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Feature-based attentional control for distractor suppression
Abstract
To investigate whether attentional suppression is merely a byproduct of target facilitation or a result of independent mechanisms for distractor suppression, the present study examined whether attentional suppression takes place when target facilitation hardly occurs using a spatial cueing paradigm. Participants searched for target letters that were not red, i.e., a negative color. On each trial, a target color was randomly chosen among 12 colors to prevent establishing attentional control for target colors and to reduce intertrial priming for target colors. Immediately before a target display, a noninformative spatial cue was presented at one of the possible target locations. The cue was rendered in a negative color, which was to be ignored, to detect targets or the reference color, which was never presented for target and non-target letters. Experiment 1 showed that negative color cues captured attention less than reference color cues, suggesting feature-based attentional suppression. The suppression effect was replicated when the temporal interval between the onsets of the cue and target displays was reduced in Experiments 2 and 3, suggesting proactive suppression. Experiment 3 directly confirmed no attentional control settings for target colors and intertrial priming. These findings suggest that distractor features can guide attention at the pre-attentive stage when target features are not used to attend to targets.
Four experiments tested a new hypothesis that involuntary attention shifts are contingent on the relationship between the properties of the eliciting event and the properties required for task performance. In a variant of the spatial cuing paradigm, the relation between cue property and the property useful in locating the target was systematically manipulated. In Experiment 1, invalid abrupt-onset precues produced costs for targets characterized by an abrupt onset but not for targets characterized by a discontinuity in color. In Experiment 2, invalid color precues produced greater costs for color targets than for abrupt-onset targets. Experiment 3 provided converging evidence for this pattern. Experiment 4 investigated the boundary conditions and time course for attention shifts elicited by color discontinuities. The results of these experiments suggest that attention capture is contingent on attentional control settings induced by task demands.
In visual search tasks, negative features provide information about stimuli that can be excluded from search. It has been shown that these negative features help participants to locate the target, possibly by attentional suppression of stimuli sharing the negative feature. Attentional suppression is assumed to be reflected in an event-related potential, the PD component. To provide a further test of these assumptions, we presented the color of the distractor at the start of a trial and asked participants to find the other colored stimulus in the subsequent search display. Consistent with attentional suppression, we observed a PD to a lateral distractor shown with a vertical target. However, the PD occurred in this condition only when target and distractor could also be on opposite sides of fixation. The effect of trial context on the PD suggests that the PD reflects a search strategy whereby participants select stimuli opposite to the distractor when trials with opposite placements occur during the experiment. Therefore, the PD to the distractor may in fact be an N2pc to the opposite stimulus, indicating that the distractor is not suppressed, but avoided by redirecting attentional selection to the opposite side.
In three spatial cueing experiments, we investigated whether a negative search criterion (i.e., a task-relevant feature that negatively defines the target) can guide visual attention in a top-down manner. Our participants searched for a target defined by a negative feature (e.g., red if the target was a nonred horizontal bar). Before the target, a peripheral singleton cue was shown at the target position (valid condition) or a nontarget position (invalid condition). We found slower reaction times in valid than invalid trials only with singleton cues matching the negative feature. Importantly, we ruled out that participants searched for target-associated features instead of suppressing the negative feature (Experiment 1). Furthermore, we demonstrated that suppression of cues with a negative feature was stronger than mere ignorance of singleton cues with a task-irrelevant feature. Finally, cue-target intervals of 60 ms and 150 ms elicited the same suppression effects for cues matching the negative feature. These findings suggest that the usage of a negative search criterion elicited feature-selective proactive suppression (Experiments 2 and 3). Thus, our results provide first evidence of top-down attentional suppression dependent on current task goals as a strategy operating in parallel to the goal-directed search for target-defining features (Experiment 2). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
Visual selection of target objects relies on representations of their known features in visual working memory. These representations are referred to as attentional templates. We asked how the capacity of visual working memory relates to the maximal number of attentional templates that can simultaneously guide visual selection. To measure the number of active attentional templates, we used the contingent capture paradigm where cues matching the attentional template have larger effects than cues in a non-matching color. We found larger cueing effects for matching than non-matching cues in one-, two-, and also three-color searches, suggesting that participants can establish up to three attentional templates. However, scrutiny of matching cue trials showed that with three attentional templates, larger cueing effects only occurred when the matching cue had the same color as the actual target. When the matching cue had a possible target color that was different from the actual target color, cueing effects were similar to non-matching cue colors. We assume that processing of a matching cue activates one of the three templates, which inhibits the remaining templates to the level of non-matching colors. With two colors, the inhibition from the activated template is less complete because the initial template activation is higher. Overall, only a maximum of two attentional templates can operate successfully in the contingent capture paradigm. The capacity of template-guided search is therefore far below the capacity of visual working memory.
We describe an ambitious ongoing study that has been strongly influenced and inspired by Don Stuss's career-long efforts to identify key cognitive processes that characterize executive control, investigate potential unifying dimensions that define prefrontal function, and carefully attend to individual differences. The Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control project tests a theoretical framework positing two key control dimensions: proactive and reactive. The framework's central tenets are that proactive and reactive control modes reflect domain-general dimensions of individual variation, with distinctive neural signatures, involving the lateral prefrontal cortex as a central node within associated brain networks (e.g., fronto-parietal, cingulo-opercular). In the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control project, each participant undergoes three separate imaging sessions, while performing theoretically targeted variants of multiple well-established cognitive control tasks (Stroop, Cued task-switching, AX-Continuous Performance Test, Sternberg working memory) in conditions that encourage utilization of different control modes, and also completes an extensive out-of-scanner individual differences battery. Additional key features of the project include a high spatio-temporal resolution (multiband) acquisition protocol and a sample that includes both a substantial subset of monozygotic twin pairs and participants recruited from the Human Connectome Project. Although data collection is still continuing (target n = 200), we provide an overview of the study design and protocol, along with initial results (n = 80) revealing evidence of a domain-general neural signature of cognitive control and its modulation under reactive conditions. Aligned with Don Stuss's legacy of scientific community building, a partial data set has been publicly released, with the full data set released at project completion, so it can serve as a valuable resource.
Recent advances in attention research have been propelled by the debate on target enhancement versus distractor suppression. A predominant neural correlate of attention is the modulation of alpha oscillatory power (~10 Hz), which signifies shifts of attention in time, space, and between sensory modalities. However, the underspecified functional role of alpha oscillations limits the progress of tracking down the neuro‐cognitive basis of attention. In this short opinion article, we review and critically examine a synthesis of three conceptual and methodological aspects that are indispensable for a mechanistic understanding of the role of alpha oscillations for attention. (a) Precise mapping of the anatomical source and the temporal response profile of neural signals reveals distinct alpha oscillatory processes that implement facilitatory versus suppressive components of attention. (b) A testable framework enables unanimous association of alpha modulation with either target enhancement or different forms of distractor suppression (active versus automatic). (c) Linking anatomically specified alpha oscillations to behavior reveals the causal nature of alpha oscillations for attention. The three reviewed aspects substantially enrich study design, data analysis, and interpretation of results to achieve the goal of understanding how anatomically specified and functionally relevant neural oscillations contribute to the implementation of facilitatory versus suppressive components of attention.
Contexts that predict characteristics of search targets can guide attention by triggering attentional control settings for the characteristics. However, this context-driven search has most commonly been found in the spatial dimension. The present study explored the context-driven search when shape contexts predict the color of targets: non-spatial context-driven search. It has been demonstrated that context-driven search requires cognitive resources, and evidence of non-spatial context-driven search is found when there is an increase in cognitive resources for the shape/color associations. Thus, the scarcity of evidence for non-spatial context-driven search is potentially because the context-driven search requires more cognitive resources for shape/color associations than for spatial/spatial associations. In the current study, we violated a previously 100% consistent shape/color association with two mismatch trials to encourage allocation of cognitive resources to the shape/color association. Three experiments showed that the shape-predicted color cues captured attention more than the non-predicted color cues, indicating that shape contexts triggered attentional control settings for a color predicted by the contexts. Furthermore, the shape contexts guided attention to the predicted color only after the two mismatch trials, suggesting that expression of the non-spatial context-driven search may require cognitive resources more than the spatial context-driven search.
Our ability to focus on goal‐relevant aspects of the environment is critically dependent on our ability to ignore or inhibit distracting information. One perspective is that distractor inhibition is under similar voluntary control as attentional facilitation of target processing. However, a rapidly growing body of research shows that distractor inhibition often relies on prior experience with the distracting information or other mechanisms that need not rely on active representation in working memory. Yet, how and when these different forms of inhibition are neurally implemented remains largely unclear. Here, we review findings from recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies to address this outstanding question. We specifically explore how experience with distracting information may change the processing of that information in the context of current predictive processing views of perception: by modulating a distractor's representation already in anticipation of the distractor, or after integration of top‐down and bottom‐up sensory signals. We also outline directions for future research necessary to enhance our understanding of how the brain filters out distracting information.
In a visual search task, sensory input is matched to a representation of the search target in visual working memory (VWM). This representation is referred to as attentional template. We investigated the conditions that allow for more than a single attentional template. The attentional template of color targets was measured by means of the contingent attentional capture paradigm. We found that attentional templates did not differ between search with 1 and 2 memorized target colors, suggesting that dual target search allowed for multiple attentional templates. In the same paradigm, we asked participants to memorize target and distractor color with equal precision. Both were presented before the search task. An attentional template was set up for the target, but not for the distractor color, suggesting that keeping a color in VWM does not automatically result in the creation of multiple attentional templates. Importantly, the precision of recall of the distractor color was worse than the precision of recall of the target color, regardless of instructions, suggesting that participants always allocated fewer VWM resources to the distractor color. Thus, 2 attentional templates may be set up, but only when the 2 colors receive an equal amount of resources in VWM (i.e., in dual target search). In contrast, when 1 item is deprioritized because of task demands, it receives fewer resources in VWM and multiple attentional templates cannot be established. Thus, unequal roles in the search task prevented the simultaneous operation of multiple attentional templates in VWM. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
Distractor suppression, or the ability to disregard salient distractors while dealing with task-relevant information, is a key component of selective attention. Recent research has shown that distractor suppression can take place in different circumstances and present itself in different guises, which is presumably paralleled by a multiplicity of underlying neural mechanisms. In this review article, we discuss a number of central themes concerning distractor suppression and the underlying neural mechanisms, and also highlight several unresolved issues that will have to be addressed in future investigations.
Decades of research in attention have shown that salient distractors (e.g., a color singleton) tend to capture attention. However, in most studies, singleton distractors are just as likely to be present as absent. We therefore have little knowledge of how probabilistic expectations of the salient distractor’s occurrence and features affect suppression. In three experiments, we explored this question by manipulating the frequency of a singleton distractor and the variability of its color within a search display. We found that increased expectations regarding the occurrence of the singleton distractor eliminated the singleton response time cost and reduced the number of first saccades to the singleton. In contrast, expectations regarding variability in the singleton color did not affect singleton capture. This was surprising and suggests the ability to suppress second-order salience over and above that of first-order features. We next inserted the probe display that included a to-be-reported letter inside each shape between search trials to measure if attention went to multiple objects. The letter in the singleton location was reported less often in the high-frequency condition, suggesting proactive suppression of expected singleton. Additionally, we found that trial-to-trial repetitions of a singleton (irrespective of its color and location) facilitated performance (i.e., singleton repetition priming), but repetitions of its specific color or location did not. Together our findings demonstrate that attentional capture by a color singleton distractor is attenuated by probabilistic expectations of its occurrence, but not of its color and location.
The present study investigated whether statistical regularities can influence visual selection. We used the classic additional singleton task in which participants search for a salient shape singleton while ignoring a color distractor singleton. The color distractor singleton was systematically presented more often in 1 location than in all other locations. For this high-probability location, we found that both the amount of attentional capture by distractors and the efficiency of selecting the target were reduced. There was a spatial gradient of suppression, as the attentional capture effect and the efficiency of selecting the target scaled with the distance from the high-probability location. Some participants were aware of the statistical regularities, but this did not affect the results whatsoever. We interpret these findings as evidence that spatially statistical regularities that are unknown to the observer can influence attention such that locations that have a high probability of containing a distractor are suppressed relative to all other locations.
Previous research has revealed that people can suppress salient stimuli that might otherwise capture visual attention. The present study tests between three possible mechanisms of visual suppression. According to first-order feature suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of simple feature values. According to second-order feature suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of local discontinuities within a given feature dimension. According to global-salience suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of their dimension-independent salience levels. The current study distinguished among these models by varying the predictability of the singleton color value. If items are suppressed by virtue of salience alone, then it should not matter whether the singleton color is predictable. However, evidence from probe processing and eye movements indicated that suppression is possible only when the color values are predictable. Moreover, the ability to suppress salient items developed gradually as participants gained experience with the feature that defined the salient distractor. These results are consistent with first-order feature suppression models, and are inconsistent with the other models of suppression. In other words, people primarily suppress salient distractors on the basis of their simple features and not on the basis of salience per se.
For more than two decades, researchers have debated the nature of cognitive control in the guidance of visual attention. Stimulus-driven theories claim that salient stimuli automatically capture attention, whereas goal-driven theories propose that an individual's attentional control settings determine whether salient stimuli capture attention. In the current study, we tested a hybrid account called the signal suppression hypothesis, which claims that all stimuli automatically generate a salience signal but that this signal can be actively suppressed by top-down attentional mechanisms. Previous behavioral and electrophysiological research has shown that participants can suppress covert shifts of attention to salient-but-irrelevant color singletons. In this study, we used eye-tracking methods to determine whether participants can also suppress overt shifts of attention to irrelevant singletons. We found that under conditions that promote active suppression of the irrelevant singletons, overt attention was less likely to be directed toward the salient distractors than toward nonsalient distractors. This result provides direct evidence that people can suppress salient-but-irrelevant singletons below baseline levels.
Researchers have long debated whether attentional capture is purely stimulus driven or purely goal driven. In the current study, we tested a hybrid account, called the signal-suppression hypothesis, which posits that stimuli automatically produce a bottom-up salience signal, but that this signal can be suppressed via top-down control processes. To test this account, we used a new capture-probe paradigm in which participants searched for a target shape while ignoring an irrelevant color singleton. On occasional probe trials, letters were briefly presented inside the search shapes, and participants attempted to report these letters. Under conditions that promoted capture by the irrelevant singleton, accuracy was greater for the letter inside the singleton distractor than for letters inside nonsingleton distractors. However, when the conditions were changed to avoid capture by the singleton, accuracy for the letter inside the irrelevant singleton was reduced below the level observed for letters inside nonsingleton distractors, an indication of active suppression of processing at the singleton location.
Three questions have been prominent in the study of visual working memory limitations: (a) What is the nature of mnemonic precision (e.g., quantized or continuous)? (b) How many items are remembered? (c) To what extent do spatial binding errors account for working memory failures? Modeling studies have typically focused on comparing possible answers to a single one of these questions, even though the result of such a comparison might depend on the assumed answers to both others. Here, we consider every possible combination of previously proposed answers to the individual questions. Each model is then a point in a 3-factor model space containing a total of 32 models, of which only 6 have been tested previously. We compare all models on data from 10 delayed-estimation experiments from 6 laboratories (for a total of 164 subjects and 131,452 trials). Consistently across experiments, we find that (a) mnemonic precision is not quantized but continuous and not equal but variable across items and trials; (b) the number of remembered items is likely to be variable across trials, with a mean of 6.4 in the best model (median across subjects); (c) spatial binding errors occur but explain only a small fraction of responses (16.5% at set size 8 in the best model). We find strong evidence against all 6 documented models. Our results demonstrate the value of factorial model comparison in working memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).
This chapter shows how all working memory (WM) theorists agree that control processes are a critical component of WM function. The general theoretical framework is the dual mechanisms of control (DMC): proactive control and reactive control. They can be differentiated on the basis of their information-processing characteristics, computational properties, temporal dynamics, and underlying neural systems. Regardless of the source of WM variation, the proximal mechanisms of variation remain the same and have the same impact on brain activity and behavior. Thus, the DMC framework provides a unifying account that has the potential to synthesize and integrate a large body of literatures on WM function. By recognizing that there are multiple alternative routes to cognitive control, investigators may be in a better position to explore and investigate the complexity of empirical findings.
Rather than attempting to fully interpret visual scenes in a parallel fashion, biological systems appear to employ a serial strategy by which an attentional spotlight rapidly selects circumscribed regions in the scene for further analysis. The spatiotemporal deployment of attention has been shown to be controlled by both bottom-up (image-based) and top-down (volitional) cues. We describe a detailed neuromimetic computer implementation of a bottom-up scheme for the control of visual attention, focusing on the problem of combining information across modalities (orientation, intensity,l and color information) in a purely stimulus- driven manner. We have applied this model to a wide range of target detection tasks, using synthetic and natural stimuli. Performance has, however, remained difficult to objectively evaluate on natural scenes, because on objective reference was available for comparison. We present predicted search times for our model on the Search_2 database of rural scenes containing a military vehicle. Overall, we found a poor correlation between human and model search times. Further analysis, however, revealed that in 75% of the images, the model appeared to detect the target faster than humans (for comparison, we calibrated the model's arbitrary internal time frame such that 2 to 4 image locations were visited per second). It seems that this model, which had originally been designed not to find small, hidden military vehicles, but rather to find the few most obviously conspicuous objects in an image, performed as an efficient target detector on the Search_2 dataset. Further developments of the model are finally explored, in particular through a more formal treatment of the difficult problem of extracting suitable low-level features to be fed into the saliency map.
Three visual-search experiments tested whether the preattentive parallel stage can-selectively guide the attentive stage to
a particular known-to-be-relevant target feature. Subjects searched multielement displays for a salient green circle that
had a unique form when surrounded by green nontarget squares or had a unique color when surrounded by red nontarget circles.
In the distractor conditions, a salient item in the other dimension was present as well. As an extension of earlier findings
(Theeuwes, 1991), the results showed that complete top-down selectivity toward a particular feature was not possible, not
even after extended and consistent practice. The results reveal that selectivity depends on the relative discriminability
of the stimulus dimensions: the presence of an irrelevant item with a unique color interferes with parallel search for a unique
form, and vice versa.
An important component of routine visual behavior is the ability to find one item in a visual world filled with other, distracting
items. This ability to performvisual search has been the subject of a large body of research in the past 15 years. This paper reviews the visual search literature and
presents a model of human search behavior. Built upon the work of Neisser, Treisman, Julesz, and others, the model distinguishes
between a preattentive, massively parallel stage that processes information about basic visual features (color, motion, various
depth cues, etc.) across large portions of the visual field and a subsequent limited-capacity stage that performs other, more
complex operations (e.g., face recognition, reading, object identification) over a limited portion of the visual field. The
spatial deployment of the limited-capacity process is under attentional control. The heart of the guided search model is the
idea that attentional deployment of limited resources isguided by the output of the earlier parallel processes. Guided Search 2.0 (GS2) is a revision of the model in which virtually all
aspects of the model have been made more explicit and/or revised in light of new data. The paper is organized into four parts:
Part 1 presents the model and the details of its computer simulation. Part 2 reviews the visual search literature on preattentive
processing of basic features and shows how the GS2 simulation reproduces those results. Part 3 reviews the literature on the
attentional deployment of limited-capacity processes in conjunction and serial searches and shows how the simulation handles
those conditions. Finally, Part 4 deals with shortcomings of the model and unresolved issues.
There is considerable controversy about whether salient singletons capture attention in a bottom-up fashion, irrespective of top-down control settings. One possibility is that salient singletons always generate an attention capture signal, but this signal can be actively suppressed to avoid capture. In the present study, we investigated this issue by using event-related potential recordings, focusing on N2pc (N2-posterior-contralateral; a measure of attentional deployment) and Pd (distractor positivity; a measure of attentional suppression). Participants searched for a specific letter within one of two regions, and irrelevant color singletons were sometimes present. We found that the irrelevant singletons did not elicit N2pc but instead elicited Pd; this occurred equally within the attended and unattended regions. These findings suggest that salient singletons may automatically produce an attend-to-me signal, irrespective of top-down control settings, but this signal can be overridden by an active suppression process to prevent the actual capture of attention.
The present paper argues for the notion that when attention is spread across the visual field in the first sweep of information through the brain visual selection is completely stimulus-driven. Only later in time, through recurrent feedback processing, volitional control based on expectancy and goal set will bias visual selection in a top-down manner. Here we review behavioral evidence as well as evidence from ERP, fMRI, TMS and single cell recording consistent with stimulus-driven selection. Alternative viewpoints that assume a large role for top-down processing are discussed. It is argued that in most cases evidence supporting top-down control on visual selection in fact demonstrates top-down control on processes occurring later in time, following initial selection. We conclude that top-down knowledge regarding non-spatial features of the objects cannot alter the initial selection priority. Only by adjusting the size of the attentional window, the initial sweep of information through the brain may be altered in a top-down way.
Although large variations in the magnitude of attentional capture have been evidenced across a wide range of studies and paradigms (see Burnham, 2007, for a review), the nature of these variations is unclear. In the present study, we used a modified spatial cuing task to address two related issues. In the first experiment, we explored the hypothesis that the magnitude of attentional capture varies systematically as a function of cue-target similarity. Targets of a particular color were preceded by uninformative peripheral cues carrying varying percentages of the target color. As was predicted, the magnitude of attentional capture varied directly with the similarity between cue and target. In the second experiment, we explored whether these similarity effects reflect a mixture of trials on which attention is fully captured and trials on which attention is not captured at all (i.e., a two-process model). A mixture analysis conducted on obtained reaction time distributions proved inconsistent with a two-process model.
In the present study, we explored the mechanisms involved in the contingent capture phenomenon, using a variant of the classic precuing paradigm of Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992). Rather than keeping the target fixed over a whole block of trials (as has traditionally been done with contingent capture experiments), we encouraged participants to adopt a top-down set before each trial. If top-down attentional set determines which property captures attention, as is claimed by the contingent capture hypothesis, one would expect that only properties that match the top-down set would capture attention. We showed that even though participants knew what the target would be on the upcoming trial, both relevant and irrelevant properties captured attention (Experiment 1). An intertrial analysis (Experiments 1 and 2) showed that previous contingent capture findings may, to a large extent, be explained by intertrial priming. In addition, when participants were further forced into adopting the required top-down set (Experiments 3 and 4), irrelevant cues were suppressed, suggesting that top-down control might operate through disengagement of attention from the location of a property that does not match top-down goals. The present findings suggest that top-down control and intertrial priming make their own distinct contributions to the contingent capture phenomenon.
Four experiments tested a new hypothesis that involuntary attention shifts are contingent on the relationship between the properties of the eliciting event and the properties required for task performance. In a variant of the spatial cuing paradigm, the relation between cue property and the property useful in locating the target was systematically manipulated. In Experiment 1, invalid abrupt-onset precues produced costs for targets characterized by an abrupt onset but not for targets characterized by a discontinuity in color. In Experiment 2, invalid color precues produced greater costs for color targets than for abrupt-onset targets. Experiment 3 provided converging evidence for this pattern. Experiment 4 investigated the boundary conditions and time course for attention shifts elicited by color discontinuities. The results of these experiments suggest that attention capture is contingent on attentional control settings induced by task demands.
Bartlett viewed thinking as a high level skill exhibiting ballistic properties that he called its “point of no return”. This paper explores one aspect of cognition through the use of a simple model task in which human subjects are asked to commit attention to a position in visual space other than fixation. This instruction is executed by orienting a covert (attentional) mechanism that seems sufficiently time locked to external events that its trajectory can be traced across the visual field in terms of momentary changes in the efficiency of detecting stimuli. A comparison of results obtained with alert monkeys, brain injured and normal human subjects shows the relationship of this covert system to saccadic eye movements and to various brain systems controlling perception and motion. In accordance with Bartlett's insight, the possibility is explored that similar principles apply to orienting of attention toward sensory input and orienting to the semantic structures used in thinking.
We examined a visual search task, in which observers responded to the high-acuity aspect of a pop-out target (shape of an odd-colored diamond or vernier offset of an odd spatial-frequency patch). Repetition of the attention-driving feature (color or spatial frequency) in this task primes the pop-out; repetition of the high-acuity aspect (shape, vernier offset) does not. Priming of pop-out is due to a decaying memory trace of the attention-focusing feature laid down with each trial. The trace exerts a diminishing effect over the following five to eight trials (approximately 30 sec), and its influence over this time is cumulative. Observers cannot wilfully overcome the priming, which suggests that it is passive and autonomous. Both target facilitation and distractor inhibition are evident; the former has a greater effect. The phenomenon shows complete binocular transfer.
Three central problems in the recent literature on visual attention are reviewed. The first concerns the control of attention by top-down (or goal-directed) and bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) processes. The second concerns the representational basis for visual selection, including how much attention can be said to be location- or object-based. Finally, we consider the time course of attention as it is directed to one stimulus after another.
When up and down stimuli are mapped to left and right keypresses or "left" and "right" vocalizations in a 2-choice reaction task, performance is often better with the up-right/down-left mapping than with the opposite mapping. This study investigated whether performance is influenced by the type of initiating action. In all, 4 experiments showed the up-right/down-left advantage to be reduced when the participant's initiating action was a left response compared with when it was a right response. This reduction occurred when the initiating action and response were both keypresses, both were spoken location names, and one was a spoken location name and the other a keypress. The results are consistent with the view that the up-right/down-left advantage is due to asymmetry in coding the alternatives on each dimension, and a distinction between categorical and coordinate spatial codes seems to provide the best explanation of the advantage.
According to contingent-processing accounts, peripheral cuing effects are due to the cues' inadvertent selection for processing by control settings set up for targets (e.g., C. L. Folk, R. W. Remington, & J. C. Johnston, 1992). Consequently, cues similar to targets should have stronger effects than do dissimilar cues. In the current study, this prediction is confirmed for cue-target combinations similar or dissimilar in the static features of color (Experiments 1-3) and location (Experiment 4), even when both cues and targets share the dynamic feature of abrupt onset. Perceptual priming (Experiment 2) and reallocation of attention did not account for similar-dissimilar differences (Experiments 3 and 4). The results are best explained by top-down-contingent attentional effects of the similar cues. Implications for bottom-up accounts of peripheral cuing effects are discussed. ((c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)
Contrary to our rich phenomenological visual experience, our visual short-term memory system can maintain representations of only three to four objects at any given moment. For over a century, the capacity of visual memory has been shown to vary substantially across individuals, ranging from 1.5 to about 5 objects. Although numerous studies have recently begun to characterize the neural substrates of visual memory processes, a neurophysiological index of storage capacity limitations has not yet been established. Here, we provide electrophysiological evidence for lateralized activity in humans that reflects the encoding and maintenance of items in visual memory. The amplitude of this activity is strongly modulated by the number of objects being held in the memory at the time, but approaches a limit asymptotically for arrays that meet or exceed storage capacity. Indeed, the precise limit is determined by each individual's memory capacity, such that the activity from low-capacity individuals reaches this plateau much sooner than that from high-capacity individuals. Consequently, this measure provides a strong neurophysiological predictor of an individual's capacity, allowing the demonstration of a direct relationship between neural activity and memory capacity.
Differences in performance with various stimulus-response mappings are among the most prevalent findings for binary choice reaction tasks. The authors show that perceptual or conceptual similarity is not necessary to obtain mapping effects; a type of structural similarity is sufficient. Specifically, stimulus and response alternatives are coded as positive and negative polarity along several dimensions, and polarity correspondence is sufficient to produce mapping effects. The authors make the case for this polarity correspondence principle using the literature on word-picture verification and then provide evidence that polarity correspondence is a determinant of mapping effects in orthogonal stimulus-response compatibility, numerical judgment, and implicit association tasks. The authors conclude by discussing implications of this principle for interpretation of results from binary choice tasks and future model development.
A long-standing issue in the study of how people acquire visual information centers around the scheduling and deployment of attentional resources: Is the process serial, or is it parallel? A substantial empirical effort has been dedicated to resolving this issue (e.g., J. M. Wolfe, 1998a, 1998b). However, the results remain largely inconclusive because the methodologies that have historically been used cannot make the necessary distinctions (J. Palmer, 1995; J. T. Townsend, 1972, 1974, 1990). In this article, the authors develop a rigorous procedure for deciding the scheduling problem in visual search by making improvements in both search methodology and data interpretation. The search method, originally used by A. H. C. van der Heijden (1975), generalizes the traditional single-target methodology by permitting multiple targets. Reaction times and error rates from 29 representative search studies were analyzed using Monte Carlo simulation. Parallel and serial models of attention were defined by coupling the appropriate sequential sampling algorithms to realistic constraints on decision making. The authors found that although most searches are conducted by a parallel limited-capacity process, there is a distinguishable search class that is serial.
Attentional selection of a target presented among distractors can be indexed with an event-related potential (ERP) component known as the N2pc. Theoretical interpretation of the N2pc has suggested that it reflects a fundamental mechanism of attention that shelters the cortical representation of targets by suppressing neural activity stemming from distractors. Results from fields other than human electrophysiology, however, suggest that attention does not act solely through distractor suppression; rather, it modulates the processing of both target and distractors. We conducted four ERP experiments designed to investigate whether the N2pc reflects multiple attentional mechanisms. Our goal was to reconcile ostensibly conflicting outcomes obtained in electrophysiological studies of attention with those obtained using other methodologies. Participants viewed visual search arrays containing one target and one distractor. In Experiments 1 through 3, the distractor was isoluminant with the background, and therefore, did not elicit early lateralized ERP activity. This work revealed a novel contralateral ERP component that appears to reflect direct suppression of the cortical representation of the distractor. We accordingly name this component the distractor positivity (PD). In Experiment 4, an ERP component associated with target processing was additionally isolated. We refer to this component as the target negativity (NT). We believe that the N2pc reflects the summation of the PD and NT, and that these discrete components may have been confounded in earlier electrophysiological studies. Overall, this study demonstrates that attention acts on both target and distractor representations, and that this can be indexed in the visual ERP.
While searching for a goal-relevant object, an internal representation of the features necessary to identify the to-be-searched-for object (i.e., target) guides attention towards visual stimuli with matching properties. Recent evidence suggests that features that negatively define a target (i.e., negative features) also bias attentional allocation through top-down suppression. Since humans usually know what to look for, it will rarely, if ever, be the case that a negative feature defines a goal-relevant object alone. Thus, to better understand the relevance of top-down suppression, our participants searched for a target conjunctively defined by a positive (e.g., a blue bar) and a negative feature (e.g., a nonred bar) with both features realized within the same dimension (color in Experiments 1, 3 and 4, orientation in Experiment 2). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that reaction times were slower if cues with a negative feature preceded the target at the same versus a different position (i.e., validly vs. invalidly cued targets), indicating suppression. In contrast, cues with a task-irrelevant different-dimension feature elicited no significant reaction time difference between validly cued and invalidly cued trials. In addition, Experiment 3 showed that while negative cues were top-down suppressed, cues with a positive feature captured attention. This finding indicated that both positive and negative features guide visual attention through capture and suppression, respectively, during the search for a target defined by the presence of one and the absence of another feature from the same dimension. However, suppression seems to apply to the negative and all nontarget features in the task-relevant dimension. This was shown in Experiment 4, in which participants suppressed cues with a task-irrelevant color similarly to cues with a negative color.
We acknowledge the empirical and theoretical advancements described within Luck et al. and commend the integration of viewpoints on the debate over attentional capture by salient distractors. Our commentary seeks to build on the conversation by drawing attention to open questions that remain about how proactive and reactive mechanisms might operate, the mechanisms of implicit learning, and how attentional capture might occur within the context of naturalistic behaviors.
This paper describes Guided Search 6.0 (GS6), a revised model of visual search. When we encounter a scene, we can see something everywhere. However, we cannot recognize more than a few items at a time. Attention is used to select items so that their features can be "bound" into recognizable objects. Attention is "guided" so that items can be processed in an intelligent order. In GS6, this guidance comes from five sources of preattentive information: (1) top-down and (2) bottom-up feature guidance, (3) prior history (e.g., priming), (4) reward, and (5) scene syntax and semantics. These sources are combined into a spatial "priority map," a dynamic attentional landscape that evolves over the course of search. Selective attention is guided to the most active location in the priority map approximately 20 times per second. Guidance will not be uniform across the visual field. It will favor items near the point of fixation. Three types of functional visual field (FVFs) describe the nature of these foveal biases. There is a resolution FVF, an FVF governing exploratory eye movements, and an FVF governing covert deployments of attention. To be identified as targets or rejected as distractors, items must be compared to target templates held in memory. The binding and recognition of an attended object is modeled as a diffusion process taking > 150 ms/item. Since selection occurs more frequently than that, it follows that multiple items are undergoing recognition at the same time, though asynchronously, making GS6 a hybrid of serial and parallel processes. In GS6, if a target is not found, search terminates when an accumulating quitting signal reaches a threshold. Setting of that threshold is adaptive, allowing feedback about performance to shape subsequent searches. Simulation shows that the combination of asynchronous diffusion and a quitting signal can produce the basic patterns of response time and error data from a range of search experiments.
Current theories assume that there is substantial overlap between visual working memory (VWM) and visual attention functioning, such that active representations in VWM automatically act as an attentional set, resulting in attentional biases towards objects that match the mnemonic content. Most evidence for this comes from visual search tasks in which a distractor similar to the memory interferes with the detection of a simultaneous target. Here we provide additional evidence using one of the most popular paradigms in the literature for demonstrating an active attentional set: The contingent spatial orienting paradigm of Folk and colleagues. This paradigm allows memory-based attentional biases to be more directly attributed to spatial orienting. Experiment 1 demonstrated a memory-contingent spatial attention effect for colour but not for shape contents of VWM. Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that the placeholders used for spatial cueing interfered with the shape processing, and showed that memory-based attentional capture for shape returned when placeholders were removed. The results of the present study are consistent with earlier findings from distractor interference paradigms, and provide additional evidence that biases in spatial orienting contribute to memory-based influences on attention.
Our aim was to examine the specificity of the effects of acquiring expertise on visual working memory (VWM) and the degree to which higher levels of experience within the domain of expertise are associated with more efficient use of VWM.
Previous research is inconsistent on whether expertise effects are specific to the area of expertise or generalize to other tasks that also involve the same cognitive processes. It is also unclear whether more training and/or experience will lead to continued improvement on domain-relevant tasks or whether a plateau could be reached.
In Experiment I, veterinary medicine students completed a one-shot visual change detection task. In Experiment 2, veterinarians completed a flicker change detection task. Both experiments involved stimuli specific to the domain of radiology and general stimuli.
In Experiment I, veterinary medicine students who had completed an "eyes-on" radiological training demonstrated a domain-specific effect in which performance was better on the domain-specific stimuli than on the domain-general stimuli. In Experiment 2, veterinarians again showed a domain-specific effect, but performance was unrelated to the amount of experience veterinarians had accumulated.
The effect of experience is domain specific and occurs during the first few years of training, after which a plateau is reached.
VWM training in one domain may not lead to improved performance on other VWM tasks. In acquiring expertise, eyes-on training is important initially, but continued experience may not be associated with further improvements in the efficiency of VWM.
Control problems of attention theory concern analysis of the source of limitations in processing information, and the mechanisms that control the flow of information from input to output. Early theories of attention suggested a very close link between processes that take time and processes that take attention. But abundant information suggests that at least one time-consuming process, that whereby a stimulus activates familiar associations in memory, demands little or no attention in many instances. Apparently a very wide range of memories within a code and a variety of different codes, such as visual, phonemic, and semantic codes, are activated by the same stimulus. Moreover, more than one stimulus may activate memory at a time. This widespread activation necessitates a limited control process that selects and integrates codes or memories in accordance with goals and task demands.
Observers find a target item more quickly when they have foreknowledge of target-defining attributes, such as identity, color, or location. However, it is less clear whether foreknowledge of nontarget attributes can also speed search. Munneke, Van der Stigchel, and Theeuwes Acta Psychologica 129:101-107, (2008) found that observers found the target more quickly when they were cued to ignore a region of space where a target would not appear. Using a similar paradigm, we explored the effects of cueing nontarget features on search. We found that when we cued observers to ignore nontarget features, search was slowed. The results from a probe-dot detection task revealed that this slowing occurred because, paradoxically, observers initially selected an item appearing in the to-be-ignored color. Finally, we found that cueing nontarget features sped search when placeholders matching the location of the to-be-ignored color preceded presentation of the search display by at least 800 ms; thus, it appears that some limited inhibition of to-be-ignored items occurs following selection. Taken together, these results suggest that observers are unable to explicitly avoid selection of items matching known nontarget features. Instead, when nontarget features are cued, observers select the to-be-ignored feature or the locations of objects matching that feature early in search, and only inhibit them after this selection process.
Prominent models of attentional control assert a dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up control, with the former determined by current selection goals and the latter determined by physical salience. This theoretical dichotomy, however, fails to explain a growing number of cases in which neither current goals nor physical salience can account for strong selection biases. For example, equally salient stimuli associated with reward can capture attention, even when this contradicts current selection goals. Thus, although 'top-down' sources of bias are sometimes defined as those that are not due to physical salience, this conception conflates distinct--and sometimes contradictory--sources of selection bias. We describe an alternative framework, in which past selection history is integrated with current goals and physical salience to shape an integrated priority map.
In a visual search task, a salient distractor often elongates response times (RTs) even when it is task-irrelevant. These distraction costs are larger when the irrelevant distractor is similar than when dissimilar to the target. In the present study, we tested whether this similarity effect is mostly due to more frequent oculomotor capture by target-similar versus target-dissimilar distractors (contingent capture hypothesis), or to elongated dwell times on target-similar versus dissimilar distractors (attentional disengagement hypothesis), by measuring the eye movements of the observers during visual search. The results showed that similar distractors were both selected more frequently, and produced longer dwell times than dissimilar distractors. However, attentional capture contributed more to the similarity effect than disengagement. The results of a second experiment showed that stronger capture by similar than dissimilar distractors in part reflected intertrial priming effects: distractors which had the same colour as the target on the previous trial were selected more frequently than distractors with a different colour. These priming effects were however too small to account fully for the similarity effect. More importantly, the results indicated that allegedly stimulus-driven intertrial priming effects and allegedly top-down controlled similarity effects may be mediated by the same underlying mechanism.
When target-color repeats in pop-out visual search performance is faster than otherwise. While various characteristics of such priming of pop-out (PoP) are well known, relatively little is known about the temporal character of the memory traces underlying the effect. Recent findings on the perception of ambiguous stimuli show that the percept at any given moment is affected by perception over a long period, as well as by immediately preceding percepts. Intrigued by the existence of various parallels between this perceptual priming phenomenon and PoP, we here investigate whether similar multiplicity in timescales is seen for PoP. We contrasted long-term PoP build-up of a particular target color against shorter-term build-up for a different color. The priming effects from the two colors indeed reflect memory traces at different timescales: long-term priming build-up results in a more gradual decay than brief buildup, which is followed by faster decay. This is clearly demonstrated in Experiment 2 where sustained repetition of one target color is followed by a few repetitions of a second color. Following such a sequence, priming is initially stronger for the second target color, which was primed most recently; however, as more time passes longer-term priming starts to dominate, resulting in better search performance for the first color later on. Our results suggest that priming effects in visual search contain both transient and more sustained components. Similarities between the time courses of attentional priming and perception of ambiguous stimuli are striking and suggest compelling avenues of further research into the relation between the two effects.
Inter-trial repetitions of a target's features in a visual search task reduce the time needed to find the target. Here I examine these sequential dependencies in the Priming of Pop-Out task (PoP) by means of system identification techniques. The results are as follows. Response time facilitation due to repetition of the target's features increases linearly with difficulty in segmenting the target from the distracters. However, z-scoring the reaction times normalizes responses by equating facilitation across levels of difficulty. Memory kernels, representing the influence of the current trial on any future trial, can then be calculated from data normalized and averaged across conditions and observers. The average target-defining feature kernel and the target position kernel are well fit by a sum of two exponentials model, comprised of a high-gain, fast-decay component and a low-gain, slow-decay component. In contrast, the average response-defining feature kernel is well fit by a single exponential model with very low-gain and decay similar to the slow component of the target-defining feature kernel. Analysis of single participant's data reveals that a fast-decay component is often also present for the response-defining feature, but can be either facilitatory or inhibitory and thus tends to cancel out in pooled data. Overall, the results are similar to integration functions of reward history recently observed in primates during frequency-matching experiments. I speculate that sequential dependencies in PoP result from learning mechanisms that bias the attentional weighting of certain aspects of the stimulus in an effort to minimize a prediction error signal.
A priming paradigm was employed to investigate the processing of an ignored object during selection of an attended object. Two issues were investigated: the level of internal representation achieved for the ignored object, and the subsequent fate of this representation. In Experiment 1 a prime display containing two superimposed objects was briefly presented. One second later a probe display was presented containing an object to be named. If the ignored object in the prime display was the same as the subsequent probe, naming latencies were impaired. This effect is termed negative priming. It suggests that internal representations of the ignored object may become associated with inhibition during selection. Thus, selection of a subsequent probe object requiring these inhibited representations is delayed. Experiment 2 replicated the negative priming effect with a shorter inter-stimulus interval. Experiment 3 examined the priming effects of both the ignored and the selected objects. The effect of both identity repetition and a categorical relationship between prime and probe stimuli were investigated. The data showed that for a stimulus selected from the prime display, naming of the same object in the probe display was facilitated. When the same stimulus was ignored in the prime display, however, naming of it in the probe display was again impaired (negative priming). That negative priming was also demonstrated with categorically related objects suggests that ignored objects achieve categorical levels of representation, and that the inhibition may be at this level.
A new hypothesis about the role of focused attention is proposed. The feature-integration theory of attention suggests that attention must be directed serially to each stimulus in a display whenever conjunctions of more than one separable feature are needed to characterize or distinguish the possible objects presented. A number of predictions were tested in a variety of paradigms including visual search, texture segregation, identification and localization, and using both separable dimensions (shape and color) and local elements or parts of figures (lines, curves, etc. in letters) as the features to be integrated into complex wholes. The results were in general consistent with the hypothesis. They offer a new set of criteria for distinguishing separable from integral features and a new rationale for predicting which tasks will show attention limits and which will not.
Visual attention is often conceived as a high-speed serial system moving rapidly from one object to another at rates of a few dozen milliseconds per item. We present four experiments demonstrating that this high-speed model is incorrect. Subjects identify two objects, presented at separate times. We measure how long the first object continues to interfere with accuracy on the second, and hence the time-course of the first object's attentional demand. We find interference for a half-second or more-roughly 10 times longer than might be predicted from conventional visual search paradigms. In further experiments, we show that the time-course of interference depends upon the number of attended objects, not the number or complexity of responses. Even objects which require no response, such as nontargets in visual search, can still produce long lasting interference on subsequent identification. We suggest that visual attention is not a high-speed switching mechanism, but instead a sustained state during which representations of relevant objects become available to guide behavior.