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International Journal of Environmental Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/genv20
The destruction of the Kakhovka dam and the
future of the Kakhovske reservoir
Viktor Vyshnevskyi & Serhii Shevchuk
To cite this article: Viktor Vyshnevskyi & Serhii Shevchuk (2024) The destruction of
the Kakhovka dam and the future of the Kakhovske reservoir, International Journal of
Environmental Studies, 81:1, 275-288, DOI: 10.1080/00207233.2024.2320033
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2024.2320033
Published online: 23 Feb 2024.
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The destruction of the Kakhovka dam and the future of the
Kakhovske reservoir
Viktor Vyshnevskyi
a
and Serhii Shevchuk
b
a
Faculty of International Relations, National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine;
b
Department of Hydrology,
Central Geophysical Observatory, Kyiv, Ukraine
ABSTRACT
The destruction of the Kakhovka dam that held back the Kakhovske
reservoir terminated the operation of irrigation canals, industrial
and drinking water supplies across southern Ukraine. We consider
the consequences of the emptying of the reservoir, and its future;
and argue that it should be restored with minor changes. Taking
account of the adjustments of water abstraction and the changes of
water regime caused by climate change, the normal retention level
and the forced level of the reservoir can be lowered. Some improve-
ments are needed to the hydropower plant.
KEYWORDS
Kakhovka dam; reservoir;
irrigation; water supply
Introduction
Until 6 June 2023, the Kakhovka hydropower plant and the Kakhovske reservoir were
primary energy and water management facilities in the south of Ukraine. The reservoir
supplied water for irrigation, industrial and domestic use, as well as shipping, fishing and
recreation [1–3]. It fed three big canals: the Dnipro-Kryvyi Rih, North Crimean and the
Main Kakhovskyi Magistral, as well as the North Rohachytska irrigation system on the
left bank of the reservoir; and it supplied the Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant and
Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant – at 6 million kW, the most powerful in Europe
(Figure 1).
On the night of 6 June 2023, the Kakhovka hydropower plant and the spillway dam,
which were under the control of the Russian army, were destroyed. The deluge flooded
four cities and scores of villages in the lower reaches of the Dnipro River with dreadful
loss of life and destruction of homes, industries and infrastructure. Bacteriological and
chemical pollution has been recorded in both the lower reaches of the Dnipro River and
the north-western part of the Black Sea [4,5].
Over the course of the following weeks, the reservoir – the largest by volume on
the Dnipro River – emptied, terminating supply to irrigation canals, industrial and
domestic needs, as well as shipping on the reservoir; an eerie echo of the August 1941
destruction of the spillway of Dnipro hydropower plant near Zaporizhzhya by the
retreating Red Army to delay advancing German forces [1,6,7]. Many dams and weirs
have been casualties of the Russia-Ukraine war but the Kakhovka dam is the biggest
CONTACT Serhii Shevchuk sergey_shevchuk_@ukr.net Department of Hydrology, Central Geophysical
Observatory, 39 Nauky Avenue, building 2, Kyiv 03028, Ukraine
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
2024, VOL. 81, NO. 1, 275–288
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2024.2320033
© 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Published online 23 Feb 2024
[1,4,5,8]; its destruction has left hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians without water
and livelihoods. This demands attention to the future of the Kakhovske reservoir.
Materials and methods
The main sources of data are hydrometeorological observations, remote sensing data,
and published scientific papers. Satellite images taken by Landsat and Sentinel satellites
were downloaded from https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov and https://scihub.copernicus.eu.
Results
Project parameters of the Kakhovka dam, hydropower plant and reservoir
The Kakhovka complex was designed shortly after the end of the World War II as the last
of a cascade of structures on the Dnipro River. It is located 64 km upstream of Kherson
city and 92 km upstream of the mouth of the Dnipro River.
Initially, the mean natural flow of the Dnipro River at its mouth was 53 km
3
per
year. In recent years, abstraction from the river and increased evaporation from
numerous ponds and reservoirs in the river basin have reduced mean river flow by
more than 10 km
3
; the mean water discharge at the Kakhovka hydropower plant in
the period 1956–2020 was 1290 m
3
/s, or 40.7 km
3
/year [9].
The Kakhovka complex consisted of four parts (Figure 2): the left-bank and the right-bank
ground dam with a total length of 3.8 km, a 447 m concrete spillway dam with a maximum
height of 29 m and with 28 spillways, a generator room with six turbines, and a 18 m-wide
shipping lock [1]. The designed throughput capacity of the dam was 21 400 m
3
/s; the
hydropower plant had a throughput capacity of 2600 m
3
/s with a power capacity of
312,000 kW, later increased to 335,000 kW.
Figure 1. Location: 1, Kakhovka reservoir; 2, Dnipro River; 3, Dnipro–Kryvyi Rih Canal; 4, North Crimean
Canal; 5, Main Kakhovskyi Magistral Canal; 6, Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.
276 V. VYSHNEVSKYI AND S. SHEVCHUK
Filling of the reservoir began in July 1955 and was complete in the spring of 1958.
With a normal retention level of 16.0 m above sea level (asl), its area was 2155 km
2
with
a storage volume of 18.2 km
3
; with a maximum retention level of 18.0 m asl, its area was
2 222 km
2
with a storage volume of 22.6 km
3
; with the dead storage level of 12.7 m asl
(at which water abstraction was restricted) the area was 1917 km
2
and the remaining
reservoir storage was 11.4 km
3
[1].
To prevent flooding of adjacent settlements, dykes were built to protect the cities of
Nikopol and Marganets on the right bank and Kamianka-Dniprovska on the left bank.
The water of the Bazavluk River, a right-bank tributary, was pumped into the reservoir.
Creation of the reservoir caused various environmental problems including bank
erosion, an increase of groundwater level in the surrounding area, and occasional algal
blooms. The water quality has been problematic and the dam cut off the passage of once-
prolific sturgeon; their numbers were fast decreasing and all sturgeon species are now
listed in the Red Book of Ukraine [1,2,10,11].
Use of the reservoir
During the construction of the hydropower plant, the construction of the North Crimean
Canal began. In 1958 its initial section was ready and in 1963 the canal crossed the
Perekop Isthmus connecting the Crimea peninsula. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
canal abstracted up to 300 m
3
/s of water, and the annual volume reached 3.5 km
3
. This
water reached Dzhankoi town by gravity, thence by four pumping stations supplying
Kerch in the furthest corner of the peninsula. The main use was for irrigation, especially
growing rice in the south of the Kherson region and the north of Crimea; indeed, a
branch of the North Crimean Canal was called the Rozdolnenskyi Rice Canal [1,3].
Figure 2. Satellite image of the Kakhovka complex before its destruction: 1, Kakhovske reservoir; 2 left-
bank and the right-bank ground dam; 3, concrete spillway dam; 4, generator room; 5, shipping lock; 6
intake of the North Crimean Canal. (Source: Google Earth, 20 October 2020).
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 277
At the same time, the Dnipro-Kryvyi Rih Canal was built, initially with a capacity of
26 m
3
/s but soon increased to 41 m
3
/s, leading to the Pivdenne reservoir on the south-
eastern outskirts of Kryvyi Rih and a branch serves the Kryvorizka coal-fired power
station – one of the biggest in the country.
In the 1970s, the Main Kakhovskyi Magistral Canal was built to carry more than 1
km
3
/year of irrigation water from the Kakhovske reservoir to the east and the south of
Kherson region. Subsequently, the North-Rohachytska irrigation system in the
Zaporizhzhya region and several others were built and water supplied to the
Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant and Zaporizhzhya nuclear power-plant near
Enerhodar.
The last thirty years have seen shrinkage of irrigated areas and adoption of
water-saving technology, leading to a significant decrease in water abstraction. On
the eve of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2012–13, the North Crimean Canal took 1.8
km
3
, of which 1.0 km
3
entered Crimea. This supply stopped when Russia annexed
Crimea in 2014. In 2020–21, before the recent Russian invasion, the water intake
of the North Crimean Canal was about 0.6 km
3
. At the same time, the water
intake of the Main Kakhovskyi Magistral Canal was somewhat greater: in 2020 it
was about 0.99 km
3
; in 2021, 0.63 km
3
, as a result of heavy rain at the start of
irrigation season. That year, the decrease in abstraction was also observed in the
North Crimean Canal but was less noticeable due to the cultivation of rice
(Figure 3).
In 2020–21, the area of land that could be irrigated using the North Crimean
Canal was about 50,000 ha, compared to 240,000 ha, using the Main Kakhovskyi
Magistral Canal. In addition, there were smaller irrigation systems in the
Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya regions bringing the total irrigable area supplied
by the Kakhovske reservoir to about 350,000 ha. In fact, only 234,000 ha was irrigated
in 2021.
Figure 3. Water abstraction by the North Crimean Canal (1) and the Main Kakhovskyi Magistral Canal (2).
278 V. VYSHNEVSKYI AND S. SHEVCHUK
Water regime of the kakhovske reservoir before and after the Russian invasion
During the period of observation (1966–2021), the mean level of the Kakhovske reservoir
at Nikopol station was 15.67 m. The maximum (16.46 m) was registered on 26-28
November 1993 and the minimum (14.18 m) was recorded on 4 April 1968 [9].
Everything changed with the all-out Russian invasion. On 11 November 2022, Russian
troops destroyed part of the roadway across the dam and three sections of spillway near
the right bank to prevent Ukrainian forces from crossing the river (Figure 4).
This damage resulted in a fall of the water level in the reservoir and, by the end of
February 2023, the water level had dropped more than 2 m and the shoreline retreated in
some places by more than 100 m. Water levels in the reservoir began to rise again when
unusually heavy spring rains and snowmelt increased Dnipro River flows. On 19 April
2023, the largest discharge at the Dnipro hydropower plant near Zaporizhzhya reached 6
490 m
3
/s and the water level measured at Nikopol gauging station reached 17.13 m asl by
early May, which is the highest recorded [9]. On the day of the sabotage, 6 June 2023, the
Kakhovka dam and hydropower plant were under the control of Russian forces. The
water level at Nikopol station was 16.76 m asl and the total reservoir volume at this level
was 19.8 km
3
[12].
Water balance of the Kakhovske reservoir
The Hydrometeorological Service of Ukraine calculates the water balance of all 6
reservoirs of the Dnipro Cascade annually. Their data [9], show that in 2011–20 the
mean annual drainage from the Dnipro reservoir, located upstream of the Kakhovske,
Figure 4. Satellite image of the damaged spillway of the Kakhovka dam before its destruction https://
twitter.com/planet/status/1666116252090388480/photo/1.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 279
was 34.15 km
3
.
1
The volume of water pumped from protected areas near the Kakhovske
reservoir was 114 mln m
3
, the calculated runoff to the reservoir was 106 mln m
3
,
precipitation on the water surface was 901 mln m
3
, the volume of water discharged
after the operation of the two power plants at Zaporizhzhya was 706 mln m
3
, the water
discharged from other industrial plants was 344 mln m
3
. Finally, the total water volume
arriving in the reservoir was 36.32 km
3
. The outgoing components of the water balance
were: the mean annual discharge of the Kakhovka hydropower plant, 30.68 km
3
; dis-
charge over the spillway, 708 mln m
3
; discharge through the shipping lock, 150 mln m
3
;
seepage through the dam, 127 mln m
3
; evaporation, 1 924 mln m
3
; abstraction for
irrigation, 1 949 mln m
3
; abstraction for the two Zaporizhzhya power plants, 813 mln
m
3
; abstraction for other industrial plants, 268 mln m
3
; seepage through the banks of the
reservoir 847 mln m
3
. Finally, the total water volume taken from the reservoir was 37.46
km
3
. The error of the water balance calculation is about 1.1 km
3
or 3%.
From these data, we calculate an excess of evaporation from the reservoir area over
precipitation of about 1.0 km
3
. There is also substantial water consumption by the
Zaporizhzhya power stations − 107 mln m
3
annually or 3.4 m
3
/s.
Destruction of the dam and its immediate consequences
The explosion between 2.30 am and 3 am on 6 June 2023, caused a deluge of water from
the reservoir that washed away of much of the dam (Figure 5).
The water level downstream rose rapidly. At 4:00 am on June 6th, the water level at
Kherson hydrological station was 0.31 m asl. Four hours later, it reached 1.60 m asl; by
8:00 am the following day it had risen to 5.29 m. The flood peaked at 5.68 m, on 8 June
2023 at 3:00, an increase of 5.37 m (Figure 6).
Figure 5. Destruction of the Kakhovka dam: on the left, soon after the explosion; on the right, on 7
June 2023. https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-dam-collapse-before-after-photos-
b504eb2ce21e2c30cbcf902fbd718b71.
280 V. VYSHNEVSKYI AND S. SHEVCHUK
The deluge flooded extensive areas downstream: parts of Nova Kakhovka, Oleshky
and Hola Prystan on the left bank of the Dnipro River; Kherson on the right bank, and
dozens of villages along the river; most immediately Nova Kakhovka city and the village
of Kozatske, both less than 2 km downstream of the dam. In these places, the water level
rose within minutes of the explosion – in the middle of the night. Most of the residential
buildings in the center of Nova Kakhovka lie at an elevation 11.5–12.0 m asl. Video
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9hp3Z_OKKw) shows that this area, in particular
the square in front of the Palace of Culture, was flooded to a depth of about 1 m, so we
estimate that the water level in Nova Kakhovka city reached 12.5 m asl. (Figure 7).
As can be seen in Figure 7, water levels rose along both the lower reaches of the Dnipro
River and in its right-bank tributary, the Inhulets River, flooding villages on the banks.
The gradient of the lower reaches of the Dnipro River is slight; likewise, the water level of
the tailwater of the Kakhovka hydropower plant. With a mean long-term discharge of 1
490 m
3
/s, the water level in the tailrace of the hydropower plant is 0.20 m asl. There are
no data on the water level at this point at the time of the explosion but we can make an
estimate on the basis of discharge data from the Dnipro hydropower plant. Water
discharge at the Dnipro plant on June 4 was 1 660 m
3
/s and on June 5 it was 1 750 m
3
/
s. Under the same discharge of the Kakhovka hydropower plant, the water level in its
tailrace is about 0.35 m asl. This means that the total increase of the water level in Nova
Kakhovka city exceeded 12 m, double the increase recorded downstream in Kherson city.
As can be seen on Figure 6, the water level in Kherson city returned to normal after
June 20.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, some 50 people were killed
or missing on the right bank of the Dnipro River. No information is available on human
toll on the left bank but, taking account the location of settlements on the left bank, the
number of victims is surely much greater.
The water level measured at the Nikopol monitoring station on 6 June, before the
sabotage, was 16.76 m asl. It decreased to 16.13 m asl by 8:00 am that day; by 8:00 am the
following day, it fell to 14.48 m asl; by 8:00 pm 11 June 2023, it decreased to 9.04 m asl by
Figure 6. Water levels at Kherson (dotted line) and Nikopol (solid line) hydrological stations between
5–20 June 2023.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 281
which time most of the reservoir volume was lost and the station at Nikopol was no
longer able to record. At the end of summer 2023, the water level near Nikopol city was
about 6 m asl, close to the natural value. At the same time, a significant decrease in the
water level was observed in the upper part of the reservoir in the city of Zaporizhzhya. On
the eve of the incident, the water level in the tailrace of the Dnipro hydropower plant was
Figure 7. Satellite images of the lower reaches of the Dnipro River taken by landsat 9: a – on 1 June
2023, b – on 9 June 2023.
282 V. VYSHNEVSKYI AND S. SHEVCHUK
17.05 m asl; on June 10, it dropped to 14.42 m asl; on June 15, to 13.40 m asl; on 20 June,
the water level was about 12.60 m asl – a decrease of more than 4.5 m which is beyond the
design-conditions of the operation of the turbines so, their vibration increased and their
power decreased.
By the end of June 2023, the Kakhovske reservoir – the biggest on the Dnipro River –
practically disappeared leaving the network of branches of the river over the area of the
former reservoir (Figure 8).
Medium-term consequences of destruction of the Kakhovka dam and emptying
the Kakhovske reservoir
Water supply to the main consumers, primarily the cities of Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol, has
been stopped. Drilling of wells increased and a decrease in the level of groundwater was
soon observed; water had to be carried to many villages by road tanker. Construction of a
new water supply system from the Karachunivske reservoir on the Inhulets River on the
western outskirts of Kryvyi Rih to the Pivdenne reservoir was designed and begun
quickly; followed by construction of a new water pipeline from there to Nikopol.
All the irrigation canals which took water from the Kakhovske reservoir have ceased
operation. In turn, the irrigated area has shrunk to less than a tenth of its former extent
(Figure 9).
Gradually, vegetation has colonised the floor of the former reservoir, first in the
shallows of its north-eastern part (Figure 10).
The problem with the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant
At the time of writing, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was under Russian
control. Its water supply depended on water intake from the Kakhovske reservoir.
Figure 8. The Kakhovske reservoir taken by the sentinel 2 satellite on 30 June 2023. Source: https://
scihub.copernicus.eu/dhus/#/home.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 283
First, the abstracted water was used for the needs of the Zaporizhzhya coal-fired
power station and, then, carried on to the nuclear power plant. The cooling
system of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear plant had three components: a cooling
pond, two cooling towers and several basins with fountains. The cooling pond,
which has the area 8.2 km
2
was formed by separation of part of the Kakhovske
reservoir [1].
The emptying of the Kakhovske reservoir isolated the cooling pond and its water
level slowly subsided through evaporation and seepage of water through the dyke;
there now being a 10 m difference between the pond level and the adjacent branch of
the river. The satellite images (Figure 11) reveal many places where seepage is taking
place.
Figure 9. Images from the sentinel 2a satellite showing the decrease of irrigated lands near the
Kakhovske reservoir: left – on 2 August 2021, right – on 7 August 2023.
Figure 10. Grassy vegetation in the north-eastern part of the Kakhovske reservoir on the image taken
by landsat 9 satellite on 30 August 2023.
284 V. VYSHNEVSKYI AND S. SHEVCHUK
What to do about it?
Back to nature
Some environmentalists contend that there is no need to restore the reservoir. If left
alone, water quality can be expected to improve and there is hope for a recovery of
the sturgeon. The greenies also argue that it is possible to pump essential potable
water supplies directly from the river. But this proposal means that irrigation will be
restricted; the same can be said of industrial and drinking water supply to a large
area. The productivity of agriculture will not recover and many livelihoods will not be
reinstated.
The issue of climate change
Figure 12 illustrates the recent trends of temperature and precipitation at Askania-Nova
station in the middle of Kherson region, in the area served by the Main Kakhovskyi
Magistral Canal. Over the last 75 years, air temperatures have increased here by 2.0–2.5°C
whereas precipitation has fluctuated around the mean of about 400 mm.
In fact, the climate in this region has become dryer – see, also [9,13–16] – and, in these
pages, Mulvey et al. [17] have argued that the loss of irrigation will prompt an absolute
decrease in rainfall.
Arguments for the restoration
Sooner or later, the war will end and, we believe, the occupied lands will return.
Accordingly, the people on this land will need the water that is now lost to the Black
Figure 11. Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and its cooling pond taken by Sentinel 2a satellite, 5 July
2023 (Earthcache/SkyWatch 6 July 2023).
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 285
Sea and restoration of the water supply to Crimea will be an impetus for the economy and
society of the peninsula.
The easiest way to provide this water is to restore the destroyed dam. The primary and
most urgent task is to build a temporary structure a little way above the destroyed one.
First of all, this dam should ensure an increase of the water level to the so-called dead
volume level, which is equal to 12.7 m. At this level, the volume of the Kakhovske
reservoir is 11.4 km
3
, or a quarter of the annual flow of the Dnipro River at the mouth.
This volume can be accumulated in the reservoir in just one year or year and a half. This
level, or a little higher, will allow the North Crimean, Main Kakhovskyi Magistral and
other canals to operate. Both Zaporizhzhya power stations and Kryvorizka power station,
as well as a number of other facilities will also be able to operate at this level. The total
capacity of these power stations is more than 8 million kW. The final stage should be the
restoration of the Kakhovka hydropower plant itself, the capacity of which can be
400,0000-500,000 kW.
Probably, the new reservoir should be smaller than it was. As already mentioned, less
water is taken from it than several decades ago so the normal retention level can be
reduced from the former 16.0 m to, say, 15.5 m asl, which is close to the value observed in
last decade. In 2012–2021 it was 15.58 m asl. This decrease will somewhat reduce the
height of water at the new hydropower plant but the lesser height will facilitate the
exploitation of protected areas near the banks of the reservoir.
It is arguable that progressive climate drying will reduce the spring floods, in which
case, there is an opportunity to lower the maximum retention level of the reservoir from
18 m to approximately 17 m asl, which would release 30–40 km
2
for economic and
environmental needs. Probably, the maximum retention level can be reduced to 16.5 m
asl. Even such level was not registered before the war.
When restoring the reservoir, it is desirable to clean it beforehand and to deepen some
sections. Moreover, the available time can be used for archaeological and other
researches.
When restoring the Kakhovka hydropower plant, it would be desirable to increase the
number of turbines. The original six turbines allowed a flow rate of only 2600 m
3
/s
compared with the 4950 m
3
/s capacity of the Dnipro plant upstream. Quite often, only 5
units could work at the Kakhovka hydropower plant, often operating off-peak when the
value of electricity was reduced; whereas the limited capacity of the plant made it
Figure 12. The long-term changes of the air temperature (a) and precipitation (b) at the meteor-
ological station Askania-Nova.
286 V. VYSHNEVSKYI AND S. SHEVCHUK
necessary to release water through the spillway dam without any economic benefit. This
means that more turbines need to be installed at the restored hydropower plant – at least
8 or 9. Of course, when restoring the Kakhovka complex, it would be good to construct a
fish pass, lacking in the old dam.
Finally, we should consider the climate changes that are already affecting living and
agriculture conditions across the south of Ukraine. Without enough water, the conditions
of life and agriculture will be much harder than some decades ago. The same argument for
restoring the reservoir is expressed by Starodubtsev & Ladyka and by Mulvey et al. [16,17].
Considering the question of future of the Kakhovske reservoir, one should also consider
Ukraine’s contribution to world food security of the world [18–20] which also argues for
the reservoir’s restoration.
Conclusions
The destruction of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023 caused dreadful loss of life and has
been widely described as ecocide. The loss of water from the Kakhovske reservoir
terminated irrigation over large areas of southern Ukraine; water supply has been cut
off in several cities, including Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol; water supply to Zaporizhzhya
nuclear power plant and two big coal-fired power stations became much more difficult.
Restoration of the Kakhovske reservoir will restore drinking and industrial water supply,
the possibility to irrigate a large area of land, and re-supply of Crimea will be the impetus
for its economic and social rejuvenation.
Note
1. One cubic km = 1,000,000,000 cubic metres
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Viktor Vyshnevskyi http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2900-1598
Serhii Shevchuk http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5844-4980
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