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Not So Implicitly Political: Selective Exposure to Fictional Entertainment Media
Abstract
Technological advances have brought with them an explosion in the amount of media available to consumers, particularly fictional entertainment programming depicting “implicitly” political content such as social issues. Although exposure to entertainment media is fractured along political lines, there remains an assumption that most viewers choose their entertainment media absent of political considerations. I contend that individuals with stronger political identities will evaluate “implicitly” political entertainment programs as more relevant to politics, and in turn engage in stronger selective exposure. In two studies (total N = 1,311), participants evaluated the political relevance of and rank their preferences for mock television shows. I find that political identity strength indirectly affects selective exposure through individuals’ evaluations of entertainment media as politically relevant. I discuss the implications that these findings have for narrative persuasion and entertainment media as a vector for political polarization.
... The additional scrutiny that texts receive due to cognitive elaboration should alert users to whether the texts carry pro-or counter-attitudinal messages. This again positions user antecedents as potential predictors and moderators of PRM evaluations (Coles, 2020(Coles, , 2021a(Coles, , 2021bValkenburg & Peter, 2013). Media selection also depends on user motivations (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). ...
... Different user antecedents would also be implicated as drivers and/or moderators of PRM evaluations. For example, political interest may be related to selecting texts evaluated as more politically relevant for self-improvement motivations (i.e., informational utility) (Coles, 2021b), whereas political identity strength may be related to selecting more politically relevant attitude-consistent texts to fulfill self-consistency motivations (Coles, 2020(Coles, , 2021a. Thus, the form of future media selection depends on user antecedents and their motivations at the time of selection. ...
... As indicated above regarding propositions 7-9 and demonstrated in Coles (2020Coles ( , 2021aColes ( , 2021b, there are several ways that user antecedents, as dispositional variables, may act as moderators between PRM evaluations and their outcomes. Consistent with the DSMM's third proposition, I offer the final proposition of the DSMM: ...
Prior research acknowledges the potential implications of how media users evaluate media texts as being relevant to politics. Yet there are limitations to existing operationalizations of these evaluations due to how people use the words "politics" and "political." What first appears as a measurement issue instead reveals a deficiency in the conceptualization of the evaluation being measured, as well as that evaluation’s relationships with its antecedents and consequences. This article fuses work from disparate fields such as political theory, media studies, media effects, and political communication to offer a multidimensional conceptualization of evaluations of the political relevance of media texts. It introduces the Politically Relevant Media Model (PRMM) connecting these evaluations to their text and user characteristic antecedents, as well as their cognitive, affective, and behavioral outcomes. Implications for various phenomena such as agenda setting, learning, selective exposure, message processing, narrative persuasion, reinforcing media spirals, and political polarization are discussed.
Thanks to technological advances over the past two decades, media consumers now have an unprecedented number of content options. Along with an increase in news options has come an even greater expansion in the number of entertainment options available to media consumers. This is especially true when it comes to fictional entertainment television programming available via cable and services such as Netflix and Hulu. Much attention has been paid to how individuals’ political identities affect their selection of news. Although there is evidence that exposure to entertainment media is fractured along political lines, there remains an assumption that most viewers select entertainment media without any political considerations. The average individual consumes much more entertainment media than they consume news media. What if people’s political identities actually do influence what fictional entertainment media they choose? I contend that 1) individual-level differences such as political identity strength affect whether people evaluate media content as politically relevant, and 2) these evaluations affect whether people selectively expose themselves to fictional entertainment media. Rather than rely on researchers’ designations of media as politically relevant or not, I call for a viewer-centric approach to identifying politically relevant media. Any given media text may be of greater or lesser political relevance to any given media consumer. Unfortunately, asking viewers to identify what television shows are politically relevant isn’t a straightforward process due to the way people often use terms such as “political” and “politics.” To overcome limitations with existing approaches, this dissertation develops a new scale that I use to evaluate individuals’ perceptions of media as politically relevant. I propose a model predicting how the strength of a viewer’s political identities, together with a television show’s content, will affect the viewer’s evaluation of the show as politically relevant. In turn, the evaluation of the show as politically relevant will affect politically motivated selective exposure to that show. In Chapter 2, I develop the Politically Relevant Media (PRM) scale across two studies. In Chapter 3, I examine how attributes of media content and political identities affect evaluations of television programs as politically relevant, as indicated by PRM scale scores. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate the predictive and mediating abilities of the PRM scale. I find that political identity strength has a positive effect on evaluations of television programming as politically relevant, and such evaluations are associated with greater politically motivated selective exposure to fictional entertainment shows. This has implications for the study of politically motivated selective exposure more broadly, but particularly in the context of fictional entertainment media.
The reinforcing spirals model (RSM) describes the role of communication (mediated and interpersonal) in how socialization, attitudes, and social identities are formed, reinforced, and/or sustained in the face of competing perspectives. The RSM proposes that people tend to select communication sources and content that reinforces their beliefs and social identity, and in turn beliefs and behaviors can be reinforced by such communication selectivity. From this perspective, the role of mediated communication in particular can be viewed as an endogenous or mediating process. Under normal circumstances this reinforcement process is likely to have reached homeostasis, and not be readily detectable empirically. However, in times of identity formation/change (e.g., adolescence, immigration) and identity threat (e.g., social disruption, economic difficulty, life changes) the process should become dynamic and measurable. Other boundary factors impacting the process include how open or closed the communication norms are for a given individual or set of individuals in a given social identity group, as well as how open or closed communication systems are in the larger society. This entry also describes empirical findings supporting the RSM, reviews methodological issues in the study of reinforcing spirals as a dynamic model, and identifies future research directions.
If the individuals who are most likely to perceive media bias no longer encounter, via selective exposure, media content they might consider biased, why are perceptions of media bias so pervasive? We argue that many people who engage in politically motivated selective exposure also perceive “the media” in general to be biased. Relying on a survey of adults in the U.S. state of Wisconsin, which has witnessed particularly contentious and divisive political events since 2011, this study examines self-reported patterns of selective exposure to partisan media while accounting for the role of the local communication ecology in encouraging or discouraging partisan media selectivity. It also tests the idea that selective exposure is related to a generalized perception of media bias—the idea that “the media” in general are biased while self-selected media are not. Finally, the study tests a moderated mediation model showing the structure of relationships among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias. Results suggest (a) a positive relationship between political opinion extremity and selective exposure, (b) opposite patterns of relationships between selective exposure and perceived media bias about self-selected and general media, respectively, and (c) evidence of moderated mediation among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias.
The current work provides evidence for a psychological obstacle to the resolution of divisive social issues (e.g., affirmative action, drug legalization); specifically, people approach discussions of these issues with a threatened mind-set. Across three studies, it is shown that the prospect of discussing topics which divide social opinion is associated with threatened responding (the dissensus effect). Divisive discussion topics are associated with both a greater level of self-reported threat (Studies 1 and 3) and a greater tendency to perceive neutral faces as threatening (Study 2). Furthermore, the effect is shown to be robust across manipulations of social opinion (ratings of multiple social issues in Studies 1 and 2; fictional polling data in Study 3), and was not reducible to individual attitude extremity (Studies 1 and 3) or a valence effect (Study 2).
This article presents conceptual considerations on the classification of TV series and movies according to their political references and introduces an empirical approach for measuring the constituent features. We argue that political representations in fiction vary along two dimensions: political intensity and degree of realism. These dimensions encompass four indicators relating to characters, places, themes, and time. The indicators were coded for a sample of 98 TV series and 114 movies. Cluster analyses showed four clusters of TV series and six clusters of movies. Nonpolitical fiction, thrillers, and fantasy were central types in both TV series and movies. Movies, however, stand out through a greater diversity and a focus on the past that is reflected in three additional types. Based on the identification of different types of movies and TV series, three directions for theory building are suggested.
How do regular people define the term “political”? This original study gives Americans and Canadians an opportunity to express their interpretations of the concept. It identifies a great deal of inter-personal variation in terms of how many and what kinds of topics people perceive as the stuff of politics. And this variation comes in predictable patterns: the findings reveal correlations between socio-political attributes (such as gender, nationality and ideology) and the boundaries people draw around the political domain. The study also provides insight into the ways people distinguish the political from the non-political in their minds. And importantly, individuals’ interpretations of the term “politics” relate systematically to other measures of self-reported political behavior including political interest and frequency of political discussion. These results can be used to refine survey analysis and to broaden knowledge of day-to-day citizen politics.
The mechanisms underlying the formation and sustenance of social capital on the individual level were explored with a structural model composed of the endogenous variables of civic engagement and interpersonal trust. Using the 1995 DDB Needham life style study, analysis of the model permitted an examination of the strength and direction of the causal relationships driving the “virtuous circle” of participation and trust; the demographic, situational/contextual, orientational, and attitudinal factors that are exogenous to these latent variables; and the linkage between these components of social capital and viewing preferences for specific television genres. The results indicate that (1) the direction of the linkage between civic engagement and interpersonal trust is mainly from participating to trusting; and (2) television viewing plays a conditional role in the production of social capital that is dependent on the use of particular genres.
Scholars studying the content of televised entertainment programming have long argued for a relationship between exposure to sexist media representations of women and opinions concerning women's status in society, yet research has rarely examined prime-time television audiences and their sociopolitical opinions concerning women's rights. To explore these relationships, we engaged in a secondary analysis of the 1997, 1998, and 1999 DDB Life Style Studies. Using hierarchical regression, we found three forms of entertainment television use (traditional drama, progressive drama, and situation comedy) that retain statistically significant, unique relationships with opinions concerning women's rights, even after accounting for variables thought to shape patterns of media use and influence support for women's rights. Further, regression path analysis revealed that these three forms also mediate relationships between various demographic, situational, and orientational variables and the criterion variable.
Since its introduction the Need for Closure (NFC) Scale (Webster & Kruglanski 1994 revised by Roets & Van Hiel 2007) has been frequently used in psychological research However given the scale s substantial length researchers often used abridged idiosyncratic versions by selecting a number of items on seemingly arbitrary grounds without reporting or validating their item selection The present study aims to meet the apparent need for an empirically validated abridged NFC scale Based on data obtained from an aggregated heterogeneous sample (N = 1584) we propose a 15 item selection comprising three items from each facet scale Comparison of the full and reduced NFC scales revealed similar psychometric properties and correlations with third variables The brief NFC scale provides researchers with a useful tool for assessing the NFC construct when practical considerations prohibit the use of the original full 42 item scale or the 41-item revised version (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.
Although evaluating media as politically relevant should be consequential for outcomes related to political attitudes and persuasion, scant research takes a viewer-centric approach to exploring such evaluations. This study conceptualizes evaluations of the political relevance of media and introduces the Politically Relevant Media (PRM) scale, then examines how media characteristics, individual-level factors, and viewing behaviors are related to PRM evaluations. Across two experiments (total N = 649), participants evaluated news and fictional entertainment television program descriptions depicting either "explicitly" political objects (e.g., politicians) or "implicitly" political objects (e.g., social issues). Although fictional shows depicting "implicitly" political objects were evaluated as less "political" than other shows, participants evaluated these shows as more politically relevant using the PRM scale than fictional shows depicting "explicitly" political objects. Regarding behaviors, PRM evaluations positively predicted high political interest viewers' exposure to entertainment programs. Implications for selective exposure, message processing, persuasion, and political polarization are discussed.
It has been established that narrative entertainment messages have the power to produce persuasive outcomes in audiences, but the specific message components that influence audience responses are not well understood. The current study uses focus groups to explore audience interpretations of meaning, perceptions of persuasive intent, and perceptions of the source of a persuasive message in response to a satirical narrative with an environmental theme. The results indicated that audiences define persuasive intent much more narrowly than researchers. Audiences also inferred meaning based on which characters espoused certain messages, but struggled to form conceptions of the creators behind the show or discern an overall persuasive intent. Furthermore, humor acted both as a factor in enjoyment of the narrative and as a discounting cue.
Cambridge Core - Media, Mass Communication - Frenemies - by Jaime E. Settle
To what extent do partisan media sources shape public opinion? On its face, it would appear that the impact of partisan media is limited, given that it attracts a relatively small audience. We argue, however, that its influence may extend beyond its direct audience via a two-step communication flow. Specifically, those who watch and are impacted by partisan media outlets talk to and persuade others who did not watch. We present experimental results that demonstrate this process. We therefore show that previous studies may have significantly underestimated the effect of these outlets. We also illustrate that how the two-step communication flow works is contingent upon the precise composition of the discussion group (e.g., is it consistent of all fellow partisans or a mix of partisans?). We conclude by highlighting what our results imply about the study of media, preference formation, and partisan polarization.
A wide range of entertainment media content has been shown to influence some of our most important democratic outcomes. In addition, political communication scholarship is beginning to look at how certain entertainment-based media outlets function alongside more traditional political outlets (e.g., TV news, debates). In today's complex media environment, it is apparent that audience members do not experience entertainment media or news in complete isolation. There is hybridity across individuals, across genres, and across texts. Studying how various forms of political information work together, and how people make sense of them in tandem, is essential to understanding the broader role of media in politics. This chapter offers a plan of action designed to allow political communication researchers to engage in a theoretically grounded, systematic study of how entertainment media relates to, informs, and interacts with more traditional public affairs media within the context of politics.
Keywords:
entertainment;
politics;
narrative;
humor;
transportation;
satire;
cognition;
affect
This study investigated the effects of message and social cues on selective exposure to political information in a social media environment. Based on the heuristic-systematic model, we hypothesized that readers' selective consideration of specific cues can be explained by situational motivations. In an experiment (N = 137), subjects primed with motivational goals (accuracy, defense, or impression motivations, as well as a control group) were asked to search for information. Participants preferred attitude-consistent information and balanced information over attitude-inconsistent information, and also preferred highly recommended articles. Defense-motivated partisans exhibited a stronger confirmation bias, whereas impression motivation amplified the effects of social recommendations. These findings specify the conditions under which individuals engage in narrow, open-minded, or social patterns of information selection.
Particularly in the context of American television, hybridity has become the defining feature of contemporary broadcast journalism. Hybridity itself manifests on multiple levels – the textual, systemic, and discursive. Together, these three levels of hybridization challenge traditional conceptions of journalism while at the same time enabling the emergence of new forms of journalistic truth-telling. This essay explores three examples of ‘public affairs narratives’, long-form fictional dramas that sit, in different configurations, at the intersections of news and narrative. It concludes that in an age of complexifying distinctions between the factual and the fictive, hybrid public affairs narratives have the potential to play a valuable journalistic function, orienting audiences to critical, but often under-explored, socio-political realities.
Can ostensibly nonpolitical television programming affect policy opinions? In this article, I use a laboratory experiment to test whether the gender norms portrayed on two primetime sitcoms can alter political attitudes on gender issues, specifically access to abortion, and contraception. Though the shows in the experiment did not explicitly discuss any policy, I find that sitcoms can influence policy opinions, particularly when the show conveys a “boys will be boys” mentality toward sexual behavior. This finding has important implications for public opinion scholars because it suggests that there may not be such a thing as apolitical programming, and pop culture may have a profound, overlooked effect on public opinion.
While a growing body of literature examines exposure to social, news, and political information via social media, we have little understanding of how users delineate these categories. In this study, we develop over 100 discrete Facebook stimuli varying these topics, and then test to what extent and which users match our definition of those posts. Our results suggest that users and researchers often agree on defining social and political content, but are more likely to disagree in categorizing news content. Therefore, researchers should carefully define all concepts—especially news—when considering prevalence and effects on social media users.
The new edition of this influential work updates and expands the scope of the original, including more sustained analyses of individual films, from The Birth of a Nation to The Wolf of Wall Street . An interdisciplinary exploration of the relationship between American politics and popular films of all kindsincluding comedy, science fiction, melodrama, and action-adventure Projecting Politics offers original approaches to determining the political contours of films, and to connecting cinematic language to political messaging. A new chapter covering 2000 to 2013 updates the decade-by-decade look at the Washington-Hollywood nexus, with special areas of focus including the post-9/11 increase in political films, the rise of political war films, and films about the 2008 economic recession. The new edition also considers recent developments such as the Citizens United Supreme Court decision, the controversy sparked by the film Zero Dark Thirty, newer generation actor-activists, and the effects of shifting industrial financing structures on political content. A new chapter addresses the resurgence of the disaster-apocalyptic film genre with particular attention paid to its themes of political nostalgia and the turn to global settings and audiences. Updated and expanded chapters on nonfiction film and advocacy documentaries, the politics of race and African-American film, and women and gender in political films round out this expansive, timely new work. A companion website offers two additional appendices and further materials for those using the book in class.
Scholars have long noted the importance of the media in shaping citizens' attitudes about crime and justice. Most studies have focused on the impact of news and particularly local TV news, yet Americans spend far more time watching entertainment media. We examine the portrayal of police misconduct in crime dramas, and how exposure to these portrayals affects perceptions of the police. We find that viewers of crime dramas are more likely to believe the police are successful at lowering crime, use force only when necessary, and that misconduct does not typically lead to false confessions. In contrast, perceptions regarding the frequency of force are unaffected. Our results add to a growing literature demonstrating the importance of entertainment media for attitudes toward crime and the criminal justice system.
This study tests whether exposure to The Colbert Report influenced knowledge of super PACs and 501(c)(4) groups, and ascertains how having such knowledge influenced viewers' perceptions about the role of money in politics. Our analysis of a national random sample of adults interviewed after the 2012 presidential election found that viewing The Colbert Report both increased peoples' perception of how knowledgeable they were about super PACs and 501(c)(4) groups and increased actual knowledge of campaign finance regulation regarding these independent expenditure groups. Findings suggest that the political satirist was more successful in informing his viewers about super PACs and 501(c)(4) groups than were other types of news media. Viewing The Colbert Report also indirectly influenced how useful his audience perceived money to be in politics.
This study examines selective exposure to political information, arguing that attraction to proattitudinal information and aversion to counterattitudinal information are distinct phenomena, and that the tendency to engage in these behaviors varies by partisanship. Data collected in a strict online experiment support these predictions. Republicans are significantly more likely to engage in selective avoidance of predominantly counterattitudinal information than those with other partisan affiliations, while non-Republicans are significantly more likely to select a story that includes proattitudinal information, regardless of its counterattitudinal content. Individuals across the political spectrum are receptive to predominantly proattitudinal content and to content that offers a mix of views, but the form these preferences take varies by partisanship. The political significance of these findings is discussed.
Winner of the 2008 W J M Mackenzie Book Prize Politics was once a term with an array of broadly positive connotations, associated with public scrutiny, deliberation and accountability. Yet today it is an increasingly dirty word, typically synonymous with duplicity, corruption, inefficiency and undue interference in matters both public and private. How has this come to pass? Why do we hate politics and politicians so much? How pervasive is the contemporary condition of political disaffection? And what is politics anyway? In this lively and original work, Colin Hay provides a series of innovative and provocative answers to these questions. He begins by tracing the origins and development of the current climate of political disenchantment across a broad range of established democracies. Far from revealing a rising tide of apathy, however, he shows that a significant proportion of those who have withdrawn from formal politics are engaged in other modes of political activity. He goes on to develop and defend a broad and inclusive conception of politics and the political that is far less formal, less state–centric and less narrowly governmental than in most conventional accounts. By demonstrating how our expectations of politics and the political realities we witness are shaped decisively by the assumptions about human nature that we project onto political actors, Hay provides a powerful and highly distinctive account of contemporary political disenchantment. Why We Hate Politics will be essential reading for all those troubled by the contemporary political condition of the established democracies.
General questions concerning the role of entertainment media in politics permeated the 2004 election cycle. Political communication scholars are beginning to systematically analyze potential sociopolitical ramifications stemming from entertainment television viewing, but one difficulty with this emerging area of research is an inability to forge connections between seemingly disparate research agendas. Several distinct lines of research are summarized in this article and forged into a coherent whole through the lens of Zillmann's disposition theory and the broader study of media enjoyment. Extantworks devoted to the study of entertainment television and politics are summarized, and a ninepart typology is introduced. This article closes with a discussion of howthe typology can serve to advance the study of entertainment television and politics.
This paper examines the effects of exposure to late-night comedy programming on trait ratings of the candidates in the 2000 Presidential election and the moderating effects of political knowledge and partisan- ship. The study includes a content analysis of late-night jokes, an analysis of the predictors of late-night exposure, and several tests of the relationship between late-night exposure and candidate trait ratings. Results did not reveal direct effects of late-night exposure on subjects' ratings of the candidates' caricatured traits, though findings did suggest differential effects of exposure to late-night as a function of the partisanship and political knowledge of the viewer.
This article takes up Bennett and Iyengar's (2008) call for debate about the future of political communication effects research. We outline 4 key criticisms. First, Bennett and Iyengar are too quick to dismiss the importance of attitude reinforcement, long recognized as an important type of political media influence. Second, the authors take too narrow a view of the sources of political information, remaining fixated on news. Third, they offer an incomplete portrayal of selective exposure, exaggerating the extent to which individuals avoid attitude-discrepant information. Finally, they lean toward determinism when describing the role technologies play in shaping our political environment. In addition, we challenge Bennett and Iyengar's assertion that only brand new theory can serve to help researchers understand today's political communication landscape. We argue that existing tools, notably the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), retain much utility for examining political media effects. Contrary to Bennett and Iyengar's claims, the ELM suggests that the contemporary political information environment does not necessarily lead to minimal effects.
The impact of entertainment—education messages on beliefs, attitudes, and behavior is typically explained in terms of social cognitive theory principles. However, important additional insights regarding reasons why entertainment—education messages have effects can be derived from the processing of persuasive content in narrative messages. Elaboration likelihood approaches suggest that absorption in a narrative, and response to characters in a narrative, should enhance persuasive effects and suppress counterarguing if the implicit persuasive content is counterattitudinal. Also, persuasion mediators and moderators such as topic involvement should be reduced in importance. Evidence in support of these propositions are reviewed in this article. Research needed to extend application of these findings to entertainment—education contexts, to further develop theory in the area of persuasion and narrative, and to better account for other persuasive effects of entertainment narrative, such as those hypothesized in cultivation theory, are discussed.
In this experiment, we examine effects of television dramas on support for controversial public policies (gay marriage and the death penalty) and explore mechanisms that may explain such effects. The dramas influenced support for death penalty but not gay marriage. As predicted, exposure to the relevant drama eliminated the relationship between prior ideology (conceptualized as a continuous variable) and death penalty support. Moreover, the valence of the relationship between prior (increasingly liberal) ideology and salience of a relevant value (perceived importance of a safe and crime-free society) went from negative in the comparison condition to positive after exposure to the relevant drama. These and other results suggest that a television narrative can influence policy support by reframing the dramatic situation to reduce the effect of prior ideology and values and by minimizing processing of the story as intentionally persuasive discourse.
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