intentions.10 Such concerns have been voiced by lower riparian states like Vietnam
and India, which accuse China of leveraging its water resources to exert political
pressure. Vietnam, for instance, alleges that China’s construction of dams on the
Mekong River aims to divert water away from Vietnam, while India accuses China
of building dams on the Brahmaputra River to diminish water flow into India.11
China refutes these allegations, asserting that it employs its water resources
solely for legitimate economic and environmental purposes. However, the argu-
ments of experts and the concerns voiced by lower riparian states have raised
concerns about the potential for water conflicts in the future.12
China’s concept of hydro- hegemony extends to its administration and control
of rivers within its borders, notably the Mekong River and the Yarlung Tsangpo
8 Audrye Wong, “China’s Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping.” Brookings, 22 January 2019, https://
www.brookings.edu/.
9 Wong, “China’s Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping.”
10
Mathieu Duchâtel et.al., “Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-
interference,” SIPRI, June, 2014, https://core.ac.uk/.
11 Manash Pratim Gohain, “Fearing ‘water war’ by China, government puts Arunachal dams on Fast Track,”
Times of India, 19 January 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.
12 PK Khup Hangzo, Implications of China’s Hydro- Hegemony on River Yarlung Tsangpo: Another Lever of
China’s Expansionist Tactics into India’s East, VIF Paper (New Delhi: Vivekananda International Foundation,
October 2021, https://www.vifindia.org/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 215
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
River. Due to its management policies and approaches concerning transboundary
rivers, China has been labeled a “negative hydro- hegemon” by several scholars.
ese strategies may involve coercion, pressure, and exploitation of power imbal-
ances. From this perspective, China is seen as exerting control over rivers originat-
ing within its borders to gain an advantage in water resources and associated
geopolitical interests over other countries.13
However, an alternative viewpoint, proposed by other scholars, suggests that
China can be viewed as a positive hydro- hegemon regarding the Mekong River.
ey argue that China has taken proactive steps to foster collaboration among
mainland Southeast Asian countries, leading to the expansion and development
of the Mekong region. is perspective emphasizes China’s efforts to promote
regional cooperation and mutual benefit through various cooperative mechanisms,
countering the negative portrayal of China as a hydro- hegemon.14
e construction of dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, particularly in the lower
reaches including the Great Bend section, serves as part of an infrastructure- driven
program aimed at consolidating China’s claims over disputed territories such as
Arunachal Pradesh. is policy seeks to enhance China’s influence in these con-
tested regions. Scholars suggest that these dam projects could have strategic im-
plications, strengthening China’s position along the border with India.15
China regards transboundary rivers as sovereign resources within its jurisdiction,
to be utilized as it sees fit. Consequently, China perceives international water con-
ventions and legally binding treaties concerning transboundary rivers as contrary
to its national interests and sovereignty. is stance is exemplified by China’s refusal
to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non- Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses in 1997, which aims to establish norms for coop-
eration and management of transboundary rivers among riparian countries based
on principles of mutual benefit and cooperation. China’s rejection of this conven-
tion underscores its position.16
China’s hydrological dominance over these rivers prompts debate over whether
its actions are detrimental or beneficial, particularly regarding the Mekong River
and the Yarlung Tsangpo River. It highlights China’s reluctance to engage in in-
13 Hangzo, Implications of China’s Hydro- Hegemony.
14 Stephen Chen, “Chinese Engineers Plan 1,000km Tunnel from Tibet to Xinjiang,” South China Morn-
ing Post, 30 October 2017, https://www.scmp.com/.
15 Chen, “Chinese Engineers Plan 1,000km Tunnel.”
16 Eleanor Albert, “Water Clouds on the Tibetan Plateau,” e New Politics of China, India, and Pakistan
(blog), 9 May 2016, https://www.cfr.org/.
216 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
ternationally recognized conventions and treaties related to transboundary rivers,
signaling a preference for maintaining control over these resources.17
Potential Threats to Lower Riparian States
China’s idiom 得天独厚 (dé tiān dú hòu, translated as “benefiting from the gifts
of nature”) underscores China’s advantageous position as a riparian state in the
vast Himalayan watershed. is position enables China to reap the benefits of the
natural endowments bestowed upon it. It highlights China’s control over the
headwaters of rivers traversing its territory and the resulting power asymmetry it
holds in the region, both economically and militarily. is power dynamic poses a
significant challenge for efforts aimed at achieving fair water distribution in
the region.18
e construction of dams by China on the Mekong River commenced in 1986,
and since then, these dams have had numerous adverse effects on downstream
countries, including Myanmar, ailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Among
these unintended consequences is the reduction of water levels, disrupting the
natural flow of water and sediment. is disruption has negatively impacted fish-
eries’ health, significantly affecting populations reliant on fishing along the Mekong
River, particularly in ailand.19
In 2019, China’s dams in the upper Mekong River basin retained a record amount
of water, setting a new record despite experiencing above- average rainfall in the
region during the wet season. Consequently, countries downstream faced an un-
precedented drought during this typically wet season.
is isn’t the first instance of China’s dams causing unintended repercussions
downstream on the Mekong River. Over the past two decades, drought conditions
have worsened and become more frequent in the lower Mekong basin, likely due
to a combination of factors, including climate change and dam construction in China.
Since 2019, ailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam have endured the most severe
and prolonged drought on record. is has severely harmed the region’s economy
and ability to ensure food security. Farmers have lost crops, fish populations have
dwindled, and reservoir levels have dangerously decreased.
17 Department of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation, “India- China Coopera-
tion,” 12 February 2024, https://jalshakti- dowr.gov.in/.
18 Ananth Krishnan, “Study on China Dams Brings the Brahmaputra into Focus,” e Hindu, 29 April
2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.
19
Brahma Chellaney, “China Is Weaponizing Water and Worsening Droughts in Asia,” Nikkei Asia,
28 October 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 217
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
Figure 2. Mainstream Mekong River dams. (Source: Brian Eyler and Courtney Weatherby,
“Mekong Mainstream Dams,” Stimson Center, 23 June 2020, https://www.stimson.org/.)
e debate surrounding the construction of dams on the Mekong River remains
contentious. Many argue that dams are vital for clean energy production and ir-
218 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
rigation purposes, while others assert that they have detrimental effects on the
river’s ecosystem and the communities relying on it.
e situation is complex, with no clear- cut solution. However, it is undeniable
that dams constructed in China contribute to downstream droughts. China must
increase transparency regarding its dam operations and collaborate with affected
countries to mitigate their negative impacts.20
Moreover, agriculture downstream has been severely affected by the dams.
For example, the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam heavily relies on river water
for irrigating crops, particularly rice, which contributes 16 percent to the coun-
try’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).21 Leaders from several Southeast
Asian countries have criticized China for disregarding the downstream impacts
of its dam projects.
In 1995, Cambodia, Laos, ailand, and Vietnam established the Mekong River
Commission (MRC) as an intergovernmental organization to collaboratively de-
velop and manage shared water resources. is initiative aimed to address water
security concerns. Southeast Asian states have consistently urged China to fully
engage with the MRC. Currently, China is obligated to provide water- level data
from its Jinghong and Manwan dams under a 2010 agreement with the MRC.
Nevertheless, China continues to withhold crucial information regarding water
quality, pollution, and irrigation water usage.
Full membership of China in the MRC would foster improved transparency
and cooperation, leading to better understanding of the impacts of dam construc-
tion and supporting equitable water resource management in the region.22
In South Asia, China’s proposal to construct seven dams along the main course
of the Brahmaputra River has sparked concern in both India and Bangladesh. is
apprehension stems from the river’s vital role as a lifeline for farmers in both na-
tions. China’s current Fourteenth Five- Year Plan (2021–2025) prioritizes the rapid
development of hydropower bases along the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra
River. China asserts that these dams will operate as “run- of- the- river,” meaning
they will align with the natural flow of the river and avoid significant alterations
to water storage upstream.23
20 Brian Eyler, Regan Kwan, and Courtney Weatherby, “New Evidence: How China Turned Off the Tap
on the Mekong River,” Stimson Center, 13 April 2020, https://www.stimson.org/.
21 Mekong Delta Plan: Long- Term Vision and Strategy for a Safe, Prosperous and Sustainable Delta (Hanoi:
Government of Vietnam, December 2013), https://www.wur.nl/.
22 Eyler, Kwan, and Weatherby, “New Evidence.”
23
Ananth Krishnan, “China Gives Green Light for First Downstream Dams on Brahmaputra,” e Hindu,
8 March 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 219
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
Figure 3. China’s dam projects on River Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra). (Source: Gen-
erated by Arc GIS using data found at “China’s Brahmaputra Dam Project,” Graphic News, 1
November 2021, https://www.graphicnews.com/.)
However, India has expressed concern that China might redirect additional
water from transboundary rivers to its arid northern regions to meet the water
demands of China’s coal and grain production centers. Compared to China’s other
main rivers, the Brahmaputra River has the lowest rate of hydropower utilization.
Consequently, China has been actively constructing dams on the Brahmaputra
River to generate hydroelectricity and enhance irrigation.
e Zangmu Dam in Tibet became China’s inaugural hydropower project to
commence operation in 2015, situated on the Brahmaputra River. Additionally,
the Dagu Dam, Jiexu Dam, and Jiacha Dam are three other dams currently un-
der construction. e Medog Dam, the latest addition to this region’s dam infra-
structure, commenced operation in 2023 and lies only 30 kilometers from the
Indian border.24
e construction of dams on the Brahmaputra River has faced opposition from
various environmental specialists concerned about the potential impact on the
surrounding ecosystem. Nonetheless, China has defended its dam- building program,
emphasizing its significance in meeting the country’s growing energy demands.
24 Mohd. Hussain Naik, “Transboundary Implications of Damming River Brahmaputra and Response of
Indian Government” (dissertation, Central University of Punjab, June 2014), http://kr.cup.edu.in/.
220 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
While research continues to elucidate the potential effects of China’s dam con-
struction on the Brahmaputra River, it’s highly probable that these dams will
significantly impact both the river’s environment and the livelihoods of those
dependent on it. Alterations to water flow timing and distribution caused by the
dams may disrupt fish migration patterns, leading to decreased water accessibility
for drinking and agricultural purposes.
e issue of dam construction on the Brahmaputra River is complex, lacking
straightforward solutions. However, to make informed decisions regarding the
dams’ future, a comprehensive understanding of their potential impacts is imperative.25
e series of dams erected on the Yarlung Tsangpo River poses a significant
threat to various water- dependent activities in downstream countries, with India
expressing valid concerns about their repercussions. e Yarlung Tsangpo River,
known as the Brahmaputra in India, plays a critical role in supplying water to
India’s northeastern region, with estimates of India’s dependence ranging from 7
percent to as much as 40 percent.26
e Government of India staunchly opposes China’s proposed Medog project,
asserting that it encroaches upon its rights as a lower riparian state and raises
serious concerns about adverse impacts on water availability, especially during the
lean season. ese concerns are warranted, as the Brahmaputra serves as a lifeline
for millions in India’s northeastern states, supporting agriculture, industry, and
daily livelihoods.
Bangladesh, another lower riparian country, shares India’s concerns. About 70
percent of Bangladesh’s population resides in the Brahmaputra River basin. Any
alteration in the river’s flow due to upstream dam construction could lead to severe
consequences for Bangladesh, including potential water shortages, disruptions to
agriculture, and adverse effects on citizens’ livelihoods. India, in particular, perceives
this as a violation of its rights as a lower riparian state, underscoring the necessity
for diplomatic dialogue and international cooperation to address these urgent issues.
27
According to certain reports, the proposed western route of the South- North
Water Transfer Project aims to transfer water from the Yangtze River in southern
China to the Gobi Desert in the north. Construction of the project’s east and
central canals has already commenced, with the completion of all three channels
25 Krishnan, “China Gives Green Light for First Downstream Dams.”
26 Nilanjan Ghosh, “Chinese Dam on Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra: Should India Be Concerned?,”
Observer Research Foundation, 1 December 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/.
27 Nilanthi Samaranayake, Satu Limaye, Joel Wuthnow, Water Resource Competition in the Brahmaputra
River Basin: China, India, and Bangladesh (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 2016), https://
www.cna.org/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 221
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
anticipated by 2050.
28
e potential involvement of the Brahmaputra River in this
project raises concerns about its impact on downstream water availability in India
and Bangladesh. Despite sharing the major transboundary river, the Brahmaputra,
India and China lack a formal water- sharing agreement, exacerbating worries and
uncertainties surrounding China’s dam construction activities.29
e deteriorating water quality of rivers within Chinese territory has the po-
tential to become a contentious issue between China and downstream countries
in the near future. ere is growing apprehension that China might deliberately
degrade the water quality of transboundary rivers, rendering them unsuitable for
various uses. An indicative incident occurred in 2017 when the Siang River, known
as the Brahmaputra between the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam,
exhibited sudden signs of contamination, turning muddy and black. is event
raised suspicions regarding upstream activities in Chinese territory.30 Subsequent
water quality testing revealed elevated turbidity levels, indicating an increased
presence of suspended particles. is surge in turbidity had detrimental conse-
quences, including a significant decline in fish populations due to the clogging of
their gills by these suspended particles, severely impacting the local fishing com-
munity and agricultural production in the Siang Valley.
is instance highlights the vulnerability of the Brahmaputra basin to potential
conflicts over water resources. e region faces significant risks to water security,
further compounded by the lack of established institutional mechanisms to address
the challenges of transboundary water security. Consequently, there is an urgent
requirement for diplomatic initiatives and cooperative agreements to tackle these
issues and ensure the sustainable management of shared water resources.
China’s Attempt to “Isolate” India in South Asia
India, due to its strategic geographical location, occupies a central role in the
management of transboundary rivers in South Asia. As a regional power, India’s
involvement in river management is regarded with suspicion by neighboring coun-
tries, many of which share river systems with India.31 is dynamic has prompted
China, an influential player and extended neighbor in South Asia, to undertake
28 Nivedita Khandekar, “Why India Must Push for a Water- Sharing Agreement with China,” dailyO,
31 October 2017, https://www.dailyo.in/.
29 Khandekar, “Why India Must Push for a Water- Sharing Agreement.”
30
Neeraj Singh Manhas and Hari Yadav G, “Relooking India- China Water Relations: A Major Concern?,”
Financial Express, 2 October 2022, https://www.financialexpress.com/.
31 Richa Singh, Trans- Boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia: Towards “Water for Peace” (New
Delhi: Heinrich Boll Foundation, December 2008,) http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/.
222 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
actions that seem to challenge India’s leadership in the region. ese activities by
China, aimed at offsetting India’s influence, are evident in various instances.32
In 2016, China announced that it had obstructed the flow of the Xiabuqu River,
a Brahmaputra tributary located in Tibet near the Sino- Indian border. is ob-
struction was executed to facilitate the operation of the Lalho hydropower project.
33
Notably, this action occurred while India was contemplating a review of the Indus
Waters Treaty with Pakistan following the Uri attack. It suggests a collaborative
effort between upper and lower riparian states to undermine India’s water- related
interests. is trend signifies the potential “weaponization” of transboundary water
resources, posing a significant threat to regional stability in South Asia.34
Moreover, China has exhibited a discriminatory approach in sharing hydro-
logical data between India and Bangladesh. Following the Doklam military stand-
off, China abruptly ceased sharing hydrological data for the Brahmaputra River
with India, despite previous agreements. In contrast, Bangladesh continued to
receive uninterrupted data from China. is behavior by China reflects its intent
to utilize water resources as a political tool against India within the South
Asian context.35
China’s indirect efforts to exert pressure on India within its own sphere of influ-
ence, particularly regarding water resources, present a significant risk and are
profoundly concerning for the long- term security of the region. Such actions have
the potential to escalate tensions not only between India and China but also with
other neighboring nations that depend on shared rivers for their water requirements.
36
Preparing for the Worst- Case Scenario
Extracting vital lessons from China is crucial for lower riparian states in effec-
tively managing shared water resources. When dealing with China’s water resources
and transboundary river systems, lower riparian states can adopt several key strategies.
32 Antara Ghosal Singh, “China’s Evolving Strategic Discourse on India from Doklam to Galwan and
Beyond,” Stimson Center, May 2022. https://www.stimson.org/.
33
Neeraj Singh Manhas, “A Comparative Analysis of Water Management Issues and Challenges for India
and China,” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, December 2022. https://cenjows.in/.
34
Wini Fred Gurung and Amit Ranjan, eds., Emerging Security Challenges and Water Politics in the
Himalayas (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS, March 2023. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/.
35 Neeraj Singh Manhas, “A Fragile Lifeline: India and China Must Collaborate on Water,” e Interpreter,
21 November 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.
36 Brahma Chellaney, “China’s Escalating Water War: On Top of Other Asymmetric Tactics, Brahmapu-
tra Mega- Project Is a New reat India Faces,” Times of India, 16 March 2021. https://timesofindia
.indiatimes.com/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 223
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
First and foremost, recognizing the importance of bilateral and multilateral
cooperation is paramount. Establishing transparent channels of communication
and nurturing diplomatic relationships can foster trust and facilitate negotiations
over shared water resources.
Second, a thorough understanding of international water law and related agree-
ments is essential. Embracing principles such as equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion, prior notification, and consultation can provide a robust legal framework for
resolving water- related disputes.
ird, investing in sustainable water management practices is imperative.
37
Lower riparian states can prioritize efficient water resource utilization, advocate
for conservation measures, and implement eco- friendly approaches to mitigate
potential conflicts.
Additionally, participating in knowledge- sharing and capacity- building initia-
tives can enhance technical expertise and decision- making processes related to
water governance.38
Long- Term Strategies for Lower Riparian States
China underscores the necessity to reassess its dam- development policies and
improve the transparency and thoroughness of environmental and social impact
assessments. Other Asian nations should put aside their bilateral disputes and strive
for a unified stance concerning Chinese upstream dam development. e impacts
of climate change on the Himalayan watershed highlight the importance of es-
tablishing frameworks for water sharing and enhancing the effectiveness of water
and energy management.39
Chinese policy makers ought to enforce existing water management objectives
and laws and enhance effectiveness by fostering a deeper understanding of the
water- energy- food nexus. is could entail implementing regulations, conducting
public awareness campaigns, and enforcing stricter enforcement measures. It is
urged to transition into a full- fledged member of the MRC rather than remaining
a dialogue partner.40
37
Department of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation, “India- China Cooperation.”
38
Department of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation, “India- China Cooperation.”
39 Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and cooperation along international waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2 (1998):
251–65, http://cawater- info.net/.
40
Yumiko Yasuda et al., Transboundary Water Cooperation over the Brahmaputra River: Legal Political Econ-
omy Analysis of Current and Future Potential Cooperation (e Hague: Hague Institute for Global Justice, 2017),
https://siwi.org/.
224 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
Figure 4. Map of the Mekong Basin (Source: Shannon1, Creative Commons, 5 January
2015, https://commons.wikimedia.org/.)
In the South Asian context, it is imperative that China commits to a water
agreement with India to build trust. is entails increased transparency in data
sharing and informing downstream neighbors of dam construction plans. It is
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024 225
China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet
advisable for China to broaden regional dialogues on water security to encompass
renewable energy sources like solar and wind.41
Centering on topics such as dam construction, environmental impact assess-
ments, water management, regional collaboration, transparency, and sustainable
energy, China will stress the importance of proactive measures to tackle these issues,
fostering regional harmony and sustainable development.42
Institutional Approaches to deal with China
In South Asia, there are two potential institutional approaches to engage with
China regarding transboundary river management. Firstly, inspired by the MRC,
South Asian nations could unite as lower riparian countries to negotiate collectively
with upper riparian China concerning shared water resources. In this initiative, a
regional organization, primarily South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), should take an active role in convening all lower riparian countries
under a common platform. is unified stance would amplify their collective voice
in discussions with China.
Moreover, to ensure that China’s engagement in regional institutions aligns with
the interests of South Asian countries, it is essential to consider China’s participa-
tion in organizations where it holds representation. e Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), initiated by China, includes South Asian nations sharing
transboundary rivers facing various challenges. China’s influence over the manage-
ment practices of such organizations could indirectly impact shared water resources.
China’s inclination to lead negotiations on shared water resources might be
framed within contemporary concepts like climate change rather than direct ref-
erence to water sharing. If the SCO delves into climate change issues, it would
inevitably address transboundary water concerns, given that many key rivers, such
as the Indus and the Brahmaputra, originate in Chinese- controlled territory. is
geographical advantage grants China significant influence. With SAARC encoun-
tering challenges and no other regional institution adequately equipped to manage
transboundary water issues, this power vacuum could lead to an expanded role for
China in hydro diplomacy within South Asia.
Consequently, incorporating China into the management of cross- border rivers
within institutions led by South Asian countries could signify a positive stride
toward achieving a peaceful and lasting resolution to transboundary river water
41 Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, ed., India- China Competition: Perspectives from the Neighbourhood, ORF
Special Report No. 197 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, August 2022), https://www.orfonline.org/.
42 Santosh Chaubey, “Water Imperialism and Future Water Wars—Why China Has Colonised Tibet,”
Central Tibetan Administration, 3 March 2021, https://tibet.net/.
226 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS MARCHAPRIL 2024
Manhas & Lad
management issues in South Asia. is approach would underscore collaboration
and collective decision- making, thereby addressing the concerns of all parties involved.
Conclusion
e imperative to address the threat of China weaponizing water in Tibet can-
not be overstated. Immediate action is essential to safeguard the water resources
of lower riparian states. Proactive measures are crucial for anticipating future
disturbances and implementing enduring policies to protect these vital resources.
Drawing lessons from other regions, fostering regional cooperation, diversifying
water sources, engaging in diplomatic dialogue, and garnering international support
are paramount strategies for mitigating the risks posed by China’s actions.43 Le-
veraging open- source satellite data can further enhance these efforts.
Should existing bilateral or regional mechanisms prove ineffective or nonexis-
tent, lower riparian countries must advocate for multilateral solutions to counter
any single country’s dominance over transboundary rivers. With only about one
percent of Tibet’s hydropower potential currently exploited, the potential for
further dam- building and hydropower development on Tibetan rivers looms
large.44 China’s ability to manipulate the flow of water from Tibet’s rivers for
geopolitical leverage poses a significant concern for lower riparian states, poten-
tially shaping future conflicts.
e future of continental Asia’s hydro- politics hinges on institutionalized co-
operation, transparency, the establishment of new regional frameworks for water
sharing, and robust mechanisms for dispute resolution. Such measures are im-
perative for ensuring the sustainable management of transboundary river systems,
benefiting millions of people in South Asia and Southeast Asia alike.
Neeraj Singh Manhas
Mr. Singh Manhas is the PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Maharaja Sayajiarao University
of Baroda, Gujarat, India. In addition to his academic endeavors, he holds the position of Special Advisor for South
Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He has previously worked as the Director of Research in the
Indo- Pacific Consortium at Raisina House, New Delhi. He can be reached at neeraj.m- polsciphd@msubaroda.ac.in.
Dr. Rahul M. Lad
Dr. Lad is a visiting fellow in the Department of Geography at the Savitribai Phule Pune University, India. He can
be reached at ladrahul93@gmail.com.
43 Chaubey, “Water Imperialism and Future Water Wars.”
44 Uttam Kumar Sinha, Riverine Neighbourhood: Hydro- politics in South Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Press,
2016), https://idsa.in/.
Disclaimer
e views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the
official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air
University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
